

国汉级潜艇,认为该潜艇从水下通过日本石垣海峡的领海水域,该事件被归咎于导航上的失误,而对于海军专家来说这似乎是难以置信的。⁷⁹据报道,2006年10月,一艘中国柴油潜水艇在离美国海军“小鹰”号航母不到8千米处突然浮出水面,当时该航母正在冲绳附近作业。⁸⁰中国在2007年1月进行的反卫星试验据报道是历史上最大一次危及卫星碎片的人为原因,虽然美国政府多次询问,但中方仍未做出合理解释。2007年11月,两艘美国扫雷舰和“小鹰”号航母战斗群在不同时间要求停靠香港港口,但都被拒绝。这一事件引发了更大的问题,即军队与军队之间的活动会在多大程度上受到不断变化的政治动向和战略分歧的影响。

其实,对于前文提到的每一个事件都可以有很明确的解释,但遗憾的是,中国政府迄今不愿做出任何解释。某种程度的公开澄清是有必要的,而且对于减轻美国的忧虑极有用,即使这种澄清是为了给美国可能会强烈表示不赞同的中国战略理论作辩解。虽然对于中国的军事发展和良好意图主张的官方解释可以满足国内的政治甚至是文化需要,但它们最终都不适合于美国所认为的中国政府利益,因为它们对于美国读者来说不具有说服力,或在某些情况下甚至是不可理解的。

战略透明的障碍是使人清醒。正如政治科学领域中的新自由主义制度论者文献提醒我们的那样,合作失败通常是信息的问题;缺乏正确的信息会导致双方不履行协议。信息不对称可能是有意也可能是无意的。这可能源自缺乏内部协调(如军事和外交官僚机构)或有意混淆消息。对信息的错误理解甚至可能导致安全方面的困境。⁸¹因此,中国提供的对其战略意图的不明确说明不能解释重大行为,再加上中国某种程度的军事力量和对美国产生的局部影响力使得中方对其意图的更加详细的解释仍受到美方的怀疑,使双方更难建立强有力的安全合作基础。不过,同时,更好的做法、协议甚至是制度有助于证明做出的承诺和重新保证。⁸²

十三、跨太平洋的进展

尽管在言谈话语中,中国似乎一直保持谨慎、回避的态度,但低级别、具体的海洋合作都一直在继续进行而没有对此大吹大擂。真正的问题是这一进展是否可能催化更强的海洋和海军合作,或是更广泛的战略关系。鉴于问题关系重大,该是研究怎样采取那些重要措施的时候了。这就要求奥巴马总统和胡主席将布什政府关于中美作为全球“利益相关国”的想象力更充分地扩展至海洋领域。公海作为国际贸易与能源不可替代的通道具有重要性,海上安全包括民间海上合作和海军的合作,建立两国可以赖以帮助确保这一全球公域安全并避免冲突的关系是问题的关键。一旦建立这种关系,要克服许多可能破坏这种关系的事件就要求进行更好的交流和高水平的互动。

各种非敏感合作领域仍然是最可行的起始点而且无论中美海洋关系如何,这些合作领域都将一直存在。这些领域包括旅游、民间学术会议和交流、“第二轨

道”外交（即由亚太地区安全合作委员会开展的）、新海洋资源和技术的商业利用、环境保护、气象学（如台风和海啸探测）和科学研究。对于这些领域，私营部门和非政府组织能持续发挥主要作用。

在与国家安全问题有更密切联系的合作领域，进行更有组织的和官方的交流将是很有必要的。加强民间军事和海军合作的复杂途径是发展专业军事教育相关机构间强有力的联系。虽然，目前双方师生的交流受到限制，但未来有望获得稳步发展。曾有中国专家告知笔者“中国仍然对某些美国建议表示忧虑，并且想更多地了解‘千舰海军’”。如前面所述，通过交流可以便于向中国官员和专家更全面地解释新海洋战略的方方面面，以及对可以在其支持下增加合作（如人道主义活动和减灾）可能性的语言学、课程和技术这些非敏感领域进行讨论。新的一批军官经过培训能进行深入交流并进行某种程度的协同工作。开展双边学术联系有助于保持两国关系，同时促进在中国文化和墨守成规的语境中必不可少的合作进程和私人交流。这些奠定的基础反过来有助于支持和维持更积极的官方活动、计划和长期协议。

