04 July 2014

Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese and Outside Perspectives

Wow! Just finished reading all 512 pages. A veritable cornucopia of China military sources–excellent compendium of key speeches and data points.

Anthony H. Cordesman, Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese and Outside Perspectives (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 July 2014).

The Burke Chair at CSIS has developed a new analysis of the trends in Chinese military strategy and forces entitled Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese and Outside Perspectives. This report provides a comprehensive update of previous Burke Chair studies and is available on the CSIS web site at http://csis.org/files/publication/140702_Chinese_MilBal.pdf.

The goal behind this report is not to present the authors’ view of the balance, but rather to provide the basis for an unclassified dialogue on the military developments in China, including the size and structure of the country’s current and planned military forces. It draws on official US, Chinese, and other Asian official reporting, as well as the work of other scholars and the data bases developed by the IISS and Jane’s in an effort to compare different views of Chinese strategy and military developments, and is meant to provide US, Chinese, and other analysts with a better basis for understanding Western estimates of the changes in Chinese force strength and force quality.

The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) face a critical need to improve their understanding of how each is developing its military power and how to avoid forms of military competition that could lead to rising tension or conflict between the two states. This report focuses on China’s military developments and modernization and how they are perceived in the UIS, the West, and Asia. It utilizes the unclassified data available in the West on the trends in Chinese military forces. It relies heavily on the data in the US Department of Defense (DoD)Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, particularly the 2013 and 2014 editions.

It relies heavily on the annual military balances compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), though a range of sources are included. It should be noted that this report focuses on Chinese forces, and therefore presents only one side of the US and Chinese balance and the security situation in Asia. It also draws upon a Burke Chair report entitled The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, looking at the bilateral US-Chinese balance in more detail.

Accordingly, it focuses on the actual changes taking place in Chinese forces, and it provides a detailed analysis detailed analysis of the trends in Chinese military forces since 1985, examining how the often-conflicting trends in outside sources interact with reporting on Chinese military spending and strategy. It also shows that important changes are taking place in US strategy and that these changes must be considered when evaluating Chinese actions.

The study makes it clear that US, other Asian, and other Western sources and analyses of Chinese military developments are not an adequate basis for US and Chinese dialogue without Chinese review, commentary, or more Chinese transparency in providing data on Chinese strategy, military forces, and military spending. There is a critical need for focused military dialogue and for joint US and Chinese efforts to develop common data and perceptions on US and Chinese military strategy and net assessments of the overall trends in military balance and strategic situation in the Pacific region.

Moreover, this report shows that focusing on strategy and concepts in broad terms is no substitute for a detailed examination of specific changes in force strength, the extent to which concepts and strategy are actually being implemented, and how the shifts in US and Chinese forces actually compare.

The report examines a range of data regarding Chinese capabilities and force modernization, focusing on the most reliable sources. Using these sources, it analyzes the full range of China’s military capabilities as well as trends in their growth and composition. The data indicate that the PRC has engaged in a continuing military modernization program that is expanding the capabilities available to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Although the PLA has consistently reduced its Personnel since the 1980s, reductions in obsolete equipment and the procurement and deployment of modern systems in its land, air, naval, and missile forces have led to increases in the PLA’s overall military effectiveness, especially in the context of its “Local War under Conditions of Informatization” military doctrine.

Data alone, however, cannot provide a full narrative: this report places the observable data within the context of contemporary Chinese military thought and doctrine. Seen within the context of Chinese military doctrine, the modernization efforts in the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force have enabled changes in operations and tactics as well as in force structure and weapon systems: these changes, in turn, have expanded PLA military capabilities and placed China on the road to becoming a modern military power.

The report contains numerous maps, figures, and tables. Its contents are shown below:

INTRODUCTION
THE NEED FOR FOCUSED MILITARY DIALOGUE
THE TRENDS IN CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION
SETTING THE STAGE: AMERICA’S DEVELOPING STRATEGY IN ASIA
US Forces in the Pacific
Changes in US Strategy and Rebalancing to Asia
The New US Strategic Guidance in 2012
Secretary Hagel’s Summary in April 2014
An Uncertain Rebalancing and Not a “Pivot”
STRATEGY, REBALANCING, AND REALITY
The 2012 Strategic Guidance
Growing Strategic and Resources Uncertainties
The 2013 US Report on Chinese Military Power and the 2014 QDR
Secretary Hagel’s Statements in April 2014
President Obama’s New Statements on Strategy: The West Point Speech
The 2014 PACOM Posture Statement
THE BROADER PACIFIC FRAMEWORK: THE 2014 SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE

