

From Shanghai to Somalia: China's Contributions to the Security of Seaborne Commerce in Asia and Beyond*

Andrew S. Erickson

China is contributing increasingly to the security of the global maritime commons as a major maritime strategic stakeholder. It has done so by participating in such efforts to secure maritime commerce as the Container Security Initiative (CSI), by supporting Southeast Asian nations in their efforts to fight piracy, and by playing a valuable and growing role in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China's contributions in these areas are rightly receiving approbation from the international community. While events in areas closer to China's shores, particularly in East Asia, may impact Beijing's interests most directly, its growing economic and resource interests and international position necessitate increasingly more distant presence. This may create new opportunities for cooperation in such areas as the Gulf of Aden; separated from their nations' respective maritime claims by significant distance, the maritime forces of the Asia-Pacific, including those of the U. S. and China, may find a "safe strategic space" for new forms of maritime partnership. Further contributions to collective sealane security can help to reassure other nations that China's rise will be both peaceful and beneficial to the world.

For the first time in its modern history, China has deployed naval forces operationally (as opposed to representationally) beyond its

* The views expressed in this draft paper are solely those of the author as a private individual. This study is based only on publicly available sources and does not represent the official position or analysis of the U. S. Navy or any other organization of the U. S. government. This is a work in progress, and the author would greatly appreciate comments and suggestions.

immediate maritime periphery to protect merchant vessels from pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Since 26 December 2008, the PLAN has dispatched twelve ships in five task forces to the Gulf of Aden. As of 20 March 2010, PLAN forces have escorted 1 768 ships in 179 convoys. Sixteen PLAN operations have rescued 10 Chinese and 13 foreign-flagged vessels from pursuit by pirates.¹ As of 25 December 2009, 3 300 PLAN personnel had participated and 405 foreign vessels had been escorted.² The PLAN's escort missions in the Gulf of Aden have made the area safer from Somali piracy, thus benefitting both the international system and Chinese trade and energy interests. What explains this unprecedented instance of long-distance, sustained operations?

1. Motivations

Growing SLOC Security Imperatives

China's leadership has identified the security of China's seaborne imports and exports as critical to the nation's overall development, and hence a vital and growing mission for the PLA(N). The last two of the four "new historic missions" with which President Hu Jintao charged the PLA in 2004 reflect new emphases, and the fourth is unprecedented; all but the first may be furthered by naval development³, provided that the operation is UN-led, multilateral, and targeted at nontraditional threats. In an attempt to transform President Hu's general guidance into more specific policy, articles in state and military media have argued that to safeguard China's economic growth, the PLA must go beyond its previous mission of safeguarding national "survival interests".⁴ to protecting national "development interests". High level PLAN officers are now conducting sophisticated analysis of the "non-war military operations" needed to promote these interests.⁵

This guidance and policy implementation is informed by clear economic realities—themselves of particular importance for a leadership that is determined to maintain roughly 8% growth of an economy that remains reliant on extremely high levels of resource imports and manufactured goods exports. China depends on maritime transportation for 90% of its imports and exports. By some metrics, China has more

seafarers, deep sea fleets, and ocean fishing vessels than any other nation.⁶ As of 2006, maritime industries accounted for \$270 billion in economic output (nearly 10 percent of GDP).⁷ Already at least tied with South Korea for status as the world's largest shipbuilder, China aims to become the largest by 2015.⁸ Chinese oil demand, growing rapidly, has reached 8.5 million barrels per day (mbtd) even amid the global recession.⁹ China became a net oil importer in 1993, and will likely become a net gasoline importer by the end of 2009. While still a very significant oil producer, China now imports half of its crude oil, with 4.6 mbpd in imports as of July 2009. Seaborne imports, which even ambitious overland pipeline projects lack the capacity to reduce, constitute more than 80 percent of this total. At present, therefore, 40% of China's oil comes by sea.

Why Beijing Had to Act

Security of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) around the Horn of Africa is especially critical to major Chinese economic interests. China imports 16% of its overall energy (including 1/3 of its oil), as well as numerous strategic resources critical to manufacturing, from Africa. China is the EU's second largest trading partner, the EU China's largest, and much of their trade transits the Red Sea and Indian Ocean via container ship. Forty percent of the vessels transiting the Indian Ocean are Chinese.¹⁰ Some of China's 2,000 distant water fishing vessels, subsidized by Beijing, balance East Asia's dwindling fish stocks by exploiting the more numerous ones off the Horn of Africa.¹¹

Perhaps nothing exemplified this vulnerability and Beijing's inability to address it more directly than two incidents at the end of 2008.¹² On 14 November Somali pirates captured the fishing boat *Tianyu 8* and held its twenty-four member crew captive for three months.¹³ On 17 December, nine men attempted to pirate the tanker *Zhenhua 4*, using makeshift rocket-launchers and AK-47 assault rifles. An otherwise defenseless crew unnerved the pirates with improvised Molotov cocktails, but it was a Malaysian military helicopter that compelled the attackers to retreat.¹⁴ All told, a fifth of the 1,265 Chinese-owned, —cargoes, or —crewed Chinese ships transiting Somali waters in 2008

“faced piracy,” and seven were attacked.¹⁵ This was part of a growing international problem that showed no sign of abating: of the 100 attempted piracies in 2008, 40 were successful, including the capture and detention of the VLCC *Sirius Star*.¹⁶

Official Explanations. China's government portrayed its decision to deploy naval vessels as a responsible solution to an unexpected but tangible challenge to its sovereignty, security, and commerce.¹⁷ “Piracy has become a serious threat to shipping, trade and safety on the seas,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao explained. “That’s why we decided to send naval ships to crack down.”¹⁸ This was part of a carefully-orchestrated campaign. Various Chinese strategists floated ‘trial balloons’ in the media in mid-December, giving the government a chance to gauge possible international reactions.¹⁹ And, as part of a larger effort to increase foreign perceptions of Chinese transparency, the Ministry of National Defense Information Office (MNDIO), conceived in late 2007 and active from January 8, 2008, plays new role both ‘at home and abroad’ in interfacing with the outside world and consolidating public consensus.²⁰

On December 17, 2008, MNDIO office director and chief spokesman Senior Col. Hu Changming “told the *Financial Times* that China would likely deploy warships to the Gulf of Aden.” On December 20, he stated officially that three vessels would depart in a week’s time. Then, on December 23, Senior Colonel Huang Xueping, MND Secondary Spokesman and MNDIO Deputy Director then convened a news conference at MNDIO’s News Release Office.²¹ There he and two other PLA representatives stressed that the primary goal of the mission—to safeguard Chinese shipping—represented neither a shift in non-interventionist foreign policy nor a commitment to further blue-water operations. China wants to protect ships of international organizations such as the UN World Food Program that are carrying humanitarian supplies to Somalia. This allows China to shift from being the only permanent member of the UNSC not to have contributed to international maritime security operations toward becoming a responsible power that makes all types of contributions.²² Of course, as repeated Chinese statements underscore, the central purpose of the mission is to escort Chinese ships. As criminal law researcher Huang Li, who has published

one of the few Chinese books available thus far on the deployment, emphasizes, "sending warships on an escort mission is one's own business, as the country which joins the escort operation is the boss of its own. This is a transition of status from the employee to the boss."²³

Unofficial Explanations. The above rationales are accurate, but incomplete (in the author's view). First, all easier options had been exhausted. Second, Beijing was under mounting popular pressure to act. Third, deploying naval vessels offered a politically-safe opportunity to do what many decision-makers likely regarded as a logical next step in China's military development.

The heart of the matter was lack of further options to solve the piracy problem indirectly. According to Huang Li, "It took nearly a whole year to find a solution to this problem."²⁴ Unable to afford high private security fees, Chinese ships had started to detour around the Cape of Good Hope, raising shipping rates and risking the loss of market share if Chinese merchant ships broke contracts.²⁵ This, in turn, risked putting China's government in a difficult position. Preoccupied with the May 12, 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake and the August 2008 Olympics²⁶, Beijing tried a variety of alternatives to muddle through, but none proved effective; hence its pursuit of what might be termed a sovereign approach under a multilateral aegis.

China's three decades of involvement in international organizations and a decade of increased military spending present both opportunities and challenges; they offer more options for safeguarding Chinese interests, but raise expectations among the public at home, and policy makers abroad. China's leadership was undoubtedly concerned about the opinions of citizens, some of whom expressed in Internet postings increasing frustration at the inability to protect Chinese shipping.²⁷ Reportedly, in mid-October, the PLAN "launched a feasibility study of an operation 'to send troops to Somalia on an escort mission,'" and in mid-November, the PLA General Staff Department initiated a related study.²⁸ Unusually rapid and effective inter-agency coordination between China's Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Navy (following an initial meeting between the first two in mid-October 2008) succeeded in laying the groundwork for the counter-piracy deployment; these agencies and the Ministry of Commerce

reportedly held a joint symposium on 2 December.²⁹ Meanwhile, on November 15, 261 students of four PLAN academies aboard training vessel *Zheng He* participated in an anti-piracy exercise in Southeast Asia. On December 4, Major General Jin Yinan, director of the National Defense University's Institute for Strategic Studies, advocated PLAN participation to "gain experience" both in "fighting piracy" and "carrying out ocean-going quasi-combat missions."³⁰

Although its decision-making process appears to be long term and gradual, China's State Council and Central Military Commission likely approved the Aden mission in part to exercise the PLAN's growing naval capability. "Apart from fighting pirates, another key goal is to register the presence of the Chinese navy," states Senior Capt. Li Jie, a prominent expert at the Navy Military Studies Research Institute in Beijing. His institute, the PLAN's strategic think tank³¹, and the PLAN more generally, had earlier analyzed relevant maritime legal issues and found nothing to prevent such a mission. The relatively limited U. S. response to piracy in the Horn of Africa arguably offered China a particularly useful strategic opportunity in this regard. As Huang Li put it, "to achieve 'peaceful' entry into the Indian Ocean, we need [ed] a legitimate cause so that other people could not criticize [us]."³²

2. Relevant Operational Details

Platform Capabilities

On December 26, 2008, China deployed two South Sea Fleet destroyers—*Wuhan* (DDG-169 052B Luyang- I) and *Haikou* (DDG-171 052C Luyang- II)—and the supply ship *Weishanhu* (#887 Qiandaohu/Fuchi class) 10 000 km from their homeport in Sanya, Hainan Province. After about three months, the destroyer *Shenzhen* and frigate *Huangshan* were dispatched to replace them, while the supply ship *Weishanhu* remained on station. This second escort fleet conducted operations for about 112 days before being relieved by a third escort fleet composed of the frigates *Zhoushan* and *Xuzhou* and another supply ship, *Qiandaohu*. Three months later, frigates *Ma'anshan* and *Wenzhou* relieved their predecessors and joined *Qiandaohu* in the Gulf of Aden.

The PLAN chose some of its newest, most advanced (and indigenously constructed) vessels and most distinguished, experienced officers and crew to carry out this mission. This suggests that it is serious about using this opportunity to test some of its foremost systems and gain modern seafaring experience. For the first two deployments, the PLAN selected vessels from the South Sea Fleet, closest to the theater of operations. The next two deployments came from the East Sea Fleet, which suggests a broader effort to expose as many units as possible to new experiences.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

Following the careful interagency coordination and PLAN legal preparations noted above, Beijing has reaffirmed the practical reasons for the deployment, and stressed that China has explicit UN authorization for its presence in the region. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 provides specific legal authority for the international effort to fight piracy outside a coastal state's territorial sea. The Security Council, necessarily with Beijing's support, has passed four relevant resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (authorizing states to take "all necessary measures"): 1816, 1838, 1846 (on December 2, 2008), and 1851 (on December 16).³³ Affirmed under that umbrella, UNSC resolution 1846 authorizes participating states to engage pirates within the 12-nautical mile territorial waters off the coast of Somalia.³⁴

Resolution 1851, passed unanimously by the UNSC, authorizes international navies to pursue pirates from the Gulf of Aden to the shores of Somalia and—if conditions warrant—to engage in related activities "in Somalia" itself.³⁵ Beijing also voted in favor of Resolution 1816, which authorizes members of the international community to "enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea."³⁶ But China's government, having obtained from Mogadishu's ambassador to China, Ahmed Awil, a specific request to participate³⁷, emphasized that international assistance "should be based on the wishes of the [Somali] Government and be applied only to the territorial waters of Somalia."³⁸ To build on this sense of legitimacy with 'Chinese characteristics,' Beijing's official media

constantly publishes appreciation from Somali officials and civilians.³⁹

The PLAN itself has pledged a cautious, reactive approach limited to defense of its ships and any vessels under their escort. The explicit objective is to escort Chinese vessels (and those of other nations on a case-by-case basis) and thus deter pirates from attacking them in the first place, not to actively search for pirates and engage in combat with them. PLAN forces will not even “take the initiative to search for captured vessels and personnel at sea and carry out armed rescues.”⁴⁰

Moreover, according to Senior Colonel Ma Luping, director of the navy operational bureau under the headquarters of the General Staff, PLAN forces will not “normally” enter another nation’s national territorial seas (within the internationally recognized 12 nautical-miles limit) to chase pirates.⁴¹ At a press conference accompanying the departure of the Chinese destroyer contingent on December 26, 2008, the high-ranking lead commander of the first deployment, South Sea Fleet Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Du Jingcheng, said the ships would “independently conduct escort missions” and not land on Somali shores.⁴² According to a senior Chinese military official: “For us to use force is a very complex matter . . . it is not just a simple question based on an operational requirement.” . . . “There are political questions—and these are not issues dealt with by military commanders alone. Our warships off Somalia are very well aware of this. We are fully prepared to use force, but we do not take that step lightly.”⁴³ It thus seems clear that China wants to avoid using force in another nation’s land or territorial sea⁴⁴ in order to avoid setting a precedent that might later be used against it. Huang Li emphasizes that, according to Article 107 of UNCLOS, “warships, military aircraft, or other aircraft or vessels carrying clear markings of service for a government may pursue, attack, and detain all pirate ships”⁴⁵ However, there have not been any signs yet that the PLAN is permitted even to board and inspect suspicious ships.

Beyond basic escort duties, PLAN vessels have pursued two of the following three modes of emergency operation:

- (1) *On-call support*: “Rapid and flexible actions” that the task force takes after receiving a request for support from vessels passing through high-risk zones or anticipating pirate attacks. If the

PLAN detects a “suspicious vessel,” it will deploy a helicopter for surveillance and reconnaissance. Only after that will the Chinese ship(s) approach the vessel in question.

- (2) *Pirate deterrence*: After the fleet receives emergency rescue signals from vessels under attack but not yet controlled by pirates, PLAN platforms take air and sea deterrence measures. This typically entails helicopter deployment—with potential for engagement, at least in theory. It can also involve having a PLAN vessel approach the pirates, if available and close enough to arrive in time. In the event that pirates are seizing a ship and the PLAN vessels are close enough to stop it, the fleet commander will give orders based on his evaluation of the situation.
- (3) *Vessel rescue*: sustained pressure and rescue actions that the fleet takes when it receives calls for help or instructions that pirates have seized vessels. In the unlikely event that pirates attack the PLAN ships, with their overwhelming firepower—which they practice regularly at sea, they will engage in “self-defense.” Underscoring this defensive posture to an extreme, Chinese Rear Admiral Xiao Xinnian stressed: “[If] our naval vessels are ambushed by pirate ships, we will resolutely fight back to protect our own safety.”⁴⁶

These cautious rules of engagement suggest that Beijing wants to support the efforts of the UN, but does not want to have its forces subordinate to (or appear subordinate to) those of any other nation; that it wishes to avoid political and legal issues associated with engaging pirates directly if possible; and that it probably wishes to avoid capturing them for fear of the responsibility involved, the lack of viable legal options, and the possibility of negative political ramifications internationally, particularly in the Muslim world. Huang Li adds that killing pirates could lead to harming of crew members and targeting of Chinese vessels for revenge, neither of which is currently a problem.⁴⁷ To the extent that Beijing takes risks in any of these areas, it would almost certainly be to defend crewmembers of a Chinese vessel in the absence of other options.

