

# CHINA GOES TO SEA

Maritime Transformation in  
Comparative Historical Perspective

中海

EDITED BY

ANDREW S. ERICKSON, LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN,  
AND CARNES LORD

JOINT PUBLICATION OF THE  
CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE AND THE NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS

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## Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective

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*edited by Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein,  
and Carnes Lord*



**NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS**  
*Annapolis, Maryland*



Naval Institute Press  
291 Wood Road  
Annapolis, MD 21402

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Erickson, Andrew S.

China goes to sea : maritime transformation in comparative historical perspective /  
Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and Cary Lord.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-59114-242-3 (alk. paper)

1. China—History, Naval. 2. Sea-power—China—History. 3. Naval art and  
science—China—History. 4. History, Naval. 5. Sea-power—History. 6. Naval art  
and science—History. I. Goldstein, Lyle. II. Lord, Cary. III. Title.

DS739.E75 2009

359.00951—dc22

2008055202

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

14 13 12 11 10 09 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

First printing

# Contents

List of Maps	vii
Acknowledgments	ix
Introduction: Chinese Perspectives on Maritime Transformation <i>Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein</i>	xiii
 Part I. PREMODERN ERA	 1
Persia: Multinational Naval Power <i>Gregory Gilbert</i>	3
Sparta's Maritime Moment <i>Barry Strauss</i>	33
Rome Dominates the Mediterranean <i>Arthur M. Eckstein</i>	63
Ottoman Sea Power and the Decline of the Mediterranean World <i>Jakub Grygiel</i>	93
 Part II. MODERN ERA	 121
France: Maritime Empire, Continental Commitment <i>James Pritchard</i>	123

Imperial Russia: Two Models of Maritime Transformation <i>Jacob W. Kipp</i>	145
Imperial Germany: Continental Titan, Global Aspirant <i>Holger H. Herwig</i>	171
Soviet Russia: The Rise and Fall of a Superpower Navy <i>Milan Vego</i>	201
Part III. CHINESE MARITIME TRANSFORMATIONS	235
The Maritime Transformations of Ming China <i>Andrew R. Wilson</i>	238
The Neglect and Nadir of Chinese Maritime Policy under the Qing <i>Bruce A. Elleman</i>	288
More Red than Expert: Chinese Sea Power during the Cold War <i>Bernard D. Cole</i>	320
Part IV. CHINA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE	341
Strong Foundation: Contemporary Chinese Shipbuilding Prowess <i>Gabriel Collins and Michael Grubb</i>	344
China's Navy Today: Looking toward Blue Water <i>Eric A. McVadon</i>	373
China Studies the Rise of Great Powers <i>Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein</i>	401
China and Maritime Transformations <i>Carnes Lord</i>	426
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	457
About the Contributors	459
Index	469



Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein

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## China Studies the Rise of Great Powers

A REMARKABLE CHINESE GOVERNMENT STUDY titled *Daguo Jueqi* (*The Rise of Great Powers*, 大国崛起) attempts to determine the reasons why nine nations (Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United States) became great powers. *The Rise of Great Powers* was apparently inspired by a 24 November 2003 Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee Political Bureau group session, "Study of Historical Development of Major Countries in the World since the 15th Century," reportedly following a directive from Chinese president Hu Jintao to determine which factors enabled major powers to grow most rapidly.<sup>1</sup> Hu is reported to have said at the session, "China, as a late-coming great nation, should learn from and draw upon the historical experience of the leading nations of the world in their modernization processes, as this will certainly be very beneficial to realizing the strategy of catching up and overtaking the leaders in modernization and achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation."<sup>2</sup>

Completed in 2006, the study draws on the analyses of many top Chinese scholars (including those at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Beijing University's History Department), interviews with several hundred international political leaders and scholars, and the producers' onsite research in all nine nations. Some of the scholars reportedly briefed the

Politburo concerning their conclusions.<sup>3</sup> As a twelve-part program twice broadcast on China Central Television (CCTV) and an eight-volume book series, *The Rise of Great Powers* has enjoyed considerable popular exposure in China.<sup>4</sup> The first ten thousand copies of the book series sold out almost immediately.<sup>5</sup> CCTV president Zhao Huayong states that his organization produced the series “for the development of the country, the rejuvenation of the nation.”<sup>6</sup> This chapter will analyze *The Rise of Great Powers* and other relevant Chinese writings for insights into the particular lessons that Beijing is drawing from other nations’ previous attempts to master the maritime domain as well as the geopolitical results of those efforts.<sup>7</sup>

*The Rise of Great Powers* is not the first popular Chinese production to raise the issue of maritime development to the level of national popular discourse. In 1988 CCTV broadcast *He Shang* (*River Elegy*, 河殇), which used the theme of China’s early development centering on the Yellow River to criticize “the mentality of a servile, static, and defensive people who always meekly hug to mother earth to eke out a miserable living, rather than boldly venturing forth on the dangerous deep blue sea in search of a freer, more exalted existence.”<sup>8</sup> This ethos, which was quite consistent with the initial “reform and opening up” (改革开放) ethic of the Deng Xiaoping era, challenged viewers to consider: “How can the ‘yellow’ culture of the earth be transformed into the ‘blue’ culture of the ocean?”<sup>9</sup> Like *The Rise of Great Powers*, *River Elegy* suggested that China had much to learn from the West. *River Elegy* was later viewed by Chinese officials as having helped to inspire the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations, however, and was subsequently banned.<sup>10</sup> In this sense, it is significant that the far more sophisticated and intellectually nuanced *Rise of Great Powers* seeks to analyze the ascension to preeminence of foreign powers objectively, even citing the development of Western political systems and institutions as great national strengths rather than focusing on the harm caused by Western exertion of power, as has much Marxist-Leninist propaganda in the past.<sup>11</sup> This seemingly daring act appears to have attracted a small amount of controversy, particularly from Chinese leftist hard-liners, but is understandable when one examines the purpose of the series: not to recount past wrongs but to guide China’s great power development, which cannot plausibly be linked to slavery or colonization.<sup>12</sup>

*The Rise of Great Powers* suggests that national power stems from economic development fueled by foreign trade, which can in turn be furthered by a strong navy. To see how the series’ developers reached this conclusion, it is worthwhile to examine the initial and later sea powers detailed in the series, especially the land powers that attempted to become sea powers with

varying degrees of success.<sup>13</sup> Where appropriate, the views of other Chinese scholars and analysts will also be considered.

## Initial Global Sea Powers

To establish a contrast with the world land powers that are the focus of our analysis, we first examine how *The Rise of Great Powers* portrays world sea powers. The earliest examples are Portugal and Spain, which were ultimately limited by their focus on empire, and the Netherlands, which became a global economic juggernaut and appears to offer a model for China in some respects.

