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## Mutually Assured Destruction or Dependence? U.S. and Chinese Perspectives on China's Military Development

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One can imagine a future in which China contemplates limited first strikes against an adversary's population centers or strategic forces. In such a violent world, we may dream of the days when China was only MAD [only pursued mutually assured destruction].

—James Mulvenon, Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis

The sustainable development of [the] two powers enables both to benefit from non-rival policies and that is why Sino-U.S. relations should be based on mutually assured dependence.

—Xu Hui, China National Defense University

The National Intelligence Council is the U.S. intelligence community's center for midterm and long-term strategic projections, producing Global Briefings every four years between election and inauguration day. The most recent of these highlights China's rise as a great power with increasing influence on the global system. It indicates that while the United States retains its overall positioning in the world, it has lost leverage in relative terms:

China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country. If current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world's second largest economy [including the EU] and will be a leading military power. It also could be the largest importer of natural resources and the biggest polluter. Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States' relative strength—even in the military realm—will decline and US leverage will become more constrained.<sup>1</sup>

This analysis raises several key policy questions: What will U.S. policy be? What will China's be? What challenges and concerns will influence their evolving military relationship in the security realm? Will "mutually assured dependence" prevail over "mutually assured destruction"? These questions animate the chapter that follows, one that explores the mutual fears and concerns of the United States and China over each other's military objectives and capabilities as well as the prospects for their mitigation and even abatement.

### FOREGROUNDING THE ANALYSIS

Adapting to an increasingly powerful China will be neither instantaneous nor easy. The United States and China will face particular challenges in their relations and positions in the world that, if not managed carefully, could cause considerable tensions. China's recent development suggests that its so-called Century of Humiliation (the period from roughly 1840 to 1945 when China was subject to crushing predation and subjugation by outside powers) was an aberration. Now it is returning to what it believes is its rightful place as a great power in the international system. But herein lies a challenge: this exceptional period of weakness in Chinese history corresponds with the duration of the United States' meteoric rise on the world stage. Never before has the world witnessed the simultaneous presence of a powerful United States and a powerful China, let alone their interaction. Nearly as exceptional is the phenomenon of two great powers in the international system with two very different cultures, political systems, geographic regions, and sets of national interests poised to avoid a great power war. It is time to reconsider the utility and effectiveness of the age-old scarcity narrative of the rise and fall of nations.

Although China is unlikely to eclipse the United States in overall power and influence in the near or distant future, the best example of the successful incorporation of a major rising power into the international system—the United States itself—may offer needed perspective on any analysis of China's "peaceful rise." The earlier history of the United States' emergence as a world power has been described as relatively "peaceful," largely because of the U.S. resemblance to Great Britain, which had itself been the preceding "greatest power." Even with such ties, these Euro-Atlantic powers fought two wars, one in which the future United States declared independence, and a second (the War of 1812) that included substantial naval combat, occupation of each other's territory, and the burning of Washington. The United States subsequently declared the Monroe Doctrine ("hands off the Americas"), and the Royal Navy enforced it, because both nations had a

vital national interest in keeping other European powers from establishing footholds in the Western Hemisphere.

Moreover, while the United States was successful in avoiding great power conflict in the nineteenth century, its growth was hardly peaceful—as the indigenous peoples of the continent, the Mexicans, and the Spanish will attest. For that matter, the growth of the United States as a nation also included a civil war that killed 2 percent of its population. Lastly, the process by which the United States replaced Great Britain as the global hegemon was hardly peaceful: two world wars, in which Washington and London fought on the same side, were a significant part of that power transition. And whereas Great Britain was a small island nation with an unwieldy empire whose extraordinary global influence proved unsustainable, U.S. national power appears far more broad-based and durable—thereby obviating the possibility that Washington will assuage Beijing's concerns by relinquishing its preeminent status.

That status, however, hinges in part on a globe-girdling military presence that Britain never achieved, involving U.S. bases, staging areas, or troops on all continents save Antarctica. This extraordinary span of presence and power, particularly in areas surrounding China, worries Beijing, which is developing its own countervailing capabilities and wields increasing long-range presence and influence of its own. At the same time, the United States and China have shared interests and areas of interdependence. They have been engaging sporadically in military exchanges and joint meetings of commanders and officers, although this has been limited severely by differing notions of transparency and reciprocity. Against this backdrop, the United States and China will hope for the best, but continue to prepare for the worst.

This is the larger context of developing U.S.-China relations in the initial decades of the twenty-first century. Most fundamentally, the United States fears that China seeks to, and is increasingly capable of, undermining the U.S. preeminent position in world affairs achieved through its successful manner of governance and performance in World War II, subsequent construction of the postwar international system, and ongoing status as an indispensable provider of global public goods. China, for its part, fears that the United States and other Western powers will never accommodate its return to its hard-won position as an autonomous, moral, and powerful civilization with a preeminent regional role. This fear persists despite Beijing's abandonment of Maoist insurgencies and its new identity as a champion of the interests of developing nations in promoting a more diverse and equitable international system. The fears and aspirations of the United States and China draw on powerful currents of national identity and experience. Consequently, they are easy to reinforce and difficult to moderate. In

coming years, driving factors, such as their constant development of new high-end military capabilities, are likely to become more significant. Given the military hardware already available to both sides, the costs of giving into those fears would be too devastating to contemplate.

## CHINA'S GEOPOLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAJECTORY

Over the past century China, like the United States, has been ideologically exceptionalist. Indeed, each centers its identity on a powerful and enduring idea. Whereas the United States sees its mission as that of the shining "city on a hill" and a purveyor of democratic capitalism, China has long viewed itself as an ancient "Middle Kingdom" whose meritocratic cultural superiority produced orderly society at home and respect abroad.

The U.S. vision of itself as a disseminator and a defender of capitalist democracy offers clear prescriptions for its role in the world, as evidenced by the continuing vigor—and even the periodic hubris (as seen in Vietnam and, most recently, Iraq)—of U.S. foreign policy. Ever since colonial incursions at the beginning of the nineteenth century, China, on the other hand, has battled an identity crisis. Indeed, to the extent that China was relatively insular during its early golden age of development and regional power, it maintained an imperial tributary system and never developed a robust *international* identity.

