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Take the \$ Out of Mentor\$

The Dream Machine: The Untold History of the Notorious V-22 Osprey

Through a Chinese Lens

(See P. A. Dutton, pp. 24–29, April 2010
Proceedings)

Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, U.S. Navy (Retired), Consultant on East Asia Security Affairs—Commander Dutton describes well “horizontally” the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and U-shaped line issues as the Chinese see them, covering their complex positions on the EEZ issue and South China Sea territorial claims. However, he does not dig “vertically” quite deeply enough to reveal two more fundamental aspects.

First, the Chinese, understandably from their perspective, object to the conduct of intelligence collection operations by aircraft and ships off their coast. Americans, understandably from their perspective, insist on conducting these operations against a country that refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and has gone so far as to pass an Anti-Secession Law to legitimize such military actions against Taiwan in a variety of circumstances, including “that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.” The United States feels the need to collect intelligence, as most countries consider permissible under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to deter or more readily defeat People’s Liberation Army forces attacking Taiwan.

Second, regardless of the position each country takes on these matters, China’s harassment of U.S. aircraft and ships is a violation of International Civil Aviation Organization rules and International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. These actions and reactions pose dangers of collision and loss of life—as occurred with the EP-3 in 2001 and nearly with the USNS *Impeccable* (T-AGOS-23) in 2009—and escalation.

Neither country will likely change its position on intelligence collection; so the answer is for the most senior officials in Washington and Beijing to agree to disagree and move under the 1998 U.S.-PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement to adopt rules to prevent incidents at sea and in the air and review incidents that do occur—as the United States and Soviet Union did in the 1976 Incidents at Sea Agreement—still in force between the

United States and Russia. The U.S.-PRC document can be crafted to avoid the reportedly unwanted implication that this is an agreement between adversaries. Emphasis can be placed on the cooperative, procedural, and advisory aspects.

This will not be an easy negotiation, but it must be done both to prevent confrontations and ensure that such incidents do not disrupt the efforts of the United States and China, arguably the two most important countries in the world, to overcome other differences and work together on North Korea, the global economy, climate change, terrorism, piracy, proliferation, and future problems.

'Get Off the Fainting Couch'

(See C. Hooper and C. Albon, pp. 42–47, April 2010 *Proceedings*)

Andrew S. Erickson, Associate Professor, China Maritime Studies Institute, Naval War College—I welcome the authors’ forceful contribution concerning Chinese antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) development. They correctly underscore Chinese sensitivity, and vulnerability, to foreign prompt global strike systems. Respectfully, however, the following points warrant clarification:

- Contrary to the assertion that recent research brings “very little new information to the table,” such publications offer a tremendous amount of new data, particularly through analysis of authoritative, primary Chinese sources. *Science of Second Artillery Campaigns*, for example, reveals considerable new information about how China would plan to employ the ASBM as a deterrent and how it might use it operationally if deterrence fails.

- Regarding the claim that “The hand wringing has, at a minimum, confused our regional allies and legitimized China’s ASBM program,” it is not the hand wringing that has legitimized China’s ASBM program. Rather China itself has legitimized it through its well-documented processes of research, development, and testing (as reflected by public comments of Admiral Robert Willard, Scott Bray, and other U.S. officials).

- The authors misinterpret Department of Defense reports when they write: “there

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
are too few conventional antiship DF-21D variants available to pose an immediate hazard to U.S. carriers. Government estimates suggest the inventory of nuclear- and conventionally armed DF-21/CSS-5 missiles is still manageable, expanding from 19 to 23 in 2004 to a moderate-sized fleet of 60 to 80 missiles." They apparently refer to estimates of nuclear and conventional medium-range ballistic missiles. Because the ASBM is "developmental," as noted in the National Air and Space Intelligence Center's 2009 unclassified report, it should be clear that it's not even included in the estimate the authors cite.

• "It is, today, hardly an inventory sufficient to defeat a well-defended U.S. carrier battle group." Again, the estimate they cite is for the inventory of other types of missiles. Moreover, how many do they think it takes to achieve a mission kill, and how long would it take China to field sufficient numbers? Beyond misunderstanding DOD report numbers, they make assumptions without demonstrating any sort of serious operational assessment or even back-of-the-envelope calculations. And what about China's increasingly capable cruise missiles and other anti-access weapons, which Chinese sources discuss using with ASBMs to achieve a multi-access attack?

• The "distant question of supercarrier vulnerability" may not be so distant; they offer no supporting evidence. Here again, public statements from the U.S. officials mentioned above suggest gathering danger.

• The authors' discussion of precision global strike capabilities appears to assume that mobile land targets are easily located. Certainly if an adversary can find them, it can strike them. The problem is that mobile targets are hard to find (the 1991 Gulf War Scud hunt), which the authors don't appear to acknowledge. Even if all targets can be found, striking them could be highly escalatory.

