Each year there is one book that stands out from the pack. China, the United States and 21st Century Sea Power is a book that needs to be read by every member of the Australian Naval Institute, not only because it provides a blue-print for naval policy in the Asia-Pacific Century but also because it is one of the few authoritative works that discusses a cooperative alternative to the sensationalist threat driven responses to the rise of China.

The collection of papers contained within China, the United States and 21st Century Sea Power are derived from the US Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute’s third annual conference, ‘Defining a Maritime Partnership with China’, held in Newport, Rhode Island on 5-6 December 2007. Most of the papers were updated after the conference and a few additional chapters were added to round out the book. The result is a remarkably insightful work that should set the conceptual agenda for maritime engagement between China and the United States (US) for years to come. … Each chapter is prepared by a subject matter expert writing authoritatively, thoroughly and precisely, even though the language itself often has subtle differences in meaning between the equivalent English and Chinese translations. The editors have allowed each chapter to speak for itself, retaining cultural nuances which add considerably to the overall work. The result is a volume that discusses the advantages and limitations of US-China maritime cooperation, which should help policymakers of both nations to chart a course for ‘peaceful development’ for this century.

Overall, the book makes clear that the US and China now have a great opportunity to increase naval cooperation, particularly with maritime security and humanitarian assistance.  The release of A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower, by the US sea services in 2007, has been received positively as a step towards future cooperation, even though that cooperation may be bilateral when dealing with China. A Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) which includes China is still some way off – as is evident from the Chinese decisions to opt out of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and not to join CTF 150 when conducting anti-piracy patrols off the Somali coast.

Although it is not possible to discuss every chapter of the book in this review, a few highlights will illustrate the scope of China, the United States and 21st Century Sea Power. The first chapter by Zhuang Jianzhong effectively sets the scene. He is convinced that US-China cooperation in maritime issues should be in line with China’s overall ‘peaceful development strategy’, as both nations aim to ‘build harmonious oceans and a harmonious world’. Yu Wanli, after summarising the evolution of Chinese naval strategy, states that ‘few scholars publicly declare that the development of the Chinese navy aims to challenge US supremacy at sea.’ He discusses China’s 2004 national defence white paper and its concept of ‘safeguarding national development interests’, and recognises ‘that China’s “peaceful development” is realized by participating in the existing international system and economic globalization.’ Such statements are reassuring, but as other chapters point out, the Chinese language of hedging is not always reflected by actions. Transparency and reciprocity issues are raised a number of times in the book, but even here Eric McVadon points out that much of the US concern may be due more to their not liking what they see from China than to a lack of transparency. It may also be appropriate to reflect upon how hedging language in Australia’s recent Defence White Paper is interpreted overseas, particularly in China. Chapters dealing with maritime commercial partnerships, search and rescue cooperation as well as humanitarian and disaster relief operations, highlight just how far US-China maritime security cooperation has come in recent years. In an especially informative chapter, Andrew Erickson examines views on America’s new maritime strategy as published in China. After describing areas of growing cooperation, he lists some of the obstacles to enhanced cooperation between China and the US; the Taiwan situation, the US use of military power projection, non-transparency, and recent incidents/crises. ‘Despite the long-term strategic importance of cooperation, perceptions and misconceptions will continue to wield great influence over its success’. That said, Erickson also believes that China’s rhetoric is hedging, while actual maritime cooperation proceeds quietly. Again the reader is left feeling cautiously positive about the future.

Some of the major differences between China and the US involve maritime legal issues, especially over the interpretation of maritime zones under the Law of the Sea Convention. The chapters by Julia Xue and Peter Dutton analyse areas of common ground as well as the major differences. The large number of disputed maritime claims, made by China, remain potential sources for international conflict, although the Chinese policy of shelving such disputes is a pragmatic, albeit short-term, solution. The chapters by Wu Shicun and Zhu Huayou describe the opportunities for regional security cooperation in the South China Sea, an area which is of great strategic importance to most Asian nations, but particularly to ASEAN and Australia. James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara also provide a good synopsis of the strategic relationship between the US, China and India in the Indian Ocean.