China's present grand strategy may be described as a multilevel process that seeks to restore and maintain territorial integrity, thereby ensuring peace for economic development, social stability, and the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Its members (more than 78 million) believe the party's leadership is essential to realizing these interrelated objectives and that China's recent success validates their approach. Strategic efforts focus in particular on resisting U.S. "containment" and opposing independence in any form for Taiwan. Economic efforts emphasize access to economic inputs and export markets, entailing major acquisitions of energy and minerals, often by entering into mutually profitable dependency-inducing relationships with the governments of developing nations. U.S. analysts debate the extent to which this is primarily an ad hoc process involving bottom-up demand "pulls" from a wide variety of actors or a coordinated top-down "push" strategy that amounts to a strategic shopping spree by China's government and state-owned enterprises (e.g., national oil companies) to exploit the current global economic crisis. In any case, China's government generally employs pragmatic experimentation, although bureaucratic interests and organizational impediments sometimes complicate this.

In Beijing's strategic sights, both U.S.-China relations and the question of Taiwan's status loom large. The Taiwan issue is particularly challenging

for China's leaders because it is tied to China's economic development and, through it, to all their other major problems. If they can retain political power in the meantime, China's leaders would prefer to defer major international issues (and even the Taiwan question, if necessary) until they can achieve sustainable economic growth through domestic reform, thereby securing the basis for a long-term buildup of comprehensive national strength. The issue will probably intensify when China's economic and military power increase to the point where Beijing feels more able to assert its interests. Many U.S. strategists worry that this point is now arriving; I agree that some significant changes appear to be visible.

At a lower level of intensity, China's international efforts, while approved by elites in developing countries, face increasing local backlashes. Examples include Beijing's support of governments such as those of Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, whose policies are deeply unpopular with certain segments of the societies that they govern. China's strict conception of independence and respect for other nations' sovereignty, which has long included a vow not to station military forces abroad, has limited its willingness to use military means to protect and rescue its citizens overseas.<sup>2</sup> China's relevant power projection capability has heretofore been relatively limited. While I would argue that concerns about Chinese overseas military ambitions are exaggerated, many U.S. analysts fear that this is already in flux and could change dramatically over time.

### NOT COMMUNIST BUT "TECHNONATIONALIST"

Since 1949 the leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have promulgated ideology to guide society toward specific national goals. Chairman Mao Zedong called for class-based social revolution as the mobilizing principle for Chinese society. Following the disastrous failure of that utopian ideology, Chinese leaders, starting with Deng Xiaoping, seized on the idea that technological strength determines national power in a harshly competitive world. This "technonationalism" was seen as the best principle to modernize China to great power status. Technonationalism represents both a new ideological direction and a testament to historical continuity in Chinese political thought. As in the past, use of foreign technology is justified as a means of strengthening China and offers the prospect of finally reconciling two goals that have eluded China for over a century: national sovereignty and modernization.

By concentrating authority and privileging ideology, China's post-1949 political system brought the question of its international identity to the fore. Despite early ideological clashes that convulsed Chinese society, China's leaders have long articulated a set of principles that officially govern

China's international actions. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence of 1954 emphasize "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence."<sup>3</sup> These principles have led some scholars to draw parallels to China's imperial past as a "benevolent" regional hegemon.

These Five Principles, however, do not acknowledge the extent to which nations must engage in competitive activities, even war, to defend their national interests. Perhaps most importantly, they imply an egalitarian international system that is scarcely in keeping with China's notion of itself as a "great power" that demands deference even beyond that merited by its current material capabilities. For these reasons, it is doubtful that the Five Principles completely inform Beijing's foreign policy. Rather, they are a product of China's earlier dalliance with exporting world revolution and overcoming the Soviets as the best model for the nationalist uprisings in places like Southeast Asia and Africa.

This contradiction has led U.S. experts and others to explore other sources and manifestations of a "true" Chinese conception of international relations. Some (such as Harvard's Alastair Iain Johnston, a scholar of Chinese classical military texts) contend that, over centuries, leaders and bureaucratic elites have distilled China's historical experiences into a "strategic culture" that emphasizes both territorial integrity and selective and carefully calibrated use of force to address key national interests.

Domestic policy under Mao Zedong was highly ideological, even irrational, at least from the standpoint of popular welfare as opposed to individual or party political survival. For example, in 1967 the Central Committee recalled embassy personnel in stages to participate in the Cultural Revolution. According to former foreign minister Huang Hua, "nearly all the ambassadors and counselors of the Chinese embassies abroad were called back to China, and became the targets of criticism and attack." As a result, "the Foreign Ministry became a severely damaged department" and its work was "seriously impaired."<sup>4</sup>

With a few exceptions, Chinese foreign policy since 1949 has been both rational and professional. Under Mao's strategic thinking and Zhou Enlai's professional—and often moderating—implementation, PRC foreign policy was carefully attuned to changes in nations' relative power. This is evident in China's initial "leaning to one side" policy favoring the USSR (1949–1959), its subsequent championing of "nonaligned" nations to improve its own international position at the 1955 Bandung Conference, and its shift toward cooperation with the United States against the USSR in 1970.

Deng Xiaoping's ascent in 1978 brought realism even more consistently to the fore as a determinant of Chinese foreign and security policy. This can be seen in his termination of aid to foreign insurgencies and assumption

of a more independent foreign policy for China as a third-power balancer in the 1980s. This trend continues in China's current efforts to position itself as an emerging great power, promoting a "multipolar" international system.

Close examination of China's diplomacy and military action since 1949 suggests that, despite communist rhetoric and internal turmoil, it has primarily followed a "realist" course of international relations for the past half century. Realism dictates husbanding national power and utilizing alliances to achieve maximum material benefit from an anarchic international system in which nations can only truly depend on themselves.

The question facing China's leaders today is not how to fulfill ancient cultural imperatives, or even how to develop a nebulous conception of ideological legitimacy. Communist ideology, however disastrous in application, was designed to serve specific material objectives. Instead, Beijing must determine how to maximize measured dimensions of national power in order to achieve its material interests in a competitive international system. Over the past half century, China has dramatically transformed the ideological basis on which to pursue this goal, abandoning Maoist "politics in command" in favor of science.

China's present leaders hope to coordinate a transformation that is more gradual but equally as dramatic as the one their party had originally sought after taking power in 1949. Beijing's methods may be new, but not their motivation: using authoritarianism to transform China into a great power, commanding order at home and respect abroad. Under the ideological aegis of technonationalism, China has surrendered collective activism in favor of economic and technological development.

