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PANNING FOR GOLD

Assessing Chinese Maritime Strategy from Primary Sources

Ryan D. Martinson

What are the drivers behind China’s vigorous pursuit of sea power? What are the interests Beijing seeks to advance by building a powerful blue-water navy and the world’s largest coast guard? What are the principles that guide its use of sea power in pursuit of its national interest? How are China’s state objectives, and approaches to pursuing them, evolving over time?

The answers to these questions are of obvious concern both to the states along China’s maritime periphery, many of which are party to maritime disputes with Beijing, and to external powers with major interests in East Asia, such as the United States. Increasingly, Chinese actions have important implications for other parts of the watery world, such as the Indian Ocean region, where China has maintained a constant naval presence since late 2008.¹

Those seeking to gauge and define Chinese policy must be willing and able to draw on all available sources of information. Most fail to do so. The vast majority of analyses of China’s maritime strategy focus almost entirely on Chinese behavior: what it has done, what it has built. In particular, most highlight a small number of events or cases from which they draw conclusions about Chinese strategy.

To be sure, Chinese actions are the best indicators of Chinese strategy. They reveal exactly what Chinese policy makers are willing to do. They provide raw data that cannot be manipulated. However, the specific drivers of a given behavior are often open to interpretation. Some analysts, for example, assume that Chinese actions in the “near seas” of East Asia are a product of a carefully designed and implemented national strategy, with head and arms working in perfect coordination. However, were these analysts familiar with the breadth of Chinese writings lamenting the country’s lack of well-defined ends, ways, and means, they might revise this proposition. While strategy is surely involved, Chinese mariners
probably are not acting out a detailed script for regional dominance. Moreover, a particular action may be the result of local initiative, or later may be judged a mistake, in which case it may not portend future behavior. The 2009 Impeccable incident, discussed below, may be a case in point.

Judicious use of authoritative statements about Chinese maritime strategy can validate and enrich assessments made on the basis of observed behavior, ameliorating the problems described above. Many of those who research and write on contemporary maritime issues, however, are not fully aware of the potential value of original Chinese documents. Moreover, those who are aware often disagree, sometimes fiercely, about which sources are most useful. This problem is exacerbated by the tremendous proliferation of Chinese documents in recent years, a challenge that has aptly been called “a poverty of riches.”

This article seeks to describe the range of sources available for helping to understand Chinese maritime strategy and to assess their relative value. It comprises five parts. Part 1 outlines basic assumptions and defines key terminology. The subsequent three parts examine three distinct categories of sources, grouped according to the role of the author or speaker: those who formulate Chinese maritime strategy, those who implement the strategy, and the scholars and pundits who define and influence it. The article concludes by offering a set of general rules for assessing the value of Chinese sources on maritime strategy.

The primary aim of this article is to identify specific individuals and their affiliations and draw conclusions about why their statements may (or may not) shed light on Chinese maritime strategy. For illustration purposes, the article will offer examples of the type of information that may be gleaned from close reading of those sources. It does not, however, seek to define Chinese maritime strategy comprehensively, per se.

DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

This article focuses on Chinese “maritime strategy,” defined as state policy governing the development and use of sea power to achieve national objectives in peacetime. It adopts a narrow definition of sea power: those instruments the state wields directly to achieve objectives on or from the sea. These instruments include the Chinese military, above all the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy; Chinese maritime law enforcement forces, especially the China Coast Guard; and the maritime militia, i.e., civilian mariners, often fishermen, who sometimes perform state functions.

The term “maritime strategy” (海洋战略) seldom appears in Chinese documents. Chinese decision makers do not refer to one overall set of policies governing use and development of all the sea services. PLA Navy strategists write of “naval strategy” (海军战略) or “maritime security strategy” (海上安全战略).
Leaders in China’s maritime agencies, especially the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), tend to use the term “maritime development strategy” (海洋发展战略), which refers to an overall national approach to leveraging the ocean and ocean-related industries to support Chinese economic development. Maritime development strategy also encompasses “maritime rights protection” (海洋维权), meaning the use of maritime law enforcement forces to defend and advance China’s position in its maritime disputes. The term “maritime power strategy” (海洋强国战略) is often used synonymously with “maritime development strategy.” Some in the SOA, including deputy director Sun Shuxian, speak of “maritime rights protection strategy” (海洋维权战略), which refers very narrowly to the use of sea power to defend China’s maritime claims.

That Chinese policy makers seldom use the term “maritime strategy” is significant. It suggests a compartmentalization among China’s sea services. This fact, however, does not invalidate use of this term when examining how China develops and uses sea power. For analytical purposes, Chinese maritime strategy comprises a set of policy guidelines—however compartmentalized—governing the development and use of sea power to pursue a range of peacetime purposes. These include, inter alia, deterring Taiwan from formally declaring independence, deterring American military intervention in a regional conflict involving China, defending and advancing China’s position in its maritime disputes, expanding China’s strategic depth in the maritime direction, ensuring sea-lane security, cultivating Chinese “soft power” through naval diplomacy, and protecting the lives and property of Chinese citizens in foreign lands.

This article assumes that the statements of those in positions of authority within the party-state or military are most likely to reflect actual policy. This assumption is uncontroversial. However, authority does not always imply reliability. Sometimes individuals who ostensibly hold positions of authority disseminate propaganda aimed at shaping opinions at home and abroad. In such instances, their views may be unreliable. This tendency will be discussed in some detail in part 2. This article also generally dismisses the public statements of Chinese diplomats, who naturally have a strong interest in downplaying Chinese ambitions and vindicating Chinese actions.
This article examines the statements of individuals. Because of their obvious importance and because they are the best-studied sources for understanding Chinese strategy, documents that the Chinese state issues directly are not examined in any detail. These include national defense white papers, five-year plans, party and government work reports, government yearbooks, and laws and regulations.  

