For more than three decades, beginning soon after the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other. The concept of “mutual assured destruction”—MAD, the U.S. threat of massive retaliation to a Soviet first strike—became America’s Cold War de facto strategic defense policy. In March 1983, however, President Ronald Reagan asked whether ballistic missiles could be destroyed before they reached the United States or its allies, thus catalyzing efforts for a national ballistic-missile-defense program that would undermine the need for MAD. That same year, the U.S. Navy commissioned USS  Ticonderoga (CG 47), the first of what is to become a fleet of more than eighty Aegis warships. In 2012, these trends have converged, and Aegis ballistic-missile defense (BMD) is an increasingly important component of a robust national BMD System (BMDS).

National BMDS has morphed from President Reagan’s original vision of a system to deter and, if necessary, defeat Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to one focused on deterring or defeating shorter-range ballistic missiles fired at the United States or its allies and friends by rogue nations or terrorist groups. So too the “pillars” of the national BMDS have changed. As other air, ground, and space pillars have advanced in fits and starts, and as related programs have been initiated and, sometimes, canceled, the seaborne component of national BMDS has become an increasingly central component of U.S. regional ballistic-missile defenses. Aegis BMD is now moving toward a role in the defense of the American homeland as well.

As more countries—many with hostile intentions toward U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe—have acquired the requisite technologies during the past three decades, many U.S. friends and allies have been obliged to contend with the threat of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In northwest Asia, both Japan and Korea have built or are building Aegis BMD-capable ships. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Europe have been dealing with ballistic-missile defense through the alliance’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) program and, since 2009, also through the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), comprising “Aegis Afloat” and “Aegis Ashore.”This new approach now also includes forward-basing four Aegis BMD-capable warships in Rota, Spain. “With four Aegis ships at Rota, the alliance is significantly boosting combined naval capabilities in the Mediterranean, and enhancing our ability to ensure the security of this vital region,” Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted on 5 October 2011.

These ships will also support NATO’s critical efforts to build effective missile defense. Alongside important agreements that were recently concluded with Romania, Poland, and Turkey, Spain’s decision represents a critical step in implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach. The United States is fully committed to building a missile defense capability for the full coverage and protection of all our NATO European populations, their territory and their forces against the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles.

Today the steady growth of Aegis-capable ships in the U.S. Navy—as well as an increasing number of world navies fielding such ships—presents new opportunities and challenges. The portion of the Navy’s fleet that is capable of ballistic-missile defense is increasing from twenty-one ships now to a planned ninety-four in 2024. Given the well-publicized demand for these assets, Aegis BMD unquestionably is becoming an increasingly important component of BMD planning and operations of the unified commands’ combatant commanders.

But some are questioning whether the Navy can afford to see multimission Aegis BMD ships abandon general-purpose, Navy-specific missions—such as air, surface, and subsurface defense and precision strike for carrier and expeditionary strike groups—to support the combatant commanders directly with their BMD capabilities. Some view Aegis BMD through the same lens as they would the strategic ballistic-missile submarine program and ask whether Aegis BMD is a mission the nation needs but the Navy cannot afford. However, Aegis BMD is an increasingly important element of the nation’s maritime strategy, and it differs from the ballistic-missile submarine in a way that enables Aegis BMD to satisfy both combatant-commander ballistic-missile-defense demands and Navy general-purpose requirements.

Moreover, the Navy and the nation have an opportunity to leverage more fully Aegis BMD capabilities to provide territorial defense as well as protection of coalition naval task forces. The vision, first expressed in 2005, of a former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, of a “thousand-ship navy”—now transformed into a Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), in which nations and navies increasingly work together to ensure security of the global commons—is reaching fruition as the U.S. Navy works with increasing regularity with coalition partners in global and regional partnerships. Because some of these countries are acquiring Aegis-equipped ships, a nascent “Aegis Global Enterprise” is evolving, in which navies work together to capitalize on the capabilities of these ships for integrated fleet air defense and even ballistic-missile defense.

