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Chinese Views of America's New Maritime Strategy

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA are entering a new era of shared stakes in the global maritime commons. How the two nations interact on the high seas will be of enormous import to their respective futures and that of the international system. The United States is forging a new path with the recent promulgation of a new maritime strategy, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," which was presented by the chief of naval operations (CNO) and the commandants of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard at the International Seapower Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island, on 17 October 2007. China's reaction to the strategy will significantly impact its direction and even perhaps its realization and success.

The new U.S. Maritime Strategy contains a variety of crucial elements that could facilitate enhanced cooperation with China: (1) the emphasis on conflict prevention echoes many elements of Chinese strategic culture and doctrine; (2) the avowed objective of securing the global maritime commons is highly compatible with China's strategic interests; and (3) the new emphasis on humanitarian operations, especially, offers opportunities for bilateral cooperation to build mutual trust.

This chapter describes the new U.S. Maritime Strategy and surveys unofficial Chinese responses to date. Most Chinese analyses laud the strategy's

focus on conflict prevention and international cooperation but emphasize that the strategy is not altruistic and instead serves U.S. national interests. Placing the onus on the United States to demonstrate its strategic "sincerity," Chinese observers are waiting for the new Maritime Strategy's ideals to be realized through concrete U.S. actions. This study subsequently reviews cooperative efforts relevant to the strategy before candidly examining major remaining obstacles to enhanced cooperation while also emphasizing the need to more fully explore the new strategy and China's attitude as a maritime stakeholder. While China appears to be maintaining a cautious, hedging approach in its rhetoric, actual maritime cooperation is proceeding quietly.

A Path-Breaking Document

The new Maritime Strategy embodies a historic reassessment of the international system and how the United States can best pursue its interests in harmony with those of other nation-states. The unveiling of the strategy in front of the heads of nearly one hundred navies and coast guards from around the world demonstrated initial global maritime inclusiveness. The new direction for a U.S. Maritime Strategy began with a landmark speech delivered at the 17th International Seapower Symposium, held at the U.S. Naval War College in September 2005, by then–U.S. CNO Admiral Michael Mullen. He called for a series of "Global Maritime Partnerships" spearheaded by a "thousand-ship navy" that would bring the maritime forces of friendly nations together based on their abilities, needs, and interests to provide collective security against a variety of threats in the maritime commons.[1]

Under the leadership of Admiral Mullen and Admiral Gary Roughead—the current CNO—the U.S. government has brought all three of its maritime forces (the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) together for the first time to produce a unified strategic document, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower."[2] This new strategy incorporates the ideas of U.S. military officers, government civilians, and academics.

As former U.S. secretary of the navy Donald C. Winter has cautioned, the United States is "not walking away from, diminishing, or retreating in any way from those elements of hard power that win wars—or deter them from ever breaking out in the first place."[3] But this first major U.S. Maritime Strategy in twenty-five years is based on the premise that "preventing wars is as important as winning wars."[4] The strategy places renewed emphasis on cooperating to protect the global maritime commons (shared international space) on which

the security and prosperity of nations around the world depend, as demonstrated by Gabriel Collins in his chapter in this volume. In this new vision, U.S. maritime forces will focus more heavily on participating in collective security efforts that recognize the importance of broad coalitions "in an open, multi-polar world."[5] Long-term engagement with other nations, in the form of maritime law enforcement (e.g., against terrorism, proliferation, and drug trafficking), regional maritime governance frameworks, capacity building, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief will be emphasized. This is because trust and cooperation, while vital to collective defense against security threats, cannot simply "be surged" to respond to a crisis; they must be painstakingly built and maintained on a permanent basis.[6]

The new U.S. Maritime Strategy represents a significant departure from the last major strategy, as defined by Navy secretary John F. Lehman Jr. in his 1986 "Maritime Strategy."[7] War fighting played a much more prominent role in that policy document: whereas the Soviet Union was the explicit focus of the 1986 strategy, today there is no identified adversary. The new eleven-page strategy document is not detailed, but it does contain a powerful vision. In today's globalized and uncertain world, U.S. maritime forces are committed to working with other states' forces to maintain the security of the global maritime commons. Every nation has the opportunity to participate in this process; no nation is explicitly excluded. Rather, it is only nations and substate actors that actively decide to challenge or disrupt the cooperative process that could become a threat to the existing order and hence trigger countermeasures on the part of the United States and its global maritime partners.

While it is premature to predict the degree to which the new U.S. Maritime Strategy will succeed in shaping and safeguarding the global maritime commons, a variety of indicators should be monitored over the next several years.[8] Within the U.S. Navy, continued CNO support and the appearance of the Maritime Strategy's principles in key navy planning documents as well as national strategy pillar documents will provide important barometers of success.[9] Already, U.S. military planning documents, including the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)—the Pentagon's guiding strategy document—and the March 2010 Joint Operating Environment (JOE) echo the Maritime Strategy's emphasis on developing and maintaining international partnerships to address shared nonconventional security threats and thereby safeguard the security of the global maritime commons.[10] As in the past, reactions from other military services (e.g., the U.S. Army), Congress, and mass media will signal policy and monetary support for relevant programs. Given U.S. fiscal difficulties, particularly given the global financial crisis, ongoing

challenges associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the continuing counterterrorism mission, implementation is likely to be subject to budgetary limitations. Cooperation and coordination between the U.S. Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard will be particularly important to the strategy's successful functioning.

Why Chinese Views Matter

A broad acceptance of and participation in the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative by the international community will likewise be essential if the strategy is to fulfill its intended goals. In light of the strategy's focus on building partnerships to better safeguard the global maritime commons, it is vital that U.S. leaders understand clearly the frank and unvarnished views of allies, friends, and potential partners. The new Maritime Strategy generates responses from numerous states.[11] As U.S. leaders work to implement global maritime partnerships in the years ahead, they must carefully study the reactions of the nations and maritime forces with which they hope to work.

Chinese responses to the strategy warrant especially close consideration. China is a key global stakeholder with which the United States shares many common maritime interests. Beijing has not yet made any official public statements on the Maritime Strategy. Yet Chinese opinions on this matter are clearly important, even if they suggest that in some areas the two nations must "agree to disagree." Chinese reactions to the Maritime Strategy provide a window into a larger strategic dynamic, not just in East Asia, where China is already developing as a great power, but also globally, where it is playing an ever-greater role. How the United States can maintain its existing status and role while China continues to rise will be perhaps the critical question in international relations for the twenty-first century.[12]

Elements of the new U.S. Maritime Strategy could further cooperation with China. First, the strategy's emphasis on conflict prevention is compatible with many elements of Chinese strategic culture and doctrine in general, and new missions of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in particular. The PLA's fourth mission, "play an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development," is especially relevant in this regard.[13] Second, the avowed objective of securing the global maritime commons is highly compatible with China's strategic interests. China relies increasingly on the oceans to import tremendous amounts of energy and raw materials, and to ship its finished goods to market. At the same time, while its navy becomes increasingly

formidable as a means of asserting influence over Taiwan and contested littoral maritime areas, it has not yet developed the extensive high-end blue water capabilities needed to independently safeguard interests farther afield. The key for the United States will be to attempt to convince China that the goals and intentions of the new strategy are real and not, as many in China fear, merely "window-dressing" or camouflage for "containment" of China. Third, the new emphasis on humanitarian operations offers opportunities for bilateral cooperation to build mutual trust even as Beijing may avoid participating in activities that it deems objectionable.

Complex Reactions

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has a long tradition of informing its policy elites on international affairs through the widespread translation of foreign news and documents. Since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's reforms in the early 1980s, which opened the way for market forces and more widespread circulation of information (e.g., through an increasingly diverse and lively news media), a "public intellectual complex" has emerged. Members of this community of strategic scholars and policymakers at a variety of private and public institutions engage in vigorous debates; publish widely in specialized and popular journals; make media appearances; and, on occasion, brief policymakers, sometimes even China's senior leadership. Some intellectuals are privy to internal deliberations and a few play a major role in shaping policy, particularly in specialized subject areas. Even when Chinese public intellectuals are not directly involved in the policy process, their views often have substantive impact. Their ideas may inform policymakers indirectly and may even be adopted as policy. They may also play a role in justifying or socializing already-established policies. When politics or bureaucratic maneuvering comes to the fore, they may become caught up in a larger competition of ideas. For all these reasons, the writings of public intellectuals are particularly worth examining for possible insights into Chinese policy debates, even government decision making. Chinese analysts are meticulous students of policy documents from major countries (particularly the United States) and scrutinize their texts in the belief that wording contains specific insights; any such document is likely to receive careful vetting in Chinese publications. In this context, it is hardly surprising that the Maritime Strategy has been subject to Chinese description and evaluation. In the years following the strategy's promulgation, a variety of assessments has emerged.

Early Media Portrayals

The strategy has been covered extensively in China's civilian (and, to a lesser extent, military) press. The vast majority of these articles are brief and descriptive.[14] Some of the more extensive ones touch on the strategy indirectly in discussing more broadly the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific, and several are rather sensational in their obsession with the idea that the United States is attempting to contain China. Still, initial articles and news reports do offer some insight into Chinese assessments of the U.S. Maritime Strategy.

Some analyses evince a desire to better understand the Maritime Strategy and the reasons for its promulgation. An article in China's military affairs press develops the overall theme that the strategy and other U.S. military realignments are "inseparable from the Iraq War" but also states that "there are also different voices within the U.S. Navy."[15] The basic facts of the strategy's promulgation are well covered, and even such details as the influence of "Conversations with the Country" (与国家对话)—efforts to educate the American public about the strategy and incorporate its feedback—are recognized.[16] In October 2007, for instance, an article in *International Herald Leader*, a weekly general affairs newspaper, described a new emphasis on soft power and highlighted the document's balance of preventing war with winning war.[17] While seemingly open to this new approach, the article quotes a U.S. official as stating that the new strategy fails to address critical issues, such as "commercial fleets, industrial bases, polar resources and missile defense."[18] In a theme common to nearly all Chinese articles on the subject, however, the author states, "so-called 'international cooperation' still serves the global deployment of U.S. sea power."[19]

More blatant suspicions of U.S. intent are often on prominent display. Many Chinese observers contend that U.S. military activities are specifically designed to "'encircle' China." In one case, emphasis is expressed with regard to U.S. military activities with the Philippines, which, located in Southeast Asia and so close to Taiwan, is seen by two Chinese reporters as being vital for such "encirclement."[20] This last point, while seeming to ignore the overwhelming rationale for counterterrorism cooperation between Washington and Manila, does underscore the centrality of Taiwan to the U.S.–China relationship. The theme of Chinese "encirclement" is likely to continue to influence bilateral strategic interactions.