POLICY MAKERS

Major decisions affecting China’s maritime strategy are made by senior members of the party-state in secret sessions in Beijing. Outside observers have little or no access to information on the content of these meetings. The Chinese legislature does not summon Chinese policy makers for public inquiries at which they are questioned about national security policy. The decisions of the Central Military Commission, which guide naval policy, are classified; when information is released, it is often dated and incomplete. There is very little publicly available information about the Maritime Rights and Interests Leading Small Group (中央海洋权益工作领导小组), an entity the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or Party) created in the second half of 2012 to formulate and coordinate maritime dispute policy among the SOA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the military. Sources on the State Oceanic Commission (国家海洋委员会), set up in 2013 to formulate China’s maritime development strategy, are likewise extremely sparse. Scholars do, however, have access to “the strategy” as Chinese policy makers articulate it when they openly speak about maritime issues. Given the obvious authority of such sources, they should be regarded as key building blocks for any effort to define Chinese maritime strategy.

One such source is the official summary of a July 2013 CCP Politburo “study session.” An innovation of Hu Jintao, Politburo study sessions take place at roughly one-month intervals. Two experts are invited to provide lectures on the topic under discussion. During these sessions, the Party leader outlines his views on the topic. These reflect state policy.

At the 30 July 2013 study session, the Politburo discussed the topic of building China into a “maritime power” (海洋强国), an objective identified eight months earlier in Hu Jintao’s work report at the Eighteenth Party Congress. The official summary of the meeting provides a precious glimpse into how China’s top leaders conceive of the country’s relationship with the sea.

A close reading of this document reveals that the party-state’s definition of “maritime power” is very broad. Maritime powers use the ocean to build wealth. Their marine science and technology are advanced. They are able to exploit marine resources effectively. When they use the ocean, they take steps to avoid
harming its ecology. That the two invited lecturers were both civilians is a clear indication of this economic focus.

However, maritime powers are also able to safeguard their maritime rights and interests, and a careful reading of Xi Jinping’s remarks also suggests endorsement of an assertive turn—in his words, a “transformation” (转变)—in how China handles its maritime disputes, an assessment that observed behavior has borne out. In Xi’s words, “We love peace and will continue along the path of peaceful development, but we absolutely cannot abandon our legitimate rights and interests, much less sacrifice our core interests.”

Official coverage of Xi Jinping’s attendance at the Fifth National Border and Coast Defense Work Meeting in Beijing in June 2014 offers another example of the availability and value of policy-maker statements. This event is relevant to China’s maritime strategy because “ocean defense” (海防) involves much more than preventing foreign invasion along China’s coast; it refers to actions to defend all “Chinese” space from encroachment, including offshore islands and remote waters under Chinese jurisdiction. The Xinhua news agency published an official summary of Xi’s remarks. Xi recalled the humiliating and damaging experiences of modern Chinese history, when China “was poor and weak . . . and suffered several hundred instances of foreign encroachment.” As a result, China must place the highest priority on sovereignty and security, “resolutely safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,” and build an “impregnable wall [literally, “a wall of copper and iron”] for border and ocean defense.” Other senior leaders spoke at the event, but media coverage of the meeting gave them scant mention—the focus was Xi Jinping.

Xi’s remarks take on special meaning when contrasted with official media coverage of Hu Jintao’s participation in the same meeting in January 2010. Aside from shaking hands and posing for group photos, Hu played no role in the earlier event. People’s Republic of China (PRC) minister of national defense General Liang Guanglie delivered the keynote address. Liang’s speech balanced out patriotic content—“defending the security of national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests must be seen as the sacred mission of border and coastal defense work”—with conciliatory words about the need to “deepen and expand friendly relations with neighboring states.” Such comparisons both suggest the policy shift that has taken place in the intervening years and shed light on the role Xi may be playing personally in deciding China’s maritime strategy.

Provincial leaders also play important roles in maritime policy. This is especially true for Hainan Province, which administers all the Chinese-claimed land features within the “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea. Hainan’s marine policy, then, has direct repercussions for Chinese behavior at sea. Provincial leaders also play a large part in mobilizing civilian mariners to serve in the country’s
maritime militia (海上民兵). At a meeting in December 2013, Hainan provincial party secretary Luo Baoming (罗保铭) spoke on the role of provincial militias. According to an official summary of his remarks, Luo stated that militias serve a key function in China’s maritime disputes. Their presence in disputed waters “highlights” (彰显) Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea.¹⁹ The province, then, must play a role in fostering their growth and development.

POLICY IMPLEMENTERS

Elements of Chinese maritime strategy are reflected in the statements of those charged with implementing it, above all senior officers within the Chinese military and the Chinese coast guard.²⁰ The civilians in the SOA who directly oversee China’s maritime law-enforcement agencies also speak and write authoritatively about the ends, ways, and means of China’s approach to the sea.

PLA Leaders

Among senior officers, the most authoritative statements are naturally those made by the PLA Navy commander, currently Admiral Wu Shengli (吴胜利).²¹ Admiral Wu is no Sergei Gorshkov, a senior officer who had pretensions to profound strategic insights.²² In contrast, Wu’s statements are often clogged with jargon and therefore difficult to decipher. They are generally very short on details. However, in some cases they do offer valuable revelations about “the strategy.”²³

In August 2014, Admiral Wu gave a very important speech at a ceremony, held aboard the aircraft carrier support ship Xu Xiake, to commemorate the 120th anniversary of the first Sino-Japanese War.²⁴ The text was published in the August 2014 issue of China Military Science, with “appropriate abridgment.”²⁵ While the purpose of the event was to reflect on a historical event, Wu delivered his speech with contemporary issues very much in mind. For the student of Chinese strategy, it demonstrates the service’s commitment to expanding its role in waters beyond Asia—in Wu’s words, “wherever China’s interests extend.” It confirms that senior leaders fear that a powerful enemy (强敌—i.e., the United States) seeks to contain China. Its numerous references to Xi Jinping show that the head of state takes a keen interest in China’s development and employment of sea power.