The vast majority of GMP missions, however, have been on the “low end” of, or completely outside, the “kill chain”—target identification, dispatch of forces, decision and order to attack, and destruction of the target. Such tasks as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and antipiracy patrol dominate the shared mission set. With the increasing threat of ballistic missiles that can be armed with WMD, however, the Aegis BMD capabilities present in the navies of U.S. allies and friends can now provide the Global Maritime Partnership with a means to address the “high end” of the kill chain with combined, coordinated, ballistic-missile defense: the Aegis BMD Global Enterprise.

This potential is already manifest in the Asia-Pacific region in the close working relationship between the United States and Japan. Korea and Australia could well join this Aegis network soon, giving the four governments the means to address not only territorial BMD but also coordinated BMD of fleet units operating together. In Europe, plans are well along to provide robust territorial defense of European nations with ALTBMD and the EPAA. Together, these systems provide a nascent BMD capability today and promise an even more robust capability as the EPAA evolves over the next decade and a half.

But as demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Libya, NATO and the nations of Europe have equities often well beyond the territorial boundaries of the European continent. Also, a European military deployed beyond Europe’s borders will always have a naval component. This is therefore a propitious time to begin to link European allies more completely into an Aegis BMD Global Enterprise in much the same way the U.S. Navy is linked to its Asia-Pacific partners—Japan today, Korea soon, and thereafter Australia in the near future—in a high-end Aegis BMD Global Maritime Partnership. …

For the interview mentioned here, see:

David Axe, “China’s ‘Ripples of Capability’: An Interview with Andrew Erickson,” AOL Defense, 29 August 2011.

Air and aerospace power has been fundamental for defending China’s “near seas”—encompassing the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, and the East and South China Seas—since the founding of the People’s Republic. While air and naval operations did not play a significant role in the Chinese Civil War, which was won by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the victorious Communist forces  were threatened immediately by hostile air and naval forces from the maritime sphere. In 1949 the regime was ill equipped to defend its eleven thousand miles of coastline and more than six thousand islands against attacks and harassment from Nationalist Chinese air and naval forces occupying the large islands of Taiwan and Hainan, as well as  several smaller islands, let alone protect the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against the aircraft carriers of the powerful U.S. Seventh Fleet. Even before the People’s Republic was officially declared in October 1949, communist leaders immediately recognized the need for strong naval and air forces; the PLA’s commander, General Zhu De, stated in April 1949 that China “must build its own air forces and navy in order to boost national defense.” This need became apparent shortly thereafter, in June 1949, when the Kuomintang (KMT) government on Taiwan declared a blockade of coastal mainland ports and its naval and air forces began attacking coastal shipping and ports as well as laying mines in river estuaries.

Over the course of the 1950s the PLA achieved only mixed success in protecting China’s coastline. In 1949 Communist forces captured Hainan Island, the second-largest KMT-held island, and most of the smaller offshore islands fell in the early 1950s. The PLA was also successful in stopping raids on the mainland and its merchant and fishing fleets. However, KMT forces stubbornly held on to Jinmen and Matsu, as well as a few additional islands such as Taiping (Itu Aba) in the South China Sea. Also, the PLA never represented a serious invasion threat to Taiwan—an issue that persists to this day. Further, throughout the 1950s the PLA naval and air forces were impotent against powerful U.S. forces operating in China’s near seas, as evidenced by the Seventh Fleet’s role in resupplying Jinmen in 1954–55, evacuating KMT troops and civilians from the Dachen Islands in 1955, and escorting KMT vessels resupplying Nationalist-held offshore islands in 1958.

Despite a clear need to defend China’s near seas, resource constraints in those years meant that coastal defense represented the extent of the operational capacity of the PLA’s sea and air forces. The overall emphasis of the PLA Navy (PLAN) on coastal defense as opposed to longer-range operations was evidenced by the deployment of thirteen coastal-defense artillery regiments in 1951, the primary focus of naval aviation on air defense of fleet bases, and the disbanding of the  PLAN marines in 1957, only three years after the force was established. While PLAN aviation and aircraft of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) flew several hundred sorties during the campaigns of the 1950s, they were primarily relegated to coastal air defense and operated under restrictive rules of engagement. On a positive note for the PRC, the 1950s ended with the KMT air force no longer operating at will over Fujian and Guangdong Provinces, due to a permanent presence of

