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
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中国海事研究所
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NOTES: 16



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**Admiral Yuan Huazhi Removed as the PLAN's
Political Commissar**



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CMSI NOTE #16 /// 4 SEPTEMBER 2025

Confirmed: ADM Yuan Huazhi Removed as the PLAN's Political Commissar

Andrew S. Erickson¹

Key Takeaways

- An authoritative source has confirmed what many had long suspected: Admiral Yuan Huazhi is no longer serving as the Political Commissar of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). As the chief political officer, the Political Commissar shares responsibility with the PLAN Commander for leading the service.
- While the details of ADM Yuan's departure are unknown, it is very likely that he was a victim of the massive purge within China's military that began in mid-2023. Unlike other senior PLA officers implicated in the purge, however, ADM Yuan's status has not been publicly disclosed.
- ADM Yuan appears to have been replaced by VADM Leng Shaojie. In early January, Leng was identified as the Secretary of the PLAN Party Committee, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organization that administers the PLAN. The Secretary of the Party Committee is a post historically held by the service's Political Commissar.
- VADM Leng is a career PLA Army (PLAA) officer with no experience in the PLAN. The practice of transferring political officers between services is common in China's military. Another recent PLAN Political Commissar (2014–17), ADM Miao Hua, was likewise transferred from the PLAA to PLAN. Miao is currently under investigation for alleged "serious disciplinary violations."
- VADM Leng spent much of his career assigned to northeast China's former Shenyang Military Region. Among his recent appointments, Leng served as the Political Commissar of the PLAA Headquarters Logistics Department (starting in 2018) and the Deputy Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command (2021).
- Although it is unclear when VADM Leng was transferred to the PLAN, PRC media sources show him in a Navy uniform as early as December 2024.

Introduction

Amid new evidence of bureaucratic churn, one mystery appears at least partially solved: PLAN Political Commissar (海军政治委员/PC) three-star Admiral (海军上将) Yuan Huazhi (袁华智),

missing for a year and counting, seems to have been replaced in some capacity by two-star Vice Admiral (海军中将) Leng Shaojie (冷少杰). An authoritative PLAN article describes VADM Leng as the PLAN Party Secretary (党委书记), a role that has historically been held by the PC (CMSI is unaware of any exceptions). Leng has not had the formal ceremony for concurrent promotion to Theater-Grade Leader and three-star Admiral that would normally precede PC status (as his predecessor Yuan achieved in 2019).² But neither has anyone else of late: unusually, no three-star promotion ceremonies of any kind have yet been held in 2025.³ This suggests that Leng's pre-rank-and-grade promotion status might be broadly akin to an "Acting" or a "Performing the Duties Of" (PTDO) role within the U.S. Department of Defense, and U.S. government more generally. This is what the PLA calls a "policy promotion" (政策升级).⁴ Whatever his precise bureaucratic position, Leng seems to have assumed Yuan's duties as the Party's foremost overseer of the Navy.

A Revealing Meeting

Among the rare recent articles of *People's Navy* that mentions senior PLAN leadership, one in particular stands out. The 6 January 2025 front-page banner-headline article describes a 2–3 January 2025 meeting held in Beijing by the PLAN Party Standing Committee (PSC).⁵ There, senior PLAN officers studied Xi Jinping speeches, reviewed their 2024 work, and issued tasks for 2025. Yuan Huazhi was not present; PLAN Party Secretary Leng Shaojie delivered the work report on 2 January. As PLAN Commander, Admiral Hu Zhongming also gave a speech as PLAN Party Deputy Secretary.⁶

The article cites several challenges facing the Party in 2025. First, "the changing world situation is evolving at an accelerated pace" (世界变局加速演进). This is a clear reference to the "changes not seen in a century," which also offer China a chance to rise and improve its standing and leverage significantly vis-à-vis America and the West. Second, "the competitive dynamics at sea have grown even more complex" (海上博弈更趋复杂). Third, "the counter-corruption campaign is deepening" (正风反腐纵深推进)—both a general trend and a potential reference to Admiral Yuan Huazhi's downfall.

