12 July 2013

Simplified Chinese Translation Now Available: “Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability”

Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, “Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability,” Naval War College China Maritime Study 3 (June 2009).

Chinese translation (simplified character version/简体版) now available: Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, “中国水雷作战: 中国海军的「杀手锏,” 美海军战院中国海事研究第3号 (2009 六月), translation by苏文启 [Su Wen-Chi], ROC Navy officer (retired).

Chinese translation (traditional character version/繁體版/繁体版) likewise available: Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, “中國水雷作戰: 中國海軍的「殺手鐧」,” 美海軍戰院中國海事研究第3號 (2009 六月), translation by 蘇文啟 [Su Wen-Chi], ROC Navy officer (retired).

Japanese translation also available: 米海大論文 「中国の機雷戦」の紹介.

美海军战院

中国海事研究

第3号

2009 六月

中国水雷作战

中国海军的「杀手锏」

 作者:Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray

美海军战院-中国海事研究所

美国罗得岛新港市 (Newport, Rhode Island)

网址:www.usnwc.edu/cnws/cmsi/default.aspx

 

中国水雷作战

中国海军的「杀手锏」

 

经过将近六世纪之后,中国再度以海事强权的角色出现,此次重视的焦点在于其水下作战能力。1996年到2006年间,解放军取得了30艘以上潜舰1。这些舰艇包含两种新型核能潜舰-改良型宋级柴油潜舰及元级柴油潜舰(根据某些报导,此为美国情报单位预期外的新型潜舰2。除了上述野心勃勃的海军建军计划外,在2005到06年间,人民解放军接收了八艘强大的基洛级潜舰(及武器系统)。这几艘在2002年时购买的潜舰,加上原有的四艘同型潜舰后更如虎添翼。以海南岛为驻地的新型核能潜舰基地,可能更进一步地宣告了解放军海洋作战新纪元的到来。

东亚安全分析家间现多专注于北京潜在的航空母舰建军及部署之议题。然而这项说法,至少就近期而言,可说是一个转移注意力的作法。在可预见的未来里,解放军并非把重点完全置于「掌控海权」,而是追求东亚近海制海权:此一范围较小,且更易理解的目标。在解放军的第一艘航母照片流出后,毫无疑问地增添了此议题的讨论空间,然而其海军在近期更着重于有效,且较少受到关注的海战类型-水雷作战。这个议题及其他非对称类型的海战,对于东亚的军事平衡有举足轻重的影响。

解放军的海军战略家宣称水雷战具有「易布难扫、隐匿效果强、破坏力高及长期威胁价值」等特色3。解放军对于水雷攻击策略的关键目的在于「封锁敌人基地、港口及航道、摧毁敌人海上运输能力、攻击或限制敌舰行动、削弱或耗尽敌人战力」4 ,就未来沿海作战而言,普遍地认为「水雷是各国海军的主要威胁,对于航母作战群及潜舰更加为甚」5。且这点更加呼应解放军在作战评估上认为「相对于其他种类作战,(美国海军)水雷战能力极弱」6。中国海军战略家认为二次世界大战以来,遭击沉或严重损害的18艘战舰中就有14艘是被水雷所破坏7。如同解放军报所称「当军事专家放眼于开阔海域作战时…隐匿的潜舰鱼雷攻击及水雷的巧妙部署依然是现代海军的主要作战工具」8。当代解放军准则中「布雷」这个名词 ,在2008年的中国国防白皮书中使用了不下3次,由此可见被重视的程度9。正当多数国家投入于研究水雷反制时,仍有少数国家枉顾普世价值而追求攻势水雷作战10。例如2006年出版的战役学(着重于解放军准则作战及战略的研究)中,提到「(我们必须)全面地运用(水雷)…前进至敌港及经济航道,以进行大规模地布雷」11

