

Deep Blue Diplomacy

Soft Power and China's Antipiracy Operations

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For the first time in its modern history China has deployed naval forces operationally beyond its immediate maritime periphery for extended durations, to protect merchant vessels from pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Over a six-year span beginning in December 2008, China has contributed over ten thousand navy personnel in nearly twenty task forces and has escorted over six thousand Chinese and foreign commercial vessels in the process. While it is uncertain how many task forces will be deployed and for how long, China will likely remain in the Gulf of Aden through 2015, and perhaps longer if the United Nations further extends its mandate for navies to fight piracy off Somalia.¹ China's naval antipiracy mission represents an unprecedented instance of conduct by the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of sustained long-distance operations. It provides a rare window by which outside observers can see how the naval component of China's "going out" strategy cuts across economic, political, and strategic dimensions. While many of China's other maritime activities damage its international image, antipiracy operations in the far seas project soft power and a positive image.

The Chinese navy's antipiracy missions provide much-needed security for Chinese overseas interests. But the PLAN has also crafted its antipiracy missions to portray blue-water operations positively abroad. Increasingly, the PLAN's antipiracy mandate is oriented toward broader international security objectives. Commercial escort statistics exemplify this trend: initially China's navy was only allowed to escort Chinese-flagged ships through the Gulf of Aden, but now in some cases over 70 percent of ships in given Chinese escort flotillas have been foreign flagged. Similarly, to secure the maritime commons Chinese commanding officers and sailors serving off Somalia have worked increasingly in the framework of bilateral exchanges with other navies as well as in multistakeholder settings.

This chapter explores the soft-power dimension of China's far-seas antipiracy operations. It addresses the extent to which Gulf of Aden deployments might increase the PLAN's prospects for cooperation with other navies and also the impact of these missions on the role the navy plays within China's larger diplomacy. Finally, it assesses how these deployments might relate to future Chinese naval development.

Historical Background

A sharp increase in piracy attacks off Somalia threatened to interfere with China's foreign trade. Several well-publicized pirate attacks prior to the PLAN's antipiracy deployment in 2008 demonstrated Chinese vulnerability. *Tianyu 8*, a fishing boat with twenty-four crewmen, the Chinese tanker *Zhenhua 4*, and the Sinotrans-owned cargo ship *Dajian*, as well as two Hong Kong-registered ships, *Stolt Valor* and *Delight*, were all pirated prior to the PLAN's deployment.² Over 1,200 Chinese merchant vessels transited the Gulf of Aden during the first eleven months of 2008, and of this number eighty-three were attacked by pirate groups. Direct threats to China's economic interests and citizens abroad were thus important drivers of the PLAN's first antipiracy deployment.

As the PLAN's initial deployment prepared to set sail in December 2008, Senior Col. Huang Xueping, Ministry of National Defense secondary spokesman and deputy director of the ministry's Information Office, convened a news conference in which he clarified the points that, first, the mission's primary objective was to protect Chinese shipping interests, and that, second, it did not represent a change in Chinese foreign policy or a desire to project greater blue-water naval capabilities.³ Idealistic and realistic interpretations of China's antipiracy operations differ greatly. The former focuses on China's desire to contribute meaningfully to regional and international security, while the latter includes a "desire to protect Chinese shipping, expand China's influence, and to provide opportunities for realistic training that will enhance the PLAN's capabilities in military operations other than war."⁴

In line with the realists, economic interests in the Gulf of Aden had perhaps the greatest impact on pragmatic Chinese policy makers. As Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao explains, "Piracy has become a serious threat to shipping, trade and safety on the seas. . . . That's why we decided to send naval ships to crack down."⁵ China's overseas maritime trade is highly dependent on vulnerable sea lines of communication (SLOCs), such as the Bab el Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca, Strait of Singapore, and South China Sea. China currently relies on just five SLOCs for roughly 90 percent of its overseas trade. In particular, approximately 60 percent of all commercial vessels that transit through the Strait of Malacca are Chinese flagged.⁶

For China, therefore, the economic benefits of protecting its international trade are abundantly clear. China's leadership continues to emphasize the PLAN's imperative to secure Chinese overseas maritime interests. Specifically, energy supplies transported via international SLOCs will constitute a larger percentage of China's aggregate energy consumption. Having become a net oil importer in 1993, for example, China now relies on seaborne oil imports for over 40 percent of its oil consumption.⁷ China's oil import dependence will rise substantially between now and 2030, by some estimates to as high as 80 percent.⁸

Oil and other energy imports constitute just one of many sectors in China that face growing dependence on the sea. *China Daily* reported that as early as 2006, maritime industries accounted for \$270 billion in economic output, nearly 10 percent of China's gross domestic product.⁹ In 2009, over 260 companies, across various industries, reportedly engaged in international maritime shipping.¹⁰ In 2010 it was reported that each year over two thousand Chinese commercial vessels were transiting the Gulf of Aden.¹¹ In 2011, more than two years after the PLAN's first antipiracy deployment, a professor at China's National Defense University observed, "From the current situation, ocean lifelines have already become a soft rib in China's strategic security."¹²

China's growth as a sea power has been rapid. It currently has more seafarers, deep-sea fleets, and ocean fishing vessels than any other nation. It has become, in the words of Ju Chengzhi, of the Ministry of Transport, a "maritime shipping power" (海运大国). In 2009 China's merchant maritime fleet reportedly consisted of over 3,300 vessels and forty thousand crewmen.¹³ *People's Daily* reported in 2011 that China surpassed South Korea as the world's largest shipbuilder in terms of capacity and new orders.¹⁴

China's maritime responsibilities are huge, since it has thirty-two thousand kilometers of coastline and claims over three million square kilometers of offshore waters.¹⁵ Public awareness of the importance of maritime issues is increasing. Two Chinese media outlets have reported separate public surveys in which 86 percent and 91 percent of Chinese citizens polled supported the PLAN's antipiracy deployment.¹⁶ Simultaneously, many Chinese "netizens" (frequent Internet users) have criticized their government for its inability to ensure Chinese sailors' safety.¹⁷

Domestically, in the period before deployments began Beijing faced strong political incentives to intervene decisively to protect its shipping. These political concerns at home paralleled international expectations. Such deployments, it was predicted, would enhance China's image as a "responsible stakeholder" in international society, particularly in the domain of maritime security.¹⁸ In the years since, China's antipiracy operations have already aided the PLAN substantially in developing its blue-water capacity.

Military Development and Blue-Water Aspirations

Beijing's deployment of PLAN antipiracy forces appears to be spurring on Chinese military development. As the Chinese newspaper *Global Times* puts it, over five years of deployments to the Gulf of Aden have transformed PLAN antipiracy forces from "maritime rookies to confident sea dogs."¹⁹ Since China has not fought an actual war since its 1979 conflict with Vietnam, this experience of maintaining multiyear, distant deployments of warships is extremely valuable. In 2011, a PLAN senior captain effectively summarized the multidimensional benefits of distant sea antipiracy operations: "The experience definitely would be unprecedented not only for officers and sailors, but also for the durability and function of the ships."²⁰

Furthermore, antipiracy operations have positioned the PLAN as China's most active service. By proving its effectiveness against threats to Chinese overseas interests, the PLAN has ensured that it will continue to procure some of the military's newest and best technology.²¹ More broadly, the persistent threat of piracy in international waters has enabled China to expand its far-seas security operations under the umbrella of benign international cooperation.²²

Close analysis of PLAN antipiracy activities reveals four primary conduits for projecting soft power: the escort of commercial ships and other direct operational aspects of PLAN antipiracy missions; navy-to-navy meetings, combined training, and other exchanges and instances of cooperation with foreign navies; participation in multistakeholder dialogues on land and at sea related to international antipiracy operations; and, perhaps most significantly, a growing number of port visits conducted by PLAN warships for replenishment and diplomatic purposes before, during, and after service in the Gulf of Aden. Exploiting these channels has positioned the PLAN as an important and highly visible player in China's comprehensive quest for international soft power.

Antipiracy services provided by the PLAN to commercial ships have primarily included area patrols, escorts, and on-ship protection.²³ Wang Yongxiang, deputy commander of the tenth escort task force, explains that specific tactics depend on multiple idiosyncratic factors: "the schedules of the merchant vessels to be escorted, their characteristics, and how well our warships have rested. We want to not only ensure the safety of our charges, but also improve the efficiency of escort protection."²⁴ Area patrol—monitoring certain maritime zones in and around the Gulf of Aden—is the approach least employed by the PLAN. When China's navy does engage in area patrols, it typically maintains two base points 550–600 nautical miles apart—for example, one a hundred nautical miles north of Yemen's Socotra Island and the other seventy-five nautical miles southwest of Aden Harbor.²⁵ On a normal mission PLAN vessels travel between these points, typically taking two to three days to do so.²⁶

Of all the services provided by China's antipiracy forces, the escort of civilian ships is the most common; it has become a daily practice for PLAN task forces in the Gulf of Aden. Task forces consist of two warships—usually a combination of destroyers and frigates—and a replenishment or landing ship. However, since the first task force, two or more warships concurrently stationed in the Gulf of Aden have led separate flotillas of merchant ships, sometimes in opposite directions, through an area west of longitude fifty-seven east and south of latitude fifteen north.²⁷

PLAN escort efficiency has improved significantly since 2008. As a 2010 *Liberation Army Daily* article states, "From the first escort to the escort of the 1,000th ship the Chinese naval task force used over 300 days, from the 1,000th to the 2,000th ship used over 220 days, and from the 2,000th to the 3,000th ship only used over 180 days' time."²⁸ As early as 2011, approximately 70 percent of ships escorted by China's navy at any given time were foreign.²⁹ In terms of aggregate escorts over the first four years, roughly 50 percent of PLAN-escorted commercial vessels were foreign flagged.³⁰ *People's Navy* reported in mid-2011 that China had provided escort services to ships from over fifty foreign countries, and this figure has likely increased over the past four years.³¹ *People's Daily* emphasizes that escort services are provided gratis for Chinese and foreign commercial ships.³² That is, PLAN escort services are being provided as a complimentary public good to the international community.