李亚强大校，海军研究员（位于北京的中国人民解放军海军战略智囊团）概述了中国可接受的海上安全合作领域。依据他的观点，合作应“主要在非敏感、非传统领域进行，以避免由于传统军事行为而危害海上安全”。关于合作地点，适合的区域包括“公海、国际海域、非敏感海域和相关国家满意或接受的水域，避免在敏感海域，其他国家管辖的、有争议的、不接受或抵制的水域内采取行动”。可接受的活动包括“友好交流、和平协商和联合行动，避免滥用武力和单方面干预”。更具体地说，“海军可以在海上联合执法、反恐、打击海盗、海上航行安全和搜救等领域开展合作，以便威慑和遏制给国际海洋安全带来潜在威胁的军事力量，稳定动荡区域内的海上形势，促进并保护海洋运输安全并最终建立有效的海上安全保护机制”。⁸³

鉴于两国的基本利益，打击恐怖主义、海上犯罪、海盗以及人口、毒品及其他非法物品买卖所进行的合作应在未来几年继续保持在高水平上运作。双方也可以针对传染病、环境安全和经济问题开展合作。正如本书第四章“集装箱安全倡议与中美关系”所充分论述的那样，中国参与到《集装箱安全倡议》（CSI）中是该领域内的积极事态发展，而且有望会有更多的中国港口加入进来。针对打击海盗所进行的合作有可能比较复杂，这取决于事情的来龙去脉，因为这种合作与国际海洋法律问题有联系，而中国对于这些问题的解释往往不同于美国。然而，这里所涉及的利益基本相同，而且中国持续向亚丁湾进行部署是一个鼓舞人心的实例。许多中国分析家认为能源安全与海军冲突情况有关，但商业上可行的建立信任的措施可以弥补。

关于海洋能源安全，美国与中国是目前世界两大石油消费国，在维护安全、稳定和担负得起的石油供应方面都享有利益。他们应考虑建立联合石油储量报告

系统。两国的海军应处理远离中国和美国周边敏感区域地方的海上危机（例如，防止索马里海盗在亚丁湾袭击油轮）。两国还应建立重要海上交通线（SLOCs）的威胁报告联合数据库。美国政府还应鼓励中国政府加入国际可再生能源机构（IRENA）和国际能源署（IEA），以促进更紧密的战略石油储备（SPR）管理合作。⁸⁴有了适当的协议和激励机制，洁净能源的生产技术转让在促进共享经济利益的同时也有助于减轻怀疑。

尤其是，美国新海洋战略能通过促进各种需要进行大量协调，但双方都不认为具有固有敏感性的任务能发挥关键作用。在人道主义行动方面可做的工作有很多，尤其是随着中国提高其在该领域的能力。联合搜救演习可以从当前的民间海洋力量和挑选的海军部队之间扩展至更常规的海军合作。正如埃里克·麦克瓦东（Eric McVadon）上将在本书其文章中指出的那样，2008 年中国第一艘海军医务船的交付使用，可以证明中国有意将更多“软实力”投入海洋领域。中国最大的甲板飞行平台，具有医用舱的多功能飞行训练船“世昌”号已经支持了国内抗洪救灾工作并远渡到新西兰。⁸⁵没有特别的理由解释为什么中国已经很强的国内海洋减灾能力未来不能用来在海外提供人道主义援助。事实上，中国的“和平方舟”号医务船目前已打算被派往参与每年的海外部署。2010 年，该船据报道首次被派往中东和非洲港口。⁸⁶或许，未来该船可能会与美国海军“怜悯”号合作深化两国在脆弱区域的共同利益。

由于中国海军现代化持续快速发展而且中国新型飞机和船只未经宣布就面世，所以中美军事平台在领海或领空内或附近相遇越来越多。正如戴维·格里菲思在本书其文章中指出的，这些事件增加了战术事件升级为重大危机的可能性。美国与苏联达成的 1972 年《海上事故协议》和 1989 年《防止危险军事活动协议》为在这类情况下采取行动制定了具体方针，已经预防了无数次危机的发生。当前，美国与中国签订的 1998 年《海上军事协商协议》规定进行年度协商但没有提供具体程序。两国可受益于新的行为守则——一个强调军事平台间的早期交流在具有先进通信和遥感技术的时代中的行为守则。这连同更频繁的会议以及也许以某种形式建立信任的措施，将大大地促进旨在改进双边交流和危机处理的更多努力。

