The future for the U.S. and its partners is bright: they have prevailed in the Cold War and have established the systems and institutions—based on what are arguably universal human principles—to allow for the greatest human possibilities in the twenty-first century world. Blessed with abundant resources, cutting-edge universities and research institutions, an innovative capitalist economy, the world’s largest and most advanced military, a diverse and adaptable democratic society, a robust and reasonably efficient legal and regulatory system, attractive cultural “soft power,” the most favorable demographic profile in the developed world, and excellent allies, friends, and partners with which to cooperate, the United States is positioned to remain the world’s preeminent power and public goods provider for at least the next several decades. Increased American willingness to collaborate with partners around the world to provide collective security solutions is likely to underwrite enduring influence. Even in light of current economic difficulties, this is powerful and inspiring.

Nonetheless, Washington faces a rapidly-changing world that is becoming increasingly complex, vulnerable to disruptive trends, and diffused in power—in addition to needed domestic reforms, particularly with regard to fiscal policies and social entitlements. …

Projecting notionally out to 2025, the longest time horizon generally considered in unclassified U.S. government studies and their scholarly equivalents, and as far as 2050 in selected instances, several trends seem likely to define the emerging international system, and America’s role within it. Fortunately, Washington is well-placed to turn these challenges into opportunities, provided that it pursues intelligent, pragmatic policies and works well with a growing network of allies, friends, and partners. …

No discussion of PLAN modernization (or PLA modernization in general) would be complete without reference to the issue of “informatization.” Andrew Erickson and Michael Chase of the U.S. Naval War College discuss this subject in the chapter “Informatization and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy.” This chapter explores PLAN efforts at informatization and its implications for command and control and joint operations. The research draws on a variety of Chinese-language publications to survey how the concept of informatization is defined in naval terms and how it relates to current PLAN capabilities in integration of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), conducting joint operations, training and education, and the modernization of PLAN command and control. The chapter concludes that implementation of informatization and modernization of Chinese C4ISR have clearly become top priorities for the PLAN. However, there are still many gaps between the theory of informatization and the operational practice and implementation. There appears to be a debate on PLAN “connectivity” theories and between advocates of centralization and decentralization of command and control. Will increased C4ISR capabilities push information to lower levels or will they further empower the center? The Chinese leadership may hold an overly optimistic expectation that informatization can fully relieve the fog of war and battlefield uncertainty. This new reliance on modern C4ISR capabilities will also leave China more vulnerable to command and control warfare. Finally, the chapter considers if the PLAN has the same metric for integration of C4ISR as the U.S. Navy. The PLAN could approach the concept not from a “one weapon, one target” approach relying on individual operators, but instead by emphasizing a large arsenal of missiles meant to overwhelm the defenses of a targeted naval group without concern for individual accuracy or collateral damage.

Introduction

In recent years, the modernization of the PLA Navy (PLAN) has become a very high priority for China. Senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders and high-ranking military officers have emphasized the importance of naval modernization. Most prominently, CCP General Secretary, President, and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Hu Jintao in a December 2006 speech to PLAN officers underscored the need to “endeavor to build a powerful People’s navy that can adapt to its historical mission during a new century and a new period.” Similarly, PLAN Commander Wu Shengli and PLAN Political Commissar Hu Yanlin promoted the importance of naval modernization in an article that appeared subsequently in the authoritative CCP journal Seeking Truth (求事). According to Wu and Hu, “Since the reform and open door policy, along with the consistent increase of overall national strength, the oceanic awareness and national defense awareness of the Chinese people have been raised and the desire to build a powerful navy, strengthen the modern national defense and realize the great revitalization of China has become stronger than at any other time.” Moreover, Wu and Hu contend, “To build a powerful navy is the practical need for maintaining the safety of the national sovereignty and maritime rights.” High-level statements such as these appear intended to underscore the importance that China’s civilian and military leaders attach to the modernization of the PLAN.

This growing sense of urgency about naval modernization appears to be a function of increasing concern about maritime security issues, particularly Taiwan’s status, maritime resources, and energy security, with the most rapidly developing, high-intensity capabilities focused on the “Near Seas” (the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas), and their immediate approaches. Chinese naval modernization is focused partially, but by no means exclusively, on Taiwan. Most of the platforms China is acquiring are multimission platforms, and the PLAN is investing in capabilities like large amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, which are clearly much more relevant to other missions. Moreover, the comments of senior PLAN officers underscore the diversity of missions the PLAN must be ready to execute. For example, Wu and Hu emphasize

that the PLAN must be prepared for a potential conflict over Taiwan. At the same time, however, they point out that the PLAN must be prepared for a wider range of missions, including the protection of maritime resources and energy security issues. This reflects Hu Jintao’s concept of the Chinese military’s “New Historic Missions,” which was introduced at an expanded CMC conference on December 24, 2004. In an attempt to transform Hu’s general guidance into more specific policy, articles in state and military media have argued that to safeguard China’s economic growth, the PLA must go beyond its previous mission of safeguarding national “survival interests” (生存利益) to protecting national “development interests” (发展利益).

Hu has also stated specifically that the PLA must prepare for “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). As Hu stated in December 2008, “As we strengthen our ability to fight and win limited wars under informatized conditions, we have to pay even more attention to improving noncombat military operations capabilities.” The PLAN’s participation in antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since December 2008, its dispatch of a hospital ship to the Indian Ocean in summer 2010, and its involvement in the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya in February 2011 underscore its importance in fulfilling the “New Historic Missions.”

Indeed, these expanding combat operations and MOOTW missions drive the PLAN’s requirements, not only for the new platforms China is putting into service with the PLAN, but also for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities to support their use in monitoring and—in a worst case scenario—targeting foreign platforms on, under, and above the sea.