PLAAF and PLAN aviation along China’s eastern and southern coastlines. Overall though, while China’s air forces demonstrated the capacity to defend Chinese airspace against KMT aircraft, they could do little to counter U.S. air and naval operations in China’s near seas, as demonstrated by the Seventh Fleet’s operations in and around the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s and the freewheeling nature of U.S. Navy and Air Force air support to United Nations forces during the Korean War.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s PLA air forces continued to emphasize coastal air defense and possessed little ability to exert influence in China’s near seas. The KMT air force on Taiwan continued to fly reconnaissance missions over the mainland. (Several of these aircraft were shot down; in addition, PLAN fighters based on Hainan shot down a small number of U.S. Navy and Air Force fighters that strayed too close to Chinese airspace during the Vietnam War.) However, some PLA combat operations in the 1970s called for China’s air forces to push beyond the coastal-air-defense paradigm. In 1974, PLAN fighter aircraft flew thirty-eight sorties in support of operations to seize the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam, a mission that to this day represents the longest-distance opposed landing executed by the PLA. Further, in the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, PLAN aircraft flew 751 sorties in support of fleet units off Vietnam’s coast, although no information is available regarding the types of missions flown. …

For articles cited herein, see:

Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “‘Flying Shark’ Gaining Altitude: How might new J-15 strike fighter improve China’s maritime air warfare ability?,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 38 (8 June 2011).

Andrew S. Erickson, Abraham M. Denmark, and Gabriel Collins, “Beijing’s ‘Starter Carrier’ and Future Steps: Alternatives and Implications,” Naval War College Review, 65.1 (Winter 2012): 14-54.

This book offers an empirical comparison of Chinese and Indian international strategic behavior. It is the first study of its kind, filling an important gap in the literature on rising Indian and Chinese power and American interests in Asia. The book creates a framework for the systematic and objective assessment of Chinese and Indian strategic behavior in four areas: (1) strategic culture; (2) foreign policy and use of force; (3) military modernization (including defense spending, military doctrine, and force modernization); and (4) economic strategies (including international trade and energy competition). The utility of democratic peace theory in predicting Chinese and Indian behavior is also examined. The findings challenge many assumptions underpinning western expectations of China and India.

Advance praise:

“This fascinating book provides a needed corrective to the all-too-common view in Washington that China is simply a threat and India a reliable ally. Gilboy and Heginbotham show that both states pose security challenges, albeit of different kinds. A realistic understanding of Chinese and Indian international strategic behavior has to be the starting point for a wise U.S. policy towards Asia.”

—Robert J. Art, Brandeis University and Director of the Seminar XXI Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

“At last we have a rigorous and systematic comparison of modern Chinese and Indian defense and security policies and structures. As such, it is an invaluable resource for understanding Asia’s strategic destiny.”

—Stephen P. Cohen, Brookings Institution

“This is a well-written, thoroughly researched, and erudite comparison of Indian and Chinese security doctrine and practice. The book shows that the growing view in the United States of China as an implacable adversary and India as a natural ally is simplistic and naive. One can only hope that U.S. policy makers are willing to make the effort to read through this very enlightening book.”

—Alistair Iain Johnston, Harvard University

“Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior is a seminal comparative treatment of the international behavior of Asia’s rising powers, China and India, and their implications for the United States. This book provides a solid foundation for objective assessment of the strategic role to be played by Beijing and New Delhi.”

—Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

“This systematic and well-researched analysis makes a major contribution to American foreign policy discourse, bringing an insightful comparative perspective to bear in the perennial U.S. controversy about China’s rise and at the same time providing a welcome stimulus to the debate the United States should have about India’s growing power.”

—Alice Lyman Miller, Stanford University

See below for sample works cited in Gilboy & Heginbotham’s volume:

Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “Gunboats for China’s New ‘Grand Canals’? Probing the Intersection of Beijing’s Naval and Energy Security Policies,” Naval War College Review, 62.2 (Spring 2009): 43-76.

Andrew S. Erickson and David Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 135.3 (May 2009): 26-32.

Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray, and Andrew R. Wilson, eds.,China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007).

Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “Welcome China to the Fight Against Pirates,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 135.3 (March 2009): 34-41.

Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review, 62.4 (Autumn 2009): 53-86.