美国新海洋战略不能单独实现的是改变中国对于其基本国家利益的观点。它不会说服中国参与它认为影响不好的活动。依据李亚强大校的观点，这包括中国政府认为不“遵循联合国宪章宗旨、公认国际法、和平共处五项原则、尊重国家主权、保护共同利益、承认政治多样性、承担强制性国家责任、履行国际义务、摒弃冷战思维并充分考虑每个相关国家的战略利益、价值和社会特点”的活动。⁸⁷这类活动可能包括在《防扩散安全倡议》保护下的入侵性登船，中国明显认为这违反其经常重申的基于联合国的合法性要求（许多西方海洋法律学者对这一观点持有异议）并使其稳定朝鲜半岛局势的努力复杂化。然而，在关于海洋战

略的讨论会上, 双方必须讨论关注的领域和分歧, 因为两国必须详细而全面地了解彼此的观点。合作伙伴必须能够在所有共同利益的问题上进行公开而坦率的对话。

无论其确切的要素是什么, 建设和维持高水平合作都需要巨大的努力和耐心。中美两国政府必须能容忍不明确性并应对不时出现的挫折做好准备。在可预见的未来, 在两国的军事能力、政治制度和国家利益方面将存在巨大的差别。为了防止随着中国作为正在崛起的大国赶超当今处于支配地位的美国而带来的冲突威胁, 双方都可能认为“回避”是有必要的——不仅在口头上, 而且也在经济、政治和军事上。这种实力转换冲突情况是国际政治很自然的一部分, 有时将会是高度不稳定因素, 尤其是当美国和中国国内政治陷入混乱状态时。

尽管合作具有长期的战略重要性, 但各种观念与误解将会持续对合作的成功产生重要的影响。正如美国政府许多人密切关注中国分析家所指的“中国威胁论”一样, 中国政府的许多人也认为实际上任何美国行动背后都存在着不可告人的动机(“美国威胁论”)。美国分析家和规划者需要着眼于大局, 这强烈需要中国在总体上有与美国进行合作而不是提出挑战的意愿和需求。美国对于人道主义行动的重新关注应当被中国人看作是促进合作并改善与美国关系的一个机会。只有时间、增加互动以及具体的合作努力, 才会改善这些关于认知和信任的棘手问题。

正如之前所提到的, 马英九 2008 年 3 月当选为台湾领导人使海峡两岸关系在陈水扁挑衅性领导下的 8 年不稳定状态之后走上了改善的轨道。同时, 近期的事态发展, 例如, 持续派遣海军舰船打击亚丁湾海盗, 表明中国人民解放军和海军的任务越来越与海洋战略所关注的人道主义援助和减灾相一致。在 2004 年 12 月 24 日召开的中央军委扩大会议上, 胡锦涛主席介绍了新的军事政策, 确定了中国人民解放军的四项新任务, 包括“在维护全球和平和促进共同发展方面发挥重要作用”。⁸⁸中国人民解放军和中国人民解放军海军的论著都介绍了这一主题和胡主席近期的指示, 即中国军队应对“多样化军事任务”给予关注。⁸⁹这类因素很可能更好地支持任务的机动性并增加中美海上合作的战略空间, 尽管双方要做出相当大的努力来发展这些机会, 而且这不是容易的事情。⁹⁰

虽然海上安全面临挑战, 但海上安全是国家生存和繁荣的核心所在。重要的是永远不要忽略更大的前景: 世界最发达的国家和最大的发展中国家坚持通过联合确保海洋公域的安全来获取巨大的利益。冲突的可能性总会威胁到中美关系, 但国家利益的客观理由极大地强化了世界最发达国家和发展中国家达成支持持久的, 有时是竞争性的全球海洋共存的谅解的需要。

注释:

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1. Michael Mullen, “The Thousand Ship Fleet,” Pentagon Brief, 1 October 2005; and “‘Global Maritime Partnership’ Gaining Steam at Home and with International Navies,” *Defense Daily International* 7, no. 42 (27 October 2006).
2. Admiral Mullen is now chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Peter Dombrowski, “Maritime Strategy Project: Overview and Preliminary Analysis,” presentation to author, October 2007.
4. Several maritime strategies have been issued in between, but most analysts evaluate that they have had no lasting legacy. Few outside the U. S. Navy have even heard of them. “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (Washington, DC: U. S. Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandants of the U. S. Marine Corps and U. S. Coast Guard, 17 October 2007), <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf>, 4.
5. *Ibid.*, 5.
6. *Ibid.*, 11.
7. John Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U. S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986*, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004), <http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press/Newport-Papers/Documents/19-pdf.aspx>.
8. Dombrowski, “Maritime Strategy Project.”
9. Key naval planning document include “Navy Strategic Plan in Support of Program Objective Memorandum08” (Washington, DC: U. S. Chief of Naval Operations, May 2006), <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/23263501/Navy-Strategic-Plan>; and “Naval Operations Concept 2006” (Washington, DC: U. S. Navy and Marine Corps, 2006), <https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/CIW/ER/Naval%20Operations%20Concept.pdf>. National strategy documents include “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010); “The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2008), <http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf>; “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow” (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf>; “The National Strategy for Maritime Security” (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, September 2005), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD13_MaritimeSecurityStrategy.pdf; and “The Nuclear Posture

