… Nowhere is the dynamic relationship between the US and China more tense and more intimate than on the high seas, owing, as this WSJ article notes, to the amphibious ambitions accompanying China’s rise…. The authors highlight 12 key Chinese maritime developments to look for in the next year, and readers will recognize in them many of the key China-related issues that we have been tracking here on the blog. … The PLAN has the potential to play either a stabilizing or destabilizing role in the geopolitics of the 21st century … geostrategists should be tracking its development closely. These 12 trends are a good place to start.

To read the full text of the post referenced here, see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Year of The Water Dragon: 12 Chinese Maritime Developments to Look for in 2012,” China Real Time Report (中国事实报), Wall Street Journal, 23 January 2012.

… Iranian heavy crude anyone? Why don’t Russia and China go along with Western oil sanctions against Iran? One reason is that companies from both countries stand to profit handsomely once the crackdown begins, write Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson at the Wall Street Journal. … This is the history of embargoes, Collins and Erickson remind us — discounts or premiums are demanded, the oil’s provenance is disguised, and it ends up refined and pumped into our automobiles as gasoline. … As for who will earn the big bucks this time, China’s oil trading giants Zhuhai Zhenrong and Unipec seem exceedingly well-placed, write Collins and Erickson. … Collins and Erickson get added points for passing along this extremely handy report (from tanker brokers Poten & Partners) detailing China’s rise as global oil traders. …

To read the original full-text post referenced here, see Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Chinese Traders Poised to Profit From Iran Oil Embargo,” China Real Time Report (中国事实报), Wall Street Journal, 26 January 2012.

How worried should investors be about a slowdown in China? According to the latest GDP statistics, China’s economy expanded 8.9 per cent in the fourth quarter of last year, confounding those who had been predicting a “hard landing” for the country.

But other indicators, such as sales of earthmoving equipment, tell a different story.

“Finding data that accurately reflect real economic activity and are not easily manipulated for political reasons is a key challenge in assessing the Chinese economy,” say Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson on their blog China SignPost. “We believe that earthmover sales are one such indicator.” …

Earthmover sales are a particularly useful indicator, argue Collins and Erickson, because China’s economy is largely driven by construction and fixed-asset investment, which is very heavy equipment-intensive.

And unlike other construction inputs such as copper and steel, earthmovers are not hoarded by speculators. After all, they are illiquid assets that depreciate in value as soon as they are acquired. Therefore earthmover sales are a superior gauge of real demand within the construction sector.

Which is why the following chart should alarm investors. It shows how sales of excavators, bulldozers, and wheel loaders have plunged in recent months. …

To read the original full-text report on which this post is based, see Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Digging In: Earthmover sales reflect risks to China’s economic growth,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 52 (17 January 2012).

Excerpt from the Executive Summary:

The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, despite each country’s power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. Particularly since September 11, 2001, Americans have sensed this vulnerability. The extent to which the Chinese sense it is unclear.

Vulnerability to nuclear attack is familiar to both countries. But the United States and China are also becoming exposed to damage in space and cyberspace because of their growing reliance on those domains for their prosperity and security, as well as each side’s increasing antisatellite (ASAT) and cyber war capabilities. For China, economic integration, production, and commerce—and thus, sustained growth and perhaps political stability—depend vitally on data sharing, making networks and satellites as strategic as they are for the United States.

All three strategic domains are “offense dominant”—technologically, economically, and operationally. Defenses against nuclear, ASAT, and cyber weapons are difficult and yield diminishing results against the offensive capabilities of large, advanced, and determined states such as the United States and China. Nuclear weapons are patently offense dominant because a single explosion can destroy a city. Moreover, it is easier and cheaper for China to improve the survivability of its strategic missile launchers, to multiply deliverable weapons, and to penetrate U.S. missile defenses than it is for the United States to maintain a nuclear first-strike capability. Though it has yet to admit it, the United States cannot deny the Chinese the second-strike nuclear deterrent they are determined to have.

Satellites are inherently vulnerable: conspicuous, easy to track, and fragile. Destroying them or degrading their performance is easier than protecting them. ASAT interceptors are much cheaper than satellites. Likewise, defending computer networks becomes harder and more expensive as the scale and sophistication of the attacker increase. The woes of the cyber defender are compounded by integrated global markets and supply chains for digital components and equipment—in which U.S. and state-affiliated Chinese corporations are leading competitors—increasing the potential for strategic degradation of network infrastructure and disruption of services. In general, strategic offense dominance gives each country an incentive to invest in offense, which in turn spurs the other to keep pace.

