

Chapter 4

Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea Region¹

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Maritime Security Challenges in Southeast Asia

It is well known that the greater South China Sea region confronts significant maritime security challenges, many partially linked to the region's continued economic growth.² Recent trends in non-state threats including terrorism, piracy, smuggling, and the targeting of critical infrastructure have led some experts to argue that sub-state threats have truly combined to form a new challenge to international maritime commerce and security. While there are a variety of views on these critical issues both within and outside the region, and economic development and political consolidation and reform (with the attendant issues of "territorial sovereignty,³ illegal seaborne population movements, arms trafficking to and by separatist rebels... and environmental pollution"⁴) remain clear priorities for many states in the region, there is clearly an urgent need to fight rising terrorism and other security threats. Maintaining maritime security, and giving clear evidence of this security to the various entities and market forces that regulate the global

1 The views expressed in this study are solely those of the author as a private individual. This study is based only on publicly available sources and does not represent the official position or analysis of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. Government.

2 For a useful background, see Brian Nichiporuk, Clifford Grammich, Angel Rabasa, and Julie DaVanzo, "Demographics and Security in Maritime Southeast Asia", *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Winter/Spring (2006).

3 For U.S. understanding concerning the importance of this issue, see Admiral William J. Fallon, United States Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Remarks at 4th Annual Shangri La Dialogue, "Enhancing Maritime Security Cooperation", June 5, 2005, <http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2005/050606-emsi-shangrila.shtml> (accessed July 1, 2009).

4 Evelyn Goh, "Southeast Asian Reactions to America's New Strategic Imperatives", in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., *Asia Eyes America: Regional Perspectives on U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*, Newport, R.I., Naval War College Press, 2007, p. 206.

economy, is important for the wellbeing of the region's people, 60 percent of whom live in or rely economically on maritime zones.⁵

Maritime security is also important because of Southeast Asia's vital role as both a source of and a conduit for international trade and energy supply. Roughly one third of world trade transits the Strait of Malacca annually. This includes more than 50,000 vessels,⁶ twice the number that pass through the Suez Canal by some estimates and many times that which pass through the Panama Canal.⁷ It includes 11.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil.⁸ Eighty percent of Chinese crude oil imports, for instance, including virtually all of China's imports from the Middle East and Africa, flow through the Strait of Malacca.⁹ According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency, if an oil spill, piracy, or terrorism closed the 1.5 mile wide Strait, "nearly half of the world's fleet would be required to sail further, generating a substantial increase in the requirement for vessel capacity. ... Closure of the Strait of Malacca would immediately raise freight rates worldwide."¹⁰

Roughly three-quarters of annual world oil and natural gas trade transits the South China Sea, which, at 3.5 million square kilometers, is the world's sixth largest body of water.¹¹ The South China Sea handles an annual oil flow three times that of the Suez Canal and 15 times that of the Panama Canal. By 2020, increasing regional energy demand is expected to double its oil flow figures.¹² The South China Sea is a vital transport corridor for liquefied natural gas (LNG), carrying two-thirds of the world's current LNG trade.¹³ While Japan and South

5 John Bradford, "Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia," *Naval War College Review* (Summer 2005), p. 63.

6 "World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Malacca", U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Malacca.html (accessed July 1, 2009).

7 Sudha Ramachandran, "Divisions Over Terror Threat in Malacca Straits", *Asia Times* (June 16, 2004), www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FF16Ae01.html (accessed July 1, 2009).

8 "World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Malacca."

9 Zhang Yuncheng, "Energy Security and Sea Lanes", in Yang Mingjie, ed., *Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation*, (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2005), p. 118.

10 "World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Malacca."

11 John Garofano, "China, the South China Sea, and U.S. Strategy", in Gabriel Collins, Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray, *China's Energy Strategy: Implications for Beijing's Maritime Policies* (Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 2008).

12 Ibid.

13 Zhang Yuncheng, "Energy Security and Sea Lanes", p. 107.

Korea are East Asia's primary LNG users,¹⁴ LNG transport security is also of great interest to China, which commenced maritime imports in May 2006. The South China Sea represents a critical source of seaborne energy for China, which receives nearly 90 percent of overseas-sourced oil (as compared to roughly 75 percent for Japan) and many trading goods through this major body of water.¹⁵ One half of the world's merchant fleet navigates the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) of the South China Sea and waters around Indonesia.¹⁶

Of central significance to the economic interests of the U.S., its (South)east Asian trading partners, and indeed the world, is the security of mega-hubs. Five of these deep-water ports (Singapore, Hong Kong, Ningbo/Shanghai, Kaosiung, Guangzhou, and Yokohama), which can accommodate the 60-foot drafts of the largest container ships, are located in East and Southeast Asia. The world's 20 mega-hub container ports¹⁷ send nearly 68 percent of the 5.7 million containers entering the U.S. by sea annually.¹⁸ This is part of a larger pattern in which seaborne trade, which accounts for 80 percent of all international trade,¹⁹ has increased an estimated 4.1 percent (in 2004), and 3.6 percent (in 2005 and 2006).²⁰

For all these reasons, a variety of Asia-Pacific maritime powers, including the United States and China, are making important contributions to regional security. This chapter will review the two nations' regional roles, existing cooperation initiatives both indigenous and applicable to the region, and the vital importance of both bilateral and multilateral efforts to ensuring future progress.

14 Japan imported 58.6 million tons of LNG in 2005, and South Korea 23.1 million tons in 2004, as compared to a smaller amount in Mainland China and Taiwan's 5.5 million tons in that same year. See <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Japan/pdf.pdf> (accessed July 1, 2009); http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/South_Korea/NaturalGas.html (accessed July 1, 2009); <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/taiwan.html> (accessed July 1, 2009).

15 Garofano, "China, the South China Sea, and U.S. Strategy."

16 Ibid.

17 As of 2005, the world's top 20 ports were, in descending order of annual tons of container traffic: Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Busan, Kaohsiung, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Dubai, Los Angeles, Long Beach, Antwerp, Qingdao, Port Klang, Ningbo, Tianjin, New York/New Jersey, Guangzhou, Tanjung Pelepas, and Laem Chabang. Data from the American Association of Port Authorities, <http://www.aapa-ports.org/> (accessed July 1, 2009).

18 "China Joins the U.S. in Container Security Initiative", U.S. Customs and Border Protection, October 25, 2002, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/legacy/2002/102002/china_joins_csi_1025.xml (accessed July 1, 2009).

19 "Hong Kong Trails Singapore in 2005 Container Volume", *Bloomberg.com*, January 16, 2006, <http://www.bloomberg.com> (accessed July 1, 2009).

20 UNCTAD, *Review of Maritime Transport 2006*, p. x.

The U.S. and Maritime Southeast Asia

As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Eric G. John has testified,

We want to see a Southeast Asia that is a partner in the promotion of democracy and human rights and an engine of economic growth; a group of nations whose varied ethnic and religious groups live together and flourish in peace; countries that cooperate fully with us in battling the evils of terrorism, proliferation, and infectious diseases; and a region in which the United States plays a positive role, in harmony with other powers.²¹

Former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, in his May 2005 tour of Southeast Asia, “very effectively conveyed that Washington would not ignore the maintenance and extension of economic ties with the Southeast Asian nations.”²² Indeed, the region is presently “America’s fifth-largest export market, with two-way trade of over \$136 billion in 2004 and U.S. direct investment of over \$90 billion in 2003. The United States, along with Japan, is Southeast Asia’s top trading partner and investor.”²³ After the EU 15, the U.S. contributed the second largest amount of ASEAN²⁴’s foreign direct investment in 2004 (23.7 percent, over \$5 billion dollars).²⁵ Through the U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington “is the largest source of bilateral official development assistance in the ASEAN region.”²⁶ Initiated in 2002, with a goal to involving states across the region,

21 Deputy Assistant Secretary Eric G. John, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “The United States and Southeast Asia: Developments, Trends, and Policy Choices”, Statement Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, September 2005, p. 1; Goh, “Southeast Asian Reactions to America’s New Strategic Imperatives.” See also “Remarks by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Evans Revere to the Baltimore Council of Foreign Relations”, May 3, 2005.

22 Goh, “Southeast Asian Reactions to America’s New Strategic Imperatives”, p. 215.

23 Ibid., p. 206.

24 For an overview of U.S.–ASEAN relations, see “The United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Thirty Years of Dialogue and Cooperation”, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, July 27, 2007, www.state.gov (accessed June 30, 2009).

25 Donald E. Weatherbee, “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia”, in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds, *Strategic Asia 2006-07: Trade, Interdependence, and Security*, Washington, D.C., National Bureau of Asian Research, 2006, p. 279.