Within this context, enhancing the PLAN’s information technology (IT) and communications capabilities is seen as critical to the success of China’s overall naval modernization program. According to one recent article on the future of the PLAN, “The informatization of the shipboard weapons and equipment is the core of maritime joint combat . . . the Chinese Navy should vigorously build the data links for maritime military actions and fundamentally change the way to carry out tasks in the future.” The ultimate goal is operations carried out by a “networked fleet.” Reaching this goal means narrowing the gap between the PLA and the world’s most advanced militaries through the development, acquisition, and integration of advanced information technology, which is one of the major goals of contemporary Chinese military reforms. Central to this effort is the process of informatization (信息化), which is often billed as crucial to the modernization of the Chinese military. This emphasis on informatization derives from the expectation that the PLA must strengthen its preparation for local wars under informatized conditions. As part of China’s broader strategy of active defense, the PLA is “enhancing in an allround way its capabilities of defensive operations under conditions of informatization” to make sure “that it is well prepared for military struggle” and capable of “winning local wars under conditions of informatization.” This applies with particular force to the navy. According to the authors of the abovementioned article on the future of Chinese maritime power, “Informatized warfare is the mainstream trend in the development of future maritime wars.”

PLA modernization is critical to China’s military competitiveness, and “informatization” is central to the PLA’s modernization. An explicit goal of the 2006 Defense White Paper was to build informatized armed forces capable of winning informatized wars. In the view of the PLA, China has yet to fully exploit mechanized warfare, while it is now having to transform to the follow-on era of informatization. According to Beijing’s 2006 Defense White Paper, “China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense and armed forces, in accordance with the state’s overall plan to realize modernization. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century.” At the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, Chinese President Hu Jintao declared, “To attain the strategic objective of building computerized armed forces and winning IT-based warfare, we will accelerate composite development of mechanization and computerization, carry out military training under IT-based conditions, modernize every aspect of logistics, intensify our efforts to train a new type of high-caliber military personnel in large numbers and change the mode of generating combat capabilities.” The PLAN is at the center of this effort to achieve the informatization of the Chinese military. It “has published an entirely new set of revised guidance documents since the end of the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996–2000).” Since the beginning of this decade, the “Two Transformations” program has sought to implement this guidance by using informatization and mechanization to transform the PLAN, along with the rest of China’s military, from a posture that is personnel-intensive to one that is technology-intensive.

This chapter explores PLAN informatization and its implications for command and control (C2) and joint operations. Drawing on a variety of Chinese-language publications, it attempts to address the following key questions:

■ How does the PLA define the concept of informatization, what does this mean for the PLAN, and how does it relate to the modernization of PLAN C2?

■ How well can the PLAN currently connect sensors, C2, and weapons to get a clear picture of the battlefield and execute combat operations?

■ What is the PLAN’s ability to conduct joint operations with other services?

■ What technical improvements is China’s navy likely to make over the next decade (e.g., space-based ocean surveillance, use of unmanned aerial vehicles, and better communications) and which capabilities would make the most difference for combat effectiveness?

■ Where does the PLAN currently fit in the spectrum between the U.S. and Russian C2 models?

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section surveys how the concept of “informatization” is defined in naval terms and how it relates to the modernization of PLAN C2. The second examines the PLAN’s current ability to connect sensors, C2, and weapons to get a clear picture of the battlefield and execute combat operations, as well as its ability to conduct joint operations with other services. The third section addresses the technical improvements likely to materialize over the next decade and the capabilities that would make the most difference for combat effectiveness. The fourth examines the training and education issues that are integral to PLAN informatization. The fifth section assesses the PLAN’s position on the spectrum between the U.S. and Soviet models of C2. The final section summarizes the key findings and highlights some possible areas for further research on naval informatization. …

China is contributing increasingly to the security of the global maritime commons as a major maritime strategic stakeholder. It has done so by participating in such efforts to secure maritime commerce as the Container Security Initiative (CSI), by supporting Southeast Asian nations in their efforts to fight piracy, and by playing a valuable and growing role in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China’s contributions in these areas are rightly receiving approbation from the international community. While events in areas closer to China’s shores, particularly in East Asia, may impact Beijing’s interests most directly, its growing economic and resource interests and international position necessitate necessitate increasingly more distant presence. This may create new opportunities for cooperation in such areas as the Gulf of Aden: separated from their nations’ respective maritime claims by significant distance, the maritime forces of the Asia-Pacific, including those of the U.S. and China, may find a “safe strategic space” for new forms of maritime partnership. Further contributions to collective sealane security can help to reassure other nations that China’s rise will be both peaceful and beneficial to the world.

For the first time in its modern history, China has deployed naval forces operationally (as opposed to representationally) beyond its immediate maritime periphery to protect merchant vessels from pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Since 26 December 2008, the PLAN has dispatched twelve ships in five task forces to the Gulf of Aden. As of 20 March 2010, PLAN forces have escorted 1768 ships in 179 convoys. Sixteen PLAN operations have rescued 10 Chinese and 13 foreign-flagged vessels from pirates. As of 25 December 2009, 3300 PLAN personnel had participated and 405 foreign vessels had been escorted. The PLAN’s escort missions in the Gulf of Aden have made the area safer from Somali piracy, thus benefitting both the international system and Chinese trade and energy interests. What explains this unprecedented instance of long-distance, sustained operations? …

亚洲国际关系的重构 [平装]
沈丁立 (编者), 张贵洪 (编者), 杨玉良 (丛书主编), 秦绍德 (丛书主编), 金在烈 (丛书主编)

本书是2010年上海论坛政治分论坛论文集，共有25篇论文，分为四个部分，主要涉及国家关系、反恐、应对气候变化合作三大领域。包括主旨发言、东亚国际关系的重构、亚洲反恐格局重构、气候变化合作的再思考。

商品描述
内容简介
《亚洲国际关系的重构》主要内容简介：发展是当代世界的重大主题，也是亚洲增进居民福祉的根本途径。亚洲的发展以经济持续增长为驱动力，同时也包括社会、政治、文化等领域的协调推进。在经济全球化不可逆转的背景下，亚洲的发展不仅需要亚洲与其他区域进行良性互动，而且需要亚洲各国对全球格局变动形成有效回应。2007年由美国次贷危机引发的国际金融危机已造成全球性的经济衰退，并对亚洲的持续发展产生了明显冲击。危机影响的严重性和广泛性促使人们深刻反思此轮危机的成因，就本质而言，此次危机是全球不同经济板块在贸易、金融等方面非均衡发展的衍生后果。自20世纪70年代以来，发达经济体（以美欧为代表）和新兴经济体（以中印为代表）的关联度日趋增强，其关联方式为：发达经济体利用国际货币优势竭力发展金融业，而新兴经济体则利用要素禀赋优势大力发展制造业。以各自的增长模式为前提，发达经济体大量进口并形成贸易逆差，而新兴经济体大量出口并保持贸易顺差；发达经济体因消费过度、货币流人而投资过度，而新兴经济体因储蓄过度、外汇盈余而出现资金流出。上述关联方式使世界各国的共同利益特征得以增强，但关联关系的非均衡性已蕴藏着危机爆发的基因。当发达经济体家庭、企业和政府的债务过度膨胀与金融过度虚拟化同步发展时，全球经济非均衡的潜在风险就会以金融危机的方式显性化。