Apart from offense dominance, the advance of technology has slashed the costs in lives and treasure of strategic attack, as capabilities have graduated from mass invasion to heavy bombing to nuclear weapons to ASAT and cyber war. If one ignores possible deaths resulting from disruption of public services, ASAT and cyber war might even be considered “nonviolent.” As the number of expected casualties from strategic attack options drops, so could international opprobrium and the inhibitions of decisionmakers. Absent deterrence, thresholds for war in space and cyberspace could become perilously low as offenses improve.

Read the PDF of Paradox of Power.

Advance Praise for “Paradox of Power”:

In an era where the development of new technologies threatens to outstrip strategic doctrine, David Gompert and Phil Saunders offer a searching meditation on issues at the forefront of national security. Policymakers on both sides of the Pacific will find much to consider in this timely and important book.
— Henry Kissinger

In this book, David Gompert and Phil Saunders make an important contribution both to American strategic thinking and to the future of U.S.-China relations. Grounded in the international experience in nuclear deterrence yet fresh and novel, their recommendations for mutual strategic restraint in space and cyber relationships between the two countries are deep and compelling. Gompert and Saunders take a new look and come up with a practical way forward in areas that are difficult, important, sensationalized and little understood. Both interested citizens and government specialists and policymakers will benefit from their work.
—ADM Dennis Blair, USN (Ret.)
former Director of National Intelligence and
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

For the United States, avoiding an adversarial relationship with China cannot be accomplished through wishful thinking or adjustments in defense spending. Despite many overlapping interests between the two countries, strategic mistrust is growing and has the potential to overwhelm areas of cooperation. This seminal book addresses this problem head on, focusing on how to achieve stable deterrence through mutual restraint in three critical areas—nuclear weapons, computer systems, and space—where both countries are vulnerable to attacks. The authors, two experienced and respected experts, provide thoughtful analysis and constructive recommendations. Readers will gain a better understanding not only of these strategic issues but also of the complex dynamic at the heart of the U.S.-China relationship.
— J. Stapleton Roy
former U.S. Ambassador to China

Read the PDF of Paradox of Power.

For sources cited in this volume, see:

Andrew Erickson, “Take China’s ASBM Potential Seriously,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 136. 2 (February 2010): 8.

Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray, and Andrew R. Wilson, eds., China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007).

Executive Summary

Although China continues to lag approximately two decades behind the world’s most sophisticated air forces in terms of its ability to develop and produce fighter aircraft and other complex aerospace systems, it has moved over time from absolute reliance on other countries for military aviation technology to a position where a more diverse array of strategies can be pursued. Steps taken in the late 1990s to reform China’s military aviation sector demonstrated an understanding of the problems inherent in high-technology acquisition, and an effort to move forward. However, a decade later it remains unclear how effective these reforms have been. Where are the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and China’s military aviation industry headed? What obstacles must be overcome for China to join the exclusive ranks of those nations possessing sophisticated air forces and aviation industries capable of producing world-class aircraft?

This study identifies potential aviation technology development and procurement strategies, presents a general model of the options available to developing countries, and applies that model to explain Chinese procurement and aviation technology acquisition efforts over the last 60 years. The model articulates three main technology procurement avenues: purchase (buy), indigenous development (build), and espionage (steal), and three subavenues: reverse engineering (combining buy/steal and build), coproduction (combining buy and build), and codevelopment (combining buy and build, with an emphasis on build). It examines the costs, benefits, and tradeoffs inherent in each approach. Four variables influence decisions about the mix of strategies: (1) a country’s overall level of economic development, in particular the state of its technical/industrial base; (2) the technological capacity of a country’s military aviation sector; (3) the willingness of foreign countries to sell advanced military aircraft, key components, armaments, and related production technology; and (4) the country’s bargaining power vis-à-vis potential suppliers.