The content of Wu’s speech also has important implications for understanding the nature of China’s commitment to resolve its maritime disputes. He suggests that the ocean may be equivalent to the land in its importance, declaring that “we must not only protect every inch of land, but also every inch of the ocean.” Wu talks about the need to protect both China’s rights under international law and “historic rights passed down from ancestors,” a reference to Chinese claims to waters within the nine-dash line in the South China Sea. Wu refers to China’s claims to “island sovereignty and maritime rights and interests” as constituting
“core interests” (核心利益). Thus, not just offshore land features but also the zones of sovereignty and jurisdiction emanating from them may now be considered objects of vital state interest.\textsuperscript{26} Wu’s remarks also provide more specific insights on current strategy: China should “continue to strengthen control over [its] claimed maritime space.” Wu’s speech, then, is an index of the PRC’s commitment to resolve the disputes in China’s favor.

The words of other flag officers may also serve as useful indicators of Chinese strategy. These regularly appear in service publications. On 19 March 2014, for example, \textit{People’s Navy} published excerpts of speeches that senior PLA Navy leaders had given at a meeting held to discuss Xi Jinping’s maritime strategic thought. All sixteen of these eighth-hundred-to-nine-hundred-character excerpts are worth reading, but the remarks of Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaoyin (张兆垠), deputy commander of the South Sea Fleet, stand out.

Rear Admiral Zhang sheds light on the Chinese sea services’ overall approach to handling China’s disputes in the South China Sea. Zhang candidly acknowledges that the objective of Chinese strategy in the South China Sea is to “continuously expand the strength of Chinese administrative control” and to “progressively achieve effective administrative control” over Chinese-claimed waters.\textsuperscript{27} That is—in contradiction to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs narrative that China merely responds to the provocations of other states—the PLA Navy, working in conjunction with the Chinese coast guard, is pursuing proactively a policy aimed at controlling disputed land and ocean areas in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{28}

\textit{Coast Guard Leaders}

The statements of leaders within the Chinese coast guard and their civilian overlords are also authoritative indicators of Chinese strategy. Liu Ciguì (刘赐贵), head of the SOA from February 2011 to January 2015, frequently spoke and wrote on China’s efforts at “rights protection.”\textsuperscript{29} Liu presided over China’s policy shift from a generally passive coast guard presence in disputed waters to actual efforts to assert control over disputed waters on the pretext of routine law enforcement.\textsuperscript{30}

Liu’s statements provide useful data for understanding China’s “maritime power” strategy and how it impacts China’s approach to its disputes. In a 7 June 2014 essay in a SOA-run newspaper, \textit{China Ocean News}, Liu outlined what was involved for China to transform itself from a “major maritime state” (海洋大国) into a “powerful maritime state” (or “maritime power”—海洋强国). Liu’s article elaborates on many of the themes Xi Jinping had discussed in his remarks at the Politburo study session eleven months earlier. Liu describes the current period in very dark terms, as one in which states compete with one another for control over the ocean and the ability to use the ocean to become wealthy and powerful. He concludes with a very important admission:
As can be seen, for a long period going forward, China will face increasing challenges in its efforts to safeguard maritime rights and interests. The ocean very likely will become the primary direction from which come efforts to interfere with China’s period of strategic opportunity [to engage in economic development] and threaten China’s security. These realities require that we continuously improve our abilities to control the ocean, accelerate the pace of efforts to transform China into a maritime power, and more effectively safeguard and expand China’s maritime rights and interests.

This and many other similar statements indicate that the national objective is peacetime control of the sea, and the consequences of failing to realize this aim could not be more severe.31

Prior to the creation of the China Coast Guard in mid-2013, China Marine Surveillance (CMS) was the constabulary agency most active along China’s maritime periphery. Thus, the statements of senior CMS leaders also provide useful indicators for assessing key elements of “the strategy.” In July 2012, just days after the Scarborough Shoal standoff ended with China in control of the feature, senior CMS officer Sun Shuxian attended a maritime conference held in Hainan. At the event, Sun suggested that China should use military force against other (unnamed) disputants, because doing so would “ensure a century of peace.” Sun also said, “We do not want to be provocative, but we are not afraid of provocations and cannot tolerate provocations. We cannot simply respond by issuing statements that their actions are illegal and invalid. We must make the provocateurs pay a cost. By killing one, we can deter a hundred others, thereby preventing the situation from worsening.”32 This episode sheds light on the personality of an important leader within China’s sea services. Moreover, that Sun was subsequently appointed deputy commandant of the China Coast Guard and later promoted to deputy director of the SOA suggests a degree of endorsement within the party-state for Sun’s aggressive attitude toward handling China’s maritime disputes.

Certain commanders within China’s other maritime law-enforcement agencies also have been forthcoming with information on their services’ role in China’s maritime strategy. Until his retirement in 2014, Wu Zhuang, the head of the South China Sea branch of Fisheries Law Enforcement, frequently gave interviews to Chinese news outlets. Wu’s own history also sheds light on the mechanism through which policy leads to state behavior, in that individual personalities can play an important role in events at sea: it was Wu, apparently operating on his own initiative, who likely ordered Chinese fishing vessels to obstruct the operations of Impeccable in March 2009.33

In a December 2012 interview, Wu spoke of the strategic logic behind a decision to begin convoying Chinese fishing vessels out to fishing grounds in disputed waters in the southeastern sections of the South China Sea. The lives and property of Chinese fishermen were being threatened by the maritime
law-enforcement forces of other states. Protecting them was a priority because their presence in disputed waters was extremely important, not for the fish they were catching, but for the political significance of their activities. Wu said, “Development of fisheries near the Spratly Islands involves questions of sovereignty over China’s Spratly Islands. ‘Development equals presence, presence equals occupation, and occupation equals sovereignty.’” This statement, uttered by somebody in Wu’s position, may reflect how Chinese strategists conceive of the role of civilian economic activity in China’s maritime dispute strategy.

**SCHOLARS AND PUNDITS**

Any original research on Chinese maritime strategy should rely, to the maximum extent possible, on the statements of those who formulate and implement policy. Yet while these sources are far more numerous than most analysts recognize, leadership statements alone are inadequate. To fill the gaps, students of Chinese strategy must look to the writings of men and women whose vocation is to define and influence “the strategy.”