- Review Report" (Washington, D C: Department of Defense, April 2010), <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>.
10. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) 2010 (Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Defense, 1 February 2010), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200700.pdf>; and The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 (Norfolk, VA: U. S. Joint Forces Command, 15 March 2010), http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2010/JOE_2010_o.pdf. Like the Maritime Strategy, the QDR has been criticized for saying little about the growing challenges posed by the PLA—particularly to U. S. access to the global maritime, air, space, and cyber commons. Yet there are good reasons for taking a relatively indirect approach, rather than enumerating directly a litany of specific Chinese military developments and corresponding threats. These issues are well known, and well documented in other forums. Given the complex, bifurcated, and uncertain military relationship with China that the above discussion suggests, it makes sense to focus primarily on U. S. access interests. This enables a more constructive focus on U. S. interests and objectives, and thereby—as with the Maritime Strategy—places the onus on all nations (including China) to respect them, rather than automatically assuming that there is no hope for avoiding conflict, which could become a self-fulfilling prophesy in critical aspects.
 11. See, for example, Paul D. Taylor, ed., *Perspectivas Sobre Estrategia Maritima: Ensayos de las Américas, La Nueva Estrategia Maritima de EE UU y Comentario Sobre: Una Estrategia Cooperativa para el Poder Naval en el Siglo XXI* [Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas, the New U. S. Maritime Strategy and Commentary on a Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower] (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2009).
 12. See, for example, Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry; "China on the March," *The National Interest* 88 (March – April 2007): 16 – 22; Thomas J. Christensen, "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U. S. Policy toward East Asia," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 81 – 126; and Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Future of U. S. – China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?" *International Security* 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 7 – 45.
 13. Chairman Hu Jintao introduced a new military policy that defines the four new missions of the PLA at an expanded Central Military Commission conference on 24 December 2004. The first three missions are (1) serve as an "important source of strength" for the CCP to "consolidate its ruling position"; (2) "provide a solid security guarantee for sustaining the important period of strategic opportunity for national development"; and (3) "provide a strong strategic support for safeguarding national interests." See "Earnestly Step Up Ability Building within CPC Organizations of Armed Forces," *解放军报* [Liberation Army Daily], 13 December 2004, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/sitel/xwpdxw/2004-12/13/content_86435.htm; and "三个提供, 一个发挥," ["Three Provides and One Brings into Play"], *解放军报* [Liberation Army Daily], <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-09-29/08517064683s.shtml>.
 14. See, for example, 彭立军 [Peng Lijun], "美国推出新的海上战略" ["The U. S. Releases a New Maritime Strategy"], *新华网* [Xinhua Net], 18 October 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/18/content_6898372.htm; "美国新海上战略强调合作和预防" ["The New U. S. Maritime Strategy Emphasizes Cooperation and Prevention"], *新华社电* [Xin-