编辑推荐
《亚洲国际关系的重构》为2010上海论坛丛书之一。

目录
“上海论坛2010”共识：全球经济再平衡与亚洲的持续复苏
“亚洲国际关系的重构”——2010上海论坛政治分论坛白皮书

第一部分 主旨发言
Asia-A Dominant Influence beyond Borders
A Joint-Venture between Sino-America for Better Cooperation, Better Co-development, Better Co-rising, and Better Life to All Mankind

第二部分 东亚国际关系的重构
The Making of a Regional International Society in East Asia：History and Outlook
东亚的未来与中国作用
China and East Asia: Projecting beyond the Current Crisis
From Interdependence to a Dangerous Divide: How Is the Crisis Changing Asia and America?
竞争中的亚太及东亚区域合作安排
Asian Regional Architecture–Thoughts on the Future U.S. Role
中国与周边关系的重构: 论中朝关系的可持续发展
还原历史 超越历史–中日历史共同研究的一些情况与感想
Restructuring International Relations in East Asia: The Role of ODA
Building CBMs across Borders–An Indian Experience

Global Economic Dynamics: Their Impact on Asian Leadership and International Relations

Geo-political Realignment in Motion: Canberra’s Strategic Choice in Sino-U.S.-Australian Tripartitie Relations

反思西方民主话语
第三部分 亚洲反恐格局重构

论美国的“阿富巴”战略对亚洲的影响
Towards A Cooperative Security Structure in Asia
China and the Conflicts in Afghanistan/Pakistan
From Shanghai to Somalia: China’s Contributions to the Security of Seaborne Commerce in Asia and Beyond
Nuclear Terrorism and Asian Security
美国反恐战略的演变及其对亚洲的影响

第四部分 气候变化合作的再思考

气候变化影响分析与对策思考
关于哥本哈根气候变化大会之后国际气候合作的若干思考
哥本哈根进程与亚洲低碳共同体
A New Silk Road? China in the Global Marketplace

Beijing’s military air components are finally on the verge of giving the country’s leaders something they have dreamed of since before the founding of the People’s Republic of China: a reliable instrument of national power. This has significant implications for the security architecture of northeast Asia. China is poised to increase its power and influence in the region, and has the potential to play an even more positive role than it has in recent years. Indeed, cooperation between China and South Korea has generally been excellent, and the two nations share tremendous interests, particularly in the economic sphere. Unfortunately, in an effort to pursue its own national interests, which include placing stability above all else, prioritizing the security of its border with North Korea, and making sure that developments on the Korean peninsula do not undermine China’s interests, China limits the ability of other nations to place pressure on North Korea to curtail its nuclear brinksmanship and other destabilizing and wholly irresponsible behavior. This is particularly regrettable, as North Korea remains the primary military threat to South Korea, and has developed a large air force and other military services to challenge it. As a thriving capitalist democracy that serves as a model to the world in economic and technological development, South Korea should by all rights be allowed to flourish in the same peaceful environment that many similarly advanced nations enjoy. Regrettably, the nation’s geopolitical location has long precluded this. Given the enduring military threat from Pyongyang, and expectations of deference from Seoul by Beijing, it will be essential for South Korea to secure and defend its own interests by carefully monitoring regional military trends, such as the growth and development of Chinese air power, and maintaining sufficient air, land, and sea power to ensure that its interests are taken seriously. This paper will therefore survey the development of Chinese air power and offer further implications for the Republic of Korea and its Air Force. …

XI. Implications for the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF, 大韓民國 空軍)

The ROKAF and PLAAF share historical similarities, but their recent trajectories and purposes as instruments of national power have since diverged substantially. Like the PLAAF, the ROKAF had developed gradually during the 1940s, but expanded greatly during the Korean War, in part through acquisition of foreign aircraft and instructors (both from the U.S., as opposed to the USSR, as was the case with the PLAAF). Unlike the PLAAF, whose capabilities declined precipitously in the 1960s and have only begun to recover, the ROKAF continued to develop steadily and substantially in subsequent decades to address ongoing high-intensity threats from North Korea. This clearly Korean effort and achievement, complete with indigenously produced aircraft, was assisted by continuing aircraft purchases and production arrangements and other cooperation with the U.S. Air Force under the aegis of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Unlike the PLAAF, the ROKAF has contributed to international allied missions, supporting coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm in 1990-91 and Somalia stability operations in 1993. In a testament to the caliber of South Korea’s indigenous aircraft production capability, Korean Aerospace Industries has sold 19 KT-1B trainers to Indonesia in 2003, and has further export plans.

North Korea remains by far South Korea’s primary security threat, and thus North Korea’s air force and army remain the ROKAF’s primary targets. While most North Korean Air Force aircraft are old Soviet models, its order of battle is twice as big as that of the ROKAF, and it may be prepared to engage in high attrition operations. Perhaps most worrisome, North Korea has long focused on developing artillery and missiles. These projectiles’ relatively simple design and low cost enables it to produce significant numbers, while the laws of physics make it far easier to attack aircraft and runways with them than to defend against them. In the future, this could pose a major challenge to the ability of ROKAF aircraft to operate near North Korean airspace in the unfortunate event of conflict.