Studying the works of Chinese scholars, however, is an approach fraught with risk and uncertainty. The easy availability of scholarship and punditry on maritime affairs in China creates a strong temptation to draw heavily on these sources. At issue is when to regard a particular item as a primary source and when to regard it as a secondary source (and thus to subject it to the same standards of evidence as analyses written by non-Chinese scholars).

Any claim a Chinese scholar makes can be regarded as more or less authoritative depending on the extent to which he/she has privileged access to “the strategy.” Scholars who work at research units within the Chinese military or a civilian maritime agency likely have privileged access to at least some components of “the strategy.” The extent of access no doubt varies by rank and position; with seniority comes access. Regardless of rank or position, at best their statements may serve as proxies for the more authoritative statements of those they serve.

**PLA Scholars**

Given the prominent role of the navy in Chinese maritime strategy, PLA Navy scholars no doubt constitute the most authoritative sources in this category. They work in the Naval Research Institute (NRI), PLA Navy educational institutions (e.g., the Naval Command College in Nanjing and the Naval Academy in Dalian), and other military institutions, such as the National Defense University (NDU).

NRI scholars deserve special consideration. NRI was set up at the behest of the then commander of the PLA Navy Admiral Liu Huaqing. This was in 1985, during a period of intense ferment in the field of naval strategy. NRI scholars and analysts continue to do important work on strategic issues, much of it for
internal use. Many NRI products, however, are publicly available. NRI scholar Senior Captain Zhang Wei (张炜) is among China’s leading experts on the strategic use of sea power. Interviewed for a July 2012 People’s Navy article, Zhang recounted the joy she felt in discovering the theories of Gorshkov and Mahan, whose work had a “rational core” (合理内核) that transcended the immorality of their respective periods and systems. Chinese policy makers have turned to her for guidance regarding some of the more difficult policy challenges facing the regime as it expands in the maritime direction.

Some publicly available NRI products serve to convey elements of “the strategy” directly to the fleet. For example, close reading of Senior Captain Ren Xiaofeng’s (任筱锋) Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations sheds light on the political assumptions that animate PLA Navy interpretations of international law. Ren defines the PRC’s official position on the nine-dash line in the South China Sea, what he terms China’s “traditional maritime boundary line” (传统海疆线), to mean that China “enjoys historic rights to all of the natural resources” within these waters. Ren’s volume also outlines PLA Navy policies and procedures for handling encounters with foreign vessels conducting military surveys (军事测量) in China’s exclusive economic zone.

The Naval Command College in Nanjing is home to several important PLA Navy scholars, including Senior Captain Feng Liang (冯梁), a professor in the strategic research department and director of the college’s Maritime Security Center. Feng was a driving force in the creation of the Collaborative Innovation Center for South China Sea Studies (中国南海研究协同创新中心), a think tank located at Nanjing University, and continues to serve in a leadership position within this organization. Collaborating with NRI’s Zhang Wei, he wrote the award-winning book Maritime Security of the State (国家海上安全). While this volume, published in 2008, is now somewhat out of date, it provides a good baseline from which to gauge recent changes in China’s maritime strategy. Among his publicly available works, Feng also coauthored China’s Peaceful Rise and the Maritime Security Environment (中国的和平发展与海上安全环境), another volume highly regarded within the PLA.

The bulk of Feng’s work likely involves directing research projects intended for internal use. His products are read by—or at least given to—Chinese policy makers. For instance, he led a research team studying the topic of “SLOC [sea lines of communication] security and expanding state interests”; its work purportedly has influenced Chinese policy makers. He has also researched the topic of the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” again for the reference of leaders within the
military and the party-state. \(^4\) Feng also has led projects studying questions vital to China’s maritime dispute policy. He has researched strategic problems associated with infrastructure construction, presumably Chinese, on islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, Feng was an important force behind the decision for the Naval Command College to provide advanced training for maritime law-enforcement officers from CMS. He has also completed dozens of studies on the roles and missions of CMS forces in maritime rights protection operations, which doubtlessly have influenced the use of maritime law enforcement in China’s disputes. \(^5\)

The PLA Air Force also constitutes an important agent in China’s maritime strategy. As such, scholars working on its behalf have valuable insights on how and why China pursues sea power. For example, in a 2015 article published in *China Military Science*, Senior Colonel An Peng, head of research at the PLA Air Force Command College, wrote about the role of the PLA Air Force in China’s strategic posture in the “maritime direction” (海上方向). Among other useful data, An’s article highlights the prominent place of the American threat in Chinese strategic thinking. In peacetime, writes An, China must develop airpower to prevail in the “struggle to contain and counter the containment” (围堵反围堵, 遏制反遏制) of a certain, unnamed foreign superpower. In a conflict with another East Asian state, Chinese airpower must be potent enough to counter the same unnamed foreign superpower’s “military intervention” (军事干预). \(^6\)

Some authoritative scholarly works are collective efforts published under the name of a single organization. In such cases, the degree of authority is a function of the institution, not any individual. Written/edited by three dozen scholars from the strategic studies department of the Academy of Military Science, the 2013 *Science of Military Strategy* (战略学) is a case in point. Despite its primary focus on the prosecution of war (page 4), this volume also has a chapter on peacetime military operations (chapter 8), which naturally include a broad spectrum of naval operations, from counterpiracy operations to sovereignty patrols through disputed waters (page 163). Indeed, much of the content in the section on the PLA Navy’s “strategic tasks” focuses on the service’s peacetime missions (pages 209–21). \(^7\)

The statements of some members of the PLA thinking class should be received with skepticism. These are the pundits. \(^8\) Their frequent appearances on Chinese television and their prolific output of often-shallow analyses in the popular press suggest that shaping domestic and international opinion is a major function of their work. Their writings and commentary may be guided by instructions to convince domestic audiences that international affairs are important and that the party-state is taking steps to protect the nation, and to signal to foreign audiences that China is willing and able to defend its interests. \(^9\)
PLA Navy pundits include Senior Captain Li Jie (李杰) (Ret.) and Senior Captain Zhang Junshe (张军社), both from NRI; Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo (尹卓) (Ret.), director of the PLA Navy Informatization Expert Committee; and Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong (张召忠), a professor at NDU. For his part, Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong has published numerous books and articles aimed at the mass-consumption market, and he frequently appears on Chinese television to talk about maritime issues. His views are sometimes far-fetched, making him the target of online pillorying. As Andrew Chubb shows, pundits such as Zhang Zhaozhong openly acknowledge their role as propagandists. This obviously casts doubt on the reliability of their statements.