### *Portugal and Spain*

Portugal and Spain are assessed by Chinese scholars to have initially realized global power by achieving internal unity at a time when the rest of Europe lacked it, which enabled them to embark on naval expansion.<sup>14</sup> When the land-focused Ottoman Empire blocked Iberian access to the spice trade, strong economic imperative emerged to develop a sea route. As People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) colonel Dai Xu points out, “Portugal, the first [global] power in modern history, suddenly developed an interest in the sea in 1415 when she conquered Cueta, an important place for transportation between the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.”<sup>15</sup> Portugal achieved technological breakthroughs by inventing new boats and developing navigation science, which helped it to wrest control of trade from Italy and circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope in 1487. This “national project” was systematically organized. Portugal’s future lay in taking “the sea road” (海上之路) and “conquering the vast ocean” (征服大海). Just as China’s influence disappeared from the seas, “Portugal’s big maritime discoveries . . . [emerged as] a well-conceived and well-organized national strategy.”<sup>16</sup>

Spain likewise embarked on maritime expansion. As Colonel Dai points out, “Stimulated by her neighbor Portugal, Spain also withdrew from the endless conquests over the European continent and began her adventure on the sea, initiating the overseas conquests.”<sup>17</sup> Spain became a “strong enemy” (强大对手) for Portugal after Queen Isabella seized Granada, thereby ending Islamic attempts at control of the Iberian peninsula and providing the requisite internal unity, “strength” (实力), and “determination” (决心). “On 12 October 1492,” the CCTV film series relates, “the Atlantic’s strong trade wind sent Columbus’ fleet to the new continent it had dreamed to reach,



blowing away the invisible barriers that separated all the continents. . . . It was those mariners' passion that cleaved the tranquil blue waters. To pursue wealth, they and their ships, loaded with goods, cannons and other weapons, started the journeys of building big nations."<sup>18</sup> The ability of a unified Spain to value and support Columbus' efforts paid great dividends for national power: "When Columbus with his navigation plan bargained with the Spanish royal court, Queen Isabella accepted his request, even though he was a common man. To finance Columbus' seafaring trip, she even sold the jewelry on her crown. However, what she won back was a crown with even greater luster. It was the laurel of a world overlord."<sup>19</sup>

By the late 1500s, however, Portugal and Spain are assessed to have squandered their great power status by waging wars in the defense of far-flung colonial empires, and importing expensive products, rather than focusing on their own intensive economic development and raising living standards at home. The obvious lesson for China is that naval development in the absence of robust maritime commerce and internal growth is unsustainable. Colonel Dai blames Spain's decline on the neglect of sea power: "With mere foresight, Spain had once chosen the move toward the sea, which benefitted her greatly, but the country did not further develop military theories of marine control, because of her comparatively shallow knowledge of sea power. As a result, not having gone further, the unrivaled fleet had followed the same old road of the Ottomans to ruin—in just 17 years. We can see: an empire declined once its navy failed."<sup>20</sup> Ye Zicheng, a prominent Beijing University scholar whose landpower-centric theories were surveyed in the introductory chapter, draws another lesson: "The rise of the Spanish Empire indeed achieved success through relying on sea power, but the history of Spain also shows that without land power, sea power cannot prop up the international status of a leading power for long."<sup>21</sup>

### *The Netherlands*

*The Rise of Great Powers* pointedly notes that while Spain and Portugal depended on military force as a key element of their rise as maritime powers, Holland relied on commerce and became a "global commercial empire" (全世界的商业大国). It is quite possible that the authors of the series are using this parallel to frame China's rising maritime power as commercial rather than military in nature.<sup>22</sup>

The Netherlands' rise was driven by commercial maritime development. Export of herring generated significant profits, thereby permitting the con-

struction of canals and turning the loose coalition of city-states run by feudal lords into a "key hub" (集散地), with Rotterdam as the world's premier port. This infrastructure renaissance, in turn, allowed the Dutch to serve as middlemen in trade (e.g., of Portuguese gold and spice). More than eighteen hundred unarmed Dutch ships—lighter, cheaper, and of higher capacity than their British counterparts—ferried goods throughout Europe. This commerce in turn fueled the ascendance to power of merchant elites who further supported maritime-oriented policies.

Were the Dutch experience to end here, the lesson for China might be to pursue trade to the exclusion of politics and naval development. But military technological innovations (e.g., gunpowder) made it impossible for the Netherlands to escape intra-European power struggles. Later, with fifteen thousand branches and ten thousand ships, the Dutch East India Company captured half of world trade. An analyst at Beijing's influential Navy Research Institute likewise notes that "seventeenth century Holland, with its incomparable 'Chariots on the Sea' opened up colonial regions that spanned as far as Asia, Africa, America and Oceania, controlling sea channels and four-fifths of the world's trade volume."<sup>23</sup> Wealthy Amsterdam seized control of Taiwan and Indonesia (the latter as a colony) and monopolized trade with Japan. In 1656 Dutch representatives arrived in Beijing and prostrated themselves before Qing Dynasty emperor Shunzhi. At the time, the Chinese interpreted this to mean that for the Dutch, "the great interest was making money" (重大利益赚钱). The ultimate lesson for China from the Dutch experience would seem to be that trade produces wealth and power but that some degree of naval forces is necessary to safeguard it.

### Later Sea Powers

The modern world sea powers surveyed by *The Rise of Great Powers* are the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States. The United Kingdom and the United States are viewed as success stories with valuable lessons for China, whereas Japan's aggressive attempt to rise rapidly on the seas, despite its undeniable achievements, is viewed as a terrible failure.

### *United Kingdom*

"How did such a small island transform itself and influence the world?" asks *The Rise of Great Powers*.<sup>24</sup> Britain, like the United States later, is assessed to have achieved this rapid accretion of power thanks to economic growth



driven by innovation. "England . . . put great effort into developing a powerful navy, and defeated Holland through three wars," notes a Chinese military researcher.<sup>25</sup> Elizabeth I helped to catalyze Britain's rise by encouraging privateers to attack Spanish shipping. Anglo-Spanish religious wars ended with British victory in 1588 when Spain's Armada was defeated by lighter ships with better firepower. Spain persisted for five more decades as a great power, but this naval victory clearly marked Britain's rise as a "maritime power" (海上强国).

Much is made of Britain's internal consolidation facilitated by such political innovations as the Magna Carta, which sustained Britain's great power rise and facilitated rapid economic development. Overseas trade expansion, which fueled Britain's rise, was facilitated by Britain's subsequent use of both naval power and the eighteenth century "Navigation Acts" (航海法), intended to give preference to British commercial shipping to eliminate Dutch and French maritime commercial competition. Britain thus won both "the competition for sea power" (海上竞争) and "the competition among the great powers" (大国竞争). This, in turn, enabled London to become a "world power."

The Industrial Revolution, scientific and technical innovation, patents (rule of law), and laissez faire capitalism made Britain the "workshop of the world" and enabled it to defeat rival Napoleonic France, whose military uniforms and other provisions were British-made. By the time Britain hosted the World's Fair in 1852, it produced more iron products than the rest of world combined, two-thirds of world coal, and 50 percent of world textiles. This achievement marked Britain's zenith, however, and it had already begun slow decline as increasingly unprofitable colonial acquisitions produced imperial overstretch. Following World War II, Britain decided to relinquish its territories to improve national living standards.