Foreign civilian ships can apply online to join a PLAN escort convoy via the China Shipowners' Association website. Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, has asserted, "China shoulders responsibility for foreign vessels based on growing national strength and a friendly policy"; many other states do not send escort forces, because of limited interest and the enormous costs. In Zhai's opinion, "such international cooperation and exchanges also help the rest of the world to know more about China and accept it."³³

Given the international context in which China's antipiracy operations take place, the PLAN has taken steps to professionalize its services. For example, the use of the English language is important while conducting international operations; the twelfth task force had an on-duty translator on board the frigate *Yiyang* to liaise with foreign naval and merchant counterparts.³⁴ Each PLAN task-force member receives four "pocket books" covering the psychological aspects of deployment, security, international law, and the application of international law to military operations. Also, naval officers specializing in international law provide full-time legal support to officers and crews in meetings with ships of other nations.³⁵ These efforts have assisted China's internavy exchanges.

Internavy Exchanges and Dialogues at Sea

Chinese and international commentators greatly value the unprecedented exposure of PLAN vessels and crews to foreign navies.³⁶ Rear Adm. Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), articulates the historical significance of the PLAN's deployments in this way: "In terms of international engagement, the first decade of the 21st century should be divided into a pre-anti-piracy operations period and a post-anti-piracy period, because once the PLAN began to conduct anti-piracy operations, the entire nature of its approach to international naval engagement changed appreciably."³⁷

The missions have had an undeniable impact on Chinese naval diplomacy; interaction with foreign navies that was novel in 2008 is now routine in the Gulf of Aden and adjacent waterways. In 2011, Han Xiaohu, commander of China's eighth escort task force, visited in March the flagship, a frigate, of NATO's Operation OPEN SHIELD; in May, hosted the Singapore navy's Rear Adm. Harris Chan, then commander of U.S.-led Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, on a PLAN warship; and in June hosted the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) commander on board the frigate *Wenzhou*.³⁸ The PLAN and Singapore navy conducted bilateral exchanges in September 2010 in the Gulf of Aden, sending personnel on board each other's ships.³⁹ China's navy conducted more exchanges with CTF-151 in July 2012 and with NATO in April and July 2012.⁴⁰ An article in *People's Daily* stated in 2012 that Chinese naval escort task forces continue to inform the outside world about the "activities of suspicious ships through network mailbox and radio station every day and shared information resources with 50-odd warships of 20-plus countries and organizations."⁴¹

China's naval diplomacy in the region goes well beyond shipboard interactions with Western antipiracy forces. For example, PLAN task forces off the Horn of Africa have also been active in a variety of bilateral exchanges. The PLAN and the Russian navy executed joint antipiracy escorts for the first time in October 2009, during the PEACE BLUE SHIELD 2009 (平蓝盾—2009) exercise.⁴² Similarly, China's navy held extensive joint exercises with Russian navy BLUE SHIELD units in May 2011 and conducted similar antipiracy joint exercises in both 2012 and 2013.⁴³ Amid comprehensive Sino-Russian joint maritime exercises in 2012, Chinese and Russian naval forces performed extensive piracy-deterrence and rescue joint training off the coast of Qingdao.⁴⁴

The Chinese navy is not interacting only with large navies. During November 2009, PLAN military officials met with Dutch counterparts to perform on-ship inspections and exchanges, and during 2010 PLAN forces collaborated with South Korean naval units in antipiracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden.⁴⁵ In 2012, China and South Korea conducted joint antipiracy exercises in which helicopters of the two sides landed on

each other's warships for the first time.⁴⁶ In April 2011, China's eighth escort task force sent *Wenzhou* and *Qiandaohu* to conduct joint antipiracy exercises with the Pakistani guided-missile destroyer *Khyber*.⁴⁷ These combined drills followed the Pakistani-hosted PEACE 11 multinational maritime exercises, which included naval ships from, among other states, China, the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and Pakistan. China sent guided-missile frigates *Wenzhou* and *Ma'anshan*, two helicopters, and seventy special forces commandos.⁴⁸ More recently the PLAN conducted joint antipiracy training with the Ukrainian navy in the Gulf of Aden. All of these efforts support China's growing naval diplomacy.

Chinese Naval Diplomacy

At-sea engagements with other navies are crucial for establishing a positive image of China's growing global maritime presence. These engagements are complemented by a growing focus by the PLAN on establishing effective relationships with littoral states in and adjacent to the Indian Ocean region. Indeed, since 2008 the nature and scope of Chinese naval port visits have expanded continuously. Growing port calls bolster China's far-seas soft-power projection by facilitating interaction and dialogue between China and the many countries whose ports and geographic locations heighten the strategic value of these relationships.

The PLAN is increasing port visits (see the table) as its far-seas antipiracy presence matures. A small sample reveals the dynamism with which the PLAN is engaging the navies, governments, and citizens of littoral states in connection with its antipiracy missions. For example, during September 2012, *Yiyang* of the twelfth escort task force arrived in Karachi for a second cycle of rest and replenishment, during which it held seminars and other exchanges with Pakistani naval counterparts.⁴⁹ Later that year Rear Adm. Zhou Xuming and members from the twelfth escort task force met with Commo. Jonathan Mead, acting commander of the Australian Fleet, in Sydney on an official visit. The Australian chief of navy, Vice Adm. Ray Griggs, remarked, "I welcome the continued opportunity for our navies to share their experiences today as we exchange lessons learned in the conduct of counter-piracy operations."⁵⁰ More recently, in late 2013 the fifteenth escort task force, in addition to holding friendly exchanges with fleets from the EU, United States, and NATO, docked for friendly visits in Tanzania, Kenya, and Sri Lanka.⁵¹

Clearly, uninterrupted operations in the Gulf of Aden have helped to facilitate PLAN maritime engagement with other countries in the vicinity as well as those strategically situated on the route from China to Somali waters. China has effectively increased the role of naval diplomacy as a component of its antipiracy deployments in a number of world regions. *People's Daily* reports that "since the 2nd Chinese naval escort task force,

the Chinese navy has established a new mechanism of organizing escort warships to pay friendly visits to foreign countries, and the Chinese naval escort task forces have successfully paid friendly visits to more than 20 countries, such as India, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Singapore.”⁵²

Selected Port Visits by PLAN Antipiracy Forces

<p>ALGERIA Algiers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2–5 April 2013, friendly visit <p>AUSTRALIA Sydney</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 18–22 December 2012, friendly visit <p>BAHRAIN Manama</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 9–13 December 2010, friendly visit <p>BULGARIA Varna</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6–10 August 2012, friendly visit <p>BURMA Rangoon</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 29 August–2 September 2010, friendly visit <p>DJIBOUTI Djibouti</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 24 January 2010, replenish/overhaul • 3 May 2010, replenish/overhaul • 13 September 2010, replenish/overhaul • 22 September 2010, replenish/overhaul • 24 December 2010, replenish/overhaul • 21 February 2011, replenish/overhaul • 5 October 2011, replenish/overhaul • 24–29 March 2012, replenish/overhaul • 14 May 2012, replenish/overhaul • 13–18 August 2012, replenish/overhaul • 1–6 December 2012, replenish/overhaul • 6–8 June 2013, replenish/overhaul • 28 July 2013, replenish/overhaul • 7–9 October 2013, replenish/overhaul • 22–26 February 2014, replenish/overhaul • 1–5 April 2014, replenish/overhaul and friendly visit <p>EGYPT Alexandria</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 26–30 July 2010, friendly visit <p>FRANCE Toulon</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 23–27 April 2013, friendly visit 	<p>GREECE Crete</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 7 March 2011, replenish/overhaul <p>Piraeus</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 9–13 August 2013, friendly visit <p>INDIA Cochin</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 August 2009, friendly visit <p>ISRAEL Haifa</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 14–17 August 2012, friendly visit <p>ITALY Taranto</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2–7 August 2010, joint drills and friendly visit <p>KENYA Mombasa</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2–5 January 2014, friendly visit <p>KUWAIT Shuwaikh</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 27 November–1 December 2011, friendly visit <p>MALAYSIA Port Kelang</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 December 2009, friendly visit <p>MALTA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 26–30 March 2013, friendly visit <p>MOROCCO Casablanca</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 9–13 April 2013, friendly visit <p>MOZAMBIQUE Maputo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 29 March–2 April 2012, friendly visit <p>OMAN Masqat</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1–8 December 2011, friendly visit <p>Salalah</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 21 June–1 July 2009, replenish/overhaul • 14 August 2009, replenish/overhaul • 2 January 2010, replenish/overhaul • 1 April 2010, replenish/overhaul
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Selected Port Visits by PLAN Antipiracy Forces, continued

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 June 2010, replenish/overhaul • 10 August 2010, replenish/overhaul • 8 January 2011, replenish/overhaul • 19 January 2011, replenish/overhaul • 10 April 2011, replenish/overhaul • 8–11 June 2011, replenish/overhaul • 23 June 2011, replenish/overhaul • 7–10 November 2011, replenish/overhaul • 21–24 February 2012, replenish/overhaul • 1–3 July 2012, replenish/overhaul • 9 July 2012, replenish/overhaul • 28–29 March 2013, replenish/overhaul <p>PAKISTAN Karachi</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5–8 August 2009, joint drills and friendly visit • 7–13 March 2010, joint drills and friendly visit • 13 March 2011, joint drills • 8 September 2012, replenish/overhaul <p>PHILIPPINES Manila</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 13–17 April 2010, friendly visit <p>PORTUGAL Lisbon</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15–19 April 2013, friendly visit <p>QATAR Doha</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2–7 August 2011, friendly visit <p>ROMANIA Constanța</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 31 July–3 August 2012, friendly visit <p>SAUDI ARABIA Jidda</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 27 November–1 December 2010, friendly visit • 3 September 2011, replenish/overhaul • 17 June 2012, replenish/overhaul • 1–6 January 2013, replenish/overhaul • 5–28 April 2013, replenish/overhaul • 14–18 September 2013, replenish/overhaul • 2–6 November 2013, replenish/overhaul <p>SEYCHELLES Port Victoria</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 14 April 2011, friendly visit • 16–20 June 2013, friendly visit 	<p>SINGAPORE Changi</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5–7 September 2010, replenish/overhaul and joint drills • 18–20 December 2011, replenish/overhaul and friendly visit • 5–10 September 2013, friendly visit <p>SOUTH AFRICA Durban</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4–8 April 2011, friendly visit <p>SRI LANKA Colombo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5–7 January 2010, friendly visit • 7–12 December 2010, friendly visit <p>Trincomalee</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 13–15 January 2014, friendly visit <p>TANZANIA Dar es Salaam</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 26–30 March 2011, joint drills and friendly visit • 29 December 2013–1 January 2014, friendly visit <p>THAILAND Sattahip</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 16–21 August 2011, joint drills and friendly visit • 21–25 April 2012, friendly visit • 12–16 September 2013, friendly visit <p>TURKEY Istanbul</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5–8 August 2012, friendly visit <p>UKRAINE Sevastopol</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 31 July–3 August 2012, friendly visit <p>UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Abu Dhabi</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 24–28 March 2010, friendly visit <p>VIETNAM Ho Chi Minh City</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 13 January 2013, friendly visit <p>YEMEN Aden</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 21 February 2009, replenish/overhaul • 25 April 2009, replenish/overhaul • 23 July 2009, replenish/overhaul • 28 September 2009, replenish/overhaul • 5 February 2010, replenish/overhaul • 16 May 2010, replenish/overhaul • 26 July 2010, replenish/overhaul • 1 October 2010, replenish/overhaul
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Whereas in all of 2009 PLAN task forces berthed in foreign ports in just five states, Chinese antipiracy flotillas have, among them, stopped in over ten countries every year since 2010. Moreover, the nature of port calls has evolved dramatically during the past six years. In 2009 and 2010 most Chinese port calls were conducted for replenishment, rest, and relaxation. But by 2012 Chinese antipiracy escort task forces had made eight port calls for friendly visits (i.e., for primarily diplomatic reasons), and this trend has continued over the last two years. This demonstrates a growing share of Chinese naval resources devoted to diplomacy. More importantly, it illustrates the efficiency with which the PLAN is deriving soft-power capital from its contributions to international maritime nontraditional security.