That’s right, the rumors appear to be true. Beijing is joining the United States as the only nations with reusable spaceplane designs that are actually conducting test flights. Beijing reportedly sent its Divine Dragon — or Shenlong — space plane aloft for a successful atmospheric test flight in January 2011. …

…according to DT’s go-to China expert Andrew Erickson, its the speed at which China is closing the gap between the fielding of advanced technology compared to the U.S. Remember when then-defense secretary Robert Gates last year dismissed China’s new J-20 stealth fighter by saying that the PLA is about 20 years behind the Pentagon in terms of technology? The launch of the Divine Dragon less than a [year] after the X-37B made its first space flight may be an indicator that China is closing that double decade technology gap, according to Erickson. …

For the original article that this post quotes, see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Shenlong ‘Divine Dragon’ Takes Flight: Is China developing its first spaceplane?” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 58 (4 May 2012).

Tensions in the South China Sea—most recently with the Philippines—and Beijing’s unease about Washington’s renewed strategic focus on Asia are likely to strengthen calls from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for more modern fighters and strike aircraft. Russia has historically supplied the high performance military jet engines that power these craft. However, China’s defense industry is working hard to become capable of mass producing Chinese-made military jet engines in order to end dependence on Russia, give China maximum strategic flexibility, and begin to compete with Russian-made combat aircraft in export markets. …

For detailed analysis, see the following two China SignPost™ Deep Dive reports:

Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “A Chinese ‘Heart’ for Large Civilian and Military Aircraft: Strategic and commercial implications of China’s campaign to develop high-bypass turbofan jet engines,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 47 (19 September 2011).

Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Jet Engine Development in China: Indigenous high-performance turbofans are a final step toward fully independent fighter production,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 39 (26 June 2011).

Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, eds., China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, July 2009).

Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray, and Andrew R. Wilson, eds., China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007).

China SignPost™ 洞察中国–“Clear, high-impact China analysis.”©

Strategic Horizon 1C: The U.S.-China relationship will be central to international relations in the twenty-first century, as the two great Asia-Pacific powers compete, coexist, and cooperate across the full spectrum of national capabilities. While they share many important interests and are increasingly interdependent, particularly in the economic realm, Beijing and Washington regrettably retain presently-irreconcilable differences regarding important security issues. While this friction can likely be managed, albeit at the cost of tremendous effort and patience on both sides, occasional crises are likely, and conflict cannot be ruled out completely if wisdom and diligence prove insufficient. The best way to avoid conflict is to understand its potential nature and cost. To that end, this four-part series will examine four major issues:

–China’s Near Seas military focus and capabilities

–China’s economic environment and implications for military development

–Chinese energy and resource imports and their potential to drive naval expansion

–China’s conflict triggers and mitigating factors, particularly economic interdependence

While this series will retain China SignPost™ (洞察中国)’s traditional Sino-centric focus, it must be noted that the U.S. and its capabilities, policies, and actions clearly represent a major part of the strategic equation, and Beijing clearly has its own views and concerns about them.

Chinese Energy and Resource Imports and Their Potential to Stimulate Naval Development

The extent to which Chinese energy and resource import trends might drive expansion of China’s navy and “blue water” capabilities is one of the most important yet difficult questions for analysts forecasting Beijing’s military development.(1)

Experts agree that China’s imports of energy resources such as crude oil will likely rise significantly in coming years.(2) In 2011, China imported roughly 40% of its crude oil supply, 182 million tonnes of coal (3), roughly 6% of total demand; and 12% of its natural gas supply by sea. More importantly, these numbers are likely to rise. For instance, even if the Chinese economy slowed substantially, the country could still add more than 300,000 barrels per day of new crude oil demand each year—the equivalent of adding a Philippines to the global oil market annually.

Geologic and economic realities strongly suggest that China’s dependence on seaborne energy imports will continue to surge. China’s domestic oilfields are hard pressed to maintain current output levels, and barring major breakthroughs, will not provide a net expansion in domestic supplies that could replace oil imports.

As a result, more than half of China’s total oil supply is now imported. Roughly 90% of imports come by sea and pipeline construction will not reduce this, as oil output growth in Russia and Kazakhstan—China’s overland oil suppliers—has not kept pace with China’s rising oil demand. Russian oil production grew by 170 thousand barrels per day (bpd) in 2011, while China’s oil consumption grew by 566 thousand bpd during that same period.