Elaborating on the last point, the article cites a need to prioritize anti-corruption scrutiny over the "few key people" or "few key members" (紧盯关键少数正风气) who have the greatest impact on the force, i.e., leaders like Admiral Yuan. This focus on scrutinizing the "few key people" is one of Xi's anti-corruption principles.⁷ According to the article's last paragraph, during the two-day event the PLAN PSC conducted a "public pledge not to engage in corrupt behavior" (海军党委常委作廉政公开承诺), or "public integrity pledge."

The article references the dozen PLAN Party Committee Members by their party, not military, roles—and hence does not refer to Leng Shaojie as the PLAN PC. However, in all other issues of *People's Navy*, and in all other cases, of which CMSI is aware, the senior PLAN political officer serves as Party Secretary (党委书记/PS) of the PLAN Party Committee; just as the PLAN Commander always serves as Deputy Party Secretary (DPS).⁸ This combination reflects both the PLA's dual command structure and the PSC's dual political-administrative role, the latter aspect of which includes man, train, and equip responsibilities. The pattern is mirrored throughout the PLA: the roles of PS and DPS are traditionally occupied by the Political Commissar and

Commander, respectively, within all military units large enough to establish a standing committee—the highest authoritative body at a given level.⁹

The PLAN PSC’s roughly-dozen members are particularly influential in shaping the PLAN’s development trajectory. More technically sophisticated and proficient as well as operationally and diversely experienced than their predecessors, they are better able to execute their man, train, and equip authorities, despite the politically sensitive environment.¹⁰ Other PLAN PSC members include the PLAN Deputy Political Commissar; three PLAN deputy commanders, including VADM Ma Lixin; the Chief of Staff (COS)—formerly VADM Li Hanjun until he was removed ca. 27 June 2025;¹¹ and the directors of the PLAN’s Political Work, Logistics, and Equipment Departments. The Secretary of the PLAN’s Discipline Inspection Commission (DIC), until recently VADM Liu Xunyan, is the only addition to PSC membership since Xi’s 2016 reforms, indicating continuity in the PLAN’s administrative structure.¹² The article lists the then-current names of the next ten PLAN PSC members after VADM Leng Shaojie and ADM Hu Zhongming, in protocol order: VADM Li Yujie (李玉杰), VADM Cui Yuzhong (崔玉忠), VADM Liu Zizhu (刘子柱), VADM Ma Lixin (马立新), VADM Cheng Jian (程坚), VADM Cheng Dongfang (程东方), VADM Li Hanjun (李汉军)—since dismissed, current replacement unknown—VADM Liu Bencheng (刘本成), RADM Wang Tianlin (王天林), and RADM Wang Hongli (王红理). The below table combines that listing with additional open-source knowledge to attempt an overall framing of the committee’s membership as of that meeting.

Table 1: PLAN Party Standing Committee Personnel (as of 6 January 2025)

| Standing Committee Role | Name | Rank | Date of Birth | Grade | (Assumed) Billet |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------|------|---------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Secretary | Leng Shaojie (冷少杰) | VADM | 1963 | TC Leader | (Acting) PC |
| Deputy Secretary | Hu Zhongming (胡中明) | ADM | 1964 | | Commander |
| Member | Li Yujie (李玉杰) | VADM | 1962 | TC Deputy Leader | Deputy Commander |
| Member | Cui Yuzhong (崔玉忠) | VADM | 1964 | | |
| Member | Liu Zizhu (刘子柱) ¹³ | VADM | 1958 | | |
| Member | Ma Lixin (马立新) | VADM | 1966 | | |
| Member | Cheng Jian (程坚) | VADM | 1963 | | Deputy Political Commissar |
| Member | Cheng Dongfang (程东方) | VADM | Unknown | | Secretary, DIC |
| Member | Li Hanjun (李汉军) | VADM | 1965 | | Chief of Staff, Staff Department |
| Member | Liu Bencheng (刘本成) | VADM | 1967 | TC Deputy Leader | Director, Political Work Department |
| Member | Wang Tianlin (王天林) ¹⁴ | RADM | Unknown | Corps Leader | Director, Logistics Department |
| Member | Wang Hongli (王红理) ¹⁵ | RADM | 1966 | | Director, Equipment Department |