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15. 吕德胜 [Lu Desheng], “伊战带给美军的影响” [“The Influence of the Iraq War on the U. S. Military”], 中国民兵 [Conmilit], no. 11 (2007), http://www.pladaily.com.cn/sitel/zg-mb/2007-11/23/content_1030774.htm.
 16. “美军: 21 世纪海上力量的合作战略” [“The U. S. Military: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power”], 人民网军事频道 [People's Net Military Channel], 25 October 2007, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/4/200710/1025_342_272411.shtml.
 17. 杨晴川 [Yang qingchuan], “美国海上力量 ‘三巨头’ ——海军作战部长拉夫黑德, 海军陆战队司令康韦和海岸警卫队司令艾伦共同出现在罗得岛州纽波特海军战争学院举行的国际海军研讨会上, 向与会的 100 多个国家和地区的海军首脑隆重推出美国新版的海上战略” [“The ‘Three Magnates’ of U. S. Sea Power—Adm. Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. James T. Conway, Marine Corps commandant; and Adm. Thad W. Allen, Coast Guard Commandant, Presented the Strategy to Maritime Leaders from More than 100 Countries Attending the International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College in Newport, R. I.”], 国际先驱导报 [International Herald Leader - Beijing], 17 October 2007, available at www.chinesenewsnet.com. Translation by Danling Cacioppo and Nan Li. International Herald Leader is published by Reference News, a daily with materials translated by the foreign press, carried by China's official news agency, Xinhua. Like a brief Xinhua English - language summary, and a wide variety of other online articles and Internet commentaries to date, it provides some basic facts about the strategy and the circumstances of its roll - out. See also “U. S. Releases Unified Maritime Strategy,” Xinhua General News Service, 18 October 2007, http://news.xinhua-net.com/english/2007-10/18/content_6899251.htm.
 18. For a similar quotation regarding “omitted” topics, see 未克 [Wei Ke], “美国《国防新闻》: 美军海上战略缺陷多” [“U. S. Defense News: The U. S. Military's Maritime Strategy Has Many Defects”], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], 25 October 2007, http://www.china.com.cn/military.txt/2007-10/25/content_9124389.htm; <http://mil.news.sohu.com/20071025/n252858218.shtml>. A similar version appeared in a major PRC - funded Hong Kong newspaper: “美媒: 美军海上新战略缺陷多” [“U. S. Media: The New U. S. Maritime Strategy Has Many Defects”], 大公报 [Ta Kung Pao], 26 October 2007, <http://www.takungpao.com/news/07/10/26/YM-814681.htm>.
 19. This final point may help to explain the reasoning behind the article's contention that “[Admiral] Mullen not long ago aroused great concern from the international community by proposing the so - called ‘1000 - ship Navy’” It is important to note that this term appears to have been largely replaced by the phrase “Global Maritime Partnerships” in current U. S. Navy parlance.
 20. 刘华, 吴强 [Liu Hua and Wu Qiang], “美国通过新海上战略 指导美军重返菲律宾” [“Through the New Maritime Strategy, the U. S. Directs its Military to Return to the Philippines”], 国际先驱导报 [International Herald Leader], 24 October 2007, <http://www.china->

- taiwan.org/xwzx/gj/200710/t20071024_473467.htm. See also 肖亭 [Xiao Ting], “美军变相重返菲律宾企图‘包围’中国” [“The U. S. Military Covertly Returns to the Philippines in Attempt to ‘Encircle’ China”], 国际先驱导报 [International Herald Leader], 25 October 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-10/25/content_6207471.htm. For a related online posting, see “‘中国不造航母行吗’系列之五‘美国在海上包围中国’” [“‘Is It OK for China Not to Build an Aircraft Carrier?’ Series No. 5 ‘The U. S. Encircles China by Sea’”], 新浪论坛 [Sina Forum], 24 November 2007, <http://s.bbs.sina.com.cn/pview-70-16355.html>.
21. 杨晴川, 王薇 [Yang Qingchuan and Wang Wei] “美国推出新的海上战略—遏制潜在竞争对手” [“The U. S. Releases a New Maritime Strategy—Containing Potential Competitors”], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], 18 October 2007, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2007-10/18/content__986293.htm. Translation by Andrew Erickson and Nan Li. It must be emphasized that this is not a Liberation Army Daily article and did not appear in that publication's print edition. The brief text gives factual information on the strategy; it is the seemingly arbitrary label “containing potential competitors” that is troubling. See also 邱贞诤 [Qiu Zhenhui], “美国海军发布 21 世纪海权合作战略” [“The U. S. Navy Issues a Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power”], 环球网 [Global Net], 18 October 2007, <http://www.huanqiu.com/www/86/2007-10/13500.html>; and 杨晴川 [Yang Qingchuan], “美国海上战略‘由硬变软’以谋求海上全球部署” [“The U. S. Maritime Strategy Changes ‘From Hard to Soft’ in the Quest for Global Maritime Deployment”], 国际先驱导报 [World Herald Leader], 24 October 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content_6933474.htm.
 22. 封长虹 [Feng Zhanghong], “美抛出‘以海制陆’新战略—多样手段维持霸权地位” [“The U. S. Puts Forward a New Strategy to ‘Use the Sea to Control the Land’—Diverse Means to Preserve (Its) Hegemonic Position”], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], 8 December 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-12/08/content_7217221.htm; and “美军推出海上新战略” [“The U. S. Releases a New Maritime Strategy”], 工人日报 [Worker's Daily], 20 October 2007, <http://news.sohu.com/20071020/n252754840.shtml>.
 23. 许钦铎 [Xu Qinduo, reporter], 张鹏飞 [Zhang Pengfei, editor], “美国推出新海上战略” [“The U. S. Releases a New Maritime Strategy”], 中央电视台国际在线 [China Central Television International Online], <http://news.cctv.com/world/20071019/103473.shtml>; republished as “突破狭隘海洋斗争定义——美军推出新的海上战略” [“Break Through a Narrow Definition of Ocean Combat—The U. S. Releases a New Maritime Strategy”] 云南信息港 [Yunnan Information Portal], http://news.yninfo.com/world/gjjs/200710/t20071020_502850.htm.
 24. 顾祥兵 [Gu Xiang Bing], “美国海权的‘最新外衣’—新海上战略透视别国隐私” [“The ‘Latest Cover’ for U. S. Sea Power—The New Maritime Strategy Scrutinizes Other Countries Secrets”], 当代海军 [Modern Navy], http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-02/27/content_7609770.htm.
 25. 刘江平, 沈基飞 [Liu Jiangping and Shen Jifei], “美海军新战略: 打入全球核心区” [“The New U. S. Maritime Strategy: Infiltrate Global Core Regions”], 中国国防报 [China Defense News], 29 November 2007, <http://bbs.people.com.cn/postDetail.do?boardId=2&id=>