Many articles infer ulterior motives for the new U.S. Maritime Strategy with their assessments of the strategy's determination to "contain potential competitors."[21] An October 2007 article on the Xinhua News Web site maintains that

while the U.S. public believes that the strategy reflects a new emphasis on cooperation, in fact "this strategy's basic objective still lies in preserving America's maritime hegemonic status. . . . The U.S. emphasis on so-called 'international cooperation' is for the mission of deploying U.S. sea power globally."[22] A transcript from China's state television network concurs: "Although on the surface it might appear that the new U.S. Maritime Strategy is not as overbearing as its predecessor, its basic objectives have not changed in the slightest."[23] A People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) magazine article states, "The latest cover for U.S. sea power is called 'maritime cooperation.'"[24] These strongly expressed sentiments suggest that some Chinese observers at this early stage of the new strategy's application may already believe that U.S. sea power and ambitions remain fundamentally unchanged and continue to challenge China's interests.

A somewhat more balanced account in *China Defense News* opines that "cooperating with other countries is a necessary choice to protect U.S. interests." At the same time, it states that "the [USS *George*] *Washington* [carrier strike group] will undoubtedly further strengthen U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific region."[25] Increasing U.S. focus on deploying forces to the Western Pacific is the subject of several articles.[26] China's military and civilian media have been monitoring U.S. military deployments in the Asia-Pacific with concern well before the strategy's promulgation.[27]

Other unofficial sources do articulate the balance of challenges and opportunities for China in the area of maritime strategy. The *People's Daily Online* attempted to place the new document within the larger context of America's strategic conditions.[28] Having previously suffered from a "strategically confusing" period with the removal of its Soviet competitor, and having labored mightily to respond to the September 11 terrorist attacks and support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Navy, *People's Daily Online* reports, has been too busy to conduct a systematic self-examination of its long-term development until very recently. The new U.S. Maritime Strategy is thus correctly seen as an attempt to re-create strategic clarity and direction for U.S. maritime forces. In a more positive tone, the article contends that the new U.S. Maritime Strategy is "quite gentle, and it really embodies the lofty ideal of 'cooperation,' and regards war prevention as an important mission of U.S. sea power." Moreover, the author notes, "this is the first time that a U.S. official document has put forward the concept [of a] 'multi-polar world,'" a foreign policy goal long championed by Beijing.

Yet the gist of the analysis is consistent with the other analyses in its concern with and suspicion of U.S. motivations. Had Washington not revised its maritime strategy to emphasize fighting nontraditional security challenges such as

terrorism in keeping with changes to the international system following the end of the Cold War, "the mighty U.S. fleet [would] be like a giant that [had] lost its way, a colossus without any merit." Renewed U.S. emphasis on cooperation and humanitarian operations is thus not seen as being altruistic. Rather, it is a utilitarian repackaging of a time-honored power-politics approach. "In this strategic document that emphasizes protecting the global system, there is not a single mention of the role of the United Nations," the author continues. "Will the nations of the world identify with and accept a maritime security system presided over by the United States?" The article concludes, "Americans have recognized the weaknesses of the unilateralism of the last several years . . . What [the strategy] expresses can only be one thing, that is, American hegemony has put on a new cover called 'cooperation.'"

Still, the potential for a significant change in U.S. naval strategy is taken seriously by some analysts. An article by China's Xinhua news agency states that "within the next 15 years, the U.S. Navy's large scope of maritime operations will become smaller and smaller. Far ocean operations are already no longer the U.S. Navy's focal point."[29] While this may raise questions about Washington's long-term influence, it does suggest that the ongoing focus on counterterrorism is being taken seriously. In a possible indication of perception of U.S. weakness, however, other articles raise questions about U.S. ability to persevere in protracted conflicts.[30]

Substantive Analyses

As this volume went to press, three articles have been published openly that stand out from the rest in their focus on the strategy and their detail and sophistication of analysis. Therefore, they have been selected as the focus of this chapter. The respective authors' affiliations with different major institutions suggest that their writing (through variations in coverage) offers windows into how different elements of China's bureaucracy, with their specific interests and perspectives, assess the new U.S. Maritime Strategy. While these informed commentaries are not definitive and should not be overinterpreted, they may be suggestive of the Chinese government's viewpoint and future policy responses.

The first article is by Dalian Naval Vessel Academy emeritus professor Lu Rude.[31] Lu's full-page article appeared in *People's Navy*, the official newspaper of the PLA Navy, which is published by the PLA Navy's political department and provides guidance for PLA Navy officers and enlisted personnel.[32] The second article is by Wang Baofu, researcher and deputy director of PLA National

Defense University's Institute for Strategic Studies.[33] Wang's article appeared in *Study Times*, a journal of the CCP Central Party School. The third article is by fellow contributor Su Hao, who has himself published a full-length Chinese translation of the strategy.[34] Su's article appeared in *Leaders*, a popular magazine on current affairs and policy published in Hong Kong for popular consumption there, as well as for a select mainland audience.

Common Assessments

The three articles give a sophisticated and relatively comprehensive summary of the U.S. Maritime Strategy. They differ in assessing various arguments in its text, and there is some tension between the commonalities that emerge from shared perspectives and those that are products of their following the strategy's original structure. But they share unambiguously several major conclusions.

A New Strategic Direction

All three authors see the new U.S. Maritime Strategy as representing a major shift from the Maritime Strategy of 1986. Each regards the strategies issued in the interim as products of post–Cold War strategic uncertainties, with little lasting influence.[35] They characterize the current strategy as fundamentally different. Su explains that when formulating the 2007 edition, "U.S. Navy theoretical circles were faced with the new situation of international anti-terrorism and the rapid rise of emerging countries." Wang states that the new strategy "not only has new judgments and positions concerning maritime security threats, but more importantly has new thinking regarding how to use military power to meet national security objectives." All emphasize the importance of the subject at hand: in Wang's words, "As a bellwether of world military transformation, U.S. maritime strategic transformation merits scrutiny."

Emphasis on Cooperation and Conflict Prevention

All three analysts describe—with apparent approbation—the strategy's explicit focus on cooperation. Su declares that "it prominently emphasizes maritime security cooperation." Wang states that "the U.S. military's 'maritime strategy' has already taken 'international cooperation' as an important principle. This . . . indicates that the United States security and military strategy will face a major new adjustment." Lu writes, "One can see that the new U.S. Maritime Strategy emphasizes 'military software' such as 'humanitarian rescue missions and improving cooperative relations between the U.S. and every country.'"

The analysts all emphasize that the new Maritime Strategy elevates preventing war to an equal status with winning wars. They interpret war prevention as involving primarily soft power operations, as opposed to deterrence based on war winning capabilities to undergird otherwise cooperative approaches. Wang terms the emphasis on war prevention the strategy's "most prominent feature." Lu describes this "conspicuous new viewpoint" as being a product of "major change" and recognizes the utility of "maritime military operations other than war" and increased "international cooperation and non-combat use of navies," to include humanitarian rescue missions and improved cooperative relations with other regions. Su describes this as a "major bright spot." Chinese analysts implicitly welcome a U.S. Navy more focused than before on such missions vis-à-vis sea control and power projection.

But the Chinese analysts are not prepared to fully acknowledge that war prevention may require substantial coercive capabilities, and they do not endorse U.S. efforts in this area.[36] They quite naturally examine regional maritime security from the perspective of China's national interests. These include emphasizing the use of venues in which Beijing is relatively influential (e.g., the United Nations) to address disputes and limit foreign military influence. In the views of many Chinese, letting other states unduly shape these areas could—in a worst-case scenario—lead to military intervention in a manner that could harm China's regional influence and sovereignty claims.[37] In the analysts' apparent unwillingness to acknowledge that conflict prevention can sometimes rely on coercive capabilities, one can see an effort to emphasize desired elements of the document while deemphasizing or contesting undesired ones—a common practice in both policy analysis and international relations.

Mention of Multipolarity

The analysts also note the Maritime Strategy's reference to a "multipolar" world. Lu describes this as a "first time" shift in U.S. policy documents. In the present author's opinion, however, the term "multipolar" (which is often confused with "multilateral") does not properly describe the current international system, at least from a U.S. scholarly or policy perspective.[38] Moreover, many Chinese audiences regard multipolar (多极) as having a specific meaning akin to: "a world in which there are several major regional powers and no single superpower hegemon."[39] This situation would be realized in the near future only by substantial relative decline in U.S. power to the benefit of other emerging major powers. A small but increasingly influential Chinese school of thought promoting an American "decline theory" (衰落论)—which lost influence after it incorrectly predicted the emergence of multipolarity follow-

ing the Cold War's end—has recently gained ground with the U.S. difficulties in Iraq and elsewhere.[40] The strategy's very use of the term "multipolar," therefore, appears to validate the Chinese government's vision of the benefits of a decline in American hegemony, which it has described periodically as a threat to its core interests.[41] According to China's Foreign Ministry, "Multipolarization on the whole helps weaken and curb hegemonism and power politics, serves to bring about a just and equitable new international political and economic order and contributes to world peace and development."[42] China's 2008 Defense White Paper judges that "economic globalization and world multi-polarization are gaining momentum."[43] To be sure, directly promoting the erosion of U.S. hegemony on a global scale is not an active policy on the part of China's government, which remains focused on internal development and defense of core interests on China's periphery. And the writings surveyed clearly state that the United States is still hegemonic and thus retains significant deterrence power.[44] However, in the present author's personal view, encouraging the misperception that U.S. power is ebbing risks harming U.S. deterrence capabilities in the longer term.

Together with other apparent instances of the United States recognizing the limitations of its power and influence, the author believes that such a change of attitude is likely to be seen by many Chinese as being inspired not by sudden enlightenment in an altruistic sense but rather by growing recognition of weakness (in light of previously overly ambitious strategic goals). Indeed, the analysts cited here welcome, as Su points out in almost Corbettian fashion, a strategy apparently based on recognition of limitations (i.e., U.S. "ability is not equal to its ambition") and a consequent reliance on cooperation with other international partners. As Su states, paraphrasing the strategy itself, "no country alone has adequate resources to ensure the security of the entire maritime area." In the author's opinion, then, the problematic use of the term "multipolar" potentially risks engendering misinterpretation, miscalculations, and false expectations on the part of Chinese analysts. Or, perhaps even worse, the term may make the strategy's rhetoric seem removed from the reality of U.S. force structure and deployments. Care should be taken in further interactions with Chinese counterparts to counteract any potential misperceptions in this regard.