For Ye Zicheng, England's rise cannot be ascribed to sea power alone, however:

The emergence of England as the first world power of truly worldwide significance did not just depend on the development of sea power and its sea power superiority. Without the great revolution, the industrial revolution, and the parliamentary democracy system in England's land space, England would not have had the status of a world power. . . . Britain still has strong sea power today, which to a certain extent props up Britain's great power status, but due to the limitations of the development of its land space, Britain can cer-

tainly not become a powerful land power, or else the strong points of its land power development are not as strong as those of other land powers, hence Britain is now losing and is bound to lose its world power status.<sup>26</sup>

Chinese appraisals of the Falklands War demonstrate a keen awareness of the Royal Navy's weaknesses in that campaign.<sup>27</sup>

### Japan

Chinese analysts assess that, like Germany and Russia, Japan suffered from institutional defects that compromised its ability to succeed as a late-modernizer. As with Germany, a policy of external aggression is cited as a major reason for Japan's failure to realize its imperial ambitions. These lessons have been emphasized repeatedly by Chinese policy makers and scholars alike.<sup>28</sup> Qinghua University's Yan Xuetong points out that coordinated containment by other nations can hinder the rise of a great power.<sup>29</sup> Rather than focusing on Japan's anti-Chinese atrocities, however, *The Rise of Great Powers* dwells instead on Japan's constitutional-monarchy-led internal modernization following the Meiji Restoration, which enabled it to avoid Western domination until imperial overstretch provoked war with the United States.<sup>30</sup>

In its "one-hundred-year road to great powerhood" (一百年的大国之路), Japan became the first Asian country to resist Western colonialism, industrialize, and colonize others. In 1853, however, Japan's leaders ultimately decided not to resist the black ships of Admiral Perry when he came to open Japan for trade and to seize control of Pacific shipping routes. Perry believed that Japan might eventually come to rival the United States in terms of national power. This "pressure from abroad and chaos within" (外忧内患) triggered the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Rapid, far-reaching internal reforms commenced. In 1871 forty-nine high officials (more than half Japan's government) joined the Iwakura Mission to visit America and Europe. In Germany they found the model system they sought, one in which the government led industrialization to catch up to earlier modernizers. Chinese analysts note that they listened intently to Bismarck, who declared that despite all the diplomatic niceties, the world was still a place where the strong oppressed the weak.

In addition to importing substantial commercial and military technology, Japan supported small businesses, notably Mitsubishi, which by 1875 had taken over the Tokyo-Shanghai shipping route. Despite rapid, wide-



ranging internal reforms culminating in the “Constitution of the Empire of Japan,” however, Japan still lagged behind the West. Accordingly, in 1889 Tokyo began to “develop through war” (通过战争来发展). This “militaristic emphasis” occurred under the rubric of “Enrich the Country, Strengthen the Military”—“富国强兵.”

*The Rise of Great Powers* emphasizes that naval development was central to Japan’s expansionism: Following the 1895 war, in addition to colonizing Taiwan, the Chinese documentary asserts that Japan took four times as much from China in reparations as annual government expenditure and invested half of that into its own navy. This investment paid off in 1905 with victory in the Russo-Japanese War.<sup>31</sup> Japan then colonized the Korean Peninsula.<sup>32</sup> In World War II, Japan expanded into the Pacific and Indian Oceans.<sup>33</sup> But this progress was short-lived, and the atomic bombing and surrender ceremony on the deck of USS *Missouri* followed in 1945. According to Zhang Wenmu, the Beijing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics scholar whose seapower-centric writings were surveyed in the introductory chapter, “Japan’s defeat was to a large extent the result of the Japanese people taking on the United States at sea. Once Japan lost its control of the sea in the Pacific, it was doomed to defeat.”<sup>34</sup> A “Peace Constitution” (和平宪法) demoted Japan’s emperor to symbolic status and imposed categorical military limitations. Rapid economic growth, however, made Japan the world’s third largest economy by 1968 and the second largest today.

In contrast to Zhang Wenmu, Ye Zicheng believes that Japan failed disastrously in World War II because this natural sea power tried to become a land power:

Japan is relatively distant from the east Asian continent; it is also homogenous, and relatively lacking in natural resources; this aspect has been prone to shape the Japanese nation’s independent nature, and another aspect has created the rootless cultural characteristic of the Japanese nation in following the tide. The former aspect meant that Japan very early on refused to join the east Asian system centered on China, and the latter caused the Japanese nation to lose its way and embark on a deviant path in the process of developing sea power, becoming a big scourge to Asian and world peace, and doing tremendous damage to the countries of east Asia, especially China and north and south Korea.<sup>35</sup>

Then, “in 1907 Japan decided to develop both sea and land power, simultaneously developing the navy and the army; the main objective for the army

would be to repulse Russia, the land power on the Eurasian continent, while the building of the navy would have the U.S. sea power as the imaginary enemy. It was precisely Japan’s continental strategy and strategy of turning itself into a continental country that led to its final defeat. Japan’s switch also ended in failure.”<sup>36</sup>

### United States

*The Rise of Great Powers* marvels at how the United States became a great power in only 230 years of history, built independently on the base of European civilization enriched with subsequent immigrant contributions from all over the world, protected by a foresighted constitution, and driven by a culture of industry and self-reliance.<sup>37</sup> By 1860 the U.S. economy was already bigger than that of most European powers. The peaceful environment that the United States enjoyed following the Civil War is credited with providing the conditions necessary for it to develop into a superpower. A culture of invention during the second industrial revolution transformed the United States from a student of European technology to an innovator in its own right.<sup>38</sup> By 1894, 118 years after its founding, the United States had become the world’s largest economy. According to Wang Jisi, Beijing University professor and president of the Institute of International Strategy under the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, “in 1894 the United States was already the world’s number one power.”<sup>39</sup>

Meanwhile, as a senior colonel at Beijing’s Navy Research Institute concludes, “Mahan’s sea power theory directly supported 20th century America’s abrupt rise.”<sup>40</sup> PLAN senior captain Xu Qi agrees: “[The United States] benefited from the guidance of Mahan’s theories of sea power, and unceasingly pressed forward in the maritime direction . . . [thus] establishing a firm foundation for its move into the world’s first-rank powers.”<sup>41</sup> PLAAF Col. Dai Xu goes even further: “America introduced the term ‘sea power’ and the United States was also the first country to realize the secret of sea power. Exactly because of holding such a secret, the United States has gradually approached being a superpower and accomplishing world hegemony.”<sup>42</sup> Whereas the CCTV film series ignores Mahan’s contribution to the rapid rise of American sea power, the book series devotes a section to it. Mahan’s writings are reviewed in some detail, with a focus on his complaint that while England and Japan had powerful navies and “China also has a modern ‘Beiyang’ fleet . . . the U.S. Navy stands twelfth in the world, and must pursue [the others] with force and spirit.”<sup>43</sup> Mahan is credited with



inspiring Congress to appropriate funds for naval construction in 1890 such that within five years the U.S. Navy was fifth in the world. By 1898, when the United States vanquished the Spanish fleet in Manila Harbor, thus capturing the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico, America's ascension to sea power dominance was indisputable: "500 years before, the Spaniards had found the new continent of America. Now, this rising New World country had defeated its discoverers by revealing its cutting edge battleships to the world for the first time. On the North American continent, this promising youth, obsessed with ambition, sized up the world, and its warships flying star-spangled flags frequently appeared in the world's five oceans. Already, the world could not ignore America's influence."<sup>44</sup>

