The killing of eight Hong Kong tourists in the Philippines last week has generated both grief and outrage. The incident has also helped sharpen an ongoing policy debate within the Chinese security establishment on how Beijing should protect its citizens and assets in foreign lands. …

In a review of the Chinese debate on the use of force abroad to protect its citizens, Andrew Erickson, an American analyst at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island says that despite many uncertainties, “the chances of Beijing using force to protect citizens overseas are rising.”

Erickson adds that “Beijing’s acute sensitivity regarding sovereignty issues makes it highly unlikely to intervene on another nation’s soil without explicit permission. In the event of a crisis, China is likely to supply intelligence, and its security personnel might work with their local counterparts, with an emphasis on isolating and evacuating Chinese nationals.”

“But it is at sea that we are already witnessing the most dramatic developments. China’s ongoing anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden is arguably the first step in overseas military deployments to protect PRC citizens working overseas,” Erickson concludes. …

For original article, see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Looking After China’s Own: Pressure to Protect PRC Citizens Working Overseas Likely to Rise,” China Signpost, No. 2 (17 August 2010).

Peace Ark left the port of Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province on 31 August 2010 with a crew of 428 soldiers, officers, and medical personnel on an 87-day mission to “provide medical services to officers and soldiers of other countries conducting anti-piracy activities” in the Gulf of Aden and “offer medical treatment to local people and carry out medical exchange” in “Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles, and Bangladesh.”

This promises to be an extremely positive Chinese contribution to regional security, and illustrates the increasing potential of Beijing to serve as a responsible maritime stakeholder.

For related analysis by Galrahn on his Information Dissemination blog, click here.

For the first public report that Peace Ark would be deployed to the Middle East and Africa in 2010, see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Oversea Trumps Overland: China’s Oil Supply Future is Maritime,” China Signpost, No. 1 (26 May 2010).

For detailed analysis of China’s counter-piracy deployments to the Gulf of Aden, see Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Sea Power in Action: the Counter-Piracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research, July 2010).

China is showing its determination and efforts to protect its citizens overseas while dealing with the case of the killings of Hong Kong tourists in Manila, said an article in the Wall Street Journal on Aug 25. …

Andrew Erickson, an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department at the US Naval War College, said that “Beijing’s efforts to protect Chinese overseas are likely to increase.” He believed that “Several factors increase the likelihood that the Chinese government may be more able and willing to respond with force to future hostage situations or other targeted violence against Chinese citizens.”

They include the growing strength of the Chinese navy and the “Chinese leadership’s increasingly assertive worldview as the country emerges strongly from the deep global economic recession.”

For article quoted, see Jason Dean, “Manila Response Shows Pressure on Beijing,” China Real Time Report, Wall Street Journal, 25 August 2010.

For original article, see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Looking After China’s Own: Pressure to Protect PRC Citizens Working Overseas Likely to Rise,” China Signpost, No. 2 (17 August 2010).

China’s anti-ship ballistic missile – a long-feared weapon known as the “carrier killer” – is close to operational, according to a senior US military official.

The commander of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Robert Willard, made the remark in Tokyo this week. He said the US would not be deterred from deploying vessels in the region because of the missile.

“To our knowledge, it has undergone repeated tests and it is probably close to being operational,” Willard told Japanese journalists. “We have not allowed the development of these capabilities and capacities to deter our right to navigate in international waters in areas around China, nor do you want us to.” …

Andrew Erickson, an associate professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute of the US Naval War College, wrote this week there was now significant open evidence that China had made ASBM development a priority. A fully integrated flight test – something the PLA would not be able to hide – would be needed to give China’s generals full confidence in its deterrent qualities and prompt approval of full-scale production, he said.

Pentagon officials said the ASBM was now of great concern but the PLA still faced potential roadblocks in integrating the missile with computerised command and control systems. “They still have a ways to go before they manage to get that integrated, so that they have an operational and effective system,” a Defence Department official said.

A ballistic missile under development in China for the purpose of deterring and attacking U.S. aircraft carriers in the western Pacific is close to becoming operational, according to Adm. Robert Willard, commander of U.S. Pacific Command.

Willard provided the assessment in a [24 August] round table discussion with Japanese media in Tokyo. …

Asked how he perceives the current status of development, Willard said, “To our knowledge, it has undergone repeated tests and it is probably very close to being operational.” …

Andrew Erickson, an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College, and a leading authority on China’s ASBMs, said other recent indications of China’s progress in the development of ASBMs include the launch of multiple advanced surveillance satellites, which probably offer better coverage of critical areas along China’s maritime periphery for targeting. Other U.S. experts suggest that the first ASBM launch sites may be under construction.

Erickson also writes, “If and when China’s DF-21D is developed sufficiently, Beijing might reveal a dramatic weapon test to the world—with or without advance warning—in some way geared to influencing official and public opinion in the United States, Taiwan, Japan and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific” (region). He also points out, “The fact of a hit, however manipulated and revealed, could change the strategic equation.” …

Erickson said in his recent presentation, “I do not think China is working to start a war here. Neither is the United States.” He went on: “There is so much at stake here. Our two countries, as well as all the other countries in the region and around the world, have so much strategic interests to share. It would be really a shame if this (ASBM) will be allowed to spiral out of control.”

He echoed Willard’s call for the need to stress the importance of resuming military-to-military dialogue between the United States and China in this regard.

Click here for the latest analysis and sources on Chinese ASBM development.