China has also bolstered international exchanges by hosting foreign navies at Chinese ports and cities. In mid-May 2011 China invited twenty representatives from eight African nations, including Algeria, Cameroon, and Gabon, to participate in a twenty-day maritime law enforcement program in Zhejiang Province.⁵³ At the first International Symposium on Counter-Piracy and Escort Cooperation, in February 2012 at the PLAN Command College in Nanjing, Navy Military Studies Research Institute senior researcher Cai Weidong stated, “The Chinese navy hopes to build up a platform for international cooperation that will allow naval forces of different countries to familiarize themselves with each other. I hope the platform well serves our antipiracy goals.”⁵⁴

As these examples illustrate, China has derived incrementally greater soft-power benefits from its antipiracy operations by boosting the number of both midmission port calls and diplomatic and friendly visits en route home. Chinese scholar Wang Yizhou has called for a higher degree of “creative involvement,” a foreign policy concept that identifies and adapts creative and flexible modes of foreign engagement on a case-by-case basis.⁵⁵ The PLAN seems to be applying Wang’s concept in the far seas, perhaps most notably through its antipiracy operations, without changing their fundamental form. Adding more stops before and after antipiracy service in the Gulf of Aden has allowed the PLAN to accumulate larger soft-power gains. This practice reflects the PLAN’s greatest lesson from far-seas antipiracy missions: there is no substitute for experience, and six years of continuous operations have allowed China gradually to become more effective in securing its comprehensive interests through the deployment of antipiracy task forces.

Arguably even more than foreign port calls, other nontraditional maritime security operations facilitated by Beijing’s Gulf of Aden antipiracy presence contribute to China’s “deep blue diplomacy.” Escort of foreign vessels carrying Syrian chemical weapons through the Mediterranean and active participation in search and rescue operations during the frantic search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 in early 2014 are just two

examples of how the PLAN has leveraged antipiracy resources to contribute to international security.⁵⁶

Some commentators are less sanguine about China's attempts to expand its maritime relations; it is important to note that there are objections to the notion that China's antipiracy missions are benign. In that view, self-interested economic and security calculations are arguably the largest drivers of the PLAN's deployment of warships to the Gulf of Aden, and viewing port visits as diplomatic exchanges risks oversimplification, since many states may view them as harbingers of creeping Chinese power projection.⁵⁷ For example, the tiny island-state Seychelles is one of several coastal and island African states in which China has actively sought to enhance its soft power.⁵⁸ China could be using antipiracy operations to support an aggressive naval development policy, as well as to pursue a more active grand strategy that involves overseas access facilities and a long-term trend toward a greater overall global presence.

Chinese Naval Development

The PLAN is just one of several "independent" providers of antipiracy assets in the Gulf of Aden. While the majority of naval antipiracy forces fight pirates under the aegis of multilateral commands, several states—including China, India, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, and Russia—have primarily operated on a unilateral basis rather than under the command of multinational antipiracy forces such as CTF-151, NATO's Operation OPEN SHIELD, or EU NAVFOR. This posture suggests that China is probably trying to learn as much as it can from other navies without revealing much about its own operations, while also, clearly, maintaining ideological independence in foreign policy.

China's preference to abstain from combined operations is driven by several factors. First, greater independence allows the PLAN to conduct its preferred method of antipiracy operations—relatively low-risk escort operations aimed at deterring, rather than actively searching for, pirates. It also offers China an individual identity as a provider of maritime public goods, rather than as just another state operating within Western-led security mechanisms. Moreover, if China joined the existing security structure, potential frictions might arise that could preclude meaningful integration, such as sensitivities related to information sharing and technology theft. Some Chinese defense experts opposed acceptance of the U.S. Navy's invitation to participate in the 2014 RIMPAC exercises and other joint maritime cooperation activities for such reasons.⁵⁹

These concerns notwithstanding, China's antipiracy operations over the past several years have made meaningful contributions to Gulf of Aden security. In addition, they have achieved unprecedented coordination between China and other antipiracy maritime forces in the region, such as those of the United States. While suspicions abound

regarding China's motives, antipiracy cooperation may contribute to more positive outside perceptions of China and its international status. China has been "ready to exchange information and cooperate with the warships of other countries in fighting Somalian pirates" since its inaugural deployment in 2008.⁶⁰ One PLAN antipiracy task force commander, Adm. Du Jingcheng, has recalled that he was eager to "facilitate exchanges of information with escort naval vessels from other countries."⁶¹

In the nearly six-year period beginning December 2008, the PLAN has coordinated information with over twenty nations, including the United States.⁶² Li Faxin, associate professor (and lieutenant commander) at the Naval Marine Academy, states that PLAN antipiracy forces have established "high-trust partner relations" (高度信任的伙伴关系) with many nations operating in the Gulf of Aden.⁶³

Positive results have also been facilitated by Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE), a voluntary multistate antipiracy information-sharing mechanism. SHADE meetings occur quarterly in Bahrain and regularly host naval and industry leaders from various states. Willingness on the part of independent navies, China's in particular, to synchronize their antipiracy operations with those of Western forces within the SHADE mechanism is a historic achievement for twenty-first-century maritime commons governance.

China was denied SHADE chairmanship in 2009 but, notwithstanding, coordinates its antipiracy escorts with those of other SHADE members. For example, China has participated in SHADE's Convoy Coordination Working Group and coordinates its monthly escort schedules with other navies providing independent escorts. China, India, and Japan reportedly began coordinating their antipiracy operations as early as 2011.⁶⁴ They mutually arranged escort schedules twenty-nine times between January and March 2012, with China acting as the coordinator for ten escorts, India for ten, and Japan for nine.⁶⁵

Conclusions

For six years the PLAN's antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have symbolized China's burgeoning out-of-area naval activity. They also showcase Beijing's growing ability to achieve soft-power objectives while concurrently promoting its overseas interests and military development. Important components of these missions include escort of commercial ships, navy-to-navy meetings, participation in multistakeholder dialogues on antipiracy operations, and, most significantly, the growing number of port visits undertaken by PLAN warships. These position the PLAN as an important and highly visible player in China's recent soft-power diplomacy.

China's ongoing antipiracy operations in its far seas have generated many positive assessments. In contrast to its contentious near seas, where Beijing is consistently embroiled in sovereignty disputes that show no signs of abating, antipiracy missions represent the most significant positive component of China's naval engagement to date, particularly with regard to the degree to which Chinese vessels and sailors are interacting with the outside world. This interaction not only enhances China's maritime image in the eyes of its antipiracy partners but may help alleviate fears that China's naval rise might one day threaten twenty-first-century maritime prosperity in regions beyond the near seas. The United States and China reportedly planned over forty visits, exchanges, and other engagements for 2013, double the number in the previous year, and successfully carried out joint antipiracy exercises in 2012 and 2013.⁶⁶ In 2014, China participated in RIMPAC for the first time, the U.S.-hosted forum that is currently the largest naval exercise in the world.

The PLAN's experience fighting piracy in distant seas is a benchmark that can be used by Beijing to cement its positive image in the international arena. Antipiracy operations prove that the PLAN can be a provider—not merely a consumer or, worse, a disrupter—of maritime commons security. International society largely perceives Chinese naval contributions to fighting piracy as positive developments, perceptions that stand in sharp contrast to China's hard-power naval approaches in the East and South China Seas. The nature and perceived efficacy of China's soft power are constantly being scrutinized by scholars.⁶⁷ While it is too early to speculate exactly how Beijing's contributions to antipiracy today will bolster its future soft-power influence, the results should be at least moderately positive. More generally, the Gulf of Aden case suggests that China will continue to reap international political benefits commensurate with its contributions to international maritime security.

Notes

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
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Navies and Soft Power

Historical Case Studies of Naval Power
and the Nonuse of Military Force


Bruce A. Elleman
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Foreword

This book is the last in a series of seven collections of case studies over the past twelve years that have examined the institutional roles played by navies throughout history. The series has collected an impressive group of scholars who have examined a variety of topics from the history of blockades and commerce raiding, the role of navies in coalitions, and naval mutinies in the twentieth century. This final volume, edited by Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, expands the series to cover the use of navies as instruments of “soft power,” which includes a wide variety of missions.

The use of navies for purposes other than war is a phenomenon that goes back to antiquity and has continued ever since. For example, the great historian and keen observer of *res navales* Thucydides was well aware of the importance of ancient Greek antipiracy operations for promoting wealth and security. Perhaps one of the most interesting cases from antiquity is the humanitarian mission led by Pliny the Elder in AD 79, when, as commander of the Roman fleet at Misenum, he went to Pompeii to rescue civilians imperiled by the eruption of Mount Vesuvius, losing his life in the process.