World War I further stimulated the U.S. economy by generating large-scale European weapons and steel orders and left the United States with 40 percent of the world's wealth. Following President Wilson's subsequent failure to remake the international order, "the United States' geopolitical advantages that allowed it to advance or retreat freely were once again manifested. It shifted its focus back to the American continent and concentrated on its own matters."<sup>45</sup> After World War II, whose naval battles are depicted only briefly, the United States emerged triumphant: "The participation of the United States, as the number one economic and military power, was undoubtedly decisive for the victory of the antifascist war."<sup>46</sup> In the new world order that unfolded at Yalta, "the gross industrial output value of the United States accounted for more than half of the world total and a dollar-centric international financial system was established worldwide," giving the United States "leadership status" (领导地位).<sup>47</sup> Washington "also sent troops to 50 countries and territories around the world and had them stationed there."<sup>48</sup> It began to dominate the international order in a way that was beneficial to itself and, in the latter part of the twentieth century, eventually became a superpower (超级大国). Wang Jisi has cautioned, "Wars did accompany the rise of the United States, but we cannot say it became powerful through war. The notion that the rise of a world power is inevitably accompanied by wars is erroneous."<sup>49</sup>

To Ye Zicheng, the role of land power in America's rise should not be underestimated: "The United States first embarked on the power road by land power expansion and development; the political system established in its early years became the strong and firm foundation for the later United States."<sup>50</sup> Ye posits that nations must develop within their natural endowments, which typically dictate a maritime or continental focus:

One can say that there have been few successful examples in history of switching from sea to land power. The United States may appear now to be an exception. The United States was mainly a land power from its founding up to the 1890s, when it started its switch process and vigorously developed sea power. . . . The United States then became a world power, very strong in both land and sea power. . . . However, the past success of the United States does not mean that it was also successful later. The United States today seems to be starting a second switch. It is not content with only possessing land power on the American continent, but also wants to possess land power on the Eurasian continent and become a sea and land power with land power on both the American and Eurasian continents. . . . Can U.S. success continue? No. This is because U.S. actions have gone far beyond the strategic potential given it by its natural endowment.<sup>51</sup>

Ye predicts that "if land power does not develop well, U.S. influence abroad is bound to greatly shrink, and the so-called U.S. hegemony will ebb away; [but] if no major problems emerge in U.S. land power development, its international influence may be maintained for a very long time."<sup>52</sup>

## Land Powers

Land powers are naturally of greatest interest in this book because the focus is how land powers are able or are not able to transition into sea powers. It is therefore worthwhile to examine these cases and see what insights can be gleaned from this comprehensive Chinese survey to gain at least a partial understanding of how the Chinese conceptualize sea power as an element in the rise of great powers and their prospects for transition.

### France

In this discussion of French history, the continental nature of its power is emphasized from the start.<sup>53</sup> Indeed, the title of the chapter on France in the main study compilation refers to France as a "continental power" (陆上强权).<sup>54</sup> Louis XIV is credited with building up France's science, technology, and national power to the point that it played a role in the international system at that time comparable to the role played by the United States today.<sup>55</sup>

France's position vis-à-vis sea power arises primarily in the context of analysis of the Napoleonic wars. According to this analysis, Britain was



gravely troubled in 1802 when France closed Dutch and Italian ports to British trade and set the shipyards to work with the goal of doubling the size of the French Navy.<sup>56</sup> The Trafalgar victory for England in 1805, noted by the Chinese analysis to have occurred against superior numbers, spelled the end of France's quest to match Britain at sea.<sup>57</sup> Neither Britain nor France could decisively defeat the other's strength, so the Chinese analysis observes that their war became one of blockade and counterblockade—in essence, economic warfare.<sup>58</sup> As PLAN senior captain Xu Qi observes, “At the end of the eighteenth century, Napoleon sought to expel England from the European continent, and toward that end advanced into the Mediterranean on the southern flank and attempted to cut England off from its foreign markets and natural resources by way of the Persian Gulf.”<sup>59</sup>

In a dictum with resonance in contemporary Chinese strategy, Napoleon is quoted in *The Rise of Great Powers* as saying to his brother that he intended to “use the land to conquer the sea” (用陆地征服海洋).<sup>60</sup> In evaluating Napoleon's intention to defeat Britain by cutting it off from crucial continental markets, the Chinese analysts do credit France with creating difficulties for Britain in 1807–8. Nevertheless, British sea power is viewed as being decisive in routing the so-called Continental System. By the Chinese account, Napoleon's strategy was defeated because England was a strong naval power that relied on its mighty fleets in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, and even along the French coast, for which France, despite its having conquered much of Western Europe with “military power” (军事力量), remained “without any option” (无可奈何). It is recognized, however, that Britain's financial and industrial prowess were also key to its eventual victory.<sup>61</sup>

There is no further mention of sea power in the discussion of France. Still, France once again found itself the dominant continental power in Europe after World War I.<sup>62</sup> At that time, however, France's role was quickly surpassed because, the Chinese analysis contends, Paris no longer had the will to dominate as had Louis XIV or Napoleon. Likewise, its rapid defeat by Hitler's Germany is put down to a deleterious national sense of being “in no hurry to fight” (快不再战).<sup>63</sup> Indeed, the concept of appeasement has developed its own place in Chinese discourse concerning the use of force.<sup>64</sup>

It is also noted that France and China have enjoyed somewhat similar modern histories and culture. Like Beijing, Paris has “[taken] an independent road” [唯一道路] in the postwar years, developing “an independent industrial system” complete with “aviation and nuclear industries.”<sup>65</sup>

## Germany

The discussion of German history in *The Rise of Great Powers* has little focus on Germany's shortcomings in the maritime domain. Nevertheless, the analysis is still noteworthy because of the lessons Chinese analysts appear to draw regarding the imperative of national unification, on the one hand, and caution regarding the use of force, on the other.<sup>66</sup>

Germans are depicted as a people who are courageous, tough, and skilled at warfare, owing largely to their history of continuous military conflict.<sup>67</sup> The description of Frederick the Great relates his cold calculations to serve the national interest, noting that this logic could justify breaking any treaty and launching any attack.<sup>68</sup> Indeed, the theme of Prussia's militarization is emphasized when the common adage appears noting that Prussia was not a state with an army but rather an army with a state.<sup>69</sup> After a recounting of the wars of German unification in some detail, Bismarck is described in glowing terms as the principle architect of German unification: “Overall, the unification of Germany represented progress as a historical fact, because it was a requirement of modern development, and Bismarck's activities were in conformity with the wave of modern development.”<sup>70</sup> In a depiction with possible significance for Beijing's evaluation of Taiwan's future, it is emphasized that Bismarck succeeded with “iron and blood” (铁与血) where the peaceful revolutionaries of 1848 had failed.