Deng Xiaoping's consolidation of power in the late 1970s and the initiation of economic reforms heralded the rise of truly "expert" technocrats into China's leadership. While Deng also rehabilitated a number of party elders of Long March fame, their new role was primarily to provide continuity and legitimacy; a younger generation of technocrats supervised the actual reforms. The Long March revolutionaries were ultimately forced into lucrative retirement to allow technocrats to exert increased influence.

During the Tiananmen Crisis of 1989, Deng Xiaoping initiated Jiang Zemin's ascent to the Chairmanship, a process that culminated in Jiang's assumption of leadership after Deng's death in 1997. An archetypal technocratic leader, Jiang received his degree in electrical engineering. Thanks to his deft manipulation of bureaucratic politics, he advanced in Shanghai party leadership. Once at the top of the leadership structure, Jiang was surrounded by fellow technocrats, many of whom were engineers. Long before he consolidated power, Jiang emphasized that "China's security calculus should . . . incorporate economic, scientific, and technological dimensions." In 1992 he declared that post-Cold War geopolitical competition is,

"in essence, a competition of overall national strength based on economic, scientific, and technological capabilities."<sup>5</sup>

Not only was China's third-generation leadership (after Mao and Deng) technocratic, it ceded power to a fourth generation under Hu Jintao (BS, hydraulic engineering) that is even more technocratic in its background and policy preferences. Starting in 2012, a fifth generation—led by Xi Jinping (PhD, chemical engineering)—will continue this tradition.

## CHINA'S MILITARY DEVELOPMENT

China's rapid rise on the international stage has made the question of its military trajectory salient. Beijing is developing its military much in the same way that Deng developed China's market economy: by initiating modernization in the most pressing and promising areas and then attempting to extend this progress to the less-developed and less-crucial areas. China's overall military capabilities remain limited geographically, and it has yet to develop fully the wide range of platforms, weapons systems, and supporting infrastructure needed for large-scale, high-intensity power projection far beyond its immediate maritime periphery and lengthy land borders. Yet as part of a larger process of creating expanding "pockets of excellence," China has made great progress in developing certain strategic weapons. For example, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) places strong emphasis on missiles (see figure 4.1). Its short-range conventional missiles have advanced quickly to become the world's most numerous. They have the capacity to target Taiwan, as well as various nations around




Figure 4.1. PLA Mobile Missile Launcher. Lithograph by Samm Tyroler-Cooper Sacks.



China's periphery, and increasingly surface vessels as well. They even offer the potential for export to strategic allies, without threatening China's own security.

### Evolving Regional Security Policy

As part of an ongoing revolution in military doctrine and hardware, Beijing is accruing a limited but growing capacity to project force beyond its immediate borders for the defense of its large maritime interests and burgeoning coastal development. China's Central Military Commission,<sup>6</sup> in part by devoting greater resources to the PLA Navy, is in the process of operationalizing a strategy that Deng originally proposed in 1979. Admiral Liu Huaqing further developed, articulated, and promoted a strategy of "Near Seas Defense," which he defined as covering the Yellow, East, and South China Seas. He also envisioned China's defensive capabilities eventually extending to the First Island Chain, the Second Island Chain, and beyond. This strategy—which was accepted in 1986—at present entails preparing to participate in limited-scale, high-tech, high-intensity, potentially operationally offensive conflicts on, under, and above the "near seas" and their approaches. China's construction of outposts on the Spratly and Paracel Islands that it captured in 1974 (in its longest distance opposed amphibious operation to date), 1988, and 1995, as well as its testing of ballistic missiles in the Strait of Taiwan on the eve of Taiwan's first presidential election in 1996 suggest that it is committed to defending its territorial claims and regional sphere of influence, which it believes should include Taiwan, other islands and maritime zones in the "near seas," and the potentially oil-rich shipping lanes of the South China Sea.

However, China's attempts to focus on its maritime periphery are complicated by its other border problems. It has been said that the United States' four greatest allies are Canada, Mexico, the Atlantic, and the Pacific; China lacks such peaceful and economically conducive surroundings. Although some areas remain unstable, China has settled virtually all its disputed land borders save for those with India and Bhutan. Moreover, it has resolved none of its maritime claims, leaving disputes with all of its sea neighbors: the Koreans, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei.

As of late these have been a particular source of regional and international concern with Japan's arrest in disputed waters near the Pinnacle Islands (administered by Japan as the Senkakus, and claimed by China as the Diaoyus) of a Chinese fisherman. On September 7, 2010, the Chinese trawler *Minjinyu 5179* collided repeatedly with Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats, prompting detention of skipper Zhan Qixiong. A major diplomatic incident ensued, in which Beijing cancelled all bilateral meetings at

the ministerial level and above, summoned the Japanese ambassador six times, and allegedly suspended rare earth shipments. In what was widely perceived as caving in to Chinese pressure, Japan released the trawler and fourteen of the crewmembers on September 13 and Zhan eleven days later.

Beijing regards Taiwan, which some in the U.S. view as a self-governing democracy, as its own wayward province. Gaining bilateral and cross-strait endorsement of the One China Policy has been a major, and largely successful, focus of PRC diplomacy since 1972. As Shirley Kan of the Congressional Research Service explains:

Since 1971, U.S. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have articulated a “one China” policy in understandings with the PRC. Congressional oversight has watched for any new agreements and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing’s “one China” principle—on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC’s claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan’s status as unsettled. With added conditions, U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait: peacefully, with the assent of Taiwan’s people, and without unilateral changes. In short, U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not its outcome.<sup>7</sup>

Because the PRC is unable to achieve reunification with Taiwan but insists on pursuing its One-China Principle, Taiwan’s status remains the most likely point of military conflict for Beijing, and for bringing Washington into conflict with Beijing. China maintains that Taiwan must commit to a process of reunification by an unspecified time in the near future. Beijing further insists that, if necessary, it will intervene militarily to prevent Taipei from declaring independence.