26 Ibid., p. 278.

Washington's Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI)²⁷ "has been highly valued."²⁸ During a November 2005 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting, President Bush and seven ASEAN leaders issued a Joint Vision Statement for an ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership.²⁹ The Enhanced Partnership is envisioned to be "comprehensive, action-oriented and forward looking, and comprising political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and social and development cooperation."³⁰ In this regard, it is worth noting that nations across Southeast Asia, with the unfortunate exception of Burma, "all wish to maximize economic and technological gains from relations with the United States."³¹ For a demonstration of the importance of foreign trade, and the relevance of the U.S. economy, to Southeast Asia, see Table 4.1:

Table 4.1 Trade Intensity and Share of Trade with the U.S. for Selected Southeast Asian States and Administrative Regions in 2004³²

Economy	Trade as share of GDP (%)	Share of trade with U.S. (%)
Hong Kong	376.2	11.0
Macau	161.8	24.0
Malaysia	221.1	37.1
Cambodia	140.5	24.6
Vietnam	140.0	11.0
Thailand	136.4	21.3
Philippines	102.4	33.8

27 EAI offers guidelines for converting consultative bilateral trade and investment framework agreements (TIFA) into more robust and rewarding binding bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). FTAs also allow for dispute resolution mechanisms. See Weatherbee, "Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia", p. 282.

28 Goh, "Southeast Asian Reactions to America's New Strategic Imperatives", p. 215.

29 Weatherbee, "Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia", p. 284.

30 See "Joint Vision Statement for an ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership", <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/ris/ot/57078.htm> (accessed August 12, 2008).

31 Goh, "Southeast Asian Reactions to America's New Strategic Imperatives", p. 216.

32 Data from Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds, *Strategic Asia 2006-07: Trade, Interdependence, and Security*, Washington, D.C., National Bureau of Asian Research, 2006, pp. 398-9. Economies selected based on data available from this source.

Meanwhile, “none of the [regional] states with current military strategic ties with the United States wish to diminish or downgrade these ties, while those states that do not have such ties wish to develop them to some degree.”³³ Indeed, “Though the U.S. war in Iraq is generally unpopular in Southeast Asia ... the impetus of congruent U.S. and Southeast Asian counter-terrorism interests has in fact strengthened and deepened U.S. defense links with its ASEAN friends and allies.”³⁴

Washington’s “commitment to regional security”³⁵ is expressed in a robust program of bilateral and multilateral exercises and exchanges between U.S. forces in the Pacific Command and friendly and allied Southeast Asian forces.” Relevant exercises include Cobra Gold, CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training), and SEACAT (Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism). SEACAT specifically “promotes information sharing and multinational cooperation in maritime interception scenarios.”³⁶ On May 23–24 2006, for instance, the navies of the U.S. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand trained to search for illicit drugs and weapons aboard ships in the South China Sea.³⁷ “Regional cooperation is already in place, and when it comes to piracy in this area, we need everybody’s help,” stated Singaporean Navy Captain Tan Yong. “SEACAT is a good opportunity for us all to exercise together.”³⁸

As two U.S. Navy officers from PACOM elaborate,

33 Goh, “Southeast Asian Reactions to America’s New Strategic Imperatives”, p. 216.

34 Weatherbee, “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia”, p. 294.

35 For an overview of relevant U.S. cooperative mechanisms, see “Maritime Security in the East Asia and Pacific Region”, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, April 21, 2006, www.state.gov (accessed August 3, 2008).

36 Major Victor Huang, Republic of Singapore Navy, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?” *Naval War College Review*, Winter 2008, Vol. 61, No. 1. For more information, see the 2006 SEACAT website, www.clwp.navy.mil/seacat2006 (accessed July 1, 2009).

37 Melinda Larson, “Communication Key to SEACAT Boarding Exercises”, May 26, 2006, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=23830 (accessed July 1, 2009); Commander Task Force 73 Public Affairs, “Navies Partner for Southeast Asia Maritime Security Exercise”, May 19, 2006, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=23727 (accessed July 1, 2009); Melinda Larson, “SEACAT Strengthens Maritime Bonds in Southeast Asia”, May 29, 2006, <http://www.clwp.navy.mil/seacat2006/news/SEACAT%20closing.htm> (accessed November 18, 2008). For details on the previous year’s exercise, see U.S. Seventh Fleet Public Affairs, “SEACAT 2005 Training Catalyst for U.S., SE Asia Navies”, May 30, 2005, <http://www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2005/may/35.htm> (accessed October 11, 2008).

38 Melinda Larson, “SEACAT Fosters Exchange Between Future Naval Leaders”, www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=23773 (accessed July 1, 2009).

USPACOM engagement strategies include Service-to-Service activities, joint and combined multilateral exercises, subject matter expert exchanges, and other training venues. Bilateral exercises are historically among the most successful exchange opportunities. Among the many that USPACOM is involved in are Exercise Balikatan in the Philippines, Pacific Fleet's Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training, Marine Force Pacific's Incremental Training Exercises, and U.S. Army Pacific's Garuda Shield with Indonesia and Keris Strike with Malaysia. USPACOM is increasingly encouraging multilateral ventures by inviting partner nations to participate in traditionally U.S.-only exercises. Cope Tiger, Red Flag, and Cobra Gold are among the most visible military-to-military exercises, but they represent only a fraction of the actual participation of Southeast Asian nations' militaries in U.S. or regional exercises.³⁹

Among Washington's many military exchanges involving Southeast Asia, which include the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, "The U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has graduated tens of thousands of Southeast Asian students including [Indonesian] President Yudhoyono." Finally, Washington "is also the major extra-regional defense supplier to the key ASEAN countries."⁴⁰

The U.S. is thus poised to remain a welcome influence in Southeast Asia, according to Evelyn Goh, particularly if it continually strives to address the diverse needs of nations across the region. Because Washington's "nonimperial history suggests a more benign exercise of power ...⁴¹ many Southeast Asian policymakers favor a continuation of the preponderance of perceived benign U.S. power."⁴²

China's Growing Interests in the Maritime Realm and Southeast Asia

As it becomes an increasingly capable, influential, and cooperative maritime power in all dimensions, China is acquiring a large, comprehensive stake in the security of the oceans. Maritime commerce, in particular, supports China's national program of "peaceful development." With its over four million square km of claimed sea area, 1,400 harbors, and a tremendous number of cargo ships, the world's largest developing nation generated 10 percent of its GDP (US\$270 billion) from

39 John D. Wheeler and Herschel Weinstock, "The Enduring Value of Military-to-Military Cooperation in Southeast Asia", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 47: 4th quarter (2007), p. 67.

40 Weatherbee, "Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia", p. 294.

41 Goh, "Southeast Asian Reactions to America's New Strategic Imperatives", p. 202.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 209.

maritime industries in 2006, up 14 percent from 2005.⁴³ Estimates have projected that China's maritime GDP will reach one trillion by 2020.⁴⁴ With 1,700 ships, China's merchant marine is second only to Panama's in size.⁴⁵ A recent article by People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Senior Captain Xu Qi further underscores China's growing global maritime interests, stating that today "[China's] open ocean transport routes pass through every continent and every ocean [and] through each important international strait to over six hundred ports in over 150 nations and [administrative] regions."⁴⁶ The insightful, popular government-inspired study *大国崛起* (The Rise of Great Powers) suggests that economic development, fueled by foreign trade and safeguarded by a sustainable and non-provocative degree of naval power, drives national development. There appears to be a vigorous domestic debate today concerning China's maritime history, orientation, and ideology as the nation increasingly relies on the seas even while working to preserve elements of its longstanding maritime cultural heritage.⁴⁷

The need to import key natural resources such oil, natural gas, and iron ore gives China a major stake in maritime security. China imports tremendous amounts of raw inputs to fuel its dynamic industrially intensive economy. The bulk of China's natural resource imports come by sea from places as far afield as Brazil and Saudi Arabia, making sea lane security a major policy concern in China.

China's strategic thinkers apparently perceive maritime energy security to be increasingly vital. Their nation, already the world's second largest oil consumer, is on track to become the world's second largest net oil importer by 2015. Since 1993, when Beijing became a net crude oil importer, demand has skyrocketed. In 2005–06, for example, year on year import demand growth was 14.5 percent. Despite extensive exploration of offshore reserves to replace dwindling onshore reservoirs, and a new oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang province, China imports 45 percent of its oil and receives 85 percent of it by sea. China's rising motor vehicle ownership, its reported plans to double the size of its road network, and its domestic firms' huge fixed investments in steel, petrochemicals, and other

43 "10% Of GDP Now Comes From Sea, Says Report", *Chinadaily.com.cn*, April 10, 2007.

44 Xu Qi, "Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early Twenty-first Century", *China Military Science*, 17: 4 (2004), pp. 75–81, in Chinese; trans. Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein, *Naval War College Review* 59: 4 (Autumn 2006).

45 See www.nationmaster.com (accessed July 1, 2009). Lyle J. Goldstein, "China: A New Maritime Partner?", U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, August 2007, p. 27.