The analysis then turns to explain how Germany turned toward a wayward and self-destructive path in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While Germany's “military focus” (军事注意) started with Bismarck, he preserved peace in Europe by maintaining the balance of power and not overexpanding. In a shift with some echoes in contemporary Chinese foreign policy (at least from a Western perspective), Berlin under Kaiser Wilhelm is described in 1890 as altering its foreign policy “from a ‘continental policy’ to a ‘global policy’” (“大陆政策”向“世界政策”). It is related that German leaders desired “living space,” viewed their existing territory as being too small, and also sought a “place in the sun” for Germany. Meanwhile, “the German government continuously increased its military expenditures.” The enormous naval building program of Adm. Alfred von Tirpitz is mentioned in this context.<sup>71</sup>

The Chinese discussion of the world wars observes that the earlier wars of German unification had convinced Berlin (wrongly) that another war would also be short.<sup>72</sup> In a thinly veiled critique of democratic norms, the analysis notes that the German decision for war in 1914 was intensely popu-



lar.<sup>73</sup> Although Anglo-German commercial rivalry is mentioned as a cause of World War I, it is somewhat surprising that no mention is made of the extensive Anglo-German naval arms race that preceded this conflict.<sup>74</sup> Little is said about German naval power before and during World War II except to note that German submarines “did not achieve their anticipated goal” of knocking Britain out of the war.<sup>75</sup>

Ultimately, this Chinese discussion of Germany’s rise as a great power concludes: “Germany’s economic development, especially its education and technological development, provide a rich experience for us. However, once Germany had become powerful, it became an upstart, had difficulty in finding its place, and as a result its excess of power was channeled into a path of expansion, belligerence and destruction.”<sup>76</sup>

It is recognized that Germany’s difficult geostrategic situation—located in the heart of Europe—rendered it subject to intense pressures.<sup>77</sup> But the primary lesson for China of Germany’s travails is to “always choose the path of peaceful development.”<sup>78</sup> *The Rise of Great Powers* draws a larger lesson for China from the German legacy: “So far there is yet to have any precedence of any emerging big power defeating a hegemonic power directly. The rise and decline of Germany was a historical legacy that all big powers must contemplate deeply. . . . When this emerging big power adopted the parity principle that big European powers were following, it developed rapidly in a peaceful environment and became the leading economic power in Europe. However, just when it attempted to assert its turf under the sun, it met disastrous defeat.”<sup>79</sup> Any contradiction between this point and the prior endorsement of Bismarck’s belligerent unification policies is not addressed.

### Russia

The Chinese discussion of modern Russian history provides the most focused assessment of maritime transformation by a traditional continental power.<sup>80</sup> This analysis concentrates heavily on the leadership of Peter the Great, who is described as being fully dedicated to establishing Russia as a maritime power.<sup>81</sup> According to this history of Russia, Muscovy grew powerful because the city lay proximate to rivers that were crucial thoroughfares for people and goods. Nevertheless, Russia’s agrarian economy, as that of a “landlocked country” (内陆国家), was restricted by limited transport routes and so remained backward. “The only way to alter this situation was to capture ports, and for this war was the only option.”<sup>82</sup> In fact, during the thirty-six year reign of Peter the Great, Russia fought fifty-three wars.<sup>83</sup>

To reach the sea, Peter needed a strong military to confront the strong power on its northern flank, Sweden, as well as the strong power on its southern flank, the Ottoman Empire. The Chinese analysis observes admirably that Peter achieved progress in military development at a rapid pace.<sup>84</sup> Peter’s time abroad (especially in Holland) was crucial to informing his perspective regarding Russia’s relative weaknesses. In a description analogous to contemporary China, Peter is praised for having insisted that Russia open itself to foreign ideas and influences. In particular, he stressed the imperative to study the development of foreign militaries, to import foreign military equipment, and to call upon foreign experts. Russian students were also sent abroad more frequently to study foreign military methods.<sup>85</sup> The discussion also notes Peter’s success in creating a foreign policy that complemented his military strategy (e.g., in the Northern War against Sweden, which Russia defeated in 1709).<sup>86</sup> In 1713 Peter built his cosmopolitan, Westernized capital of St. Petersburg on land captured in that war.

A critical component of Peter’s broadly successful strategy, according to the Chinese analysis, was the building of Russia’s first navy, with its own academy. After his return from Holland, where he personally observed how the European powers were “prosperous and strong” (富强), Peter was utterly determined to seize a port on the Baltic Sea to open Russia to commercial and cultural interaction with Western Europe.<sup>87</sup> He is quoted as saying “our country needs the sea—without a port, we cannot survive.”<sup>88</sup> To this end, Peter emphasized the importing of modern shipbuilding and navigation technology. Between 1706 and 1725, Russia launched forty full-size battle-ships in addition to almost one thousand smaller vessels. With naval power, it is suggested, the Russian state was no longer dependent on a single hand but rather had two hands (land and sea power) with which to fulfill its ambitions.<sup>89</sup> This initial Russian progress is recognized by PLAN senior captain Xu Qi: “As early as the reign of Peter the Great, Russia initiated a military struggle to gain access to the sea. It successively achieved access to seaports along its northern flank and expanded its influence to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf, even contending for the Black Sea Straits, as well as nibbling at the Balkan Peninsula.”<sup>90</sup> While amply crediting Peter for modernizing Russia and establishing it as a sea power, the Chinese analysis also observes that the Russian navy all but disappeared after Peter’s death because its capabilities were not maintained.<sup>91</sup>

The role of sea power in Russian history after Peter is not seriously explored in the book series. It is noted that Russia emerged as the dominant European continental power in the wake of Napoleon’s demise.<sup>92</sup> Catherine,



who assumed power in 1762, embraced much of Peter's ideology as a proponent of the "Western faction" over the "Slavic faction." Like Peter, she turned to military conquest to expand Russia's power and influence, seizing a Black Sea port, Poland, and even Alaska. It is implied that the emancipation of serfs enabled industrialization and military expansion. In the 1856 Crimean War, however, Russia is said to have been forced to confront the powerful armored fleets of Britain and France with mere wooden sailing ships, thereby ensuring its defeat.<sup>93</sup> Russia's "catastrophic vanquishment" at the hands of the upstart Japan in 1905 is likewise mentioned, but not described in any detail.<sup>94</sup>

Like Russia, the USSR is described as a power that was continuously striving toward the sea.<sup>95</sup> In the years following the Revolution of 1917, Moscow used not "military power" (武力) but "national power" (国力) to further internal development. As this Chinese analysis indicates, however, the Soviet Union reached the apex of its power in the 1970s but failed at that time to pay adequate attention to its own people's standard of living, preferring instead to lavish resources on its military rivalry with the United States.<sup>96</sup> A wide body of scholarship and policy statements indicate that China is determined not to repeat this mistake.<sup>97</sup> As Zhou Yan, executive writer-director of the CCTV documentary series notes, "if a country is economically undeveloped it will find it very hard to rise."<sup>98</sup>

Not only did the USSR reach parity with the United States in nuclear weapons, it also exceeded the United States in numbers of tanks. As for the Soviet Navy, the analysis notes that it was active on all the world's three major oceans and began to hold global exercises that demonstrated its strength.<sup>99</sup> Cumulatively, the Russian case is especially interesting for Beijing because it is a case of a land power with a similar governmental system making a concerted, if ineffectual, effort to transform into a maritime power.