### Recent Incidents

U.S.-China rapprochement had a military component from the start: Henry Kissinger shared intelligence on the Soviet military with Chinese counterparts in 1971. Military-to-military relations were initiated formally during Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s trip to Beijing in 1980. During the 1980s, the United States sold China many types of military and dual-use equipment, including helicopters and torpedoes, and there were plans to upgrade fighter avionics. But this ended abruptly with a Euro-American arms embargo following the 1989 Tiananmen Crisis.

The resulting discord, coupled with the Cold War’s end, eroded the strategic rationale for military cooperation. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s democratization since the late 1980s has raised the salience of its international status in Beijing’s eyes. By the mid-1990s, the first significant U.S.-China

security tensions since the Vietnam War emerged. During 1995 and 1996—in response to then Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's series of anti-unification statements culminating in a controversial address at Cornell University—the PLA conducted a series of live missile tests in the waters off Taiwan's ports. Beijing stopped this brinkmanship only when Washington dispatched two carrier battle groups toward the region and urged both sides to moderate their rhetoric.

Since then Sino-U.S. military incidents have occurred with disturbing frequency. On May 1, 2001, a Chinese J-8 fighter collided with a U.S. EP-3 signals reconnaissance aircraft that it had been intercepting over international waters approximately seventy nautical miles south of Hainan Island. The J-8 and its pilot crashed into the South China Sea, never to be seen again. The EP-3 made an emergency landing on nearby Hainan Island; there the crew was detained for two weeks. Their aircraft was confiscated, only to be returned *in pieces* later. At issue were fundamentally different perceptions of sovereignty and interpretations of international law. The United States and many other nations believe that it is permissible to conduct aerial surveillance in international airspace, that is, beyond twelve nautical miles from a nation's coastline. China disagrees and regularly sends military aircraft to intercept and monitor such missions, just as a variety of Chinese vessels routinely confront U.S. research vessels surveying high seas near (though never inside) China's territorial waters. Such encounters could readily produce an unanticipated and unwanted crisis in the future.

Although immediately after September 11, 2001, there was a convergence of U.S. and Chinese national interests resulting in counterterrorist intelligence sharing and joint financial monitoring working groups, by the mid-2000s this strategic respite had passed—overcome in part by Chinese convictions that the United States was mired in Iraq and Afghanistan even as China was rising rapidly in comprehensive national power. A series of incidents epitomize the problem of Chinese nontransparency and its impact on crisis management between the two nations. Not only have a number of recent events been murky in explanation, there have also been confusing signals about who was making various related decisions (China's central leadership, the PLA, the foreign ministry, or even Chinese civil maritime enforcement agencies). This lack of coordination raises worrying uncertainties about Chinese civil-military relations and bureaucratic coordination, and the PLA's policy influence.

A November 2004 incident in which a Chinese *Han*-class submarine was tracked by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force as the submarine passed submerged through Japanese territorial waters in the Ishigaki Strait was blamed on a navigational error in a manner that does not appear credible to naval experts. In October 2006 a Chinese diesel submarine

reportedly surfaced unexpectedly within eight kilometers of the U.S. Navy's *Kitty Hawk* aircraft carrier as it was operating near Okinawa. China's January 11, 2007, antisatellite test, reportedly the single greatest human source of satellite-endangering debris in history, has still not been satisfactorily explained, despite repeated inquiries by the U.S. government; Beijing was only slightly more forthcoming regarding its January 11, 2010, antiballistic missile test.

And despite widespread evidence that China is developing and deploying an antiship ballistic missile—a potentially offensive and destabilizing technology because it creates incentives for a preemptive strike against associated targets—Beijing has made few official public statements in this regard. In November 2007 two U.S. minesweepers and the *Kitty Hawk* carrier strike group were denied permission, on separate occasions, to make port calls in Hong Kong. There may well be clear explanations for each of the above events, but unfortunately, with only a few partial exceptions, China's government has been unwilling to provide any.

The *Impeccable* incident of March 8, 2009, in which a group of Chinese civil maritime vessels and fishing trawlers harassed the surveillance ship USNS *Impeccable*, then operating some seventy-five miles south of Hainan Island, constituted perhaps the most serious crisis in U.S.-China military relations since the EP-3 incident. It also highlighted a relatively new (and ongoing) form of engagement: the use of civilian vessels. Subsequent U.S. offers to support Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members in efforts to "multilateralize" discussion of disputes over South China Sea claims, and Beijing's angry responses, threaten to make this a particular zone of future tension.

Lack of strategic transparency and understanding remains a major problem between China and the United States. Beijing has traditionally disclosed far less information about the most critical aspects of its military capabilities than has Washington; its strategists believe that as the weaker party it must use ambiguity to compensate for technological inferiority. This has been exacerbated by ongoing Chinese efforts to use the suspension of military-military relations as a means of expressing umbrage at U.S. policy; this has happened twice in two years (2008, 2010). While China's rising military strength increasingly incentivizes the PLA to engage in "selective transparency" in order to impress its populace and deter its U.S. competitor with improved capabilities, this remains insufficient to reassure Washington. Meanwhile, Beijing complains that Washington lacks "strategic transparency," or credible explanations, regarding its own intentions. This issue raises the larger question as to what degree military-to-military activities will be subject to ever-shifting political winds and strategic disagreement; or rather, if there is any hope that they will not be the first casualty of such challenges in the future.

## Growing Resources for a Growing PLA

The PLA's official 2011 defense budget is \$91.5 billion. Though widely believed by Western analysts to be understated, even this figure is well over twice that of India, and second only to that of the United States (roughly \$700 billion in 2011). Since 1990 it has enjoyed double-digit growth, with the exception of 2003 (in which growth was 9.6 percent) and 2010 (7.5 percent). No major power is even approaching this level of defense spending growth. China's defense industry, while still uneven in efficiency and quality of output, is improving steadily. Together, these factors enable steady increases in overall PLA capabilities, with particularly rapid progress in selected areas.

U.S. analysts differ widely in their assessment of China's defense budget, in part because it is difficult to compare directly with those of Western industrial powers. Some believe there is now firm evidence that Beijing fully intends to challenge Washington for regional leadership in maritime East Asia and may even reach further to conduct extensive operations. Others have concluded from the extent and nature of recent budgets that China is simply pursuing military power commensurate with its economic strength and sufficient to facilitate reunification with Taiwan. Certainly the expenditures are higher than Beijing's official figure, which omits large hard-currency transactions such as China's recent purchases of Russian aircraft, submarines, and destroyers. Nevertheless, it is clear that China's defense investment has grown considerably and will continue to grow in the future.<sup>8</sup>

## Bifurcated Military Development, at Home and Abroad

Close to home China's military capabilities are rapidly reaching a very high level. However, they are making much slower progress, from a lower baseline, further away. The most common source of error in Chinese and U.S. analyses of PLA development is the conflation of these two factors.