In addition to VADM Leng and his role, a particularly important addition revealed in the *People's Navy* article is the PLAN PSC's new DIC Secretary, VADM Cheng Dongfang (程东方). Per protocol order, the DIC Secretary comes immediately before the COS. Cheng's legal education up through the master's degree level at Peking University and China University of Political Science and Law and his previous experience as a military prosecutor equipped him to handle the discipline inspection role. His experience deftly handling legal and public affairs issues for the PLA's Hong Kong garrison may have further enhanced his skillset and career.¹⁶ The CCP's anti-corruption and discipline enforcement body inside China's armed forces, the DIC ensures political loyalty, investigates corruption, and reports not only to the CMC but also to the national Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the CCP's top internal-control, discipline-enforcement, and anti-corruption organ. Cheng, like Leng, is a member of the CCP's 20th CCDI.¹⁷ The DIC is thus one of the strongest levers Xi has to control the PLA and eliminate disloyal or corrupt officers, and Cheng has a critical role to play in this regard within the PLAN.



Figure 1: PLAN PSC DIC Secretary VADM Cheng Dongfang (CCTV Xinwen Lianbo, 8 January 2025)¹⁸

Yuan's Year-Plus Disappearance

Yuan garnered few public appearances and mentions during summer 2024, and none since 7 September 2024. Given the highly visible public role of a PC, and the number of regular and pop-up end-of-the-year events at which a service PC such as Yuan should normally be present,¹⁹ his absence seems validation of the previous rumors that he has been under investigation for “disciplinary violations.” Yuan might possibly have been rolled up in the larger investigation that has already been officially confirmed to include Admiral Miao Hua, who served as the PLAN PC

(December 2014–September 2017) and then as the Director of the Central Military Commission (CMC)’s Political Work Department (October 2017–November 2024).²⁰



Figure 2: Admiral Yuan Huazhi (front row, third from right) was last seen at Military-Wide Special Seminar for Senior Military Cadres (CCTV-1: 7 September 2024, 22:13).²¹

Leng’s Exceptional Army Ascension

Like his predecessor twice removed, Miao Hua, Leng had a meteoric career as a PLA Army (PLAA) officer on the PC track before recently transferring to the Navy in the same capacity. Unlike Miao, he has remained in political favor, at least through the beginning of this year. A work horse, not a show horse, and always a quick study, Leng appears to have advanced through a wide range of positions with talent and diligence. Even as a PC generalist, he constantly led by example, striving to educate himself about specific warfare areas for which his colleagues and charges were responsible and supporting realistic instruction and training accordingly.

Leng Shaojie is credited as one of multiple military figures bringing honor to the Leng surname.²² Leng was born on 16 April 1963, in Lishu, Jilin Province. His hometown lies within the former Shenyang Military Region, the PLA’s primary northeastern command from its establishment in 1955 until its dissolution through Xi’s reforms in February 2016. Leng joined the PLA in October 1982. It remains unclear whether he attended an academy or instead obtained a direct promotion as an officer. Leng established himself initially in the Shenyang Military Region, where he spent much of the early 2000s—and perhaps even his entire career before reporting to Beijing in 2018. His slightly unorthodox early trajectory included serving as Deputy Director, Political Department, 3rd Division, then PC of an armored regiment, and subsequently Director, Political Department, 3rd Division.²³

In December 2001, Leng was promoted from the position of Deputy Director, Political Department to PC, 3rd Armored Division (MUCD 65571) in Siping, Jilin.²⁴ By April 2005, Leng had been PC of an unidentified armored regiment for more than three years. He was consistently credited with diligence and innovation.²⁵ Leng, his Party Committee, and his regiment all won awards for reforms, regulations, and training improvements.²⁶ In August 2006, Leng was identified as the Director of the Political Department organizing an innovative exercise in the 3rd Armored Division.²⁷ A December 2006 article identifies Leng as a Senior Colonel (SCOL).²⁸ He excelled in the Shenyang Military Region's first division-level command officer quality competition. The only political officer mentioned among the winners, he tied for first place with command-track counterparts.²⁹ In 2008, Leng coauthored an article articulating how Party Committees could best help the PLA prepare for future informatized warfare.³⁰ Leng appeared to retain his role as PC of the 3rd Armored Division in early May 2011, when he was referenced in his related role of Party Secretary.³¹