In the view of Ye Zicheng, Moscow's failure stemmed from trying to become a sea power when it was naturally more of a land power. "The size of the Soviet Navy ranked second in the world at one time, and was three times that of the British fleet. Eventually, however, the Soviet Union's switch ended in failure. Many Soviet aircraft carriers were sold to other countries for scrap, becoming theme park vehicles. The development of Soviet naval power did not leave behind any inheritable legacy for Russia, and Russia now remains a mainly land power."<sup>100</sup> PLAAF colonel Dai Xu has a different interpretation: Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, "Russia painfully realized that no country can be a long-term power without sea power."<sup>101</sup>

## Conclusion

The *Rise of Great Powers* project is an ambitious, timely, sophisticated, and surprisingly objective study of one of China's greatest challenges: accomplishing the rise of China without precipitating devastating conflict in the international system. Indeed, *The Rise of Great Powers* reflects China's new technocratic society at its best because it demonstrates a new will and capability to look outward for lessons applicable to China's new situation. And this project does so in a deep and integrated way (over the course of several well-edited volumes prepared by disciplined and focused research teams), rather than a shallow and subjective approach. The overall findings can be summarized as emphasizing the importance of (a) internal unity; (b) market mechanisms; (c) related ideological, scientific, and institutional innovation; and (d) international peace.

This chapter does not attempt a comprehensive summary of the findings of *The Rise of Great Powers*, however. Rather, this chapter surveys the study's notions of sea power to gauge how this project might affect a future Chinese transformation into a full-fledged maritime power. Although *The Rise of Great Powers* does not itself assert direct findings related to sea power (which is in itself an interesting conclusion), the case studies that comprise it nevertheless do make ample observations with respect to maritime power that have been revealed in this research effort.

In studying the rise of Britain, the United States, and Japan, any historical study is likely to question of the role of sea power. As is the case for the rest of this volume, we define "sea power" here to mean not only explicit naval strength but also the commerce and shipping that underpin it. Sea power is not an end in itself but a medium for trade and a source of national security. In some cases, maritime power is useful primarily as a means to trade (as when Portugal's land trade route was cut off by the Ottomans). Yet, as the commercially proficient Dutch discovered painfully, trade must be secured from foreign threats. In this sense, naval power is necessary even if it is not needed for trade per se.

In reviewing British history, for example, it is not surprising that the study emphasizes London's use of the Navigation Acts, coupled with naval power, to eliminate Dutch and French maritime commercial competition. With respect to the United States, the authors of *The Rise of Great Powers* observe that Washington enjoyed "the geopolitical advantages [and by inference the necessary naval power] that allowed it to advance and retreat freely."<sup>102</sup> Similarly, the major investment in naval expansion made by Tokyo



after the Sino-Japanese War is described as paying major dividends during the Russo-Japanese War, and especially at the all-important naval victory in the Tsushima Straits.<sup>103</sup> The role of sea power is even more pronounced in other historical case studies. For example, regarding Portugal, *The Rise of Great Powers* notes that just as China's influence disappeared from the seas, "Portugal's big maritime discoveries . . . [emerged as] a well-conceived and well-organized national strategy."<sup>104</sup> Similarly for Spain, Madrid's willingness to support Columbus' maritime discoveries is described as a risky investment with a massive payoff for Spain's national power. Sea power is also discussed in the context of exploring the ascent of various land powers. While Napoleon intended to "use the land to conquer the sea," in the end Paris was left "without any option" to contest Britain's power on the seas.<sup>105</sup> Somewhat contrary to its wider conclusions, the legacy of Bismarck (especially in the context of national unification) is thoroughly praised, but Germany's clumsy attempts to develop and wield naval power are criticized in *The Rise of Great Powers*. The description of Russia's development as a great power may be the most relevant to the maritime transformation question. Indeed, Peter the Great's quest to develop ports for international trade is described as a major impetus for Russia's rise. Ultimately, however, the capability of the USSR to field fleets on all the world's oceans, impressive as it might have been, is discredited in *The Rise of Great Powers* because of its part in Moscow's larger tendency "to lavish resources on its military rivalry with the United States."<sup>106</sup>

Undoubtedly, a major conclusion of *The Rise of Great Powers* is the fundamental value of the market and international trade as drivers for national development and consequently national power. For example, one historian is cited in the study explaining that "only three countries in the past 500 years could claim that they had dominated the world—the Netherlands, Britain and the United States. Like taking part in a relay race, these three countries renewed and developed the market economy."<sup>107</sup> The essential link between maritime commerce and national development is very clear in the context of *The Rise of Great Powers*' exploration of the Netherlands' rise to preeminence: "During the 17th century, the Netherlands, which has an area about half the size of Beijing, created a commercial empire that dominated the world because of the financial and commercial institutions it had created."<sup>108</sup>

Observing in *The Rise of Great Powers* that the Netherlands' commercial power was superseded with remarkable rapidity by the upstart British in part because of a lack of robust naval power, a possible conclusion is certainly that Chinese commercial power cannot develop wholly independently

of national military capabilities, including a blue water fleet. PLAN analysts unquestionably view commercial and naval power as creating a virtuous circle: "The booming maritime economy will surely advance and drive the progress of a navy with high-tech. On the other hand, a navy with high-tech can also protect, drive and advance the maritime economy."<sup>109</sup>

In conclusion, then, *The Rise of Great Powers* suggests that developing maritime power is necessary but not sufficient to support the rise of a great power. A great power's rise, which may be underwritten by such other factors as industrialization, innovation, and an effective political system, can support naval development, but naval development only seems to support a great power's rise if it is part of a larger flourishing of economic development and trade. Such nations as Portugal and the Soviet Union tried to further their national power by selectively developing the military component of maritime power but ultimately failed because of a lack of dynamic economic activity. China is clearly avoiding this strategic error; indeed, its commercial maritime development is proceeding much more rapidly and broadly than its naval development. Perhaps in this way China can finally follow the injunction of Li Hongzhang from the Qing-era Self-Strengthening Movement to "place equal emphasis on wealth and strength, use wealth to promote strength, use strength to protect wealth" (富与强并重, 以富促强, 以强保富).<sup>110</sup> By thus balancing economic and military development, China may rise to great power status sustainably and with minimal foreign opposition.

This is a positive sign—for China, the United States, and the rest of the world. Western analysts and officials should welcome the findings of *The Rise of Great Powers* project because it uses sound historical research methods to chart a path for China's peaceful rise—one that is careful to avoid military conflicts that could derail its development path. Still, it must be emphasized that the study's findings also may serve to support China's continued dynamic development of its new maritime inclinations. Further research should be done to see what lessons Chinese leaders take from the series.



## Notes

This chapter represents only the authors' personal opinions and not the policies or analyses of the U.S. Navy or any other element of the U.S. government. The authors thank Alexander Liebman for his useful insights.