Some defence analysts continue to see the rise of China in this century, as a modern version of the Anglo-German rivalry of the early 20th Century. Germany’s economic prosperity helped to fund an expanded Imperial German Navy with a global outlook. The British, as the only global sea power, felt threatened by Germany and became involved in a naval arms race that many historians believe was one of the causes of World War I. One would hope that today we would not wish to repeat such a nightmare scenario in the Pacific. It is a little surprising that the other example of naval rivalry during the early 20th Century is often overlooked. From the late 1890s, a rising United States competed with the British Empire for global markets. The US Navy grew rapidly in size and ability, in cooperation with the Royal Navy during 1917-18, and eventually the US replaced Britain as the maritime hegemon. Using Gabriel Collins’s step-wise diagram of maritime security cooperation (p. 33), which ranges from ceremonial visits to full interoperability, we note that the Royal Navy was at the bottom step even though it conducted ceremonial visits with the Imperial German Navy right up to the start of World War I. By the end of that war the US Navy battlefleet was operating as a fully interoperable component of the British Grand Fleet, and thus the US Navy/Royal Navy engagement was at the top step of Collins’s diagram. Today these likely alternatives are at the extreme ends of the spectrum when considering the future relationship between the US Navy and the PLA Navy, but they are certainly worth considering.

China, the United States and 21st Century Sea Power is a positive, balanced, thought provoking, and timely study which will no doubt impact upon the relationship between China and the United States over the next twenty years. One thing is certain, that relationship will also directly affect Australia and Australians. This book is highly recommended.

This book connects China’s past, present, and future and places them in a larger, evolving context. Horner’s work is nothing short of a tour de force of world intellectual history as projected and contested on the canvas that is China. Eloquent and engaging, it is pointed without being overly judgmental, incorporating an absorbing literature review that is surprisingly cogent, considering the sheer amount of information conveyed.

Horner takes a bold and transparent approach: his “hypothetical history of the future” analyzes the past in the context of contemporary politics and debates, as post-1978 market reforms have opened up intellectual discourse. He explores longtime Chinese bureaucratic practices of devising norms and lessons from history, offering examples from the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties. Strategic debate in the Qing dynasty regarding the value of China’s western territories reveals enduring tensions in its strategic orientation between continental and maritime frontiers and between factions advocating their respective emphases. Horner tackles the enduring puzzle of why China’s leaders failed to anticipate maritime threats from Western powers and finds that the Qing government devoted insufficient attention to diplomacy and intelligence abroad and failed to consult knowledgeable overseas Chinese. Then, as now, there is widespread determination to make China a prosperous great power but uncertainty regarding how to do so.

In this initial two-volume set, Boris Chertok chronicles Soviet air and space development through approximately 1960, drawing on his six decades of experience as one of Moscow’s foremost air and space engineers, engaged in nearly all major projects. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration plans to publish volumes three and four (concerning Moscow’s space program in the early-to-mid 1960s and the moon shot in the late 1960s, respectively) in 2008–9. Translated from the original Russian (published in Moscow as Rakety i lyudi, 1994–99) and substantially revised, the series is edited by noted space historian Asif Siddiqi. In these volumes, Chertok offers unique historical insights and documentary references, many previously unavailable in the West, thus giving the reader penetrating views into an era in which “rocket-space technology became one of the determining factors in the politics of the leading nations” (vol. 1, p. 8).

The authors have produced the first major study that evaluates comprehensively the specific antiaccess methods being discussed by Chinese military strategists. They bring to bear a wide variety of relevant doctrinal and analytic materials (many of which they themselves have translated) and explain clearly their relative authority. The authors’ conclusion is sobering: in the unfortunate event of a Taiwan Strait conflict, China’s military may consider launching a rapid surprise attack. Such a first strike could damage and render ineffective a wide variety of U.S. military platforms (aircraft carrier strike groups–which are described as having special vulnerabilities–and assets at regional bases). This could deny U.S. forces effective “access” to sea and air space to China’s east, leaving Taiwan vulnerable to military coercion and testing American resolve. The authors term this growing zone “the Dragon’s Lair.” While the United States would retain significant military forces regardless of the outcome of such a conflict, China might be able to achieve specific military and political objectives at America’s expense.