Deployment, Operations, and ROE Employment

The PLAN offers three methods of protection against pirates: “area

patrol,” “accompanying escort,” “on-ship protection.” Area patrol, the method least-used (at least as a discrete approach), involves monitoring relevant zones. PLAN has maintained two rendezvous points 550 nautical miles apart at 100 nautical miles north of Yemen’s Socotra Island and 75 nautical miles southwest of Port Aden and seven patrol zones along the main shipping route in the sea area east of the Gulf of Aden.⁴⁸

Accompanying escort, in which PLAN ships travel next to or near groups of commercial vessels, is by far the most-used method. Through the China Ship Owners’ Association, Beijing now accepts applications from ship-owners in mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan for the PLAN to escort their vulnerable ships through the Gulf of Aden.⁴⁹ Foreign ships may apply on a case-by-case basis. The Ministry of Transportation, which is subordinate to the State Council, processes the applications, determines ship-specific requirements, and suggests a method of escort to the PLAN. After the PLAN determines the proper plan, the MoT then guides the ships to be escorted to the predetermined location where they are to meet the relevant PLAN vessel(s).⁵⁰

China has already escorted a wide variety of Chinese and foreign ships in an area west of longitude 57 degrees east and south of latitude 15 degrees north.⁵¹ Even in the first deployment, *Wuhan* and *Haikou* worked around the clock and could escort multiple ships simultaneously in opposite directions.⁵²

In response to initial problems with commercial ships not adhering to the details of escort procedures during the first month, the PLAN now offers pre-scheduled group escorts. Starting after the 2009 Spring Festival, escort was offered based on marine traffic conditions, as determined by PLAN and MoT research. Now this has become routinized, like a “train schedule.” Announcements posted on the China Ship Owners’ Association’s website before the 15th of each month announce “fixed escort times” (e. g., weekly) and merchant ships must make arrangements accordingly.⁵³ The PLAN must be notified a week in advance regarding ships which are slower than 10 knots/hour or have other special requirements.⁵⁴

The configuration of the escort formation is generally determined by the number of merchant ships to be escorted. They are divided into one

or two columns, organized to facilitate communication, and separated at a standard distance. For single-column escort, the PLAN warship(s) will maintain similar speed and course from a position outside the column. For double-column escort, a single warship would operate on the inside, whereas two warships would each take one side. Occasionally one ship will be relieved by another coming in the opposite direction, as in a "relay race." Escort columns can incorporate more than a dozen ships and extend over a dozen km.

To save fuel and wear and tear on PLAN vessels on routes that are less traveled, with ships that travel fast enough to better evade pirates, the PLAN relies on embarked special forces and helicopter operations. On-ship protection involves stationing special forces personnel on one or more vessels in a group of civilian ships. Here the PLAN draws on its 70–90 highly trained Marine Corps Special Operations Forces. Building on earlier land-based training, during transit to the Gulf of Aden, members of a special force unit aboard the warships carry out anti-piracy training with a ship-borne helicopter, from which they rappel onto the deck to simulate landing on hijacked or pirate vessels. The helicopters also practice nighttime landing operations at sea, a new area for the PLAN.

The special forces are sufficient to protect at least 7 convoys of merchant ships. The typical procedure is to use helicopters to embark 5–7 special forces on the first and last ships of a convoy. With a range of up to 2 000 m, their deck-mounted grenade launchers enable them to destroy pirate boats before the pirates could threaten them. They are also equipped with a variety of shorter range weapons, including Type-56 assault rifles, QBZ-95 automatic rifles, and QBU-88 sniper rifles, as well as infrared night-vision equipment. In emergencies, civilian crewmembers may be allowed to use some of the weapons.⁵⁵

Encounters with Pirates

While the PLAN has sought to minimize contact with pirates during all three types of operations, it has encountered, and demonstrably deterred them, on multiple occasions. Sixteen PLAN operations have rescued 10 Chinese and 13 foreign-flagged vessels from pursuit by pirates—it is significant that even more foreign than Chinese ships have been saved by the PLAN.⁵⁶ Of all PLAN platforms, helicopters have

made the closest and most numerous encounters. On 18 January 2009, *Tianhe*, a vessel owned by China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), radioed to *Wuhan* that two speedboats were chasing it and—following suspicious communications breakup—requested immediate assistance. Task Group commander Admiral Du Jingcheng ordered the ships to assume battle formation, with helicopters readied. *Wuhan* approached the speedboats, chasing them away. The fleet received a similar distress call earlier that day from a mainland cargo ship, which evaded speedboats without needing PLAN assistance.⁵⁷ On February 6, 2009, seven embarked special operations forces organized crew members of *Oriental Oil Explorer 1* against an oncoming pirate speedboat, fired three warning shells, and prepared to fight when the speedboat, deterred, sped away.⁵⁸ On February 24, 2009, *Lia*, a Liberia-flagged Italian merchant ship, had to leave a *Haikou*-escorted formation to repair an engine. Almost immediately, in response to two rapidly-approaching speedboats, it requested help from *Haikou*. *Haikou* dispatched a helicopter with three special forces and a photographer. The helicopter fended off the speedboats by circling and firing two signal flares at each of them.⁵⁹ A similar procedure, this time using *Huangshan* as well, was used on July 13 to protect Liberian oil tanker *A. Elephant* and Maltese merchant ship *Polyhronis*.⁶⁰ On August 6, *Zhoushan* “expelled several suspected pirate ships and guarded the Chinese merchant ship *Zhenhua 25*.”⁶¹ A further helicopter deterrent mission on November 12 also succeeded, even though pirates had already fired and attempted to board COSCO vessel *Fuqiang*, injuring two of its crew in the process.⁶²

Equipment, Personnel, and Logistics Support

At-Sea Replenishment. In what might be considered the linchpin of the entire mission, the PLAN handled the logistics and supply requirements associated with the counter-piracy deployments through a combination of underway replenishment and port visits.

First Deployment: Three PLAN vessels (*Wuhan*⁶³ and *Haikou*⁶⁴ destroyers and the replenishment vessel *Weishanhu*⁶⁵), commanded by Rear Admiral Du Jingchen and his deputy Rear Admiral Yin Dunping⁶⁶, departed Sanya on December 26, 2008 and arrived in waters off of Somalia on January 6, 2009. On December 30,

2008, transiting the Strait of Malacca, *Weishanhu* performed its first at-sea replenishment.⁶⁷ *Wuhan* and *Haikou* spent 124 days at sea before returning on April 28 but did not make any port visits. *Weishanhu* made two brief replenishment stops at Port Aden, Yemen (February 24 and April 25).

Second Deployment: In April 2009, a destroyer and a frigate (*Shenzhen* and *Huangshan*), under the command of Rear Admiral Yao Zhilou, replaced the first two combatants. They conducted separate “rest and replenishment” port visits at Port Salalah, Oman between June 21 and July 1 2009. Resupply vessel *Weishanhu* made one more replenishment stop at Port Aden on July 23, as well as rotating “Rest and Replenishment” port visits to Port Salalah, Oman between June 21 and July 1. Rotation ensured that 5 groups of 54 merchant ships were escorted during this time. This first ever shore rest for crew involved with the anti-piracy missions entailed group shopping and sightseeing and recreational activities with civilians.⁶⁸ On its way home in August, *Shenzhen* conducted a four-day port visit in Kochi, India. The crew visited the Southern Naval Command’s training facilities and interacted with their Indian counterparts.⁶⁹ Concurrently, *Huangshan* and *Weishanhu* visited Karachi, Pakistan on August 5–7, 2009 to engage in joint exercises with Pakistan’s navy simulating a variety of combat situations.⁷⁰ The task force returned to its home port on August 21.⁷¹

Third Deployment: Combatants *Zhoushan* and *Xuzhou*, along with replenishment vessel *Qiandaohu*, left Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province on the morning of July 16, 2009 under ESF deputy commander Wang Zhiguo.⁷² They relieved the second trio on August 1.⁷³ All three vessels made alternating “Rest and Replenishment” port visits to Port Salalah, Oman mid-August.⁷⁴ Like *Weishanhu*, *Qiandaohu* has significant medical facilities.⁷⁵

Fourth Deployment: On October 30, 2009, missile frigates *Ma’anshan* and *Wenzhou* left Zhoushan under the command of the East Sea Fleet Deputy Chief of Staff, Qiu Yuanpeng to join replenishment vessel *Qiandaohu* in the Gulf of Aden. The task force has two helicopters and a crew of more than 700, including a special forces unit.⁷⁶

The initial destroyer deployment made PLAN history in numerous ways. It was:

- The first time multiple naval service arms, including surface vessels, seaborne aircraft, and special forces, were organized to cross the ocean and execute operational tasks;
- The first long-term ocean task execution that did not include port calls throughout its entire course, breaking records in continuous time underway and sailing distance of a PLAN vessel formation and in flight sorties and flight time of seaborne helicopters;
- The first execution of escort tasks with the navies of multiple countries in the same sea area and holding of shipboard exchanges and information cooperation;
- The first sustained, high-intensity organization of logistical and equipment support in unfamiliar seas far from coastal bases, accumulating comprehensive ocean support experience;
- The first organization of base-oriented logistical support using commercial methods in a foreign port;
- The first time civilian vessels delivered replenishment materials for a distant sea formation;
- The first all-dimensional examination of multiple replenishment methods, including underway, alongside connected, helicopter, and small vessel replenishment;
- The first long-range video transmission of medical consultations and humanitarian assistance such as medical care for casualties from other vessels conducted on the ocean;
- In addition to these, this first escort formation set a record of 61 days for the longest sustained support of a formation at sea, without calling at port for replenishment, and also set a record for the longest number of days of sustained support of a combatant vessel at sea without calling at port.⁷⁷

The most significant sign from the Gulf of Aden mission is that the PLAN was able to keep the ships underway and steaming for this length of time.⁷⁸ Previously, PLAN ships transiting to the AMAN-07 and AMAN-09 exercises had refueled in Colombo, Sri Lanka, but China had little other experience on which to draw. As of November 2009, however, the replenishment vessels have been able to supply food and

water as well as ammunition on smooth and even somewhat choppy seas. Fuel and spare parts are supplied both in this manner and via port calls; the latter is true for personnel rotation.⁷⁹

Little information is available on maintenance and repairs, which are essential on a taxing mission of this duration. The situation appears to be far better than that during the 2002 global circumnavigation, when German technicians had to be flown in to repair imported MTU diesel engines on the Type 052 destroyer *Qingdao* (DDG 113);⁸⁰ this time, the PLAN even helped a civilian vessel fix its own engine problems. According to Sr. Col. Xie Dongpei, deputy director of the PLAN headquarters general office, vessels deployed for anti-piracy operations would go to Karachi, Pakistan for major repairs if needed.⁸¹

Replenishment progress builds on China's developing combined civilian-military logistics system.⁸² Here, China's commercial sector is already a tremendous asset. Two of China's top shipping companies, China Shipping Development and China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO), have established several logistics-based joint operations with power and mining companies in China.⁸³ China Ocean Shipping and China Shipping Container Lines have also launched their own logistics operations, which support their mainstream shipping ventures. The West Asia division of COSCO Logistics, which has been rated China's biggest logistics firm in revenue terms five years running, has played a major role in supporting the current missions.⁸⁴ Smaller companies such as Nanjing Yuansheng Shipping Co. Ltd. have also been used.

Coordination with Other Militaries

From the outset, Beijing has been "ready to exchange information and cooperate with the warships of other countries in fighting Somalian pirates," according to Ministry of National Defense Information Office (MNDIO) deputy spokesman Huang Xueping.⁸⁵ Admiral Du Jingcheng, commander of the first deployment, said his forces would "not accept the command of other countries or regional organizations," but rather "facilitate exchanges of information with escort naval vessels from other countries."⁸⁶

There has since been gradual increase in communications with vessels from the U. S. and over 20 other countries and several shipboard

exchanges of commanding officers and CTF 151 staff.⁸⁷ Email exchanges have increased markedly over time, with over 300 exchanged with foreign vessels during the first deployment alone. The PLAN uses a Yahoo email account and “unclassified chat” on an instant messaging system.⁸⁸ Methods for sea and air coordination and intelligence sharing have been exchanged, with exchange of relevant videos and photos as well as best practices on identifying and handling pirate vessels discussed.⁸⁹ According to a U. S. destroyer commanding officer in the Gulf of Aden: “[We] talk with the Chinese destroyers by VHF radio to coordinate search patterns and to exchange information on suspicious ships. [We] also have coordinated Chinese helicopter flight operations with the ScanEagle launches and recoveries. The exchanges are “professional, routine and positive”⁹⁰ U. S. and Chinese vessels have engaged in leadership exchanges. On 1 November 2009, Rear Adm. Scott Sanders, commander, CTF-151, visited his counterpart, Rear Adm. Wang Zhiguo aboard *Zhoushan*.⁹¹ “As a partner in maritime security, we have worked with China on a tactical level in order to prevent piracy . . . off the coast of Somalia,” Sanders stated. “Having the opportunity to sit down and share views with Adm. Wang was an invaluable experience. The cooperation between our nations continues to pay big dividends.”⁹² On 19 November, Wang and four other PLAN officers reciprocated by visiting Sanders on USS *Chosin*.⁹³

On 10 September 2009, China began its first ever joint global security action with Russia on the world stage. All three vessels from the PLAN’s third deployment worked with Russian vessels similarly deployed. As part of joint “Blue Peace Shield 2009” exercises, the two navies have conducted “tests of communications links, simulated missions to identify ships from helicopters, coordinated resupply efforts, and live firing of deck guns.”⁹⁴ They subsequently conducted joint escorts. PLAN vessels have also conducted joint at-sea exercises with their counterparts from South Korea.⁹⁵ China and the Netherlands have also stationed sailors aboard each other’s ships.⁹⁶

China’s fifth task force is now working to cooperate more closely with its foreign counterparts. According to Sr. Capt. Zhang Wendan, its commander, and deputy chief of staff of the South Sea Fleet, his task

force will “expand the fields for cooperation . . . actively carry out communication, exchange of visits among commanders, joint escort and exercise and . . . exchanges and cooperation on intelligence and information, organization of escort actions, emergency handling, and logistics support”⁹⁷ Information exchange and planning will include a focus on “countermeasures against the pirate attacks on the escorted ships or the escorting warships.”⁹⁸ According to South Sea Fleet Political Commissar Chen Yan, all sailors must achieve basic English capabilities. “We even prepared some English menus, with knives and forks, to prepare for future visits and exchanges,” Chen added.⁹⁹

Closer Cooperation?