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26. See, for example, “针对台湾与朝鲜问题美军增兵 太平洋将不‘太平’” [“The Increase of U. S. Armed Forces in the Pacific to Counter the Taiwan and North Korean Problems Will Not Be ‘Peaceful’”], 环球时报 [Global Times], 12 November 2007, <http://www.sxgov.cn/jstd/jsrd/501023.shtml>.
27. 美海军全球作战新概念 [“The U. S. Navy’s New Global Concept of Operations”], 解放军报 [Liberation Army Daily], 21 April 2005, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/site/jsslpdjs/2005-04/21/content_188893.htm; and 章华 [Zhang Hua], “美军两大航母东亚演练形成威慑—磨刀霍霍为实战” [“The Drills of the U. S. Armed Forces ‘Two Large Aircraft Carriers in East Asia Create Deterrence—Sharpening the Sword for Actual Combat’”], 国际先驱导报 [International Herald Leader], 20 August 2008, <http://www.southcn.com/news/international/gjkd/200408200230.htm>.
28. Unless otherwise specified, all quotations from this and the following paragraph were derived from 邢蓬宇 [Xing Pengyu], “美国新海上战略：以合作之名谋强权之实” [“The United States’ New Maritime Strategy: Solidifying Its Might under the Banner of Cooperation”], 人民网军事频道 [People’s Daily Online: Military Affairs Section], 24 October 2007, <http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/51756/81282/81532/6422552.html>.
29. 周婷 [Zhou Ting], “美海军作战范围从远洋转到近海—催生近海战斗舰” [“The Scope of U. S. Naval Operations Shifts from Far Oceans to the Littoral—Hurrying to Develop the Littoral Combat Ship”], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], 21 February 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-02/21/content_7638401.htm.
30. 米兰, 维希 [Mi Lan and Wei Xi], “美海洋战略因缺乏对冲突持续时间的预判可能失败” [“The U. S. Maritime Strategy May Fail Because It Lacks Prediction of the Duration of Sustained Conflict”], 四川新闻网 [Sichuan News Network], 4 March 2008, <http://world.newssc.org/system/2008/03/04/010714245.shtml>.
31. This article was originally published as 陆儒德 [Lu Rude], “美海上新战略浮出水面” [“The New U. S. Maritime Strategy Surfaces”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 27 November 2007, 3. Lu’s home institution is perhaps most similar to the U. S. Naval Academy, although this comparison has significant limitations, in part because Chinese professional military education is dispersed among a wider range of schools than is the case in the United States.
32. See also 陆儒德 [Lu Rude], “在大战略中给中国海权定位” [“Defining Sea Power in China’s Grand Strategy”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 6 June 2007, 4.
33. This article was originally published as 王宝付 [Wang Baofu], “美军‘海上战略’与未来军事转型” [“The U. S. Military’s ‘Maritime Strategy’ and Future Military Transformation”], 学习时报 [Study Times], 22 January 2008, http://www.lianghui.org.cn/xxsb/txt/2008-01/22/content_9568776.htm.
34. This article was originally published as 苏浩: 外交学院外交学系教授; 吴兵: 外交学院外交学系博士生 [Su Hao, Professor of Diplomacy, China Foreign Affairs University; Wu Bing, Doctoral Student, China Foreign Affairs University], “美国海上战略新思路—‘21 世纪海权的合作战略’ 报告评述” [“The U. S. Maritime Strategy’s New Thinking—Reviewing the ‘Coopera-