China's pattern of emerging military development clearly reflects its relative ranking of security concerns. Its military capabilities may be represented by a series of concentric circles, or "range rings," with the most advanced, potent, and numerous platforms and weapons systems concentrated on China's shores, in its territorial waters (up to twelve nautical miles from its shores), in its claimed exclusive economic zones (up to two hundred nautical miles from its shores), and in the South China Sea, which China claims virtually in its entirety, although it has not stated officially the specific basis for this claim. This is hardly surprising; the three "near seas" contain all China's maritime claims—disputed with all its maritime neighbors—as well as rich resources to which it seeks access. Here China's capabilities are advancing rapidly, and it is increasingly prepared to wage "local limited wars under high technology conditions."




Figure 4.2. Dual Canister Missile Launcher Engaged. Lithograph by Samm Tyroler-Cooper Sacks.

PLA development thus far has been focused largely on developing a variant of regional "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD) to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence, in part by developing credible capabilities to thwart U.S. forces in the event of intervention. The PLA's current order of battle is based primarily on the world's foremost array of substrategic land-based mobile missiles (see figure 4.2); diesel submarines armed with cruise missiles, torpedoes, and sea mines; and improving variants of surface ships and aircraft likewise outfitted with increasingly capable missiles. Though already formidable in firepower, it remains clearly sized and shaped primarily for defending claims on China's disputed maritime periphery as opposed to conducting extraregional blue-water sea control operations. To assess related scenarios, one must compare the actual assets that relevant militaries could deploy; outright comparison of Chinese and U.S. forces is misleading unless one envisions an all-out global conflict between the two. This is virtually inconceivable.

Although concerns about Taiwan's status have played a prominent role in driving Chinese defense spending since at least the mid-1990s, the PLA's defense interests are now necessarily greater as its reliance on foreign resources, trade, and shipping lanes grows. Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's March 2008 landslide election and his pragmatic policies have greatly

stabilized cross-strait relations. So with China continuing to grow as a global stakeholder, its navy is likely to supplement its previous approach. Its current naval platforms and weaponry largely support a Taiwan- and "near seas"-centric access-denial strategy. China will continue to develop these core capabilities but also add what the Office of Naval Intelligence terms "new but limited requirements for protection of the sea lanes beyond China's own waters, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and expanded naval diplomacy." China's capabilities are clearly growing, but its naval intentions—at least beyond asserting control over its claimed territorial waters to include Taiwan—remain unclear.

Further afield, in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, China has not developed high-intensity military capabilities, instead projecting power in the form of recent peacetime deployments. The PLA now has much to be proud of and talk about in this area, having dispatched

- a frigate and military transport aircraft to safeguard the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya in February 2011;
- nine (and counting) task forces to escort over 4,000 ships and rescue 40 from attacks by pirates in the Gulf of Aden since December 2008;
- a hospital ship to treat over 15,500 in African and Indian Ocean nations in summer 2010; and
- a variety of aircraft, and vehicles, and personnel to assist the victims of two major earthquakes (Wenchuan, 2008; Yushu, 2010)—as well as other natural disasters—in China.

Although apparently constructive and peaceful in nature, such efforts are viewed by some as a prelude to more expansive maneuvers. Beijing already has the capability to augment its power projection capabilities, but this would require far greater investment in nuclear-powered submarines, deck aviation, auxiliary platforms, overall force structure, and training. Such preparations would be extremely visible to outside observers; thus far there are few indications that China is moving substantially in this direction.<sup>9</sup>

## CLASH OF PERSPECTIVES

The yawning gulf between U.S. and Chinese strategic perceptions is salient in the latest reports produced by their respective militaries. China's latest Defense White Paper (2010) outlines a purely "defensive" national defense policy of "active defense." It vows that China will "never seek hegemony." Instead it intends to safeguard China's security situation by preventing "separatism," curbing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and increasing stability in the Asia-Pacific, despite U.S. attention thereto and what it views as promotion of strategic struggles therein. The PLA will achieve this by pursuing a

three-step development strategy: (1) engaging in "informationalization," or the application of information technology and networks, as well as other technological progress, to achieve a revolution in military affairs and thereby leapfrog the earlier era of "mechanization"; (2) coordinating economic and defense development; and (3) deepening reform. The PLA is preparing for three major types of warfare: winning local wars in conditions of informationalization, deterring crises and wars, and increasing its capabilities to deal with nontraditional security threats.

Where the Chinese report focuses on intentions, policies, and history and gives virtually no details on China's current military capabilities, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) annual report on China's military power focuses on specific capabilities. The DoD engages in broad speculation about China's intentions but emphasizes that lack of transparency leaves significant uncertainty. Beijing's official spokespeople and media harshly denounce each year's DoD report, yet offer no specifics regarding which facts they consider wrong or what the correct information is.

Not surprisingly, the reports' differences are rooted in something much deeper than technical analyses. Several fundamental differences in viewpoint obscure U.S.-China security relations, posing major obstacles to mutual understanding, let alone cooperation. Their very different modern histories have produced a significant strategic cultural divide, as mentioned above.

The inability of Beijing and Washington to reach an understanding concerning Taiwan's status has long been the principal obstacle to improvements in U.S.-China relations. Since 1949 the PRC has consistently and clearly emphasized the vital importance of reunification with Taiwan as a central tenet of national policy. Beijing fully expects Washington to honor its commitment not to support Taiwan independence even as Washington also strives to honor its self-imposed responsibility to protect Taiwanese democracy amid massive cross-strait changes. Arguably, economic integration and rising Chinese military strength make the island increasingly indefensible militarily and complicate the previous status quo. Fortunately, since his election President Ma Ying-jeou has pursued a positive and practical policy of improving relations and economic links between Taiwan and mainland China.