Despite shared goals, however, China—like India and Russia—for some time did not join any of the multinational counter-piracy efforts.¹⁰⁰ Despite extremely positive overtures in SHADE meetings as well as other venues and optimistic expectations from EU officials and Commodore Tim Lowe, deputy commander, CTF-150, China appeared to have “deftly parried appeals . . . to lead” existing CTF initiatives. One Chinese analyst stated that while China’s proposal would reduce costs and increase effectiveness, relative gains concerns on the part of other nations might well prelude its implementation.¹⁰¹ Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, Chairman of the Chinese Navy Informatization Experts Advisory Committee, a senior researcher at the PLAN Equipment Research Institute, and a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, explained that China lacks formal relations with NATO.¹⁰² Closer cooperation “would involve the sharing of intelligence codes, which is a sensitive military and political issue.”¹⁰³ There appeared to be some Chinese concerns that their vessels would be subject to scrutiny. Rear Admiral Yang Yi stated that “some secretive reconnaissance does take place”; Sr. Captain Li Jie of the Naval Research Institute added that “As long as all parties keep their activities to a minimum, military powers will not engage in disputes.”¹⁰⁴

Despite these concerns, China has since moved to play an active leadership role in the SHADE meetings, and participate in cooperative operations within SHADE, although it has been a tortuous process. In early 2009, CMF and the EU assumed SHADE co-chair duties. In April

2009, China, Russia, and India came in as independent deployers. SHADE adopted a rotating chair with permanent CMF and EU co-chairs. Countries whose navies maintained an enduring presence in the IRTC and filled patrolling boxes therein were eligible to chair meetings. The EU's participation in this approach was approved in Brussels in January 2010. By the end of the month Chinese media confirmed China's involvement in the new consensus.¹⁰⁵

China's potential participation has been hailed almost universally as a constructive breakthrough.¹⁰⁶ Capt. Chris Chambers, director of CMF operations, described China's potential chairmanship of SHADE as "a very positive development." He added, "There has been major progress in communication and co-operation with navies that once didn't really speak to each other. . . . It will open the door for other independent nations to come in."¹⁰⁷ EUNAVFOR operation commander Rear Adm. Peter Hudson was similarly positive: "we very much welcome [China's] involvement."¹⁰⁸ At the 2 March meeting, all parties agreed to the rotating chair position and related changes in terms of reference.

At present, Chinese vessels escort ships three miles north of the IRTC as they await their government's position to join operations there. Their commanders operate their vessels well, and cooperate with those of other forces through the Mercury chat room. PLAN vessels respond regularly to attacks. China has invited U. S. representatives to Beijing, has agreed to escort UN World Food Program shipping, is attempting to establish greater presence in the Gulf of Aden region. China is poised to lean further forward, possibly to include chairing SHADE meetings on a rotating basis, escorting vessels formally with the IRTC, and even requesting refueling from U. S. ships.

As this paper was being completed, remaining uncertainties included whether Beijing will indeed be willing to assume IRTC coordination duty, and to what extent it will give authority to the PLAN task force commander.¹⁰⁹ At present, Chinese vessels escorting ships travel near the IRTC and keep in contact with participating forces, but have not participated directly themselves. IRTC duty appears to be politically acceptable to Beijing, which could retain authority to approve the PLAN's participation in desired patrol blocs. At least one source states that China may assume leadership by mid-2010.¹¹⁰

3. Reactions to the Mission

Responses to the mission both “at home and abroad” appear to have exceeded the expectations of China’s leadership and analysts. Surveying relevant academic and media sources, as well as interviews with Chinese interlocutors, suggests that foreign responses to the missions were far more encouraging than many expected. One Chinese source does see a “China threat theory,” and questions the need for warships to address the piracy issue.¹¹¹ But the vast majority of assessments are far more positive. Fudan University Scholar Shen Dingli states that “China’s ‘harmonious diplomacy’ has been well received by countries in the region.”¹¹² According to a mainland-owned Hong Kong newspaper, “the current expedition by Chinese naval vessels to Somalia has not stoked the ‘China threat theory’ in the West; quite the contrary, China is being seen as a ‘responsible global player.’”¹¹³

The Chinese public has expressed great pride in the missions’ success. PLA analysts have seized on this precedent to call for relevance to other military operations. Many suggest that such missions should increase in the future and that therefore better platform capabilities, and even improved access to overseas port facilities, are needed. Major General Peng Guangqian (Ret.) states that deploying to Somalia will teach the PLAN how to inter-operate with other navies.¹¹⁴ Major General Zhang Zhaoyin, deputy group army commander, Chengdu Military Region, argues that the PLA should use missions other than war to increase war fighting capabilities.¹¹⁵

4. Conclusion: The Big Picture

The dramatic rise of piracy in the waters off of Somalia in 2008, combined with United Nations Security Council resolutions designed to empower other nations to fight that piracy, have presented China with an historic opportunity to deploy a naval force to the Gulf of Aden. China’s leaders approved the Gulf of Aden deployment to protect Chinese ships,

which were being attacked and sometimes captured by pirates, under the aegis of furthering international security. This does not necessarily signify a change in Beijing's sensitive approach to national sovereignty issues: four UN resolutions and the Somali Transitional Federal Government itself explicitly support these missions. Instead, it represents China's debut as an international maritime stakeholder, and a vital training opportunity for its navy. Significant logistics capabilities constitute the vital backbone of the mission; their largely commercial nature suggests dynamism and sustainability that could make future efforts in this area both feasible and affordable. In sum, the PLAN is clearly attaining a new level of blue-water experience; it remains to be seen how that knowledge will be spread throughout the service, and to what ends Beijing will put the new capabilities that result.

The PLAN's evolving role in defending China's expanding economic interests, as demonstrated in its ongoing Gulf of Aden deployments, has broader implications. For now, China seems to be pursuing a two-level approach to naval development, with consistent focus on increasingly formidable high-end "active defense"/"anti-access" capabilities to support major combat operations on China's maritime periphery (e.g., a Taiwan scenario), and relatively low-intensity but gradually growing capabilities to influence strategic conditions further afield (e.g., Indian Ocean) in China's favor.

Some expect Beijing to pursue a more ambitious approach. One American scholar believes that "the main disadvantage from Washington's perspective could be that, should Chinese leaders consider the Somali mission a success, they would likely prove more willing to promote the continued growth of China's maritime power projection capability."¹¹⁶ Robert Ross envisions Chinese "construction of a power-projection navy centered on an aircraft carrier."¹¹⁷ One pre-deployment Chinese analysis advocates just such a redirection of PLAN strategy: priorities from a submarine-centric navy to one with aircraft carriers as the "centerpiece."¹¹⁸

Internally, such a shift, would have major internal and international implications. Internally, it would mean that the PLAN would likely capture a much larger portion of the defense budget, especially as the carriers themselves would need a complement of aircraft and a dedicated

fleet of escort vessels to be useful in actual combat conditions. Its internal clout would be further enhanced by the fact that aircraft carriers might rapidly become an important diplomatic instrument for projecting Chinese presence and influence in Asia, and perhaps (eventually) globally.

By this logic, moving toward a carrier-centric navy could prompt other navies in the region and further afield to upgrade their own forces in anticipation of China's taking a more assertive stance regarding naval power projection. Despite efforts both to channel China's maritime development in a peaceful direction and to portray it accordingly to the rest of the world, history suggests that any major military modernization program is likely to antagonize other powers. Internationally, moving toward a carrier-centric navy could prompt other regional and global navies to upgrade their own forces in anticipation of China's taking a more assertive stance regarding naval power projection.

I foresee a very different trajectory for China's navy. While China will no doubt build as many as several carriers over the next decade, its two-level approach to naval development is likely to persist for some time, with parallel implications for American security interests. China's military has achieved rapid, potent development by maintaining an "active defense"/"anti-access" posture along interior lines and exploiting physics-based limitations inherent in the performance parameters of U. S. and allied platforms and C4ISR systems. *This* should be of tremendous concern to Washington. But dramatic breakthroughs here should in no way be conflated with developments further afield: the core elements of this approach cannot easily be transferred to distant waters. In perhaps the most graphic example of this strategic bifurcation, the Chinese military, as it develops increasing capabilities to target aircraft carriers, is likely becoming acutely aware of their vulnerabilities—and hence reluctant to devote more than a modest level of resources to their development.

Just as these limiting factors increasingly threaten U. S. platforms operating in or near China's maritime periphery, they likewise haunt China's navy as it ventures further afield—a navy that is still far, far behind that of the U. S. in overall resources and experience. Thus far, Chinese decision-makers, having studied carefully the lessons of Soviet overstretch, seem unlikely to expend overwhelming national resources to

fight these realities. Despite their growing concerns abroad, they have too many imperatives closer to home that demand ongoing funding and focus. Additionally, in two separate articles, one in written in 2007 and one in 2009 PLAN commander Adm. Wu Shengli states clearly that the PLAN will continue to develop into a force that is smaller in quantity, yet greater in quality. In the 2009 article he also states that naval modernization must be put within the overall context of national modernization as well as the overall context of military modernization. This suggests an honest acknowledgement of the reality that resources allocated to the PLAN are and will continue to be finite.¹¹⁹

With regard to the Gulf of Aden deployments, the advanced platforms and personnel dedicated thereto represent an elite subset of China's military. For the first task force, the PLAN embarked some of its best helicopters—Ka-28 *Helixes* from the East Sea Fleet¹²⁰, and piloted them with Senior Colonels with several thousand hours of flight experience.¹²¹ In the U. S. military, by contrast, 26-year-old Lieutenants perform such missions on a regular basis. What truly defines the level of a military is not training and equipping a small number of elite forces but institutionalizing competence across an entire force. Given ongoing critical requirements for the PLAN to provide security for Chinese interests in the South and East China Seas, it is highly unlikely that a PLAN that is smaller in quantity will be able to sustain the sort of robust footprint in the Indian Ocean that some Western analysts claim it is moving toward, no matter how much greater in quality it may be. Chinese participation in long range non-traditional missions on a limited basis is thus not something that the U. S. should fear.

It therefore seems likely that for the foreseeable future China will have limited capabilities but significant shared interests with the U. S. and other nations in the vast majority of the global maritime commons. In fact, the prospects for China to participate further in the global maritime regime as a maritime strategic stakeholder look better than ever, now that Beijing increasingly has the capabilities to do so substantively.¹²² Of course, China will choose its own course. As Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi has emphasized, China “will never shirk from international roles that are within our capacity, and will continue to meet our global obligations. At the same time, China, as a developing country, will

make more contributions within its capacity to world peace and development. . . . We won't do things that go beyond our strength and current level of development. " ¹²³

China has significant shared interests with the U. S. and other nations in the vast majority of the global maritime commons. Opportunities for the U. S. and China to cooperate on the high seas have never been greater. On 5—6 December 2007, the U. S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) held its third annual conference, "Defining a Maritime Partnership with China". The conference featured seven delegates from China, who represented some of China's leading universities in the maritime domain, as well as Rear Adm. Yang Yi. American participants included representatives from the U. S. Pacific Fleet and other relevant fleet commands, as well as the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security. ¹²⁴

Despite occasional turbulence in U. S. -China military-to-military relations, conference participants reaffirmed that the U. S. and China have substantial shared interests that could enable extensive U. S. -China maritime security cooperation. The goal of the conference was to foster dialogue between Chinese and American experts on potential areas of cooperation among the two nations' respective maritime services. Attendees agreed that a strong foundation for maritime partnership exists in the increasingly robust commercial relationship, but that the military side of the partnership lags well behind.

The conference reached six major conclusions:

- Economic cooperation provides a durable foundation for enhanced partnership between the United States and China on the world's oceans, since the health of the global system relies on secure and stable sea lanes.
- Although barriers still exist that prevent a robust U. S. -Chinese partnership to maintain security at sea, there has been some impressive success in creating new forms of collaboration in search and rescue, as well as in fisheries enforcement.
- China's cautiously positive reaction to the new U. S. Maritime Strategy ¹²⁵ suggests possibilities for expanding cooperation in HADR operations, maritime environmental issues, energy security, counterterrorism, and education. More discussions about

international law authorities will be required in order to find ways to cooperate that take into account each country's perspective.

- Beijing's growing capabilities and presence on the seas will make maritime collaboration and crisis management procedures with Washington both more feasible and more essential.
- The sensitive Taiwan issue, differences over definitions and appropriate prioritization of transparency, and a limited foundation of military-to-military trust remain fundamental limiting factors for expanded military and maritime cooperation.
- To enhance maritime cooperation, political leaders in Washington and Beijing must create sufficient political and institutional space for maritime and naval professionals to structure cooperation. They must also resist the temptation to use maritime cooperation to "score points" in the various political controversies that will inevitably affect this complex bilateral relationship. Additionally, restricting military-to-military contact whenever a political issue arises is contrary to long-term cooperative efforts.

New long-range PLAN capabilities offer China unprecedented opportunities for participating further in the global maritime regime as a great "strategic maritime stakeholder." The United States, in accordance with its new maritime strategy, has welcomed China's deployment to the Gulf of Aden as an example of cooperation that furthers international security under the concept of Global Maritime Partnerships. Admiral Timothy Keating, then Commander, U. S. Pacific Command, vowed immediately to "work closely" with the Chinese task group, and use the event as a potential "springboard for the resumption of dialog between People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces and the U. S. Pacific Command forces."¹²⁶ In this sense, the Gulf of Aden, with no Chinese territorial claims or EEZ to inflame tensions, may offer a "safe strategic space" for U. S.-China confidence building measures and the development of "habits" of maritime cooperation.¹²⁷

Washington's real security challenges in the Asia-Pacific, for now, are fostering stability and development while preventing trans-national terrorism in southwest Asia; preserving regional peace and stability; reassuring U. S. allies; and cooperating with China and other nations to restrain North Korea's reckless brinksmanship. Beyond that, the U. S. and China have considerable shared interests in maritime

security and prosperity. In the words of Sun Zi, they are “crossing the river in the same boat, and should help each other along the way.” There is a lot the two great powers can accomplish together, if both sides do their part.¹²⁸

Notes

1. “Sailing into the Storm: International Praise for Chinese Escort Fleets Protecting Merchant Ships against Somali Pirates,” *Beijing Review*, 19 April 2010, http://bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2010-04/19/content_264275.htm.

2. Li Xiaokun and Peng Kuang, “Anti-Piracy Special: Calming Troubled Waters,” *China Daily*, 29 December 2009.

3. At an expanded Central Military Commission conference on December 24, 2004, Chairman Hu introduced a new military policy that defined the four new missions of the PLA: first, to serve as an “important source of strength” for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to “consolidate its ruling position”; second, to “provide a solid security guarantee for sustaining the important period of strategic opportunity for national development”; third, to “provide a strong strategic support for safeguarding national interests”; and fourth, to “play an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development.” See “Earnestly Step up Ability Building within CPC Organizations of Armed Forces,” *Liberation Army Daily*, December 13, 2004, available at www.chinamil.com.cn; Three Provides and One Bring Into Play, at www.news.sina.com.cn. The second mission entails continued military modernization to enhance the credibility of deterrence against threats on China's periphery (e. g. , the possibility of Taiwan independence). The resulting strategic stability ensures a peaceful external environment for economic development globalization and integration of China into the global economy at a time when China can benefit from diversion of U. S. attention to countering terrorism. According to a subsequent article in the PLA's official newspaper, the third includes maritime rights and interests. Liu Mingfu, Cheng Gang, and Sun Xuefu, *The Historical Mission of the People's Army Once Again Advances with the Times*, *Liberation Army Daily*, December 8, 2005, p. 6. See also Yang Yi, chief editor, *Research on National Security Strategy* (Beijing: National Defense Univ. Press, 2007), p. 323.

4. “Our economic development generates the need of overseas resources and markets, and there are hidden dangers in the security of our development,” explains a Nanjing Army Command College political commissar, Major General Tian Bingren. “With the deepening of economic globalization and increasingly frequent flow of . . . energy sources, an outside local war or conflict will influence the

development and construction of a country.” Maj. Gen. Tian Bingren, *The Scientific Development of the Historical Mission of Our Army in the New Phase of the New Century*, *China Military Science* (October 2007), pp. 21—27. Writing in a PLA newspaper, the recently retired Major General Peng Guangqian warns that “some of the foreign hostile forces” may “control the transport hubs and important sea routes for China to keep contact with the outside, and curb the lifeline China needs to develop.” Peng Guangqian, *From the Focus on Safeguarding the Interests of Survival to the Focus on Safeguarding the Interests of Development*, *National Defense News*, January 17, 2007. These statements may allude to concerns about potential great power competitors, but they could also apply even to non-state actors like pirates.