With its triple-digit SAMS and the world’s foremost sub-strategic missile force, China has far more ability than North Korea to disable ROKAF aircraft and the airfields that they operate from. One need only consider the rapidly shifting military balance across the Taiwan Strait to see the PLA’s progress in this area. Fortunately, the prospect of hostilities erupting between Seoul and Beijing is extremely low, and the chances of the ROKAF and the PLAAF facing each other in combat as they did during the Korean War over half a century ago is even lower. The ROK and PRC enjoy good relations, and seek to build on their strong and growing economic ties. Still, with regard to strategic issues, there remain certain limits and barriers to cooperation. While Beijing decries military alliances, including the very positive ROK-US alliance that has served as a cornerstone of peninsular and regional stability, it maintains in some form (but rarely discusses) its six-decade alliance with Pyongyang. While the ROK clearly enhances regional stability and economic growth as a responsible and vibrant capitalist democracy, and North Korea continues to play a decidedly harmful and destabilizing role in both these areas, China remains unwilling to acknowledge Seoul’s good behavior or punish Pyongyang’s bad behavior. No recent issue has so underscored this inequity as the North Korean navy’s unconscionable 26 March 2010 sinking of ROKS Cheonan. China’s unwillingness to condemn this war-like act makes it clear that it will tolerate virtually any North Korean behavior in the name of protecting the stability of its border with North Korea and its northeast regions with their significant ethnic Korean populations. There are also indications that Beijing is working to position itself as a power-broker with regard to peninsular issues, such that any future reunification would entail critical concessions to Beijing. Such behavior is particularly unfortunate given China’s own painful experience of national division, and suggests strongly that while Beijing professes that all nations are equal, in reality it expects deference from South Korea given its relatively smaller size and national power.

For all these reasons, a strong and reliable ROKAF will continue to be important to safeguard ROK security interests in the years ahead. First and foremost, it will have to defend the ROK from North Korean attack, bullying, and brinksmanship. More broadly, however, it will play a critical role in making it clear to China and any other nations that the ROK is to be taken seriously and its interests respected. For all the challenges that the ROK-U.S. alliance has faced over the years (most recently, the U.S. should make it a priority to sign a bilateral free trade agreement, which would benefit both sides significantly), it endures because it is based on mutual interests and mutual respect. The U.S. values and admires the ROK, covets none of its territory, has no opposition whatsoever to its national reunification, takes seriously threats to its security, and is willing—decisively and unapologetically—to help defend against them. Only by maintaining a strong ROKAF and other military services will the ROK be able to demand the similar respect for its interests that it deserves from other countries, such as China.

That Korea has endured such terrible injustices and geopolitical threats is one of the tragedies of history. That it has surmounted nearly insuperable odds to become a leading democracy and economy with technology that is the envy of the world is one of history’s miracles, and a testimony to the strength of Korean culture, national spirit, and hard work. It is by no means fair that Korea has had to work so hard to safeguard these great achievements without the advantages that many other nations have enjoyed, but it has been by such exceptional efforts that it has survived and thrived as a nation, and will continue to do so in years to come. It is to be hoped that the ROK-U.S. alliance can continue to productively support South Korea’s important and supremely justified efforts to provide a secure climate for its national development.

http://hongik.isbnshop.com/books/book.php?isbn=9788977783539

한반도 안보환경 변화와 항공우주력의 진화

김기정 지음 | 오름

출간일 : 2011년 02월 28일 | ISBN : 9788977783539

페이지수 : 235쪽 | 판형 : 신국판 (148*225)

도서분야 : 사회학 > 정치학 > 국방군사

정가: 15,000원

Tags

김기정, 항공우주력, 진화, 한반도, 연세대공군력연구총서, 안보환경

본 연구서의 발행은 13번째 회의를 정리하는 단순한 연구총서 이상이다. 본 연구서는 대한민국 공군이 한반도 안보환경 변화에 맞추어 진화하고 있음을 확인하고, 이를 통해 대한민국의 대북 억지력을 강화하는 초석임을 재확인할 수 있는 종합보고서라고 할 수 있다. 또한 ‘공군과 타군과의 합동성 강화, 대국민 이미지 강화, 무기획득의 효율성강화’ 라는 세밀한 주제가 2011년 한반도 안보지형을 이해하는 데 많은 도음을 줄 것이라고 생각된다.

-서문 중에서

목차

서문

제1부 전쟁수행방식의 변화와 공군의 역할

제1장 Trends in Conventional Conflicts and Air Power / Jasjit Singh

Ⅰ. Historical Trends in Conventional Wars

Ⅱ. Sub-conventional Wars

Ⅲ. Trends in Air Power

Ⅳ. Some Conclusions

제2장 21세기 전쟁양상의 변화와 항공우주력의 역할 / 조한승

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 전쟁양상 변화의 의미

Ⅲ. 21세기 전쟁양상: 4세대 전쟁 (4GW) 과 하이브리드 전쟁 (hybrid warfare)

Ⅲ. 미래전과 항공우주력

Ⅳ. 결론

제3장 China’s Increasing Air Power: Implications for the Republic of Korea Air Force / Andrew S. Erickson

Ⅰ. Background and Order of Battle

Ⅱ. Weapons

Ⅲ. Doctrinal Guidance and Transformation

Ⅳ. Aviation Industry

Ⅴ. Training

Ⅵ. Scenarios

Ⅶ. Non-Traditional Uses of Air Power

Ⅷ. Deck Aviation Developments

Ⅸ. Potential Emerging Missions

Ⅹ. The Future of Chinese Air Power

ⅩⅠ. Implications for the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF, 大韓民國 空軍)

제2부 국민과 함께 하는 공군력 강화

제4장 국민의 눈에 비친 공군 이미지: 투사 이미지의 비교분석 / 박남기

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 조직 이미지의 정의

Ⅲ. 대한민국 공군의 일반적 이미지

Ⅳ. 대한민국 공군의 이미지 제고 노력

Ⅴ. 매스미디어의 대한민국 공군 관련 보도

Ⅵ. 미국 공군의 이미지

Ⅶ. 매스미디어의 미국 공군 관련 보도

Ⅷ. 결론

제5장 항공우주국가로서 한국의 이미지와 공군 / 정일권

Ⅰ. 문제의 제기

Ⅱ. 국가기관으로서의 공군의 항공우주군 이미지

Ⅲ. 한국 공군의 PR전략

Ⅳ. 향후 PR을 위해 몇 가지 제안

제3부 항공우주력 발전을 위한 공군 경영 효율성: 무기획득과정의 합리성과 효율성을 위한 제언

제6장 Acquiring Air Forces: Lessons Learned from Foreign Cases / Zachary Mears)