46 Xu, "Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early Twenty-first Century".

47 For more information on efforts to protect China's maritime cultural heritage, see Ren Huaifeng and Zhu Huayou, National Institute for South China Sea Studies, "Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage in the South China Sea and Regional Cooperation", paper presented at Conference on New Development of the Law of the Sea and China, Xiamen, March 9–12, 2005.

energy-intensive industries could drive oil imports to as much as 60 percent of total oil demand by 2016–20. If import demand grows at 6 percent per year, China's oil import needs could increase from roughly 3.2 million bbl/day at present to 5.3 million bbl/day in this timeframe.

Envisioned future pipelines, of varying logistical and economic viability, seem unlikely to substantially reduce this dependence on sea lane security. Indeed, according to Senior Captain Xu, "By 2020... It may be[come] necessary to import three-quarters of [China's] oil from overseas."⁴⁸

LNG use promises to ameliorate China's serious air pollution problems, which some researchers believe are already causing as much as US\$200 billion annually in economic damage. In the economically vibrant southeast coastal region, which is emerging as China's main LNG demand center, seaborne imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) are already proving economically viable and are likely to grow rapidly in coming years. Given energy policy reform and Russia's construction of promised gas pipelines to China, Chinese LNG demand could reach 20 million tons/year by 2016. By 2020, China may be importing more than 30 million tons per year,⁴⁹ much of it by sea.

Shipbuilding is emerging as a "strategic industry" in need of "special oversight and support."⁵⁰ China launched over 13 million tons of new ships in 2006 and (assuming continuation of recent trends)⁵¹ will produce 20 million tons annually by 2010.⁵² Beijing reportedly aims to become the world's largest shipbuilder by 2015, with 24 million tons of production capacity (35 percent of global capacity). However uneven in its pace and nature of development, China's large shipbuilding sector will support broad-based maritime and naval development.

For all these reasons, Beijing seems poised to assume an even greater stake in the security of the global maritime commons. Encouragingly, awareness of the

48 Xu, "Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early Twenty-first Century".

49 Scott C. Roberts, "China's LNG Program Turns a Corner", Cambridge Energy Research Associates, <http://www.cera.com/aspx/cda/client/report/reportpreview.aspx?CID=7328&KID=> (accessed July 1, 2009).

50 "China to Limit Foreign Investment in Shipyards", *Shanghai Daily*, September 19, 2006, <http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/?id=292385&type=business> (accessed August 24, 2008).

51 The recent drop-off in global ship construction and transport demand may render some of the more optimistic projections cited in this chapter unrealistic, but the overall development of China's ship building and shipping industries will continue and they remain poised to assume increasing prominence internationally.

52 Derived from new construction and order book statistics in Lloyd's Register—Fairplay, Ltd., *Register of Ships, Sea*—web database, <http://www.sea-web.com> (accessed July 1, 2009); Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, "China's Maritime Evolution: Military and Commercial Factors", *Pacific Focus* (Fall 2007).

importance of maritime anti-terrorism appears to be increasing in China.⁵³ Chinese attention to non-traditional security threats appears to have prompted a variety of unprecedented maritime safety exercises.⁵⁴

Emerging Maritime Cooperation in Southeast Asia

As explained above, many regional “stakeholders,” as well as the U.S. and China, have a strong interest in the continued security of Southeast Asia and its sea lanes. Each nation will have its own interests and priorities, but it will be important to reach a common understanding concerning the need to ensure the collective good of maritime security more broadly. One issue on which all parties can already agree is that the multiple, complex security challenges that confront the region call for cooperative security measures that are no less sophisticated and diverse than the threats that they are designed to address. An appropriate philosophy for building on this consensus might be termed, “mutual interests, mutual respect, mutual consultation, and mutual responsibility.”

The importance of maritime security in Southeast Asia, therefore, is clear. The question then becomes how to achieve this pressing, multifaceted objective. Such non-traditional security threats as piracy, former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen has emphasized, “... can no longer be viewed as someone else’s problem. [Piracy] is a global threat to security because of its deepening ties to international criminal networks, smuggling of hazardous cargoes, and disruption of vital commerce.”⁵⁵ As Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff has stated from the U.S. perspective, “we fear the intrusion of terrorist weapons from a nation not our own [but] it is only in building strong alliances with foreign countries that we can prevent such an attack from occurring.”⁵⁶

53 See, for example, Zhang Lina, “Maritime Anti-Terrorism and Recent Developments in the International Marine Transportation Security System”, *China Water Transport*, 1 (2007) [in Chinese], <http://scholar.ilib.cn/A-zgsy-xsb200701111.html> (accessed July 1, 2009); Wang Fei, “The Policies of U.S. ‘Port Security’ in the Age of Anti-Terrorism and Information Revolution Safety Measures”, *Informatization Construction*, 4 (2006) [in Chinese], <http://scholar.ilib.cn/A-xxhjs200406018.html> (accessed July 1, 2009); Yu Chengguo and Li Daze, “Thoughts on Strengthening Maritime Security Counter-Terrorism Measures”, *China Navigation*, 2 (2003) [in Chinese].

54 See, for example, Yuan Xuan, “China’s First Anti-terrorism Drill Involving an Oil Tanker with a Loading Capacity of 300,000 Tons—Launched Jointly by the China Maritime Safety Administration and COSCO”, *Maritime China*, 7 (2004) [in Chinese], <http://scholar.ilib.cn/A-zgyyhwgg200407005.html> (accessed July 1, 2009).

55 Admiral Michael Mullen, “Remarks as Delivered for the 17th International Seapower Symposium”, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., September 21, 2005, <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen050921.txt> (accessed July 1, 2009).

56 Dannielle Blumenthal, “CBP Kicks Off Secure Freight Initiative”, *U.S. Customs & Border Protection Today*, April/May (2007), <http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2007/>

Encouragingly, a variety of agreements have already been formed to safeguard various aspects of maritime security in the region—thereby suggesting widespread recognition of the need for action.

The Malacca Straits Patrol Network

The Malacca Strait littoral states are critically dependent on maritime security. Eighty percent of Malaysia's trade transits the Strait.⁵⁷ Malaysia's foremost law enforcement official emphasized in June 2007 that maritime terrorism is a "real and possible threat" that could "devastate Southeast Asia's economic environment and severely disrupt trade."⁵⁸ Najib Razak, Malaysia's deputy prime minister, "has called for greater vigilance and intelligence sharing to combat piracy and prevent terrorism along the Malacca Strait."⁵⁹ Singapore's economy is even more dependent on the "free flow of shipping through the region" than Malaysia or Indonesia.⁶⁰

The Malacca Straits Patrol Network encompasses two initiatives among the littoral states of the Malacca Straits, MALSINDO and "Eyes in the Sky" (EiS).⁶¹ In July 2004, the MALSINDO (Malaysia/Singapore/Indonesia) Trilateral Coordinated Patrols were initiated in the Strait of Malacca based on cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.⁶² The goal is to better utilize the littoral states' respective resources in order to combat piracy,⁶³ terrorism, and other criminal actions. According to Major Victor Huang of the Republic of Singapore Navy,

A conceptually linked but officially unrelated boost to the initiative's effectiveness was Project SURPIC, a technical system that allows information sharing between Singapore and Indonesian command and control (C2) centers in order to achieve

apr_may/secure.xml (accessed July 1, 2009).

57 Huang, "Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?"

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 For a Chinese perspective on Malacca Strait security issues, see Yu Kun, "Who Will Manage the Security of the Malacca Strait?" *The Contemporary World*, 5 (2006) [in Chinese].

62 "Launch of Trilateral Coordinated Patrols—MALSINDO Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol", Singapore Ministry of National Defense, July 20, 2004, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2004/jul/20jul04_nr.html (accessed July 1, 2009).

63 For an argument that the threats of maritime terrorism and piracy have been exaggerated, see Joshua H. Ho, "The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia", *Asian Survey*, 46: 4, July/August (2006), pp. 558–74.

a common operating picture in the Singapore Strait, facilitating communication and enforcement.⁶⁴

As Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh has emphasized, MALSINDO involves “coordinated,” not “joint” patrols, meaning that nations do not normally subordinate their forces to a supra-national command on the basis of a defense agreement or introduce them into each other’s territorial waters.⁶⁵ Accordingly, “MALSINDO ... excludes other countries such as the United States ...”⁶⁶ Moreover, even among the participating littoral states, “Due to the sensitivity of the littorals over the issue of ‘sovereignty’, MALSINDO does not provide for ‘hot pursuit.’”⁶⁷

A new initiative for the original MALSINDO states, this time in partnership with Thailand, emerged following a proposal by Malaysia’s deputy prime minister and defense minister, Najib Tun Razak, at the Shangri La Dialogue in June 2005.⁶⁸ The four parties began EiS maritime air patrols in September 2005 out of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. While these have met with considerable media attention,⁶⁹ however, researchers have differed concerning the extent to which EiS has produced tangible results.⁷⁰

In an effort to address ongoing security concerns while upholding national sovereignty, the Indonesian Navy’s chief of staff has declared, “Other countries that would like to help in making Malacca Strait safe, would be highly appreciated if they are willing to share by providing intelligence information, weapon equipment,

64 Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?”