5. Rear Admiral Tian Zhong, “Characteristics, Types, and Capability Development of Naval Non-War Military Operations”, *China Military Science*, No. 3, 2007.

6. China has 260 shipping companies. Its flagged merchant fleet ranks fourth in the world, with 400 000 mariners crewing 3 300 ocean-going ships of 84.88 million deadweight tons.

7. “10% of GDP Now Comes from Sea, Says Report,” *China Daily*, April 10, 2007, www.chinadaily.com.cn.

8. Between January-October 2009, Chinese shipyards won 2.7 million compensated gross tons of total global ship orders, or 52.3% of the world total.

9. Skyrocketing car ownership will hamper efforts to make China’s economy less petroleum-intensive.

10. Wu Jiao, “Navies Seeking Better Ways to Battle Pirates,” *China Daily*, November 6, 2009, p. 1. It is unclear whether this means Chinese owned, Chinese flagged (or both), or simply carrying goods to China.

11. Alison A. Kaufman, *China’s Participation in Anti-Piracy Operations off the Horn of Africa: Drivers and Implications*, conference report (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2009), p. 8.

12. “China to Bolster Image as Responsible Big Nation,” *People’s Daily*, December 24, 2008, <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/6561221.html>.

13. Pirates released the crew unharmed on February 8 after negotiations with Chinese diplomats. “Somali Pirates Release Chinese Boat After 3 Months in Captivity,” *Agence France Press*, February 8, 2009.

14. “Chinese Ship Rescued in Gulf of Aden, Pirates Retreat,” *Xinhua*, December 17, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-12/17/content_7315328.htm.

15. Wu Jiao and Peng Kuang, “Sailing to Strengthen Global Security,” *China Daily*, December 26, 2008, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-12/26/>

content_7342612. htm.

16. For the importance of oil tanker security to China, see Andrew Erickson and Gabriel Collins, "Beijing's Energy Security Strategy: The Significance of a Chinese State-Owned Tanker Fleet," *Orbis*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Fall 2007), pp. 665—684.

17. Beijing has acknowledged publicly that its increasingly global interests will require a presence abroad—at least in the commercial and humanitarian dimensions. Since China opened up to the world in 1978, this has taken the form first of diplomacy, development efforts, and trade, then U. N. Peacekeeping missions, and now counter-piracy efforts.

18. Wu Jiao and Peng Kuang, "Sailing to Strengthen Global Security," *China Daily*, December 26, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-12/26/content_7342612.htm.

19. Richard Weitz, "Operation Somalia: China's First Expeditionary Force?" *China Security*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2009), p. 37.

20. Unless otherwise specified, all MNDIO data cited in this essay are derived from Matthew Boswell, "Media Relations in China's Military: The Case of the Ministry of National Defense Information Office," *Asia Policy*, No. 8 (July 2009), pp. 97—120.

21. Two other PLA representatives presented conditions and answered reporters' questions on the PLAN's escort mission to the Gulf of Aden, including Rear Admiral Xiao Xinnian, Deputy Chief of Staff, PLAN; and Senior Colonel Ma Luping, Director of the Navy Operations Department in the General Staff Headquarters Operations Department, PLAN. China Ministry of National Defense News Conference, December 23, 2008, <http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1076/52984/8565326.html>; http://www.gov.cn/xwfb/2008-12/23/content_1185458.htm.

22. In response to charges that China should do more to further collective security close to home, PLA spokesmen state that China is not similarly involved in Southeast Asia because the situation in Malacca is different from that in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy in the Malacca Strait is already controlled through the joint efforts of the coastal states Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia. In Somalia, by contrast, the problem is more rampant—with 10 times as many attacks in the past year—and sea conditions around the Gulf of Aden are more complex. "Dispatching Forces to Escort in the Somalia Sea Area—The Ministry of National Defense Presents the Situation", Zhongping News Agency, December 23, 2008. For further MNDIO updates on the missions, see "Chinese Naval Frigate Comes to Escort Released Filipino Tanker in Somali Waters," *Xinhua*, April 26, 2009; Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, January 20, 2009, <http://www.gov.cn/wszb/zhibo300/>; Jiao Wu and Kuang Peng, "No Threat from Military Development," *China Daily*, January 16, 2009, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/>

china/2009-01/16/content_7403124.htm; Hu Changming: Ship Escort Activities Are Carried Out under United Nations Framework, *Renmin Wang*, December 25, 2008.

23. Huang Li, *Sword Pointed at the Gulf of Aden: The Chinese Navy's Bright Far Seas Sword*, (Zhongshan University Press, 2009), p. 174. Dr. Huang Li is a professor at South China Normal University Law School, where he teaches international criminal law to master's students. He is also a member of the China branch of the International Criminal Law Association, and Vice President of the Guangdong Province Criminal Law Institute. Huang worked in China's public security system for twelve years, achieving the rank of third class police inspector. He has conducted extensive research, and his reports have been praised by the Ministry of Public Security leadership. Huang is an influential expert in China on organized crime. His publications include the 2008 monograph, "Crack Down on Speculation and Profiteering, Eliminate the Loathsome Cancer Uprooting the Harmonious Society." While Huang acknowledges that he lacks naval operational expertise, his book is a useful compilation of open source information and displays incisive critical analysis.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

25. Chinese shippers have seized a significant portion of the global shipping market by coming from the market that most drives growth in global bulk commodity and container shipping, and by minimizing crewing and other costs. No shippers from any country have been eager to spend money on private security fees, as this would affect their margins significantly and make them less competitive.

26. During the concurrent Russia-Georgia War, Moscow reportedly invited Beijing to send ships to fight pirates, but Beijing feared becoming implicated in an anti-NATO "alliance." Huang Li, p. 170.

27. Eighty-six percent of respondents to a Chinese news media survey said agreed that "China should send warships to fight international pirates and protect cargo ships of China." But some Chinese feared the potential for a new "China Threat Theory," the potential for PLAN secrets to be revealed, and the potential for disproportionate cost; and advocated a free-riding approach. Huang Li, p. 169.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

31. See "Head of International Cooperation Department of Ministry of Transportation Reveals Origins of Decision on Naval Escort," *Sanlian Life Weekly*, 16 January 2009, www.lifeweek.com.cn; Military Law Precedes Movement of Troops and Horses—The Chinese Military Also Needs the 'Cover' of Law, *Southern Weekend*, April 2, 2009.

32. Huang Li, p. 178.

33. Commander James Kraska, JAGC, U. S. Navy, "Fresh Thinking for an Old Problem: Report of the Naval War College Workshop on Countering Maritime Piracy," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Autumn 2009), p. 141.

34. "Resolution 1846 (2008)," Adopted by the Security Council at its 6026th Meeting, December 2, 2008.

35. "Resolution 1851 (2008)," Adopted by the Security Council at its 6046th Meeting, December 16, 2008. Resolution 1851 also encouraged creation of a multinational Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. This group of more than twenty nations met for the first time in January 2009. Kraska, p. 141.

36. Report of Security Council 5902nd Meeting (PM) of June 2, 2008, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9344.doc.htm>.

37. Huang Li, p. 169.

38. Ibid.

39. Abdurrahman Warsameh, "Somalis Express Support for China's Naval Operation Against Piracy," *Xinhua*, January 8, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/08/content_10625418.htm.

40. Shi Hua and Zhang Beixin, Chinese Navy Will Protect Ships Free of Charge, *Global Times*, December 24, 2008, <http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2008-12/322933.html>.

41. "Warships to Set off on Friday for Somalia Pirates," *China Radio International*, December 23, 2008, <http://english.cri.cn/6909/2008/12/23/189s435892.htm>.

42. Bai Ruixue and Zhu Hongliang, "Commander of the Chinese Flotilla for Escort Missions Says: At Present, the Flotilla Does Not Have a Disembarkation Plan," *Xinhua*, December 26, 2008.

43. Greg Torode, "For PLA, Firing on Pirates is a Political Issue," *South China Morning Post*.

44. Interestingly, Somalia lacks an EEZ, instead claiming a territorial sea out to 200 nm. Beijing has avoided calling attention to this anomaly. The author thanks Peter Dutton for this point.

45. Huang Li, pp. 252—253.

46. "Piracy Draws China Back to the Ranks of Maritime Giants," *Agence France-Presse*, December 24, 2008, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jStNCMD_SCFJWIPuB0J4LUeWfd0w.

47. Huang Li, pp. 258—262.

48. Sun Zifa, "Chinese Navy Escort Fleet to Adopt Three Modes of Action in Escort," *Zhongguo Xinwen She*, January 3, 2009.

49. "Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan Ships Can Request Escort of Chinese Mainland Navy," *Xinhua*, January 6, 2009.

50. "Head of International Cooperation Department of Ministry of Transportation

Reveals Origins of Decision on Naval Escort," *Sanlian Life Weekly*, January 16, 2009, www.lifeweek.com.cn.

51. "Chinese Navy Completes 15 Escort Missions in Gulf of Aden," *Xinhua*, February 6, 2009.

52. Qian Xiaohu and Tian Yuan, "Three Chinese Warships Work Independently in Escort Mission," *Liberation Army Daily*, January 19, 2009.

53. "Chapter on Combat", *Modern Navy*, (July 2009), pp. 10—11.

54. Lt. Cdr. Xie Zengling led the unit on the first deployment. Huang Li, pp. 222, 224.

55. Unless otherwise specified, all data in this section from Huang Li, pp. 226—236.

56. "Sailing into the Storm: International Praise for Chinese Escort Fleets Protecting Merchant Ships against Somali Pirates," *Beijing Review*, 19 April 2010, http://bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2010-04/19/content_264275.htm.

57. *Liberation Army Daily*, January 18, 2009.

58. Huang Li, pp. 234—236.

59. The PLAN photographs events to provide legal evidence for its activities. Huang Li, p. 253.

60. Xia Hongping and Cao Haihua, *Liberation Army Daily*, July 15, 2009.

61. Guo Gang, "Third Chinese Escort Flotilla on Task," *Xinhua*, english.chinamil.com.cn.

62. Stephen Chen, "Brave Crew of HK-Flagged Ship Holds Pirates at Bay," *South China Morning Post*, November 14, 2009.

63. Commanding officer: Captain Long Juan; political commissar: Captain Yang Yi.

64. Commanding officer: Captain Zou Fuquan; political commissar: Liu Jianzhong.

65. Commanding officer: Captain Xi Feijun; political commissar: Captain Yuan Zehua.

66. Deputy Director, South Sea Fleet Political Department.

67. Huang Li, p. 213.

68. Huang Shubo and Su Yincheng, "Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Berths in Port Salalah for Rest," *Liberation Army Daily*, July 2, 2009.

69. "Chinese Warship Docks at Kochi," *The Hindu*, <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/002200908081832>.

70. "Chinese Naval Ship Formation Visits Pakistan," *Liberation Army Daily*, August 6, 2009, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2009-08/06/content_4018615.htm.

71. "PLA Navy's 2nd Escort Formation Returns from Gulf of Aden 21 August," *Military Report*, CCTV-7, August 21, 2009.

72. CCTV-1, July 18, 2009.

73. Zhu Da and Yu Zifu, "Interview of Commander of Third Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce," *Liberation Army Daily*, July 16, 2009.

74. For details, see *Liberation Army Daily*, July 16, 2009, <http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/images/2009-07/16/jfjb04b716b0c.JPG>; Guo Gang, "(Escorts by Naval Vessels) 'Zhoushan' Frigate from the PLAN's Third Escort Formation Conducts First In-Port Rest and Consolidation," *Xinhua*, August 16, 2009.

75. Zhu Da and Xu Yeqing, "Qiandaohu Supply Ship Becomes Logistics Support Base of Escort Taskforce," *Liberation Army Daily*, November 23, 2009, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2009-11/23/content_4106306.htm.

76. "Chinese New Naval Flotilla Sets Sail for Gulf of Aden While Merchant Vessel Still Held by Pirates," *Xinhua*, October 31, 2009, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2009-10/31/content_4071693.htm; Xu Yeqing and Li Yibao, "China's Escort Action Heads Toward Regularization," *China Military Online*, October 30, 2009, www.chinamil.com.cn.

77. Wording taken directly from Sun Yanxin and Zhu Hongliang, "(Naval Vessel Escort) First Chinese Navy Escort Formation Achieves Multiple 'Firsts' in History of People's Navy", New China News Agency, April 28, 2009. In first bullet, "naval" was added and "jointly" was removed to prevent U. S. readers from assuming mistakenly that non-PLAN forces were involved.

78. Chinese deployments average three months in duration, half the U. S. length. This may be attributed to their lack of basing access. Huang Li, p. 213.

79. Alison A. Kaufman, *China's Participation in Anti-Piracy Operations off the Horn of Africa: Drivers and Implications*, conference report (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2009), p. 11.

80. Gabriel Collins and Michael Grubb, *A Comprehensive Survey of China's Dynamic Shipbuilding Industry: Commercial Development and Strategic Implications*, China Maritime Study 1 (Newport, R. I.: Naval War College Press, 2008), p. 32.

81. Goh Sui Noi, "China Not Planning Sri Lanka Naval Base," *Straits Times*, June 24, 2009.

82. See several articles on "Research on the Concept of Military and Civil Integrated Development," in *China Military Science* No. 2, 2009, pp. 26—50; Fan Jichang, "A Study of the Strategy of Building a Logistic Support System Bases on Military and Civilian Integration With Chinese Characteristics," *China Military Science* (May 2008), pp. 86—94.

83. Such companies as Liugong have long shipped large amounts of heavy equipment equivalent in size and weight to large tanks and armored personnel carriers to locations as far away as Africa.

84. For details, see Guo Gang, "(Escorts by Naval Vessels) 'Zhoushan'

Frigate from the PLAN's Third Escort Formation Conducts First In-Port Rest and Consolidation," *Xinhua*, August 16, 2009.

85. "Warships to Set off on Friday for Somalia Pirates," *China Radio International*, 23 December 2008, <http://english.cri.cn/6909/2008/12/23/189s435892.htm>.

86. Bai Ruixue and Zhu Hongliang, "Commander of the Chinese Flotilla for Escort Missions Says: At Present, the Flotilla Does Not Have a Disembarkation Plan," *Xinhua*, 26 December 2008.

87. "Commander of Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Visits U. S. Guided-missile Cruiser Chosin," *Liberation Army Daily*, 23 November 2009, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2009-11/23/content_4106280.htm; "U. S. CTF 151 Commander Visits the 'Zhoushan'" *Xinhua*, 2 November 2009, news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2009-11/02/content_12372253.htm.

88. Andrew Scutro, "Communication Key for Anti-Pirate Fleet."

89. Sun Yanxin and Zhu Hongliang, "(Naval Vessel Escort) First Chinese Navy Escort Formation Achieves Multiple 'Firsts' in History of People's Navy", New China News Agency, 28 April 2009.

90. Cole, p. 6.

91. "U. S. CTF 151 Commander Visits the Warship 'Zhoushan'", *Xinhua*, 2 November 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2009-11/02/content_12372253.htm.

92. "CTF-151 Commander Visits Chinese Counter-Piracy Flagship," U. S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, 2 November 2009, http://www.vdidsweb.net/?script=news/news_show.php&id=40960.

93. "Commander of Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Visits U. S. Guided-Missile Cruiser Chosin," *Liberation Army Daily*, 23 November 2009, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2009-11/23/content_4106280.htm.

94. "Russia, China Holding Anti-pirate Exercise off Horn of Africa," *Interfax* (Moscow), September 18, 2009; "China, Russia Navies on Joint Anti-Piracy Patrols," *Associated Press*, http://www.seattlepi.com/national/1104ap_as_china_russia_piracy.html?source=rss.