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Characterizing the Nature of the Military Competition Over Time

Ⅲ. Identifying Goals and Objectives in the Military Competition

Ⅳ. Competitive Strategies

Ⅴ. Capabilities-Based Planning

Ⅵ. Concluding Thoughts and Lessons Learned

제7장 미래지향적 공군전력 운용 및 건설의 효율성 강화 방안 / 정철호

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 현대전의 특징 및 항공우주력의 역할

Ⅲ. ‘항공우주군’ 에 대한 도전과 과제

Ⅳ. ‘한국 공군’ 의 전투력 증강 효율성 강화 방안

Ⅴ. 결론

제4부 좌담 천안함 사건을 통해 본 합동성 진단

필자 소개 (원고 게재 순)

Introduction

Chinese oil demand, growing rapidly, has reached 8.5 million barrels per day (mbtd) even amid the global recession. China became a net oil importer in 1993, and will likely become a net gasoline importer by the end of 2009. While still a very significant oil producer, China is now the world’s second-largest oil user. It imports half of its crude oil, at a record 4.6 million bpd in July 2009. Seaborne imports, which overland pipelines will not reduce, constitute more than 80 percent of this total. At present, therefore, 40% of China’s oil comes by sea.

Chinese security analysts and policy makers worry about their nation’s “excessive” reliance on seaborne oil shipments. Many believe that by investing in pipelines to deliver oil from neighboring oil producers and building additional lines to “bypass” the Malacca Strait, China can protect its oil imports from possible interdiction during a conflict.

A robust internal debate is being waged within China at multiple levels and across a number of disciplines regarding how to ensure access to oil supplies. At stake is the extent to which China should cooperate with international economic institutions versus seeking unilateral military solutions. Also at stake is: should China develop as a maritime versus continental power, or should it focus on defending against state, as opposed to non-state, actors. Despite this diversity of opinion, a wide variety of influential Chinese experts, including scholars, policy analysts, and members of the military, believe that the United States can sever China’s seaborne energy supplies at will and in a crisis might well choose to do so. It is widely claimed, for instance, that “whoever controls the Strait of Malacca effectively grips China’s strategic energy passage, and can threaten China’s energy security at any time.” Such views are widely cited to justify pipeline construction.

Yet as this chapter will demonstrate, China’s overland oil supply plans may largely be unrealistic, driven by a combination of a misunderstanding of global oil market mechanisms, incomplete assessment of security issues, and the lobbying by local commercial and political interests of a massively overtaxed national energy policy-making apparatus. Some projects—such as the planned line from Russia and an existing line from Kazakhstan—are indeed economically viable overland projects that will bring at least limited diversity to China’s oil supplies. Others, however, like the proposed lines through Burma and Pakistan, make much less economic and security sense.

In the end, pipelines are not likely to increase Chinese oil import security in quantitative terms, because the additional volumes they bring in will be overwhelmed by China’s demand growth; the country’s net reliance on seaborne oil imports will grow over time, pipelines notwithstanding. If we estimate Chinese oil-import demand growth conservatively at an average of 3 percent annually over the next five years, Beijing’s imports will still increase by a total of roughly a 500,000 barrels a day—the combined volume that the pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan will likely be able to bring in by 2013. Of that total, the 300,000 bpd from Russia will not be “new” overland supplies, but rather, a transfer from rail to pipe as the crude volumes previously carried into China by rail are moved into the pipeline instead. The proposed Burma–China and Pakistan–China lines are simply “shortcut” routes, not true overland supply routes; oil will still have to be carried by sea in tankers to the pipelines’ starting points.

A total figure for these two sources of 500,000 bbl/day may seem low, but it reflects the reality that China’s neighbors have limited capacity to offset its seaborne oil imports. Their reserves are limited in key potential supply areas (e.g., eastern Siberia), and politics further complicate the picture. Kazakhstan, for its part, is pursuing a three-vector oil export policy. It entails shipping oil through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium line to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossisk; to China through the Atasu–Alashankou line; and, soon, through the $1.5 billion Kazakhstan Caspian Pipeline System to a port on the Caspian Sea, from which it will be carried by tanker to Azerbaijan, there to enter the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. The third route may ultimately be able to pump up to fifty-six million tons a year of oil.

Russia, meanwhile, may prioritize oil supplies to the East Siberia–Pacific pipeline, feeding the port of Kozmino, on the Sea of Japan near Nakhodka; from there it can be exported to Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, and other Pacific Basin consumers, not China alone. A spur pipeline from Russia to China is now under construction and is scheduled to enter service in the second half of 2010.

Pipelines are more vulnerable to sabotage and military interdiction than seaborne shipping is. Projects designed to help seaborne shipments bypass choke points (e.g., the Burma–China pipeline) are expensive, can be blockaded, and are vulnerable to weather and other physical disruptions. Seaborne shipping, by contrast, is very flexible and can be routed around disruptions. For this reason, pipeline plans predicated on the idea that bypassing the Strait of Malacca increases oil security are fundamentally flawed. Even if Malacca were completely sealed off by blockade or accident, tankers could be diverted through the Sunda, Lombok, or other passages with little disruption in deliveries and at an additional cost of less than one or two dollars per barrel. Some Chinese analysts now share this conclusion, one noting that “SLOC security is much more important than pipeline transport lines.”

Finally, pipelines are far more expensive than tankers in terms of what must be spent to move a given volume of oil a given distance. Certain pipelines—such as the Pakistan, and possibly the Burma, projects—will likely require substantial subsidies if they are to compete with seaborne imports. Much of the cost of supporting such uneconomical projects, which are driven more by politics than profits, will fall on the Chinese government, which already faces substantial energy-subsidy costs as well as the demands of its new four-trillion-RMB stimulus package, of which more than 25 percent may come from central government funds.