Nevertheless, one cannot discard wholesale the statements of PLA pundits. In their role as transmitters of national defense policy to the Chinese people, the pundits may offer useful insights. For instance, when Zhang says that China has adopted a “cabbage strategy” (包心菜战略) in the South China Sea, who is to doubt him, especially when his description matches known behavior? When NRI’s Li writes that a primary driver behind China’s “One Belt—One Road” strategy is to counteract perceived American efforts to hem China in from positions along the “first island chain,” and that the strategy requires a strong PLA Navy, what logic suggests he is lying?

The extent to which students of Chinese maritime strategy should ascribe value to the statements of military pundits clearly is debatable. Therefore, any scholarship that cites a member of their ranks must reckon with this debate.

SOA Scholars
The same assumption of privileged knowledge applies to researchers working for civilian maritime agencies. The SOA’s internal think tank is called the China Maritime Development Strategy Research Institute (中国海洋发展战略研究院, officially translated as the China Institute for Marine Affairs—CIMA). CIMA scholars are assigned research projects for the direct benefit of Chinese policy makers, that is, for internal use. One area of focus has been maritime power, a topic CIMA researchers have studied for years. In 2010, CIMA researchers completed work on a report entitled Research on China’s Maritime Strategy for the Years 2010–2020: Building China into a Mid-Level Maritime Power, and in 2011 they began another major research project called A Blueprint for Turning China into a Maritime Power, both for internal consumption. Although the original reports are unavailable, the public writings of CIMA scholars, including CIMA deputy director Zhang Haiwen (张海文), and researcher Wang Fang (王芳), make an excellent proxy.

Individual CIMA experts publish books, scholarly articles, and essays. CIMA researchers interpret the significance of new maritime policies, place the policies
into an international context, and contribute to the debate on China’s proper relationship with the ocean. They also analyze developments in China’s relations with states along its maritime periphery. Examining their assessments over time sheds light on the evolution of China’s maritime strategy. In May 2007, for instance, several CIMA experts wrote an analysis of China’s maritime security environment, publishing it in *China Ocean News*. Looking back at 2006, they conclude that the implementation of China’s policies of “treating neighbors well, treating them as partners” and as “harmonious neighbors, secure neighbors, and wealthy neighbors,” and the diplomatic approach of “building a harmonious world” had a certain restraining effect on the acquisitive activities of some states, thereby resulting in continuous improvement in the maritime situation near China.\(^{58}\)

Thus, in 2007 the consensus in Chinese maritime policy circles may have been that a conciliatory approach toward other disputants was proving effective. This suggests that China’s decision to pursue a more assertive dispute strategy in subsequent years may have been a result of an internal debate in which Chinese policy makers decided ultimately that the former approach no longer was bearing fruit.

The statements of two CIMA researchers merit particular attention. One is CIMA director Gao Zhiguo. Gao was one of only two maritime experts who briefed the CCP Politburo during the July 2013 Politburo study session (discussed above).\(^{59}\) Thus, he demonstrably has the ear of Chinese leaders. Aside from internal research projects, Gao publishes academic articles and commentary on maritime issues, often blending legal and strategic analysis. Gao collaborated with another Chinese scholar on a treatise outlining the legal bases for China’s nine-dash line.\(^{60}\) Gao has long advocated for China to draft a maritime basic law, a comprehensive document that, among other things, could define more fully the scope of Chinese maritime claims and the penalties for foreign mariners who encroach on them.\(^{61}\) Perhaps in part as a result of Gao’s efforts, the SOA currently is taking the lead on researching and drafting a maritime basic law, an objective on the agenda of the current National People’s Congress.\(^{62}\)

The second is Gao’s deputy, Zhang Haiwen mentioned above. Like Gao, Zhang is a maritime legal expert. Much of her work involves internal reports prepared for Chinese policy makers’ reference (决策参考建议). For example, Zhang has led a team researching the question of the rights of Chinese maritime law-enforcement vessels operating in disputed waters. Do foreign states, for instance, have the right to board CMS ships? Such work has very direct policy implications. Zhang also advises Chinese leaders on how to handle incidents at sea (突发事件).\(^{63}\)
CIMA also publishes institutional analyses. It produces the annual *China Oceans Development Report* (中国海洋发展报告), a volume that covers a full range of maritime-related topics, from maritime law to marine-related economic production. It is an important source for understanding how China conceives of its maritime rights and interests and how it uses the sea services to "safeguard" them.

CIMA has an avowed role in state propaganda efforts. In late 2012, at the height of tension among China and its neighbors in the East and South China Seas, Zhang Haiwen frequently appeared on television for the purpose of “correctly guiding public opinion” (正确引导舆论). The Chinese people needed to know the source of tensions—that foreigners were to blame—and they needed to know that Chinese leaders were acting to defend the nation, thereby “dispelling the misunderstandings” of Chinese nationalists. Thus, in settings in which a large audience is presumed, the reliability of statements made by CIMA scholars—indeed, the statements of all scholars affiliated with the military or the party-state—should be scrutinized for any political purpose.

**Outside Scholars and Pundits**

Unlike their colleagues working for the sea services, outside scholars writing about Chinese maritime affairs cannot be assumed to have privileged access; instead, the case must be made. Unless it is, their writings lack authority and should not be treated as primary sources.