1. For more on the Central Committee Political Bureau group session, see 袁正明, 主任 [Yuan Zhengming et al.], 中央电视台“大国崛起”节目组 [China Central Television “Rise of Great Powers” Program Group], 德国 [Germany], vol. 5, “大国崛起”系列丛书 [“Rise of Great Powers” Book Series] (Beijing: 中国民主法制出版社 [China Democratic and Legal Institutions Press], 2006), 205–10. For President Hu Jintao's directive, see Irene Wang, “Propaganda Takes Back Seat in Fêted CCTV Series,” *South China Morning Post*, 27 November 2006, OSC# CPP20061127715018. Individuals associated with producing *The Rise of Great Powers*, when quoted in the Chinese media, have often minimized or denied that there is an official connection. See Long Yuqin and Shen Liang, “The Rise of Great Powers’ Has No Special Political Background,” 南方周末 [Southern Weekend], 30 November 2006, OSC# CPP20061205050002. Also see “The Rise of Nations,” *China Daily*, 25 November 2006, OSC# CPP20061125052001. At minimum, however, it must be recognized that the series was produced by China's state-owned media and benefitted from the insights of China's foremost scholars and analysts.
2. Chiang Hsun, “China Explores Secrets of Rise of Great Powers: Institutions, Quality of People, Soft Power,” 亚洲周刊 [AsiaWeek], no. 49 (10 December 2006): 68–73, OSC# CPP20061207710014.
3. Joseph Kahn, “China, Shy Giant, Shows Signs of Shedding Its False Modesty,” *New York Times*, 9 December 2006, www.nytimes.com.
4. Jiang Shengxin, “Why Has the ‘Rise of Great Powers’ Attracted Such Widespread Attention—A Wen Hui Bao Staff Reporter Interviews Experts and Scholars Who Shed Light on the Reasons for the Ratings Miracle Wrought by a Documentary,” *Wen Hui Bao*, 11 December 2006, OSC# CPP20061213050001; Dominic Zigler, “Reaching for a Renaissance,” *Economist*, 31 March 2007, 4; Aric Chen, “The Next Cultural Revolution,” *Fast Company*, June 2007, 73.
5. Chiang Hsun, “China Explores Secrets,” 68–73.
6. Zhao Huayong, “Let History Illuminate Our Future Path,” “The Rise of Great Powers” (CCTV website), <http://finance.cctv.com/special/C16860/01/index.shtml>.
7. For an indication of the range and sophistication of related scholarship, see the recent series in a premier Academy of Military Sciences journal, 中国军事科学 [China Military Science] 20, no. 3 (2007); 李效东 [Li Xiaodong], “大国崛起安全战略的历史考察” [“A Historical Review of the Security Strategies of Rising World Powers”], 39–49; 王春生 [Wang Chunsheng], “美国国家安全战略选择探析” [“An Analysis of the Strategic Choices for U.S. National Security”], 50–61; 原颖 [Yuan Ying], “法国国家安全战略钩沉” [“A Study of the Strategic Choices for French National Security”], 62–72; 丁皓, 万伟 [Ding Hao and Wan Wei], “从殖民地走向大国的崛起之路—印度国家安全战略选择” [“The Road from Former Colony to Rising World Power—Strategic Choices for Indian National Security”], 73–84. See also, 张文木 [Zhang Wenmu], “欧美地缘政治格局的历史演变” [“Historical Evolution of Euro-American Geopolitical Patterns”], 中国军事科学 [China Military Science] 20, no. 1 (2007): 30–38; 丁一平, 李洛荣, 龚连娣 [Ding Yiping, Li Luorong, and Gong Liandi], 世界海军史 [The History of World Navies from the Chinese Perspective] (Beijing: 海潮出版社 [Sea Tide Press], 2000).
8. Chen Fong-Ching and Jin Guantao, *From Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy: The Chinese Popular Cultural Movement and Political Transformation 1979–1989* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1997), 221–22.
9. Ibid., 222.
10. Wang, “Propaganda Takes Back Seat.” To these national soul-searching historical series might be added 走向共和 [For the Sake of the Republic] a fifty-nine-episode Chinese television series that covers the Qing Dynasty's collapse and the Republic of China's founding.
11. Even such sources as the daily newspaper sponsored by the Communist Youth League of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee emphasize this willingness to learn from abroad. See, for example, 徐百柯 [Xu Baike], “何谓大国? 如何崛起?—电视纪录片‘大国崛起’总策划麦天枢访谈” [“What Is a Big Power? How Does a Country Spring into Being?—An Interview with Mai Tianshu, Chief Producer of the CCTV Documentary ‘Rise of Great Nations’”], 青年报 [China Youth Daily], 29 November 2006, [http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2006-11/29/content\\_1591021.htm](http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2006-11/29/content_1591021.htm), OSC# CPP20061130715007.
12. For more on this controversy, see Zhang Shunhong, “Worries Emerge and Linger in the Air—After Watching ‘The Rise of Great Nations,’ *Studies on Marxism*, January 2007, 111–14, OSC# CPP20070726332002; Chiang Hsun, “China Explores Secrets of Rise of Great Powers; He Sanwei, “Opportunity and Right of ‘Misinterpretation,’” 南方周末 [Southern Weekend], 14 December 2006, OSC# CPP20061214050003.
13. Unless otherwise specified, quotations and summaries in this chapter are derived from the film series 中央电视台十二集大型电视纪录片 [China Central Television Large Scale Documentary No. 12], “大国崛起” [“The Rise of Great Powers”], 2006.
14. Unless otherwise specified, quotations and summaries in this section are derived from “第一集: 海洋时代 (开篇·葡西)” [“Part 1: The Age of the Sea (Introduction, Portugal, and Spain)”], CCTV International, 14 November 2006, www.cctv.com.
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16. “Part 12: 第十二集 大道行思 (结尾)” [“The Big Way (Final Part)”], Transcript of the last part of CCTV-2 Program, “The Rise of Great Powers,” CCTV, 25 November 2006, www.cctv.com.cn, OSC# CPP20061215071001.
17. Dai Xu, “The Rise of World Powers.”
18. “Part 12: The Big Way (Final Part).”
19. Ibid.
20. Dai Xu, “The Rise of World Powers.”