Navies have thus always carried out a variety of operations that went beyond those necessary for the fighting and winning of wars and they continue to do so. During the last two centuries the U.S. Navy has engaged in an ever-broader array of non-war-fighting missions. For example, the Navy was famously involved protecting against piracy in the Mediterranean in the early nineteenth century and carried out equally important patrol missions, such as attempts to stop the illegal slave trade beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. After the end of the Cold War, many other nonmilitary missions came to the fore, in particular maritime humanitarian aid missions after natural or man-made disasters. One recent example of such a mission was the post-tsunami Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in Southeast Asia during 2004–2005.

Beginning in 2006, the U.S. Naval War College was engaged in the process of writing the Navy’s latest strategy document, called *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. This document was published in October 2007, and updated in March 2015. While the *Cooperative Strategy* has a strong focus on traditional missions, embedded in concepts such as deterrence, sea control, and power projection, it also discusses broader missions such as maritime security and humanitarian assistance / disaster relief. It is the latter two missions that form the focus of the current volume, which examines nine

case studies ranging from the nineteenth through the twenty-first century on a wide spectrum of non-war-fighting missions.

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Preface

For well over two centuries, the U.S. Navy has engaged in an ever broader array of nonmilitary missions. Although a fundamental *raison d'être* of navies concerns hard power, in the twentieth century an awareness of the uses of soft power developed. For example, since ancient times protecting against piracy has been a common naval problem, while since the mid-nineteenth century equally important patrol missions, such as attempts to stop the illegal slave trade, have been conducted by the U.S. Navy. After the Cold War, many other nonmilitary missions became important, in particular maritime humanitarian-aid missions like the post-tsunami Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in Southeast Asia during 2004–2005.

Beginning in 2006, the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, hosted a “blue-team/red-team” process for writing the Navy’s latest strategy document, called *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (CS-21, for short). These teams addressed a wide variety of naval missions, including offshore balancing versus high-end and low-end strategies, to consider how aggressive, forward-positioned naval forces could be used both for war-fighting and for “lesser and included” missions, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. According to Adm. James Foggo III, former Commander, U.S. European Command, “You can be out there forward, totally isolationist, or do what we call offshore balancing. Or you can be reactive and go where you are needed or surged. Or you can do . . . a mixture: to be combat capable but also at the same time able, in a phase zero situation, . . . to provide humanitarian assistance for disasters.”¹

In five different scenarios, named “Alpha” through “Echo,” writing teams discussed the goal of humanitarian missions, anticipating that global climate change might create an increased demand for them.² Much of this thinking was reflected in CS-21, which was published in October 2007 and updated in March 2015. To supplement this effort, this volume presents nine historical case studies examining the use of navies in non-military missions.

Notes

1. Rear Adm. James Foggo III, telephone interview, 6 February 2013.
2. Bryan McGrath, “Maritime Strategy Option Echo,” spring 2007.

Introduction

Navies Are Not Just for Fighting

BRUCE A. ELLEMAN AND S. C. M. PAINE

Navies are most commonly thought of in terms of warfare. Naval blockades, commerce raiding, and expeditionary warfare are basic missions. However, since almost their very beginning, professional navies have conducted many operations that are not strictly war related; antipiracy patrols, dating back at least to the Roman Empire, if not before, are just one example. In more modern times, patrols against the transportation of African slaves—and more recently, refugees—have become common. In addition, navies can be tasked to respond to a wide range of both man-made and natural disasters, including oil spills, hurricanes, and tsunamis.

Previous related volumes by the editors of this publication and in this series have examined the many force-based maritime operations that are considered to be the norm for professional navies.¹ This volume is different, however, in that it focuses primarily on the nonmilitary uses of naval forces—in other words, naval actions that are conducted outside of the normal actions associated with war and often (although not always) avoiding the firing of weapons or other uses of lethal force. With the end of the Cold War in 1990, the U.S. military created a special term, “military operations other than war,” or MOOTW, to describe such operations; not to be outdone, the United Kingdom created “Peace Support Operations,” or PSO. However, nonmilitary naval operations have existed longer than these terms and can include, but are not limited to, humanitarian-aid missions, civilian evacuation operations (often referred to as “non-combatant evacuation operations,” or NEOs), and a wide variety of non-war-related patrol functions, including (during the nineteenth century) antislavery patrols and more recently (in the twenty-first century) antipiracy patrols.

In the modern era, navies can also be called on to respond to a wide range of natural or man-made threats that have little or nothing to do with questions of war or peace, including disasters at sea like the *Deepwater Horizon* fire and oil spill. They can also sponsor fundamental research on ecological or environmental problems, including

the possible impact of sonar on marine mammals. Finally, naval operations originally created in wartime, such as the intentional sinking of ships to block important channels, have in recent years borne fruit in more peaceable endeavors, such as the sinking of decommissioned naval ships to form artificial reefs for recreational diving and sportfishing.

While the military use of navies during times of international tension or war is obvious and well reported by the press, these nonmilitary uses can be equally important, even when largely ignored by the media and public at large. As with the “negative space” in an abstract picture, so long as the global commercial system is functioning, international trade is conducted without interruption, and peacetime maritime activities—including fishing, mining in or under the seas, and recreational pursuits, such as yachting, sportfishing, and scuba diving—can be carried out safely, there is no need to highlight the usefulness of navies. It is often only when problems arise and catch maritime security organs unawares that media organs report on them. Nobody appears very interested in reporting “business as usual.”

In the more than twenty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, global navies appear to have adopted many new nonmilitary responsibilities—including patrolling sea-lanes for pirates and assisting in oil-spill cleanups—that break the traditional mold regarding what most people think are navies’ primary duties. But as the first chapter will show, such operations are not new. Although the U.S. government outlawed the transatlantic slave trade in 1808, only after the 1842 Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Britain did the U.S. Navy actively enforce this prohibition, by conducting antislavery patrols off the coast of Africa. As John Pentangelo discusses in his contribution, the sloop of war USS *Constellation* served as flagship of the African Squadron from 1859 to 1861. During *Constellation*’s two-year cruise, this squadron of eight sail- and steam-powered vessels captured fourteen slave ships and liberated almost four thousand Africans from involuntary servitude. Arguably, the most important capture during *Constellation*’s patrol occurred on 25 September 1860, when it stopped the slave ship *Cora* and discovered 705 African slaves—men, boys, women, young girls, and even babies—whom it subsequently freed.

Naval forces can play a very important role in diplomacy without ever firing a shot. As Henry “Jerry” Hendrix argues, by sending practically the entire U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet to conduct “winter exercises” in the Caribbean during 1902–1903, under the command of the famous Adm. George Dewey, President Theodore Roosevelt was able to pressure the German and British governments to back down from a threat to use military force against Venezuela and to seek arbitration instead. It is notable—although “war by algebra” has been much criticized, especially in land warfare—that in this case fifty-three American ships opposed only twenty-nine British and German ships; while additional

ships could have been sent by each of these major European powers, to do so would have taken considerable time and left other parts of their respective empires undefended. Thus, an American “fleet-in-being,” backed up by U.S. Marines stationed strategically on island bases throughout the Caribbean, produced a diplomatic coup not only for President Roosevelt but also for a rising American sea power.

While blockades have always been considered an important naval operation during times of war, in the twentieth century the focus of “starvation blockades” could be fine-tuned by simultaneously conducting humanitarian relief operations. As shown by Bruce A. Elleman, one of the first large-scale humanitarian-aid missions by sea occurred during World War I, with the creation of the nonprofit Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB). This organization distributed \$927,681,485.08 worth of foodstuffs and clothing to Belgium and to German-occupied areas of northern France. Before this aid could be delivered, however, its director, Herbert Hoover, had to persuade England and Germany to let ships carry it through the maritime blockade lines. From 1 November 1914 until the summer of 1919, over nine hundred CRB-leased ships successfully navigated not only the British naval blockade but also German minefields and swarms of U-boats conducting unrestricted submarine warfare. By delivering this essential food aid to helpless civilians in Belgium and northern France, the CRB helped the British focus the full impact of the starvation blockade against Germany and its allies.

An embargo is an important naval function that includes patrols but usually does not require force. During the years immediately prior to the U.S. entry into World War II, the American government tried to force Japan to pull out of China by imposing progressively more restrictive embargoes. As S. C. M. Paine discusses, following Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the creation of Manchukuo in 1932, Washington adopted a nonrecognition policy toward Japanese territorial expansion in northern China. After the war escalated in July 1937, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Japan, including an ever more restrictive naval embargo intended to halt deliveries to Japan of war matériel and, most notably, U.S. petroleum. This chapter outlines the historical background of the imposition of sanctions and of the Japanese reaction, which proved to be not a withdrawal from China but a massive escalation on 7 December 1941, with an attack on Pearl Harbor and invasion of British and Dutch interests throughout the Pacific.

Navies can assist refugees to relocate during crises and wartime. Jan K. Herman recalls a formerly secret U.S. Navy mission that occurred during April 1975, in the final days of the war in Indochina. Although most of the South Vietnamese army had already surrendered to the approaching North Vietnamese, senior South Vietnamese naval officers refused to surrender their ships. With time running short, Richard Armitage, an agent for the Secretary of Defense, offered U.S. Navy assistance to rescue what

remained of their navy. As a result, thirty-two ships and approximately thirty thousand refugees were safely escorted by USS *Kirk* across the South China Sea to Subic Bay in the Philippines.

Decommissioned or stricken naval vessels can still make important and honorable contributions to the common good. Tom Williams shows that navy ships can continue to serve a military by being turned into naval museums or by being sunk—during war-time as blockships, in peacetime in gunnery exercises. On 25 November 2003, President George W. Bush authorized, as a provision of the Defense Department budget, U.S. Navy ships to be donated for use as artificial reefs. Although ships have been made artificial reefs for years, the first to be sunk in the new program was the aircraft carrier USS *Oriskany* (CV 34) on 17 May 2006, south of Pensacola, Florida. Sinking naval vessels to form artificial reefs can offer important economic benefits for coastal communities, by increasing maritime tourism and fishing, even while playing a positive ecological role by boosting local marine life.