Appreciation of Domestic Dimensions

The analysts also recognize the interagency aspects of U.S. maritime cooperation and coordination. As Su notes, this is the "first time that the U.S. sea services jointly issued a strategic report." He notes the strategy's injunction that "coordination and cooperation must be strengthened among the mari-

time forces of each military service and each domestic department." This indicates recognition that cooperation and coordination between the U.S. Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard will be particularly important to the strategy's successful functioning. In Wang's analysis, as will be discussed in more detail, he displays significant understanding of the U.S. defense policy process.

A Special Role for Naval Forces

The analysts see the maritime domain as being vital to many nations' development and recognize the central role that the U.S. Navy has played in the world. Wang contends that "the ability of the United States to become the world hegemon is directly related to its . . . comprehension of sea power, and [its] emphasis on maritime force development." All three note the strategy's own wording that today "the majority of the world's population lives within several hundred kilometers from the ocean, 90 percent of world trade is dependent on maritime transport, [and] maritime security has a direct bearing on the American people's way of life." Lu additionally observes (using wording similar to that of Wang) that naval forces are particularly relevant to fighting terrorism because of such "special characteristics" as "mobility, which gives [them] the ability to advance and withdraw, to deter and fight."

Asia-Pacific Focus

All three scholars identify the Asia-Pacific as a priority area for U.S. naval presence. Lu describes the Middle East as a "powder keg" and acknowledges the status of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea—the two other areas specifically mentioned in the strategy—as strategic energy lifelines. But he uses his own interpretation to connect several issues mentioned in the strategy, concluding that "the Western Pacific is determined to be 'a region of high tension' where the U.S. has the responsibility to 'carry out treaty obligations' to its allies and to 'contain potential strategic competitors.'" Wang and Su also take notice of the Maritime Strategy's specific mention of the Western Pacific.

Continued Hegemony

Most important, all three analysts view the strategy as part of a larger U.S. effort to maintain its predominant international power and capabilities for unilateral action. They do acknowledge that the new strategy is far more cooperative than the 1986 version in both concept and rhetoric. Wang states that "overbearing, offensive language is relatively reduced, and there is noticeably more emphasis on 'strategic cooperation.'" Lu notes that "the new Maritime

Strategy is relatively moderate compared to the previous version in its use of words and style." But, he emphasizes, while the strategy "projects the pleasant words of 'peace,' 'cooperation,' and 'war prevention,' hegemonic thinking remains its main thread." The analysts see the United States as being unwilling to abandon the traditional "hegemony" and "sea control" that its capabilities have long afforded it. Wang judges that the United States retains a long-standing "maritime hegemonic mentality," which he traces to Mahanian thought, and remains "the only superpower in the world today." He adds, "Because the U.S. . . . places maritime power above all others, its maritime strategy can be better described as serving its global hegemony rather than safeguarding the world maritime order." Lu charges that "the hegemonic U.S. thinking of dominating the world's oceans has not changed at all." In his view, "what is behind 'cooperation' is America's interests, having 'partners or the participation of allies' likewise serves America's global interests."

The Chinese analysts express concern that the United States retains power to threaten core Chinese interests. These interests include reunification with Taiwan, assertion of sovereignty over disputed islands (and associated resources and air and water space) on China's maritime periphery, and ultimately some form of sea-lane security and regional maritime influence. Chinese concerns in this area offer a useful caution regarding the possibilities of U.S.–China cooperation in the near term.

Diverging Viewpoints

Despite these shared viewpoints, there are identifiable differences in focus and interpretation among the three analysts. By chance, the Maritime Strategy's promulgation has coincided with a vigorous and unprecedented debate within China concerning its own maritime development. The three Chinese assessments of the U.S. strategy, particularly in their judgments about the contours and directions of U.S. strategy, cannot help but influence that debate.

A Model for PLA Navy Development?

Lu's lengthy, complex analysis contains apparent attempts to use the new Maritime Strategy, rightly or wrongly, as evidence of an elevated position of influence for the U.S. Navy. Lu writes that the new U.S. Maritime Strategy demonstrates that the Navy "has been placed in an extremely prominent position" and "continues to serve as the daring vanguard and main force of U.S. global strategy." While the latter point may seem optimistic to some, this does

realistically describe the character of U.S. power projection from Lu's strategic vantage point in maritime East Asia. Even in its current fiscal difficulties, the U.S. Navy in terms of capabilities alone must seem very impressive to the PLA Navy. Such a portrayal of U.S. naval power and influence is consistent with his advocacy of rapid, robust Chinese maritime development.

There are several indications that Lu's evaluation, in addition to educating PLA Navy officers about the U.S. Maritime Strategy, may also contain an implicit argument for a similar increase in the PLA Navy's mission from access denial to blue water SLOC defense consistent with China's growing interests as a great power.[45] More than Su and even Wang, Lu appears to believe that "the oceans have become a new domain for rivalry." He notes that "the Western Pacific is the area of most intense competition among nations for maritime sovereignty," "has the highest growth and concentration of the world's naval forces," and "is the sea area where the U.S. military conducts the largest and most frequent maritime exercises with its allies." Lu appears also to hint that PLA Navy development must inevitably be used to balance against U.S. naval power projection. "Some Asian countries are rising rapidly, have abundant economic and technological strength, and possess nuclear weapons," he notes elliptically. "They will directly influence and challenge American hegemonism."

Here Lu may be arguing implicitly for some form of PLA Navy power projection capabilities, perhaps in the form of deck aviation (as might be broadly surmised from the context). In East Asia, he emphasizes, the United States "dispatches carrier battle groups to cruise around in a heightened state of war readiness." Were it operationally feasible, one might infer, China could benefit from having similar capabilities to protect its sovereignty claims. And "by setting up point defenses and carrying out strategic deployment, the U.S. is prepared to act at any time and to intervene" in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, where China has similar interests in SLOC security and energy access.

In time, at least by Lu's ambitious standards, China might likewise benefit from a navy that could maximize its forward presence while minimizing its international footprint to avoid the tremendous political risk of overseas bases, which the PRC has foresworn since its founding in 1949. This would allow for a Chinese approach to power projection—respecting sovereignty while influencing events ashore. Wang and Su do not appear to share Lu's emphasis or advocacy. But Lu's arguments should not be dismissed as mere naval promotion.[46] While likely reflecting the PLA Navy's bureaucratic interests, naval advocates publishing in official forums such as Lu must defer to the guidance promulgated by China's civilian leadership. A real danger here is that having Chinese naval development inspired by that of the United States, as manifested

in internal bureaucratic debates and budgetary battles, risks generating the sort of interaction effects that have triggered previous arms races.[47]

Seeking Explanations in Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic Politics

Where Lu takes a narrow institutional approach, Wang seeks larger strategic explanations. Wang describes the new Maritime Strategy as not only representing a major departure from the tone of previous security documents issued by the Bush administration but also as "one of the most far-ranging adjustments in the last 20 years." He sees it as the logical outcome of three major factors: military setbacks in Iraq; the failures of transformation in that conflict; and the need for the Navy to justify its share of the defense budget.[48] "The '9.11' terrorist attacks produced a tremendous assault on the U.S. security concept," Wang observes, in wording akin to Lu's. "The U.S. maritime strategy changed accordingly." The Iraq War experience, Wang states, is teaching America the importance of combining hard and soft power to develop "rational strength." This strategic rethinking, and the concepts of the thousand-ship navy and Global Fleet Stations, "can only be regarded as a major transformation in [U.S. military] understanding of the application of military force in the realization of national interests, following setbacks in earlier unilateralist and pre-emptive strategy."[49] According to Wang, "As Chief of Naval Operations, [Admiral] Mullen repeatedly suggested that 'the old maritime strategy had sea control as a goal, but the new maritime strategy must recognize the economic situation of all nations, [and] not only control the seas, but [also] maintain the security of the oceans, and enable other countries to maintain freedom of passage.' It is precisely through his promotion that the new 'maritime strategy' was introduced."

Wang's charge of strategic overreach is broadly compatible with Su's less abrasive assessment, but it stands in contrast to Lu's, which focuses more on U.S. capabilities than limitations. Wang's third conclusion is based on a sophisticated understanding of the U.S. defense establishment and its policy processes. "For the maritime forces to obtain a larger share of the future defense spending pie, they must lead strategic thinking and initiatives," Wang maintains. At the same time, like many of his peers, he also alleges that people and "military industrial interest groups have worked together to frequently concoct a 'Chinese naval threat theory.'"

Strategic Coherence

Su's largely descriptive article contains a fairly favorable assessment of U.S. maritime power and intentions. Su sees the United States developing a coherent maritime policy in which the Maritime Strategy and "the so-called

'Thousand Ship Navy' concept currently being deliberated in U.S. Navy circles are two sides of the same coin." Where Lu sees a model for PLA Navy development and Wang sees responses within the U.S. military bureaucracy to changing conditions and failed policies, Su sees a diplomatic message that is carefully calibrated and coordinated.

Issues Not Addressed

A number of key uncertainties are neither mentioned nor explored by the analysts. For all their insights, the three analysts do not address the fact that the new U.S. Maritime Strategy is not a stand-alone document, even in the U.S. domestic bureaucratic context.[50] U.S. Navy modernization goals would have seemed a potential subject for inquiry, especially as the U.S. Navy appears first (in 2005) to have derived a goal of increasing its 281-ship fleet to 313 vessels by 2020, and then developed a strategy for their use.[51] These ambiguities between the ends and means of U.S. policy are not explored.