65 Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, Chief of Staff Indonesian Navy, “National Sovereignty and Security in the Strait of Malacca”, paper presented to the Conference held by Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 12, 2004, p. 11, www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/conferences/som04/papers/sondakh.pdf (accessed May 17, 2008).

66 Zhang Xuegang, “Southeast Asia and Energy: Gateway to Stability”, *China Security*, 3: 2, Spring (2007), http://www.wsichina.org/cs6_2.pdf (accessed July 1, 2009).

67 Gurpreet S. Khurana, “Cooperation Among Maritime Security Forces: Imperatives for India and Southeast Asia”, *Strategic Analysis*, 29: 2, April–June (2005), p. 298.

68 Graham Gerard Ong and Joshua Ho, “Maritime Air Patrols: The New Weapon Against Piracy in the Malacca Straits”, *IDSS Commentary*, 13 October 2005, www.idss.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/IDSS702005.pdf (accessed July 1, 2009).

69 “M’sia, Thailand to Adopt Malsindo Module—Mohd Anwar”, *Malaysia National News Agency*, August 25, 2005, <http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news.php?id=152155> (accessed July 1, 2009); Ocean Policy Research Foundation, *Monthly Report* (September 2005), p. 1.

70 Carolin Liss, “The Privatisation of Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?”, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Working Paper No. 141, February 2007, <http://www.warc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/wp141.pdf> (accessed July 1, 2009).

navigational buoys/sea traffic sign, training, etc.”⁷¹ Indeed, in July 2005 the three littoral states “request[ed] equipment, training, and intelligence assistance from other countries, including the United States, Japan, and Australia.”⁷²

Here, Japan’s substantial role in providing such assistance merits special recognition. Following policy adjustments to account for local sensitivities, Tokyo has undertaken a variety of measures in support of the efforts of states surrounding the Malacca Strait to increase security there,⁷³ including the installation of navigational aids in the Strait.⁷⁴ Japan’s Coast Guard, for instance, has engaged in joint training exercises with six nations Southeast Asia. All coastal states have received Japanese training and equipment.⁷⁵ Tokyo has funded an anti-piracy center in Singapore.⁷⁶ According to Sam Bateman, Japan has also:

hosted Port Security Seminars in Southeast Asian countries to assist implementation of the ISPS Code. In June 2006, Japan donated three patrol boats to Indonesia to help fight terrorism and piracy, after earlier donating a training vessel to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA). At a higher political level, Japan has held recent talks with ASEAN on cooperation against terrorism. These talks were expected to focus on how Japan can help ASEAN to exchange information on terrorism, tighten immigration controls, strengthen maritime patrols and improve investigation technology.⁷⁷

71 Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Navy, “National Sovereignty and Security in the Strait of Malacca”, paper presented to the Conference held by Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 12, 2004, pp. 11–12, www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/conferences/som04/papers/sondakh.pdf (accessed May 17, 2008).

72 Goh, “Southeast Asian Reactions to America’s New Strategic Imperatives”, p. 206.

73 For a Chinese perspective on Japan’s role in maritime security affairs in Southeast Asia, see Gong Yingchun, “Japan and the Construction of Multilateral Marine Security Mechanism”, *Contemporary East Asia*, 7 (2006) [in Chinese].

74 Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?”

75 John F. Bradford, “Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and the Coastal State Responses”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 26 (2004).

76 Ocean Policy Research Foundation, *Monthly Report*, p. 3.

77 Sam Bateman, “International Cooperation in Piracy Prevention”, in Werner Vom Busch and Tobias Rettig, eds, *Covering Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia*, Media Programme Asia, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Singapore, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2006, p. 67.

U.S. Military and Economic Contributions to Southeast Asia

The U.S., for its part, has worked to increase regional security while respecting the views and interests of states in the region. Washington has sought to develop robust economic and military partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and other important regional nations.

Indonesia The tragic December 26, 2004 tsunami gave the U.S. an historic opportunity to restore good relations with Indonesia, a regional power of critical importance with over 17,000 islands and the world's fourth largest population.⁷⁸ Jakarta has requested U.S. "military assistance in the form of training and support in order to build its enforcement capacity."⁷⁹

In February 2005, the U.S. and Indonesia resumed International Military Education and Training (IMET). This was cemented with a visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in June. In November of that year, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice "waived all remaining legislative restrictions on U.S. military assistance to Indonesia,"⁸⁰ thereby lifting a five-year ban on arms sales to Jakarta, and permitting defense exports and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).⁸¹ In March 2006, during a visit to Jakarta, Secretary Rice highlighted "the growing strategic partnership and strategic relationship of the United States and Indonesia."⁸² That month, U.S. State Department "posted formal notice permitting the sale of lethal military equipment to Indonesia on a case-by-case basis."⁸³ Following these measures, then Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command William J. Fallon

78 Bruce A. Elleman, *Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia*, Newport, R.I., Naval War College Press, February 2007; Sumathy Permal, "U.S.-Indonesia Military Ties: An Observation", http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/sumathy/sumathy-us_indon_military_ties.pdf (accessed October 1, 2008); Admiral Gary Roughead, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, "Deployment of Hospital Ship 'Mercy' and Current Pacific Command Operations", Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, D.C., May 10, 2006, <http://2002-2009-fpc.state.gov/66063.htm> (accessed July 1, 2009).

79 Huang, "Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?"

80 U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman, "Indonesia-Military Assistance", January 4, 2006, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/2006/58686.htm> (accessed March 30, 2008); Weatherbee, "Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia", p. 296.

81 Michael Vatikiotis, "Washington's Turnaround on Indonesia", *International Herald Tribune*, January 1, 2006, <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2006/01/06/opinion/edvatik.php?page=1> (accessed July 1, 2009).

82 Weatherbee, "Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia", p. 297.

83 *Federal Register* 71: 60 (13 March 2006), 15797; Weatherbee, "Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia", p. 296.

recommended a “rapid, concerted infusion” of U.S. military aid to Indonesia,⁸⁴ a call that was echoed in the U.S. administration’s FY 2007 foreign operations budget request.⁸⁵ In 2006, the U.S. Pacific Command invited the Indonesian Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS) to participate in its annual Pacific Area Special Operations Conference (PASOC).⁸⁶ Indonesia has also participated in the annual CARAT exercises.⁸⁷

“From a military point of view,” according to Donald Weatherbee,

the restoration of normal relations allows the United States to again contribute to Indonesia’s military modernization and capacity building, aid that will better allow Indonesia to support common strategic interests in counter-terrorism and maritime security. These changes will also enhance Indonesia’s ability to work with Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand in their joint security presence in the Strait of Malacca. With access to U.S. assistance and equipment reopened, the Indonesian military’s capacity for interoperability with other U.S. friends and allies in the ASEAN region will be increased. The reintegration of Indonesia into the PACOM-centered security nexus in Southeast Asia also is expected to give further incentives to the Indonesian military for reform and professionalization.⁸⁸

In a larger sense,

The United States views Indonesia’s position in Southeast Asia as strategically unique—given that Indonesia contains nearly half of Southeast Asia’s population, has the largest Muslim population in the world, is located on critical Asian sea lane choke points, is a key ally in the war on terrorism, and is a re-emerging leader of ASEAN.⁸⁹ ... As important as normalization is for the military, the greatest significance is the new political quality that normalization lends to the

84 Admiral William J. Fallon, “Statement to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on Pacific Command Posture”, March 7, 2006, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statement.2006/March/Fallon%2003-07-06.pdf> (accessed February 2, 2008); Weatherbee, “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia”, p. 296.

85 U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2007*, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60643.pdf> (accessed July 1, 2009); Weatherbee, “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia”, p. 296.

86 Weatherbee, “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia”, p. 297.

87 Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?”

88 Weatherbee, “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia”, p. 297.

89 Ibid., p. 296.

bilateral relationship. ... Given Indonesia's critical role in ASEAN, the U.S.-Indonesia "strategic partnership" is a necessary key ingredient to the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership.⁹⁰

Malaysia The U.S. and Malaysia enjoy robust trade relations. Kuala Lumpur, which already has Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) status, initiated further negotiations with Washington in the beginning of 2006. As for maritime security, between 2004 and 2006 Malaysia reorganized its five maritime agencies into the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA).⁹¹ The MMEA "will buy new vessels, refurbish many of its seventy-plus existing craft, and acquire six helicopters for surveillance, enforcement, and search-and-rescue duties."⁹² Washington stands willing and ready to provide assistance should Kuala Lumpur deem it to be helpful. Following a meeting with his Malaysian counterpart in July 2006, then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen stated, "As we are developing future capabilities, certainly we are willing to share those with the Malaysian navy ..."⁹³

Singapore In May 2003, Singapore became the first Southeast Asian nation to conclude an FTA with the U.S. This robust "WTO plus" agreement, which entered force on January 1, 2004, has been credited with increasing bilateral trade by 10 percent in 2004 and 2005.⁹⁴ As a Major Security Cooperation Partner of Washington, the dynamic city state has concurrently strengthened military relations with Washington by constructing a naval base capable of accepting U.S. aircraft carriers and hosting a naval logistics command center. Of its own initiative, in 2003 Singapore formed a Maritime and Port Security Working Group, involving its maritime and port authority, police coast guard, and navy, to implement port and shipping security regulations.⁹⁵ Singapore's vessel traffic information system employs sophisticated coastal radars to track as many as 5,000 vessels and allows both real time and historical analysis.⁹⁶ In addition to hosting ReCAAP's

90 Ibid., p. 297.

91 Hon Dato' Sri Najib Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister, Malaysia, "The Security of the Straits of Malacca and its Implications to the South East Asia Regional Security", Korea National Defense University, March 13, 2007, http://www.kln.gov.my/?m_id=25&vid=432 (accessed July 1, 2009).