The U.S. Navy's use of sonar has been blamed for numerous whale strandings and other damage to sea life. Darlene Ketten argues that the relatively small threat of sonar to the populations of whales compared with those posed by other anthropogenic dangers—fisheries, ship strikes, indigenous hunts, etc.—puts these concerns into perspective. While acknowledging the coincidence of strandings with some U.S. Navy exercises, she believes there must be an attempt to find the boundaries of the problem, as well as a retrospective analysis of the events under investigation. This requires outside support for research on multiple fronts to address the mechanisms that can trigger strandings and methodologies to avoid them. Naval participation in federal panels to address public concerns is also crucial, since the largest impediments to seeing these events clearly are widespread public misperception of the magnitude of the events per se and of their implications, and skepticism about why results sometimes appear to come slowly. To correct media errors would require better dissemination of these results plus constant explanation of the broader impacts of these results on other areas of marine science.

Navies can respond in nonmilitary ways to natural, and especially man-made, disasters. Rear Adm. Mary Landry, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.), relates the background of the 20 April 2010 fire on the offshore oil rig *Deepwater Horizon* in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in the rig's sinking and an oil spill. Not only did eleven of the 126 crew members perish, but from 20 April through 19 September 2010 about five million barrels of oil leaked out of the five-thousand-foot-deep well, creating the largest offshore spill in American history. In response, Coast Guard cutters and personnel became the first line of disaster response. Rear Admiral Landry, commander of the Eighth Coast Guard District, headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, was the top Coast Guard official coordinating, using the incident command system, what grew to be the largest fully integrated response

ever mounted in the United States, including approximately forty-seven thousand people from federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector entities.

Not just established navies but also emerging and reemerging ones can conduct non-military operations. For the first time in its modern history, the People's Republic of China has deployed naval forces operationally beyond its immediate maritime periphery to protect merchant vessels from pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange show that beginning in December 2008, China has contributed more than ten thousand naval personnel in almost twenty successive task forces and has escorted nearly six thousand commercial vessels, approximately 70 percent of them foreign flagged, in seven hundred escort missions.² The People's Liberation Army Navy has carefully crafted its antipiracy operations to portray China's blue-water operations abroad in a positive way. These Gulf of Aden deployments might increase the Chinese navy's prospects for cooperation with other navies as well as impact China's future naval development.

The conclusions examine the targets, audiences, objectives, effects, and outcomes of such operations. Long before the MOOTW and PSO were invented, navies were deeply involved in the conduct of nonmilitary operations. Given that peace is the norm and war the exception, such nonmilitary missions occur much more regularly and produce significantly greater effects than most people would think.

Notes

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this essay are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Navy Department, or the Naval War College.

1. Christopher M. Bell and Bruce A. Elleman, *Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, eds., *Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-strategies, 1805–2005* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, eds., *Naval Coalition Warfare: From the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and David Rosenberg, eds., *Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies*, Newport Paper 35 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2010); Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, eds., *Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare* (New York: Routledge, 2012); Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, eds., *Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755–2009*, Newport Paper 40 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2013).

2. “中国海军护航编队执行第700批护航任务” [Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Carries Out 700th Escort Mission], 中国新闻网 [China News Web], 5 April 2014, www.chinanews.com/mil/2014/04-05/6034225.shtml.

Conclusions

Breaking the Mold

BRUCE A. ELLEMAN AND S. C. M. PAINE

Navies are most commonly thought of in terms of warfare, when the primary naval objective is closing the commons to the enemy while keeping it open to friends. In peacetime, the main objective is keeping the commons open to lawful use by everyone. Nonmilitary missions tend to occur in peacetime, and many indirectly concern the protection of the maritime commons through the enforcement of “good order at sea.”¹ Such missions include halting the movement of banned cargoes, preventing interference with the movement of legal traffic, and protecting the environment. Many navies and coast guards cooperate with those of other countries to conduct these missions because all nations share a common interest in safe transit and healthy fisheries.

After the end of the Cold War, many military missions no longer fit the standard war-fighting paradigm. A new term, “military operations other than war,” or MOOTW, was coined to describe them. Many officers did not like this shift, since it seemed to diminish the military’s role. Gen. John Shalikashvili characterized this widely held (and in his mind erroneous) sentiment as the attitude that “real men don’t do mootw.”² But of course, while the term might be new, the missions are not. A RAND study identified no fewer than 846 military operations other than war between 1916 and 1996 in which just the U.S. Air Force, or its Army predecessor, played a role.³

As the nine historical case studies in this volume have shown, for well over a century and a half the U.S. Navy has engaged in many nonmilitary missions, dating back to the antislavery patrols of the 1840s. Navies can play a major role in diplomacy, economics, fisheries, humanitarian relief, scientific research, and disaster relief, to name just a few fields. During these historical missions the Navy did not necessarily focus on aiding American citizens but often on assisting allies or simply those in need. These missions affected numerous audiences, ranging from individuals through interest groups to entire nations. Thus, it is important to consider both the targets of these missions and

the wide range of audiences observing from the sidelines and to consider how direct and indirect effects impact all stakeholders.

Targets of Nonmilitary Operations

Whereas during wartime the target of a naval force is typically either an enemy or an ally of the enemy, in nonmilitary operations the “target” is quite often one’s own citizens or friends; also the goal is rarely destruction, more often being assistance (see table 1). Examples of such missions include freeing slaves, feeding noncombatants in war-time, shutting down one’s own commerce by embargo, protecting marine life through research and pollutant containment, and defending shipping from piracy. If these activities occurred on land, they would be considered matters of law enforcement, not military action, but on the high seas professional navies are often tasked to carry them out; in littoral waters coast guards generally assume these responsibilities.

TABLE 1
Targets of Nonmilitary Operations (in order of importance)

CASE STUDY	DIRECT TARGET	INDIRECT TARGET	COLLATERAL DAMAGE
Slave Trade	slaves (cargo)	abolitionist voters, slave owners, international press	
Venezuela Deterrence	no target—only audiences		
Starvation Blockade	noncombatants in occupied territory	U.S. voters, Entente voters	↓ collateral damage of blockade
Oil Embargo	commerce	Japanese decision makers	↓ U.S. commerce
Vietnamese Refugees	refugees	North Vietnamese government and navy	
Artificial Reefs	ship disposal	sportfishing, tourism, scuba diving	
Sonar and Whales	whales	environmentalists, voters	
Gulf Oil Spill	BP workers, oil cleanup	press, voters, shoreline, fisheries, tourists	
PLAN Antipiracy	pirates	image building at home and abroad, naval training, naval espionage	

Counterintuitively, the indirect, secondary target is often more important than the direct target—for example, domestic voters, who can determine whether politicians remain in office, and the press, which often interprets news items and influences voters. Thus, voters and the press are often the indirect targets of operations to protect the

environment and help refugees. After an oil spill, the initial environmental cleanup is the direct target, but press and voter perceptions of the cleanup are often secondary targets. In the case of Britain's "starvation blockade" against Germany in World War I, the strategy might have become unsustainable if it had alienated American and British voters by causing the mass starvation of innocent noncombatants in Belgium and occupied France. Herbert Hoover's humanitarian mission to provide food to those caught in the midst of war avoided this dilemma.

Likewise, if the U.S. Navy can show—by conducting research on sonar and whales—that its activities do not damage marine life, or better yet, if it can improve marine life—by building artificial reefs—voters might view the Navy in an ever more positive light. Although the immediate target of Coast Guard operations following the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill was the rescue of workers and pressing BP to cap the well, the secondary target of preventing the infiltration of oil into marshlands, which would have outraged conservationists, the fishing industry, and tourists, was even more important for the recovery of the ecosystem. In the case of the Chinese navy's recent antipiracy efforts, the primary target might be the pirates, but the maritime proficiency and intelligence it is gaining, in combination with the pride that Chinese citizens derive from these new power-projection capabilities, are arguably far more important to the Chinese government.

In contrast to these successful operations, it is possible to reach the intended target but in unanticipated and undesired ways. American attempts to pressure Japan to withdraw from China in the 1930s failed; Washington's public ultimatums hardened rather than softened Japanese attitudes. When the United States attempted to deter Japan from further escalation in China, it imposed a succession of sanctions, with great fanfare in the press. Sanctions broadly targeted the Japanese government and people, on the assumption that finance was a central consideration of Tokyo's decision making. Apparently the sanctions did in fact convince Japan's finance minister that war with the United States was untenable; he, at least, received the intended message loud and clear. But Japan's naval and, particularly, army leaders did not wish to accept such a conclusion. They became desperate instead to deter the United States and concluded that attacks across the Pacific constituted their best, albeit remote, hope. So the American strategy backfired with regard to Japan's military leaders and delivered an outcome opposite to what was intended. In this case, the U.S. government correctly gauged Japan's civilian leaders but failed to anticipate the adverse reaction of its military.

Primary targets are often individuals in distress. As various chapters have shown, non-military operations can assist victims of slavery or disaster survivors or help refugees flee a war zone. The number of individuals included can be small or in the tens of thousands, if not more. For example, the Navy's Operation FREQUENT WIND helped thirty thousand refugees flee Vietnam for the Philippines, and melded later into Operation

NEW LIFE, which moved them to Guam for processing before permanent resettlement in the United States and other nations. An important secondary target was the victorious North Vietnamese government, which was denied the ships of the South Vietnamese navy, as well as its officers and their families. Sometimes the secondary targets are audiences—people who witness events and whose subsequent actions may be influenced by the nonmilitary operation.

Audiences of Nonmilitary Operations

In a world connected by instantaneous mass communication, onlookers are far more numerous than participants. Observers can be subdivided into specific audiences with differentiating interests and agendas (see table 2). In the past, the professional press provided the lens through which viewers interpreted events; now, with bloggers and the social media, isolated individuals can unexpectedly attract mass followings. Audiences include voters and political parties at home and in allied and enemy nations, the press at home and abroad, nonstate actors, foreign governments or foreign militaries or foreign intelligence agencies, and also a range of foreign and domestic nongovernmental interest groups, such as environmentalists. In fact, audiences can include any group that has an interest in maritime affairs. The problem for naval strategists becomes reaching the targeted audience without alienating other, unintended audiences.