The Maritime Strategy was issued at the end of the second Bush administration, yet the analysts seem to assume that it will serve as a precursor to future policy regardless of changes in U.S. government leadership. It is portrayed more as authoritative policy than a "trial balloon," yet few indications are given as to how it will actually shape U.S. policy. Most U.S. analysts, by contrast, believe that the specific effects of the document on future U.S. maritime policy are not yet certain.[52]

As in the past, reactions from other military services, Congress, and the media will signal policy and monetary support for relevant programs. Wang does appear to allude to this when he states that a major rethinking of military and foreign policy remains under way: "The U.S. intellectual elite is in the process of comprehensively rethinking the war, and this is beginning to have an impact on policy-making departments." Implementation of the new strategy is certain to be subject to budgetary limitations, particularly given the recent recession and ongoing challenges associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. From Wang's perspective, by contrast, "whether the Republican Party or the Democratic Party comes to power, adjustments and changes in the U.S. government's foreign policy are inevitable." Wang and Su appreciate the fiscal challenges that may impact U.S. military spending. None of the analysts appears to entertain the idea, however, that funding constraints might constrain the development of nontraditional low-end capabilities to support the Maritime Strategy.

Are the Chinese analysts "mirror imaging," assuming that the strategy is a more authoritative document than it actually is based on their own experience with a more centralized policy process? Perhaps. But the three analysts cannot be expected to address all of its contents and related issues. What is noteworthy is that all three do emphasize a most important point: a broad acceptance of and participation in the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) initiative by the international community will be essential if the strategy is to fulfill its intended goals. Nevertheless, these collective omissions do suggest that the analyses represent a "first cut" at understanding the strategy and how it may affect China. The goal is apparently to consider some initial implications for maritime development in the United States and China as well as the prospects for future bilateral relations.

Tentative Implications

In the first year and a half since the new U.S. Maritime Strategy's promulgation (during late 2007 and through early 2009), public reaction in China has been relatively muted although substantive commentary has increased over time. There are several likely explanations for this relative reticence. The new strategy may not have been perceived to represent a bona fide shift in U.S. policy—a strategic opportunity for China. Other events, such as cross-strait politics preceding the March 2008 Taiwan presidential election, likely demanded greater attention at the time. Among officials and analysts, lack of direct response may also have represented a deliberate hedging strategy to avoid definitive judgments until the new document could be better understood. On this point, it must be recognized that Beijing may require time and further explanation from the United States before it is ready to issue an official response to the strategy.

These preliminary unofficial Chinese reactions suggest that revising America's maritime strategy alone will not persuade China of positive U.S. intentions. Relative capabilities are important for Beijing, making it hard to believe that the United States will do good with so much power. The Chinese analysts obviously retain major concerns vis-à-vis the goals of U.S. military strategy. Regarding the Maritime Strategy in particular, they worry that beneath a veneer of cooperative rhetoric, they are being asked to tolerate—or even directly acquiesce to—projection of U.S. power in a manner that threatens China's core national interests. In these Chinese views, the new Maritime Strategy recognizes the limits of unilateralism, but a perceived fundamental

arrogance of American power is seen as structural and unchanged. Thus, there is a degree of competing perspectives on the future use of U.S. naval power. Here the cooperative implications of the strategy may run against the grain of much Chinese thinking regarding the United States, particularly its armed forces. The initial reaction remains highly circumspect and more will need to be done to overcome Chinese suspicions. In this regard, America's actions must ultimately speak louder than its words. Unilateral military disarmament in selected areas, though convincing in theory, seems unrealistic. In the absence of actual conflict, however, there should be some room to cooperate.

At the same time, many Chinese analysts are heartened by the new U.S. emphasis on cooperation. While retaining concerns about U.S. strategic objectives, they do not dismiss the strategy outright. For Lu, Washington stands at a strategic crossroads: it must demonstrate its true strategic intentions to Beijing. On the one hand, Lu is concerned about the United States conducting frequent "transnational and multinational maritime military exercises" in East Asia, which, he believes, constitutes "evidence that the new U.S. Maritime Strategy has already been put into effect." On the other hand, the new cooperative approach may truly represent "a major change in the U.S. military's maritime strategy," Lu allows. "It must receive the affirmation of all the world's nations."

China's attitude toward the Maritime Strategy can also be gleaned from its assessments of the GMP, previously termed the "thousand-ship navy" (TSN). A number of articles express strong support for the concepts encompassed in GMP, although they do not mention it directly. They include comments by the PRC ambassador to the United States and the PRC minister of foreign affairs, discussion by military commentators, and an example of actual GMP-type cooperation between the U.S. and PRC coast guards.[53] Conversations with Chinese academics and analysts reveal fairly unanimous general approval for the "cooperate to achieve security" concept behind the GMP. Other analyses, such as a recent one in a Chinese military trade publication, are at least even-handed: "strengthening the alliance system and building maritime alliances have been important tasks of the U.S. Navy all along. This is clearly manifested in the U.S. Navy's 'Thousand-Ship Navy' plans, as well as in the New U.S. Maritime Strategy of 2007."[54] But China is not likely to approve of the GMP directly by name since, from its leaders' perspective, to do so would effectively cede control of the international initiative and the framework of cooperative efforts to the United States.

This ambivalence is reflected in two articles published before the Maritime Strategy was issued. The first highlights two benefits the United States can gain from the program: contractual access to ports of partner countries, which ben-

efits U.S. global naval deployment; and partner countries sharing the U.S. burden of fighting terrorism. It also states that the Asia-Pacific/Southeast Asia is the emphasis of the program because of sea-lanes and chokepoints and competing Russian and Chinese influence, but countries of the region may not fully embrace the program.[55] A second article highlights Chinese navy commander Wu Shengli's visit to the United States in early April 2007 and the U.S. proposal for China to join the program. According to an anonymous naval expert from Nanjing Naval Command College, the United States stands to receive strategic benefits in the form of port and logistics accesses. Japan and South Korea likewise strongly support the program because of their dependence on sea-lanes and the Malacca Strait for oil shipment. So does India, to whom the United States has offered such preferential measures as the sale of an amphibious assault ship and joint exercises. But, perhaps in an oblique reference to China, he states that other Asian countries may have reservations because of sovereignty infringement.[56]

There is room for optimism in the sense that the views from Chinese think tanks, policy analysts, and government officials—like those of their U.S. counterparts—as they become publicly available, are likely to be more balanced and pragmatic. They are likely to acknowledge the many potential benefits of more actively cooperating with the United States in the maritime dimension. Here it will be important for U.S. officials and scholars to engage deeply with a wide variety of Chinese interlocutors to explain in great detail the strategy's genesis, intent, word choices, evolution, and potential applications as well as to discuss specifically Chinese concerns and reactions. In this sense, the strategy can serve as a catalyst for much-needed Sino-American strategic dialogue and engagement.

Chinese analysts are encouraged by the strategy's new rhetoric, and encouraging progress has been made in bilateral maritime cooperation already, but at the higher levels of China's military and civilian government, officials believe that the ball is in Washington's court, and are waiting for concrete actions on the part of the United States. Chinese observers will therefore likely wait to see how Washington's initiatives affect Beijing's core strategic concerns. Statements in China's maritime press are guardedly positive, noncommittal, and emphasize the need to carefully consider the implications for China's national interests: "At the present stage, the U.S. has put forward the 'Thousand Ship Navy' plan and invited China to join; we should pay great attention to this, and actively carry out discussion and research."[57] In future discussions with their U.S. counterparts, they will probably continue to probe for U.S. willingness to commit to actions that make China feel strategically assured. They will undoubtedly be watching for the United States to, in the words of a Chinese proverb, "言必信,

行必果" ("be true to its words and resolute in its deeds"). As Lu puts it, "The people of the entire world are glad to see this transformation in strategic thinking, [but] will wait and see, hoping for genuine actions and practical results."

Growing Cooperation

Amid the suspicious rhetoric of its official media, China is quietly cooperating with the United States on a number of maritime security activities.[58] The premise for these increased activities may be China's 2006 Defense White Paper, which for the first time acknowledges that "Never before has China been so closely bound up with the rest of the world as it is today." China, in this statement of national policy, is "committed to peace, development and cooperation" as it seeks to construct "together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity."[59] Looking further into the future, an analysis in *Modern Navy* advocates maritime engagement and cooperation on China's part and goes so far as to declare that "a big and powerful [Chinese] fleet will support a stable supply chain" from which "all oil trading nations benefit."[60]

This new wave of cooperation already extends from the corridors of government to the Pacific Ocean. Here the two nations' navies and other maritime services have the opportunity, even the duty, to do what other services have not: establish a new and cooperative relationship. This special maritime role is not a coincidence. Given the unique nature of sea-based presence, port visits, diplomacy, and critical trade relations, maritime forces interact in peacetime differently from other services. For the U.S. and Chinese maritime forces, this generates many compatible and overlapping strategic priorities. Indeed, when seaborne bilateral trade is considered, the two nations already have a major maritime partnership, albeit one in which the military element lags far behind the commercial.[61] This peacetime contact, particularly between the U.S. and Chinese navies, is potentially vital; given the nature of the volatile Taiwan issue, U.S. and Chinese naval forces would also be the most likely to directly engage each other in the unfortunate event of kinetic war. Therefore, there is a strong impetus for the two nations' maritime forces, particularly their navies, to better relations regarding issues critical to both peacetime and times of conflict.

Underscoring the value of the new Maritime Strategy's comprehensive sea service scope, the U.S. Coast Guard has established a working relationship with its Chinese counterparts.[62] As Captain Bernard Moreland documents in his chapter in this volume, Chinese fisheries enforcement officers have served temporarily on U.S. cutters (to interdict Chinese ships fishing illegally). Their

patrol boats work with U.S., Japanese, and Russian counterparts annually to prevent illegal driftnet fishing in the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, East Asia's only maritime security organization, in which China and the United States both play substantive roles.[63] The possible creation of a unified Chinese coast guard organization may provide further opportunities to build on this progress by reducing institutional conflict and confusion, as Lyle Goldstein explains in his contribution to this volume.