“To our knowledge, [China’s anti-ship ballistic missile/ASBM] has undergone repeated tests and it is probably very close to being operational.”

Click here for the latest analysis and sources on Chinese ASBM development.

CURRENT STATUS:

Open source data offer significant evidence that China has prioritized and is proceeding rapidly with anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) development. A variety of Chinese sources have stated a desire to demonstrate the ability to threaten carrier strike groups (CSGs). There are a number of indications that China may have reached the point that it is able to conduct some fairly sophisticated ASBM tests. While system components may be tested separately, and on the ground in many cases, a fully integrated flight test is likely to be necessary to give the PLA confidence in approving full-scale production and deploying ASBMs in a full operational state. At some point, such tests would be a necessary step to reach the next level in ASBM development–and to attempt to use the ASBM as a deterrent.

On 24 August 2010, Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), made the following statement to Japanese media in Tokyo:

“To our knowledge, [China’s ASBM] has undergone repeated tests and it is probably very close to being operational.”

 A 16 August 2010 background briefing by a Senior U.S. Department of Defense official indicates that China still needs to successfully integrate its ASBM with C4ISR in order to operationalize it:

“We continue to be concerned about their efforts to development this—this particular system. I would say the primary area… where we see them still facing roadblocks is in integrating the missile system with the C4-ISR. And they still have a ways to go before they manage to get that integrated so that they have an operational and effective system.”

“But nonetheless, this is an area that, for all the obvious reasons, remains, you know, of great concern for us.”

The just-released 2010 U.S. Department of Defense Report on China’s Military offers a general background:

“Augmented by direct acquisition of foreign weapons and technology, [defense industry] reforms have enabled China to develop and produce advanced weapon systems that incorporate mid-1990s technology in many areas, and some systems—particularly ballistic missiles—that rival any in the world today.” (p. 43)

“Production trends and resource allocation appear to favor missile and space systems….” (p. 44).

“China has the most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world. It is developing and testing several new classes.” (p. 1)

“China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km, is armed with a maneuverable warhead, and when integrated with appropriate command and control systems, is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean.” (p. 2)

“The PLA is acquiring conventional MRBMs to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships, including aircraft carriers, operating far from China’s shores out to the first island chain.” (p. 31)

“The PLA Navy is improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability with Sky Wave and Surface Wave OTH radars. OTH radars could be used in conjunction with imagery satellites to assist in locating targets at great distances from PRC shores to support long range precision strikes, including by anti-ship ballistic missiles.” (p. 2)

“Over the long term, improvements in China’s C4ISR, including space-based and over-the-horizon sensors, could enable Beijing to identify, track, and target military activities deep into the western Pacific Ocean.” (p. 37)

Based on sophisticated organizational analysis, Mark Stokes and Tiffany Ma suggest that the Second Artillery may be constructing ASBM missile brigade facilities in the northern Guangdong Province municipality of Shaoguan (韶关):

“Last week, China’s state-run media quietly announced the construction of facilities for a new Second Artillery missile brigade – the 96166 Unit – in the northern Guangdong municipality of Shaoguan… the province is already home to a Second Artillery short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) brigade (the 96169 unit in Meizhou)….”

“Although the introduction of the 1,700km range solid fuelled, terminally guided DF-21C ballistic missile into Guangdong is possible, the brigade is also a candidate to be the first unit equipped with the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The DF-21C, first introduced into the active inventory in 2005, is designed to attack fixed targets on land. If an ASBM is successful in passing the necessary design reviews and a sufficient sensor network is in place, the Shaoguan brigade could become the first in the PLA to field a lethal capability against moving targets at sea out to a range of 1,500-2,000km or more from launch sites.”

“The Second Artillery planned to finalize the design of the DF-21D by the end of 2010 and the establishment of a permanent deployment location often coincides with the design finalization of a new missile. However, an initial operational capability is likely a ways off, as a follow-on testing of a prototype design may be needed prior to certification for full-rate production.”

Shaoguan’s location near Hunan Province, with the inter-provincial Nanling mountains and tunnels through them that complicate satellite surveillance (under construction since at least 2008), offers significant advantages:

“Whether the unit is equipped with the DF-21C or the more advanced DF-21D maritime variant, the establishment of a conventionally-capable medium range ballistic missile brigade in Guangdong would decisively expand the Second Artillery’s striking radius. More specifically, it would enable the Second Artillery to support the Central Military Commission to enforce territorial claims in the South China Sea, or strike targets in a Taiwan-related contingency without having to overfly Japanese territory.”

Other recent indications of Chinese ASBM development progress include the reported completion of a DF-21D rocket motor facility in 2009 and the recent launch of 5 advanced Yaogan satellites, three of which were apparently placed in the same orbit on 5 March–thereby perhaps offering better coverage of critical areas along China’s maritime periphery. Another possible indication is a recent news release attributed to China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC) citing Wang Genbin, Deputy Director of its 4th Department, as stating that the DF-21D can hit “slow-moving targets” with a CEP (circular error probable, meaning half of missiles fired will strike within) of dozens of meters. Mark Stokes, a noted expert at the Project 2049 Institute on this and related issues, stated on 4 June 2010 that “odds are what you’re seeing now in terms of testing is… flight tests of the [DF-21D] motor itself and the airframe… the final step would be most likely going against a target at sea in a realistic environment.”

For detailed analysis of Chinese ASBM development and its larger strategic implications, see the presentation I gave at the at the Maritime Security Challenges Conference 2010, Maritime Forces Pacific, Canadian Navy, Victoria, British Columbia, 29 April 2010.