In applying the model, we divide the evolution of China’s military aviation industry into five periods based on China’s changing access to foreign suppliers of military aircraft and aviation technology. Soviet assistance (1950–1960) provided the foundation for China’s military aviation industry, which cut its teeth coproducing Soviet fighter, bomber, and transport aircraft. Given Western embargoes, Moscow offered the only viable path to advanced aviation technology and provided assistance on favorable terms to support its communist ally. The second period (1960 1977) is marked by the Sino-Soviet split, which eliminated Chinese access to cutting-edge aviation hardware. China continued to produce and make modest refinements to 1950s vintage Soviet aircraft designs, using reverse engineering to fill in gaps where technical information was lacking. In the third period (1977–1989), China gained some access to Western aviation components and technologies and sought to apply them to a variant of the J–8 (a twin engine fighter based on a modified MiG–21 design) and the JH–7 (a fighter-bomber with a British engine). The fourth period (1989–2004) is marked by Western bans on arms sales to China in the wake of Tiananmen, Sino-Soviet rapprochement (leading to sales of advanced Russian fighters and coproduction arrangements), and a brief but important window of access to Israeli technologies. Covert access to advanced Western fighters and espionage (in both traditional forms and via computer network operations) also began to make more contributions.

In the fifth period (2004–present), China has enjoyed increased access to foreign commercial aviation technologies and has benefited from a “spin-off, spin-on” dynamic in gaining commercial access to dual-use technologies and applying them for military purposes. However, China’s legitimate access to advanced military-specific technologies has been reduced as Western sources of supply remained closed and Russia has become more reluctant to provide advanced aviation technology due to China’s reverse engineering of the Su-27, fear of future competition for export markets, and concerns about China’s long-term strategic direction.

China has used coproduction, selected purchases of advanced aircraft, reverse engineering, and foreign design assistance to build a capable military aviation industry with a significant indigenous design and production capacity. The Chinese military aviation industry can now produce two fourth-generation fighters roughly equal to those in advanced air forces: the J–10 (indigenously developed with Israeli assistance) and the J–11B (based on coproduction and reverse engineering of the Su-27). Both aircraft still rely on imported Russian turbofan engines. Test flights of the new J–20 stealth fighter prototype demonstrate Chinese ambitions to build fifth-generation fighters, but the extent to which the J–20 will match the performance of state-of-the-art Russian and Western fighters is unclear. Significant technical hurdles in engine design, avionics, and systems integration are likely to delay operational deployment of the J–20 until about 2020. This would be about 15 years after the F–22 entered U.S. Air Force service, supporting an overall assessment that the Chinese military aviation industry remains 15–20 years behind.

Producing state-of-the-art fighters requires an aviation industry to master a range of highly advanced, military-specific technologies. The historical development of China’s military aviation industry reflects an ongoing tension between the desire for self-reliance in defense and the need for access to advanced foreign technologies. China’s legitimate access to cutting-edge Western military technologies will likely remain curtailed and Russian reluctance to supply advanced military technologies will likely grow. These assumptions support two important conclusions. First, the Chinese military aviation industry will have to rely primarily on indigenous development of advanced “single-use” military aviation technologies in the future. The Chinese government is pursuing a range of “indigenous innovation” and technology development programs, but mastering advanced technologies becomes more difficult and expensive as a country moves closer to the technology frontier. This leads to a second, related conclusion: China will likely rely more heavily on espionage to acquire those critical military aviation technologies it cannot acquire legitimately from foreign suppliers or develop on its own. …

For sources mentioned in this study, see:

Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Jet Engine Development in China: Indigenous high-performance turbofans are a final step toward fully independent fighter production,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 39 (26 June 2011).

Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, eds., Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011).

Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “China’s New Project 718/J-20 Fighter: Development outlook and strategic implications,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 18 (17 January 2011).

Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security, 36/3 (Winter 2011/12): 41-78.

Two assumptions dominate current foreign policy debates in the United States and China. First, the United States is in decline relative to China. Second, much of this decline is the result of globalization and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization. Both of these assumptions are wrong. The United States is not in decline; in fact, it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991. Moreover, globalization and hegemony do not erode U.S. power; they reinforce it. The United States derives competitive advantages from its hegemonic position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. The United States should therefore continue to prop up the global economy and maintain a robust diplomatic and military presence abroad. …

For the article cited here, see Andrew S. Erickson and David Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 135.3 (May 2009): 26-32.

For a related article of possible interest, see Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “China’s S-Curve Trajectory: Structural factors will likely slow the growth of China’s economy and comprehensive national power,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 44 (15 August 2011).

The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. Admiral Michael Mullen, then-Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, stated in June 2010 that “I have moved from being curious to being genuinely concerned” about China’s military programs. The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget.

Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.

China’s naval modernization effort, which began in the 1990s, encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surface ships. China’s naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises.

Observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization effort has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. Observers believe that China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals, such as asserting or defending China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing China’s view—a minority view among world nations—that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); protecting China’s sea lines of communications; protecting and evacuating Chinese nationals living and working in foreign countries; displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific; and asserting China’s status as a major world power.

Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: whether, in the context of anticipated reductions in planned levels of defense spending, the U.S. Navy in coming years will be large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also adequately performing other missions of interest to U.S. policymakers around the world; the Navy’s ability to counter Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and whether the Navy, in response to China’s maritime anti-access capabilities, should shift over time to a more distributed fleet architecture.…

… Having already sounded my own note of pessimism earlier this year regarding the rampant predictions of China’s never-ending linear growth, it is worth revisiting an excellent blog post from August by China Signpost’s Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson entitled, “China’s S-Curve Trajectory,” which argues that structural factors are likely to slow the growth of China’s economy and its “comprehensive national power.” Building off economist Michael Pettis’ prediction that China’s GDP growth rate actually needs to drop by half — from 8-9 percent to 3-4 percent — if its many structural problems are to be addressed, the two authors borrow political scientist Robert Gilpin’s seminal use of the S-curve theory to explain how China’s decelerating growth rate will deeply constrain its ability to project power internationally. …

In their eyes, the same debilitating drains on national wealth that currently affect the United States — namely, out-of-control healthcare costs, unfunded pensions and vast overseas military commitments — will eventually threaten China’s fiscal standing in a very similar fashion. Unsurprisingly, given the presently poor state of strategic thinking in the United States, the authors lament that “few [analysts] have considered the possibility that similar factors would contain China — and perhaps much sooner than commonly anticipated.”

But that’s just the tip of the “S”-berg that Collins and Erickson cite. Detailing the rising — and largely hidden — public debt represented by rampant pollution, political corruption, chronic diseases, water shortages, internal security spending and an aging population, the two authors warn that China’s internal challenges will logically “feed off of one another and exact increasingly large costs.” Moreover, they note that “China is encountering these headwinds at a much earlier stage in its development than did the U.S. and other great powers, thanks in part to its late start in modernization and its domestic internal disparities.”

But what of China’s legendary capacity for long-range thinking that overcomes all such dynamics? Here, Collins and Erickson correctly capture the reality of rapidly urbanizing and industrializing China when they argue that not only is the country’s economic development far more locally directed than is commonly realized, but local officials exhibit a get-rich-quick mindset completely at odds with Beijing’s desire to keep everything on a reasonably even keel, lest the country tear itself apart over skyrocketing income inequality. As they note, “A local official attempting to get promoted to the next level . . . is judged on short-term growth, just as an American corporation is preoccupied with quarterly profits, often at the expense of long-term strategy.” …

To read an abridged version of the aforementioned article, see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “China’s S-Shaped Threat,” The Diplomat, 6 September 2011.

For the full text version, see Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “China’s S-Curve Trajectory: Structural factors will likely slow the growth of China’s economy and comprehensive national power,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 44 (15 August 2011).

Gabriel B. Collins and William S. Murray, “No Oil for the Lamps of China?” Naval War College Review, 61.2 (Spring 2008): 79-95.

The ubiquitous Made in China stickers and labels on consumer products remind us daily of China’s incredible economic rise. The world is accustomed to this powerful phenomenon and seems to expect that China’s economy will grow at 10 percent annually for at least another decade. Such remarkable economic progress has lifted millions of Chinese out of poverty and also substantially benefited the global economy. It is also arguably the cornerstone of Chinese Communist Party legitimacy.

Western and Asian hunger for inexpensive Chinese goods fuels much of this growth, but China’s economic engine cannot run without imports of raw materials, such as bauxite, iron ore, timber, and, perhaps most significantly, crude oil. Once a significant exporter, China became a net importer of crude in 1993 and now struggles to deal with this dependency.

Chinese security analysts fear that oil import dependency is a potential pressure point that could be exploited by future adversaries of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Approximately 80 percent of China’s 3.3 million barrels per day (bpd) in crude oil imports passes through the Straits of Malacca. Such funneling could facilitate interdiction of China’s oil lifeline in times of crisis. The United States, India, and Japan are all seen as potential blockaders, but Chinese observers appear to believe that only the United States has both the capability and the will to blockade oil shipments to China. One recent Chinese article postulates that the most likely triggers of an oil blockade of China include a fight over Taiwan and a situation in which China’s rise becomes hostile and directly threatening to other major powers.