Grain imports are also likely to rise significantly, even though China already obtains 67% of its soybean supplies by sea. If each of China’s roughly 200 million “middle class” who have enough disposable income to periodically eat out begin to consume one five-ounce chicken sandwich per week, this would create an additional 3.2 million tonnes per year of grain demand (in the form of corn and soybeans). China’s push to rebalance its economy in favor of domestic consumption, coupled with a small per capita arable land base and a water supply crisis in the North China wheat bowl, is generating increased seaborne imports of staple grains from places like Australia, the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina.

Securing China’s Seaborne Natural Resource Imports

Under a wide range of plausible scenarios, Chinese energy/natural resource imports will continue rising. Less clear is how China might respond to rising dependency on foreign-sourced seaborne oil, mineral, and food. Some analysts believe that Beijing will continue to free ride off U.S.-led sea lane security that protects oil and natural resources being shipped to any different Asian consumers. Others contend that Beijing will be impelled to build a blue water navy to defend its resource lifelines and protect its trade.

People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)-affiliated writers often advocate that their service develop further capabilities to protect maritime transit and resources. Together with many of their civilian counterparts, they view such comparatively abundant and under-exploited resources, newly accessible thanks to emerging technologies, as timely replacements for increasingly depleted continental reserves. However, opinions on the nature and extent of the threat to China’s sea lane security and what corresponding policies are feasible and desirable vary widely, and there appears to be an extreme lack of consensus across the board.

These factors make it extremely difficult to predict the extent to which natural resource imports are likely to stimulate PLAN development. While some researchers emphasize the extent of China’s proximity to Russian energy sources, domestic energy supplies, and political ability to ration supplies for military use in crisis, few serious experts dispute the overall trend of higher dependence on imported natural resources and the strategic vulnerabilities that might result. There is greater debate concerning how Beijing is likely to respond to the challenge.

Some analysts go so far as to view concerns over protection of seaborne natural resource imports as a potent, rapid driver of Chinese blue water expansion. They tend to cite statements by Chinese experts expressing grave concern about Chinese seaborne energy reliance. Others emphasize the inherent difficulty of blockading China or Chinese analyses citing the advantages of relying on the public good of sea lane security provided by the U.S. Navy and openness to cooperation as reasons why Beijing has not (yet) assumed defense of its critical sea lanes.

In fact, China appears at a strategic crossroads. Today’s objects of focus in the Near Seas offer compelling strategic cohesion and consensus. There is far less agreement concerning the ability and advisability for China to develop similarly kinetic capabilities in the Far Seas/Oceans. It thus seems likely that China’s long range “blue water” naval capability will primarily be a slowly-growing, lower-level supplement to the naval forces geared for a conflict closer to China’s coast, unless or until one or more of the following conditions are met:

–China makes major progress concerning Near Seas objectives

–China achieves economic strength sufficient to pursue intense development in both arenas

–Significant events or strategic changes convince Beijing that further action is needed

Growing Resource Imports Will Likely Influence Naval Procurement

China’s tremendous appetite for natural resources will remain a key influence behind economic and maritime security policies in the East Asian region and abroad. Geographically, Chinese policymakers will likely focus the bulk of their efforts on the South China Sea and Indian Ocean regions, as they form the most active seaborne commodity corridor feeding China.

Providing sea lane security in these areas will involve China’s uniformed maritime security services (and civilian counterparts, in the South China Sea). It will also likely become a focal point as the PLAN begins building its first carrier group. China’s State Oceanic Administration has ordered 36 additional patrol vessels and also plans to add 16 patrol aircraft to its force in coming years. (4)

These vessels could be used for sea lane security patrols in the South China Sea and thereby help free up PLAN assets for deployment further afield. (5) The PLAN itself is also presently building the new Type 056 light corvette, which appears geared toward operations in the South China Sea area. (6) Finally, the December 2011 deployment of the 3,000-ton Haijian 50 (7), China’s largest coast guard patrol vessel, to disputed areas of the East China Sea suggests that Beijing intends to use its growing civil maritime forces to help secure key maritime transit zones in coming years.