Despite these recent improvements, however, Taiwan's status will remain sensitive. No U.S. president has the power to change a basic reality: the preservation of Taiwan's democracy is an issue of critical importance politically and morally to the United States and one that enjoys overwhelming congressional support, at least for now. The ability of Washington and Beijing to agree to disagree regarding their enduring strategic differences will determine the degree of their ability to cooperate to safeguard larger commercial, resource, homeland security, and maritime interests.



In addition to their concerns about the sensitive issues of Taiwan's status, political system, and international space, Chinese policy makers and analysts also believe that the United States unduly employs military means to address problems better addressed by other approaches. Ongoing Obama administration efforts to reinvigorate such organizations as the State Department and pursue manifold diplomatic initiatives to provide a broader range of public goods (broadly beneficial services) in the international system have received little acknowledgment from Beijing, which feels that the United States is continuing intolerable "business as usual" in China's "front yard" by approving yet another arms package for Taiwan and intervening in South China issues. Arguments by some U.S. pundits that extreme and divisive efforts should be made to prevent China's rise are neither realistic nor helpful. Unfortunately, some Chinese officials seem unwilling to recognize that the United States is home to diverse discussion and debate, and these perspectives are in no way mainstream views—yet are not subject to government control.

From the U.S. perspective, China's ongoing limitations in military transparency, both in terms of capabilities and intentions, coupled with its rapid increases in defense spending and wide-ranging military modernization, remain another source of great concern. This situation undermines U.S. cooperation initiatives—which are being attempted with increasing willingness—for fear that China is unwilling or unable to reciprocate equitably. A related concern is that China may attempt to exploit U.S. goodwill by imposing greater political demands. Under these conditions, the reality of prevailing politics and values in Washington (including deep-seated suspicions of Chinese capabilities and intentions that transcend partisan lines) circumscribes the evolution of better military-to-military relations with Beijing, something the latter does not seem to understand fully. Beijing's lack of transparency and reciprocity only strengthens the critics of cooperation, engendering wide speculation in the United States and elsewhere concerning China's intentions, much of it inaccurate, unsubstantiated, and worst-case in nature. Nonetheless, the lack of communication from Beijing unnecessarily helps feed this trend in Washington.

A degree of public clarification for China's major strategic actions would do much to allay U.S. concerns, even if it defends China's strategic reasoning, with which the United States may strongly disagree. While official explanations for China's military development and assertions of benign intent may fulfill domestic political and even cultural imperatives, they ultimately do not serve Beijing's interests vis-à-vis the United States. They are not persuasive, or in some cases even comprehensible, to a U.S. audience. A prime example is President Hu Jintao's invocation of the oft-repeated Chinese vow that "we do not engage in arms race[s] or pose a military threat

to any country. China will never seek hegemony or pursue an expansionist policy."<sup>10</sup> Specific statements regarding the nature and scope of PLA development would be a far more effective way to reassure a U.S. audience.

The obstacles to strategic transparency are sobering. Breakdown of cooperation is often a problem of information; the lack of clear information can lead to mutual defection from agreements. Asymmetric information (more available to one party than to another) could be intentional or unintentional. It could stem from a lack of internal coordination (e.g., the military and diplomatic bureaucracies) or intentional mixed messages. Even the security dilemma could be driven by (mis)perceptions of information. This is especially important since national strategic trust is essential to a stable bilateral relationship and makes it even more hazardous to suspend repeatedly bilateral military-military relations. Thus the Chinese provision of vague, righteous descriptions of Beijing's strategic intentions that fail to explain key behaviors, coupled with a degree of military power and influence on the part of the United States that causes even its more detailed explanations of intent to be held in suspicion, makes it more difficult for the two sides to achieve a firm basis for robust security cooperation.

### CONTEST FOR REGIONAL INFLUENCE?

Looking forward, can China's leaders achieve what an increasing number of U.S. strategists fear they may: hegemony in East Asia, thus challenging U.S. interests and its military presence there?

In order to assess the potential for such an attack on U.S. interests, one must first determine the options open to China's leadership. China's leaders will expend considerable energy and resources vis-à-vis Taiwan because they worry about national strength and territorial integrity, CCP popular legitimacy, and succession politics. The majority of current Western military analyses suggest that China lacks the capability to conduct a successful amphibious invasion of Taiwan, particularly if the United States elected to intervene. The most potent threat to Taiwan's democratic future might come from a PRC missile and air strike campaign combined with an air and naval blockade, which could devastate Taiwan's military capability and economy while affording China a defensive position.

In order to frustrate Chinese operations without dangerous escalation to general war with the mainland or nuclear exchange, a Taiwan-U.S. coalition would need to establish short-range local supremacy in the form of air and water dominance. Current force balances suggest that, absent U.S. assistance, Taiwan would be unlikely to prevail even in this scenario. Because ballistic missiles, strikes from attack aircraft employing standoff munitions, mines, and submarines are integral to the PLA's Joint Blockade Campaign,

the significant PRC buildup of these armaments has altered the military balance in the mainland's favor.

Given China's growing but limited capacity to undermine successfully U.S. fundamental East Asian interests—with the possible exception of coerced reunification with Taiwan—it is reasonable to conclude that China will not achieve East Asian hegemony in the foreseeable future. However, several factors could complicate this. First, it is always possible that the United States might lose the will to maintain a strong, expensive presence in East Asia. Although this negative outcome is unlikely to take place given Washington's strong interests in the region, the fate of the United States' two most significant regional allies might affect its opportunity to do so. Were Japan to revise its constitution, develop a "normal" foreign policy and military, dissolve the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, or otherwise force Washington to remove its troops from Okinawa and Honshu, U.S. presence in the region would be significantly compromised.

The Korean peninsula, the other division left over from the Cold War, looms as a particular geopolitical challenge for the region. It is difficult to imagine how North Korea's third-generation dynastic leader Kim Jong-un and any future successors could continue a totalitarian system into the mid-twenty-first century; yet it is also hard to see how they could implement meaningful economic reforms without risking their regime's overthrow. The National Intelligence Council sees "a unified Korea as likely by 2025— if not as a unitary state, then in some form of North-South confederation." China, in particular, is positioning itself to be a "powerbroker" with a veto over any future developments on the peninsula and opposes any measures that it fears could cause instability, even at the expense of supporting this repugnant regime. South Korea is in a particularly difficult position, and this is likely to weigh on its alliance with the United States in the future. China is hardly interested in a unified peninsula and will seek to exploit its leverage with both Koreas to wrest considerable concessions in the event of a move toward their consolidation.