Publicity is not necessarily an effective method of exerting pressure, particularly in societies concerned with preserving “face,” so a navy’s ability to stay out of the headlines is valuable. Because naval forces operate far out to sea, their actions generally remain invisible and become public only when a government decides to make them public. The ability to limit the number of audiences is one of the greatest strengths of this “secret service.” As Adm. Joseph Prueher, Jr., U.S. ambassador in China during the 2001 EP-3 negotiations, later explained in connection with the success of his efforts to get the aircraft’s crew home, negotiating with China often requires building “ladders for the Chinese to climb down” from untenable diplomatic positions.⁴ Naval deployments in proximity to the shore but far enough away to be out of the public eye can provide leverage during diplomatic talks without subjecting leaders to public humiliation, let alone to the domestic backlash that such humiliation would entail.

During the Venezuelan crisis, President Theodore Roosevelt’s fleet-in-being had no immediate target; rather, its primary audience comprised the highest levels of the German and British governments, whom Roosevelt sought to deter from naval action against Venezuela. A secondary but critical audience was that of South American leaders, whom Roosevelt did not wish to alienate lest they seek outside assistance to counterbalance the United States. In 1906, after forcing Germany to back down, Roosevelt sent Secretary of State Elihu Root on a “goodwill tour” to South America to make it clear that

TABLE 2
Audiences of Nonmilitary Operations and Their Reactions

CASE STUDY	HOME GOVT.	HOME VOTERS	ALLIED GOVTS.	ALLIED VOTERS	ENEMY GOVTS.	ENEMY VOTERS	INTL. PRESS	INTENDED AUDIENCES	UNINTENDED AUDIENCES
Slave Trade	mixed	abolitionists and slave owners	positive	positive	N/A	N/A	positive	abolitionists	slave owners
Venezuela Deterrence	positive	N/A (secret)	N/A (secret)	N/A (secret)	effective	N/A (secret)	N/A (secret)	UK and German governments	South American states
Starvation Blockade	positive	positive	positive	positive	N/A	N/A	positive	home/allied voters, refugee governments	German and UK voters and press
Oil Embargo	mixed	positive	positive	positive	boomerang	boomerang	positive	Japanese government and businessmen	Japanese nationalistic press
Vietnamese Refugees	positive	positive	Philippines unhappy	N/A	angry	N/A	positive	U.S. voters	Filipinos
Artificial Reefs	positive	mixed	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	mixed	U.S. voters and press	environ-mentalists
Sonar and Whales	positive	positive	positive	positive	N/A	N/A	positive	U.S. voters and press	environ-mentalists
Gulf Oil Spill	positive	positive	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	positive	U.S. voters, U.S. press, Congress	fishermen, sportsmen, tourists
PLAN Antipiracy	positive	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	positive	pirates, foreigners, Chinese people	N/A

the United States desired only to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of the Latin American republics.⁵

But there were other audiences, audiences that Roosevelt wanted to keep in ignorance. He did not wish American voters or the Democratic Party to stir up an anti-British or anti-German crusade that might have strengthened British and German determination to send military forces to the Caribbean. A fourth potential audience was the international press. The mobilization of the entire U.S. fleet was secret to everyone but the American, British, and German governments; it never reached the attention of the press. In the absence of an evident crisis, the American and European press never became an important audience, a fact that avoided unwanted public pressure. Thus, secrecy allowed Roosevelt to reach just the intended audiences without setting off the others.

Even nonhumans can be the targets of naval operations and navy-funded research, with humans the intended audience. In particular, environmentalists are a major, and quickly growing, audience for such issues as marine mammals subjected to intense sound from naval sonar. Navy-sponsored research programs have greatly expanded fundamental knowledge about marine-mammal hearing and have produced innovations in underwater acoustic propagation models, tags for monitoring animals at depth, and increasingly sophisticated operational aids for detecting and predicting movements of individual animals at sea. Such information assists not only the Navy but also a wide range of other audiences in the fields of shipping, fisheries, marine biology, and research to reduce bycatch and ship strikes and to monitor migration patterns, essential behaviors, and population trends.

There is a wide array of audiences associated with environmental disasters. The U.S. Coast Guard, for instance, acted quickly after the *Deepwater Horizon* explosion. The initial target was the rescue of the missing crew members on the oil rig. But the more important audiences of this operation were American voters and Congress, the former wishing to assess the damage and determine which political party to praise or blame, and the latter, in combination with U.S. courts, determining appropriate punishment for BP, with extensive follow-on effects for oil exploration and exploitation in U.S. territorial waters. Restoration of fisheries and coastal economies depended on the efficacy of the environmental cleanup, which affected a number of other audiences, including fishermen, sportsmen, and tourists, to name just a few. Indeed, in the long term, these tertiary audiences may well be the most important politically and restoration of the coastal environment the most important issue economically.

Not all audiences are sympathetic to naval missions conducted during peacetime. For example, most Secretaries of the Navy who served during the antislavery squadron's existence hailed from southern states. Because a primary unintended audience comprised

southern plantation owners, who depended on the slave economy, the secretaries were not inclined to suppress the trade. For virtually the entire history of the squadron, the Secretary of the Navy instructed commanders to prioritize the protection of legal American commerce over the suppression of the slave trade. Only when a northerner, Isaac Toucey (1857–61), assumed the post did the primary audience shift to northern abolitionists and the patrols start aggressively targeting the slave trade.

Positive and Negative Objectives and Their Direct and Indirect Effects

The objectives of naval missions can be positive or negative (see table 3). Positive objectives make something happen and so are usually obvious to everyone. These can include facilitating the movement of people or cargo, convoying ships through pirate-infested waters, or promoting research and development to study specific problems. Early in the history of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Naval Observatory was tasked to become the world's timekeeper and principal authority for navigational astronomical data—a useful, positive objective. A nonmilitary humanitarian-aid mission, such as the Belgian relief effort in aid of noncombatants during World War I, can also contribute to a military operation, in such ways as strengthening the impact of a starvation blockade against the enemy.

TABLE 3
Positive and Negative Objectives

CASE STUDY	POSITIVE OBJECTIVES	NEGATIVE OBJECTIVES
Slave Trade	free slaves (means); catch slave traders (means); halt slave trade (ends)	deter further slave trade (means); prevent movement of banned cargo (ends)
Venezuela Deterrence		deter UK and German intervention in Americas (ends)
Starvation Blockade	feed starving (ends/means); make blockade palatable to voters (ends/means)	prevent collateral damage from blockade (means)
Oil Embargo	force Japan to de-escalate (ends)	prevent cargo movement (means); deter Japan from further escalation (ends)
Vietnamese Refugees	save refugees (means)	prevent NV from taking SV navy (ends)
Artificial Reefs	create new reefs (means); dispose of ships economically (ends)	
Sonar and Whales	research on sonar and whales (means)	avoid hurting whales (ends); avoid alienating environmentalists (ends)
Gulf Oil Spill	rescue BP workers (ends); plug well (ends/means); clean up oil (ends)	prevent spread of oil (means)
PLAN Antipiracy	convoy ships (means); catch pirates (ends)	deter piracy (ends)

NV: North Vietnam
SV: South Vietnamese

While positive objectives are usually easy to document, negative objectives are more difficult to discern, because they seek to prevent undesired actions or situations. Who can prove that anything was prevented or that any attempt was even made? Such “non-events” are virtually impossible to measure and so are often difficult to notice, let alone document. President Roosevelt’s “whisper diplomacy,” which deterred German and British military intervention in Venezuela, is a rare, well-documented instance of the achievement of a negative objective. His fleet-in-being had a direct effect of deterring European military intervention in the Americas—a very high-value national security objective for the United States.

An equally important indirect effect in that case was the British prime minister’s reaction to the crisis (see table 4). Afterward, he chose to cultivate close ties with Washington, an approach that promoted the creation of the Anglo-American “special relationship.” While this indirect result was not necessarily sought by Roosevelt at the outset of the crisis, it helped set up the framework of the Anglo-American cooperation that coalesced in World War I, continued through World War II and the Cold War, and arguably remains at the center of American and British foreign policies to this day. Therefore, counterintuitively, indirect effects of negative objectives can be just as

TABLE 4
Direct and Indirect Effects

CASE STUDY	DIRECT	INDIRECT
Slave Trade	slaves; slave owners	press; southern and northern voters
Venezuela Deterrence	British and German governments	British desire to create “special relationship”
Starvation Blockade	hungry noncombatants; UK and German blockade force	U.S., Entente, and Central Powers press and voters; make starvation blockade politically feasible
Oil Embargo	Japanese economy; Japanese people; U.S. businesses	U.S. press and voters; Japanese military
Vietnamese Refugees	refugees; North Vietnam’s loss of South Vietnamese navy	morale of U.S. Navy, participants; U.S.-Philippine relations
Artificial Reefs	economical ship disposal; reef creation	environmentalists; recreationists; voters
Sonar and Whales	whales; sonar improvement	environmentalists; voters; pure research
Gulf Oil Spill	rescue BP personnel; oil removal; save fisheries and shoreline	data for lawsuit vs. BP; improvement in U.S. interagency coordination
PLAN Antipiracy	reduce piracy	reduce insurance rates; improve PLAN proficiency; enhance international cooperation

Note: Indirect effects include all audiences influenced.

important as, if not more important in the long run than, the direct effects from the positive objectives that catch people's attention.

Antipiracy missions too concern the negative objective of deterrence. Faced with a growing piracy threat off the coast of Somalia, China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) began to conduct convoys to achieve the negative objective of deterring Somali pirates from attack. While the primary audience was the commercial shipping, which was directly affected by the success of the convoys, an indirect audience—especially once non-Chinese-flagged ships joined the convoys—was the rest of the world. The international press praised Chinese naval contributions to fighting piracy and China's international image benefited. Increasingly, the PLAN's antipiracy mandate has focused on broad international security objectives to maximize this indirect effect (see table 5).