21. Ye Zicheng, "China's Peaceful Development: The Return and Development of Land Power," *世界经济与政治* [*World Economics & Politics*], February 2007, 23–31, OSC# CPP2007032329001.
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23. Senior Col. Zhang Wei, "Exploring National Sea Security Theories," *中国军事科学* [*China Military Science*], January 2007, 84–91, OSC# CPP20070621436009.
24. Unless otherwise specified, quotations and summaries in this section are derived from "第三集: 走向现代 (英国上)" ["Part 3: Moving towards Modern Times (England, first part)"]; "第四集: 工业先声 (英国下)" ["Part 4: First Signs of Industry (England, second part)"], CCTV International, 16 and 17 November 2006, www.cctv.com.
25. Zhang Wei, "Exploring National Sea Security Theories," 84–91.
26. Ye Zicheng, "China's Peaceful Development," 23–31.
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29. Yan Xuetong, quoted in Wang Haijing, "An International Mirror for a Rising China," *Liaowang*, no. 50, 11 December 2006, 56–57, OSC# CPP20061219715005.
30. Unless otherwise specified, quotations and summaries in this section are derived from "第七集: 百年维新 (日本)" ["Part 7: One Hundred Years of Reform and Modernization (Japan)"], CCTV International, 20 November 2006, www.cctv.com.
31. Yuan Zhengming et al., *Japan*, vol. 6, "Rise of Great Powers" Book Series, 136–39.
32. *Ibid.*, 140–41.
33. *Ibid.*, 142.
34. 张文木 [Zhang Wenmu], "Modern China Needs a New Concept of Sea Power," *环球时报* [*Global Times*], 12 January 2007, <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper68/>, OSC# CPP20070201455002.
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37. Unless otherwise specified, quotations and summaries in this section are derived from "第十集: 新国新梦 (美国上)" ["Part 10: New Country, New Dream (U.S., first part)"]; "第十一集: 危局新政 (美国下)" ["Part 11: Dangerous Time, New Politics"], CCTV International, 24 November 2006, www.cctv.com.
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39. "Wang Jisi and Zhou Yan on the Real Story of the Rise of the Great Powers," Sina.com, 22 November 2006, OSC# CPP20061207038001.
40. Zhang Wei, "Exploring National Sea Security Theories," 84–91.
41. *China Military Science* is published by the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences. Unless otherwise indicated, quotations in this paragraph are from 徐起 [Xu Qi], "21世纪初海上地缘战略与中国海军的发展" ["Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early 21st Century"], *中国军事科学* [*China Military Science*] 17, no. 4 (2004): 75–81. Translation by Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein published in *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 46–67.
42. Dai Xu, "The Rise of World Powers."
43. Yuan Zhengming et al., *United States*, vol. 8, "Rise of Great Powers" Book Series, 141.
44. *Ibid.*
45. "'Focus' Program: 'Rise of Great Powers'—Episode 11: A New Deal in a Time of Crisis (United States, Part 2)," CCTV, 24 November 2006, www.cctv.com.cn, OSC# CPP20061215071003.
46. *Ibid.*
47. For World War II and the U.S. emergence as a superpower, see Yuan Zhengming et al., *United States*, vol. 8, "Rise of Great Powers" Book Series, 234–38.
48. "'Focus' Program: 'Rise of Great Powers'—Episode 11: A New Deal in a Time of Crisis (United States, Part 2)," CCTV, 24 November 2006, OSC# CPP20061215071003.
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51. *Ibid.*
52. Ye Zicheng, "Geopolitics From a Greater Historical Perspective."
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55. Yuan Zhengming et al., *France*, vol. 4, "Rise of Great Powers" Book Series, 39.
56. Tang Pu, ed., *The Rise of Great Powers*, 214.
57. *Ibid.*, 215.



58. Ibid., 217.
59. Unless otherwise indicated, quotations in this paragraph are from Xu Qi, "Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy," 75–81.
60. Tang Pu, ed., *The Rise of Great Powers*, 217.
61. Ibid., 217.
62. Ibid., 231.
63. Ibid., 232.
64. For example, one well-known Chinese scholar used the term "appeasement" to describe China's present policies vis-à-vis Taiwan, suggesting that Beijing would have to resort to force or become the victim of further bullying. Interview, Beijing, March 2007.
65. "Part 5: Years of Passion."
66. Unless otherwise specified, quotations and summaries in this section are derived from "第六集: 帝国春秋 (德国)" ["Part 6: An Empire's Spring and Autumn (Germany)"], CCTV International, 19 November 2006, www.cctv.com.
67. Tang Pu, ed., *The Rise of Great Powers*, 237.
68. Ibid., 250.
69. Ibid., 251.
70. Ibid., 264.
71. Ibid., 266.
72. Ibid., 268.
73. Ibid., 267.
74. Ibid., 139.
75. Ibid., 273.
76. Ibid., 265.
77. Ibid., 276.
78. Ibid., 277.
79. "Part 12: The Big Way (Final Part)."
80. Unless otherwise specified, quotations and summaries in this section are derived from "第八集: 寻道图强 (俄国)" ["Part 8: Searching for the Way, Seeking Strength"]; "第九集: 风云新途 (苏联)" ["Part 9: Unstable Situation, New Way"], CCTV International, 22 and 23 November 2006, www.cctv.com.
81. "Part 12: The Big Way (Final Part)."
82. Tang Pu, ed., *The Rise of Great Powers*, 335.
83. Yuan Zhengming et al., *Russia*, vol. 7, "Rise of Great Powers" Book Series, 9.
84. Tang Pu, ed., *The Rise of Great Powers*, 339.
85. Ibid., 337.
86. Ibid., 339.
87. Ibid., 336–37.
88. Yuan Zhengming et al., *Russia*, vol. 7, "Rise of Great Powers" Book Series, 38.
89. Ibid., 39.
90. Unless otherwise indicated, quotations in this paragraph are from Xu Qi, "Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy," 75–81.
91. Yuan Zhengming et al., *Russia*, vol. 7, "Rise of Great Powers" Book Series, 15.
92. Tang Pu, ed., *The Rise of Great Powers*, 352.
93. Ibid., 354.
94. Ibid., 359.
95. Yuan Zhengming et al., *Russia*, vol. 7, "Rise of Great Powers" Book Series, 39.
96. Tang Pu, ed., *Rise of Great Powers*, 371.
97. See, for example, 王辑思 [Wang Jisi], "苏美争霸的历史教训和美中国的崛起新道路" ["The Historic Lesson of the U.S.-Soviet Contest for Hegemony and China's Peaceful Rise"], essay in 中国和平崛起新道路 [*China's Peaceful Rise: The New Path*] (Beijing: 中共中央党校国际战略研究所 [Central Committee of the CCP Party School International Strategy Research Institute], April 2004).
98. "Wang Jisi and Zhou Yan on the Real Story of the Rise of the Great Powers," Sina.com, 22 November 2006, OSC# CPP20061207038001.
99. Tang Pu, ed., *The Rise of Great Powers*, 372.
100. Ye Zicheng, "Geopolitics from a Greater Historical Perspective."
101. Dai Xu, "The Rise of World Powers."
102. "'Focus' Program: 'Rise of Great Powers'—Episode 11: A New Deal in a Time of Crisis (United States, Part 2)," CCTV, 24 November 2006, www.cctv.com.cn, OSC# CPP20061215071003.
103. See Yuan Zhengming et al., *Japan*, vol. 6, "Rise of Great Powers" Book Series, 136–39.
104. "Part 12: The Big Way (Final Part)."
105. Tang Pu, ed., *Rise of Great Powers*, 217.
106. Ibid., 371.
107. "Part 12: The Big Way (Final Part)."
108. Ibid.
109. Liu Jiangping and Zhui Yue, "Management of the Sea in the 21st Century: Whither the Chinese Navy?," 当代海军 [*Modern Navy*], 1 June 2007, 6–9, OSC# CPP20070628436012.
110. 杨毅, 主编 [Yang Yi, chief editor], 国家安全战略研究 [*Research on National Security Strategy*] (Beijing: 国防大学出版社 [National Defense University Press], 2007), 319. This concept is related to another slogan from the Self-Strengthening Movement (洋务运动 or 自强运动), "Rich Country, Strong Army" (富国强兵). This concept was appropriated by Japan, initially with great success and later with devastating strategic failure.