(Scroll down for a second video of me narrating the CCTV clip mentioned here).

OTHER OFFICIAL STATEMENTS:

Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), recently testified in writing before the House (25 March) and Senate (26 March) Armed Services Committees that “China is… developing and testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21/CSS-5 MRBM designed specifically to target aircraft carriers.” Admiral Willard’s testimony in this regard has been covered in the Washington Times, and is receiving extensive attention in the Chinese blogosphere. More broadly, Admiral Willard’s testimony offers an excellent overview of China’s military progress, which has been particularly rapid in key areas that offer the potential to hold U.S. military platforms at risk in the Western Pacific.

The hearings themselves are worth watching. For the key exchange in Admiral Willard’s testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, go to minute 29:35 on the webcast–

Rep. Howard McKeon (R-CA), Ranking Committee Member:

“Admiral Willard, from PACOM’s perspective, how would you assess China’s intentions and capacity to develop and field disruptive technologies, including those for anti-access and area denial? Specifically, can you comment on China’s anti-ship ballistic missile capability and how it’s evolving?”

Admiral Willard:

“Thank you, Congressman McKeon. I can, and thanks for the question. The China military capacity has been growing by and large unabated for the past 10 to 20 years. The past 10 years have been pretty dramatic, and as you suggest, this has included investments in what has broadly been termed anti-access capabilities. Area denial capability is another way to think about it. And these range from the investments in submarine capabilities, to investments in integrated air and missile defense capabilities, to—as you suggest—anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities at extended ranges from the mainland of China….”

That afternoon, Admiral Willard elaborated at a press conference:

Admiral Robert Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, “U.S. Military Overview of Asia-Pacific,” The Foreign Press Center, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 3:33 PM EDT, 25 March 2010.

Question: “Thank you, Admiral. Betty Lin of the World Journal. Some members – some congressional members this morning were interested in the anti-ship ballistic missile threat. Could you talk about how significant the threat is and how PACOM is preparing to address the threat? And in your past dealings with the Chinese, have you talked about this? And what was their response for that?”

Admiral Willard: “Yeah, thank you. What is being referred to as a technology development, a capability development by the People’s Republic of China to develop a ballistic missile with anti-ship capabilities – inside a broader collection of capabilities that represent anti-access, a term used to describe kind of a forward power projection capability from mainland China. Each of those capabilities are concerning without a knowledge of how they’re intended to be applied in the future.”

“So trying to understand what the ballistic – anti-ship ballistic missile system is designed for and against, and its relation with other anti-access capabilities – what that strategy entails is very much an issue that we would like to discuss mil-to-mil with the Chinese. I think this raises the importance of a continuous military-to-military dialogue, which, as you know, is currently suspended as a consequence of our announcement of the former Taiwan arms sale.”

“The issues with the PRC that we would like to discuss military- to-military include areas that we have opportunities to engage, areas of common interest, and then very frankly, these areas of broader uncertainty or concern. I think both governments and both militaries would benefit from that continuous dialogue.”

The Senate Armed Service Committee hearing lacked a direct exchange on Chinese ASBM development. The closest equivalent came in response to a question from Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT), when Admiral Willard discussed growth in Chinese access denial capabilities. See minute 102:29 of the webcast.

Even as China is improving its potential ability to hold U.S. aircraft carriers at risk, it is developing one of its own. In his written testimony, Admiral Willard stated, “China’s leaders are pursuing an aircraft carrier capability. In 1998 China purchased an incomplete former Soviet KUZNETSOV class aircraft carrier, which began renovations in 2002 at its shipyard in Dalian. I expect this carrier to become operational around 2012 and likely be used to develop basic carrier skills.”

In my personal opinion (as with all other writing on this website):

What is China doing, and why? While mounting evidence from Chinese doctrinal, service, technical, trade, and netizen publications suggests that China has been developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) since the 1990s, this is the first official confirmation that it has advanced to the stage of actual testing. This data point should dispel notions previously held by some that Beijing could not, or would not, develop an ASBM. I know my own understanding of the issue has evolved considerably since Cortez Cooper and I testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March 2007, when I said: “China is… thought to be in the process of developing anti-ship homing warheads for its ballistic missiles, which is a very worrisome development. If they work, they would be extraordinarily difficult to defend against.” Three years later, almost to the day, many uncertainties remain, but the seriousness with which Beijing is pursuing ASBM capability is not one of them.

Admiral Willard’s disclosure, while disturbing, should surprise no one. Chinese development of ASBM systems and related capabilities has been documented publicly by previous U.S. government unclassified analyses (from the Department of Defense, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Congressional Research Service) as well as statements by senior officials (including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead). In November 2009, Scott Bray, Senior Intelligence Officer-China, ONI, stated that: “ASBM development has progressed at a remarkable rate…. In a little over a decade, China has taken the ASBM program from the conceptual phase to nearing an operational capability. …China has elements of an [over-the-horizon] network already in place and is working to expand its horizon, timeliness and accuracy.” When the Navy’s Senior Intelligence Officer for China makes such a significant statement, attention is long overdue.