CHAPTER 1: ASSESSING CHINA’S ARMED FORCES
Figure 1.1: China white papers, issued biennially: Total Personnel
Figure 1.2: China the Center for Strategic and International Studies
Figure 1.3: China the Center for Strategic and International Studies
Figure 1.4: China the Center for Strategic and International Studies
CHINA’S DEFENSE WHITE PAPERS
US DEFENSE WHITE PAPERS ON CHINA’S STRATEGY AND FORCES
Figure 1.5: East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zones
THE STRATEGIC FORCES DRIVING CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION
CHINA’S DECLARED STRATEGIC GOALS
“DEFENSIVE” FORCE MODERNIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION VERSUS   “OFFENSIVE” FORCE MODERNIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION
CHINESE VIEW OF THE US ‘REBALANCE’
REGIONAL VIEWS OF THE US ‘REBALANCE’
THE GROWING CHINESE-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

CHAPTER 2: UNDERLYING RESOURCES FOR CHINA’S SECURITY CAPABILITIES

IS BECOMING AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER A PRELUDE TO BECOMING A MILITARY   SUPERPOWER?
Figure 2.1: IMF Estimate of Comparative Rise in China’s GDP (nominal) – Part I
(Billions $USD in Current Dollars/Prices)
Figure 2.1: IMF Estimate of Comparative Rise in China’s GDP (nominal)- Part II
(Billions $USD in Current Dollars/Prices)
Figure 2.2: China’s Rise in Per Capita GDP – Part I
(Current $USD)
Figure 2.2: China’s Rise in Per Capita GDP – Part II
(Current $USD)    70
Figure 2.3: China’s GDP Growth – Part I
(Percent Change in Constant Prices)
Figure 2.3: China’s GDP Growth – Part II
(Percent Change in Constant Prices)
Figure 2.4: China’s Rise in GDP (PPP) – Part I
(Billion of Current International Dollars)
Figure 2.4: China’s Rise in GDP (PPP) – Part II
(Billions of Current International Dollars)
Figure 2.5: China & USA Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP
ECONOMIC TRENDS SHAPING MILITARY SPENDING
Positive Trends
Economic Uncertainties
Figure 2.6: July 2013 IMF Assessment of China’s Demographic Changes
Figure 2.7: July 2013 IMF Assessment of China
Figure 2.8: July 2013 IMF Assessment of China’s Financial Sector
Figure 2.9: July 2013 IMF Assessment of China’s Economic Growth and Inequality
Figure 2.10: Different Estimates of Chinese GDP Growth Rates (Market Prices): 2000-2018
Figure 2.11: China’s GDP (PPP) (Billions of Current International Dollars)
Chinese Economic Growth Relative to Increases in Military Spending
Figure 2.12: Comparing Percentage of GDP spent on Military Expenditures – Part I
Figure 2.12: Comparing Percentage of GDP spent on Military Expenditures – Part II
Figure 2.13: Chinese GDP Growth and Defense Spending
ECONOMIC FACTORS THAT MAY IMPACT CHINA’S MILITARY SPENDING, STRATEGY  AND MODERNIZATION
Figure 2.4: Estimates of Chinese Inflation Rates (CPI % increase)
FDI and Current Account Balance
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
SOCIETAL TRENDS AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION
Figure 2.15: Chinese Population Projection (in millions)
Figure 2.16: Chinese Population Growth Indicators
Figure 2.17: Chinese Births vs. Deaths over Time
Figure 2.18: The Impact of Population, Control, Age and Shifts in Gender on China’s Work      Force – Part I
ADAPTED FROM THE THE K2P BLOG: POSTS TAGGED ‘CHINESE GOVERNMENT’   CHINA RELAXES HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL ONE-CHILD POLICY, NOVEMBER 15,   2013HTTP://KTWOP.COM/TAG/CHINESE-GOVERNMENT/
Figure 2.18: The Impact of Population, Control, Age and Shifts in Gender on China’s Work    Force – Part II