Natural resource security is of course far from the only reason that deck aviation platforms would be useful to the PLAN, but natural resource-driven sea lane security missions could well comprise a major part of the “protect China’s overseas economic interests” mandate that carrier advocates can cite to gain traction in defense budget allocation debates.

Resource security missions could use either carriers, amphibious vessels (8), or both; and the way Beijing allocates resources for carrier and amphibious vessel construction over the next five years will suggest how extensively the PLAN wants to be able to handle higher-intensity maritime contingencies as opposed to simply being able to show the flag along key sea routes and suppress piracy.

A carrier group would offer immense diplomatic benefits in providing a visible Chinese naval presence in the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, and along key Indian Ocean sea lanes. Ultimately, several carrier groups would be necessary for persistent presence in these areas, however, to allow for periodic training and maintenance.

Greater focus on carrier group development would suggest that Chinese leaders want to bolster their capacity to handle higher-intensity expeditionary missions than would be the case if ship procurement focuses more on smaller deck aviation-capable platforms such as amphibious vessels.

Bottom Line: China’s rising dependence on seaborne imports for critical fuel and food supplies will help the PLAN leadership argue for the resources and support it would need to enhance China’s long-range naval power projection capabilities. The pace and extent of this modernization remains highly uncertain, however, and will hinge heavily on China’s finances and perception of threats to its maritime resource lifelines.

1. For detailed analysis, see Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “Gunboats for China’s New ‘Grand Canals’? Probing the Intersection of Beijing’s Naval and Energy Security Policies,” Naval War College Review 62.2 (Spring 2009): 43-76, http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/f655705e-0ef3-4a21-af5a-93df77e527fa/Gunboats-for-China-s-New–Grand-Canals—Probing-t.
2. Hearing: China’s Global Quest for Resources and Implications for the United States, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 26 January 2012, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2012hearings/written_testimonies/hr12_01_26.php.
3. “NDRC: China’s Coal Imports/Exports, Production and Consumption Performance in 2011,” 2 February 2012, http://www.chinamining.org/News/2012-02-02/1328167659d53916.html
4. Wang Qian, Maritime Forces to be Beefed up amid Disputes,” China Daily, 17 June 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-06/17/content_12718806.htm.
5. Lyle J. Goldstein, Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities, Naval War College China Maritime Study 5, April 2010, http://www.usnwc.edu/Research—Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute/Publications/documents/CMSI_No5_web1.pdf.
6. “Could This Be the First Photos of Type 056 Light Corvette Under Construction?” [sic] China Defense Blog, 3 January 2012, http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2012/01/could-this-be-first-photos-of-type-065.html.
7. “Largest Patrol Ship Makes First Trip to East China Sea,” Global Times, 14 December 2011, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/688384/Largest-patrol-ship-makes-first-trip-to-East-China-Sea.aspx.
8. “Fourth Chinese Navy Type 071 LPD launched at Shanghai Shipyard,” Naval Forces News – China, Navy Recognition, 28 January 2012, http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=301.

About Us
China Signpost™ 洞察中国–“Clear, high-impact China analysis.”©

China SignPost™ aims to provide high-quality China analysis and policy recommendations in a concise, accessible form for people whose lives are being affected profoundly by China’s political, economic, and security development. We believe that by presenting practical, apolitical China insights we can help citizens around the world form holistic views that are based on facts, rather than political rhetoric driven by vested interests. We aim to foster better understanding of key internal developments in China, its use of natural resources, its trade policies, and its military and security issues.

China SignPost™ 洞察中国 founders Dr. Andrew Erickson and Mr. Gabe Collins have more than a decade of combined government, academic, and private sector experience in Mandarin Chinese language-based research and analysis of China. Dr. Erickson is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and an Associate in Research at Harvard’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Mr. Collins is a law student at the University of Michigan Law School. His research focuses on commodity, security, and rule of law issues in China, Russia, and Latin America.

The positions expressed here are the authors’ personal views. They do not represent the U.S. Naval War College, Navy, Department of Defense, or Government, and do not necessarily reflect the policies or estimates of these or any other organizations.