Were the Koreans to reunify under a Beijing-brokered agreement, U.S. troops might have to restrict their operations on the Korean Peninsula or even leave it entirely. The presence of a new democratic regional power on China's border could further destabilize the region. However, both scenarios are unlikely to materialize overnight, and while they would almost certainly contribute to a decline in direct U.S. military influence in East Asia, they would work as well to prevent Chinese domination. Furthermore, the United States has striven to reduce its dependence on specific foreign bases in East Asia by building up Guam as a forward military logistics hub. A positive outcome for more than half a century of ruinous instability on the Korean peninsula would be to transform the Six Party Talks into a broader Northeast Asian security mechanism. This would give all key regional

stakeholders a voice and help prevent Beijing from denying Washington a seat at the table regarding key Asia-Pacific affairs.

The rise of China and corresponding relative decline of U.S. influence in the East Asian region would be an event of tremendous significance in international relations. But while Pentagon analysts are charged with vigilantly preparing Washington for worst-case scenarios, the most extreme *global* projections already seem infeasible.

First, China appears disinclined to become an aggressive Soviet-style global superpower. Of course, China might attempt to resolve the Taiwan question in its favor at any time, and its military capabilities are gradually raising the potential cost of U.S. intervention. Still, such an intervention could be extremely costly to China's comprehensive national strength. Even were it prepared to pay a high price for its actions, China would have no guarantee of prevailing in such a conflict.

Second, China will not achieve hegemony even in East Asia, at least for the foreseeable future, because it will lack the capabilities and, to some extent the intention, to undermine U.S. interests in East Asia. Moreover, the intervening years of economic development in China *may* unleash sufficient democratization, rule of law, demographic transition, and environmental degradation to reduce (or at least constrain) Beijing's regional hegemonic capacity. China will consolidate its power in the region, however, and thereby permit the maintenance of a balance of power with the United States, its allies, and actors such as the ASEAN nations, which want no power to dominate the region. If the U.S.-China relationship is properly managed, great power confrontation in East Asia may be avoided, and the region could retain the relative stability necessary to foster strong economic growth and possibly the future development of institutions promoting regional security.

### SHARED INTERESTS: REASON FOR HOPE

Despite their differences, Washington and Beijing must reach a new understanding regarding their respective roles in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific more broadly. The benefits of doing so could be substantial. In the unfortunate event of a U.S.-China conflict, maritime forces would be the most likely to be used; yet they are also the most likely to encounter each other and work together in peacetime. The two nations' navies and other maritime services have the opportunity, even the duty, to do what other services have not: establish a new and cooperative relationship. Given the unique nature of sea-based presence, port visits, diplomacy, and critical trade relations, maritime forces interact in peacetime differently from other services. For the U.S. and Chinese maritime forces, this generates many compatible

and overlapping strategic priorities. Indeed, when seaborne bilateral trade is considered, the two nations already have a major maritime partnership, albeit one in which the military element lags far behind the commercial.

It is in the maritime dimension that the potential sources of conflict and cooperation must first be sought. For instance, improved cooperation would enable mutually beneficial moving of assets. In the case of their navies, this could involve shifting investment from platforms and weapons systems useful primarily for major combat operations to "shaping" assets facilitating diverse efforts against everything from substate actors to natural disasters. These are challenges likely to be even more pronounced in the world the National Intelligence Council envisions by 2025.

The United States and China must find the means to accept each other's perspectives and roles. Washington must accept the reality that Beijing is assuming an increasingly important and independent role in global affairs. The Chinese government must realize that its confusing signals do not lend themselves to strategic trust. This situation must be improved through increased transparency of strategic intent and capabilities and better crisis management. Both powers must accept that they will both have a significant presence in East Asia for the foreseeable future, and hence must achieve some form of "competitive coexistence" there.

Following two years of increasing tension, Sino-U.S. strategic relations experienced a welcome, if largely symbolic, recalibration in 2011, when U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Beijing between January 9 and 12 and President Hu Jintao subsequently visited Washington and Chicago on January 18 through 21. The civilian leadership on both sides clearly wanted to move beyond recent acrimony, yet together with economic interdependence, the complex contradictions and concerns that characterize the relationship were all on display, so substantive results remain uncertain.

Two days into Gates's visit, a new J-20 stealth aircraft prototype made a short test flight in Chengdu. Hu assured him that the timing was coincidental. Yet *Jane's* quoted Chinese sources as suggesting that "China may have accelerated the schedule for the J-20's maiden flight after the US Department of Defense finally agreed to modernise Taiwan's fleet of Lockheed Martin F-16A/B fighter aircraft."<sup>11</sup> The test thus resembled a muted strategic communication to an international audience, albeit not a formal one that might provoke diplomatic discord.

Both sides affirmed the importance of the relationship, and Gates visited the command base of China's Second Artillery (ground-based missile forces). Gates proposed a "strategic security dialogue—as part of a broader Strategic and Economic Dialogue—that covers nuclear, missile defense, space, and cyber issues." No substantive specifics were agreed on, however, and what will actually come out of the visit is another story. U.S. skeptics believe that the PLA has been compelled to participate to avoid disrupting

President Hu Jintao's subsequent state visit to Washington. They believe that the PLA's senior leadership has no intention of actually following through with substantive initiatives after Hu's visit, and they will be monitoring the situation closely.

President Hu's state visit to the United States encompassed a far broader and more positive set of subjects than the contentious military relationship. The trip was a success for him, as it proceeded largely without incident and he was treated as the leader of a great power with a vibrant economy. In contrast to his 2006 Washington visit, he was accorded a twenty-one-gun salute and a state dinner. Problems of U.S. concern, such as North Korea, trade, and human rights, were discussed, but no commitments were made. Nevertheless, Hu's visit was clearly designed to reassure U.S. interlocutors (such as President Obama and key officials in his administration), as contentious Chinese terms like "core interests" were conspicuously absent.

### A TOP-LEVEL "RESET"?

At present this positive if merely symbolic dialogue and exchange is the best that can be hoped for among top leaders. Particularly important, given the unfortunate potential for misperception and miscalculation, as well as the potential for productive cooperation in such areas as counterterrorism and counterpiracy, is maintaining regular U.S.-China military dialogues and exchanges, including at high levels. These exchanges are not barometers of "who wants what more" and should not be severed to send a political message; U.S.-China military relations are simply too important for that, and that is not how responsible, mature powers conduct policy.