92 Huang, "Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?"

93 "U.S. Committed To Security in Malacca Strait Says Top Navy Official", *Agence France-Presse*, July 17, 2006.

94 Weatherbee, "Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia", p. 285.

95 For an overview of Singapore's complex maritime security environment, see Catherine Zara Raymond, "Maritime Security: The Singaporean Experience", Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore, draft paper, December 2005.

96 Huang, "Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?"

Information Sharing Center, Singapore announced on March 27, 2007:

that it would construct a command and control center to “house the Singapore Maritime Security Centre (SMSC), an Information Fusion Centre (IFC), and a Multinational Operations and Exercise Centre (MOEC).” The IFC will facilitate information fusion and sharing between “participating militaries and agencies,” and the MOEC will provide the infrastructure for multinational exercises, maritime security operations, and humanitarian operations and disaster relief should the need arise. In essence, Singapore is offering a readymade capability that can be leveraged for regional cooperation at any time. This will allow a rapid operationalization of cooperation initiatives should the political environment be conducive.⁹⁷

Singapore also holds the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, a useful meeting of defense ministers.⁹⁸

Other Southeast Asian Partners The U.S. and the Philippines have long had close military and economic ties. On the bilateral trade front, Manila enjoys TIFA status. Washington accorded the Philippines major non-NATO ally status in 2003. As part of their formal defense alliance relationship, Manila and Washington have also concluded a Mutual Defense Agreement and a Visiting Forces Agreement. During the two previous years, U.S. troops helped Manila fight Mindanao-based Abu Sayyaf separatists in the joint Balikatan exercises. As part of its formal defense alliance relationship with the U.S., Thailand was recognized by the U.S. as a major non-NATO ally in 2003.⁹⁹ The two nations’ longtime security discussions, initiated in 1993, culminated in a bilateral “strategic dialogue” in November 2005.¹⁰⁰ Vietnam has also bolstered its security ties with the U.S., sending representatives to IMET for the first time in 2006.¹⁰¹

97 Ibid. See also “New Maritime Command and Control Centre at Changi”, Ministry of Defense, Singapore, March 27, 2007, www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/.../2007/.../27mar07_nr.html (accessed July 1, 2009); “Speech by Mr. Yeo Cheow Tong, Minister for Transport, at the ReCAAP IFN Signing Ceremony, April 20, 2006, Garden Suite, Oriental Hotel,” http://app.mot.gov.sg/data/s_06_04_20.htm (accessed).

98 For additional information concerning Singapore’s maritime security efforts, see the “Opening Address by Mr. Yeo Cheow Tong, Minister for Transport, at the International Maritime and Port Security Conference, January 21, 2003, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore,” http://app.mot.gov.sg/data/s_03_01_21.html.

99 For more information concerning Thailand’s contribution to regional maritime security, see Chusak Chupaitoon, “Thailand’s Contribution to Regional Security.”

100 Weatherbee, “Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia”, p. 294.

101 Ibid., pp. 295–6.

Regional Cooperation Against Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP)

In November 2004, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus Japan (which originally introduced the initiative), China, South Korea, Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka concluded a Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).¹⁰² This “indigenous pan-Asian initiative,” which entered into force on September 4, 2006, is “the first regional government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery at sea in Asia.”¹⁰³ Now 16-members-strong,¹⁰⁴ ReCAAP has resulted in the establishment of an Information Sharing Center (ISC) in Singapore to “maintain databases, conduct analysis, and act as an information clearinghouse.”¹⁰⁵ Moreover, the “agreement does not ‘oblige members to take any specific action other than sharing information that they deem pertinent to imminent pirate attacks,’”¹⁰⁶ although they “agree to cooperate in capacity building, legal assistance, and extradition.”¹⁰⁷

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Another constructive measure, which has recently been applied to East Asia, is the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). PSI is motivated solely by concerns about proliferation and does not represent an effort to compromise the national interests of peaceful states that abide by the norms of the international system. Rather, supported by over 60 countries, PSI is “a set of partnerships that establishes the basis for cooperation on specific activities, when the need arises. ... PSI interdiction training exercises and other operational efforts help states work together in a more cooperative, coordinated, and effective manner to stop, search, and seize [proliferation-related] shipments.”¹⁰⁸

102 Bradford, *Naval War College Review*, p. 69. See also Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)”, press release, September 4, 2006, [http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,5230,\(accessed July 1, 2009\)](http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,5230,(accessed July 1, 2009))

103 Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ReCAAP”; Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?”.

104 “About ReCAAP ISC,” official website, http://www.recaap.org/about/about1_2.html (accessed June 30, 2009).

105 Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?”

106 Liss, “The Privatisation of Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?”

107 Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?”

108 “The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)”, U.S. State Department Bureau of Nonproliferation, Washington, D.C., May 26, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/46858.htm> (accessed January 17, 2008).

PSI “is intended to operate in a manner ‘consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks.’”¹⁰⁹ PSI supports the January 1992 United Nations (UN) Security Council Presidential Statement that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threatens international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. As Major Victor Huang of the Republic of Singapore Navy notes, “the spirit of PSI was emphatically affirmed by the passage on 28 April 2004 of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, requiring all states to take measures to prevent proliferation.”¹¹⁰ According to Admiral Michael Mullen, “Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan applauded the work of all countries active in PSI and has pointed to this initiative as an example of the type of cooperation necessary to counter today’s threats [with] nations acting in their own interest, but also for the common good.”¹¹¹ PSI is also consistent with recent G-8 and EU statements calling for more coherent and concerted efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.

Singapore hosted East Asia’s first PSI exercise, *Deep Sabre*, in August 2005. Conducted in the South China Sea, *Deep Sabre* advanced PSI participating nations’ operational capabilities by integrating an at-sea boarding (conducted by a combination of military and law enforcement forces) with a port search operation (conducted primarily by law enforcement). From August 5–19, 2,000 personnel from military, coastguard, customs and other agencies of 13 PSI countries participated.¹¹² Other regional nations were invited to observe. Singapore’s Ministry of Defense assessed that *Deep Sabre* “served to validate the multinational and inter-agency systems and procedures that have been put in place to detect and interdict illegal shipments of WMD-related materials.”¹¹³ As *Deep Sabre* demonstrated, specifically targeted exercises can provide an excellent opportunity for positive and productive cooperation for the promotion of mutual interests.

109 Office of the Press Secretary, White House, “Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles”, www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/23764.htm (accessed April 4, 2008); Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?”

110 Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?”

111 Mullen, “Remarks as Delivered for the 17th International Seapower Symposium.”

112 Participating nations included Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Singapore, the U.K., and the U.S. “Singapore Hosts Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise”, Singapore Ministry of National Defense, August 15, 2005, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2005/aug/15aug05_nr2.html (accessed July 1, 2009).

113 “Exercise Deep Sabre Successfully Conducted”, Singapore Ministry of National Defense, August 18, 2005, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2005/aug/18aug05_nr.html (accessed July 1, 2009).

The Container Security Initiative (CSI)

Another important security measure with particular significance for Asia, which boasts 13 of the world's top 20 container shipping ports,¹¹⁴ is the Container Security Initiative (CSI), introduced by the U.S. in January 2002. Containerized cargo security's importance for global economic development and stability is readily apparent. One hundred and eight million cargo containers transport early 90 percent of global trade annually. Ships carrying as many as 8,000 containers transport nearly half of incoming trade (by value), 40 percent overall, to the U.S.'s 360 commercial ports; this percentage is even higher in Japan, Singapore, and the U.K. U.S. ports received 26,000 containers per day, for a total of 9.6 million, in fiscal year 2004;¹¹⁵ seaborne containers also transported one-quarter of U.S. imports (\$423 billion) and one-sixth of U.S. exports (\$139 billion).¹¹⁶ In 2005, 16 million shipping containers arrived in U.S. ports.¹¹⁷ That fiscal year, U.S. Customs and Border Protection processed 20 million sea, truck, and rail containers entering the U.S. and 29 million of its trade entries.¹¹⁸

Seaborne container transport is also the lifeblood of China's economy. China had US\$974 billion in exports in 2006, 21 percent (US\$250 billion) of which went to the U.S. and 9.5 percent of which went to Japan. China imported US\$777.9 billion worth of goods in 2006.¹¹⁹ In all cases, logistical and commercial imperatives meant that the vast majority of goods by volume, and a substantial majority by value, traveled by sea. Thus China, like the U.S., has a major stake in seaborne container security.