The authors have published widely on maritime, energy, and security issues relevant to China. An archive of their work is available at www.chinasignpost.com.

China faces a dilemma. Today China imports more than 50 percent of its oil, and that figure is expected to rise to 75-80 percent in the coming decades. As many experts have noted, China does not seem to feel comfortable relying on the international system and the continued operation of energy markets to meet its needs. To put this dilemma in context, let’s consider the history of great powers in the age of oil, then turn to China’s options for securing its imports, and conclude with some thoughts on the implications of Beijing’s choices for other states in Asia and for the United States. The analysis suggests that China is pursuing an indirect strategy designed to alter the geo-strategic map in China’s favor. …

Further details on one of the books cited here:

Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, eds., China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008).

• Coming soon on Kindle!
• China Ocean Press (www.oceanpress.com.cn) has purchased the simplified Chinese language rights and will soon publish an authorized Chinese-language edition.

Japanese language summary translation now available: “書籍3: 中国のエネルギー戦略–北京の海洋政策への影響.”

Coauthor:

• “Introduction,” pp. xi-xix;
• with Gabriel Collins, of “Chinese Efforts to Create a National Tanker Fleet,” 81-114;
• and, with Lyle Goldstein and Gabriel Collins, of “Chinese Naval Analysts Consider the Energy Question,” 299-335.

SAMPLE CHAPTER: Dan Blumenthal, “Concerns with Respect to China’s Energy Policy,”418-36.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

China’s rapid growth has prompted Beijing to undertake an aggressive search for resources on a truly global scale. The resource most directly tied to continued growth in China is energy. Rising consumer appetites in China, coupled with occasional rolling blackouts due to spiraling demand in Chinese cities, have prompted intense anxieties in China concerning energy security. Since 80 percent of Chinese fossil fuel imports pass by ship through the Malacca Strait, an important component of Beijing’s concerns have come to be known in China as the“Malacca Dilemma.” This book draws on America’s finest experts in the fields of economics, energy, China studies, and naval strategy in order to explore China’s “Malacca Dilemma” and its implications for global maritime security. The essays in this volume draw from a wide variety of viewpoints, but a central theme of the analyses is that the United States needs to be concerned that China is drawing upon much of the world’s remaining oil reserves for its exclusive use. The resulting competition for this diminishing resource could lead to energy insecurity and may support other tendencies toward rivalry that in turn could foster a naval arms race neither side seeks. One of the major conclusions of this study is that there is, in fact, ample room for Sino-American energy dialogue and cooperation in the maritime domain and that the competition for limited energy sources like oil need not lead to conflict.

BLURBS

“This book is a comprehensive assessment of China’s overall and maritime energy security strategies; as important, it provides clear and detailed guides to judge the nature of future Chinese naval developments and overall Chinese security strategy.”

–Admiral Dennis Blair, U.S. Navy (Ret.), former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

“…a necessary read for anyone interested in the future of the People’s Republic of China’s energy development and its strategic implications for the U.S., with particular attention to maritime development in both countries. The book tackles the prospects for China’s energy development in a remarkably comprehensive, nuanced fashion. It evaluates Chinese perspectives and prospects, analyzes the PRC’s capabilities in each relevant global region, and dissects the PLA Navy’s capabilities with respect to energy security issues. The authors, including those writing for the final section, which analyzes the implications for U.S. policy, carefully identify inevitable uncertainties and analytical disagreements. On balance, the book stresses the room for U.S.-China energy cooperation in the maritime domain. Importantly, it provides the rich array of data and analysis necessary for readers to develop their own deeply informed perspectives on this issue.”

–Dr. Kenneth Lieberthal, Arthur F. Thurnau Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan and former Senior Director for Asia on the National Security Council

“Comprehensive, diverse and essential for national security professionals… a subject we must understand clearly for our Asia-Pacific future.”

–Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, U.S. Navy (Ret.), former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

REVIEWS

“The China Maritime Studies Institute… is fast becoming a center of excellence for research on all aspects of the Chinese navy. … all the contributions are excellent… The beauty of this book comes in different forms. As the editors indicate in their introduction, the contributors do not always agree. … Important statistics are also provided. …provides the latest scholarship. Further enhancing the book’s value is that the contributors are all actively involved in shaping this multifaceted debate in their respective institutions. … This reviewer could not exaggerate the importance of this book in understanding the issues shaping the development of the Chinese navy.”