The first section of this chapter will examine operational and prospective pipelines oriented toward China. The projects are arranged chronologically in the order that they have, will, or might become operational. At present, the Kazakhstan–China pipeline is operating at partial capacity, a Russia–China line could become operational within eighteen months, the China–Burma pipeline project is now under construction, and a China–Pakistan pipeline remains entirely aspirational.

The second section will examine Chinese views of how pipelines might enhance China’s oil security and assess the potential for, and utility and disadvantages of, a pipeline-centric oil-security strategy. The final, and concluding, section will suggest how China might enhance its energy security at lower financial and diplomatic cost. …

Volume Summary

Now the second largest oil-consuming country after the US, China’s growing need for resources will affect its development as well as that of its neighbors and other developing countries. “China’s Energy Relations with the Developing World” examines China’s access to the energy resources of the developing world and its impact on Chinese foreign relations. Contributed by experts in international relations and Chinese politics, the essays look at China’s expanding relations with the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, India; the security implications of China’s quest for energy resources; and, its impact on relations with world powers such as the US. The book also asks whether China’s competition for energy resources will foster cooperation or conflict with other energy-consuming great powers. “China’s Energy Relations with the Developing World” provides is an accessible text that will appeal to students, faculty, and policy makers seeking to understand Chinese politics, energy policy, and the factors that may lie beneath key future geopolitical and security issues.

Table of Contents

Part I. Theoretical and Historical Overview
1. The Strategic Implications of China’s Energy Engagement with the Developing World
Carrie Liu Currier and Manochehr Dorraj

2. The Evolution of China’s Grand Strategy with the Developing World
Lui Hebron

3. The Domestic Political Context for China’s Quest for Energy Security
Jean A. Garrison

Part II. Regional Case Studies
4. China’s Quest for Energy Security in the Middle East: Strategic Implications
Manochehr Dorraj and Carrie Liu Currier

5. China, Russia, and Central Asia: Triangular Energy Politics
Gregory Gleason

6. China’s Energy Relations with Africa
ZHAO Hong

7. China, Latin America, and the United States:  The Political Economy of Energy Policy in the Americas
Gregg B. Johnson and Jesse T. Wasson

8. A Strategic Game: China’s Energy Relations with Japan and India
Jian Yang

Part III. Challenges for the Future
9.  Pipelines versus Sea Lanes: Challenges and Opportunities for Securing Energy Resources
Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins

10. China’s Energy Relations with the Global South: Potential for Great Power Realignment
Charles E. Ziegler

The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) partnered with the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College for a fourth year and with the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University for the second year to convene the 20th annual People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Conference in Carlisle, Pennsylvania from 25–27 September 2009.

The conference, “The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military,” began with a keynote address by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, and explored the broad range of operational capabilities of China’s military.

Conference Publications: Daniel Alderman, 2009 PLA Conference Colloquium Brief: The “PLA at Home and Abroad.” Released by the Strategic Studies Institute in January 2010, this colloquium brief summarizes key insights from the September 25-27, 2009 conference.

pp. 29-31:

In Chapter 7, Andrew S. Erickson provides an assessment of the PLA Navy’s operation in the Gulf of Aden with emphasis on the motivations and preparations for the mission; relevant operational details, including rules of engagement, equipment, personnel, and logistic support; degree of coordination with other militaries; domestic and international responses to the mission; and indications of the PLA’s own assessment of its achievements regarding the deployment. The findings are:

•             Reasons for China to act are crystal clear: its economic interests are under threat. PLA’s new mission is key in this operation. The dispatch of this PLAN fleet clearly has implications for future operations outside of China. It also goes along with China’s quest for maritime power. China is fortunate to have UN sanctions for this mission. It is able to conduct a “unilateral approach under a multilateral aegis.”

•            Limited U.S. response to piracy in the Horn of Africa arguably offered China a particularly useful strategic opportunity in this regard.

• Platform capability is adequate. China sends its best fleet; although a little oversized for the mission, it is nevertheless well suited for it. At the writing of this volume, China has rotated in five task forces and warships from a variety of classes have participated. See Table on p. 305.

•            Rules of engagement are well observed. China strictly follows UN authorization and obtained Somalia government approval to act. It projects the image of a responsible stakeholder.

•            The operation is a valuable training opportunity for the PLA Navy. Significant logistics capabilities constitute the vital backbone of the mission; their largely commercial nature suggests dynamism and sustainability that could make future efforts in this area both feasible and affordable.

•            The PLAN tests a variety of capabilities such as satellite tracking and communication, sustained logistic support, and replenishment.

•            China is attaining a new level of blue-water experience with a mission that requires rapid response, underway replenishment, on-station information-sharing, and calls in foreign ports to take on supplies and engage in diplomacy. Sending an 800 crew-member surface action group five time zones away, with 70 special forces embarked and combat contingencies possible, presents unprecedented challenges and opportunities. PLAN personnel continue to learn new techniques, test their equipment, and can be expected to advocate improvements upon their return.

•            An overseas supply base is now on the agenda. Without an overseas supply post, a PLAN long- term operation is still in question. Looking for a base on land will naturally follow.

Erickson maintains that in the years to come, China is likely to follow a two-level approach to naval development, with consistent focus on increasingly formidable high-end anti-access capabilities to support major combat operations in China’s maritime close neighborhood (e.g., a Taiwan scenario), and relatively low-intensity but gradually growing capabilities to influence strategic conditions further afield.

The editors of the volume discussed its contents on 13 July 2010 at the South Congressional Meeting Room, U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, from 9:30-11:00 AM. 

2009 PLA Conference—

The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military

The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) partnered with the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College for a fourth year and with the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University for the second year to convene the 20th annual People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Conference in Carlisle, Pennsylvania from 25–27 September 2009.

The conference, “The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military,” began with a keynote address by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, and explored the broad range of operational capabilities of China’s military.

Conference Publications

2009 PLA Conference Colloquium Brief: “The PLA at Home and Abroad” by Daniel Alderman.

Released by the Strategic Studies Institute in January 2010, this colloquium brief summarizes key insights from the 2009 conference.

