This book connects China’s past, present, and future and places them in a larger, evolving context. Horner’s work is nothing short of a tour de force of world intellectual history as projected and contested on the canvas that is China. Eloquent and engaging, it is pointed without being overly judgmental, incorporating an absorbing literature review that is surprisingly cogent, considering the sheer amount of information conveyed.

Horner takes a bold and transparent approach: his “hypothetical history of the future” analyzes the past in the context of contemporary politics and debates, as post-1978 market reforms have opened up intellectual discourse. He explores longtime Chinese bureaucratic practices of devising norms and lessons from history, offering examples from the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties. Strategic debate in the Qing dynasty regarding the value of China’s western territories reveals enduring tensions in its strategic orientation between continental and maritime frontiers and between factions advocating their respective emphases. Horner tackles the enduring puzzle of why China’s leaders failed to anticipate maritime threats from Western powers and finds that the Qing government devoted insufficient attention to diplomacy and intelligence abroad and failed to consult knowledgeable overseas Chinese. Then, as now, there is widespread determination to make China a prosperous great power but uncertainty regarding how to do so.

In this initial two-volume set, Boris Chertok chronicles Soviet air and space development through approximately 1960, drawing on his six decades of experience as one of Moscow’s foremost air and space engineers, engaged in nearly all major projects. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration plans to publish volumes three and four (concerning Moscow’s space program in the early-to-mid 1960s and the moon shot in the late 1960s, respectively) in 2008–9. Translated from the original Russian (published in Moscow as Rakety i lyudi, 1994–99) and substantially revised, the series is edited by noted space historian Asif Siddiqi. In these volumes, Chertok offers unique historical insights and documentary references, many previously unavailable in the West, thus giving the reader penetrating views into an era in which “rocket-space technology became one of the determining factors in the politics of the leading nations” (vol. 1, p. 8).

The authors have produced the first major study that evaluates comprehensively the specific antiaccess methods being discussed by Chinese military strategists. They bring to bear a wide variety of relevant doctrinal and analytic materials (many of which they themselves have translated) and explain clearly their relative authority. The authors’ conclusion is sobering: in the unfortunate event of a Taiwan Strait conflict, China’s military may consider launching a rapid surprise attack. Such a first strike could damage and render ineffective a wide variety of U.S. military platforms (aircraft carrier strike groups–which are described as having special vulnerabilities–and assets at regional bases). This could deny U.S. forces effective “access” to sea and air space to China’s east, leaving Taiwan vulnerable to military coercion and testing American resolve. The authors term this growing zone “the Dragon’s Lair.” While the United States would retain significant military forces regardless of the outcome of such a conflict, China might be able to achieve specific military and political objectives at America’s expense.

This edited volume combines high-level inquiry into the larger purposes and dimensions of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reforms with fresh data that are difficult to find elsewhere. Its overall theme, the likely future dimensions and missions of China’s military, is addressed in contributions from leading experts in the field. The chapters, organized by service, are solidly grounded in Chinese sources and knowledge of Chinese organizations.

Well written, succinct, and timely, this balanced assessment of Chinese naval weaknesses and strengths offers specific technological development and procurement alternatives to inform Washington’s decision making. O’Rourke is a naval issues analyst for the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. Specialists will want to consult his related product, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress. First published in November 2006, the latter report has been updated regularly.

It should be noted that Nova published O’Rourke’s research without his participation; this was possible because copyright may not be claimed for products produced for the U.S. Government.

This sophisticated Chinese-language research, based on numerous original sources and interviews, completes Lewis and Xue’s authoritative series on China’s military development. Other books in the series, all published by Stanford University Press, are China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (1994), Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (1993), and China Builds the Bomb (1988). In this fourth and final volume, the authors (both scholars affiliated with Stanford) begin by surveying Chinese military culture and history.  Part Two elucidates China’s military decision making. The third part examines China’s recent efforts to modernize its strategic rocket forces and air force. Finally, the authors assess the degree to which China’s military has met the strategic imperatives of its ancient strategists and modern leaders.

This first English-language volume on strategy by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was translated by a team of experts at the Academy of Military Science from the original Chinese-language version (Zhanlüexue, 2001). Edited by two major generals with significant ability to shape PLA strategy as advisers to China’s powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and Politburo Standing Committee, this volume undoubtedly
reflects elements of critical policy trends in Beijing and hence merits close examination by foreign researchers and policy makers.

The 2001 Chinese-language version is used to educate senior PLA decision makers, including those on the CMC, as well as officers who may become China’s future strategic planners. Now in its fourth printing, it can be read along with a variety of other texts, such as the more operationally and tactically focused Science of Campaigns (Zhanyixue), published by China’s National Defense University in 2000, to better understand actual PLA doctrine.

Part One surveys China’s historical experience and development of military theory. Part Two offers Chinese perspectives on the laws and conduct of war. Part Three examines future warfare and the implications for China, including recent PLA experience and combat guidelines.

As the first English-language analysis of its kind, Graham’s comprehensive case study fills a critical gap in the literature concerning the maritime dimension of Japanese national security. Graham (currently a British government researcher at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s North Asia and Pacific Research Group) draws on fresh, original sources, including Japanese language documents and interviews with Japanese officials, to demonstrate that while Japan’s defense and foreign policy have changed dramatically since its opening up to the world in 1853, sea-lane security has been an enduring national security concern. Graham offers insight into Japanese leaders’ and analysts’ perceptions of their nation’s own security context, thereby avoiding the tendency of much related scholarship to view matters exclusively through the prism of relations with the United States.

This edited volume, with contributions from leading experts in the field, assesses China’s strategic force modernization and suggests that Beijing is in the process of adapting its nuclear posture to a changing strategic environment. In lieu of a traditional conclusion, it weighs future alternatives for China’s nuclear force and doctrine and probes the factors that will determine Beijing’s ultimate nuclear path. The editors are well qualified for this ambitious task. Paul Bolt, professor of political science at the U.S. Air Force Academy, has taught extensively in China. Colonel Albert Willner has taught at the U.S. Military Academy and is a U.S. Army expert on China.

Four particularly compelling issues emerge from this volume. First, continued lack of Chinese transparency concerning nuclear weapons development and policy not only makes this subject challenging for foreign research, but may complicate China’s own nuclear strategy. Secondly, much has been made of Chinese strategic culture and its emphasis on the finely calibrated use of force to achieve favorable changes in the overall strategic situation. Third, another uncertainty is how American ballistic missile defense (BMD) architecture will evolve, and the extent to which China will develop corresponding countermeasures to preserve its nuclear deterrent. Finally, and perhaps of greatest immediate interest to foreign analysts, is the issue of whether China’s policy of no-first-use (NFU), or at least a restrictive interpretation thereof, is sustainable.