In what was until 2016 the Shenyang Military Region and subsequently the Northern Theater Command with its similar geographic core, Leng may subsequently have served as PC of the PLAA's 115th Division in Yingkou, Liaoning, subordinate to the 39th Group Army; and Deputy Director of the 39th Group Army's Political Department. Following Xi's sweeping military reforms, on 28 July 2016, Leng was promoted to the rank of Major General (MGEN).³² In July 2018, Leng attained Corps Leader-grade and became the PC of the PLAA Headquarters Logistics Department in Beijing.³³ In that capacity, he supported Lunar New Year charitable activities in February 2019.³⁴



Figure 3: LTG Leng Shaojie (Circled) Sits Behind General Li Wei (李伟) at Military-Wide Ideological and Political Education Innovation Training Session on 12 October 2021 (CCTV-7, 19:47, at 00:51)³⁵

In September 2021, Leng was promoted to Lieutenant General (LTG)³⁶ and was triple-hatted as DPC, Central Theater Command (CTC); Director, CTC Political Work Department (PWD); and Secretary, CTC Party Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission, each of which are Theater Command Deputy Leader-grade billets.³⁷ He likely continued to serve in a triple-hatted capacity though at least May 2024, when he was identified as Director, CTC and Seven Provinces (Municipalities) Military Rights Protection Cooperation Center (中部战区和七省(市)涉军维权协作中心). Given the public role of PCs, this last role appears to represent a bridging function between the CTC and the respective local governments.³⁸

In September 2022, Leng was listed as a member of the CCP's 20th National Congress.³⁹ In October 2022, he was listed as a member of 20th CCDI of the CCP.⁴⁰ On 24 October 2022, Leng attended a Military Cadre Leadership Meeting (军队领导干部会议) in Beijing at which Xi gave a speech. Top PLA officials attended, including several who have since been expelled from the Party or otherwise purged and punished: Second CMC Vice Chairman General He Weidong, Defense Minister and former PLA Rocket Force Commander General Wei Fenghe, and Admiral Miao Hua. Amid his usual array of priority themes, Xi emphasized that the CMC personnel decisions made during the 20th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC)'s First Plenary Session were an “important political arrangement” (重大政治安排)—made with CCP, national, and military affairs considerations in mind.⁴¹

Leng's Navy Onboarding

In December 2024, Leng wore a PLAN uniform to PLAA PC General Chen Hui's promotion ceremony.⁴² This is possibly the earliest indication of Leng's transfer from the PLAA to the PLAN.



Figures 4 and 5: In the First Known Public Indication of His Transfer to the Navy, VADM Leng Wears a PLAN Uniform to PLAA PC General Chen Hui's Promotion Ceremony (CCTV-4, 23 December 2024, 2:07)⁴³

On 6 January 2025, as mentioned previously, Leng was identified as the Secretary of the PLAN Party Committee's Standing Committee. He was also seen in a January 2025 CCTV broadcast.⁴⁴



Figure 6: Two-Star VADM Leng Shaojie (Circled) Attends an Expanded Meeting of the CMC's Discipline Inspection Commission (CCTV-7, 10 January 2025, 0:50)

Conclusion

After months of uncertainty, an authoritative source confirms that ADM Yuan Huazhi was removed from his post as the PLAN Political Commissar and apparently replaced by a career PLAA officer, VADM Leng Shaojie. Cross-service transfers of political officers such as VADM Leng align with Xi-era patterns of tightening Party control over the military, anti-“corruption” initiatives, and reinforcing political reliability in key service commands. The PLAN has heretofore progressed amid political churn because it is run in large part by its Party Standing Committee, no member of which dominates and hence no member of which is irreplaceable. In an era of PLAN Commanders having progressively less power and influence, the PSC’s collective importance has grown commensurately. Of particular significance in these sensitive times, the PSC is responsible for managing personnel, including appointing and removing cadres per central Party guidance. For all these reasons, in the period of Admiral Yuan Huazhi’s disappearance and VADM Leng’s participation—whatever its precise nature, the PLAN PSC may now be facing its greatest test in recent years.