It’s not hard to see why China is developing and testing an ASBM–it strongly desires the ability to both deter advocates of independence on Taiwan and to prevent U.S. carrier strike groups (CSG) from intervening effectively in the event of a future Taiwan Strait crisis. Beijing has defined its immediate strategic concerns clearly in this regard. More broadly, the Chinese are interested in achieving an ASBM capability because it offers them the prospect of limiting the ability of other nations, particularly the United States, to exert military influence on China’s maritime periphery, which contains several disputed zones of core strategic importance to Beijing. ASBMs are regarded as a means by which technologically limited developing countries can overcome by asymmetric means their qualitative inferiority in conventional combat platforms, because the gap between offense and defense is the greatest here.

Since at least the mid-1990s, China has been engaged in a variety of efforts to develop an ASBM; current programs revolve around the “Delta,” or “D,” variant of the DF-21/CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). Chinese open source publications provide strong indications that Beijing has been developing an ASBM at least since the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis. This strategic debacle for China likely convinced its leaders to never again allow U.S. carrier strike groups intervene in what they consider to be a matter of absolute sovereignty.

What is China saying about its ASBM development? Quite a lot, actually, but no direct official statements so far… Even China’s military, in an apparent attempt to deter the U.S. from intervening vis-à-vis Taiwan and other claimed areas on China’s disputed maritime periphery, has provided significant hints of its own ASBM progress, as well as some thought-provoking mysteries. In an unexplained cartoon animation at the end of a lengthy 29 November 2009 program on ASBMs broadcast on China Central Television Channel 7 (China’s official military channel), a sailor falsely assumes that his carrier’s Aegis defense systems can destroy an incoming ASBM as effectively as a cruise missile, with disastrous results. The program is available in Parts 1, 2, and 3 on YouTube; start at minute 7:18 on the second clip to view this disturbing sequence. Here’s an English narration of the clip that I gave at the Maritime Security Challenges Conference 2010, Maritime Forces Pacific, Canadian Navy, Victoria, British Columbia, 29 April 2010:

Still, Chinese officials have yet to address their nation’s ASBM development directly in an open public forum. On 26 October 2009 General Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China Central Military Commission, People’s Republic of China, delivered an address and entertained questions at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. Bloomberg reporter Tony Capaccio raised the ASBM issue with Gen. Xu: “Many analysts in the United States, reviewing China’s weapons, are wondering why China is developing anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles to use against the United States Navy if, in fact, your goal is cooperation with the United States Navy.” Gen. Xu did not respond directly, instead stating more broadly that ballistic and cruise missile development was necessary for mainland China to safeguard its interests vis-a-vis Taiwan: “Now I want to address the question related to suspicions about China’s research and development of weapons and equipment. I want to make clear that the limited weapons and equipment of China is entirely to meet the minimum requirement for maintaining national security. The research and development of weapons and equipment, including that of our cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, some of which were on display on our National Day military parade, is entirely for self-defense. In my meetings with my foreign friends, both within China and on my overseas tours, I’ve heard similar suspicions or misgivings about China’s effort in developing advanced weapons and equipment, so I want to add, here, that given the vast area of China, the severity of the challenges facing us and the heavy responsibility on the part of the PLA to guarantee national security, territorial integrity, it is – the limited capabilities and limited weapons and equipment is merely for the minimum requirement of national security. As you also know, China has yet to realize complete unification.” Click here to view the transcript. On the linked video, go to minute 81:35 for Tony Capaccio’s question and to minute 92:18 for Gen. Xu’s response.

What does this mean for the U.S.? If developed and deployed successfully, a Chinese ASBM system of systems would be the world’s first capable of targeting a moving carrier strike group from long-range, land-based mobile launchers. This could make defenses against it difficult and/or highly escalatory.

Various obstacles could limit China’s ability to deploy ASBMs effectively, particularly in the areas of detection, targeting, data fusion, joint service operations, and bureaucratic coordination. When it comes to targeting a carrier strike group, there will not be a sharp red line between no capability and full capability. Some Chinese writers believe that even the significant likelihood of a capability may have a large deterrent effect. The ASBM is envisioned primarily as a deterrent weapon by Chinese analysts; to many this makes it inherently “defensive” in nature.

But make no mistake: efforts at deterrence themselves, however envisioned, can have significant strategic consequences. In this regard, it is worth noting that Beijing has consistently opposed a wide variety of U.S. missile defense efforts; if a missile specifically designed to strike an aircraft carrier is “defensive,” then how can a system specifically designed to intercept an incoming missile not be “defensive,” and hence acceptable?

On a more disturbing note, authoritative PLA sources reveal overconfidence in China’s ability to control escalation, which is itself an extraordinary danger. Chinese ASBM deployment could increase bilateral and regional tensions and may only prompt U.S. forces to deploy countermeasures rather than prevent carrier strike group employment.

When assessing possible ASBM futures, the following bears remembering: China has prioritized ballistic missiles for decades, enjoys a formidable science and technology base, and can be expected to devote considerable resources and expertise to ASBM development. If and when the DF-21D is developed sufficiently, Beijing might reveal a dramatic weapon test to the world—with or without advance warning—in some way geared to influencing official and public opinion in Taiwan, the United States, Japan, and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific. Such an unprecedented public demonstration could be used to signal either growing Chinese power during a time of stability, or Beijing’s resolve in a time of diplomatic tension or crisis. If not addressed properly, a successful test could create the impression that American power projection capabilities—and the regional credibility that depends on them—had been dramatically diminished.