CHAPTER 3: CHINESE ESTIMATES OF MILITARY SPENDING
CHINESE STATEMENTS ON MILITARY SPENDING
Figure 3.1: Official PRC Defense Budget Allocation for 2009 (in RMB billion)
Figure 3.2: Relative Burden of the PRC Defense Budget on State Finances:   PRC vs. ROC   Estimate
US ANALYSES OF CHINESE DEFENSE BUDGETS
Figure 3.3: Historical PRC Defense Budget Compared to US Estimates of Total Defense   Spending
Figure 3.4: Historical US Defense Expenditures
OTHER OUTSIDE ASSESSMENTS OF CHINESE MILITARY SPENDING
Figure 3.6: Chinese Military Budget Trends versus IISS and SIPRI Estimates, 2003-2013
Figure 3.7: PRC Defense Spending-related Comparative Statistics, 1980-2011
Figure 3.8: PRC Official Defense Budget Annual Data, 2002-2012
Figure 3.9: Change in China, ew S. Erikson, “Demystif
A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND ESTIMATION PROBLEMS
THE CHINESE RESPONSE

CHAPTER 4: CHINESE STRATEGY AND PLA MILITARY DOCTRINE
CHINESE STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
Active Defense
Local War under Conditions of Informatization
People’s War
CHINESE CAMPAIGN DOCTRINE
Integrated Joint Operations
Information Warfare
Chinese Cyberwarfare
     Integrated Firepower Operations
Mobility 
Comprehensive Support
SERVICE STRATEGY
The Nine-Dash Line
Figure 4.1 China’s New Map of Greater China: June 2014
Chinese Actions to Establish Control within the First Island Chain 
Figure 4.2: DoD Representation of the First and Second Island Chains
THE US VIEW
Japanese and South Korean Perspectives on the Balance
Figure 4.3: Japanese Ministry of Defense Summary of the Military Balance
Figure 4.4: South Korean Ministry of Defense Summary of the Military Strength of the Major   Northeast Asian Powers

CHAPTER 5: CHINESE MILITARY ORGANIZATION
PLA MILITARY ORGANIZATION
Figure 5.1: China’s Political Structure as Implemented
Figure 5.2: The Party Central Military Commission (CMC)
ORGANIZATION OF THE PLA
Figure 5.3: High Command Structure of the PLA (as of 2013)
OPERATIONAL COMMAND LEVELS
PLA Army (PLAA)
 PLA Navy (PLAN) 
PLA Air Force (PLAAF)  
PLA Second Artillery Force (SAF)
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE SECURITY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES
Ministry of State Security (MSS)
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 
People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) 

CHAPTER 6: FORCE CHANGES AND TRENDS IN TOTAL PERSONNEL
SHIFTS IN TOTAL PERSONNEL
Figure 6.1: Trends in PLA Personnel
PERSONNEL SHARE BY SERVICE AND FORCE ELEMENT
Figure 6.2: Shifts in Percentage of Total Personnel by Service: 1985-2014
Figure 6.3: Active and Reserve Personnel by Service in the PLA: 2014
SHIFTS IN THE PLA’S PERSONNEL SYSTEM
 Rebalancing the Personnel System
 Recruiting High-Level Human Capital into the PLA 
Creating Opportunities for Increased Qualification
Greater Compensation for PLA Personnel 
SHIFTS IN RESERVE AND MILITIA FORCE STRUCTURE
PLA Reserve Forces
PLA Militia Forces
SHIFTS IN THE PERSONNEL OF THE CHINESE SECURITY AND PARAMILITARY   FORCES
Ministry of State Security (MSS)  
 Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 
People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) 
Figure 6.4: Historical Trends in Absolute PLA and PAPF Personnel