When outside scholars publish in authoritative periodicals, their statements may carry some authority. For example, in the days and weeks following the above-mentioned July 2013 Politburo study session, Rear Admiral Zheng Ming (Ret.) was invited by *China Ocean News* to offer his interpretation of the significance of Xi Jinping’s remarks. In the subsequent article, published on page 1 of the newspaper, Zheng highlighted Xi Jinping’s use of the twelve-character expression "sovereignty belongs to China, shelve the disputes, and engage in joint development" (主权属我，搁置争议，共同开发), an approach that Deng Xiaoping developed for handling China’s disputes. Many people in China tend to omit the first part—“sovereignty belongs to China”—because it sounds uncompromising. Xi Jinping’s decision to include it, in Zheng’s view, indicates his resolve never to make concessions on China’s claims. While Zheng Ming himself no longer may work for the Chinese military—and therefore cannot be presumed to possess privileged knowledge of the current strategy—the fact that a SOA publication would invite him to express his views on such an important topic suggests a degree of authority in his statements.

The work of outside scholars may carry special significance if one can demonstrate direct influence on those who make and implement policy. In such
cases, the scholarship itself is not important because of its privileged insights on Chinese strategy; rather, the fact that the scholar is “influential” may suggest that his/her work reflects thinking within the military, the party-state, or both. Even in the very best of circumstances, however, this approach is seldom conclusive.

The case of Zhang Wenmu (张文木) sheds light on some of these difficulties. Zhang is a professor at Beihang University (formerly Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics). He was an early and ardent advocate for China to build a powerful navy and he sees international affairs in the starkest geostrategic terms. His analyses, often couched in the idiom of Marxist thought, are sweeping in scope and prone to facile historical analogy. Zhang’s essays on maritime affairs are collected in On Chinese Sea Power (论中国海权), a volume that has gone through three editions.68

It is clear that Zhang Wenmu’s ideas have some influence within the Chinese military and the party-state. He is invited regularly to conferences and roundtables on maritime affairs, including those sponsored by the SOA.69 Indeed, in 2014 he was asked to lecture to a class of more than eighty SOA bureaucrats receiving a two-day course on maritime strategy.70 At least some parts of the PLA attach importance to his work. For instance, he was interviewed about the strategic significance of China’s “One Belt—One Road” strategy, and the transcripts were published in the July 2015 issue of National Defense, a journal run by the PLA’s Academy of Military Science.71 All of this suggests that some of his views on the international environment and the use of sea power have some purchase among at least some leaders within the SOA and at least some faction of the PLA Navy. Ultimately, however, this is not very instructive for anybody seeking to understand Chinese maritime strategy.72

The Chinese press publishes a wide selection of what might be called “navalist” publications. These include Modern Ships (现代舰船), Naval and Merchant Ships (舰船知识), and Shipborne Weapons (舰载武器). Analysts/pundits who write for these magazines often delve into important strategic and operational issues, sometimes with obvious erudition and candor. Seldom, however, do we learn anything about the scribes themselves, many of whom write under pseudonyms. Therefore, it is impossible to map out the connection between the views of authors writing for these publications and the thinking of the men and women who formulate and implement maritime strategy. In the end, the empirical value of their statements is negligible.
The statements of those affiliated with the Chinese military and the party-state are excellent sources for understanding elements of China’s evolving maritime strategy. These sources, used in conjunction with behavioral indicators (building programs, behavior at sea, etc.), allow observers to define the primary contours of China’s relationship with the sea. Listed below are some general principles for assessing the value of these sources, distilled from the cases examined above:

1. Chinese statements on maritime strategy are useful to the extent to which they can be shown to be authoritative.

2. The statements of men and women responsible for formulating and implementing policy are the most authoritative indicators of Chinese strategy.

3. The statements of Chinese scholars and pundits should be regarded as secondary sources (and judged as such) unless these individuals can be shown to have privileged access to “the strategy.”

4. Scholars and pundits who work directly for China’s sea services (or agencies that manage them) should be assumed to have some privileged access. This access is likely a function of rank and position.

5. Beware the statements of scholars/pundits who work for the sea services but whose primary work involves internal and external propaganda. The sincerity of their statements may be questionable.

6. Outside scholars and pundits cannot be assumed to have privileged access to “the strategy.” Privileged access must be demonstrated.

7. That an outside scholar is known to be “influential” does not necessarily mean that his/her views reflect the mainstream thinking of Chinese policy makers.

8. The statements of unknown pundits writing for “navalist” publications have negligible value as indicators of China’s maritime strategy.

NOTES


3. For a recent debate on proper sources, see Lyle J. Goldstein, “How China Sees America’s Moves in Asia: Worse than Containment,” *National Interest Online*, 29 October 2014, nationalinterest.org/; Michael S. Chase,


9. The thirteenth five-year plan (2016–20) calls for China to "strengthen top-level design of maritime strategy" (加强海洋战略顶层设计). Given the context—a national plan for economic and social development—the term "maritime strategy" is likely synonymous with "maritime development strategy." See 赵建东 [Zhao Jiandong], “十三五”规划的蓝色看点 ["On the Maritime Content of the 'Thirteenth Five-Year Plan'"], 国家海洋局 [SOA website], 7 March 2016, www.soagov.cn/.

10. 罗毅 [Luo Yi], 中国海警局孙书贤副局长访问琼州学院畅谈走进海洋 ["Vice-Commandant of the China Coast Guard Sun Shuxian Visits Qiongzhou College to Talk about Maritime Affairs"], 海南热带海洋学院 [website of Hainan Tropical Ocean University], 14 August 2015, www.qzue.edu.cn/.

11. Important yearbooks include the SOA’s China Ocean Yearbook (中国海洋年鉴) and the Ministry of Agriculture’s China Fisheries Yearbook (中国渔业年鉴).


13. The decision to create the State Oceanic Commission appeared in legislation passed at the March 2013 National People’s Congress. The legislation states that the State Oceanic Commission, a “high-level deliberation and coordination mechanism,” was created to “strengthen planning and comprehensive coordination of maritime affairs...[,] assume responsibility for researching and formulating a national maritime development strategy, and conduct overall planning for major maritime projects. Its specific tasking would be carried out by the State Oceanic Administration.” See 国务院机构改革和职能转变方案 [Program for State Council Organizational Reform and Functional Transformation], 中政府网 [website of the central government of the PRC], 15 March 2013, www.gov.cn/.