95. *Liberation Army Daily* online.

96. "Sailing into the Storm: International Praise for Chinese Escort Fleets Protecting Merchant Ships against Somali Pirates," *Beijing Review*, 19 April 2010, http://bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2010-04/19/content_264275.htm.

97. Zhang Qi, Cao Haihua and Cao Jinping, "PLA Navy Becomes International Brand of Escort Operation," *Liberation Army Daily*, 4 March 2010.

98. "China's Naval Escort Task Force Responds to Rampant Pirate Activities," *Defence Professionals*, 13 April 2010, <http://www.defpro.com/news/details/14477/>.

99. "Navy Beefs up Anti-Piracy Effort," *CCTV*, 4 March 2010, <http://english.cctv.com/20100304/101788.shtml>.
100. Alison A. Kaufman, *China's Participation in Anti-Piracy Operations off the Horn of Africa: Drivers and Implications*, conference report (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2009), p. 3.
101. "Expert: Pirates' Commandeering of Chinese Cargo Ships Has Made Apparent Blind Spots in Escort Areas", *International Herald Leader*, 27 October 2009, www.chinareviewnews.com.
102. Zhang Haizhou, "Team Anti-Piracy Fight Urged," *China Daily*, 20 November 2009, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-11/20/content_9007337.htm.
103. Wu Jiao, "Navies Seeking Better Ways to Battle Pirates," *China Daily*, 6 November 2009, p. 1, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2009-11/06/content_18837678.htm.
104. Cui Xiaohuo, "Cooperation in Gulf Mission 'Smooth'," *China Daily*, 19 February 2009.
105. "China to Lead Anti-Piracy Patrols off the Somali Coast," *Global Times*, 28 January 2010, <http://language.globaltimes.cn/bilingual/2010-01/501900.html>; "Principled consensus on escort missions reached between China, EU, NATO, CMF," *Xinhua*, 30 January 2010, http://www.gov.cn/english/2010-01/30/content_1523729.htm; http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Video/2010-01/25/content_4120288.htm.
106. "China Commitment to Anti-Piracy Task Force Good News for Shipping—Significant Step in International Cooperation," *Handy Shipping Guide*, 29 January 2010, http://www.handyshippingguide.com/shipping-news/china-commitment-to-antipiracy-task-force-good-news-for-shipping_1223; "China to Join Anti-Piracy Drive Off Somali Coast," *RTT News*, 29 January 2010, <http://www.rttnews.com/ArticleView.aspx?Id=1194626&SMap=1>.
107. Greg Torode, "China to Lead Anti-Piracy Patrols: PLA Navy Officials Agree to Expanded Role Coordinating International Efforts off Somalia," *South China Morning Post*, 28 January 2010.
108. "EU Anti-Piracy Force Welcomes China Interest," *AFP*, 2 February 2010, <http://news.ph.msn.com/regional/article.aspx?cp-documentid=3836951>.
109. There is an established pattern of the PLAN reporting back to Beijing for political approval; see Greg Torode, "China to Lead Anti-Piracy Patrols: PLA Navy Officials Agree to Expanded Role Co-Ordinating International Efforts off Somalia," *South China Morning Post*, 28 January 2010.
110. Greg Torode, "China to Lead Anti-Piracy Patrols: PLA Navy Officials Agree to Expanded Role Co-Ordinating International Efforts off Somalia," *South China Morning Post*, 28 January 2010.

111. Hua Zhengmao, "'China Threat' Theory Resurfacing with Deployment of PRC Naval Vessels to Gulf of Aden, Somali Coast," *Wen Wei Po*, 26 December 2008, www.wenweipo.com.

112. Phoenix TV, 23 July 2009, op. cit. James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, "Is China a 'Soft' Naval Power?" *China Brief*, August 17, 2009.

113. Zhang Jingwei, "China Adjusts Its Maritime Power Strategy at the Right Moment," *Ta Kung Pao*, December 29, 2008, www.takungpao.com.

114. "Major General Peng Guangqian: Has Complete Confidence in China's Navy Going to Somalia to Attack Pirates", Joint Report by Sina.com Military Affairs and Oriental Network, December 18, 2008, <http://www.chinareviewnews.com>.

115. Major General Zhang Zhaoyin, deputy group army commander, Chengdu Military Region, "Strengthen Unremittingly Our Army's Core Military Capacity Building", *Liberation Army Daily*, December 2, 2008.

116. "A well-executed [Gulf of Aden] operation might tip the balance in favor of those Chinese strategists who want their country to acquire aircraft carriers, large amphibious ships, more effective attack submarines, many more replenishment and refueling vessels, and other naval instruments to defend Beijing's overseas interests." Richard Weitz, "Operation Somalia: China's First Expeditionary Force?" *China Security*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2009), p. 38.

117. Robert S. Ross, "China's Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U. S. Response," *International Security* 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009), p. 46.

118. Gao Yue, "Maritime Rights, Resources, and Security", *Modern Ships* (December 2004), p. 7.

119. Wu Shengli and Hu Yanlin, "Building a Powerful People's Navy That Meets the Requirements of the Historical Mission for Our Army", *Seeking Truth*, no. 14 (July 16, 2007), p. 72. "A New Voyage Toward Scientific Development—Central Military Commission Member and Navy Commander Wu Shengli Answers Questions From Jiefangjun Bao, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao Reporters," *Liberation Army Daily*, 18 April 2009.

120. http://cnair.top81.cn/mi-17_sa-342_s-70.htm.

121. Sr. Col. Sun Ziwu, pilot of the Ka-28 on Wuhan, has participated in many foreign visits and military exercises. In the 2004 Sino-French naval exercise, he landed on the French ship. Huang Li, p. 211.

122. See, for example, Yang Yi, "Thirty Years of Tremendous Change in the PLA," *Contemporary International Relations*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2009), pp. 1—8.

123. Wu Jiao, "China Doing All it Can in Global Affairs," *China Daily*, 1 March 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/01/content_9515365.htm.

124. This and the next several paragraphs draw on Andrew S. Erickson and

Lyle J. Goldstein, "Introduction," in Erickson, Goldstein, and Nan Li, eds., *China, the U. S., and 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, forthcoming 2010).

125. <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf>

126. Donna Miles, "U. S. Welcomes Chinese Plans to Fight Piracy, Admiral Says," *American Forces Press*, December 18, 2008, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52386>.

127. As Huang Li emphasizes, "China has no territorial ambitions in the Indian Ocean, nor are there any historical complications involving China." Huang Li, p. 177.

128. For suggestions, see Andrew S. Erickson and Wei He, "U. S. -China Security Relations," in *Task Force Report-U. S. -China Relations: A Roadmap for the Future*, Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum Issues & Insights, Vol. 9, No. 16 (August 20, 2009) pp. 7—12.



上海论坛丛书
Shanghai Forum Series


> 2010

丛书主编 杨玉良 秦绍德 金在烈

**Deconstructing of International
Relations in Asia**

亚洲国际关系的 重构

主编 沈丁立 张贵洪

 上海人民出版社

Contents 目录

- 1 | “上海论坛 2010”共识:全球经济再平衡与亚洲的持续复苏
- 1 | “亚洲国际关系的重构”——2010 上海论坛政治分论坛白皮书

第一部分 主旨发言

- 3 | Asia—A Dominant Influence beyond Borders
H. E. Shaukat Aziz
- 9 | A Joint-Venture between Sino-America for Better Cooperation, Better Co-development, Better Co-rising and Better Life to All Mankind
Leo KoGuan

第二部分 东亚国际关系的重构

- 19 | The Making of a Regional International Society in East Asia: History and Outlook
Barry Buzan
- 40 | 东亚的未来与中国作用
贾庆国

- 47 | China and East Asia: Projecting beyond the Current
Crisis
Jae Ho Chung
- 54 | From Interdependence to a Dangerous Divide: How Is
the Crisis Changing Asia and America?
Simon Tay
- 74 | 竞争中的亚太及东亚区域合作安排
任 晓
- 86 | Asian Regional Architecture—Thoughts on the Future
U. S. Role
Jonathan M. Aloisi
- 104 | 中国与周边关系的重构:论中朝关系的可持续发展
金香海
- 114 | 还原历史 超越历史——中日历史共同研究的一些
情况与感想
陶文钊
- 125 | Restructuring International Relations in East Asia: The
Role of ODA
Barbara Stallings
- 153 | Building CBMs across Borders—An Indian Experience
Dipankar Banerjee

- 164 | Global Economic Dynamics: Their Impact on Asian
Leadership and International Relations
Christopher G. Caine
- 180 | Geo-political Realignment in Motion: Canberra's
Strategic Choice in Sino-U. S. -Australian Tripartite
Relations
You Ji
- 205 | 反思西方民主话语
张维为
- 第三部分 亚洲反恐格局重构**
- 215 | 论美国的“阿富巴”战略对亚洲的影响
程瑞声
- 224 | Towards A Cooperative Security Structure in Asia
Varun Sahni
- 234 | China and the Conflicts in Afghanistan/Pakistan
Pan Guang
- 241 | From Shanghai to Somalia: China's Contributions to
the Security of Seaborne Commerce in Asia and
Beyond
Andrew S. Erickson
- 276 | Nuclear Terrorism and Asian Security
Xia Liping

- 292 | 美国反恐战略的演变及其对亚洲的影响
张家栋

第四部分 气候变化合作的再思考

- 309 | 气候变化影响分析与对策思考
刘友法
- 315 | 关于哥本哈根气候变化大会之后国际气候合作的若干思考
张海滨
- 330 | 哥本哈根进程与亚洲低碳共同体
于宏源 李 威
- 345 | A New Silk Road? China in the Global Marketplace
Gary Wihl

“上海论坛 2010”共识 全球经济再平衡与亚洲的持续复苏

发展是当代世界的重大主题,也是亚洲增进居民福祉的根本途径。亚洲的发展以经济持续增长为驱动力,同时也包括社会、政治、文化等领域的协调推进。在经济全球化不可逆转的背景下,亚洲的发展不仅需要亚洲与其他区域进行良性互动,而且需要亚洲各国对全球格局变动形成有效回应。

2007年由美国次贷危机引发的国际金融危机已造成全球性的经济衰退,并对亚洲的持续发展产生了明显冲击。危机影响的严重性和广泛性促使人们深刻反思此轮危机的成因,就本质而言,此次危机是全球不同经济板块在贸易、金融等方面非均衡发展的衍生后果。自20世纪70年代以来,发达经济体(以美欧为代表)和新兴经济体(以中印为代表)的关联度日趋增强,其关联方式为:发达经济体利用国际货币优势竭力发展金融业,而新兴经济体则利用要素禀赋优势大力发展制造业。以各自的增长模式为前提,发达经济体大量进口并形成贸易逆差,而新兴经济体大量出口并保持贸易顺差;发达经济体因消费过度、货币流入而投资过度,而新兴经济体因储蓄过度、外汇盈余而出现资金流出。上述关联方式使世界各国的共同利益特征得以增强,但关联关系的非均衡性已蕴藏着危机爆发的基因。当发达经济体家庭、企业和政府的债务过度膨胀与金融过度虚拟化同步发展时,全球经济非均衡的潜在风险就会以金融危机的方式显性化。

此轮金融危机爆发以来,发达经济体和新兴经济体均采取了积极

的财政和货币政策予以应对,但前者主要通过金融复苏以带动实体经济增长,后者则更侧重实施刺激性政策以直接驱动实体经济复苏。当前,全球经济正处在推进结构调整以重构秩序的关键时期,处在旧平衡被打破、新平衡在探索的转型阶段。就亚洲而言,中国、日本、韩国、印度等国为了回应危机的冲击,对外推动务实合作,对内实施刺激性经济政策,不仅率先实现了本地区经济的企稳回升,而且为促进世界经济复苏起到了推动作用。

亚洲当前正处在“后危机时代”的复苏阶段,但复苏的稳定性和持续性仍需增强,复苏进程面临的不确定性也亟待有效应对。亚洲复苏的持续性正受到诸多因素的影响:美国的经济政策能否使其走出“无就业式增长”的困境,不同国家在刺激性政策实施及退出策略中能否形成默契等。为了应对内部和外部的多重挑战,实现经济的持续稳健复苏,亚洲各国必须立足长远发展,增强域内合作,认真反思增长模式,加快经济结构调整,通过多维重构来夯实亚洲经济复苏的基础,打造亚洲经济持久繁荣的新型动力机制。

亚洲经济秩序的重构首先表现为亚洲需要寻找并重塑与美欧之间的新型平衡机制。在全球经济再平衡的进程中,“美欧消费、亚洲生产”的贸易格局和“美欧举债、亚洲储蓄”的资本格局需要重新审视。中美两国在亚洲及全球经济发展中具有举足轻重的作用,亚洲与美欧经济秩序重塑的核心是形成中美合作的新模式。作为金融危机的爆发国,美国应加强金融监管以提高经济增长的稳定性,增加国内储蓄以提升居民消费的合理性,扩大对外出口以降低国际贸易的失衡性,尤其应基于就业创造而增加对新兴经济体的技术密集产品输出。作为金融危机的受冲击国,中国则应通过发展方式转型形成更具包容性和持续性的增长方式,通过刺激国内居民消费来夯实增长的内部基础,通过优化产业结构来扩展贸易的盈利空间,以此与美国等发达经济体在更高层次上开展良性互动。

为了优化外部环境、促进全球发展,亚洲应努力推进国际货币体系的适宜性调整。当前改变以美国和美元为主导的国际货币体系不具有现实性,但检视现行国际货币体系的实施效力,并渐进地探索国

际金融合作新方式则既具必要性,也有可行性。金融危机爆发以来,以国际货币基金组织(IMF)、世界银行(WB)和二十国集团(G20)金融峰会等为平台,中印等国在国际金融合作中的影响力日渐彰显,而美国也基于危机的现实教训出台了严厉的金融监管法案。由于金融危机部分地削弱了华尔街的金融中心地位,希腊债务危机也对欧洲的金融中心地位产生了负面影响,因此,东京、香港、上海、首尔等亚洲城市的金融配置功能趋于增强,伴随着亚洲经济的强劲复苏和制度的持续完善,国际金融中心的洲际转移和多元趋势很可能会成为特征事实。就当前来讲,基于国际货币体系中美元本位地位难以动摇的事实,美国政府应以美国的长远利益和全球利益为重,规范美国的货币和财政政策,以保持美元币值的稳定性。就长远来讲,在世界经济格局变化,尤其是亚洲实体经济规模持续增大的前提下,人民币、日元或亚洲合作货币将在国际货币体系中发挥更积极的作用,国际货币体系“一超”(美元)“多强”(欧元、日元、人民币或亚元)的新模式可能出现,这需要我们进行持续观察和深入研究。

亚洲推进国际货币体系重构的一个“试金石”是能否确立其汇率制度和水平。改革开放以来,中国根据经济发展形势适时地推进人民币汇率制度改革。近期,美国为了平衡贸易逆差、增加就业岗位,联合其他经济体对中国施压要求人民币升值。然而,已有研究难以为人民币汇率被低估提供有力支持,而人民币升值不仅难以改变中美之间的贸易失衡、抵御输入性通胀和促进经济结构调整,而且会在贸易、金融、储备、动态、主权等层面产生福利损失,国际经验也显示:迫于外部压力所做出的汇率调整往往会损害调整者的利益。在国际货币体系重构的背景下,中国和其他亚洲国家需要推进务实合作,但不应为其经济体过度承担责任,而应基于自身战略诉求能动地确定其汇率制度和水平,在主动性、渐进性、可控性等原则指引下稳健地推进汇率制度的改革和完善。