The Secure Freight Initiative

Three East Asian ports—Singapore's Brani Terminal, South Korea's Gamman terminal (in Busan), and Hong Kong—are participating in the Secure Freight Initiative. Hong Kong's recent participation is an extremely welcome development,

114 *The Economic Costs of Disruptions in Container Shipments*, Washington, D.C., Congressional Budget Office, March 29, 2006, p. 1.

115 "Container Security Initiative Fact Sheet", U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 30 September 2006, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_fact_sheet.ctt/csi_fact_sheet.doc (accessed).

116 *The Economic Costs of Disruptions in Container Shipments*, p. 1.

117 Ibid.

118 "Container Security Initiative 2006–2011 Strategic Plan", U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, Office of Policy and Planning and Office of International Affairs, Container Security Initiative Division, August 2006, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_strategic_plan.ctt/csi_strategic_plan.pdf, p. 5 (accessed December 30, 2007).

119 14.6 percent of China's 2006 imports were from Japan, 11.3 percent from South Korea, and 7.5 percent from the U.S. "China", *CIA World Factbook*, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (accessed September 20, 2009).

as the Special Administrative Region currently ranks first in terms of the volume of both shipments and containers exported to the U.S.¹²⁰ In 2004, the U.S. received US\$43.4 billion containerized imports from Hong Kong.¹²¹ In fiscal year 2006, Hong Kong sent 13 percent (1.3 million) of its containers to the U.S. Moreover, 90 percent of Hong Kong's shipments are themselves transshipments, making their safety all the more important to verify.¹²²

Initiated officially on December 7, 2006, the Secure Freight Initiative supplements CSI by screening a greater portion of containers, even those not predetermined to be of high risk, with the goal of identifying radiological hazards. It therefore integrates sophisticated scanning technology (e.g., nuclear detection devices) into selected operations at selected ports and sub-port terminals.¹²³ In fiscal year 2006, the six ports under evaluation handled over 10 percent (nearly 1.2 million) of U.S.-bound shipments.¹²⁴

Participating (South)east Asian Nations

Under CSI, officials collaborate closely with their host nation counterparts. U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers are stationed in many overseas locations, where they engage in reciprocal information exchange. Because these personnel are essentially law enforcement officials, and not military officials, they can more easily share relevant information, which is related to law enforcement activities as opposed to potential military activities. Cooperation in law enforcement is usually much easier for nations to achieve than is military cooperation, especially against mutual threats. CSI partner nations may also send officers to U.S. ports to monitor containers destined for their own nation's ports, as Japan and Canada have already done. For a list of currently operational ports in East and Southeast Asia, please see Table 4.2.

120 "Hong Kong to Scan U.S.-Bound Goods for Radiation as Part of Secure Freight Initiative", U.S. Customs and Border Protection, July 27, 2007, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/2007_news_releases/072007/07272007_2.xml (accessed July 1, 2009).

121 This represented 10 percent of overall containerized imports, and 3 percent of total imports. *The Economic Costs of Disruptions in Container Shipments* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 29 March 2006), p. 1.

122 *The Economic Costs of Disruptions in Container Shipments*, p. 1.

123 "Secure Freight Initiative", Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1166037389664.shtm#content (accessed July 1, 2009).

124 Dannielle Blumenthal, "CBP Kicks Off Secure Freight Initiative", *U.S. Customs and Border Protection Today*, April/May (2007), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2007/apr_may/secure.xml (accessed July 1, 2009).

Table 4.2 CSI Ports in (South)east Asia¹²⁵

Mainland China	Hong Kong*	Taiwan	Singapore*	Japan	South Korea	Malaysia	Thailand
Shenzhen		Kaohsiung		Yokohama	Busan*	Port Klang	Laem Chabang
Shanghai		Chi-Lung		Tokyo		Tanjung Pelepas	
				Nagoya			
				Kobe			

* Also a participant in Secure Freight Initiative

All the aforementioned nations and entities have played a critical role in furthering CSI's coverage, and deserve great recognition for their many efforts in this regard. For the purposes of this chapter, however, it will be necessary here to focus on the implementation of CSI in two East Asian member nations, Singapore and China.

Singapore

Singapore became the first Asian nation to participate in CSI in March 2003. With the world's busiest port in terms of container traffic (23,192,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in 2005)¹²⁶ and 80 percent of its large volume of containers representing transshipments, Singapore is uniquely positioned to detect and interdict dangerous containers. U.S. Customs and Border Protection has deployed five officers in Singapore, where they observe cargo being screened by Singaporean authorities.¹²⁷ This is in complete accordance with utmost respect for Singapore's national sovereignty, as it is with all host countries. Unarmed and lacking arrest powers, foreign officers stationed in host country ports conduct

¹²⁵ "Ports in CSI", U.S. Customs and Border Protection, September 21, 2007, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/ports_in_csi.xml (accessed November 15, 2008).

¹²⁶ Data from the American Association of Port Authorities, <http://www.aapa-ports.org/> (accessed July 1, 2009).

¹²⁷ Information for this paragraph derived from "Singapore, the World's Busiest Seaport, Implements the Container Security Initiative and Begins to Target and Pre-Screen Cargo Destined for U.S.", U.S. Customs and Border Protection, March 17, 2003, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/cbp_press_releases/032003/03172003.xml (accessed July 1, 2009).

themselves strictly in accordance with CSI guidelines, with local law being the deciding factor.

China

With its rapid manufacturing-based economic growth, China has already had a major impact on global container trade, Beijing's active participation is essential to the success of CSI. With seven of the world's top 20 container ports,¹²⁸ China processes a tremendous volume of containerized exports. In 2004, Chinese ports handled roughly one-quarter of global container traffic that year and (when including that of the Hong Kong S.A.R.) nearly 40 percent of world container volume. China's rapid port development and economic growth will probably only increase its portion of global container trade.¹²⁹

China's formal accession to CSI in July 2003 was therefore a very welcome development. The announcement in April 2005 that the port of Shanghai would become operational in CSI was another milestone. Already third in volume after Singapore and Hong Kong (with 18,084,000¹³⁰ container unit throughput in 2005, a 24 percent increase from the previous year), the port may become the world's largest by 2010.¹³¹ Shenzhen's announced entry in June 2005 was similarly positive. In 2005, the port ranked fourth globally in container unit throughput, just behind Shanghai at 16,197,000.¹³² It is to be hoped that more Chinese ports will enter CSI in the near future.

Building Maritime Partnerships in Southeast Asia and Beyond

While a variety of regional and international initiatives are beginning to enhance security in maritime Southeast Asia, what are the prospects for a more comprehensive approach to maritime security in the region and beyond? In a landmark speech at the 17th International Seapower Symposium, held at the U.S. Naval War College in September 2005, then-U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen called for a series of global maritime partnerships. In CNO Mullen's vision, a "Thousand Ship Navy" would bring the maritime forces

128 Choe Sang-Hun, "Asian Ports Struggle to Keep Up with Shanghai", December 20, 2006, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/20/business/transcol21.php?page=1> (accessed July 1, 2009).

129 See Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, "China's Maritime Evolution: Military and Commercial Factors", *Pacific Focus*, Fall 2007.

130 Data from the American Association of Port Authorities.

131 Choe Sang-Hun, "Asian Ports Struggle to Keep Up with Shanghai."

132 Data from the American Association of Port Authorities.

of friendly nations together based on their abilities, needs, and interests to provide collective security against a variety of threats in the maritime commons.¹³³

Under the leadership of Admiral Mullen (now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and his successor Admiral Gary Roughead, the U.S. government has for the first time brought all three of its maritime forces (the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) together to produce a unified strategy. Unveiled at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in October 2007, with 97 heads of foreign maritime forces in the audience and participating in related discussion panels, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* is based on the premise that “preventing wars is as important as winning wars.”¹³⁴

As the U.S. Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter has cautioned, the U.S. is “not walking away from, diminishing, or retreating in any way from those elements of hard power that win wars—or deter them from ever breaking out in the first place.” But this first major U.S. maritime strategy in 25 years does place renewed emphasis on cooperating to protect the global commons on which the security and prosperity of nations around the world depends. In this new vision, U.S. “maritime forces will be employed to build confidence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests in an open, multi-polar world.”¹³⁵ Moreover: “Expanded cooperative relationships with other nations will contribute to the security and stability of the maritime domain for the benefit of all” because “trust and cooperation cannot be surged” but must rather “be built over time so that the strategic interests of the participants are continuously considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.”¹³⁶ More specifically, this new U.S. maritime strategy states, “Building and reinvigorating these relationships ... requires an increased focus on capacity-building, humanitarian assistance, regional frameworks for improving maritime governance, and cooperation in enforcing the rule of law in the maritime domain ... by countering piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.”¹³⁷ Moreover, “When natural or manmade disasters strike, our maritime forces can provide humanitarian assistance and relief, joining with interagency and non-governmental partners. By participating routinely and

133 See, for example, Admiral Michael Mullen, “The Thousand Ship Fleet”, *Pentagon Brief*, October 1, 2005; “‘Global Maritime Partnership’ Gaining Steam at Home and with International Navies”, *Defense Daily International*, 7: 42 (October 27, 2006).