The fact of a hit, however manipulated and revealed, could change the strategic equation—much as the efficacy of the 20–21 July 1921 test-bombing of the battleship Ostfriesland was hotly contested by the U.S. Navy (and remains debated to this day), yet altered service budgets immediately and helped catalyze development of what later became the U.S. Air Force. Is there today a Chinese equivalent of Brigadier General Billy Mitchell (the iconoclastic visionary who championed the Ostfriesland demonstration to further the development of air power) eager to promote such a test to further the cause of the Second Artillery (China’s strategic rocket forces, which would likely control an ASBM) and its pioneering of new ways of warfare?

This much is clear: with the DF-21D ASBM, China appears to be intent on fielding a system that directly threatens U.S. carriers. If not countered properly, this could weaken the U.S. military alliances and reassurances that have helped maintain peace in the Western Pacific for over six decades, in part by preventing costly and dangerous arms races. The game and its governing rules are changing, whether we like it or not. Only through serious investment in counter-targeting efforts and other countermeasures can we prevent Beijing from changing the game uncontested.

What is being done to address this challenge? China’s ASBM is part of a much larger pattern in which the development and proliferation of various weapons systems–such as ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, and naval mines–threatens to hold U.S. platforms at risk in vital areas of the global maritime commons. Today U.S. operations in the Western Pacific appear most threatened in this regard, but similar challenges are emerging in the Persian Gulf, and might eventually materialize elsewhere.

Fortunately, U.S. ships will not offer a fixed target for such “asymmetric” weapons, including Chinese ASBMs. U.S. military planning documents, including the March 2010 Joint Operating Environment and February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)—the Pentagon’s guiding strategy document—clearly recognize America’s growing “anti-access” challenge; the QDR charges the U.S. military with multiple initiatives to address it.

For an indication that such a process is already well underway, see the following exchange at a 4 June 2009 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing:

“Senator McCain: ‘Admiral Roughead, are you concerned about the reports… about the Chinese… acquiring… missiles that can… attack an aircraft carrier as far away as 1,200 miles…?’

Admiral Roughead: ‘Yes, sir. …I …see advances in ballistic missiles, as you have pointed out, and it was that development as well as [other factors] that was the basis for my decision to recommend that we truncate the DDG–1000 and invest more in our ability to conduct integrated air and missile defense Blue Water Antisubmarine Air Warfare.”

Moreover, in a world where U.S. naval assets will often be safest underwater and in more dispersed networks, President Obama’s defense budget supports building two submarines a year and investing in a new ballistic-missile submarine, as well as a variety of missile defense systems.

Regarding missile defense, in response to an Asahi Shimbun reporter’s question regarding “how much of an actual threat China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) pose to the U.S. Navy,” Admiral Patrick Walsh, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, stated in June 2010:

“I think it represents a continued advancement and maturing of technology. … If you remember, there were many, several years ago, who were critical of the missile defense program. Now we find the missile defense program as being something that’s essential to our ability to operate freely.”

How best to develop and implement ASBM countermeasures is a topic of vigorous discussion in U.S. Navy circles.

The U.S. is already taking important steps to prevent a Chinese ASBM from changing the rules of the game in the Western Pacific, but continued effort and vigilance of the highest order will be essential. As Admiral Willard suggests, Chinese ASBM development should also be raised in sustained discussions with China’s military to help reduce misunderstanding and miscommunication, which could produce disastrous and unintended results.

The following links (most recent first) offer further background on Chinese ASBM development. If you know of others, please send them to me, together with any ideas and insights, by accessing the “Contact” tab on the toolbar above. And feel free to post your comments below.

Greg Torode, “PLA Carrier-Killer Missile Nearly Ready, Says U.S.,” South China Morning Post, 28 August 2010.

William Vocke, “Global Ethics Corner: Aircraft Carriers and Anti-Ship Missiles,” Carnegie Council, 27 August 2010.

Dwayne A. Day, “This Space Intentionally Left Blank: The Limits of Chinese Military Power,” The Space Review, 23 August 2010.

Marshall Hoyler, “China’s ‘Antiaccess’ Ballistic Missiles and U.S. Active Defense,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Autumn 2010), pp. 84-104.

Russell Hsiao, “PLA Expands Network of Military Reconnaissance Satellites,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Vol. 10, No. 17 (19 August 2010).

Wendell Minnick, “New Sats Bring Chinese GPS, Targeting Systems Closer to Reality,” Defense News, 16 August 2010.

Senior Defense Official, “DOD Background Briefing on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), U.S. Department of Defense, 16 August 2010).

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military And Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 16 August 2010).

“New Satellites Build Out China’s Reconnaissance Strike Network,” DefenseTech.org, 12 August 2010.

Galrahn, “Observing a Systems Approach to Naval Power,” Information Dissemination, 9 August 2010.

Geoffrey Forden, “DF-21 Delta: Some Early Thoughts,” Arms Control Wonk, 6 August 2010.

Wendell Minnick, “China Builds First Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Base?,” Defense News, 5 August 2010.

Mark Stokes and Tiffany Ma, “Second Artillery Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Brigade Facilities Under Construction in Guangdong?” AsiaEye—The Official Blog of the Project 2049 Institute, 3 August 2010.

Grace V. Jean, “Navy Aiming for Laser Weapons at Sea,” National Defense, August 2010.

Jon Rabiroff, “Mullen Moves from ‘Curious’ to ‘Concerned’ over China’s Military,” Stars & Stripes, 21 July 2010.

“Signals in the Yellow Sea: China Tries to Deny U.S. Aircraft Carriers Access to International Waters,” Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal, 20 July 2010.