This edited volume combines high-level inquiry into the larger purposes and dimensions of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reforms with fresh data that are difficult to find elsewhere. Its overall theme, the likely future dimensions and missions of China’s military, is addressed in contributions from leading experts in the field. The chapters, organized by service, are solidly grounded in Chinese sources and knowledge of Chinese organizations.

Well written, succinct, and timely, this balanced assessment of Chinese naval weaknesses and strengths offers specific technological development and procurement alternatives to inform Washington’s decision making. O’Rourke is a naval issues analyst for the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. Specialists will want to consult his related product, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress. First published in November 2006, the latter report has been updated regularly.

It should be noted that Nova published O’Rourke’s research without his participation; this was possible because copyright may not be claimed for products produced for the U.S. Government.

This sophisticated Chinese-language research, based on numerous original sources and interviews, completes Lewis and Xue’s authoritative series on China’s military development. Other books in the series, all published by Stanford University Press, are China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (1994), Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (1993), and China Builds the Bomb (1988). In this fourth and final volume, the authors (both scholars affiliated with Stanford) begin by surveying Chinese military culture and history.  Part Two elucidates China’s military decision making. The third part examines China’s recent efforts to modernize its strategic rocket forces and air force. Finally, the authors assess the degree to which China’s military has met the strategic imperatives of its ancient strategists and modern leaders.

This first English-language volume on strategy by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was translated by a team of experts at the Academy of Military Science from the original Chinese-language version (Zhanlüexue, 2001). Edited by two major generals with significant ability to shape PLA strategy as advisers to China’s powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and Politburo Standing Committee, this volume undoubtedly
reflects elements of critical policy trends in Beijing and hence merits close examination by foreign researchers and policy makers.

The 2001 Chinese-language version is used to educate senior PLA decision makers, including those on the CMC, as well as officers who may become China’s future strategic planners. Now in its fourth printing, it can be read along with a variety of other texts, such as the more operationally and tactically focused Science of Campaigns (Zhanyixue), published by China’s National Defense University in 2000, to better understand actual PLA doctrine.

Part One surveys China’s historical experience and development of military theory. Part Two offers Chinese perspectives on the laws and conduct of war. Part Three examines future warfare and the implications for China, including recent PLA experience and combat guidelines.

As the first English-language analysis of its kind, Graham’s comprehensive case study fills a critical gap in the literature concerning the maritime dimension of Japanese national security. Graham (currently a British government researcher at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s North Asia and Pacific Research Group) draws on fresh, original sources, including Japanese language documents and interviews with Japanese officials, to demonstrate that while Japan’s defense and foreign policy have changed dramatically since its opening up to the world in 1853, sea-lane security has been an enduring national security concern. Graham offers insight into Japanese leaders’ and analysts’ perceptions of their nation’s own security context, thereby avoiding the tendency of much related scholarship to view matters exclusively through the prism of relations with the United States.

This edited volume, with contributions from leading experts in the field, assesses China’s strategic force modernization and suggests that Beijing is in the process of adapting its nuclear posture to a changing strategic environment. In lieu of a traditional conclusion, it weighs future alternatives for China’s nuclear force and doctrine and probes the factors that will determine Beijing’s ultimate nuclear path. The editors are well qualified for this ambitious task. Paul Bolt, professor of political science at the U.S. Air Force Academy, has taught extensively in China. Colonel Albert Willner has taught at the U.S. Military Academy and is a U.S. Army expert on China.

Four particularly compelling issues emerge from this volume. First, continued lack of Chinese transparency concerning nuclear weapons development and policy not only makes this subject challenging for foreign research, but may complicate China’s own nuclear strategy. Secondly, much has been made of Chinese strategic culture and its emphasis on the finely calibrated use of force to achieve favorable changes in the overall strategic situation. Third, another uncertainty is how American ballistic missile defense (BMD) architecture will evolve, and the extent to which China will develop corresponding countermeasures to preserve its nuclear deterrent. Finally, and perhaps of greatest immediate interest to foreign analysts, is the issue of whether China’s policy of no-first-use (NFU), or at least a restrictive interpretation thereof, is sustainable.