亚洲与美欧之间的经济再平衡不仅需要重构国际货币体系,而且需要重构亚洲区域内的经济关联方式。一个整合的亚洲可以增强对美欧的经济话语权,而一个协同的亚洲则可以减弱对美欧的经济依赖

度。当前,亚洲各国需要凝聚共识、增强合作,依靠组合力量抑制美欧的贸易保护主义,避免亚洲经济因贸易逆转而出现增速急剧下滑。亚洲各国还应利用其多样化、差异化显著的特征,充分挖掘资源禀赋,有效发挥比较优势,在区域内推进产业结构梯度转移,条件成熟的地区应率先促进产业结构优化升级。同时,亚洲各国还应增强要素市场的信号功能,降低要素流动的交易成本,引导要素进行重组和集聚,进而优化区域内的产业分工结构,挖掘自身的投资需求潜能。考虑到资本对实体经济的驱动功能,亚洲国家还要增强对国内外金融风险的识别和防范能力,应在强化监管的基础上推进区域内货币合作进程,尝试构建与区域关联相耦合的“亚洲货币单位”。

在金融危机对中国经济产生重大冲击的情形下,中国不仅通过实施“一揽子”刺激性政策避免了经济增长快速下滑,而且强调加快发展方式转变以形成增长的持续动力。中国的经济发展方式转变具有多元性、系统性和关联性特征,而其核心是促进经济增长由主要依靠投资、出口拉动向依靠消费、投资、出口协调拉动转变。这些转变的目标是通过动力结构调整夯实增长的内部基础,通过产业结构调整提升增长的竞争优势,通过要素结构调整增强增长的可持续性。为此,中国应持续推进体制改革,重塑政府与居民、中央与地方、居民与居民的收入分配结构,采取组合政策缩减城乡、地区和行业的收入分配差距,完善针对城镇低收入群体和农民的社会保障体系,重申政府在基本住房、基本医疗和基础教育等领域的职责,以此为国内居民的消费拓展提供有利条件,为构建更具包容性的增长方式奠定坚实基础。

由于能源和生态的时空配置对经济持续发展具有重要作用,因此亚洲的秩序重构还应考虑新兴能源和低碳经济的引擎效应。亚洲经济的高速增长通常伴随着能源的高消耗和生态的高破坏,从长期来看,构建在高能耗、高污染、高排放基础上的经济增长不仅难以持续,而且会直接损害居民福利。亚洲采取渐进方式发展新兴能源和低碳经济,是谋求自身发展、回应外部压力的关键抉择。然而,亚洲各国的经济发展存在差别,发展新兴能源及低碳经济的能力并不相同,特别是中印两国正处在工业化和城市化加速推进阶段,过度强调清洁化、

低碳化可能会导致其经济增长出现剧烈震荡。据此,亚洲各国应按照“共同但有区别”的原则推进能源利用、生态保护和气候合作,日本、韩国等国应基于其发展阶段率先降低排放量,并对其他国家提供资本和技术支持;中国、印度等国既应基于大国责任提出减排的路线图和时间表,更应在促进经济增长和发展低碳经济之间找到最佳平衡点,这不仅需要依托技术创新和市场培育提高能源利用效率,大力开发新兴能源,而且需要依靠自主创新和市场完善推进企业技术进步,促进产业结构升级。

伴随着要素流动性和人口集聚性的增强,亚洲各国、尤其是发展中国家正在经历着史无前例的城市化进程,这一进程将不可避免地重塑亚洲国家的经济社会结构及其相互关系。城市化通常具有促进经济增长和导致衍生问题的“双刃剑”效应,亚洲各国必须认真总结城市化进程的经验教训,努力找寻城市发展的最优路径,以在城市发展、经济增长、社会进步和居民生活改善之间形成良性互动关系。2010年上海世博会以“城市,让生活更美好”为主题,为展示城市经济的繁荣、城市科技的创新、城市社区的重塑和城市文化的融合提供了平台,也为人们深入思考城市发展的经验、挑战、趋势及其路径选择提供了契机。上海世博会带给亚洲的不仅是新产品、新发明等“工具理性”,而且是新创意、新理念等“价值理性”。就思想启示而言,亚洲的城市发展不仅应体现在外延层面的城市人口规模不断增加、占比不断提高,而且还应体现在内涵层面的产业结构优化、居住环境改善、服务能力增强以及行政效率提高等。只有将外延拓展和内涵提升有机结合,亚洲城市发展才可以有效回应各种“陷阱”和“挑战”,并通过产业集聚效应推动经济增长,通过信息互动效应推动社会融合,通过市场带动效应推动科技创新,从而更好地实现居民生活改善和福祉增加的发展目标。

伴随着经济增长和医疗条件的持续改善,亚洲正在快速、普遍且难以逆转地进入人口老龄化阶段。人口老龄化标志着亚洲的经济发展和社会转型已经取得积极成效,但同时也对社会保障与公共福利、社会稳定与公共安全等产生压力。对中印等发展中国家而言,人口老

龄化更是会对劳动力充裕且廉价的传统优势产生直接影响。亚洲各国应审慎地对人口制度及相关政策体系进行再设计,依托制度、组织和政策的完善来适应老龄化社会。改革开放以来,中国的计划生育政策已经取得了显著成效,未来应立足于人口老龄化的发展态势,在考虑地区和群体差异性的前提下对生育政策进行渐进式调整。同时,中国还应投资人力资本以提高劳动效率,完善要素市场以增加人口流动,尤其要深化户籍等体制改革以加速农民的职业流转和身份转换,逐步实现迁移人口在城市的经济社会融合。对中国等亚洲国家而言,必须立足于经济增长而对养老、医疗和教育等社会保障制度进行完善,立足于构建共享型社会而推进居民的毕生健康和终身参与工程,构建与未来老龄化社会相适应的社会治理和公共政策体系。

亚洲的经济复苏和社会发展不是孤立事件,而是以亚洲的政治稳定、文化融合为前提条件。当前,美国对亚洲的“同盟与扩展”战略已基本定型,而亚洲对国际关系格局的重构作用也日渐凸显,特别是随着中国经济增长和中美依赖对称性的提升,中国在中美双边交往中的议程设置能力大大增强。基于国际关系格局的持续性调整,亚洲各国、特别是主要经济体应强化沟通与协调,通过一致行动以在国际经济政治舞台上发挥更积极的作用。同时,亚洲各国还应继续搭建合作平台,拓展沟通渠道,增强以东盟为载体的南亚合作机制,深化以中日韩伙伴关系为载体的东亚互动关系,创新朝核问题新思维以促使朝鲜积极融入国际社会。随着经济一体化、社会关联度、政治互动性的增强,亚洲各国之间的文化交流必将日趋频繁。经济一体化可以优化资源配置,而文化单一化却只能扼杀社会活力,经济发展有先后,但文化分型无高低,亚洲的经济增长不能损害文化传承性,亚洲各国的经济政治合作也不应牺牲文化的多样性。将经济趋同化和文化多元化相结合是亚洲实现全面发展的重要准则,而尊重历史、加强理解、促进融合也应是亚洲实现文化繁荣的理性选择。

国际格局瞬息万变,区域内形势错综复杂。在全球经济再平衡的背景下,亚洲已率先步入复苏的通道,但复苏的稳定性和持续性仍面临不确定性,亚洲亟需推进经济、政治、社会、文化等诸多维度的重构。

但是亚洲的重构具有复杂性和艰难性,因为重构涉及多元主体、多重目标和多种约束。然而,亚洲的重构更具重要性和急迫性,因为重构关联着亚洲发展的持续性和协调性。为了回应挑战,亚洲国家应以勇气、智慧、协作来推进多维重构。艰难性不应成为亚洲延缓重构的理由,而复杂性则尤需亚洲理性选择重构的路径。

亚洲的重构动力在于各国及其居民,重构收益也应惠及各国及其居民。亚洲各国的发展阶段、战略诉求和实际条件存在差异,因此,重构必须按照“求大同而存小异”、“普遍化但有差别”的原则,凝聚共识、形成合力、完善机制、共享收益,以形成亚洲推进多维重构的持续动力机制。中国、日本、韩国和印度等国应在推进亚洲重构中承担更多的职责,发挥更大的作用。同时,亚洲各国应以增长方式转变、经济结构调整为突破口,按照渐进性、协商性、可控性、动态性等基准积极稳妥地推进重构进程。重构形成合力,合力驱动发展,亚洲各国在“后危机时代”已经深刻意识到重构与调整的重要性,意识到合作与协力的必要性,这种思维转变和务实行动导致亚洲的多维重构不仅是未来愿景,而且是可行方案。亚洲稳健复苏和持续发展的美好蓝图值得期待,而亚洲的稳健复苏和持续发展必定会带给亚洲居民更好的生活和更多的福祉,也必定会为世界的经济发展和社会繁荣做出更为突出的贡献。

“亚洲国际关系的重构” ——2010 上海论坛政治分论坛白皮书*

一、东亚国际关系的重构

当前,东亚区域内外的互动出现了一些新的态势,推动着东亚国际关系的重构。无论是增进共同利益,如通过“东南亚国家联盟”(ASEAN)以促进东南亚地区的繁荣与稳定;还是应对共同挑战,如协作抵御金融危机,东亚各国间的合作和交流都在不断加强。经济、社会、文化等领域的合作具有显著依赖效应,使这一地区的各个行为体努力规避相互间可能发生的政治冲突与军事危机。同时,东亚地区仍残存着一些冷战遗留的矛盾,这些矛盾在较长时间内仍将影响有关国家之间的互信。但这种状况有望通过全球化过程中各国力量与关系的调整逐步得到改善。

东亚国际关系的重构主要体现在以下四个方面:第一,东亚地区的经济和政治力量处于既分散又整合的矛盾之中,这是东亚国际关系重构的基本特点;第二,亚洲大国(如中国、印度和日本等)是东亚国际关系重构的主导力量,但其作用和影响并不平衡;第三,美国是东亚国际关系重构的关键角色,其“同盟与扩展”的新亚洲战略正在形成之中;第四,朝鲜半岛问题仍处于僵持之中,能否促进朝鲜融入国际社

* 2010 上海论坛政治分论坛的主题是“亚洲国际关系的重构”。分论坛讨论“东亚国际关系的重构”、“亚洲反恐格局的重组”和“气候变化合作的重思”三个议题。

会是东北亚国际关系重构中的决定性因素。

（一）东亚国际关系重构的基本特点

亚洲新兴的经济和政治力量正在迅速崛起,并深刻地重构着本地区乃至世界的国际关系格局。20世纪50年代,以万隆会议为标志,中国和印度等亚洲新兴民族独立国家开始登上世界历史舞台。进入21世纪以来,全球的财富和资产正在以前所未有的速度被重新分配。根据国际货币基金组织的数据,发展中国家和新兴国家预计将在不到15年内占据全球生产总值的多数,而亚洲国家则是这一不断加速的经济增长力量的重要代表。全球中产阶级数量将会很快达到12亿,其中的大多数新成员将来自于中国、印度和亚洲其他国家和地区。这些新的中产阶级将给全球经济带来更为可观的可支配收入、新的消费偏好、更为多元的文化与价值观,这些都将从根本上重塑东亚和全球的市场和社会。¹

但是东亚内部各次区域之间的一体化程度参差不齐,力量相对分散,跨区域合作有待加强,东亚地区性国际社会的构建尚需时日。由于东亚内部各国在意识形态、政治制度、社会文化、经济发展水平、宗教信仰等诸多方面呈现多样性,东亚地区国际社会的构建和区域性公共产品的供给和消费远比欧洲和北美等地区来得复杂。从行为体来看,东亚既有传统的国家行为体,也有如中国台湾、香港以及东盟等次国家或次区域行为体。从国家构成来看,既有中国、日本、韩国等区域内大国以及俄罗斯、印度等区域周边大国,又有受到美国等区外大国深刻影响的国家。从地缘和国力来看,既有中国、日本、印度等当今世界的政治经济大国,也有蒙古、部分东南亚国家等仍处在世界政治经济舞台边缘状态的国家。从同盟和机制来看,既有东盟等较为成熟的区域合作机制,也有包括“东盟10+6”在内的尚待深化共识的区域合作倡议机制;既有亚太经合组织(APEC)等综合性的区域合作机制,也有朝核问题“六方会谈”等针对特定议题的专门协商机制;既有东亚外汇储备库、亚洲债券市场发展倡议等区域各国共同参与的多边网络型机制,也有由若干自由贸易协定(FTA)、经济伙伴关系(EPA)、

更紧密经贸关系安排(CEPA)形成的客观上带有一定竞争性的诸边轮辐—轮轴型机制。上述现象充分反映了这一地区错综复杂的利益和相互博弈关系。

东亚地区的力量整合已经取得了一定的成绩,相关各国在经济、政治、安全、文化等领域相继签署了一系列合作协议,但随着合作层级的提升和合作领域的拓展,各国的力量整合日益受到阶段性瓶颈的制约。在东南亚,以东盟为机制载体,区域内各国经过 40 余年的发展,已在维护并加强本地区的和平、安全与稳定中迈出了坚实的步伐,互相尊重、协商一致、循序渐进、求同存异、互不干涉的东盟方式对于东亚国际社会的建立具有重要的借鉴作用。但近年来,东盟各国经济合作乏力,内部凝聚力降低,在东亚区域合作中的先导作用呈下降趋势。在东北亚,尽管中国、日本、韩国三国之间的合作出现了新的积极势头,但是地区认同仍显薄弱,区域合作机制亟待完善,社会秩序和行为规范尚在建立之中。中日韩三边高层对话已近十年。2008 年年底在日本福冈举行的三国领导人峰会,确立了三国伙伴关系,并将三国领导人单独举行会议机制化,这标志着中日韩合作进入了新的发展阶段。在东亚国际关系重组的背景下,中日韩应从促进共同发展、维护地区稳定、建立和谐亚洲的战略高度进一步加强合作。

全球经济正逐渐从国际金融危机中走出,但东亚国家仍需推进跨太平洋的洲际合作和东亚的区内合作。危机给亚洲国家之间的政治与经济合作带来了更多的动力,东亚各国特别是核心三国需把握机会。从短期看,需要相关国家的中央政府采取有力手段,提振内需和就业,增进信贷和流通,坚持开放,警惕地区内部的贸易保护。要把目光放远,看到亚洲内部所存在的区内合作各种便利,包括资金、技术、劳力与管理等,加上区内合作的有限商务成本,完全可能使东亚政治经济合作提升一个档次。从可能性到现实性,政治家们应将合作理念转化为造福本国和本地区人民的实际行动。

(二) 亚洲大国是东亚关系重构的主导力量

地区大国是东亚国际关系重构的主导力量,但其作用和影响并不

平衡。在东亚国际关系重构的进程中,既要看到中日等区域内大国的主体性作用,也不能忽视印度、俄罗斯等在东亚地区有着重大利益关切的周边大国。

作为一个地区大国,中国的政治经济实力正迅速崛起。作为东亚地区的地缘中心,中国的影响力正迅速扩展。无论对于中国自身还是对于东亚地区,中国的崛起都充满挑战与机遇,战略意义重大。一方面,随着中国经济的持续高速增长,一百多年来东亚地区的力量分布格局和战略态势有可能被决定性地打破。联合国亚太经济和社会委员会(ESCAP)已经预测,在2010年中国GDP将超越日本,成为世界第二大经济体。²根据联合国工业发展组织的统计,2009年中国在世界工业生产总产值中的份额已达15.6%,超过日本的15.4%,首次位居世界第二。³另一方面,如何用好不断增强的经济和政治实力,真正和平发展,是中国和整个东亚地区都在面对的重大问题。从中国国内来看,民主和法制建设既是中国推动经济可持续发展的制度性保障,也是消除“中国威胁论”、促进东亚地区长期和平与稳定的重要内部因素。从周边形势来看,中国在打击民族分裂、宗教极端和暴力恐怖三股境内外破坏性势力上,在处理领土、能源、资源等争议问题上,以及在处理各种历史遗留问题上都还面临着一系列困难和挑战。要确立新型大国的国际地位,中国需要在理念上体现出一个进步大国的形象,在行动上体现出一个负责任大国的形象,在外交风格上体现出一个成熟大国的形象。