Despite its greater sensitivity, cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese navies is expanding as well. A number of substantial visits have taken place. In July 2006 PRC Central Military Commission vice chairman Guo Boxiong became the highest-ranking Chinese military officer to visit the United States since 2001. Then-commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Admiral William Fallon, visited China in May and August 2006.[64] During the first visit, he extended to the PLA an unprecedented invitation to observe the June 2006 U.S. Guam-based military exercise Valiant Shield, which was readily accepted. This gesture of transparency demonstrates that the Unites States has nothing to hide from China, even in major military exercises in the Western Pacific. As Nan Li's chapter in this volume suggests, interaction between the nations' institutions of professional military education is also growing.[65]

Building on the foundation of this growing series of exchanges, the United States and China have held a series of unprecedented bilateral exercises. Two decades of cooperative rhetoric were matched with concrete if modest action when a search-and-rescue exercise took place off the coast of San Diego on 20 September 2006.[66] Although a series of port visits had previously occurred and are scheduled to continue, this was the first bilateral military exercise ever conducted between the two nations.[67] A second phase of the exercise was held in the strategically sensitive South China Sea in November 2006.[68] In Xinhua's assessment, "The holding of the joint search-and-rescue exercises indicates that Sino-U.S. military relations are 'moving toward the pragmatic' and carries major significance for the future development of relations between the two militaries."[69]

China has also been invited to cooperate more broadly with the U.S. Navy under the framework of GMP, as set forth in the new Maritime Strategy. While visiting China in November 2006, Admiral Gary Roughead stated to Chinese officials that "our navies can improve the ability to coordinate naval operations in missions such as maritime security, search and rescue, and humanitarian relief."[70] During PLA Navy commander Vice Admiral Wu Shengli's April 2007 visit to the United States, Admiral Mullen asked him to consider "China's potential participation in Global Maritime Partnership initiatives."[71] China's navy is reportedly in the process of considering this proposal.[72] In a

subsequent news conference, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang declined to elaborate on this point but said that the naval leaders "reached a consensus in many areas."[73] On 17–21 August 2007, Admiral Mullen visited a variety of naval facilities and educational institutions and discussed possibilities for future maritime cooperation with China's top navy officials.[74] As discussed in the introduction, recent naval leadership visits include U.S. CNO Admiral Gary Roughead's participation in the PLA Navy's sixtieth anniversary commemoration in Qingdao in March 2009.

Many of the aforementioned activities would have been unthinkable only a few short years ago when there was not a mutual outreach for cooperation on both sides. However, one could argue that only the easier areas of cooperation have been attempted thus far, while the truly substantive areas have not yet been fully explored. Much remains to be done before both sides can forge a robust maritime partnership that generates any sort of policy momentum. As the two sides must acknowledge (at least in private), several fundamental issues still serve to undermine the bilateral political and military-to-military relationship and thereby limit the possible options for deeper maritime cooperation. The next section reviews these difficult, sensitive issues.

Remaining Obstacles to Enhanced Cooperation

Unfortunately, several core differences between the United States and China—absent significant policy changes—are likely to limit cooperation for the foreseeable future. The inability of Beijing and Washington to reach an understanding concerning Taiwan's status has long been the principal obstacle to improvements in U.S.–China relations, and hence will likely retard some forms of maritime security cooperation.

Since 1949 Beijing has consistently and clearly emphasized the vital importance of reunifying with Taiwan as a central tenet of national policy. To safeguard its interests in East Asia, Washington must firmly honor its commitment not to support Taiwan independence while also honoring its responsibility to protect Taiwan's democracy amid massive geopolitical changes. Economic integration and rising Chinese military strength arguably make the island increasingly indefensible militarily and complicate the status quo that previously prevailed. It is thus essential for the United States to make clear that, in the words of former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs Thomas Christensen, "Americans will not fight and die to defend a Taiwan that declares constitutional independence from the

Chinese nation. At the same time, America should warn the mainland that a military attack on a Taiwan that is still legally Chinese will meet a U.S. military response."[75] Fortunately, since his election in March 2008, Taiwan's new president, Ma Ying-jeou, has pursued a positive and practical policy of improving relations and economic links across the strait. This is a welcome relief from the counterproductive policies of his predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, who managed to both provoke Beijing and alienate Washington with a seemingly endless stream of ill-considered actions.

Despite these recent improvements, Taiwan's status will remain a sensitive issue. But Beijing must recognize that no U.S. president has the power to change a basic reality: the preservation of Taiwan's democracy is an issue of critical importance to the United States and one that enjoys overwhelming congressional support.[76] For this reason, the question of Taiwan's status must be separated from other issues if robust bilateral cooperation is to be achieved. The ability of Washington and Beijing to agree to disagree regarding their enduring strategic differences will thus determine the degree of their ability to cooperate to safeguard larger commercial, resource, homeland security, and maritime interests.

In addition to their concerns about the sensitive issue of Taiwan's status, Chinese policymakers and analysts also believe that the United States tends to focus unduly on using military means to address problems that may be better addressed by other approaches. Recent efforts by the Obama administration to reinvigorate such organizations as the State Department and pursue a wide range of diplomatic initiatives suggest a broader-based approach that should be welcomed by all who wish the United States well in its efforts to provide public goods in the international system. While this represents realization on Washington's part that hard power wielded unwisely can be disastrous for all concerned, it in no way represents an abdication of "hard power" capabilities. Rather, it also signifies renewed appreciation that "soft power" tools are vitally important as well—a fact that Beijing appears to have recognized in recent years, with considerable benefit to its own foreign relations. Still, a sustainable future can only be realized if both powers recognize the importance of each other's continued contributions to the world system. The United States must continue to acknowledge the reality that China is assuming an increasingly important and interdependent role that produces undeniable benefits. Arguments by some American scholars that extreme and divisive efforts should be made to prevent China's rise are neither realistic nor helpful.[77] And some calls by U.S. pundits for military procurement to counter China have been patently absurd, with one advocating that the United States should

deploy "not . . . 280 ships but a thousand; not eleven carriers, but 40, not 183 F-22s, but a thousand; and so on."[78] It will be important to communicate to Chinese policymakers that America is home to diverse discussion and debate, and these perspectives are in no way mainstream views.

There is another side to this story, however. From the U.S. perspective, China's ongoing limitations in military transparency, both in terms of capabilities and intentions, coupled with its rapid increases in defense spending and wide-ranging military modernization, remains another source of great concern. This situation undermines U.S. cooperation initiatives—which are being attempted with increasing willingness—for fear that China is unwilling or unable to reciprocate equitably. A related concern is that China may attempt to exploit U.S. goodwill by imposing ever-larger political demands. Under these conditions, the political reality in Washington circumscribes the evolution of better military-to-military relations with Beijing, something the latter does not seem to fully understand (or accept). Beijing's lack of transparency and reciprocity only strengthens the critics of cooperation. This has led to a wide speculation in the United States and elsewhere concerning China's intentions, much of it inaccurate, unsubstantiated, and worst-case in nature. But the lack of communication from Beijing unnecessarily helps feed this trend in Washington.

Various incidents epitomize this issue of nontransparency and its impact on crisis management between the two nations. Not only have a number of recent events been murky in explanation, there have also been confusing signals about who was making the decision (the PLA, the foreign ministry, or even China's central leadership). The November 2004 incident in which a Chinese *Han*-class submarine was tracked by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force as the submarine passed submerged through Japanese territorial waters in the Ishigaki Strait was blamed on a navigational error in a manner that does not appear credible to naval experts.[79] In October 2006 a Chinese diesel submarine reportedly surfaced unexpectedly within eight kilometers of the U.S. Navy's *Kitty Hawk* aircraft carrier as it was operating near Okinawa.[80] China's January 2007 antisatellite test, reportedly the single-greatest human source of satellite-endangering debris in history, has still not been satisfactorily explained despite repeated inquiries by the U.S. government. In November 2007 two U.S. minesweepers and the *Kitty Hawk* carrier battle group were denied permission, on separate occasions, to make port calls in Hong Kong. This issue raises the larger question as to what degree military-to-military activities will be subject to ever-shifting political winds and strategic disagreement.

There may well be clear explanations for each of the aforementioned events, but unfortunately China's government has thus far been unwilling to

provide any. A degree of public clarification is necessary and would do much to allay U.S. concerns, even if it defends China's strategic reasoning, with which the United States may strongly disagree. While official explanations for China's military development and assertions of benign intent may fulfill domestic political and even cultural imperatives, they ultimately do not serve Beijing's interests vis-à-vis the United States because they are not persuasive, or in some cases even comprehensible, to an American audience.

The obstacles to strategic transparency are sobering. As neoliberal institutionalist literature in the field of political science reminds us, the breakdown of cooperation is often a problem of information; the lack of perfect information can lead to mutual defection from agreements. Asymmetric information could be intentional or unintentional. It could stem from a lack of internal coordination (e.g., the military and diplomatic bureaucracies) or intentionally mixed messages. Even the security dilemma could be driven by (mis)perceptions of information.[81] Thus, Chinese provision of vague descriptions of its strategic intentions that fail to explain key behaviors, coupled with a degree of military power and influence on the part of the United States that causes even its more detailed explanations of intent to be held in suspicion, make it more difficult for the two sides to achieve a firm basis for robust maritime security cooperation. At the same time, however, better practices, agreements, and even institutions can help demonstrate commitment and reassurance.[82]

Trans-Pacific Progress?

While China appears to be maintaining a cautious, hedging approach in its rhetoric, low-level yet concrete maritime cooperation is proceeding without great fanfare. The real question is whether this progress has the ability to catalyze greater maritime and naval cooperation, or broader strategic relations. Given the issues at stake, it is time to explore how to take those important steps. This will require presidents Obama and Hu to expand the Bush administration's vision of both the United States and China as global "stakeholders" more fully into the maritime dimension. With the importance of the high seas as an irreplaceable conduit for international trade and energy, maritime security includes both civil maritime and naval cooperation. Forging a relationship through which the two nations can help to secure this global commons and still avoid conflict is the crux of the issue. Once launched, overcoming the many incidents that could scuttle it will require better communication and a high level of interaction.

A wide variety of nonsensitive cooperation areas will remain the most viable starting point and can likely continue regardless of the state of U.S.–China maritime relations. These include tourism, civilian academic conferences and exchanges, Track II diplomacy (i.e., by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific), commercial utilization of new maritime resources and technologies, environmental protection, meteorology (e.g., typhoon and tsunami detection), and scientific research. For these areas, the private sector and nongovernmental organizations can continue to play a major role.

For areas of cooperation that impinge more directly on issues of national security, a more organized and official basis for exchange will be essential. A vital underpinning of both civil maritime and naval cooperation will be the development of robust ties between relevant institutions of professional military education. It is to be hoped that exchanges of faculty and students, currently limited, can grow steadily in the future. The author has been told by Chinese experts that "China still has concerns about some U.S. proposals, and wants to know more about the 'Thousand Ship Navy.'" Exchanges can facilitate fuller explanation of all aspects of the new Maritime Strategy to Chinese officials and subject matter experts, as described earlier, as well as mutual discussion of nonsensitive linguistic, curricular, and technical elements (e.g., best practices and simulation procedures) that could further cooperation possibilities (e.g., in humanitarian operations and disaster relief) under its aegis. A new community of military officers can be trained to be capable of sophisticated interaction and even some degree of interoperability. Development of bilateral academic links will help to provide continuity to the relationship while facilitating the processes and personal interaction that are essential in a Chinese cultural and bureaucratic context. These foundations, in turn, can help support and sustain more robust official events, initiatives, and agreements over the longer term.