134 “A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower”, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandants of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard, October 17, 2007, <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf> (accessed July 1, 2009), p. 4.

135 Ibid., p. 5.

136 Ibid., p. 11.

137 Ibid., p. 11.

predictably in cooperative activities, maritime forces will be postured to support other joint or combined forces to mitigate and localize disruptions."¹³⁸

Despite ongoing strategic concerns, there appears to be growing recognition that the most substantive threats at present to seaborne trade and energy supplies in such regions as Southeast Asia are not from other navies, but rather from non-state actors such as pirates and terrorists, as well as adverse weather and physical overcrowding of the Malacca Strait and other key shipping lanes. These issues are all best dealt with via "capacity building" measures aimed at improving the ability of coastal nation governments to solve these problems from the grassroots level up. Future progress in this area might include providing additional training to regional police forces and coastguards, building an improved regional vessel tracking network, and promoting economic development to give erstwhile pirates and terrorists better alternatives. Additionally, a wide spectrum of Chinese analysts appear to be attuned to the complicated reality of China's energy challenge, and express a clear readiness to engage in cooperation with other oil-consuming great powers, including the U.S., in order to secure oil and gas supply stability.

These enlightened perspectives may offer a basis for substantive cooperation, including in maritime Southeast Asia. Already, according to scholar Donald Weatherbee, the U.S. and China

have similar interests in maintaining the security of sea lanes throughout Southeast Asia and the critical straits choke points. Both Beijing and Washington have committed their support to ASEAN in a variety of multilateral non-traditional security areas: counter-narcotics, counter-piracy, and counter-trafficking in persons.¹³⁹ ... The commonality of Chinese, ASEAN, and U.S. views of the terrorist threat has been expressed in bilateral terms, ASEAN formulations, and the multilateral deliberations of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).¹⁴⁰ ... The United States and China have been proactive with ASEAN on other transnational issues, such as combating the spread of pandemic disease (including HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian influenza. From ASEAN's vantage, both China and the United States are playing positive roles.¹⁴¹

There are certainly frictions that will doubtless be associated with China's rise as an energy consumer and major player throughout the maritime arena and policymakers throughout the Asia-Pacific region must recognize this. But it is important now for the U.S. and China to engage each other on these important issues, as both sea powers are in the process of making decisions that will shape

138 Ibid., p. 12.

139 Weatherbee, "Strategic Dimensions of Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia", p. 293.

140 Ibid., p. 294.

141 Ibid., p. 293.

their force structures for years to come. In that spirit, the next section will outline some of the modest but useful interaction that has occurred thus far.

Sino-American Maritime Cooperation

Over the past few years, a larger vision has been emerging concerning the utility of cooperation between China and the U.S.¹⁴² Former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick has stated that it is in China's interest to become a "responsible stakeholder" and that Beijing "has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success." Beijing and Washington, Zoellick suggests, possess a "shared interest in sustaining political, economic, and security systems that provide common benefits."¹⁴³ While expressing significant concerns, China's 2006 Defense White Paper acknowledges that "[N]ever before has China been so closely bound up with the rest of the world as it is today." China, in this analysis, is "[C]ommitted to peace, development, and cooperation" as it seeks to construct "together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity."¹⁴⁴ The 2008 edition adds, "The Asia-Pacific security situation is stable on the whole. The regional economy is brimming with vigor, mechanisms for regional and sub-regional economic and security cooperation maintain their development momentum, and it has become the policy orientation of all countries to settle differences and hotspot issues peacefully through dialogue."¹⁴⁵

The potential for Sino-American maritime cooperation has been highlighted by recent events. The U.S. Coast Guard has established excellent relations with its Chinese counterparts. These include the Ministry of Public Security (with its Border Control Department and Maritime Police Division), Ministry of Communications (with its Maritime Safety Administration and Rescue and

142 For a positive but realistic exploration of this topic, see Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein, "Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China's Response to U.S. Hegemony", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29: 6 (December 2006), pp. 955–86. This section draws heavily on Andrew S. Erickson, "Combating a Collective Threat: Prospects for Sino-American Cooperation Against Avian Influenza", *Journal of Global Health Governance*, 1: 1 (January 2007), http://diplomacy.shu.edu/academics/global_health/journal/ (accessed July 1, 2009).

143 Robert B. Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" Remarks to the National Committee on U.S.–China Relations, New York, September 21, 2005; James J. Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders, "Visions of Order: Japan and China in U.S. Strategy", *Strategic Forum*, 220 (June 2006), Washington, D.C., National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies.

144 The Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense in 2006", December 29, 2006, www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm (accessed June 30, 2009), pp. 1, 3.

145 The Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense in 2008", January 20, 2009, www.gov.cn/english/official/.../content_1210227.htm (accessed June 30, 2009).

Salvage Agency), Ministry of Agriculture (with its Bureau of Fisheries), and State Oceanic Administration. In May 2006, buoy tender USCGC *Sequoia* (WLB-215) became the first U.S. cutter to visit China. In June 2006, USCGC *Rush* (WHEC-723) called in Qingdao. In August 2007, USCGC *Boutwell* continued these exchanges with a visit to Shanghai during the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, East Asia's only maritime security organization, in which China and the U.S. play substantive roles.¹⁴⁶ U.S. Coast Guard officers have provided training and lectures in China, and Chinese officers have studied at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (New London, C.T.) and the fisheries enforcement school (Kodiak, A.K.). Chinese fisheries enforcement officers have served temporarily on U.S. cutters (i.e., to halt illegal Chinese fishing), and their patrol boats join U.S., Japanese, and Russian counterparts annually to prevent illegal driftnet fishing in the North Pacific. It is to be hoped that the apparently planned creation of a unified Chinese coastguard organization will further opportunities to build on this substantive and useful progress. Already, the posting of a U.S. Coast Guard liaison officer, with the rank of captain, at the U.S. embassy in Beijing appears to indicate prioritization of developing the relationship on the U.S. side.¹⁴⁷

Despite its greater sensitivity, cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese navies is expanding as well, as part of larger bilateral military cooperation and exchanges. In July 2006, PRC Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong became the highest-ranking Chinese military officer to visit the U.S. since 2001. Qian Lihua, deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Office of China's Defense Ministry, described Guo's visit as "the most important Chinese military exchange with another country this year" and bilateral military relations as being "at their best since 2001."¹⁴⁸ Former Commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific Admiral William Fallon visited China in May and August 2006. He extended to the PLA an unprecedented invitation to observe the U.S. Guam-based military exercise *Valiant Shield* in June, which was readily accepted. A Chinese defense ministry official stated that, "The invitation to observe the U.S. military exercises is a very important component of exchanges between the militaries of China and the United States." That same month, the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet flagship *Blue Ridge* called on Shanghai for the fourth time, which China's official media described as "highlighting warming exchanges between the two navies." Assistant Defense Secretary Peter Rodman led a U.S. delegation to Beijing for the eighth round of annual defense consultations between the two countries. "The defense

146 "Shanghai Hosts U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Boutwell during North Pacific Coast Guard Forum 2007", U.S. Coast Guard Visual Information Gallery, August 16, 2007, http://cgvi.uscg.mil/media/main.php?g2_itemId=159644 (accessed July 1, 2009).

147 Unless otherwise specified, data for this paragraph are derived from Lyle J. Goldstein, "China: A New Maritime Partner?" p. 29.

148 All quotations in the paragraph are taken from "China, U.S. Enjoy Active Military Exchanges in 2006", *People's Daily*, December 28, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200612/28/eng20061228_336342.html (accessed July 1, 2009).

departments of the two countries restored a series of consultation mechanisms on maritime security, humanitarian disaster relief and military environmental protection,” stated *People’s Daily*. “A mechanism for officer exchanges between the two armed forces was also set up and military institutions have regular exchange programs.” Visits to China were also made in September and December 2006 by Ryan Henry, Deputy Under Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense, and Gary Roughead, then Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Building on the foundation of this growing series of exchanges, the U.S. and China have held a series of unprecedented bilateral exercises. A search and rescue exercise (SAREX) was held by off San Diego on September 20, 2006. Though a series of port visits had previously occurred, and are scheduled to continue,¹⁴⁹ this was the first bilateral military exercise ever conducted between the two nations.¹⁵⁰ The two navies stationed observers on each other’s ships as they practiced transmitting and receiving international communications signals. Led by North Sea Fleet deputy commander Rear Admiral Wang Fushan, China’s guided missile destroyer *Qingdao* and refueling vessel *Hongze Hu* joined the new U.S. Arleigh Burke-class Aegis-guided missile destroyer USS *Chung-Hoon* (DDG 93).¹⁵¹ The 2006 SAREX is envisioned to be “the first in a series of bilateral exercises.”¹⁵²

149 “Chinese Fleet Visits San Diego”, *People’s Liberation Army Daily*, September 18, 2006, http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2006-09/19/content_591087.htm (accessed July 1, 2009); “Chinese Fleet Visits San Diego”, *People’s Daily*, September 19, 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200609/19/eng20060919_304115.html (accessed July 1, 2009); Steve Liewer, “‘A Touching Moment’: Hundreds Greet 2 Chinese Navy Ships; Last Visit Was More Than 9 Years Ago”, *San Diego Union-Tribune*, September 19, 2006, “Chinese, U.S. Warships Train Off San Diego Coast”, *Mercury News*, September 20, 2006, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060919/news_1m19chinese.html (accessed July 1, 2009).