联合潜舰作战能力后,中国似乎正努力地提升其水雷作战的技术。相较之下,潜舰体积大更难隐匿,加上其他军事强权的情报机构磨刀霍霍般掌控解放军潜舰发展的状况。相对地,水雷作战的能力较易隐藏,因此可称为军事手段上的「杀手锏」12。美国的说法中,就是解放军的「银弹」(silver bullet)。这个术语在某些中国消息来源,包含解放军本身13都明确地使用于水雷作战中14。目前的解放军仅靠水雷就已经能够将台湾及西太平洋海域重要的海运航线完全封锁。如Thomas Christensen (柯庆生)曾发表「台湾海域邻近中国大陆…台湾在贸易上对海运的依赖…扫雷本身的困难性,及美国极弱的扫雷能力,特别在(太平洋)作战区…等等因素,让水雷封锁..对于中国来说…是一个极具诱惑的策略」15。水雷作战除强化其他作战能量之外,的确对于美国海军在东亚军事版图上是一个致命的重大挑战。 依上述论点,此报告中对其他近期发表的研究报告,例如:中国的水雷作战能力被过度夸大,在对台作战想定中不具决定性因素之说法提出质疑16。该研究报告的结论可能在过去某段时间内成立,但此说法现在已过时,并轻忽了水雷战对部署于亚太区域的美国海军造成严重威胁的可能性。

这份报告分为10个部分。首先是讨论波湾战争促进了中国发展现代水雷作战。第二阶段将以此脉络,讨论中国水雷作战鲜为人知的历史。接下来的两个阶段将详述中国海军的水雷储备及各种布雷的方式。第五阶段将讨论中国水雷作战发展中的人员因素,简述近期训练及操演的特色。接着说明解放军海军发展中的水雷作战准则的现阶段轮廓。第七阶段将讨论未来水雷反制扮演的战略因素;第八阶段则讨论可能的想定场景,特别是台湾海域的封锁,并着重于未来亚太海域安全环境中,水雷战可能形成的全面性评估。接着从另一个角度来切入中国的水雷战发展。最后阶段将讨论美国国防及外交政策与此相关的议题。

 

促进中国水雷战发展的历史转折点

除了1895年中日甲午战争中遭受大败的清朝舰队外,中国在近代海军史舞台中并非主要角色。中国的军事理论家因此深感中国海战经验及实战知识的不足。最明显的是二次世界大战时,中国并无能力迎战横越太平洋到中国沿海的大型舰队。难怪国防分析家习惯将中国叙述为「大陆强权」(continental power)。

1978年以来,因中国的开放政策,中国专家有系统地吸收外国经验,并提供政策家(planners)海军发展的研究分析。这些研究树立了水雷战的重要性。根据中国水雷战教材,二次世界大战期间约布署了81万枚水雷,击沉了约2,700艘舰艇17。 此外中国海军战略家更是赞叹在单次战役中,德国就因同盟军的水雷而丧失了27艘U型潜舰18。中国海军战略家也对1945年美国对日本的水雷战有极大兴趣19,认为这项策略对日本无条件投降有极大影响。他们认为美军共部署了12,053枚水雷,击沉了670艘日本舰艇20。中国海军战略家认为了福克兰战役中,阿根廷因未使用水雷对抗英国皇家海军,是其战败的主因21

中国战略家所分析的许多军事战役中,波湾战争(1990-91年)特别的重要。此战震惊了经历邓小平时代下国防预算削减、军事技术低、战备贫乏阶段的人民解放军。根据David Shambaugh(沈大伟)所说「在人民解放军70年历史中,只有韩战让人经历了如此全面性的再思考」22。这个冲击「对人民解放军有如当头棒喝」。Shambaugh解释:「(解放军的)政策家从未想象美国所发展的新型高科技可如此运用…几乎任何军事观念都提醒着解放军高层其未逮之处」23。这些研究中有个值得注意的现象被忽略,但却暗自影响了中国海军之后发展;因此,中国分析家详细的分析了1990-91年的军事冲突中的海军战役。24中国军事著作引用此战役中水雷破坏了两艘美军战舰的例子,认为水雷战几乎是全面的25

以众多水雷战及水雷反制著作闻名的中国军事专家傅金祝,在1992年3月中国船舶重工集团公司(CSIC)的「现代舰船」期刊上,发表了一篇关于波湾战争在水雷战的全面性分析26。傅认为水雷战非预期性地扮演了一个重大的角色,突显出水雷是小国能对抗大国最有效的方法之一,但傅也小心地指出大国亦可有效地部署水雷27。傅认为成功地让黎坡里号(USS Tripoli) 及普林斯顿号(USS Princeton)触雷,说明了美军在水雷反制上「相对地势弱」。他认为此论点在伊拉克水雷战失败中特别明显,傅列出了在作战规划及整备上的不足,例如未布署足够数量的水雷(伊拉克「仅」布署了1,100枚水雷),错用了系留雷,不够巧妙地隐匿水雷作战或实施长距离水雷作战等因素。虽然认同伊拉克在水雷战中善用了民船,但同盟军的空优则是阻碍伊拉克从空中布雷的主因,并消耗了大量伊拉克水雷数量。此外,傅更加确认此历史事件本质上显示出「反水雷艰巨性」。