Senior Colonel Li Yaqiang, a researcher at the Naval Research Institute (the PLA Navy's strategic think tank in Beijing), has outlined areas of maritime security cooperation that would be acceptable to China. In Li's view, cooperation should occur "mainly in nonsensitive, nontraditional fields to avoid endangering maritime security due to traditional military behaviors." As for location, the appropriate areas include "high seas, international sea areas, nonsensitive sea areas, and waters welcomed or acceptable by concerned countries to avoid taking actions in sensitive sea areas, and waters that are under jurisdiction of other countries, under conflict, not accepted or rejected by concerned countries." Acceptable activities include "friendly exchange, peaceful consultation, and joint operation to avoid abuse of force and unilateral intervention." More specifically, "the naval forces may launch cooperation in the fields of maritime

joint law enforcement, anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, maritime navigation safety, and search and rescue in order to frighten and contain the force posing potential threat to international maritime security, stabilize maritime situation of turbulent regions, promote and safeguard ocean shipping security, and eventually establish an effective maritime security safeguarding mechanism."[83]

Given the fundamental interests of both nations, then, cooperation against terrorism, maritime crime, piracy, and trafficking in humans, drugs, and other illegal goods should be able to proceed at a fairly sophisticated level over the next few years. Infectious diseases, environmental safety, and economic issues may also be addressed. As is described more fully in the fourth chapter in this volume, "The Container Security Initiative and U.S.–China Relations," China's participation in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a positive development in this area, and it is to be hoped that more Chinese ports will join soon. Cooperating against piracy may be more complicated, depending on the context, given its association with international maritime legal issues on which China tends to have different interpretations from those of the United States. Yet, the interests involved are fundamentally the same here as well, and China's ongoing deployment to the Gulf of Aden offers an encouraging example. In the minds of many Chinese analysts, energy security is connected to scenarios of naval conflict, but commercially viable confidence-building measures can be explored in an effort to remedy this.

With respect to maritime energy security, the United States and China, now the world's two largest oil consumers, share an interest in maintaining secure, stable, and affordable oil supplies. They should consider establishing a joint petroleum inventory reporting system. Their navies should address maritime crises in places far from sensitive areas surrounding China and the United States (e.g., preventing Somali pirates from pirating tankers in the Gulf of Aden). They should also establish a joint threat-reporting database for vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Washington should also encourage Beijing to join the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) to facilitate closer strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) management cooperation.[84] With the right agreements and incentive structures, technology transfer in clean energy production could likewise go very far in assuaging suspicions while promoting shared economic interests.

In particular, the new U.S. Maritime Strategy can play a crucial role by facilitating a variety of missions that require substantial coordination but are not viewed as inherently sensitive by either side. Much more can be done in terms of humanitarian operations, particularly as China increases its capabilities in this area. Joint search-and-rescue exercises can expand from the cur-

rent ones between civil maritime and select naval forces to more regular naval cooperation. As Admiral Eric McVadon explains in his chapter in this volume, China's commissioning of its first naval hospital ship in 2008 may have demonstrated an intention to project increased "soft power" in the maritime realm. Already China's largest deck aviation platform, the multirole aviation training ship *Shichang*, which has a hospital module, has supported domestic flood relief efforts and deployed as far away as New Zealand.[85] There is no inherent reason why China's already significant domestic maritime disaster relief capabilities could not be mobilized in the future to provide humanitarian assistance overseas. In fact, China's *Peace Ark* hospital ship is now slated to engage in annual overseas deployments. The first, in 2010, will reportedly involve port calls in the Middle East and Africa.[86] Perhaps in the future *Peace Ark* could work with USNS *Mercy* to further mutual interests in vulnerable areas.

As China's naval modernization continues at a rapid pace and new Chinese aircraft and vessels appear unannounced, American and Chinese military platforms are increasingly encountering each other in or near territorial waters or airspace. As David Griffiths explains in his chapter in this volume, these incidents increase the possibility of tactical incidents escalating into major crises. The U.S.–Soviet 1972 Incidents at Sea and 1989 Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities agreements established specific guidelines for conduct in such situations that have been credited with preventing countless crises. The current U.S.–PRC 1998 Military Maritime Consultative Agreement provides for annual consultations but offers no specific procedures. The two nations could benefit from a new code of conduct—one that stresses the role of early communication between military platforms in an era of advanced communications and sensing technology. This, coupled with more frequent meetings and perhaps some form of confidence building measures, would greatly further a larger effort to improve bilateral communications and crisis management.

What the new U.S. Maritime Strategy alone cannot accomplish is to change China's perception of its fundamental national interests. It will not persuade China to participate in activities with implications that it may deem objectionable. According to Senior Colonel Li Yaqiang, this includes any activities that Beijing believes do not "follow the purpose of the United Nations charter, the well-acknowledged international laws, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respect national sovereignty, safeguard common interests, accept political diversity, take mandatory national responsibilities, fulfill international obligations, abandon cold-war thinking, and give full consideration to strategic interests, values, and social characteristics of each concerned nation."[87] Such activities might include intrusive boardings under the aegis of

the Proliferation Security Initiative, which China apparently believes to contravene its oft-stated need for UN-based legitimacy (a point disputed by many Western maritime legal scholars) and complicates its attempts to stabilize the Korean Peninsula. Even areas of concern and disagreement must be discussed in forums related to the Maritime Strategy, however, because the two nations must understand each other's perspectives in a detailed and comprehensive manner. Cooperative partners must be able to have open and candid dialogue on all issues of mutual interest.

Regardless of its exact parameters, building and sustaining a high level of cooperation will require substantial effort and patience. Washington and Beijing will have to live with considerable ambiguity, and should expect occasional setbacks. For the foreseeable future, there will be significant differences in their military capabilities, political systems, and national interests. To guard against the threat of conflict as China, the rising power, gains on the United States, the dominant power today, both sides will likely find it necessary to "hedge"—not only rhetorically, but also economically, politically, and even militarily. This power transition conflict scenario is a natural part of international politics, and will be a highly destabilizing factor at times, particularly when U.S. and Chinese domestic politics are thrown into the mix.

Despite the long-term strategic importance of cooperation, perceptions and misperceptions will continue to wield great influence over its success. Just as what Chinese analysts would term a "China threat theory" continues to maintain a firm grip on many in Washington, many in Beijing construe ulterior motives from virtually any U.S. action (an "America threat theory") as well. American analysts and planners need to look at the big picture, which strongly suggests an overall Chinese desire and need to cooperate with the United States rather than to challenge it. And the renewed American focus on humanitarian operations should be seen by Chinese for what it is, an opportunity for better cooperation and improved relations with the United States. Only time, increased interaction, and concrete efforts at cooperation will ameliorate these knotty problems of perception and trust.

As mentioned earlier, the election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's president in March 2008 has placed cross-strait relations on an improved trajectory after eight years of instability under the provocative leadership of Chen Shui-bian. Meanwhile, recent developments, such as the continuing deployment of naval vessels to defend against piracy in the Gulf of Aden, suggest that PLA and PLA Navy missions may become increasingly compatible with the Maritime Strategy's focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At an expanded Central Military Commission conference on 24 December 2004, Chairman

Hu Jintao introduced a new military policy that defines the four new missions of the PLA, including "play an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development."[88] PLA and PLA Navy writings are operationalizing both this theme and Hu's recent guidance that China's military should pay attention to "diversified military tasks" (多样化军事任务).[89] Such factors may well support mission convergence and increase strategic space for Sino-American maritime cooperation, although exploiting opportunities will take substantial effort from both sides, and will not be easy.[90]

Despite the challenges before it, maritime security lies at the heart of the survival and prosperity of nations. It is important never to lose sight of the greater perspective: the world's largest developed nation and its largest developing nation stand to reap tremendous benefits by jointly ensuring the safety of the maritime commons. The possibility of conflict will always threaten the U.S.–China relationship, but the objective rationale of national interests overwhelmingly reinforces the need for the world's greatest developed and developing powers to reach an understanding to support a durable, if sometimes competitive, coexistence on the world's oceans.

Notes

The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author as a private individual. This study is based only on publicly available sources and does not represent the official position or analysis of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. government [在这篇文章的意见完全是写者个人的学术观点，并不代表美国海军或者美国政府的官方看法或者政策]. The author thanks Amy Chang, Peter Dutton, Nan Li, Donald Marrin, William Murray, William Pendley, Jonathan Pollack, Robert Rubel, Michael Sherlock, Frederic Vellucci, and Andrew Winner for their helpful inputs. To give readers the most accurate sense of how the U.S. Maritime Strategy is rendered in Chinese, quotations in this translation have deliberately *not* been synchronized with the English phrases used in the original text, which can be obtained at www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf. This article draws on earlier research that appeared as "Assessing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Window into Chinese Thinking," *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 36–53; and "New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Initial Chinese Responses," *China Security* 3, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 40–61, www.wsichina.org/cs8_3.pdf. The latter has been translated into Chinese as 汪北哲译 [Wang Beizhe, trans.], "美 <中国安全>: 中国谨慎应对美海洋战略" ["U.S. 'China Security': China Cautiously Reacts to the U.S. Maritime Strategy"], 环球时报 [*Global Times*], 18 December 2007, http://china.huanqiu.com/eyes_on_china/2007-12/36152.html.