The table of contents of the volume is listed below:

THE PLA AT HOME AND ABROAD
Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military

(July 2010)

CONTENTS

Foreword

George H.W. Bush

Introduction

David Lai

1. The People’s Liberation Army and the Changing Global Security Landscape

Paul H.B. Godwin

2. Discourse in 3-D: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine, Circa 2009

Andrew Scobell

3. Changing Civil-Military Relations in China

You Ji and Daniel Alderman

4. Towards an Integrative C4ISR System: Informationization and Joint Operations in the People’s Liberation Army

Kevin Pollpeter

5. The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Internal Security Challenges

Harold M. Tanner

6. Chinese Sea Power in Action: The Counter Piracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond

Andrew S. Erickson

7. People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-2009

Dennis J. Blasko

8. Military Exchanges with Chinese Characteristics: The People’s Liberation Army Experience with Military Relations

Heidi Holz and Kenneth Allen

9. Emerging Grand Strategy for China’s Defense Industry Reform

Eric Hagt

10. Taming the Hydra: Trends in China’s Military Logistics Since 2000

Susan M. Puska

Now the second largest oil-consuming country after the US, China’s growing need for resources will affect its development as well as that of its neighbors and other developing countries. China’s Energy Relations with the Developing World examines China’s access to the energy resources of the developing world and its impact on Chinese foreign relations.

Contributed by experts in international relations and Chinese politics, the essays look at China’s expanding relations with the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, India; the security implications of China’s quest for energy resources; and its impact on relations with world powers such as the US. The book also asks whether China’s competition for energy resources will foster cooperation or conflict with other energy-consuming great powers.

China’s Energy Relations with the Developing World provides is an accessible text that will appeal to students, faculty, and policy makers seeking to understand Chinese politics, energy policy, and the factors that may lie beneath key future geopolitical and security issues.

The greater South China Sea region boasts increasing maritime commerce but faces growing unconventional security threats. A wide variety of bilateral and multilateral maritime security cooperation initiatives that recognize both the gravity of extant threats and the interests of those responsible nations involved are helping provide a set of frameworks for collective security. There are other positive indications that analysts in nations throughout the Asia-Pacific increasingly seek cooperative solutions to maritime security concerns. Establishing specific security measures offers prospects for increasing trust, fostering good will, and enhancing maritime security in Southeast Asia. As two major Pacific powers, the U.S. and China have a critical role to play in this process. Effective bilateral communication in this regard will maximize prospects for positive results.

1. Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Challenges and Emerging Cooperation

It is well known that the Asia-Pacific region faces significant security challenges, many partially linked to the region’s continued economic growth. There is an urgent need to fight rising terrorism and other security threats. Recent trends in non-state threats include terrorism, piracy, smuggling, and the targeting of critical infrastructure. Maintaining regional security is important for the wellbeing of the region’s people, sixty percent of whom live in or rely economically on maritime zones.

It is also important because of the region’s critical role in international trade and energy supply. Roughly one third of world trade passes through the Strait of Malacca annually. This includes more than 50 000 vessels, twice the number that pass through the Suez Canal by some estimates and many times that which pass through the Panama Canal. It includes 11.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil. Eighty percent of Chinese crude oil imports, for instance, including virtually all of China’s imports from the Middle East and Africa, flow through Malacca. According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency, if an oil spill, piracy, or terrorism closed the 1.5 mile wide Strait, “nearly half of the world’s fleet would be required to sail further, generating a substantial increase in the requirement for vessel capacity. All excess capacity of the world fleet might be absorbed, with the effect strongest for crude oil shipments and dry bulk such as coal. Closure of the Strait of Malacca would immediately raise freight rates worldwide.” The South China Sea is likewise a vital transport corridor for liquefied natural gas (LNG), carrying 2/3 of the world’s current LNG trade. At present, Japan and South Korea are the region’s primary LNG users. Japan, for instance, imported 58.6 million tons of LNG in 2005, and South Korea 23.1 million tons in 2004, as compared to a smaller amount in Mainland China and Taiwan’s 5.5 million tons in that same year. LNG transport security is also of great interest to China, however, which by 2020 may be importing more than 30 million tons per year.

Of central significance to the economic interests of the U.S., its East Asian partners, and indeed the world, is the security of mega-hubs. Five of these deep-water ports (Singapore, Hong Kong, Ningbo/Shanghai, Kaosiung, Guangzhou, and Yokohama), which can accommodate the 60-foot drafts of the largest container ships, are located in East Asia. The world’s 20 mega-hub container ports send nearly 68 percent of the 5.7 million containers entering the U.S. by sea annually. This is part of a larger pattern in which seaborne trade, which accounts for 80 percent of all international trade, has increased an estimated 4.1 percent (in 2004), and 3.6 percent (in 2005 and 2006).

For all these reasons, such non-traditional security threats as piracy “…can no longer be viewed as someone else’s problem. [Piracy] is a global threat to security because of its deepening ties to international criminal networks, smuggling of hazardous cargoes, and disruption of vital commerce,” former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen has emphasized. “Imagine a major seaport or international strait that handles the flow of hundreds of ships and thousands of containers each day—imagine that critical ‘node’ of the world’s economy crippled or disrupted for days or weeks or months.”

2. China’s Growing Maritime Interests

As it becomes an increasingly capable and influential maritime power in all dimensions, China is acquiring a large, comprehensive stake in the security of the oceans. Maritime commerce, in particular, is vital to China’s national program of “peaceful development.” With its over 4 million square km of claimed sea area, 1 400 harbors, and a tremendous number of cargo ships, the world’s largest developing nation generated 10% of its GDP ($270 billion) from maritime industries in 2006, up 14% from 2005. Estimates have projected that it will reach 1 trillion by 2020. With 1 700 ships, China’s merchant marine is second only to Panama in size. A recent article by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Senior Captain Xu Qi in the prestigious journal China Military Science (中国军事科学) further documents China’s growing global maritime interests, stating that today “[China’s] open ocean transport routes pass through every continent and every ocean [and] through each important international strait [to] over six hundred ports in over 150 nations and [administrative] regions.”  A popular government-inspired study entitled The Rise of Great Powers (大国崛起) suggests that economic development, fueled by foreign trade and safeguarded by a sustainable and non-provocative degree of naval power, drives national development. In this regard, it is worth noting that China imports staggering amounts of raw inputs to fuel its dynamic industrially-intensive economy. As the world’s largest iron ore importer, for instance, China is projected to receive 370-80 million tons in 2007.