日本民主党自2009年上台执政后,日本新领导层展现出重视亚洲的姿态,着力倡导“东亚共同体”的理念。日本“亲美返亚”的平衡战略初具雏形,日美同盟的根基与发展方向出现更多争议。日本与东亚其他国家之间还存在着较为敏感的历史问题与领土争端,其中若干问题在经历了战后60多年的发展后仍未得到妥善解决,而且不能排除在特定情况下再度激化的可能。正因为东亚各国普遍存在着对痛苦历史的群体记忆和对大国强权的现实忧虑,更需要日本在区域合作中通过渐进的区域公共产品供给以“增信释疑”,在平等、互利、可持续的原则下,使东亚各国感受持久而普遍的善意。

作为金砖四国的重要成员,印度在过去几年中综合国力得到显著增强,经济、军事与科技竞争力在发展中国家中名列前茅。印度曾长期处于亚洲发展的边缘。到 20 世纪 90 年代,印度提出“东向政策”,力图加强与东盟国家的融合。进入 21 世纪以来,东亚地区一体化的发展把印度与亚洲其他地区联系得更为紧密。在东亚,印度已参加东亚峰会,并加入东盟“10 + 1”机制,启动了印度—东盟自由贸易区建设进程,开展了“恒河—湄公河项目”等次区域合作。在中亚,印度是上海合作组织的观察员国,在塔吉克斯坦有它的首个海外军事基地。尽管印度尚未加入亚太经合组织,但它积极支持泛亚经济合作,推动亚洲共同体建设。印度正从亚洲舞台上的一个配角变为主角,从一个南亚大国向亚太大国迈进,在全球事务中扮演着日益重要的角色。

俄罗斯尽管在地缘上并非属于东亚,但它在东亚地区国际政治经济现实中,仍是置身域外却利益相关的重要主体。特别是在东北亚地区,在解决朝核问题、促进能源交通等领域的经贸合作、维护和加强地区和平与稳定等方面,俄罗斯将继续对东亚国际关系的重构发挥重要作用。

(三) 美国是东亚国际关系重构的关键角色

亚太地区国家规模各异,发展水平和战略愿景也不尽相同。尽管如此,在过去近 60 年中,美国几乎与所有的亚太国家都发展了较为稳定的关系,这使得美国在这一地区长期维持了较高的影响力。即使冷战结束、日韩经济崛起、东盟的成熟与扩大、中国整体实力的不断上升,都没有从根本上改变这一格局。

美国总统奥巴马执政以来,华盛顿的“同盟与扩展”亚洲战略逐步成型。美国新的亚洲战略将继续强调美国的亚洲利益,强调其与亚洲盟国的安全合作,同时强调与亚洲新兴大国的合作以及新兴崛起者的国际责任。

近几年,美国加大了对东亚地区局势的关注,展现出了一种不能置身事外的姿态,美国因素在东亚地区事务中不断上升。2009 年 2 月,美国国务卿希拉里访问雅加达,这是美国高层官员历史上首次访

问东盟秘书处;7月,美国与东盟国家签署《东南亚友好合作条约》。美国已决定举行首届东盟—美国峰会,这些行为表明了美国对东南亚的战略重视。

亚洲事务在美国外交中的地位不断上升:为应对金融危机,美国首先需要亚洲经济振兴,并配合美国外部融资;美国当前“反恐”的两场战争都在亚洲,而它关注的两个核问题,也都出现在亚洲;美国要推动全球温室气体减排,也必须同主要亚洲大国商谈。在现实利益面前,以及在美国近来与东亚国际体系的互动和博弈中,美国的稳定因素和积极作用有所增加,不稳定因素和消极作用总体减弱。

双边同盟及其构成的网络仍是美国在东亚发挥重要影响的战略渠道。美国传统上依赖同盟体系以防不测。为此,美国历来重视与日本、韩国、澳大利亚和新加坡等盟国的安全关系。奥巴马总统上台以来,延续了这一趋势,但其亚洲政策又有新特点。美国继续依赖同盟体系,但同时增强对华合作,尽管中美关系的结构性困难没有消除。从现实来看,美国已增强中美战略对话力度,但对日和对印关系却并未同步升温。

对华关系是美国“同盟与扩展”亚洲战略的重要组成部分。根据世界银行的预测,到2025年中国和美国将分别占据全球国内生产总值总量的百分之二十。⁴两国将在引领世界经济中起到重要作用。中国已成为美国在亚太地区外交与经济活动的中心。随着中国力量的增长和中美经济相互依赖更为平衡,中国在双边交往中的议程设置能力有所增强。如今中美关系议程不仅涵盖双边议题,也包括了大量全球性议题。但是,中美利益交融的加深和和合作领域的拓展并不必然意味着中美关系稳定性的提高。由于中美社会制度与意识形态显著不同,两国相互猜疑与防范仍是彼此关系的现实。在贸易平衡、人民币汇率、全球气候变化、政治体制改革、地区安全等诸多问题上,中美可能面临更多挑战。中美双边关系还不时受到美国对台军售、在西藏等问题上干涉中国内政等问题的影响。化解现实与潜在的冲突,需要两国从战略着眼,尊重实际,平衡利益,善于把握整体关系,建立和利用双边与多边制度化管控关系的机制。

奥巴马政府对华关系更趋务实,对华合作需求较为迫切,对华遏制意愿和能力总体有所收缩。美国更认识到在应对它所面临的首要威胁方面,中国是不可或缺的战略合作者。在过去的30多年中,中美关系起伏不平,但整体向前发展,合作共赢正成为两国关系的基本特征,和平发展已成双方共同接受的概念。在维护亚太稳定和致力于地区繁荣方面,中美根本利益基本一致。在促进财富增长、公平经贸与平衡发展领域,双方的优先目标和利益分配有所差别,但互利哲学仍然一致。作为当今世界的两个大国,中美有责任有义务应对全球化时代的问题和挑战,维护和完善现有国际体系,为二十国集团(G20)等新国际机制建章立制,促进东亚地区的和平与稳定。

(四) 促进朝鲜融入国际社会

朝核危机是东亚国际关系重构的重要障碍。没有朝鲜参加的东亚国际社会是不完整的,也是不稳定的。国际社会相关各方应超越朝核问题本身,积极促进朝鲜全面融入国际社会和地区秩序。

综合利弊,朝鲜现阶段仍认为发展核武对其利大于弊。对国家利益的现实主义考虑决定了朝鲜不会立即弃核,同样的现实主义造成了公认的核武器国家都还没有放弃核武器。朝鲜发展核武器,在其认知中不是为了威胁他国,而是威慑对其正当利益进行威胁的国家。在现实世界,国家间互有威胁感知是常态,而且这种感知的威胁经常也是事实上的威胁。只要朝鲜依旧感到自己不安全,只要它感到美国仍对其构成威胁,要它弃核便无从谈起。朝核问题“六方会谈”已进行了多年。其间,朝鲜已突破核爆技术,这进一步增添了未来促其弃核的难度。即使朝鲜未来返回“六方会谈”,它仍然难以在实质上实现自我弃核。

防扩散理论与实践的矛盾,促使国际社会对朝鲜核问题作更深思考。国际社会绝大多数国家反对朝鲜发展核武,反对一切形式的核扩散,反对核军备竞赛。但现有核武器国家拥核后的发展经验表明,朝鲜拥核本身并不必然损害朝鲜半岛和东亚地区的和平与稳定。一个国家是否发展核武器,并不决定这个国家是否寻求扩张侵略政策,对

地区与全球和平与稳定的根本威胁,是某个(些)国家的霸权与侵略政策。朝鲜发展核武器确实可能刺激地区核扩散,但要是因此首先指责朝鲜发展核武器而不是批评并制止某个核超级大国对朝鲜的政治敌对与军事威胁,不仅不公正,而且反而可能刺激朝鲜在拥核的道路上越走越远。中国等国际社会各成员在推动朝鲜弃核的同时,更要促进有核国家真正奉行和平外交政策。朝鲜拥核将是国际社会一段时间内不得不面对的现实,它既可能打破地区平衡造成不稳定,但这本身是地区力量失衡引起的力量再平衡,其后果绝非防扩散理论所能简单地预测。

无论朝鲜是否发展核武,国际社会都需要塑造朝鲜与现有大国和国际体系相互适应、良性博弈,使它成为既存国际社会和地区秩序的参与者、维护者和建设者。为了促进朝鲜融入国际社会,相关各方应从以下四个方面加强协作、共同努力。

第一,解决朝核问题要有新思路。有关各国应放弃以解决朝核问题为前提与朝接触的政策,全面实现对朝关系正常化,变朝鲜停战协定为和平协定,实现朝鲜半岛的真正和持久和平。第二,为改变朝鲜的安全观,需要朝美共同行动,消除朝美在意图和能力上相互之间威胁性的环境。美朝应采取措施,扩大可能合作的领域,采取有利于相互削减威胁感知的措施,创造双方更感安全的国际环境。第三,环日本海各国在基础设施、产业转移、劳务输出、资金借贷等方面的合作已出现新势头。包括中国在内的东北亚各国应进一步加大与朝鲜交流与合作,扩大对朝投资和贸易,构建稳定的东北亚环境,塑造可持续发展的东北亚地区秩序。第四,通过对话协商实现半岛无核化是国际社会的普遍共识,也是解决朝核问题的必由之路。中国作为本地区重要国家和“六方会谈”的东道国,应在朝核会谈中继续发挥重要作用。

中朝关系是中国外交战略和周边外交的重要组成部分。根据时代的发展,中朝关系的战略定位应从朝鲜稳定着眼,帮助朝鲜改善民生,全面发展同朝鲜在政治、经济、教育、文化以及能源环境等领域的合作。2009年10月中国总理温家宝对朝鲜进行正式友好访问,两国签署了经济技术等一系列合作协定。2010年10月,中国出资建设的

鸭绿江界河公路大桥开工。朝鲜已同意向中国吉林省出租罗津港 1 号码头,租期十年。中朝两国应本着“继承传统、面向未来、睦邻友好、加强合作”精神,在相互尊重、平等相待基础上,保持高层交往、深化经贸等领域务实合作,加强在重大问题上沟通协调,推动双边睦邻关系不断发展,更好造福两国,促进地区和平、稳定和发展。

二、亚洲反恐格局的重组

为破解自 2007 年以来的阿富汗反恐困局,2009 年美国奥巴马政府决定将全球反恐重心从伊拉克东转至阿富汗,并出台了新的反恐战略。美国反恐战略的调整“牵一发而动全身”,不仅预示着亚洲反恐格局的重组,而且催生出一系列政治与新安全问题。

(一) 美国反恐重心东移与反恐战略调整

随着阿富汗塔利班和巴基斯坦境内塔利班势力回潮,美国的全球反恐重心开始东移。自 2007 年以来,阿富汗国内安全形势持续恶化。阿富汗南部和东部塔利班活动频繁。同时,巴基斯坦塔利班势力发展迅猛。阿、巴两国塔利班势力联手,导致这一地区形势紧张。此外,近两年伊拉克安全局势有所好转,给美国实施反恐重心东移提供了条件,驻伊美军战斗部队按计划于 2010 年 9 月前全部撤离伊拉克。美国的反恐重心正在从中东转向亚洲,尤其是阿富汗东部和巴基斯坦西北。为此,美国政府于 2009 年 3 月出台了对阿富汗和巴基斯坦的新战略,简称“阿富巴战略”。旨在于打乱、打碎、打败在阿富汗和巴基斯坦的“基地”组织,并防止他们卷土重来。2009 年 5 月,美国总统奥巴马和阿富汗总统卡尔扎伊、巴基斯坦总统扎尔达里在华盛顿举行了美阿巴三国峰会,同意为打击塔利班进行“前所未有的合作”。从此,美国的“阿富巴战略”付诸实施。2009 年 12 月,奥巴马总统宣布向阿富汗增兵三万。这次增兵部署完成后,驻阿美军将达到 9.8 万人。

伴随美国反恐重心的东移,奥巴马政府的反恐战略与布什政府时期相比有了重大调整。调整内容主要有以下五个方面。第一,在战略目标上,新战略相对务实可行,奥巴马政府降低了布什政府提出的政军目标,不再提将阿富汗打造成地区“民主样板”,而将目标转向打击“基地”组织以及塔利班强硬势力及其在巴境内的藏身之所;第二,在军事部署上,向阿增派军队和民事援助人员,尤其是农业专家、教师、技术员和律师,在阿各省改善政府向人民提供的基本公共服务;第三,在斗争策略上,强调军事、民事、外交等综合手段打击“基地”组织,强调多管齐下、标本兼治;第四,在反恐布局上,将巴纳入到美国“阿富巴战略”中;第五,在国际行动上,强调通过多边合作开展国际援助,吸收联合国、国际货币基金组织、世界银行等国际组织参与,寻求与北约与其他伙伴国、中亚与海湾国家、伊朗、俄罗斯、印度和中国等国的合作。“阿富巴战略”的实质是美国退出阿富汗,通过阿富汗战争的“阿富汗化”,将阿富汗安全责任转移到当地部队,实现美军分阶段直至最终撤离。

(二) 美国“阿富巴战略”使亚洲国际关系更趋复杂

美国的亚洲反恐新战略已取得某些效果,一定程度上有利于地区反恐和稳定。美国正在进行的阿富汗战争有联合国授权,得到国际社会较普遍接受,这不同于伊拉克战争。“阿富巴战略”在目标制定、资源配置、手段选择上都相对务实,这些因素使其可能取得某种成效,而可能不会重蹈美国在越南战争和前苏联在阿富汗失败的覆辙。从2010年2月起,驻阿美国和北约联军以及阿富汗政府军向阿富汗塔利班发动了大规模攻势,已取得初步进展。客观地说,美国的亚洲反恐一定程度上稳定了阿巴局势,对周边地区稳定有积极意义。当然,尽管美国在阿富汗反恐取得初步进展,但其前景仍不能过于乐观。由于阿巴境内塔利班势力采取了化整为零、暂时隐蔽的策略,这一地区的反恐进程仍将漫长而曲折。

美国反恐战略调整催生了亚洲国际关系的调整。通过反恐战争,美国同巴基斯坦和印度的关系都得到了强化。南亚区域内相关国家

的关系出现了新发展,印巴关系开始回暖但仍旧脆弱,巴阿关系有了明显改善,印度在阿富汗的影响逐渐扩大。中国与巴基斯坦的传统战略关系受到美加大对巴军事和经济援助的考验。中美在巴基斯坦的竞争与合作如何演变,将直接影响到中国重大的安全利益和该地区稳定。美国的反恐战略调整也使中国的西部安全环境趋于复杂,中国在东西两个方向都面临美国军事存在。俄罗斯对美国的反恐给予了一定合作,但美军借反恐渗入中亚,挤压了俄在中亚的传统利益,对俄腹部形成新压力。此次美国反恐战略调整也使“伊朗因素”凸显。伴随美伊在核问题上的斗争持续紧张,阿富汗成了美伊博弈的“新战场”。今后如果美伊矛盾进一步激化,美国贸然向伊朗发动军事进攻,则战火可能连接阿富汗和巴基斯坦。如果出现一场较大规模的局部战争,后果将十分严重。