Another View



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• On the larger point that the hand wringing is somehow “embarrassing,” that mischaracterizes our work, which emphasizes U.S. countermeasure capabilities and the need to develop them further. Moreover, serious discussion concerning vital national security issues isn’t embarrassing. Some in the 1920s–30s likewise opposed discussion of battleship vulnerabilities, with regrettable results. What would be embarrassing is the lack of such serious discussion.

More Henderson, Less Bonds

(See H. J. Hendrix, pp. 60–65, April 2010 *Proceedings*)

Chief Aviation Ordnanceman John Cataldi, U.S. Navy (Retired)—After reading Commander Hendrix’s article, I had only one question: Why isn’t the Navy scrambling to build and place one or more of these Influence Squadrons in every Navy homeport at home and abroad?

The article clearly articulates a fact of life that Sailors on the deckplates could understand, but seems to elude the grasp of policy makers and procurement czars; that is, no matter how “high tech” a ship or aircraft is, it can still only be at one point on the globe at any given moment.

The beauty of the Influence Squadron (besides the low cost and increased number of combat assets) is that it is scalable. Is the coastal area to be patrolled extremely large? Then combine two squadrons to increase the coverage. Is the squadron deploying on a humanitarian mission? Add another joint high-speed vessel to move more relief supplies. Is the squadron going to battle Somali pirates on the high seas? Leave the riverine boats on the mother ship and form their crews into armed guard detachments to be placed on merchant ships transiting the danger zone. Once the merchantman completes the transit, then the detachment is removed by one of the squadron’s helicopters. I’m sure that Fleet

planners can think of many more ways to use these squadrons, including mixing them in with larger high-tech ships.

Why not apply this out-of-the-box thinking to how these squadrons are manned? Since these ships are low tech, there should be shorter training pipelines en route to the Sailor’s assignment. For some jobs that require little or no schoolhouse training, such as gunners and deck crews, why not fill some of those billets with veterans and retirees who have been contracted to return to active duty for a specific deployment? The Navy gets a fully manned squadron to deploy without the expense of having the Sailor on the payroll during the time between deployments.

New Naval Concerns for India

(See P. Das, pp. 60–65, March 2010 *Proceedings*)

Lieutenant Brian Boland, U.S. Coast Guard—Vice Admiral Das should be praised for his candid assessment of India’s response to the attack on 26 November 2008. In it, he writes that “ten people came ashore in a small rubber dinghy designed to carry no more than six people” and that they “landed at a bustling fishing village.”

The United States would do well to recognize that this same scenario plays out dozens of times a year, if not more, in south Florida. In the Florida Keys, these dinghies are thankfully overloaded with refugees rather than terrorists, but the potential certainly exists for this vector to be exploited by those wishing to harm Americans.

Adding insult to injury is the fact that these illegal migrants often land right under the nose of the nations’ best maritime monitoring command center—Joint Interagency Task Force South. This is not to suggest that the task force is to blame, but rather to point out our vulnerability in the unlikely places. Despite the best efforts of the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security—and despite near constant monitoring of the Florida straits—undocumented and unverified individuals are able to easily make landfall in a “bustling fishing village,” much like terrorists did in Mumbai.

Vice Admiral Das makes several comparisons between 9/11 and 26 November

2008. Indeed both attacks dramatically and permanently affected each country. The admiral discusses the many changes his country has implemented in the wake of that terrible attack. There are many parallels, but one glaring difference remains: in the almost ten years since 9/11, the United States has yet to deploy a system that is able to thwart a small group of individuals and a rubber dinghy.

It’s Time for a Sleet Fleet

(See P. von Bleichert, p. 8, March 2010 *Proceedings*)


Rear Admiral David Titley, *Oceanographer of the Navy/Director Task Force Climate Change*—The author succinctly captured the issues regarding greater access to the Arctic due to diminished sea ice in the region. His call for the establishment of an Arctic 8th Fleet, however, is premature.

In May 2009, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead established Task Force Climate Change (TFCC) to coordinate Navy policy, strategy, roadmaps, force structure, and investment recommendations regarding Arctic and global climate change. The Arctic Roadmap referenced by Mr. Bleichert was produced by TFCC.

The United States is an Arctic nation, and the Arctic is a maritime domain, so clearly the ability to project an appropriate level naval presence is required. Our assessment is that the risk of conflict in the Arctic is low. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides an effective framework for resolving sovereignty disputes, and although the United States has not yet acceded to the convention, we adhere to its principles.

While the extent and thickness of Arctic sea ice in the summer are diminishing at a significant rate, the region remains a very harsh and challenging environment for most of the year. Although we have significant experience in submarine operations in the region, the vast distances and frigid conditions make air operations challenging, and current surface ships are not constructed to operate in the ice pack.

Arctic-related security discussions should focus on addressing the consequences of



COMMENT & DISCUSSION
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