- tive Strategy for 21st Century Seapower' Report"], 领导者 [Leaders], no. 19, December 2007 29-30. Su's translation of the U. S. Maritime Strategy is 吴兵, 母耕源, 钟龙彪翻译, 苏浩审校 [Wu Bing, Mu Gengyuan, Zhong Longbiao (translator), and Su Hao (proofreader)], "21 世纪海权的合作战略—首开历史先河: 21 世纪海权的合作战略" [" A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower—For the First Time in History: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower"], 领导者 [Leaders], no. 19, December 2007, 21-28.
35. For Chinese assessments of these maritime strategies, see 许世勇 [Xu Shiyong], "美海军实施网络反潜新战略" ["The U. S. Navy Implements a New Network Anti-Submarine Warfare Strategy"], 当代海军 [Modern Navy], September 2006; and 李杰 [Li Jie], "重视前沿存在, 强调联合作战—十年来美国海军战略的调整变化及特点" ["Attach Importance to Forward Presence, Emphasize Joint Operations—The Revision, Change and Characteristics of U. S. Naval Strategy Over the Past 15 Years"], 现代舰船 [Modern Ships], no. 1 (2003): 13-14.
36. Wang does mention "strategic deterrence theory" and Su notes that the strategy "does not assume conflict, but recognizes the historical reality that peace cannot be automatically maintained."
37. See Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., *The Science of Military Strategy* (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005), 439-443; and 徐起 [Xu Qi], "21 世纪初海上地缘战略与中国海军的发展" ["Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early 21st Century"], 中国军事科学 [China Military Science] 17, no. 4 (2004): 75-81; trans. Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein, *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 46-67.
38. See Leif-Eric Easley, "Multilateralism, not Multipolarity: China's Changing Foreign Policy and Trilateral Cooperation in Asia," *JoongAng Daily* (with *International Herald Tribune*), 14 March 2008, 11. As Samuel Huntington explains, "A multipolar system has several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns. A coalition of major states is necessary to resolve important international issues. European politics approximated this model for several centuries." Nearly two decades after Huntington wrote this, the world is still closer to the "unimultipolar" system that he described than to true multipolarity. The closest Chinese approximation is 一超多强 ("one superpower and several great powers"). Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower" *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2 (March-April 1999): 35-49, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54797/samuel-p-huntington/the-lonely-superpower>. In a recent alternative interpretation, Richard Haass likewise rejects the idea that the current international system is multipolar: "In a multipolar system, no power dominates, or the system will become unipolar." Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U. S. Dominance," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (May-June 2008): 44-56, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63397/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity>.
39. For similar wording, see Robert Kagan, "The September 12 Paradigm: America, the World, and George W. Bush" *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 5 (September-October 2008): 25-39, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080901faessay87502/robert-kagan/the-september-12-paradigm.html>.
40. For Chinese discussion of U. S. decline, see 王恬 [Wang Tian], "美国衰落与群雄崛起"

- [“U. S. Decline and the Rise of Other Power Centers”], 人民日报 [People's Daily], 30 May 2008, <http://world.people.com.cn/GB/1030/7318287.html>; 肖刚 [Xiao Gang], “在单极与多极之间: 中国外交的平衡” [“Between Unipolarity and Multipolarity: China's Diplomatic Balance”], 太平洋学报 [Pacific Journal], no. 3 (2008), <http://scholar.ilib.cn/A-QCode~tpyxb200803003.html>; 郑羽 [Zheng Yu], “多极世界是否已经成为国际关系的现实” [“Has a Multipolar World Already Become the Reality in International Relations?”], 中国社会科学院院报 [Journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], 31 January 2008, <http://en.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=122477>; 李义虎 [Li Yihu], “世界经济多极化趋势将进一步加强” [“The Trend of World Economic Multipolarization Will Further Strengthen”], 现代国际关系 [Contemporary International Relations], no. 12 (2007), <http://scholar.ilib.cn/A-QCode~xdgigx200712005.html>; 孟庆龙 [Meng Qinglong], “美国衰落过程的重要地标” [“Footprints of U. S. Decline”], 现代国际关系 [Contemporary International Relations], no. 9 (2006): 30-32, <http://scholar.ilib.cn/A-QCode~xdgigx200609016.html>; Zhang Wenmu, “Sea Power and China's Strategic Choices,” China Security (Summer 2006): 28-29, http://www.wsichina.org/cs3_2.pdf; and 裘元伦 [Qiu Yuanlun], “美国‘衰落论’与‘复兴论’之争” [“Contention between ‘U. S. Decline Theory’ and ‘U. S. Revival Theory’”], 了望 [Outlook], no. 16, 1989.
41. Denny Roy, “China's Pitch for a Multipolar World: The New Security Concept,” Asia - Pacific Security Studies 2, no. 1 (May 2003), <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/ChinasPitchforaMultipolarWorld.pdf>; and Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U. S. Global Strategy,” Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 343-365.
 42. “China's View on the Development of Multi - polarity,” Web site of China's Foreign Ministry, 15 November 2000, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjw/gjzyhy/2594/2595/t15139.htm>.
 43. Information Office of the State Council, People's Republic of China, “China's National Defense in 2008,” January 2009, www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227.htm.
 44. See also 宋国友 [Song Guoyou], “美国衰落的幻象” [“The Illusion of U. S. Decline”], 东方早报 [Oriental Morning Post], 24 January 2008.
 45. Lu's discussion of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) appears to represent further advocacy of PLA Navy development to support regional stability. Lu refers directly to UNCLOS Article 301's admonition to use the seas only for peaceful purposes—a provision to which, as a nonmember, the United States is not technically bound to observe. Lu's reference would not be readily recognizable to many American readers, and the United States and China disagree about Article 301's meaning in any case. Lu makes a similar reference to UNCLOS Article 197's call for global and regional cooperation to protect and preserve the maritime environment, which would be received in the same manner as the Article 301 reference by most American readers. The author greatly appreciates Peter Dutton's contributions concerning concepts and wording in this and the two following paragraphs.
 46. Evidence of Lu's seapower advocacy can be seen in many of his writings. See, for example, 中国走向海洋 [China Advances on the Sea], (海潮出版社 [Sea Tide Press], 1998); “实施海