Some Chinese analysts argue that the need to protect shipments of oil and other vital raw materials is a key driver behind the PRC’s intensive aerial and naval modernization programs. Yet despite impressive improvements, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) lacks the ability to defend the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) over which Chinese oil supplies flow. Among other limitations, the PLAN lacks guaranteed access to ports for refueling, repairing, and replenishing as well as adequate numbers of at-sea-replenishment vessels necessary to support long-range missions. More fundamentally, the PLAN rarely undertakes long-distance operations, which would provide vital training and experience for SLOC-protection missions.

In contrast, some of Beijing’s potential adversaries have decades of blue-water experience, world-class logistical capacity, global access to replenishment ports, and doctrine and equipment oriented toward warfare on the high seas. Beijing’s strategists recognize this disparity and are presumably devising plans to counter any possible future efforts to cut China’s petroleum umbilical cord.

This article examines potential Chinese responses to possible forms of energy blockade. The first two sections discuss how a distant blockade might be conducted and surveys possible Chinese responses to such an action. The third section hypothesizes a close blockade and then analyzes potential courses of action in response. The fourth section examines the possibility of a “blockade by convoy,” while the final section considers an energy-denial strategy that would target China’s ability to transport and process crude oil.

The authors conclude that an energy blockade of China would not only fail to achieve its objective but also send destructive shock waves through the global economic and political landscape. Frankly discussing energy sea-lane security will, ideally, promote trust and lay a foundation for deeper energy security cooperation between China and other major oil consumers. …

William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review, 61.3 (Summer 2008): 13-38.

China’s recent military modernization has fundamentally altered Taiwan’s security options. New Chinese submarines, advanced surface-to-air missiles, and, especially, short-range ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles have greatly reduced Taiwan’s geographic advantage. Taipei can no longer expect to counter Chinese military strengths in a symmetrical manner, with Patriot interceptors, diesel submarines, surface warships, F-16 fighters, and P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. Taiwan must therefore rethink and redesign its defense strategy, emphasizing the asymmetrical advantage of being the defender, seeking to deny the People’s Republic its strategic objectives rather than attempting to destroy its weapons systems. This would enable Taipei to deter more effectively Beijing’s use of coercive force, would provide better means for Taiwan to resist Chinese attacks should deterrence fail, and would provide the United States additional time to determine whether intervening in a cross-strait conflict was in its own national interest. The strategy would also place the responsibility for Taiwan’s defense squarely on its own military. Finally, it would restore the United States to unambiguous compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been increasingly explicit about its military modernization objectives. China’s 2004 white paper on national defense stated that “the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] will . . . enhance the development of its operational strength with priority given to the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and strengthen its comprehensive deterrence and warfighting capabilities.” The introduction of new classes of advanced surface warships; the unveiling of new nuclear-powered submarines, tactical fighter aircraft, and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with advanced warheads; and an antisatellite demonstration—all attest to the determined pursuit of these goals. Many analysts believe that China’s near-term purposes are to deter Taiwan from declaring independence, to provide leverage by which to coerce a reunification with Taiwan if deterrence fails, and to inhibit or delay U.S. intervention in such a conflict.

Chinese employment strategies for these new weapons systems and potential capabilities remain unknown, though statements from senior leaders provide important hints. For example, President Hu Jintao is said to have stated in August 2007 that China had five major military priorities relative to Taiwan: establishing military readiness, conducting demonstrative exercises, “imposing a blockade on the Taiwan Strait,” “carrying out combined firepower attacks,” and “[conducting a] cross-sea landing.” Guo Boxiong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, boasted in March 2008, “We have the resolve and capability to deal with a major ‘Taiwan independence’ incident at any time.” The likely use of force would encompass three components: long-range precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade. These attack mechanisms would also likely be conducted in close coordination, not independently. Taiwan faces the daunting challenge of how best to deny China the fulfillment of these objectives.

Previous studies of potential China-Taiwan conflict scenarios have concluded that Taiwan (either acting alone or with the assistance of the U.S. military) could defeat PRC coercion, thus presumably ensuring reliable deterrence. Several of these studies have asserted that the Second Artillery (the PRC’s strategic rocket force) possessed only a limited inventory of relatively inaccurate short-range missiles with which to attack Taiwan, restricting its role to what Robert Pape calls “coercion by punishment,” terrorizing or inflicting pain on the population—a strategy that observers like Pape argue is rarely successful. These circumstances, however, have now changed profoundly. Over the past decade China has greatly enhanced its capacity to “reach” Taiwan with far more accurate and decisive capabilities, and recent analyses question Taiwan’s near-term ability to resist coercive force.