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Appendix: PLA Grade Structure

Adapted with permission from Frank Miller, Tung Ho, Kenneth Allen, and Arran Hope, eds. *The People's Liberation Army as Organization Volume 3.0*. (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation; Vienna: Exovera, 2025), 508–10.

Under the current system since 1988, every PLA organization and officer is assigned a grade from platoon level to TC Leader to designate their position in the military hierarchy. Those officers from TC Leader-grade organizations, such as the CMC Joint Staff Department, Political Work Department, and Discipline Inspection Commission, and serve on the CMC as Members, are assigned the grade of CMC Member. As part of the PLA's 11th force reduction, which began in December 2015, the Military Region (MR) leader and MR deputy leader grades were renamed TC leader and deputy leader grades, respectively. In addition, as of 2007, all officers began wearing ribbons that show their current grade and number of years served. However, the PLA changed its ribbon system in 2023. As shown in Table 2 (below), each grade from TC deputy leader down has two assigned ranks, while some ranks, such as major general, can be assigned to up to four grades. Unlike the U.S. military, which assigns numbers to grades, such as an O-1 to O-10, the PLA does not assign numbers to its grades except for special technical officers. On average, officers up to the rank of senior colonel are promoted in grade every three years, while they are promoted in rank approximately every four years. Previously, personnel rarely received a rank and grade promotion at the same time; however, starting in late 2020, officers have generally received simultaneous three-star and TC Leader-grade promotions at the same time. However, as with many PLA practices, there are always exceptions to the rule. Accordingly, the TC Leader grade now only has one assigned rank (three-star) instead of two ranks (two-star and three-star).

Table 2: PLA's 15-Grade and 10-Rank Structure, 1988–Present

| Grade | Primary Rank | Secondary Rank | Special Technical Officers | Civilian Cadre |
|---|--------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| CMC Chairman (军委主席) Vice Chairmen (军委副主席) | N/A GEN / ADM (上将) | N/A | N/A | |
| CMC Member (军委委员) | GEN / ADM (上将) | N/A | Grade 1 | |
| TC Leader (正战区职) Former MR Leader (正大军区职) | GEN / ADM (上将) | N/A | Grade 2 | MR (TC) Deputy Leader Equivalent 按副大军区职待遇 |
| TC Deputy Leader (副战区职) Former MR Deputy Leader (副大军区职) | LTG / VADM (中将) | MG / RADM (少将) | Grade 3 | Corps Leader Equivalent (按正军 职待遇) |
| Corps Leader (正军职) | MG / RADM (少将) | LTG / VADM (中将) | Grade 4 | Corps Deputy Leader Equivalent (按副军职待遇) |
| Corps Deputy Leader (副军职) | MG / RADM (少将) | SCOL / SCPT (大校) | Grade 5 | Department Leader (正局级) |
| Division Leader (正师职) | SCOL / SCPT (大校) | MG / RADM (少将) | Grade 6 | Department Deputy Leader (副局 级) |
| Division Deputy Leader (副师 职)/ (Brigade Leader) | COL / CPT (上 校) | SCOL / SCPT (大校) | Grade 7 | Office Leader (正处级) |
| Regiment Leader (正团 职) / (Brigade Deputy Leader) | COL / CPT (上 校) | LTC / CDR (中校) | Grade 8 | Office Deputy Leader (副处级) |
| Regiment Deputy Leader (副团职) | LTC / CDR (中 校) | MAJ / LCDR (少校) | Grade 9 | Section Leader (正科级) |
| Battalion Leader (正营职) | MAJ / LCDR (少校) | LTC / CDR (中校) | Grade 10 | Section Deputy Leader (副科级) |
| Battalion Deputy Leader (副营职) | CPT / LT (上 尉) | MAJ / LCDR (少校) | Grade 11 | Grade 1 Staff Member (一级科员) |
| Company Leader (正连职) | CPT / LT (上 尉) | 1LT / LTJG (中尉) | Grade 12 | Grade 2 Staff Member (二级科员) |
| Company Deputy Leader (副连职) | 1LT / LTJG (中 尉) | CPT / LT (上尉) | Grade 13 | Worker / Clerk (办事员) |
| Platoon Leader (排职) | 2LT / ENS (少 尉) | 1LT / LTJG (中尉) | Grade 14 | |