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47. For theoretical literature on this subject, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” *International Security* 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 49–56; and Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U. S. – Japan Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 49–80.
48. An article in a popular newspaper similarly highlights the U. S. need for burden-sharing because of the war in Iraq. 严国群 [Yan Guoqun], “美国千舰海军的如意算盘能否实现” [“Can the U. S. Navy’s Wishful Thinking about the Thousand – Ship Navy Be Realized?”], 新京报 [New Capital News], 27 November 2006, available at <http://www.sina.com.cn>.
49. According to Naval Operations Concept 2006, a “Global Fleet Station... is a persistent sea base of operations from which to coordinate and employ adaptive force packages within a regional area of interest.”
50. For Chinese sources (most of which precede the strategy’s release, and none of which focuses on it) that demonstrate a basic understanding of the relationship between major recent U. S. strategic documents with relevance to naval development, see “美国面向 21 世纪的国防转变” [“U. S. National Defense Transformation for the 21st Century”], 全球防务 [Global Defense], 11 April 2007, <http://www.defence.org.cn/article-1-66416.html>; 秦大鹏 [Qin Dapeng], “美海军 ‘全球作战概念’ 构想及未来兵力构成” [“The U. S. Navy’s ‘Global Concept of Operations’”], 全球防务 [Global Defense], 19 February 2007, <http://www.defence.org.cn/article-1-64612.html>; “美军 21 世纪海上新战略: 打造 ‘全能武士’” [“The U. S. Military’s New Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Build ‘All – Around Warriors’”], 中国国防报 [China Defense News], 6 July 2006, available at <http://www.chinareviewnews.com>; 艾雨兵, 郑金华, 张文丽 [Ai Yubing, Zheng Jinhua, and Zhang Wenli], 中国船舶重工集团公司第 716 研究所, 江苏连云港 [China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, 716th Research Institute, Li-anyungang, Jiangsu Province], “美国海军 21 世纪战略概念分析 (连载一)” [“Analysis of the U. S. Navy’s Strategic Concept for the 21st Century” (Part 1)], 情报指挥控制系统与仿真技术 [Information, Command Control Systems & Simulation Technology] 26, no. 3 (June 2004): 1–9; Ai Yubing, Zheng Jinhua, and Zhang Wenli, “Analysis of the U. S. Navy’s Strategic Concept for the 21st Century” (Part 2), *Information, Command Control Systems & Simulation Technology* 26, no. 4 (August 2004) 9–20; “U. S. Navy’s New Global Concept of Operations,” *Liberation Army Daily*, 21 April 2005, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/site1/jsslpdjs/2005-04/21/content_188893.htm; and 李杰 [Li Jie], “看美国海军 ‘新军事变革’ 有何高招” [“A Look at the U. S. Navy’s ‘New Military Transformation’: What are the Brilliant Stratagems?”], 现代军事 [Modern Military Affairs], no. 5 (May 2004), <http://www.cetin.net.cn/storage/journal/xdjs/xd2004/xd2004-05-1.htm>.

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