Daniel Emery, “Anti-Aircraft Laser Unveiled at Farnborough Airshow,” BBC, 19 July 2010.

Erik Slavin, “New Chinese Anti-Ship Missile May Complicate Relations with U.S.,” Stars & Stripes, 19 July 2010.

Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 9 July 2010.

Abraham M. Denmark, “Managing the Global Commons,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 165-82.

Yoichi Kato, “U.S. Commander Blasts Chinese Navy’s Behavior,” Asahi Shimbun, 15 June 2010.

Mark Stokes, “Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia Pacific Region,” Panel Discussion: Implications of Aerospace Trends in Asia for the United States and the Region, Project 2049 Institute, Washington, DC, 4 June 2010.

“DongFeng 21 (CSS-5) Medium-Range Ballistic Missile,” SinoDefence.com, 4 June 2010.

Manu Sood, “China’s Anti-Ship Missiles May Make India’s 2012 Gorshkov Aircraft Carrier Unusable In War,” 8 Arms of Knowledge, 2 June 2010.

Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, U.S. Navy (Retired); Response to “Get off the Fainting Couch,” C. Hooper and C. Albon, pp. 42-47, April 2010; A. Erickson, pp. 8-12, May 2010 Proceedings; and “Eyes in the Sky,” A. Erickson, pp. 36-41, April 2010 Proceedings; U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 6 (June 2010), p. 82.

Mark Stokes and Ian Easton, “Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for Stability in the Taiwan Strait and Beyond,” Project 2049 Institute Occasional Paper Series, 28 May 2010.

Sean O’Connor, “China’s OTH Network,” Imint & Analysis, 22 May 2010.

Testimony of the Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett, Hearing on “China’s Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, 20 May 2010, p. 3.

Mark A. Stokes, Statement Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on “China’s Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, 20 May 2010.

Jan van Tol, with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 18 May 2010).

“China’s Maritime Moves Prove a Game-Changer,” Canberra Times, 17 May 2010, A9.

Thomas J. Culora, “The Strategic Implications of Obscurants: History and the Future,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Summer 2010), pp. 73-84.

Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Summer 2010), pp. 39-62.

Thilo Schroeter, Matthew Sollenberger and Bastiaan Verink, “Challenging U.S. Command of the Commons: Evolving Chinese Defense Technologies as a Threat to American Hegemony?,” Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 13 (Spring 2010).

Peter J. Brown, “China’s Navy Cruises into Pacific Ascendancy,” Asia Times, 22 April 2010.

Mike Burleson, “China’s Carrier Trap,” Carrier Alternative Weekly, 8 April 2010.

Wendell Minnick, “Chinese Anti-ship Missile Could Alter U.S. Power,” Defense News, 5 April 2010, p. 6.

Greg Torode, “Beijing Testing ‘Carrier Killer,’ US Warns,” South China Morning Post, 3 April 2010.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Eyes in the Sky,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 4 (April 2010), pp. 36-41.

Andrew Erickson, “China Testing Ballistic Missile ‘Carrier-Killer’,” Danger Room, Wired.com, 29 March 2010.

Gary J. Sampson, “China’s Development of Asymmetric Capabilities and Taiwan Strait Security,” Facing China, 29 March 2010.

“Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on the U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” 25 March 2010.

Bill Gertz, “Threat in Asia is Anti-Ship Missiles: China, Rogue Nations Watched,” Washington Times, 23 March 2010.

The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 15 March 2010).

Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Why AirSea Battle?,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 19 February 2010.

Jennifer Grogan, “Submarines Rate High in Obama Budget,” New London Day, 2 February 2010.

Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USN (Ret.), Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” 2 February 2010.

Capt. Sam J. Tangredi, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “No Game Changer for China,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 2 (February 2010), pp. 24-29.

Andrew Erickson, “Take China’s ASBM Potential Seriously,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 2 (February 2010), p. 8.

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) 2010 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 February 2010).

Ballistic Missile Defense Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010).

Major Kim Nødskov, Royal Danish Air Force (Ret.), The Return of China: The Long March to Power—The New Historic Mission of the People’s Liberation Army (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, January 2010).

Abraham M. Denmark and James Mulvenon, eds., Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 25 January 2010).

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “China Develops ASBMs,” Observer Research Foundation, 5 January 2010.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Ballistic Trajectory—China Develops New Anti-Ship Missile,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, China Watch, 4 January 2010.

Greg Torode, Chief Asia correspondent, “Is China’s Rocket Science all it’s Cracked up to be, Experts Ask,” South China Morning Post, 3 January 2010.

Cdr. John Patch, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “Fortress at Sea? The Carrier Invulnerability Myth,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 1 (January 2010).

Jean Hobgood, Kimberly Madison, Geoffrey Pawlowski, Steven Nedd, Michael Roberts, and Paige Rumberg, “System Architecture for Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Defense (ASBMD),” (Monterey, CA: Department of Systems Engineering, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009).

“The PLA Air Force Over the Horizon Radar Brigade,” The Taiwan Link, 24 December 2009.

“China: Fielding a New Anti-Ship Capability,” STRATFOR, 18 November 2009.

Tony Capaccio, “China’s New Missile May Create a ‘No-Go Zone’ for U.S. Fleet,” Bloomberg, 17 November 2009.

“Required Reading: Naval War College Review Articles on China’s DF-21/ ASBM,” Missile Defense, Steeljaw Scribe, 15 November 2009.

“Mark Stokes on Missile Defense,” Project 2049 Institute, 4 November 2009.