亚洲反恐格局的重组将对亚洲地缘政治带来重大影响。中国和俄罗斯这两个大国在反恐问题上都同美国有一定程度的合作,两国都支持联合国关于在阿富汗动武的决议,并参加了有关国际会议,同阿富汗卡尔扎伊政府也保持了友好的关系,对阿富汗重建给予了一定的援助。俄罗斯还同意在美国空运军事物资方面提供协助。但中俄并不赞成美国在反恐中片面强调军事打击的政策,也不太可能派兵参战。总体上,从当前中美俄等大国之间的关系来看,反恐合作仍是主流,分歧和矛盾只占次要地位。但是,如果美国继续将阿富汗战争进行下去,有可能导致亚洲地缘政治的重大变化,也将使得中、美、俄、印等大国之间的博弈更趋复杂。

（三）亚洲国家和组织要在地区反恐格局重组中有所作为

虽然目前的亚洲反恐格局主要由美国主导,但亚洲国家可以而且应该发挥重要作用。对于深受恐怖主义危害的阿富汗、巴基斯坦等国家而言,长久地把自己的安全维系于美国,终非长久之计。对于中国、俄罗斯和印度等大国而言,该地区的反恐与它们的周边稳定息息相关,因此探讨美国撤出阿富汗后的反恐替代措施非常必要。今后,亚洲国家需在反恐领域积极开展合作,可以采取如下举措:第一,建立亚

洲反恐协作机制,以整合上海合作组织、东南亚联盟、南亚区域合作联盟等现有的亚洲区域组织的反恐职能;第二,不断完善反恐情报交流网络,加强跨境反恐行动的协作;第三,加强全球反恐合作的协调,特别是加强联合国在全球反恐行动中的权威地位,坚持重大的跨国反恐军事行动需要联合国的授权;第四,亚洲国家要努力发展经济、追求公平、完善法治、确立善治,以消除恐怖主义产生的“土壤”;第五,反对反恐行动中的单边主义和双重与多重标准,反对把恐怖主义同特定宗教与特定文明相挂钩;第六,亚洲国家在与美国进行反恐合作时要掌握“分寸”。一方面,亚洲相关国家可在维护阿富汗、巴基斯坦稳定方面与美国、北约进行适度合作;另一方面,需同美国、北约一些干涉阿富汗、巴基斯坦内部事务的粗暴做法划清界限。总之,无论美国反恐战略如何变化,亚洲国家都要维护好地区的利益,力争在重组的亚洲反恐格局中争取主动。

上海合作组织作为亚洲反恐合作的重要地区性组织,其作用有待进一步发挥。阿富汗有6个邻国,其中除土库曼斯坦外其余就是上合组织成员国和观察国。在阿富汗问题的“6+2”机制中,其中6个参加国也属上海合作组织。因此,上海合作组织在阿富汗问题上的作用独一无二,无法替代。但是,上海合作组织的前景一定程度上受到了美国主导的阿富汗反恐战争的影响,其作用有待加强。2009年3月,上海合作组织倡导召开了首次阿富汗问题国际会议。在这次会议上,上海合作组织成员国发表了《上海合作组织成员国和阿富汗伊斯兰共和国关于打击恐怖主义、毒品走私和有组织犯罪的声明》和《上海合作组织成员国和阿富汗伊斯兰共和国打击恐怖主义、毒品走私和有组织犯罪行动计划》。在今后的亚洲反恐合作中,上海合作组织在推出自己的阿富汗问题纲领上应有所作为,在阿富汗政策上各国之间应有所协调,在推动阿富汗国内政治和解上有所尝试。上海合作组织可以成为讨论阿富汗及周边地区反恐、打击毒品走私和有组织犯罪问题的重要平台。

目前,能否通过和平进程早日结束阿富汗战争,正受到国际社会的关注。卡尔扎伊政府已通过一些渠道同塔利班力量谈判。美国对

政治解决阿富汗问题也在进行某些探索。如果各方能通过和平进程早日结束阿富汗战争,将有利于亚洲的和平与稳定。

三、气候变化合作的再思考

由温室气体大量排放所造成的气候变化是全球面临的一个共同挑战,国际社会早在 20 世纪 90 年代初就开始寻求以合作的方式来应对这一挑战。通过艰难的谈判,最终在联合国体系内形成了以《联合国气候变化框架公约》及其《京都议定书》为基础的应对气候变化机制。但是,《京都议定书》将于 2012 年到期,目前,国际社会对后《京都议定书》时期如何开展应对气候变化的合作有着严重分歧,亚洲国家之间的分歧就是一个缩影。

(一) 亚洲需坚持“共同但有区别的责任”原则

在应对气候变化问题上,亚洲国家存在三种不同的立场。第一种立场来自日本等发达国家。日本是世界上呼吁应对气候变化最早和最积极的国家之一,已经初步形成法律机制。原因在于,一方面,日本作为一个国土面积狭小的岛国,对全球气候变暖所导致的海平面上升具有强烈的危机感;另一方面,相对雄厚的资金和技术实力为日本应对气候变化提供了物质保障。此外,日本也希望开发涉及新能源技术等引领全球商机的产品,为绿色、可持续经济模式的开创奠定基础。日本明确表态要积极参与国际气候合作,成为克服气候变暖危机的国际领导者。日本政府提出到 2020 年在 1990 年基础上减排 25%,但同时把主要温室气体排放国家参与减排作为前提条件。

第二种立场来自中国、印度等发展中国家。中国政府在应对气候变化问题上的基本立场是:呼吁应坚持“共同但有区别的责任”和“可持续发展”以及“减缓、适应、技术转让和资金支持同举并重”等原则,要求发达国家大幅度减少排放量,同时向发展中国家提供资金、转让

技术,在可持续发展的框架下,统筹考虑经济发展、消除贫困、保护气候,实现发展和应对气候变化的双赢,确保发展中国家发展权的实现。印度将发展作为第一原则,提出了“人均温室气体排放量”的概念,强调了“奢侈排放”和“生存排放”概念的区别。印度政府的基本立场是,要在可持续发展框架下采取应对气候变化的措施,不承担任何量化的温室气体减排指标。中印两国都面临发展经济、摆脱贫困的巨大压力,因此两国在气候变化问题上的立场都坚持《京都议定书》应继续有效,要求发达国家承担第二承诺期减排指标。

第三种立场来自马尔代夫、孟加拉国、尼泊尔等面临气候变化中的“最脆弱国家”。马尔代夫是太平洋岛国的代表,平均海拔高度只有1.5米,如果全球变暖的趋势持续下去,马尔代夫可能会在本世纪消失。气候变化也给地处三角洲的孟加拉国造成了严重负面影响。如果海平面上升1米,18%的孟加拉国陆地将被淹没,直接影响到该国11%的人口。孟加拉国还面临洪水、龙卷风、干旱等自然灾害的严峻挑战。尼泊尔所在的喜马拉雅山南坡生态环境脆弱,气候变化对该国民众的生存、生态环境、社会经济发展等都造成了负面影响。上述“最脆弱国家”应对气候变化的立场是,呼吁发达国家和发展中国家都要承担起在全球气候变化问题上的责任,制订出“有雄心和有约束力的”减排目标,并希望发达国家向它们提供技术和资金援助。

由于亚洲国家的多样性和发展的不平衡性,导致各国在应对气候变化问题上存在分歧。但是,亚洲国家之间的共同利益多于分歧,坚持务实合作、实现互利共赢是亚洲国家的必然选择。考虑到亚洲各国经济发展水平、历史责任和当前人均排放上存在差异,坚持“共同但有区别的责任”原则应是弥合分歧的重要一步。发达国家要对其历史排放和当前的高人均排放负责,它们也拥有应对气候变化的资金和技术,而发展中国家仍在以经济和社会发展及消除贫困为首要目标。根据“有区别的责任”原则,日本等亚洲发达国家应率先减排,并给发展中国家提供资金和技术支持;亚洲发展中国家在得到发达国家技术和资金支持下,采取措施减缓或适应气候变化。在“后京都议定书”

安排中,虽然发展中国家目前无需承担强制性减排义务,但必须提出限排目标,最终尽快进行实质性减排。

（二）在发展和减排之间达致平衡

对于亚洲这样一个以发展为主的地区而言,气候变化问题在很大程度上是一个发展问题。从发展阶段上来看,北美和欧洲发达国家已完成工业化,已消耗大量资源包括能源,产生了大量碳排放,从而享受着工业化成果。而亚洲大部分国家还在发展中,正处于或刚进入工业化阶段,发展水平较低,人均碳排放也较低。亚洲国家消除贫困和发展经济的任务依然艰巨,其应对气候变化不宜以牺牲发展、延续贫困和落后为代价。在此情况下,亚洲国家在气候变化问题上面临的首要问题是发展问题,这与欧美发达国家显著不同。亚洲国家如果不发展,就缺乏应对气候变化的经济基础和科技实力。今后一段时期,亚洲国家尤其是中印的发展仍将保持较快的速度,能源消费和二氧化碳排放总量还将显著增加,对此人们要有现实期待。

面临发展经济和减少排放的难题,如何在二者间达到平衡是亚洲国家气候变化合作的关键。气候变化因其长期性和潜在的不可逆转性被国际社会公认为人类当前面临的最具挑战性的全球性问题之一。正因为认识到气候变化问题的重要性,包括中印在内的亚洲发展中国家都在以积极态度应对,承担相应责任。中国政府宣布到 2020 年单位国内生产总值二氧化碳排放量比 2005 年下降 40%—45%;印度政府表示到 2020 年实现在 2005 年温室气体排放量的基础上减少 20%—25% 的目标。对亚洲国家而言,低碳经济不能一蹴而就,关键是在积极应对气候变化、在发展和减排之间保持适当平衡。同时,亚洲国家积极应对气候变化也为它们的经济转型、科技创新与可持续发展提供了新的机遇。

在应对气候变化方面,亚洲国家需从四方面开展合作:一是在转变发展方式上进行合作。加快经济发展方式转变和经济结构调整,是积极应对气候变化的重要前提,也是世界各国、企业的共同责任。二是在环保节能科技上进行合作。在利用高新技术降低消耗、提高资源

利用效率方面,亚洲多数国家与西方发达国家水平差距很大,潜力也很大。要加快开发低碳技术,推广高效节能技术,提高新能源和可再生能源比重,为亚洲各国应对气候变化和可持续发展提供有力的科技支撑。三是在建立多边机制上进行合作。亚洲各国要坚持《京都议定书》提出的“清洁发展机制”;借鉴欧盟碳排放交易经验以构建亚洲的碳排放交易体系;要大力推进极端事件和灾害区域联防体系建设;建立发达国家(如日本)向发展中国家应对气候变化提供资金援助和技术转让的机制。四是在大力培养人才上进行合作。应对气候变化的根本目的是改善人民生存环境和生活水平,推动人的全面发展,而这在很大程度上有赖于创新人才的大量涌现。要加强对各类人才的教育培养,使亚洲的可持续发展同人的全面发展相互促进、相辅相成。

(三) 中国应有的理念和战略

中国在全球应对气候变化问题上有双重作用。首先,中国是世界第一大能源生产国、煤炭消费国、二氧化碳排放国,第二大能源消费国,因此在应对全球气候变化问题上责无旁贷。但中国又是一个发展中国家,无法承担与发达国家同等责任。其次,中国是世界人口最多、自然生态环境脆弱,自然灾害严重的国家,也是全球气候变化的主要受害者,中国更应以积极姿态响应应对气候变化的全球治理,但中国的经济发展与环境保护、气候改善之间的矛盾还很突出。第三,中国正朝向一个负责任大国的方向发展,有责任也有能力推动节能减排,应对气候变化。但中国在舆论环境、节能减排技术以及能效方面都与发达国家存在较大差距,减排任务任重道远。

在应对气候变化问题上,中国的国家利益与人类的发展利益高度一致。从长远来看,中国需制定“三步走”的减排路线图。第一步(2006—2020年),为减缓二氧化碳排放、适应气候变化阶段,要求中国在“十二五”(2011—2015年)期间大大降低排放量速度;在“十三五”(2016—2020年)期间,排放量趋于稳定且达到高峰。第二步(2020—2030年),中国应进入二氧化碳绝对减排。期间,我国到

2030 年二氧化碳排放量将大幅下降,力争退回到 2005 年水平。第三步(2030—2050 年),中国到 2050 年时二氧化碳排放量继续大幅下降,与世界同步,降到 1990 年排量的一半。

在开展气候变化合作问题上,中国将以建设性和负责任的态度与发达国家、发展中国家以及国际组织开展密切合作。首先,中国要化被动为主动,对发达国家施加压力,提出更明确的减排要求。发达国家作为整体,到 2020 年应在 1990 年的基础上至少减排 40%。其次,中国继续以“基础四国”为核心,加强与小岛屿国家和最不发达国家的沟通与交流,尽最大努力维护发展中国家的利益。中国要通过南南合作基金加大对发展中国家的资金和技术支持力度;承诺发达国家所提供的减排合作资金优先由最不发达国家使用。最后,中国要加强与联合国、国际能源署等机构的合作。中国要支持联合国尽快在国际气候变化谈判问题上取得实质性进展,维护联合国权威。中国可考虑参与国际能源署的紧急共享体系,实现信息共享,共同行动,在能源市场的全球合作中发挥中国的积极作用。

2010 年和 2011 年是气候变化谈判最关键的两年,包括中国在内的亚洲国家对气候变化合作进行重思具有积极意义。由于《哥本哈根协议》在发达国家减排、向发展中国家提供资金和技术转让支持以及其在可测量、可报告、可核查方面没有做出明确具体的安排,同时,发展中国家减缓和适应行动以及自主减缓行动的“磋商与分析”尚需明确,因此联合国气候变化会议的谈判之路仍将艰难。亚洲国家需与国际社会同舟共济,加强沟通、增进互信、深化合作、各尽所能,为解决气候变化问题,造福全人类而共同努力。

注 释

1. Christopher G. Caine, “Global Economic Dynamics and Their Impact on Asian Leadership and International Relations,” paper presented to Shanghai Forum 2010 Sub-forum “Restructuring of International Relations in Asia”, May 2010.

2. 刘坤喆:《联合国报告称中国今年将成为世界第二大经济体》,《中国青年报》,2010 年 5 月 8 日,中国新闻网,http://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/cj-gncj/

news/2010/05-08/2269978.shtml。

3. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization, *International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 2010*, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2010.

4. You Ji, “Creative Realignment and Regional Order in Transition,” paper presented to Shanghai Forum 2010 Sub-forum “Restructuring of International Relations in Asia”, May 2010.

图书在版编目(CIP)数据

亚洲国际关系的重构/沈丁立,张贵洪主编. —上海:
上海人民出版社,2011

(上海论坛丛书)

ISBN 978-7-208-09929-6

I. ①亚… II. ①沈… ②张… III. ①国际关系-研究-亚洲-文集 IV. ①D83-53

中国版本图书馆CIP数据核字(2011)第064920号

责任编辑 龚 权

封面装帧 人马艺术设计工作室·储 平

亚洲国际关系的重构

沈丁立 张贵洪 主编

世纪出版集团

上海人民出版社出版

(200001 上海福建中路193号 www.ewen.cc)

世纪出版集团发行中心发行

上海商务联西印刷有限公司印刷

开本 635×965 1/16 印张 24 插页 4 字数 326,000

2011年5月第1版 2011年5月第1次印刷

ISBN 978-7-208-09929-6/D·1866

定价 48.00 元



上海论坛丛书
Shanghai Forum Series

2010

上海论坛2010大会演讲和论文选编

主编 袁志刚

亚洲国际关系的重构

主编 沈丁立 张贵洪

封面设计：人马艺术设计工作室·储平



世界图书

上架建议：国际关系

ISBN 978-7-208-09929-6



9 787208 099296 >

定价：48.00元

易文网：www.ewen.cc