Japan’s Sea Lane Security, 1940–2004: A Matter of Life and Death?

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culture; some sections may be hard going for the casual reader. Parts of the book are rather dry; this reflects the extensive translations more than the author’s style. But for serious students of China, intelligence tradecraft, or information operations, this book provides essential understanding of contemporary Chinese statecraft.

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As the first English-language analysis of its kind, Graham’s comprehensive case study fills a critical gap in the literature concerning the maritime dimension of Japanese national security. This is an exciting issue at a dynamic time: in October 2004, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and coast guard led Northeast Asia’s first Proliferation Security Initiative exercise. In the Indian Ocean, the MSDF is currently fueling allied vessels to support operations in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Japan is struggling to assert control over its exclusive economic zones, the boundaries of which are increasingly contested by China and South Korea.

Graham (currently a British government researcher at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s North Asia and Pacific Research Group) draws on fresh, original sources, including Japanese-language documents and interviews with Japanese officials, to demonstrate that while Japan’s defense and foreign policy have changed dramatically since its opening up to the world in 1853, sea-lane security has been an enduring national security concern. Graham offers insight into Japanese leaders’ and analysts’ perceptions of their nation’s own security context, thereby avoiding the tendency of much related scholarship to view matters exclusively through the prism of relations with the United States.

Graham situates resource-poor Japan in its geographic context: “Although at nearly 30,000 km, Japan’s coastline is one-third longer than that of the United States, no inland point is more than 150 km from the sea.” He explains Japan’s historical concern with the security of its sea lines of communication (SLOC), citing official Diet testimony that “the greatest cause of [Japan’s World War II] defeat was the loss of shipping” to the Allied blockade. Graham records a recent manifestation of Japanese SLOC concerns: Prime Minister (1996–98) Ryutaro Hashimoto’s worry that “many commercial flights and aircraft [were] forced to divert around those areas affected” by China’s March 1996 missile tests, during which “some of the missiles landed in waters only 60 km from [Japan’s] Yonaguni island.” Graham’s analysis is well written, organized, and documented; based on numerous, very current data; and highly accessible to the reader. It is thus an essential reference for analysts of East Asian security.

Given this significant achievement, one hopes that Graham and other scholars will conduct follow-up research concerning such areas relevant to Japan’s future SLOC security as China’s maritime legal and naval development. Some assessments may need to be revisited as additional data becomes available. For
instance, while Graham suggests that China’s Song diesel submarine program may have “fail[ed] . . . to develop according to schedule,” it is now noteworthy the extent to which Song development appears to have progressed in parallel to China’s importing of Kilo diesel submarines from Russia. Graham projects that SLOC security will continue to preoccupy Japanese planners as a fundamental national concern. He breaks significant ground by showing that Japanese policy makers, motivated by increasingly “realist” threat perceptions, are exploring new directions in the pursuit of SLOC security. The extent to which these emerging impulses can transcend funding constraints (imposed increasingly by demographic and economic challenges) and constitutional limitations (still protected, to some degree, by domestic politics) remains a pivotal question for all concerned with East Asian security.

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Several years ago I received a phone call from Stephen Johnson asking about my service on the USS Scorpion (SSN 589), my first ship, between the fall of 1961 and the winter of 1962. He explained he was writing a book about its loss in late May 1968 with its entire crew of ninety-nine. I spoke with him at some length and sent some material about the vast “SubSafe” program changes that occurred within the Submarine Force after the loss of USS Thresher (SSN 593) in April 1963. Silent Steel is the exquisitely researched result of my tiny input and that of more than 230 others—ranging from the widows of Scorpion sailors, submarine design engineers and naval architects, and a list of active-duty and retired personnel that reads like a “who’s who” of the then and now Submarine Force. The bibliography itself spans two dozen pages of applicable books, journal articles, official reports, memorandums, and other miscellaneous correspondence.

Anyone expecting to find a clear and unambiguous set of events and circumstances that “explain” the Scorpion’s loss will be disappointed. Rather, along with fascinating personal insights into some key players, the reader will find erudite and technically credible discussions on the facts and assumptions of any number of popular and not so popular theories. For example, his dispassionate and objective examination of much of the same material that was available to formal Navy courts of inquiry virtually rules out any concept of “hostile action” and substantially weakens the plausibility of incidents involving the ship’s own torpedoes. He subtly chides some advocates for having drawn three-significant-figure conclusions from one-significant-figure assumptions. In addition, by bluntly describing some bureaucratic foibles and tragic administrative decisions (such as shortchanging Scorpion’s SubSafe package during a 1967 refueling overhaul to save money), Johnson’s work leads one to perceive that—as is true in virtually all submarine disasters that we know something about—there had to have been some series of complicating, cascading events that overwhelmed any efforts by the crew to bring