Gen. Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China Central Military Commission, People’s Republic of China, “Statesmen’s Forum: General Xu Caihou,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 26 October 2009. Video and transcript available.

“Olympic Gamble; Big Spenders; China’s Show of Force,” Lou Dobbs Tonight, CNN, 19:00 EST, 1 October 2009.

Mark Stokes, “China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability: the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Challenge to U.S. Maritime Operations in the Western Pacific and Beyond,” Occasional Paper, (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 14 September 2009).

Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Autumn 2009), pp. 53-86.

Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile: Developments and Missing Links,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Autumn 2009), pp. 87-115, A1-2.

Loren B. Thompson, “The Achilles Heel of Chinese Anti-Access Missiles,” Early Warning Blog, Lexington Institute, 18 August 2009.

編集委員 加藤洋一 [Yoichi Kato, National Security Correspondent], “[Part 2] 「中国空母は脅威ではない。ゲームチャンジャーは対艦弾道ミサイルだ」” [China’s Aircraft Carrier is Not a Threat. The ‘Game Changer’ is the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile], “中国、海軍大国への胎動” [Part 2 in the Series “The Rise of China’s Naval Power”], 朝日新聞 Globe [Asahi Shinbun Globe], 10 August 2009.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Suitland, Md.: Office of Naval Intelligence, July 2009).

Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Military Development: Maritime and Aerospace Dimensions,” presented at Defense Foundation Forum, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC, 17 July 2009.

Paul S. Giarra and Michael J. Green, “Asia’s Military Balance at a Tipping Point,” Op-ed, Asian Wall Street Journal, 17 July 2009.

Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “The Contested Commons,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 135, No. 7 (July 2009).

“Important Chinese ASBM Article,” Information Dissemination, 25 June 2009.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese ASBM Development: Knowns and Unknowns,” Jamestown China Brief, Vol. 9, No. 13 (24 June 2009), pp. 4-8.

“More Chinese Netizen Commentary on Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Program,” The Taiwan Link, 23 June 2009.

“China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Program: Checkmate for Taiwan?,” The Taiwan Link, 17 June 2009.

“Hearing on the Implications of China’s Naval Modernization for the United States,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 11 June 2009.

Paul S. Giarra, “A Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: Implications for the USN,” Statement Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, 11 June 2009.

“Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Department of the Navy in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2010 and the Future Years Defense Program,” U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, 4 June 2009.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Facing a New Missile Threat from China (Op-Ed): How the U.S. Should Respond to China’s Development of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Systems,” CBS News, 28 May 2009.

Jeffrey Lewis, “DF-21 Delta Confirmation,” Arms Control Wonk, 9 May 2009.

“ASBM – follow up,” Information Dissemination, 1 May 2009.

Andrew S. Erickson and David Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 135, No. 3 (May 2009), pp. 26-32.

Cdr. Paul S. Giarra, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “Watching the Chinese,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 135, No. 3 (May 2009).

“Near-Term BMD Defenses Against Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles Fitted with MaRVs,” Information Dissemination, 10 April 2009.

Sean O’Connor, “Dragon’s Fire: The PLA’s 2nd Artillery Corps,” IMINT & Analysis, 8 April 2009.

Martin Sieff, “Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles,” United Press International, 2 April 2009.

National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, (NASIC, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, OH, April 2009), NASIC-1031-0985-09.

Galrahn, “Risk Averse Political Policy Requires High End Focus,” U.S. Naval Institute Blog, 30 March 2009.

“PLAN ASBM development,” Information Dissemination, 28 March 2009.

Senior Defense Official, “DoD Background Briefing,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), U.S. Department of Defense, 25 March 2009.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 March 2009).

Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009.

Sean O’Connor, “OTH Radar and the ASBM Threat,” Imint & Analysis, 11 November 2008.

Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Westport: Praeger, 30 September 2008). See Chapter 6, p. 167.

Sam Roggeveen, “U.S. Reacts to China’s Carrier Killer,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 15 August 2008.

Bill Sweetman, “Navy Reacts to Missile Threats,” Ares: A Defense Technology Blog, Aviation Week, 14 August 2008.

Christopher P. Cavas, “Missile Threat Helped Drive DDG Cut: Zumwalt Class Could Not Down Chinese Weapons,” Defense News, 4 August 2008.

王伟 [Wang Wei], “战术弹道导弹对中国海洋战略体系的影响”[The Effect of Tactical Ballistic Missiles on the Maritime Strategy System of China], 舰载武器 [Shipborne Weapons], no. 84 (August 2006), pp. 12–15, reprinted as Danling Cacioppo, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), trans., Naval War College Review 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008), pp. 133–40.

“China Close to Anti-Ship BM,” Defense Tech, 24 June 2008.

Wendell Minnick, “China Developing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles,” Defense News, 14 January 2008.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Can China Become a Maritime Power?,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, eds., Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 70-110.

Larry M. Wortzel, The People’s Liberation Army and Space Warfare: Emerging United States-China Military Competition (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 17 October 2007). See especially section on attacking an aircraft carrier and the role of space assets.

Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA Command, Control, and Targeting Architectures: Theory, Doctrine, and Warfighting Applications,” Chapter 5, pp. 191-235, in Andrew Scobell and Roy Kamphausen, eds., Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and National Bureau of Asian Research, 4 September 2007). See pp. 210-11 for discussion and Chinese sources on attacking moving aircraft carrier battle groups.