CHAPTER 7: BROAD PATTERNS IN PLA MODERNIZATION AND THE ROLE OF ARMS AND TECHNOLOGY IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
UNCERTAIN PATTERNS OF CHANGE
  Shifts in PLA Training Practices
 Joint Operations
 Amphibious Operations
 Focus on C4ISR and Information Technology
ARMS TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ROLE OF IMPORTS
ARMS TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ROLE OF EXPORTS
Figure 7.1: Worldwide Arms Transfer Agreements, 2004-2011 and Suppliers’ Share with   Developing World (in millions of current 2011 US dollars)
Figure 7.2: Worldwide Arms Deliveries, 2004-2011 and Suppliers’ Share with Developing World (in millions of current 2011 US dollars)
Figure 7.3: Percentage of Each Supplier’s Agreements Value by Region, 2004-2011
Figure 7.4: Percentage of Total Agreements Value by Supplier to Regions, 2004-2011
Figure 7.5: Worldwide Arms Deliveries, 2004-2011and Suppliers’ Share with Developing  World (in millions of current 2011 US dollars)
Figure 7.6: Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations, by Supplier, 2004-2011 (in millions of   current US dollars)
Figure 7.7: Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations, by Supplier, 2004-2011
Figure: 7.8: Percentage of Supplier Deliveries Value by Region, 2004-2011
Figure 7.9: Numbers of Weapons Delivered by Suppliers to Developing Nations
Figure 7.10: Numbers of Weapons Delivered by Suppliers to Asia and the Pacific
Figure 7.11: Numbers of Weapons Delivered by Suppliers to Near East
Figure 7.12: Numbers of Weapons Delivered by Suppliers to Africa
Figure 7.13: Value of Russian Arms Exports to China, 1992-2012 (US$ millions)
Figure 7.14: Percentage of Overall PRC Arms Imports from Russia, 1992-2012
ARMS TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ROLE OF ESPIONAGE

CHAPTER 8: THE PLA ARMY
THE US OFFICIAL VIEW
THE JAPANESE OFFICIAL VIEW
OVERALL TRENDS IN PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
Figure 8.1: Deployment of PLAA Group Armies
Figure 8.2: PLAA Force Strength in 2014
SHIFTS IN FORCE STRUCTURE
Figure 8.3: PLA Ground Forces Force Structure, 1985-2014
Figure 8.3: PLA Ground Forces Force Structure, 1985-2014
Figure 8.3: PLA Ground Forces Force Structure, 1985-2014
Figure 8.3: PLA Ground Forces Force Structure, 1985-2014
SHIFTS IN PERSONNEL
Figure 8.4: Historical Trends in total PLAA Personnel, 1985-2014
TRENDS IN MAJOR EQUIPMENT STRENGTH
Figure 8.5:  Summary Trends in PLA Major Weapon System Inventory, 1985-2014
Figure 8.6: Historical PLAA Equipment Inventory of Major Weapon Systems, 1985-2014
EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION
Figure 8.7: Historical Trends in the PLAA’s Modern Major Weapon Inventory, 1985-2014
Figure 8.8: Pace of PLAA Modernization – Percent of Modern Weapon Systems, 2000-2014
SHIFTS IN UNIT TRAINING
THE PLAA AND POWER PROJECTION
THE PLAA IN COMPARISON TO REGIONAL MILITARIES AND THE US
Figure 8.9: PLA Forces in Comparison to Regional Countries and the US
Figure 8.10: PLAA Ground Forces Equipment in Comparison to Regional Countries and the   US
Figure 8.11: PLAA Artillery in Comparison to Regional Countries and the US

CHAPTER 9: THE PLA NAVY
THE US OFFICIAL VIEW
THE JAPANESE OFFICIAL VIEW
PLAN SERVICE STRATEGY
Figure 9.1: Size of the PLAN in 2014
Figure 9.2: DoD Representation of the First and Second Island Chains
Figure 9.3: Competing Sovereignty Claims in the South China Sea (2012)
Figure 9.4: Competing Sovereignty Claims (2014)
Figure 9.5: China’s Dependence on Maritime Lines of Communication and Efforts to Reduce   Dependence
Figure 9.6: China’s Import Transit Routes
SHIFTS IN FORCE STRUCTURE, EQUIPMENT COMPOSITION, AND PERSONNEL
SHIFT IN FORCE STRUCTURE
Figure 9.7: Size and Deployments of China’s Fleets (as of 2012)
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part I
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part II
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part III
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part IV
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part V
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part VI
Figure 9. 8: Force Structure of the PLA Navy 1985-2014-Part VII
Figure 9.9: Trends in PLAN Combatants Holdings
SHIFT IN EQUIPMENT COMPOSITION AND MODERNIZATION
Submarines
Figure 9.10: PLAN Progress in Submarine Technology
Major Combatant Holdings
Figure 9.11: PLAN Major Combatant Holdings
Figure 9.12: Relative PLAN Major Combatant Holdings
SHIFTS IN PERSONNEL
Figure 9.13: PLAN Personnel Trends
THE PLAN AND POWER PROJECTION
The Chinese View
Figure 9.14: Geographic Expansion in PLAN Military Exercises Locations
The US View 
The Japanese View
The US Reaction and the Air Sea Battle

