The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) partnered with the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College for a fourth year and with the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University for the second year to convene the 20th annual People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Conference in Carlisle, Pennsylvania from 25–27 September 2009.

The conference, “The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military,” began with a keynote address by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, and explored the broad range of operational capabilities of China’s military.

Conference Publications: Daniel Alderman, 2009 PLA Conference Colloquium Brief: The “PLA at Home and Abroad.” Released by the Strategic Studies Institute in January 2010, this colloquium brief summarizes key insights from the September 25-27, 2009 conference.

The editors of the volume discussed its contents on 13 July 2010 at the South Congressional Meeting Room, U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, from 9:30-11:00 AM. 

2009 PLA Conference—

The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military

The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) partnered with the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College for a fourth year and with the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University for the second year to convene the 20th annual People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Conference in Carlisle, Pennsylvania from 25–27 September 2009.

The conference, “The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military,” began with a keynote address by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, and explored the broad range of operational capabilities of China’s military.

Conference Publications

2009 PLA Conference Colloquium Brief: “The PLA at Home and Abroad” by Daniel Alderman.

Released by the Strategic Studies Institute in January 2010, this colloquium brief summarizes key insights from the 2009 conference.

The table of contents of the volume is listed below:

THE PLA AT HOME AND ABROAD
Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military

(July 2010)

CONTENTS

Foreword

George H.W. Bush

Introduction

David Lai

1. The People’s Liberation Army and the Changing Global Security Landscape

Paul H.B. Godwin

2. Discourse in 3-D: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine, Circa 2009

Andrew Scobell

3. Changing Civil-Military Relations in China

You Ji and Daniel Alderman

4. Towards an Integrative C4ISR System: Informationization and Joint Operations in the People’s Liberation Army

Kevin Pollpeter

5. The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Internal Security Challenges

Harold M. Tanner

6. Chinese Sea Power in Action: The Counter Piracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond

Andrew S. Erickson

7. People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-2009

Dennis J. Blasko

8. Military Exchanges with Chinese Characteristics: The People’s Liberation Army Experience with Military Relations

Heidi Holz and Kenneth Allen

9. Emerging Grand Strategy for China’s Defense Industry Reform

Eric Hagt

10. Taming the Hydra: Trends in China’s Military Logistics Since 2000

Susan M. Puska

Now the second largest oil-consuming country after the US, China’s growing need for resources will affect its development as well as that of its neighbors and other developing countries. China’s Energy Relations with the Developing World examines China’s access to the energy resources of the developing world and its impact on Chinese foreign relations.

Contributed by experts in international relations and Chinese politics, the essays look at China’s expanding relations with the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, India; the security implications of China’s quest for energy resources; and its impact on relations with world powers such as the US. The book also asks whether China’s competition for energy resources will foster cooperation or conflict with other energy-consuming great powers.

China’s Energy Relations with the Developing World provides is an accessible text that will appeal to students, faculty, and policy makers seeking to understand Chinese politics, energy policy, and the factors that may lie beneath key future geopolitical and security issues.

The greater South China Sea region boasts increasing maritime commerce but faces growing unconventional security threats. A wide variety of bilateral and multilateral maritime security cooperation initiatives that recognize both the gravity of extant threats and the interests of those responsible nations involved are helping provide a set of frameworks for collective security. There are other positive indications that analysts in nations throughout the Asia-Pacific increasingly seek cooperative solutions to maritime security concerns. Establishing specific security measures offers prospects for increasing trust, fostering good will, and enhancing maritime security in Southeast Asia. As two major Pacific powers, the U.S. and China have a critical role to play in this process. Effective bilateral communication in this regard will maximize prospects for positive results.

Despite possessing a coastline some 7,830 nautical miles long and some 3,400 offshore islands, China has pursued maritime development in an atmosphere of considerable uncertainty. The nation has long been a continental power with a feeble navy, but recent assessments suggest that this historic pattern is changing. China appears increasingly determined to create a modern navy. But–while the possibility cannot be excluded outright–it seems that China is not developing long-range power-projection capabilities. Rather, Beijing seems to be constructing a navy geared to achieving asymmetric sea-denial capabilities on its immediate periphery in order to defend its growing maritime interests, and in particular to resolve the volatile Taiwan issue. Nevertheless, its combat potential should not be underestimated.