TABLE 5
Correlation of Positive/Negative Objectives with Direct/Indirect Effects

	DIRECT EFFECTS	INDIRECT EFFECTS
Positive Objective	deliver food to Belgians; rescue refugees (Vietnam); rescue workers, cap well (oil spill); convoy to aid cargo movement (antipiracy); fund R&D (whales)	attract voters (humanitarian or environmental relief); cultivate allies (UK in Belgian relief)
Negative Objective	prevent cargo movement (sanctions); prevent North Vietnam from taking South Vietnamese navy; prevent pollution spread (oil spill)	UK wants "special relationship" with U.S. (Venezuela); prevent environmental damage (oil spill); prevent piracy

R&D: research and development

Deterrence is not always feasible, however. In the early 1940s, an American oil embargo backed up by a fleet-in-being based at Pearl Harbor did not, as had been intended, result in a Japanese withdrawal from China. Rather, it prompted a massive escalation on 7 December 1941—Japan's bombing of Pearl Harbor—along with attacks on British and Dutch interests throughout the Pacific. As one scholar reflects, "It is interesting to speculate whether continuing the oil shipments would have kept Japan out of the war long enough for the deterrent force in the Philippines and in the British Far Eastern Fleet to become completely effective, or whether Japan would have reacted regardless of the oil policy."⁶

Securing the Maritime Commons

One of the Navy's primary missions entails the negative objective of preventing disruption of the global economic order by stopping interference with oceanic transportation. Given that 90 percent of world trade travels by sea, this mission underlies economic prosperity globally. The global commons is often kept open to legal traffic by such non-military missions as elimination of piracy, interdiction of human trafficking, seizure of

banned cargoes, prevention of dumping or leaking of pollutants, and research on the maritime environment and other issues.

Focusing on global problems is not new; for the U.S. Navy it dates back to the early nineteenth century. Initiatives by Matthew Fontaine Maury, appointed in 1842 the first superintendent of the Naval Observatory, transformed that institution from a repository for navigational gear and charts to a center for astronomical and oceanographic observation and for data mining of charts and logbooks on currents, winds, and climate. Much of the U.S. Navy's early research, in such areas as hull design, navigational aids, and weaponry, was specific to its missions, but modern-day research and development encompass communications, climate, modeling, deep-sea mapping, visualization of battle spaces, creation of virtual training environments, and physical and cyberspace probes. Many of these research projects provide advantages well beyond war fighting, indeed well beyond the maritime world writ large, to benefit the civilian economy.

Oil spills of the magnitude of *Deepwater Horizon* threaten, if not contained expeditiously, negative environmental effects for decades to come. According to the World Health Organization, dependence on marine resources doubled in a period of about forty years in the twentieth century: "The average apparent per capita fish consumption increased from about 9 kg per year in the early 1960s to 16 kg in 1997."⁷ With the oceans already under pressure from overfishing and overuse, the maritime environment may be already damaged beyond repair by permanent ecological changes. Therefore, the protection of the seas from further pollution is not a trivial mission.

The sinking of Navy ships provides for recreational diving an alternative to natural reefs, which diving can damage. Environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and Base Action Network are concerned, however, that the use of the ships for artificial reefs might injure the ecosystem by introducing pollutants and spurring the migration of fish from natural to artificial reefs. But surveys conducted on *Spiegel Grove* off Key Largo, Florida, and anecdotal information from such longer-established artificial reefs as the ex-Coast Guard cutters *Duane* and *Bibb* off Key Largo indicate that the vessels have not diminished marine life on existing reef systems. In fact, artificial reefs can relieve the pressure on the surrounding natural reefs from recreational use and stimulate new populations of reef fish.⁸

In the waters off Somalia, Chinese commanding officers and sailors have worked closely with other navies to secure the maritime commons, through frequent bilateral exchanges as well as multi-stakeholder settings. The PLAN has carefully crafted its antipiracy missions to portray abroad its blue-water operations positively. Initially, China's navy escorted only Chinese-flagged ships through the Gulf of Aden, but recently approximately 70 percent of ships in a given Chinese escort flotilla have been foreign flagged. PLAN antipiracy task forces have called in dozens of foreign ports for a variety of purposes,

from core needs, such as replenishment, to diplomatic and friendly initiatives ranging from military parades in Seychelles to the opening of warships for public visits in Malta. Thus, nonmilitary missions can become win-win scenarios for all parties involved.

Win-Win, Lose-Lose, and Mixed-Outcome Operations

Most of the nonmilitary missions discussed in this collection benefited not only the particular nations carrying them out but also many other stakeholders supporting the peaceful use of the global maritime commons. Thus, they were win-win operations for all parties adhering to international law (see table 6). Humanitarian relief, fundamental research, and antipiracy missions all fall into this category.

TABLE 6
Win-Win, Win-Lose, and Mixed-Outcome Operations

CASE STUDY	PROTAGONIST	OPPONENT	GLOBAL AUDIENCE
Slave Trade	win	lose	win
Venezuela Deterrence	win	lose	N/A
Starvation Blockade	win	covert lose	win
Oil Embargo	lose	lose	lose
Vietnamese Refugees	win	lose	win
Artificial Reefs	win	win	win
Sonar and Whales	win	win	win
Gulf Oil Spill	win	win	win
PLAN Antipiracy	win	lose	win

One of the most important humanitarian missions conducted by the U.S. Navy was the post-tsunami Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in Southeast Asia of 2004–2005, in which over thirteen thousand service members on twenty-five U.S. Navy ships delivered essential food, water, and medicine to tens of thousands of desperate survivors.⁹ On a much smaller scale, in June 2013 the PLAN deployed hospital ship *Peace Ark* from Zhejiang Province's Zhoushan Port on HARMONIOUS MISSION 2013, in which the vessel visited Brunei, Maldives, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia, and Cambodia over four months. This ship also participated in a combined medical tour with naval ships from Indonesia and Singapore in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia, on 12 September 2013.¹⁰

Marine research is another win-win. To date, the Navy's Office of Naval Research has supported research for fifty-nine Nobel Prize winners, spanning the fields of chemistry, economics, medicine, and physics (see table 7). Among the first winners were Felix Bloch (physics, 1952), for measurement of magnetic resonance imaging and atomic nuclei, and Georg von Békésy (medicine, 1961), for the biomechanics of hearing, studies

seminal to unraveling underwater sound impacts. The Office of Naval Research assisted the *Trieste* deep-sea dives and the development of the deep-diving submersible *Alvin* and experimental underwater habitat Sea Lab, and it funded the remotely operated seafloor vehicle *Jason* and the hunt for *Titanic*. Finally, it has a growing program in unmanned undersea and aerial vehicles deployed for basic research, as well as military uses.

TABLE 7

Office of Naval Research—Supported Nobel Prize Winners, 1952–2010

Felix Bloch	Physics	1952	magnetic measurement in atomic nuclei
Linus Pauling	Chemistry	1954	chemical bond's application to the elucidation of the structure of complex substances
Severo Ochoa	Medicine	1959	synthesis of ribonucleic acid
Donald Glaser	Physics	1960	invention of the bubble chamber
Georg von Békésy	Medicine	1961	explanation of the physical events that take place within the human ear during hearing
Melvin Calvin	Chemistry	1961	explanation of the second stage of photosynthesis
Robert Hofstadter	Physics	1961	electron scattering in atomic nuclei
Charles H. Townes	Physics	1964	invention of the maser and the laser
George Wald	Medicine	1967	identification of visual pigments and their chemical precursors
Haldan Hartline	Medicine	1967	impulse coding in the visual receptors
Hans Bethe	Physics	1967	nuclear reactions, especially energy production in stars
Har Gobind Khorana	Medicine	1968	synthesis of well-defined nucleic acids
Christian Anfinsen	Chemistry	1972	ribonuclease, connection between the amino acid sequence and the biologically active conformation
Robert Schrieffer Leon Cooper	Physics	1972	theory of superconductivity
Gerald Edelman	Medicine	1972	chemical structure of antibodies
Kenneth Arrow	Economics	1972	general economic equilibrium theory and welfare theory
Paul J. Flory	Chemistry	1974	physical chemistry of macromolecules
William Lipscomb	Chemistry	1976	structure of boranes
Herbert Simon	Economics	1978	decision-making process within economic organizations
Peter Mitchell	Chemistry	1978	biological energy transfer through the formulation of the chemiosmotic theory
Herbert C. Brown	Chemistry	1979	use of boron-containing compounds in the organic synthesis
David H. Hubel	Medicine	1981	discoveries concerning the "visual system"
Roald Hoffmann	Chemistry	1981	course of chemical reactions

TABLE 7

Office of Naval Research–Supported Nobel Prize Winners, 1952–2010, continued

Nicolaas Bloembergen Arthur Schawlow	Physics	1981	development of laser spectroscopy
Kenneth Wilson	Physics	1982	critical phenomena in connection with phase transitions
William A. Fowler	Physics	1983	nuclear reactions in the formation of the chemical elements in the universe
Herbert A. Hauptman Jerome Karle	Chemistry	1985	direct methods for the determination of crystal structures
John C. Polanyi Yuan T. Lee Dudley Herschbach	Chemistry	1986	dynamics of chemical elementary processes
Norman F. Ramsey	Physics	1989	atomic precision spectroscopy
Hans Dehmelt	Physics	1989	development of atomic precision spectroscopy
Rudolph A. Marcus	Chemistry	1992	theory of electron transfer reactions in chemical systems
George Olah	Chemistry	1994	carbocation chemistry
Richard E. Smalley	Chemistry	1996	carbon atoms bound in the form of a ball
William D. Phillips	Physics	1997	cooling and trapping of atoms with laser light
Daniel C. Tsui Horst L. Störmer	Physics	1998	quantum fluid with fractionally charged excitations
Walter Kohn	Chemistry	1998	density-functional theory
Ahmed Zewail	Chemistry	1999	transition states of chemical reactions using femtosecond spectroscopy
Eric Kandel	Medicine	2000	signal transduction in the nervous system
Hideki Shirakawa Alan G. MacDiarmid Alan J. Heeger	Chemistry	2000	discovery and development of conductive polymers
Herbert Kroemer	Physics	2000	heterostructures in high-speed electronics and optoelectronics
Wolfgang Ketterle Carl Wieman Eric Cornell	Physics	2001	Bose-Einstein condensation in dilute gases of alkali atoms
John Fenn	Chemistry	2002	identification/structure analyses of biological macromolecules
Paul Lauterbur	Medicine	2003	magnetic resonance imaging
John L. Hall Theodor W. Hänsch	Physics	2005	laser-based precision spectroscopy
Robert H. Grubbs Richard R. Schrock	Chemistry	2005	metathesis method in organic synthesis
Andre Geim Konstantin Novoselov	Physics	2010	two-dimensional material graphene

Source: Darlene R. Ketten, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, Massachusetts.