CHAPTER 10: PLA AIR FORCE
THE US OFFICIAL VIEW
Figure 10.1: The Size of the PLAAF in 2014
PLAAF STRATEGY
SHIFT IN FORCE STRUCTURE, EQUIPMENT COMPOSITION, AND PERSONNEL
SHIFT IN FORCE STRUCTURE
Figure 10.2: Deployment of China’s Air Forces
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part I
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part II
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part III
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part IV
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part V
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part VI
Figure 10.3: Force Structure of the PLA Air Force, 1985-2014 – Part VII
THE PACE OF MODERNIZATION
Figure 10.4: Historical PLAAF Force Structure, 1985-2014, Part I
Figure 10.: Historical PLAAF Force Structure, 1985-2014, Part II
Figure 10.5: Historical Trend PLAAF Numbers by Key Missions Area, 1985-2014
Figure 10.6: Historical Relative Trends in the PLAAF’s Force Structure By Percent of Total     Force
SHIFTS IN EQUIPMENT COMPOSITION
Key Aspects of Equipment Modernization 
Stealth
Other Advanced Fighters and Carrier Aircraft
UAVs, Drones, and More Advanced IS&R 
Figure 10.7: Total Versus Modern Aircraft in the PLAAF
Figure 10.8: Modern Versus Total PLAAF Aircraft by Major Mission Type
Figure 10.9: Percentage of Modern PLAAF Aircraft
SHIFTS IN PERSONNEL
Figure 10.10: Historical PLAAF Personnel Trends
EXPANSION OF CHINESE AIR POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES, US FORCED     ENTRY, AND THE OUTER ISLAND CHAIN
THE PLAAF AND POWER PROJECTION

CHAPTER 11: PLA MISSILE FORCES – THE SECOND ARTILLERY FORCE
Figure 11.1: The Size of the China’s Missile Forces in 2012
THE US OFFICIAL VIEW
Missile Developments 
Space Developments 
SAF STRATEGY 
SHIFTS IN FORCE STRUCTURE, EQUIPMENT COMPOSITION, AND PERSONNEL
TRENDS IN TOTAL MISSILE FORCES
Figure 11.2: Historical Quantitative Data on the SAF- Part I
Figure 11.2: Historical Quantitative Data on the SAF- Part II
Figure 11.3: Historical Size and Composition of the SAF Arsenal
Figure 11.4: The SAF’s Changing Force Structure, 1985-2013 (Percent)
Figure 11.5: The Expanding Range of China’s Theater Missile Forces – Part I
Figure 11.5: The Expanding Range of China’s Theater Missile Forces – Part II
Figure 11.6: Year-on-Year Missile Launcher Strength, 2005-2012
Figure 11.7: Year-on-Year Missile Inventory, 2005-2012
SHIFTS IN EQUIPMENT COMPOSITION
SRBMs
Figure 11.8: NAISC Estimate of the Regional Balance of Short-range Ballistic Missiles   (SRBMs)
Figure 11.9: RAND Data on PRC SRBMs and the “Notional SRBM” Model (2009)
Figure 11.10: SRBMs Needed to Obtain Given Probabilities of Neutralizing a Single   Runway
Cruise Missiles
Figure 11.13: NASIC Estimate of the Regional Balance of Land Attack Cruise Missiles
MRBMs
Figure 11.14: NASIC Estimate of the Regional Balance of MRBMs and IRBMs
Figure 11.15: Development of Ballistic and Cruise Missile Launchers, 1985-2014
ICBMs and SLBMs
Figure 11.16: NASIC Estimate of the Regional Balance of ICBMs and SLBMs
Figure 11.17: Percentage of Modern ICBMs in the SAF’s Arsenal, 1985-2012
Figure 11.18: The Expanding Range of China’s ICBM and Longer-Range Forces – Part I
Figure 11.18: The Expanding Range of China’s ICBM and Longer-Range Forces – Part II
Figure 11.18: The Expanding Range of China’s ICBM and Longer-Range Forces – Part III
Chinese Missile Defense Capabilities
Chinese Counterspace Capabilities 
Space
Anti-Access/Area Denial Sea-based Space Programs
Anti-Access/Area Denial Land-based Space Programs
IMPROVED PERSONNEL
PROGRESS IN POWER PROJECTION
Appendix to Chapter 11: NASIC Data on SAF Ballistic Missiles