¹ The views expressed here, which are based solely on open-source research, are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent the views, policies, or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or its components, to include the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College. The author thanks Christopher Sharman, Ryan Martinson, Ken Allen, Julia Famularo, Jeffrey Becker, Brian Waidelich, and TextOre for valuable inputs. He is solely responsible for the resulting analysis and has made every effort to verify all information mentioned herein. Please kindly bring any errors to his attention via <https://www.andrewerickson.com/contact/>.

² Kenneth W. Allen, *Assessment of Simultaneous PLA 3-Star and Theater Command Leader-grade Promotions since 2019* (Maxwell, Alabama: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 8 July 2024), <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/3826912/assessment-of-simultaneous-pla-3-star-and-theater-command-leader-grade-promotio/>; Kenneth W. Allen, "Reassessment of the CMC Member grade in the PLA," China Aerospace Studies Institute, 29 July 2024,

<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/3850406/reassessment-of-the-cmc-member-grade-in-the-pla/>.

³ The PLA has had 40 three-star promotion ceremonies since 1988, including: 2022: January (7) and September (1); 2023: January (1), June (2), July (2), and December (2); 2024: March (2), July (1), and December (1). However, there have not been any promotions/ceremonies during 2025 thus far. Reasons remain unclear but it suggests turbulence in PLA leadership under Xi.

⁴ In the U.S. system, an Acting official has full legal authority; a PTDO official only has delegated, partial authority.

⁵ “海军党委十三届四次全体（扩大）会议在京召开，打好实现建军一百年奋斗目标攻坚战，推进海军强军胜战事业再上台阶，党委书记记少杰作工作报告 党委副书记胡中明讲话” [The Fourth Plenary Session (Enlarged) of the 13th Navy Party Committee Was Convened in Beijing. Winning the Decisive Battle to Achieve the Centennial Military Building Goal. Advancing the Navy's Strong Military and Victory-Oriented Endeavors to New Heights. Party Committee Secretary Leng Shaojie Delivered the Work Report, and Deputy Party Committee Secretary Hu Zhongming Delivered a Speech.], 人民海军 [People's Navy], 6 January 2025, 1.

⁶ A subtle shift in tone may bespeak present political turbulence. At previous years' annual meetings, the leading principals would be credited with delivering personally authoritative guidance in their speeches. Example: “袁华智明强调。。。 ” [“Yuan Huazhi emphasized...”]. At this year's meeting, pronouncements were ascribed to the event itself: “会议指出。。。 ” [“The meeting pointed out...”].

⁷ For more on this concept, see 傅达林 [Fu Dalin], “依法治军战略研究” [A Strategic Study of Governing the Military by Law], 中国军事科学 [China Military Science], no. 2 (April 2022), p. 15.

⁸ At least as far back as 2010 in *People's Navy*, the PLAN PC always appears as PLAN Party Secretary. Other examples include Yuan Huazhi in September 2022, Qin Shengxiang (秦生祥) in November 2017, Miao Hua (苗华) in June 2017 and Liu Xiaojiang (刘晓江) in September 2013.

⁹ However, if a commander has ever served a single day as a political officer, then the commander serves as the Party Secretary. Kenneth W. Allen, “Political Commissars of the People's Liberation Army Air Force,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, 22 March 2021, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2541427/political-commissars-of-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-force/>; Kenneth W. Allen, “Commanders of the People's Liberation Army Air Force: An Overview,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, 11 February 2021, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2501047/commanders-of-the-pla-air-force/>.

¹⁰ Andrew S. Erickson, *The People of China's Navy and Other Maritime Forces: Extended Summary of Conference Findings*, China Maritime Report 47 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 28 May 2025), <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/47/>.