1. Michael Mullen, "The Thousand Ship Fleet," *Pentagon Brief*, 1 October 2005; and "'Global Maritime Partnership' Gaining Steam at Home and with International Navies," *Defense Daily International* 7, no. 42 (27 October 2006).
2. Admiral Mullen is now chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Peter Dombrowski, "Maritime Strategy Project: Overview and Preliminary Analysis," presentation to author, October 2007.
4. Several maritime strategies have been issued in between, but most analysts evaluate that they have had no lasting legacy. Few outside the U.S. Navy have even heard of them. "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" (Washington, DC: U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandants of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard, 17 October 2007), http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf, 4.
5. Ibid., 5.
6. Ibid., 11.
7. John Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986*, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004), http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press/Newport-Papers/Documents/19-pdf.aspx.
8. Dombrowski, "Maritime Strategy Project."
9. Key naval planning document include "Navy Strategic Plan in Support of Program Objective Memorandum 08" (Washington, DC: U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, May 2006), http://www.docstoc.com/docs/23263501/Navy-Strategic-Plan; and "Naval Operations Concept 2006" (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 2006), https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/CIW/ER/Naval%20Operations%20Concept.pdf. National strategy documents include "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010); "The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America" (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2008), http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf; "The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow" (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf; "The National Strategy for Maritime Security" (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, September 2005), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD13_MaritimeSecurityStrategy.pdf; and "The Nuclear Posture Review Report" (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2010), http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.
10. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) 2010* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 February 2010), http://www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200700.pdf; and *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010* (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 15 March 2010), http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2010/JOE_2010_0.pdf. Like the Maritime Strategy, the QDR has been criticized for saying little about the growing challenges posed by the PLA—particularly to U.S. access to the global maritime, air, space, and cyber commons. Yet there are good reasons for taking a relatively indirect approach, rather than enumerating directly a litany of specific Chinese military developments and corresponding threats. These issues

are well known, and well documented in other forums. Given the complex, bifurcated, and uncertain military relationship with China that the above discussion suggests, it makes sense to focus primarily on U.S. access interests. This enables a more constructive focus on U.S. interests and objectives, and thereby—as with the Maritime Strategy—places the onus on all nations (including China) to respect them, rather than automatically assuming that there is no hope for avoiding conflict, which could become a self-fulfilling prophesy in critical aspects.

11. See, for example, Paul D. Taylor, ed., *Perspectivas Sobre Estrageica Marítima: Ensayos de las Américas, La Nueva Strategia Marítima de EE UU y Comentario Sobre: Una Estrategia Cooperativa para el Poder Naval en el Siglo XXI* [Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas, the New U.S. Maritime Strategy and Commentary on a Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower] (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2009).

12. See, for example, Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, "China on the March," *The National Interest* 88 (March–April 2007): 16–22; Thomas J. Christensen, "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 81–126; and Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?" *International Security* 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 7–45.

13. Chairman Hu Jintao introduced a new military policy that defines the four new missions of the PLA at an expanded Central Military Commission conference on 24 December 2004. The first three missions are (1) serve as an "important source of strength" for the CCP to "consolidate its ruling position"; (2) "provide a solid security guarantee for sustaining the important period of strategic opportunity for national development"; and (3) "provide a strong strategic support for safeguarding national interests." See "Earnestly Step Up Ability Building within CPC Organizations of Armed Forces," 解放军报 [*Liberation Army Daily*], 13 December 2004, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2004-12/13/content_86435.htm; and "三个提供, 一个发挥," ["Three Provides and One Brings into Play"], 解放军报 [*Liberation Army Daily*], http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-09-29/08517064683s.shtml.

14. See, for example, 彭立军 [Peng Lijun], "美国推出新的海上战略" ["The U.S. Releases a New Maritime Strategy"], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], 18 October 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/18/content_6898372.htm; "美国新海上战略强调合作和预防" ["The New U.S. Maritime Strategy Emphasizes Cooperation and Prevention"], 新华社电 [Xinhua News Agency Online], 18 October 2007, http://www.ycwb.com/ycwb/2007-10/18/content_1651674.htm; and 杨晴川, 王薇 [Yang Qingchuan and Wang Wei], "美国推出新海上战略" ["The U.S. Releases a New Maritime Strategy"], 新华社华盛顿 [Xinhua News Agency, Washington], 19 October 2007, available at http://www.sina.com.

15. 吕德胜 [Lu Desheng], "伊战带给美军的影响" ["The Influence of the Iraq War on the U.S. Military"], 中国民兵 [*Conmilit*], no. 11 (2007), http://www.pladaily.com.cn/site1/zgmb/2007-11/23/content_1030774.htm.

16. "美军: 21世纪海上力量的合作战略" ["The U.S. Military: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power"], 人民网军事频道 [People's Net Military Channel], 25 October 2007, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/4/200710/1025_342_272411.shtml.

17. 杨晴川 [Yang Qingchuan], "美国海上力量'三巨头'—海军作战部长拉夫黑德, 海军陆战队司令康韦和海岸警卫队司令艾伦共同出现在罗得岛州纽波特海军战争学院举行的国际海军演讨会上, 向与会的100多个国家和地区的海军首脑降重推出美国新版的海上战略" ["The 'Three Magnates' of U.S. Sea Power—Adm. Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. James T. Conway, Marine Corps commandant; and Adm. Thad W. Allen, Coast Guard Commandant, Presented the Strategy to Maritime Leaders from More than 100 Countries Attending the International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I."], 国际先驱导报 [*International Herald Leader*–Beijing], 17 October 2007, available at www.chinesenewsnet.com. Translation by Danling Cacioppo and Nan Li. *International Herald Leader* is published by *Reference News*, a daily with materials translated by the foreign press, carried by China's official news agency, Xinhua. Like a brief Xinhua English-language summary, and a wide variety of other online articles and Internet commentaries to date, it provides some basic facts about the strategy and the circumstances of its roll-out. See also "U.S. Releases Unified Maritime Strategy," Xinhua General News Service, 18 October 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/18/content_6899251.htm.

18. For a similar quotation regarding "omitted" topics, see 未克 [Wei Ke], "美国《国防新闻》: 美军海上战略缺陷多" ["U.S. Defense News: The U.S. Military's Maritime Strategy Has Many Defects"], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], 25 October 2007, http://www.china.com.cn/military.txt/2007-10/25/content_9124389.htm; http://mil.news.sohu.com/20071025/n252858218.shtml. A similar version appeared in a major PRC-funded Hong Kong newspaper: "美媒: 美軍海上新戰略缺陷多" ["U.S. Media: The New U.S. Maritime Strategy Has Many Defects"], 大公報 [*Ta Kung Pao*], 26 October 2007, http://www.takungpao.com/news/07/10/26/YM-814681.htm.

19. This final point may help to explain the reasoning behind the article's contention that "[Admiral] Mullen not long ago aroused great concern from the international community by proposing the so-called '1000-ship Navy.'" It is important to note that this term appears to have been largely replaced by the phrase "Global Maritime Partnerships" in current U.S. Navy parlance.

20. 刘华, 吴强 [Liu Hua and Wu Qiang], "美国通过新海上战略 指导美军重返菲律宾" ["Through the New Maritime Strategy, the U.S. Directs its Military to Return to the Philippines"], 国际先驱导报 [*International Herald Leader*], 24 October 2007, http://www1.chinataiwan.org/xwzx/gj/200710/t20071024_473467.htm. See also 肖亭 [Xiao Ting], "美军变相重返菲律宾企图 '包围' 中国" ["The U.S. Military Covertly Returns to the Philippines in Attempt to 'Encircle' China"], 国际先驱导报 [*International Herald Leader*], 25 October 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-10/25/content_6207471.htm. For a related online posting, see "'中国不造航母行吗' 系列之五 '美国在海上包围中国'" ["'Is It OK for China Not to Build an Aircraft Carrier?' Series No. 5 'The U.S. Encircles China by Sea'"], 新浪论坛 [*Sina Forum*], 24 November 2007, http://s.bbs.sina.com.cn/pview-70-16355.html.

21. 杨晴川, 王薇 [Yang Qingchuan and Wang Wei], "美国推出新的海上战略—遏制潜在竞争对手" ["The U.S. Releases a New Maritime Strategy—Containing Potential Competitors"], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], 18 October 2007, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/site1/xwpdxw/2007-10/18/content_986293.htm. Translation by Andrew Erickson and Nan Li. It must be emphasized that this is not a *Liberation Army Daily* article and did not appear in that publication's print edition. The brief text gives factual information on the strategy; it is the seemingly arbitrary label "containing potential competitors" that is troubling. See also 邱贞讳 [Qiu Zhenhui], "美国海军发布21世纪海权合作战略" ["The U.S. Navy Issues a Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power"], 环球网 [*Global Net*], 18 October 2007, http://www.huanqiu.com/www/86/2007-10/13500.html; and 杨晴川 [Yang Qingchuan], "美国海上战略 '由硬变软' 以谋求海上全球部署" ["The U.S. Maritime Strategy Changes 'From Hard to Soft' in the Quest for Global Maritime Deployment"], 国际先驱导报 [*World Herald Leader*], 24 October 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content_6933474.htm.
22. 封长虹 [Feng Zhanghong], "美抛出 '以海制陆' 新战略—多样手段维持霸权地位" ["The U.S. Puts Forward a New Strategy to 'Use the Sea to Control the Land'—Diverse Means to Preserve [Its] Hegemonic Position"], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], 8 December 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-12/08/content_7217221.htm; and "美军推出海上新战略" ["The U.S. Releases a New Maritime Strategy"], 工人日报 [*Worker's Daily*], 20 October 2007, http://news.sohu.com/20071020/n252754840.shtml.
23. 许钦铎 [Xu Qinduo, reporter], 张鹏飞 [Zhang Pengfei, editor], "美国推出新海上战略" ["The U.S. Releases a New Maritime Strategy"], 中央电视台国际在线 [China Central Television International Online], http://news.cctv.com/world/20071019/103473.shtml; republished as "突破狭隘海洋斗争定义—美军推出新的海上战略" ["Break Through a Narrow Definition of Ocean Combat—The U.S. Releases a New Maritime Strategy"] 云南信息港 [Yunnan Information Portal], http://news.yninfo.com/world/gjjs/200710/t20071020_502850.htm.
24. 顾祥兵 [Gu Xiang Bing], "美国海权的 '最新外衣'—新海上战略透视别国隐私" ["The 'Latest Cover' for U.S. Sea Power—The New Maritime Strategy Scrutinizes Other Countries' Secrets"], 当代海军 [*Modern Navy*], http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-02/27/content_7609770.htm.
25. 刘江平, 沈基飞 [Liu Jiangping and Shen Jifei], "美海军新战略: 打入全球核心区" ["The New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Infiltrate Global Core Regions"], 中国国防报 [*China Defense News*], 29 November 2007, http://bbs.people.com.cn/postDetail.do?boardId=2&id=84122024.
26. See, for example, "针对台湾与朝鲜问题美军增兵太平洋将不 '太平'" ["The Increase of U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific to Counter the Taiwan and North Korean Problems Will Not Be 'Peaceful'"], 环球时报 [*Global Times*], 12 November 2007, http://www.sxgov.cn/jstd/jsrd/501023.shtml.
27. 美海军全球作战新概念 ["The U.S. Navy's New Global Concept of Operations"], 解放军报 [*Liberation Army Daily*], 21 April 2005, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/site1/jsslpdjs/2005-04/21/content_188893.htm; and 章华 [Zhang Hua], "美军两大航母东亚演练形成威摄—磨刀霍霍为实战" ["The Drills of the U.S. Armed Forces' Two

Large Aircraft Carriers in East Asia Create Deterrence—Sharpening the Sword for Actual Combat"], 国际先驱导报 [*International Herald Leader*], 20 August 2008, http://www.southcn.com/news/international/gjkd/200408200230.htm.