CHAPTER 12: CHINA’S NUCLEAR FORCES AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE
Figure 12.1: Chinese, US and Russian Nuclear Forces
Figure 12.1: Chinese, US and Russian Nuclear Forces
Figure 12.1: Chinese, US and Russian Nuclear Forces
Figure 12.2: Comparative Estimate of Global Holdings of Nuclear Weapons
THE REGIONAL NUCLEAR BALANCE
China
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Estimate
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) Estimate
The Global Security Estimate
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Estimate
The United States
North and South Korea
India and Pakistan
CHINA’S EVOLVING NUCLEAR FORCES
Chinese Biological and Chemical Weapons
Role of Chinese Tunnel Facilities

CHAPTER 13: CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND THE TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE 
THE US PERSPECTIVE
TAIWANESE AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES
Figure 13.1: The Balance in the Taiwan Straits in 2014 – Part I
Figure 13.2: Taiwanese (ROC) Ministry of Defense Summary of the PRC-ROC Military   Balance
Figure 13.3: Japanese Ministry of Defense Summary of the PRC-ROC Military Balance
HISTORICAL TRENDS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE    380
Figure 13.4: A Summary of Trends in the PLA
Figure 13.5: Trends in PLA Forces Deployed in the Vicinity of the Taiwan Strait
Figure 13.6: Trends in the ROC Armed Forces
The Naval Balance
Figure 13.7: Absolute Trends in PLAN Deployments to the East and South Sea Fleets
Figure 13.8: Absolute Trends in ROC Naval Forces
Figure 13.9: Relative Increases in PLAN Deployments to the East and South Sea Fleets since   2005 (percentage increase)
Figure 13.10: Increases in ROC Naval Deployments since 2005 (percentage increase)
The Air and Missile Balance
Figure 13.11: Absolute Trends in PLAAF Forces Deployed Near the Taiwan Strait
Figure 13.12: Absolute Trends in the ROCAF Aircraft Inventory
Figure 13.13: Relative Changes in PLAAF Force Deployments to the Taiwan Strait, since 2005 (percentage increase)
Figure 13.14: Changes in ROCAF Force Numbers, since 2005 (percentage increase)
Figure 13.15: Japanese Ministry of Defense Summary of the Trends in the Balance of Modern   PRC-ROC Fighter Aircraft
Figure 13.16: Department of Defense Estimate of PLA SAM and SRBM Coverage
The Ground Force Balance
Figure 13.17: A Comparison of Personnel Trends in PLAA and ROC Army in the Taiwan   Strait Region
Figure 13.18: A Comparison of Trends in PLAA and ROC Equipment Holdings in the Taiwan   Strait Region
Figure 13.19: A Comparison of Relative Trends in PRC and ROC Artillery Forces (percentage   increase over 2005 levels)
Figure 13.20: PRC Force Deployment near Taiwan – Part I
Figure 13.20: PRC Force Deployment near Taiwan – Part II

CHAPTER 14: US AND CHINESE STRATEGIC COMPETITION OR COOPERATION: THE IOR AND PACIFIC AS A CASE STUDY 
CHANGES IN US STRATEGY AND REBALANCING TO ASIA
Figure 14.2 Chinese Claims and the Nine Dash Line – Part I
Figure 14.2 Chinese Claims and the Nine Dash Line – – Part II
Figure 14.2 Chinese Claims and the Nine Dashed Line _– Part III
(EEZs Overlapping Zone Enclosed by Map of Nine Dashed Line)
Figure 14.2 Chinese Claims and the Nine Dashed Line – Part IV
(EEZs in South China Sea and East China Sea)
Figure 14.3 Chinese Claims and the Nine Dashed – Part V
Locations of 2001, 2002, and 2009 U.S.-Chinese Incidents at Sea and In Air)
Figure 14.4 China’s New Map of Greater China: June 2014
THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT IN THE PACIFIC AND IOR
Tensions between China and Asia States
Impact on US and Chinese Relations