¹¹ Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher H. Sharman, “PLAN Chief of Staff VADM Li Hanjun: Fast-Rising Star of Training and Education Extinguished,” *CMSI Note* 15 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 30 June 2025), <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/15/>.

¹² Of note, prior to Xi's 2016 reorganization of the PLA, each PLA organization had two Deputy PCs. Subsequently, one of them became a concurrent DIC Secretary, then around 2018 such an individual served only as the DIC Secretary. Currently, each PLA organization has only one Deputy PC.

¹³ “Chief of General Staff (Army, Navy and Air) General Maung Maung Aye Meets a Delegation led by Vice Admiral Liu Zizhu, Deputy Commander of the Southern Theatre Command of the People's Liberation Army of China,” Ministry of Defense, Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, 11 September 2023, <https://archive.ph/CMLbW>; *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2024* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 18

December 2024), p. 118, <https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF>.

¹⁴ 范晓宇 [Fan Xiaoyu] and 王志涛 [Wang Zhitao], 海军党委理论学习中心组集体学习习主席在省部级主要领导干部专题讨论班上重要讲话精神 学习宣传贯彻习主席重要讲话精神以实际行动迎接党的二十大胜利召开 [“Navy Party Committee Theory Study Central Group Collectively Studies Spirit of Chairman Xi’s Important Speech at Provincial/Ministerial-Level Key Leading Cadre Thematic Discussion Group: Study, Propagate, and Implement Spirit of Chairman Xi’s Important Speech, Use Practical Actions to Greet Successful Opening of 20th Party Congress”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 4 August 2022, p. 1.

¹⁵ 李高峰 [Li Gaofeng] and 谭龙 [Tan Long], 海军隆重举行晋升将官军衔仪式 [“Navy Solemnly Holds Senior Officer Rank-Promotion Ceremony”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 20 June 2023, p. 1.

¹⁶ 王俊 [Wang Jun], “军事法院副院长程东方晋升少将军衔, 曾是香港驻军的‘名片’” [Deputy President of the Military Court Cheng Dongfang Has Been Promoted to the Rank of Major General; He Once Served as the “Calling Card” of the Hong Kong Garrison], 澎湃新闻 [Pengpai News], 6 June 2017, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1702002.

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³³ 李建峰, 赵伟, 董向远 [Li Jianfeng, Zhao Wei, Dong Xiangyuan], “陆军后勤部组织机关干部赴革命老区开展扶贫慰问活动” [The Army Logistics Department Organized Cadres to Carry Out Poverty Alleviation and Condolence Activities in the Old Revolutionary Areas], 央广军事 [CCTV Military], 26 July 2018, <https://archive.ph/VFSV2>; [Meng Yaxu and Pan Yue], “政知见: 军改背景下的集团军, 一年多来已有 6 主官调动” [Political Insights: Six Group Army Commanders Have Been Transferred in the Past Year or So Amidst Military Reforms], 澎湃新闻 [Pengpai News], 27 September 2018, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2478520; Yue Huairang, “Major General Leng Shaojie Has Been Appointed Political Commissar of the Army Logistics Department”; “Lieutenant General Leng Shaojie, Deputy Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command.” As a general rule, each Service Headquarters' Logistics Department has a Director and a PC. While the Director sits on the HQ's Party Standing Committee, the PC does not. However, the PC serves as the Logistics Department's Party Secretary.

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³⁶ [军事报道] 张又侠在出席全军思想政治教育创新集训时强调 着力提高灌输授课质效 推动新时代思想政治教育体系构建走深走实 [[Military Report] Zhang Youxia Stresses at Military-Wide Ideological and Political Education Innovation Training Session: Focus on Enhancing the Quality and Effectiveness of Instruction to Advance the Development of the Ideological and Political Education System in the New Era], CCTV-7 国防军事频道 [CCTV-7 National Defense and Military Channel], 19:47, 12 October 2021, <https://tv.cctv.com/2021/10/12/VIDEY4FmijFw96TKBnXkgqp211012.shtml>.

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⁴³ Ibid.

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