In order to move beyond their deep skepticism, the two sides must minimally agree to do more than "consider" each other's proposals. They must actually pursue substantive dialogues on key issues of strategic concern. Such discussions entail no preconditions to agree on any policy matters, so there is no reason not to make a good faith effort to begin. Alternatively, failure to discuss these critical areas—in which the PLA is making rapid progress—regularly and substantively will only enhance mistrust.

The United States and China are critically placed to shape the emerging international order. Yet their differences in national identity, culture, political system, and interests—which manifest themselves most dangerously regarding several key geopolitical, territorial, and maritime areas vis-à-vis East Asia—threaten to bring them into crisis and conflict. This remains true even as the two nations develop unprecedented mutual economic dependence and shared interests in a secure, prosperous global system.

Regardless of its exact parameters, building and sustaining a significant level of mutual trust and strategic cooperation will require substantial effort

and patience. Washington and Beijing will have to live with considerable ambiguity and should expect occasional setbacks. For the foreseeable future, there will be significant differences in their military capabilities, political systems, and national interests. To guard against the threat of conflict as China, the rising power, gains on the United States, the dominant power today and for the foreseeable future, both sides will likely find it necessary to "hedge"—not only rhetorically, but also economically, politically, and even militarily.

Just as Chinese officials, analysts, and media constantly charge that many in Washington promote a "China threat theory," many in Beijing likewise promote a "U.S. threat theory," construing ulterior motives from virtually any U.S. action. Analysts and planners in the United States need to look at the big picture, which strongly suggests, arguably with some notable exceptions, an overall Chinese desire and need to cooperate with, rather than to challenge, the United States. And the renewed U.S. focus on humanitarian operations should be seen by Chinese for what it is, an opportunity for mutually beneficial cooperation and improved relations. Ongoing deployment of Chinese naval vessels to defend against piracy in the Gulf of Aden suggests the capability and intention to focus increasingly on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Such factors may support mission convergence and increase strategic space for Sino-U.S. maritime cooperation, although exploiting opportunities will require sailing into strong headwinds and taking the waves as they come. Perhaps in this way "mutually assured dependence" will prevail over tendencies toward "mutually assured destruction."

## SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Chinese analyses in English on China defense and foreign policy issues are available from *China Security*, <http://www.chinasecurity.us/>.

Foreign analyses on these subjects, many written by U.S. researchers, are available from the following:

China Air and Naval Power, <http://china-pla.blogspot.com/>  
China Analysis from Original Sources, [www.andrewerickson.com](http://www.andrewerickson.com)  
China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), <http://www.usnwc.edu/cmsi>  
*China SignPost*, [www.chinasignpost.com](http://www.chinasignpost.com)  
China Military Power Mashup, <http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/>  
China's Defence Today, [www.sinodefence.com](http://www.sinodefence.com)  
CNA China Studies, <http://www.cna.org/centers/china/publications>  
Jamestown *China Brief*, <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/>  
Project 2049 Institute, <http://project2049.net/>

Some of the best sources on military and strategic issues that frequently cover China-related subjects include the following:

- Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, <http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/all/>
- Information Dissemination, [www.informationdissemination.net](http://www.informationdissemination.net)
- National Bureau of Asian Research, [www.nbr.org](http://www.nbr.org)
- Naval War College Review*, <http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review.aspx>
- RAND Corporation, [www.rand.org](http://www.rand.org)
- The Diplomat, <http://the-diplomat.com/>

Relevant latest U.S. government reports include the following:

- National Air and Space Intelligence Center. "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat." NASIC-1031-0985-09, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, April 2009, <http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/NASIC2009.pdf>.
- National Air and Space Intelligence Center. *People's Liberation Army Air Force 2010*. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, August 1, 2010, [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nasic/pla\\_af\\_2010.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nasic/pla_af_2010.pdf).
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- O'Rourke, Ronald. "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress." *Congressional Research Service*, July 22, 2011, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf>.
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## NOTES

1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2008), vi-vii.
2. Most recently, a notable exception to this isolationist practice occurred in Libya when the Chinese government rescued Chinese nationals caught in the middle of the conflict. Although China's government took credit for the evacuation, they insisted on moderating media coverage to avoid inflating domestic expectations regarding future crises or to disclose the extent of popular opposition to the Qaddafi regime.
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence," November 17, 2000, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm>.



4. Huang Hua, *Huang Hua Memoirs: Contemporary History and Diplomacy of China* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2008), 192–97, 280–83.

5. Yongjin Zhang, "China's Security Problematique: Critical Reflections," in *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy*, ed. Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001), 264.

6. This is the supreme military policy-making body, chaired by China's "paramount leader" and staffed by ten other top officials and military officers. It is usually the first official post to be secured in the quest for succession, as was demonstrated by both Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.

7. Shirley A. Kan, "China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei," *Congressional Research Service*, June 24, 2011, <http://www.fas.org/spp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf>.

8. China's development of a modern strategic arsenal is part of a comprehensive and costly, though gradual, long-term and proportionally affordable military buildup. U.S. analysts believe that the extent and nature of Chinese defense spending suggests both the future status of China's military power and China's intentions as it continues military modernization.

9. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that

while remaining focused on Taiwan as a primary mission, China will, by 2020, lay the foundation for a force able to accomplish broader regional and global objectives. By the latter half of this decade, it is likely that China will be able to project and sustain a modest sized force—perhaps several battalions of ground forces or a naval flotilla of up to a dozen ships—in low-intensity operations far from China. It is unlikely, however, that China will be able to project and sustain large forces in high-intensity combat operations far from China until well into the following decade.


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10. "Hu Jintao Says China Will Never Seek Hegemony," *China Daily*, January 21, 2011, [http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/video/2011-01/21/content\\_11908544.htm](http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/video/2011-01/21/content_11908544.htm).

11. Reuben F. Johnson, "China's J-20 Makes Maiden Flight," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 12, 2011, <http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?ID=1065929024>.

# CHINA

IN AND BEYOND THE HEADLINES



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**TIMOTHY B. WESTON AND LIONEL M. JENSEN**

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#### CONTRIBUTORS

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
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