15. 习近平在中共中央政治局第八次集体学习时强调进一步关心海洋认识海洋经略海洋推动海洋强国建设不断取得新成就 [“At the Eighth Politburo Collective Study Session Xi Jinping Emphasized That China Should Do More to Take Interest in the Sea, Understand the Sea, and Strategically Manage the Sea, and Continually Do More to Promote China’s Efforts to Become a Maritime Power”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], 1 August 2013, p. 1.

16. 李兆春, 高新生 [Li Taochun and Gao Xinseng], 海防概念的诠释 ["How to Interpret the Concept of Ocean Defense"], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 22 July 2008, p. 4.

17. 李宜良, 黎云 [Li Xuanliang and Li Yun], 习近平在第五次全国边海防工作会议代表 [Xi Jinping Meets
the Delegates Attending the Fifth National Border and Coast Defense Work Meeting, Li Keqiang and Zhang Gaoli Also Attend], Xinhua, 27 June 2014, politics.people.com.cn/.


20. The "Chinese coast guard" is a general term to describe all the maritime law-enforcement agencies charged with managing Chinese-claimed waters and offshore land features. The most important maritime law-enforcement agencies involved in implementing China's maritime strategy are China Marine Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement, the Border Defense Coast Guard, and the China Coast Guard. See Ryan Martinson, "From Words to Actions: The Creation of the China Coast Guard" (paper for the "China as a 'Maritime Power" conference, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA, 28–29 July 2015), available at www.cna.org/.

21. As a member of the Central Military Commission, Admiral Wu does more than just implement policy; he also plays a direct role in shaping it.


24. 刘金来 [Liu Jinlai], 以史为鉴知耻奋进站在实现中国梦的高度肩负起强军兴军历史责任 ["Use History as a Reference, Be Aware of Shame and Struggle Forward, Look at Matters from the Perspective of Realizing the China Dream, and Assume the Historic Responsibility of Building a Strong Military"], 人民海军 [People's Navy], 29 August 2014, p. 1.


26. The 2011 edition of PLA Military Terminology defines "maritime rights and interests" as "a general expression for the various rights and interests enjoyed by a sovereign state over the ocean. They include sovereignty in the territorial sea; the sovereign rights and jurisdictional rights in the contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf; the rights enjoyed on the high seas and the international seabed; and the right of innocent passage through other states' territorial sea." 中国人民解放军军语 [PLA Military Terminology] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, September 2011), p. 26. While serving as SOA director, Liu Cigui defined "maritime rights and interests" as "a general expression for a state's rights and interests on the ocean, chiefly including rights and interests in waters outside of one's jurisdiction and rights and interests in waters under one's jurisdiction." See also 高悦 [Gao Rui], 刘赐贵应邀在中共中央党校作专题报告坚决维护我国的海洋权益 ["Liu Cigui Gives a Speech at the Central Party School Entitled 'Resolutely Safeguard China's Maritime Rights and Interests'"], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 1 July 2013, p. 1.

27. 张兆垠 [Zhang Zhaojin], 切实有效维护南海海洋权益 ["Earnestly and Effectively Safeguard Maritime Rights and Interests in the


29. From 1983 to 2013, the State Oceanic Administration, an agency within the Ministry of Land and Resources, had authority over China Marine Surveillance, a maritime law-enforcement agency with the largest role in the administrative prong of China's maritime dispute strategy. The SOA now administers the new China Coast Guard, established in mid-2013 by combining CMS and three other maritime law-enforcement agencies.

30. Liu left the SOA to become the governor of Hainan Province, where he remains at the time of this writing.


32. 孙书贤: 日本若敢越红线 中方不惜一战 ["Sun Shuxian: If Japan Dares to Cross Red Lines China Will Not Hesitate to Go to War"], 凤凰卫视 [Phoenix TV], 13 July 2012, news.ifeng.com/.

33. This point was made by retired PLA Navy officer Rear Adm. Zheng Ming in an interview published in Modern Ships. 陈良飞, 余娉 [Chen Liangfei and Yu Ping], 钓鱼岛，黄岩岛事件或可成为我国制定和实施海洋发展战略的一个切入点 ["The Diaoyu Island and Huangyan Island Incidents Could Perhaps Become an Entry Point for China's Formulation and Implementation of Its Maritime Development Strategy"], 现代舰船 [Modern Ships] (September 2012), p. 14. See also Rui Ren [Liu Bin], 中国海警局组建一年观察执行任务不再单打独斗了 ["A Look at China Coast Guard One Year after It Was Set Up, Forces No Longer Carry Out Missions Alone"], 南方周末 [Southern Weekend], 9 October 2014. An official history of Guangdong Province's role in ocean defense states that the South China Sea branch of Fisheries Law Enforcement decided to deploy a cutter to work with fishing vessels to "track, intercept, and expel" Impeccable. This decision was "based on the spirit of the instructions issued by a higher-level department" (根据上级部门的指示精神). This suggests that the branch did not receive specific instructions for how to handle the incident and therefore had wide latitude to decide how to act. See Guangdong 海防史 [History of Guangdong Ocean Defense], 广东海防 [History of Guangdong Ocean Defense] (Guangzhou: Zhongshan, 2010), p. 466.

34. 项仙君 [Xiang Xianjun], 农业部南海区渔政局局长 海洋强国梦从未这么近 ["Head of the South China Sea Branch of the Ministry of Agriculture's Fisheries Law Enforcement: The Dream of Maritime Power Has Never Been So Close"], 南方日报 [Nanfang Daily], 20 December 2012, available at politics.people.com.cn/.


37. 柏杨 [Bo Yang], 站在桅杆上的眺望者 ["The Man Gazes Afar from Atop the Mast"], 人民海军 [People's Navy], 16 February 2015, p. 4; see also 顾博 [Gu Bo], 冯梁 [Feng Liang]: Twenty Years of Sharpening His Sword ["Feng Liang: Twenty Years of Sharpening His Sword"], 人民海军 [People's Navy], 4 April 2014, p. 3.

41. See Bo Yang, "The Man Gazes Afar," p. 4.


44. See Bo Yang, “The Man Gazes Afar,” p. 4.

45. Ibid.; Gu Bo, “Feng Liang,” p. 3. Other naval experts whose work, because of their affiliation with the PLA Navy, offers useful indicators of Chinese maritime strategy include Xie Shiting (谢适汀) from the Dalian Naval Academy and Liang Fang (梁芳) from NDU.