150 Vessels from the U.S. and Chinese navies have previously participated in search and rescue exercises in Hong Kong (e.g., in 2003), but did not directly interact in the exercise. “U.S., Chinese Navies Complete SAREX Together”, *Navy Newsstand*, September 21, 2006, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=25702 (accessed July 1, 2009); Bonnie Glaser, “U.S.–China Relations: Promoting Cooperation, Managing Friction”, *Comparative Connections, A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations*, sel.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=865DDC28-B012- (accessed February 10, 2009).

151 Specifically selected to convey a positive connection, USS *Chung-Hoon* is the first U.S. Navy ship named for a Chinese-American. Rear Admiral Gordon Pai’ea Chung-Hoon (1910–79) served as commanding officer of USS *Sigsbee* (DD 502) from May 1944 to October 1945 and received the Navy Cross and Silver Star for “conspicuous gallantry and extraordinary heroism.” See “Rear Admiral Chung-Hoon”, from the official Navy website of USS *Chung-Hoon* (DDG 93), <http://navysite.de/dd/ddg93.htm> (accessed July 1, 2009).

152 “U.S., Chinese Navies Complete SAREX Together”; “Chinese, U.S. Sailors Meet, Make Friends”, *Navy Newsstand*, September 20, 2006, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=25664 (accessed July 1, 2009).

A second phase of the exercise was held in the South China Sea in November 2006.¹⁵³ China provided guided missile destroyer *Zhanjiang*, fuel tanker *Dongting Lake*, and a Yun-7 transport aircraft. The U.S. contributed missile destroyer USS *Fitzgerald*, landing platform dock (LPD) USS *Juneau*, and a P-3C patrol plane. These ships and aircraft worked together to “locate and salvage a ship in danger.” In the assessment of PLAN South China Sea Fleet Commander Gu Wengen, “the two navies demonstrated very good military skills and strong cooperative spirits.”¹⁵⁴ “The exercise symbolizes more substantial cooperation between the armed forces of China and the United States, which is very important to the future development of military relations,”¹⁵⁵ Qian Lihua elaborated. “The current search-and-rescue exercise is an important and substantial exchange activity between the two armed forces. It has been of vital importance to expanding the Sino-U.S. military cooperation despite its limited scale in terms of troops and vessels.”¹⁵⁶ “The visit of the USS *Juneau* is indicative of improved military relations and transparency between the People’s Liberation Army navy and the U.S. navy,” then-U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Gary Roughead concluded.¹⁵⁷

China has also been invited to cooperate more broadly with the U.S. Navy under the framework of global maritime partnerships. While visiting China in November 2006, then-U.S. Pacific Fleet commander (and now Chief of Naval Operations) Admiral Roughead stated to Chinese officials that “[E]nhancing our navy-to-navy relationships is especially important so we can cooperate in our many areas of mutual interests ... [T]hrough routine dialogue and exercises, our navies can improve the ability to coordinate naval operations in missions such as maritime security, search and rescue, and humanitarian relief.”¹⁵⁸ In April 2007, during PLA Navy commander Vice Admiral Wu Shengli’s visit to the U.S., Admiral Mullen asked Admiral Wu to consider “China’s potential participation in global maritime partnership initiatives.”¹⁵⁹ According to Admiral Mullen’s spokesman Commander

153 The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2006”, December 29, 2006, www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm (accessed June 30, 2009), pp. 31–33.

154 “China, U.S. Hold Search-and-Rescue Exercise”, *Xinhua*, November 19, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/19/content_5349057.htm (accessed July 1, 2009).

155 “China, U.S. Enjoy Active Military Exchanges in 2006”, *People’s Daily*, December 28, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200612/28/eng20061228_336342.html (accessed July 1, 2009).

156 “China, U.S. Hold Search-and-Rescue Exercise.”

157 “Sino-U.S. Search-and-Rescue Exercise Held on South China Sea”, *Xinhua News Agency*, November 20, 2006, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/189469.htm> (accessed July 1, 2009).

158 “U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Visits China”, *Navy Newsstand*, November 13, 2006, www.news.navy.mil (accessed March 13, 2008).

159 P. Parameswaran, “U.S. Asks China to Help Maintain Global Maritime Security”, *Agence France Presse*, April 5, 2007.

John Kirby, Admiral Wu “expressed interest” in the proposal and “asked for more information ... so that he would better acquaint himself about it.”¹⁶⁰ Already, the U.S. and Chinese navies have made new strides in communication during the historical and widely welcomed deployment of destroyers from China’s South Sea Fleet to protect merchant vessels from piracy in the Gulf of Aden.¹⁶¹ Combating avian influenza is another area in which the two militaries might cooperate productively.¹⁶²

Conclusion

The greater South China Sea region boasts increasing maritime commerce but faces growing unconventional security threats. A wide variety of bilateral and multilateral maritime security cooperation initiatives that recognize both the gravity of extant threats and the interests of those responsible nations involved are helping provide a set of frameworks for collective security. There are other positive indications that analysts in nations throughout the Asia-Pacific increasingly seek cooperative solutions to maritime security concerns. A major collaborative Chinese study on sea lane security, for instance, calls for emphasizing cooperation in international organizations and conventions, laws and regulations concerning oil transport.¹⁶³ Establishing specific security measures offers prospects for increasing trust, fostering good will, and enhancing maritime security in Southeast Asia. As the world’s largest developed and developing nations respectively, as well as two major Pacific powers, the U.S. and China have a critical role to play in this process. Effective bilateral communication in this regard will maximize prospects for positive results.

160 P. Parameswaran, “Plea by Pentagon to Top Naval Visitor”, *The Weekly Standard*, April 6, 2007, http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_cat=3&art_id=41726&sid=13026608&con_type=1&d_str=20070406 (accessed July 1, 2009).

161 For details, see Erickson and Justin Mikolay, “Welcome China to the Fight Against Pirates,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, March 2009, pp. 34-41.

162 For further details, see Erickson, “Combating a Collective Threat: Prospects for Sino-American Cooperation Against Avian Influenza”; Erickson, “Combating a Collective Threat: Protecting U.S. Forces and the Asia-Pacific from Pandemic Flu”, in Michael Birt and Claire Topal, eds, *An Avian Flu Pandemic: What Would it Mean, and What Can We Do?* Seattle, W.A., National Bureau of Asian Research, June 2006, pp. 11–20.

163 Zhang Yuncheng, “Energy Security and Sea Lanes”, p. 124.

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Maritime Security in the South China Sea

Regional Implications and International Cooperation



Edited by
Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou

Maritime Security in the South China Sea

Regional Implications and International Cooperation

Edited by

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and Keyuan Zou, University of Central Lancashire, UK

Maritime security is a hot issue catching the attention of the whole world community. In the contemporary era, maritime security mainly concerns the safety of navigation, crackdown on transnational crimes including sea piracy and maritime terrorism and conflict prevention and resolution. In the context of non-traditional security, issues such as maritime environmental security and search and rescue at sea are included. Maritime security is of vital importance to the South China Sea which is located in Southeast Asia, a critical sea route for maritime transport of East Asian countries including China. While the concept of maritime security can apply to any seas around the world, the South China Sea has its own uniqueness. In addition to provision of a vital sea route for the region, it is defined as a semi-enclosed sea with numerous islets and reefs and surrounded by China and five Southeast Asian countries. The adjacent countries have rendered overlapping territorial and/or maritime claims in the South China Sea which complicate the situation of maintaining maritime security and developing regional cooperation there.

This book identifies and examines selected issues concerning maritime security in the South China Sea as well as its connected sea area, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and explores ways and means of international cooperation in dealing with maritime security issues.

... expands the discussion of maritime security in the South China Sea beyond the traditional confines of the conflict over the Spratlys to include the broader regional security concerns of, amongst other things, marine environmental pollution, piracy and commercial traffic. A notable aspect is the large number of authors from China, thus providing a perspective not regularly available in English.

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Maritime Security in the South China Sea

Regional Implications and International Cooperation

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