Antipiracy patrols are a win-win both for those conducting the mission and for shipping companies globally—although they are, of course, a “lose” for the pirates. The *Liberation Army Daily*, the PLA’s mouthpiece, has described the PLAN as having created by cooperation in the Gulf of Aden an “effective information network with over 50 war-ships from more than 20 countries and organizations through information resource sharing in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast.”¹¹ There are both realist and idealist reasons behind China’s antipiracy operations. The former include the “desire to protect Chinese shipping, expand China’s influence, and to provide opportunities for realistic training that will enhance the PLAN’s capabilities in military operations other than war.” But the latter involve China’s desire to contribute meaningfully to regional security.¹²

Economic win-win scenarios include using naval vessels to create reefs, thereby disposing of old ships cheaply while promoting marine life and recreation. There can be socioeconomic benefits from tourism for communities that host artificial reefs. For example, with the *Vandenberg* and the *Spiegel Grove* sinkings, the U.S. Navy, the Maritime Administration, state and local governments, local business organizations (e.g., chambers of commerce and tourism boards), and advocacy groups were all involved. The *Spiegel Grove* project has recovered most of its costs significantly ahead of schedule, owing in large part to increased tourism from the new diving destination.

Not all win-win scenarios are perceived as such at the time, particularly if there are competing audiences. For example, during the early nineteenth century the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy shared the goal of eliminating the oceanic transport of slaves. The Royal Navy had an active and well-established West Africa Squadron. But the U.S. government, because of political sensitivities from British searches in the lead-up to the War of 1812, would not allow the British to search American-flagged vessels. Commo. William Edmonstone of the Royal Navy West African Squadron noted, “As vessels engaged in the Slave Trade almost invariably fly the American flag, and our cruisers are prohibited from in any way interfering with them, of course we are to a very serious extent powerless in putting a check on the trade.”¹³ Thus, American political sensitivity about ship searches undermined what would otherwise have been a clear win for both countries.

Some operations produce public win-win scenarios that are in fact, behind the scenes, win-lose in nature. Herbert Hoover used the fact that his humanitarian relief efforts covertly assisted the blockade of the Central Powers to leverage British support for his efforts, including the free use of British shipping. He also convinced the Germans that if they did not let him feed the noncombatants, Germany would be required by international law to do so itself. Thus, Hoover presented the humanitarian aid for Belgium and northern France as a win for both parties. However, his private papers show quite clearly that the humanitarian aid allowed Britain to fine-tune its blockade against the Central

Powers so as to affect just their populations, without starving the civilians of occupied countries. The so-called starvation blockade by the Royal Navy proved highly effective: “By the end of World War I there is no question that the German and Austrian populations were suffering as a result of the blockade.”¹⁴ In reality, the Belgian relief effort was really a win-lose scenario, in that it assisted the blockaders to defeat the Central Powers.

A win-lose scenario resulted from the rescue of refugees during the final days of the Vietnam War, when thirty-two South Vietnamese naval ships, some in barely seaworthy condition and carrying more than thirty thousand refugees, crossed the South China Sea to the Philippines. The naval escort not only saved the South Vietnamese naval officers and their families from possible persecution but prevented the remaining naval vessels from falling into the hands of the conquering North Vietnamese forces, a clear strategic win for the United States and loss for North Vietnam. For the Philippines it was a win as well: to obtain permission for the ships to land, Ambassador William Sullivan convinced a reluctant President Ferdinand Marcos to give the refugees safe haven in return for the transfer of many of the South Vietnamese naval ships to the Philippine navy.

There is only one lose-lose case study in this collection—the American oil embargo against Japan. Rather than de-escalate the war in China or deter war against the West, the embargo precipitated the escalation of regional wars in Europe and China into a global war. The costs were catastrophic for all sides and produced an outcome antithetical to both American and Japanese interests. By war’s end the Japanese had eviscerated the Nationalist forces in China, positioning the communists to win the long Chinese civil war. If there is a lesson to be learned concerning deterrent measures, it would be the requirement for a careful calculation of the value of the undesired behavior to the opponent. Rightly or wrongly, the Japanese government considered prosecution of the war in China to be a matter of regime survival and so felt that it was on “death ground” in late 1941.

Dual-Use Naval Equipment and Cost Efficiency

Given that navies can serve wartime and peacetime missions, the ability to do both promotes cost efficiency (see table 8). The naval capabilities associated with embargo enforcement, reduction of collateral damage from blockades, mitigation of environmental disasters, and fleet-level deterrence enable cost-effective strategies for the United States. Beyond the economies associated with dual use with respect to wartime and peacetime missions, its war-fighting capabilities and nonmilitary missions allow the U.S. Navy to put a combined hard-power and soft-power squeeze on potential enemies, either to predispose to or to deter action.

TABLE 8
Soft- and Hard-Power Capabilities

CASE STUDY	SOFT POWER	HARD POWER
Slave Trade	humanitarian relief	naval task force
Venezuela Deterrence		fleet-in-being
Starvation Blockade	humanitarian relief	focused blockade effects
Oil Embargo	economic sanction	fleet-in-being
Vietnamese Refugees	humanitarian relief	naval escort
Artificial Reefs	environmental protection	
Sonar and Whales	basic research	
Gulf Oil Spill	environmental protection; rescue of workers; disaster relief	use of military planes to fly in extra booms to contain oil spill
PLAN Antipiracy	image building	naval task force

Naval ships are particularly well suited to nonmilitary operations by virtue of these dual-use capabilities. The same naval equipment that can support a war can also support humanitarian missions, patrol operations, or search and rescue. A proficient navy represents a spectrum of capabilities that can be applied in both war and peace. For instance, following the *Deepwater Horizon* disaster the shortage of booms to retain the drifting oil was so severe that military aircraft flew in extra booms from Alaska. In recent years, policy and planning work at the federal level has made an important leap from scenario-based planning for each potential type of event (resulting in reams of planning documents for particular scenarios ranging from pandemics to terrorism) to capabilities-based planning, wherein capabilities are examined and refined to deliver what is needed as circumstances arise. Capabilities-based planning has resulted in the more economical integration of much-needed Department of Defense capabilities into the existing domestic response structure, all the while observing the legal limitations on domestic use of the military.

Many nonmilitary missions involve saving lives and so are extremely time sensitive. Either people are reached in time and saved, or they perish. Such missions involve refugees at sea, people blown overboard from oil rigs, hungry noncombatants, and innocents threatened by pirates. Such problems are solved either quickly or not at all, so speed can be essential. The early-nineteenth-century antislavery patrols were such a mission; they constituted law enforcement, not war fighting, but warships conducted them quite effectively, especially as steam-driven units became available. Similarly, off the coast of Somalia today, *Qingdao*, a Type 052 Luhu-class destroyer commissioned in 1996, served as the PLAN's eleventh successive escort task force's command ship.

High-tech vessels can be assigned relatively easily to nonmilitary missions, thus allowing governments to get the most effective and efficient use out of modern navies. If

wartime is supposed to be the exception and peacetime the rule, nonmilitary uses of navies might actually be the most frequently called-for missions and therefore deserving of budgeting attention. Even more importantly, having overpowering naval force on call in times of state-to-state tension can provide sea powers enormous diplomatic leverage to de-escalate crises, even while remaining largely outside public view. Both of these points argue for retaining a large navy composed of many capable ships rather than downsizing or building ships with lesser capabilities. Given the cost of warfare, the ability to avoid war is worth an expensive military force structure. World War II made clear the false economy of failing to maintain military forces in Europe and Asia sufficient to deter expansionist ambitions.

The military use of navies remains their primary purpose, because of the horrendous stakes involved in wars, which one enters with the navy one has, not with the navy one wishes one had. As a former Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Gary Roughead, has made clear, “I am also a firm believer that the hard power can soften up, but the soft power normally cannot harden up.”¹⁵ In wartime, naval coalitions will fail if they lack the naval capabilities to get soldiers and supplies into the theater, to protect overseas trade, or to shut down the commons for enemy use. In peacetime, these naval assets can inspect ships for contraband, act as fleets-in-being to dissuade attack, and conduct a wide range of humanitarian missions.

Many nonmilitary operations involving naval task forces or fleets-in-being can help keep ships in readiness for war. Even while performing useful missions of a nonmilitary nature, crews continue to train for duties essential to warfare. If these humanitarian missions can supplement training exercises, and in particular if some activities turn out to be even more useful than training exercises, they will be viewed in a different financial light—that is, as maximizing tax dollars by incorporating dual-use missions and training.

While the term “MOOTW” dates only to the 1990s, the U.S. Navy has a nearly two-hundred-year history of sponsoring nonmilitary missions that affect many aspects of our lives. After the Cold War ended, the U.S. military developed the “3/1” strategy, in which a big circle called “major combat operations” encompassed several smaller inner circles—stability operations, the global war on terrorism, and homeland defense. This framework was an important first step in the creation of a new maritime strategy. These smaller circles also included counterterrorism, peacekeeping, antipiracy operations, and even humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.¹⁶

The Navy’s March 2015 maritime strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, provides for humanitarian missions: “Naval power projection capabilities also

facilitate other elements of ‘smart power’ missions in the form of humanitarian assistance and disaster response. . . . Positioned to respond rapidly to disasters in key regions, forward naval forces working with allies and partners are ready to save lives, provide immediate relief, and set the conditions for effective civilian response without relying on damaged or inaccessible ports or airfields ashore. This function supports the naval missions of defending the homeland, responding to crises, deterring conflict, defeating aggression, and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster response.”¹⁷ Working with allies and coalition partners is key for success. As Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy, points out in his preface to the maritime strategy, one of the primary missions of America’s sea services is “supporting an ally with humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.”¹⁸

Modern navies should be envisioned not as comprising either military or nonmilitary capabilities but rather as being extraordinarily flexible “hard power” platforms with an infinite array of “hard” and “soft” extension packages at their disposal. While in the past the U.S. Navy has taken the lead in many soft-power missions, in recent years other global navies, such as China’s, have performed a wide range of nonmilitary operations as well, such as patrolling sea-lanes against pirates, searching for missing airliners, or conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation in Yemen. These activities break the traditional mold of what most people think of as primary missions. In fact, navies can be important providers of soft-power solutions across a spectrum of natural and man-made threat scenarios ranging from environmental disasters to the outbreak of war.

Notes

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this essay are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Navy Department, or the Naval War College.

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