47. See also Andrew Chubb, “Propaganda as Policy? Explaining the PLA’s ‘Hawkish Faction’ (Part Two),” Jamestown Foundation *China Brief* 13, no. 16 (9 August 2013), www.jamestown.org/.

48. Distinct from a scholar, a pundit is a person who primarily writes articles for magazines and newspapers or mass-market books that do not expect scholarly standards of evidence.

51. For example, in 2011 Zhang published a four-hundred-page book entitled *Toward the Deep Blue*. For several reasons, it should not be considered a work of scholarship: (1) It contains no citations of any kind. (2) It was published by the Guangdong Economic Press (广东经济出版社), not a PLA-affiliated press. And (3) the book’s preface was written by the director of the Propaganda Department of Guangdong Province, who stated that among other things the purpose of the book was to “strengthen the maritime consciousness of the Chinese people.” 张召忠 [Zhang Zhaozhong], 走向深蓝 [Toward the Deep Blue] (Guangzhou: Guangdong Economic Press, 2011).

52. In a recent article, Zhang defended himself from his detractors. See Zhang Zhaozhong, 张召忠回应美第七舰队司令：你别碰上中国心烦时” [“Zhang Zhaozhong Responds to the Commander of the USN Seventh Fleet: Do Not Bump into China When China Is in a Bad Mood”], 凤凰军事

54. The "cabbage strategy" describes China’s coordinated use of its sea services to control maritime space, especially waters around disputed land features. Zhang seems to have first used this term during a May 2013 Beijing TV news show. For a transcript of the interview, see 张召忠: 反制菲占岛 只需用“包心菜”战略 ["Zhang Zhaozhong: To Counter Philippine Occupation of Islands China Just Needs to Implement a ‘Cabbage’ Strategy"], 环球网 [Global Times Online], 27 May 2013, mil .huanqiu.com/.

55. 李杰 [Li Jie], 缘何加力推进“海上丝路”战略 ["Why China Should Strengthen Its ‘Maritime Silk Road’ Strategy"], 军事文摘 [Military Digest], no. 9 (September 2013), pp. 6–10.


57. 张海文, 王芳 [Zhang Haiven and Wang Fang], 海洋强国战略是国家大战略的有机组成部分 ["Maritime Power Strategy Is an Organic Component of Grand Strategy"], 国际安全研究 [International Security Studies], no. 6 (2013), pp. 57–69. Obviously, the publicly available article is not identical to the internal reports. It is, however, unlikely that the publicly available article contradicts any of the content of the internal reports. Otherwise, there would be no point in writing and publishing in a public forum.


60. 高之国, 贾兵兵 [Gao Zhiguo and Jia Bing- bing], 论南海九段线的历史、地位和作用 [The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications] (Beijing: Ocean, 2014). This book is a bilingual copy of an article the two authors originally published in a 2013 issue of the American Journal of International Law.


62. 赵宁 [Zhao Ning], 国家海洋局召开海洋基本法立法座谈会 ["The State Oceanic Administration Holds a Meeting to Discuss Legislation of a Maritime Basic Law"], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 29 December 2014, p. 1.

63. 张斌键 [Zhang Binjian], 以法护海的巾帼卫士 —— 记国家海洋局海洋发展战略所副所长张海文 ["The Heroine Who Uses the Law to Safeguard the Sea—A Profile of Deputy Director of CIMA Zhang Haiven"], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 26 June 2013, p. 3.

64. Ibid.

65. 郑明 [Zheng Ming], “搁置争议 共同开发”前提是“主权属我” ["The Precondition for Shelving Disputes and Engaging in Joint Development Is Sovereignty Is Mine"], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 3 September 2013.

66. For more on the history and efficacy of the twelve-character strategy for handling disputes, see 赵勇 [Wen Yong], 新形势下维护海洋权益解决海洋争议的思考 —— 对邓小平 “主权属我, 搁置争议, 共同开发” 思想的再探讨 ["Considerations on Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests and Resolving

67. Yu Zhirong (郁志荣) is one of the more prolific retired maritime law-enforcement officers (former CMS) currently researching and writing on maritime strategy. He is a researcher at the China Maritime Development Research Center (中国海洋发展研究中心), which is an association of experts from the SOA, provincial and municipal maritime agencies, and Chinese universities. It was established in 2006. For information on this organization, see 黄冉 [Huang Ran], 国家海洋局局长刘赐贵会见中国海洋发展研究中心张文木教授 [“SOA Director Liu Cigui Meeting the Director of the China Maritime Development Research Center Wang Shuguang”], 海洋局网站 [SOA website], 20 May 2011, www.soa.gov.cn/.


69. See, for example, “海洋观与建设海洋强国”学术研讨会发言 (摘登) [“Remarks Made at an Academic Conference on the Topic of ‘Views of the Ocean and Building China into a Maritime Power’” (excerpts)], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 1 September 2014, p. 3.

70. The title of Zhang’s lecture was “A Changing Global Situation and China’s National Security,” 路涛 [Lu Tao], 海洋强国战略培训班在京举办 [“A Training Class on China’s Maritime Power Strategy Takes Place in Beijing”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 26 November 2014, p. 2.


72. For additional detail on Zhang, see Lyle J. Goldstein, “Get Ready: China Could Pull a ‘Crimea’ in Asia,” *National Interest Online*, 11 April 2015, nationalinterest.org/. Other outside scholars who study Chinese maritime affairs but may have direct connections with policy makers, the sea services, or both include Hu Bo (胡波), a researcher at Peking University’s Maritime Research Institute; Ni Lexiong (倪乐雄), a professor at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law; Shi Yinhong (时殷弘), a professor at Renmin University; Wu Shicun (吴士存), president of China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies; Zhang Jie (张洁), a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Zhang Mingyi (张明义), a member of the Senior Advisory Committee on National Maritime Development; and Zhu Feng (朱锋), executive director of the China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea at Nanjing University.
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