28. Unless otherwise specified, all quotations from this and the following paragraph were derived from 邢蓬宇 [Xing Pengyu], "美国新海上战略: 以合作之名谋强权之实" ["The United States' New Maritime Strategy: Solidifying Its Might under the Banner of Cooperation"], 人民网军事频道 [*People's Daily Online*: Military Affairs Section], 24 October 2007, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/51756/81282/81532/6422552.html.

29. 周婷 [Zhou Ting], "美海军作战范围从远洋转到近海—催生近海战斗舰" ["The Scope of U.S. Naval Operations Shifts from Far Oceans to the Littoral—Hurrying to Develop the Littoral Combat Ship"], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], 21 February 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-02/21/content_7638401.htm.

30. 米兰, 维希 [Mi Lan and Wei Xi], "美海洋战略因缺乏对冲突持续时间的预判可能失败" ["The U.S. Maritime Strategy May Fail Because It Lacks Prediction of the Duration of Sustained Conflict"], 四川新闻网 [Sichuan News Network], 4 March 2008, http://world.newssc.org/system/2008/03/04/010714245.shtml.

31. This article was originally published as 陆儒德 [Lu Rude], "美海上新战略浮出水面" ["The New U.S. Maritime Strategy Surfaces"], 人民海军 [*People's Navy*], 27 November 2007, 3. Lu's home institution is perhaps most similar to the U.S. Naval Academy, although this comparison has significant limitations, in part because Chinese professional military education is dispersed among a wider range of schools than is the case in the United States.

32. See also 陆儒德 [Lu Rude], "在大战略中给中国海权定位" ["Defining Sea Power in China's Grand Strategy"], 人民海军 [*People's Navy*], 6 June 2007, 4.

33. This article was originally published as 王宝付 [Wang Baofu], "美军 '海上战略' 与未来军事转型" ["The U.S. Military's 'Maritime Strategy' and Future Military Transformation"], 学习时报 [*Study Times*], 22 January 2008, http://www.lianghui.org.cn/xxsb/txt/2008-01/22/content_9568776.htm.

34. This article was originally published as 苏浩: 外交学院外交学系教授; 吴兵: 外交学院外交学系博士生 [Su Hao, Professor of Diplomacy, China Foreign Affairs University; Wu Bing, Doctoral Student, China Foreign Affairs University], "美国海上战略新思路—21 '世纪海权的合作战略' 报告评述" ["The U.S. Maritime Strategy's New Thinking—Reviewing the 'Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower' Report"], 领导者 [*Leaders*], no. 19, December 2007, 29–30. Su's translation of the U.S. Maritime Strategy is 吴兵, 母耕源, 钟龙彪翻译, 苏浩审校 [Wu Bing, Mu Gengyuan, Zhong Longbiao (translator), and Su Hao (proofreader)], "21世纪海权的合作战略—首开历史先河: 21世纪海权的合作战略" ["A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower—For the First Time in History: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower"], 领导者 [*Leaders*], no. 19, December 2007, 21–28.

35. For Chinese assessments of these maritime strategies, see 许世勇 [Xu Shiyong], "美海军实施网络反潜新战略" ["The U.S. Navy Implements a New Network Anti-Submarine Warfare Strategy"], 当代海军 [*Modern Navy*], September 2006; and 李杰 [Li Jie], "重视前沿存在, 强调联合作战—十年来美国海军战略的调整变化及

特点" ["Attach Importance to Forward Presence, Emphasize Joint Operations—The Revision, Change and Characteristics of U.S. Naval Strategy Over the Past 15 Years"], 现代舰船 [*Modern Ships*], no. 1 (2003): 13–14.

36. Wang does mention "strategic deterrence theory" and Su notes that the strategy "does not assume conflict, but recognizes the historical reality that peace cannot be automatically maintained."

37. See Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., *The Science of Military Strategy* (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005), 439–43; and 徐起 [Xu Qi], "21世纪初海上地缘战略与中国海军的发展" ["Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early 21st Century"], 中国军事科学 [*China Military Science*] 17, no. 4 (2004): 75–81; trans. Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein, *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 46–67.

38. See Leif-Eric Easley, "Multilateralism, not Multipolarity: China's Changing Foreign Policy and Trilateral Cooperation in Asia," *JoongAng Daily* (with *International Herald Tribune*), 14 March 2008, 11. As Samuel Huntington explains, "A multipolar system has several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns. A coalition of major states is necessary to resolve important international issues. European politics approximated this model for several centuries." Nearly two decades after Huntington wrote this, the world is still closer to the "uni-multipolar" system that he described than to true multipolarity. The closest Chinese approximation is 一超多强 ("one superpower and several great powers"). Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2 (March–April 1999): 35–49, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54797/samuel-p-huntington/the-lonely-superpower. In a recent alternative interpretation, Richard Haass likewise rejects the idea that the current international system is multipolar: "In a multipolar system, no power dominates, or the system will become unipolar." Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (May–June 2008): 44–56, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63397/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.

39. For similar wording, see Robert Kagan, "The September 12 Paradigm: America, the World, and George W. Bush," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 5 (September–October 2008): 25–39, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080901faessay87502/robert-kagan/the-september-12-paradigm.html.

40. For Chinese discussion of U.S. decline, see 王恬 [Wang Tian], "美国衰落与群雄崛起" ["U.S. Decline and the Rise of Other Power Centers"], 人民日报 [*People's Daily*], 30 May 2008, http://world.people.com.cn/GB/1030/7318287.html; 肖刚 [Xiao Gang], "在单极与多极之间: 中国外交的平衡" ["Between Unipolarity and Multipolarity: China's Diplomatic Balance"], 太平洋学报 [*Pacific Journal*], no. 3 (2008), http://scholar.ilib.cn/A-QCode~tpyxb200803003.html; 郑羽 [Zheng Yu], "多极世界是否已经成为国际关系的现实" ["Has a Multipolar World Already Become the Reality in International Relations?"], 中国社会科学院院报 [*Journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences*], 31 January 2008, http://en.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=122477; 李义虎 [Li Yihu], "世界经济多极化趋势将进一步加强" ["The Trend of World Economic Multipolarization Will Further

Strengthen"], 现代国际关系 [*Contemporary International Relations*], no. 12 (2007), http://scholar.ilib.cn/A-QCode~xdgjgx200712005.html; 孟庆龙 [Meng Qinglong], "美国衰落过程的重要地标" ["Footprints of U.S. Decline"], 现代国际关系 [*Contemporary International Relations*], no. 9 (2006): 30–32, http://scholar.ilib.cn/A-QCode~xdgjgx200609016.html; Zhang Wenmu, "Sea Power and China's Strategic Choices," *China Security* (Summer 2006): 28–29, http://www.wsichina.org/cs3_2.pdf; and 裘元伦 [Qiu Yuanlun], "美国 '衰落论' 与 '夏兴论' 之争" ["Contention between 'U.S. Decline Theory' and 'U.S. Revival Theory'"], 了望 [*Outlook*], no. 16, 1989.

41. Denny Roy, "China's Pitch for a Multipolar World: The New Security Concept," *Asia-Pacific Security Studies* 2, no. 1 (May 2003), http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/ChinasPitchforaMultipolarWorld.pdf; and Yong Deng, "Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U. S. Global Strategy," *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 343–65.

42. "China's View on the Development of Multi-polarity," Web site of China's Foreign Ministry, 15 November 2000, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjwt/gjzzyhy/2594/2595/t15139.htm.

43. Information Office of the State Council, People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense in 2008," January 2009, www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227.htm.

44. See also 宋国友 [Song Guoyou], "美国衰落的幻象" ["The Illusion of U.S. Decline"], 东方早报 [*Oriental Morning Post*], 24 January 2008.

45. Lu's discussion of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) appears to represent further advocacy of PLA Navy development to support regional stability. Lu refers directly to UNCLOS Article 301's admonition to use the seas only for peaceful purposes—a provision to which, as a nonmember, the United States is not technically bound to observe. Lu's reference would not be readily recognizable to many American readers, and the United States and China disagree about Article 301's meaning in any case. Lu makes a similar reference to UNCLOS Article 197's call for global and regional cooperation to protect and preserve the maritime environment, which would be received in the same manner as the Article 301 reference by most American readers. The author greatly appreciates Peter Dutton's contributions concerning concepts and wording in this and the two following paragraphs.

46. Evidence of Lu's seapower advocacy can be seen in many of his writings. See, for example, 中国走向还海洋 [*China Advances on the Sea*], (海潮出版社 [Sea Tide Press], 1998); "实施海洋强国战略的若干问题" ["A Number of Issues in Carrying out a Strong Sea Power Strategy"], 海洋开发与管理 [*Ocean Development & Management*], no. 1 (2002): 62–63; "创新做大 加快步伐" ["Blaze Great New Trails, Quicken the Pace"], 大连日报 [*Dalian Daily*], 20 April 2006, B04; and "树立海洋战略意识建设海上经济强国" ["Establish a Maritime Strategic Consciousness, Build a Maritime Economic Power"], 中国软科学 [*China Soft Science*] (April 1997): 13–17.

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48. An article in a popular newspaper similarly highlights the U.S. need for burden-sharing because of the war in Iraq. 严国群 [Yan Guoqun], "美国千舰海军的如意算盘能否实现" ["Can the U.S. Navy's Wishful Thinking about the Thousand-Ship Navy Be Realized?"], 新京报 [*New Capital News*], 27 November 2006, available at http://www.sina.com.cn.

49. According to *Naval Operations Concept 2006*, a "Global Fleet Station . . . is a persistent sea base of operations from which to coordinate and employ adaptive force packages within a regional area of interest."

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