For example, the PRC’s expanding arsenal of increasingly accurate ballistic missiles can quickly, and with complete surprise, cripple or destroy high-value military assets, including aircraft on the ground and ships at piers. This emergent capability, plus the acquisition of long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), suggests that the PRC has shifted its anti-Taiwan military strategy away From coercion by punishment toward denying Taiwan the use of its air force and navy. Taiwan therefore faces a threat against which it has not adequately prepared and that offers the PRC a real prospect of achieving success before the United States could intervene. This is a very worrisome development.

Taiwan’s responses to China’s enhanced capabilities remain highly conflicted, a situation that reflects the deep political disagreements that shape Taipei’s military policies. Taipei decreased its defense budgets in absolute and relative terms from1993 until 2003, with only meager improvements thereafter. These diminished efforts hardly seem commensurate with the increased threat that Taiwan confronts. They suggest either a state of denial about the threat, a gridlocked political system, misplaced faith in current systems and geographic advantages, or perhaps most disturbingly, a belief that the United States is certain to provide timely military assistance. Despite this ambivalence and its anemic defense budget, Taiwan has sought costly weapons systems from the United States, including PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability, third version) missile systems, P-3 maritime patrol and F-16 fighter aircraft, Kidd-class destroyers, and diesel submarines. Taiwan is also reportedly attempting to develop offensive counterstrike capabilities indigenously, including the 360-mile-range Hsung-Feng IIE cruise missile.

Both approaches represent serious misperceptions of the threats posed to Taiwan and a misallocation of budgetary resources. The PAC-3s and other potential purchases are expensive, and they concentrate Taiwan’s defense dollars on a limited range of capabilities that China is increasingly able to defeat. Offensive counterstrike weapons, furthermore, are potentially destabilizing, since China would have difficulty determining if such strikes originated from American or Taiwanese platforms. They are also unlikely to be acquired in numbers sufficient to deter China.

More affordable, more effective, and less destabilizing means of defense against precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade are nonetheless available, but to take advantage of them, Taiwan must rethink its defense strategies. Rather than trying to destroy incoming ballistic missiles with costly PAC-3 SAMs, Taiwan should harden key facilities and build redundancies into critical infrastructure and processes so that it could absorb and survive a long-range precision bombardment. Rather than relying on its navy and air force (neither of which is likely to survive such an attack) to destroy an invasion force, Taiwan should concentrate on development of a professional standing army armed with mobile, short-range, defensive weapons. To withstand a prolonged blockade, Taiwan should stockpile critical supplies and build infrastructure that would allow it to attend to the needs of its citizens unassisted for an extended period. Finally, Taiwan should eschew destabilizing offensive capabilities, which could include, in their extreme form, tactical nuclear weapons employed in a countervalue manner, or less alarmingly, long-range conventional weapons aimed against such iconic targets as the Three Gorges Dam.

Such shifts constitute a “porcupine strategy.” They would offer Taiwan a way to resist PRC military coercion for weeks or months without presuming immediate U.S. intervention. This shift in strategy might also be less provocative to the PRC than Taiwan’s current policy of offensive defense. A porcupine strategy would enhance deterrence, in that a Taipei truly prepared to defend itself would be able to thwart a decapitation attempt—thereby discouraging Beijing from acting militarily. Perhaps most important, such a policy would allow the United States time to deliberate whether intervention was warranted. Washington could avoid a reflexive decision that would draw it into a war against a major power that had systematically prepared for just such a contingency for more than a decade.

This article has five principal parts. The first summarizes the history and rationale of the 2001 U.S. arms offer to Taiwan and explains why the weapons sales proposed are unsuited to the effective defense of the island. The second section outlines how China would probably attempt to destroy or neutralize the Taiwan air force and navy, and it proposes an alternative strategy for countering China’s increasingly precise short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), cruise missiles, and manned tactical aircraft. The third part explores how Beijing’s invasion options would change if Taipei lost its navy and the use of its air force. The fourth section examines PRC blockade options against Taiwan and suggests how Taiwan could more effectively deny China its blockade objectives. The concluding section considers the impediments to, and repercussions of, adoption by Taiwan of a “porcupine defense.” …