China’s strategic thinkers believe maritime energy security to be increasingly vital. Despite extensive exploration of offshore reserves to replace dwindling onshore reservoirs, China receives 85% of its imported oil by sea. A variety of existing and envisioned pipelines, of varying degrees of logistical and economic viability, are unlikely to substantially reduce this dependence on sea lane security. Indeed, according to PLAN Senior Captain Xu Qi, “By 2020… It may be [come] necessary to import three-quarters of [China’s] oil from overseas.” While the central government’s level of support remains uncertain, it seems that a significant increase in Chinese-constructed and -flagged oil tankers is under way, with a view to fostering economic growth in peacetime and energy security in crisis. For example, Luo Ping, an analyst at the Institute of Comprehensive Transportation (ICT), calls for at least 60 percent of oil imports to be carried by Chinese shipping companies. Ministry of Communications’ Water Transport Department senior official Peng Cuihong states that China will expand its tanker fleet to reduce reliance on foreign oil carriers. In addition, despite considerable internal debate and ongoing challenges, China has commenced construction of some form of strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), and related refinery and pipeline infrastructure.

Shipbuilding, with commercial and military applications, is emerging as a major Chinese industrial sector. Having designated shipbuilding a “strategic industry” in need of “special oversight and support,” China launched over 13 million tons of new ships in 2006. If present trends continue, China will produce 20 million tons annually by 2010. Beijing reportedly aims to become the world’s largest shipbuilder by 2015, with 24 million tons of production capacity (35% of global capacity). Already, 275 000 personnel work in China’s shipbuilding industry overall (with approximately 125 000 employed directly in large ship construction). Nearly 1 500 marine engineers and naval architects graduate from Chinese merchant academies and universities annually (approximately 7 times that from U.S. institutions). While the size of China’s current shipbuilding workforce stems in part from employment imperatives and relatively low average productivity per worker, capabilities are rapidly improving. For example, Chinese shipyards have focused primarily on constructing less sophisticated bulk carriers, but are now building significant numbers of oil, chemical, and liquid propane gas (LPG) tankers, and—encouraged by such bureaucratic entities as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)—are even starting to build small numbers of sophisticated LNG carriers. However uneven in its pace and nature of development, China’s large shipbuilding sector will support broad-based maritime and naval development. As Alfred Thayer Mahan once postulated, when determining a nation’s sea power, “it is not only the grand total [of a country’s population], but the number following the sea, or at least readily available for employment on ship-board and for the creation of naval material that must be counted.” Whether it stays primarily commercial or increases in military orientation, Beijing’s growing shipbuilding sector will give it an even greater stake in the security of the global maritime commons. …

6. Conclusion

The Asia-Pacific region boasts increasing maritime commerce but faces growing unconventional security threats. Many experts believe that robust maritime security cooperation initiatives, (e.g., the CSI and global maritime partnerships), can help provide a framework for security. There are other positive indications that analysts in Pacific nations increasingly seek cooperative solutions to maritime security concerns. A major collaborative Chinese study on sea lane security, for instance, calls for emphasizing cooperation in international organizations and conventions, laws and regulations concerning oil transport. Establishing specific security measures, such as CSI, offers prospects for increasing trust, fostering good will, and enhancing maritime security in East Asia. As the world’s largest developed and developing nation respectively, as well as two major Pacific powers, the U.S. and China have a critical role to play in this process. Effective bilateral communication will maximize prospects for positive results.

Beyond the specifics of bilateral cooperation, important questions that need to be addressed by all Asia-Pacific maritime stakeholders in the future include: How have non-state threats combined to form a new challenge to international maritime commerce and security? What is the nature and level of the threat? Will the maritime realm be a continued target for terrorism? How will the national interests of regional states be safeguarded? Are the international responses and reforms accomplishing what they set out to do? Finally, what are the specific implications for East Asia? Each nation will have its own interests and priorities, but it will be important to reach a common understanding on these broader issues.

One issue that all parties can agree on already is that the multiple, complex security challenges that confront the region call for cooperative security measures that are no less sophisticated than the threats that they are designed to address. As former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen has emphasized,

Today’s reality is that the security arrangements and paradigms of the past are no longer enough for the future. And today’s challenges are too diverse to tackle alone and require more capability and resources than any single nation can deliver. Our level of cooperation and coordination must intensify in order to adapt to our shared challenges and constraints. We have no choice in this matter because I am convinced that… no nation today… can go it alone, especially in the maritime domain. There is no inherent conflict between a country’s national interests in maritime security and the greater security of the global commons. They are mutually reinforcing and inextricably linked—they are two sides of the same coin in today’s globalized world.

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内容简介

《亚洲地缘经济与政治》收录了在“上海论坛2007”上发表的绝大部分论文（包括中文和英文）。论坛主要探讨当下全球范围内各界共同关注的热点议题，其中包括：人民币汇率、东亚金融与货币合作、全球气候变暖与能源消费、亚洲增长模式与经济一体化，以及人口、资源、环境的协调等。

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《亚洲地缘经济与政治》是由上海人民出版社出版的。

目录

上海论坛共识: 亚洲的和谐发展将造福全世界
中国和亚洲良性互动的秩序框架
The Rationale for East Asia Community Building: Regional and Global Governance Issues-Economic Dimension
Clash of Two Asias？Competing Visions for Security in Northeast Asia
A Long Way to Go for an East Asian Economic Integration: An Evidence from Trade in Telecommunications Services
ASEAN Economic Regionalism in Response to Globalization and the Rise of China
On International Cooperation in the Development of an Economic, Financial and Environmental Infrastructure in Asia
Energy Cooperation in Northeast Asia
中国 “能源威胁论” 无助亚洲能源合作
中印能源关系的博弈分析
The Container Security Initiative and Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
美国与东亚: 贸易格局的变化及其原因分析
ASEAN-US Relations at 30: Issues and Challenges
六万会谈面临的挑战与东北亚安全合作
New Policy Paradigm to North Korea
关于泛北部湾区域合作