–Richard Desjardins (Canadian civil servant), Joint Force Quarterly, issue 57, second quarter (2010): 132-33.

“[the authors] have described the drivers of China’s quest for a limited power projection capability—and they did so well before Beijing’s December 2008 decision to deploy a series of task groups to the Gulf of Aden in order to protect shipping from an onslaught of pirate attacks. … This volume makes the case that Beijing’s desire to ensure steady and secure access to the energy resources required to continue the momentum of China’s economic growth will ‘compel the PLAN [People’s Liberation Army Navy] to be used increasingly in nonconflict situations in a wider variety of regions.’ The PLAN’s actions today certainly support this argument; Beijing’s naval task groups in the Gulf of Aden are operating thousands of miles from China to protect merchant shipping, much of which is transporting oil. … details how important maritime commerce is to China’s continued economic development.”

–Scott W. Bray (the U.S. Navy’s Senior Intelligence Officer for China), “Turning to the Sea… This Time to Stay,” Book Review Essay, Asia Policy, No. 9 (January 2010): 167-72.

“…it is a relief to read a mass of carefully considered common sense such as is contained in this fine book. It is refreshing to be reminded that so many of America’s military, especially naval, intellectuals can be so clear headed and rational. …Defence planners and warriors who are currently or likely to be involved in the Indo-Pacific regions should study this book very carefully.”

–Ships & Shipping (July 2009): 38.

“…the book is superb, rich in information and subtle analysis, and should be of interest to all students of geopolitics.”

–Arthur Waldron, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Summer 2009): 328-30.

“The importance of the energy factor in politics today can hardly be called into question. … How much does… energy affect… military doctrine? How does the energy vulnerability of the state influence the modernization of the army? As far as China is concerned, these questions are answered at the beginning of the complex research by Gabriel Collins, Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray…. This approach makes the book… exciting reading and gives a lot of food for thought and discussion. The authors are fellows of the U.S. Naval [War] College and are famous for their studies on various aspects of China’s energy strategy, including its impact on [the] maritime strategy of the country.”

–Yevgeny Petelin, “Energy at the Edge of War and Peace,” Security Index 87.15 (Spring 2009): 147-49.

“The editors achieve their task of examining China’s energy security and naval modernization and their impact on Sino-American relations. …this book is highly recommended.”

–Andrew Forbes, International Journal of Maritime History (December 2008): 478-79.

“…this is an invaluable book for anyone wanting to understand China’s economy in general and its maritime strategy in particular.”

–David N. Griffiths, Canadian Naval Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall 2008): 42-43.

China is reportedly developing a reusable space vehicle that could launch atop a rocket and land like an airplane. If true – and if the development produces an operational vehicle – China will join the U.S. in the exclusive club of nations with so-called “space planes.” …

In January 2011, the Chinese vehicle, reportedly named “Divine Dragon,” flew on its first atmospheric test flight.

The timing was noteworthy, according to Andrew Erickson, a U.S. Naval War College analyst who has written the most in-depth assessment of the Divine Dragon. “The test flight announcement from a Sha’anxi TV station came within a month of the U.S. X-37B orbital vehicle’s return to earth after its first test flight and come almost simultaneously with China’s test flight of its J-20 fighter prototype,” Erickson wrote. “This reflects China’s growing technical proficiency in the aerospace sector.” …

For full text of the report referenced, see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Shenlong ‘Divine Dragon’ Takes Flight: Is China developing its first spaceplane?” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 58 (4 May 2012).

When we think of Chinese foreign policy most of us picture foreign direct investment in Africa and assertiveness in the Near Seas (Yellow, East China and South China). Few of us think ice breakers. China’s application to join the Arctic Council as permanent observer however suggests the Chinese are now looking north. …

Further resources on China in the Arctic:

• ISN Digital Library: China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic, The Arctic as a Global Common.
• David Curtis Wright at the US Naval War College provides an excellent, extensive, introduction to China and the Arctic. See the complete report or a summary.
• Andrew S Erickson gives you up to date information on China and the Arctic on his website. …