At least for now, Beijing does not seem intent on fielding carrier battle groups. Therefore, the PLAN is developing very differently from most other large navies, and from the U.S. Navy in particular. Chinese naval strategists seem to embrace their own universal logic of sea power, with both Mahanian and Marxist undercurrents. Despite these foreign influences, however, they insist that China has not, and will not, replicate the martial patterns of the West. Yet, exceptionalism aside, Chinese naval development today seems to be constrained less by ideology than by capabilities. A concerted effort to improve these capabilities is clearly underway and enjoys the sustained support of China’s leadership. More relevant questions are, therefore: What kind of force structure will allow China to execute its strategies effectively, thereby achieving its political objectives? How feasible are China’s plans for force-structure development, and how long will it take to fulfill such plans? A close examination of these and other developments will furnish insights into how strategic thought influences Chinese maritime strategy. Particularly uncertain is the extent to which China will seek to project power beyond its shores. Will China seek ‘‘command of the sea’’? If so, what will be the essence and implications of ‘‘command of the sea with Chinese characteristics’’? In short, can China become a true maritime power?

This chapter, which selectively surveys aspects of China’s naval development in order to elucidate the trajectory of its growing sea power, will proceed in seven steps. A section on latest developments and assessments will survey China’s 2006 Defense White Paper Summary and the 2006 U.S. Department of Defense report on China’s military modernization. The next section, on force structure, will examine China’s military budget; submarine force; MIW (mine-warfare) capabilities; surface ships; amphibious forces; naval air force; command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities; and deck aviation ambitions. Subsequent sections will consider China’s base infrastructure, training, and doctrine. Inferences about China’s naval modernization plan will then be offered, followed by implications for regional naval relations and an overall assessment.

Rising threats to American national security in East Asia coincide with growing uncertainty concerning the future of local support for U.S. basing access there. There is little reason to expect this situation to improve substantially in the foreseeable future. American planners have finally recognized the imperative to build up Guam as a sovereign anchor of America’s force posture in East Asia, to protect American interests in that strategically vital region. In what follows, we examine Guam’s potential importance as a forward operating base for the U.S. Navy and Air Force.

We first detail American interests in East Asia, with particular emphasis on the new national security strategy and potential sources of regional instability. Second, we critically evaluate the 2004 Global Posture Study and the call of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review for “places, not bases.” Third, we review the various political constraints on U.S. military activities in the region. Finally, we explain the importance of strengthening port facilities in Guam, to transform it into a hub fully capable of supporting operations throughout East Asia.

A significant component of contemporary naval transformation involves adapting the force to meet the emerging ballistic missile defense challenge. With the advent of seabased BMD, the U.S. Navy has entered a new era. Northeast Asia represents a highly complex military and diplomatic environment for the United States. What impact will the U.S. Navy’s BMD initiative have on the volatile region? What will be the larger geopolitical consequences of U.S. BMD as its architecture continues to evolve? BMD’s significance for North Korea is frequently discussed and is relatively straightforward; it is, rather, China’s reaction to American BMD, including its naval component, that will have the most profound impact on global politics in the twenty-first century.

This chapter addresses China’s likely countermeasures against U.S. BMD and their implications. The purpose is not to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on the merits of investing in BMD per se but rather to explore how current investments can be made to yield the greatest security dividends for the United States given present geopolitical realities. It begins by outlining the American BMD debate as it relates to China, reviewing the evolution of BMD and countermeasures, and considering the potential impact of ballistic missile defense on China’s nuclear strategy. There follows a detailed discussion of China’s potential BMD countermeasures and a comparison of American and Chinese missile-defense strategies. Finally, the chapter offers conclusions and policy recommendations–for the nation and the U.S. Navy.