Richard Fisher, Jr., “New Asian Missiles Target the Greater Asian Region,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, 24 July 2007.

Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control and Campaign Planning (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 11 May 2007). See especially section on “Attacking Deployed Carrier Battle Groups,” pp. 12-14.

Cortez A. Cooper III, Statement Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “PLA Modernization in Traditional Warfare Capabilities” panel, “China’s Military Modernization and its Impact on the United States and the Asia-Pacific” hearing, Washington, DC, 29 March 2007.

Andrew S. Erickson, Statement Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “PLA Modernization in Traditional Warfare Capabilities” panel, “China’s Military Modernization and its Impact on the United States and the Asia-Pacific” hearing, Washington, DC, 29 March 2007, pp. 72-78.

China’s state media continued Wednesday to give big play to the killings of Hong Kong tourists in Manila, in particular trumpeting the official response from Beijing. …

Andrew Erickson, an associate professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College, argues that Beijing’s efforts to protect Chinese overseas are likely to increase. In an article published this month titled “Looking After China’s Own: Pressure to Protect PRC Citizens Working Overseas Likely to Rise,” he says that “Several factors increase the likelihood that the Chinese government may be more able and willing to respond with force to future hostage situations or other targeted violence against PRC citizens.”

They include the growing strength of the Chinese navy and the “Chinese leadership’s increasingly assertive worldview as the country emerges strongly from the deep global economic recession.” …

… This past week the DoD released its annual report Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. This is a new name for the report, which previously was called Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, but was euphemistically called “Chinese Military Power” by many, in a nod to a well-known series of bi-annual reports produced in the 1980s titled Soviet Military Power. …

Unlike Soviet Military Power in its heyday, there is apparently nothing in Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China concerning China’s space program that could not be obtained by open sources. … It would be possible, if someone is so inclined, to produce a fairly detailed annual report on Chinese space activities using open sources. However, there is at present nobody willing to sponsor such an effort. (NASA was encouraged by Congress to report on China’s space activities a few years ago, but instead of producing a report, the agency reportedly merely delivered a bundle of press clippings.)

There are a few people in the West who occasionally write about the subject of the Chinese space program. Perhaps most notably is Andrew Erickson, an associate professor at the Naval War College and a founding member of the China Maritime Studies Institute, who has written a few articles about China’s space activities. In the March 2010 issue of the US Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine Erickson described several of China’s recent developments of navigation, communications, and surveillance satellites. …

China has been engaged in a military buildup for a number of years now. One of China’s recent military developments that received a lot of attention was the country’s work on an anti-ship ballistic missile which could fly up to 1,500 kilometers before homing in on a target such as an American aircraft carrier. …

American military officials have commented that they do not believe that China has mastered the C4ISR required to usefully employ an anti-ship ballistic missile when they develop one. Admittedly, China has built some advanced radars for searching for ships, and made some general improvements in its maritime patrol aircraft.

But China has also stepped up its launching of surveillance satellites, launching its tenth Yaogan series satellite since 2006 on August 10. Rather remarkably, despite this substantial improvement in capability that indicates China is making a concerted effort to improve its space surveillance system, that subject received only one short paragraph in the Pentagon’s newly-released report. …

Relations between Taiwan and China have improved recently. At the same time, U.S.-Japanese relations have worsened, partly as the result of disagreements over Futenma Marine Air Station on Okinawa. As a result, the prospects of fighting between the United States and China over Taiwan and of U.S. reliance on Okinawa bases to supplement carrier airpower in the course of such a fight appear far-fetched, disastrous for the states concerned. Of course, military professionals and the defense analytic community need to think through unlikely and unwelcome scenarios. To that end, various analysts have contributed to a lively discussion of Chinese “antiaccess” systems designed to keep the United States at bay in the event of conflict. These systems include C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets like over-the-horizon (OTH) radar and increasing numbers of satellites, a more modern air force, more submarines with better weapons, and both cruise and ballisticmissiles to hold at risk our ships at sea and our air bases ashore. This article examines ballistic missile threats to carriers and air bases and the adequacy of U.S. active defenses.

China seeks the capacity to find U.S. aircraft carriers roughly a thousand miles from the mainland and to attack them with homing ASBMs (antiship ballistic missiles). China must overcome serious technological challenges to field the systems needed to do these things. The United States faces the prospect that China might overcome these challenges, perhaps as soon as five years from now. To attack fixed targets like American air bases in Japan, China has already developed a family of road-mobile, solid-fuel, short-range ballistic missiles. One of these missiles, the CSS-6, has the range to attack Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, a U.S. Air Force facility that is in many ways the best air base ashore for U.S. operations against China.

The current U.S. response to these developments relies heavily on active defense—that is, deployment of antiballistic missiles (ABMs). To defend ships at sea, the United States is investing in Aegis/Standard Missile ABMs, and to defend air bases ashore, in Patriot PAC-3 ABMs. The Navy originally developed Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) to protect assets ashore, such as seaports of debarkation. Given China’s ASBM efforts, however, many officers see the counter ASBM mission as an important role for Aegis BMD. Indeed, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Patrick Walsh, recently characterized missile defense as “essential to our ability to operate freely.”

MY ARGUMENT IN A NUTSHELL

The U.S. ABM investments just described deserve critical scrutiny: asymmetries in the competition of Chinese ballistic missiles versus U.S. antiballistic missiles make it unlikely that active defense alone will succeed. To see why, we need to review China’s ASBM system threat to ships at sea and China’s short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) threat to U.S. air bases. …