在波湾战争的海军作战中亦有篇研究报告呼应上述论点28。此分析报告强调,其讽刺之处在于波湾战争普遍地被认为是「高科技作战」,然而传统武器(如水雷)却扮演了重要的角色。作者认为水雷战具惊人的经济效益,并以「价廉物美」来形容它。认为水雷对中国来说为特别适切的武器,不仅在守势作为上,更因中国具有长且复杂的海岸线,因此也适用于攻势作为,可制造封锁敌港、破坏海上交通线的机会29。如同傅金祝,此分析家强调可师法伊拉克经验,因为「水雷也应该运用高科技」。在改善的方法及技术当中,以反水雷反制装备为先、接续为「智能化水雷」、快速布雷、及「多载台布雷手段」等。如前所述,第二份研究分析也相当地不赞赏同盟军的水雷反制作为:「虽然四个国家共布署了13艘舰艇,结果仍未达期望,这批联军受制于各舰艇作业能力不同,因此(在对抗伊拉克水雷上)只有缓慢的进展」。

傅金祝于2004年时,在中国造船工程学会(CSNAME)期刊-「舰船知识」中的发表,暗示关于前述及相关分析观点已成为解放军的海军战略家间普遍的看法。开头便说「我们都知道在1991年的海湾战争中,伊拉克的水雷发挥了重要的作用,重创美海军的2艘大型战斗舰和1艘改装的猎雷舰」30。这篇研究中分析了2003年伊拉克战争中水雷战及水雷反制,并检讨为何此次同盟军在水雷反制作为上明显优于1991年。傅认为伊拉克水雷并未造成同盟军的伤亡,因此2003年的水雷反制作为是成功的。然而,他认为即使运用了许多新型系统(例如AN/AQS-24猎雷声纳),同盟军水雷反制上还是有许多问题。据他观察,在水雷反制作战开始的36小时内,只搜获了6枚水雷(相对于约90枚布雷),且当时最先进的水雷反制系统仍受到海底杂迹(例如假目标)的影响31。再回到本段主题-波湾战争分析上,傅强调伊拉克水雷战的失败,在于同盟军掌握了相关空域及海域完全掌控权。傅认同水雷战的效果,但也说明水雷反制本质上的困难,他引用了伊拉克战争中负责水雷反制战的美海军官员说法:「即使在最佳的海象及作战环境下,猎雷及扫雷作业仍是缓慢的,带给人员挫折感及威胁」32

在水雷战的历史中,1991年波湾战争显然对于解放军的海军发展上有显著的影响。西方的国防分析家很明白地表示波湾战争对整体解放军来说是一个转折点,暴露出中国弱于美国军力上的显著差距,而驱使中国急起直追的欲望。然而,中国对于波湾战争水雷战及水雷反制上的评估,进而注意到美国在此类作战能力上的致命点。正如一位中国分析家在2004年中国海军官方报-人民海军上发表在中美军事冲突时水雷战可能扮演的角色:

    美军需要从海上移动补给品。但中国不是伊拉克,中国具有先进的水雷这对美国的海上运输来说是个致命的威胁当台湾海峡爆发冲突时,,解放军海军可以布署水雷。美军舰艇在反潜战前,需先执行区域扫雷。美国在波湾战争时,花了超过半年时间才将所有伊拉克水雷扫除。因此,美军在扫除解放军水雷时必不轻松33

除了对于外国水雷战经验的详细分析外,中国亦运用某些自身经验。

 

中国水雷战的发展史

虽然波湾战争及其他国水雷战的分析可能促进中国发展水雷战,但无视中国本身在这个领域下鲜为人知的努力却是错误认知。中国的水雷发展等同于其海军的盛衰史-从古代的强盛而转衰颓到近期的复苏34

值得注意的是中国宣称发明了水雷,35在明朝(16世纪中期)发明及生产,36之后亦广泛地运用37。早在1363年,据传明朝就在战役中使用分壳布雷船作战38。在1558年,唐顺编撰的「武编」一书就详细记载了沉雷的设计,从14世纪到16世纪时,就用作攻击中国沿海倭寇的布雷方法39。清朝时设立了天津水雷学堂40,并期望恢复中国的制海权并防御领土的完整性。

几世纪后,在中日战争期间,共军与国民党合作布雷,抵抗日本在长江上的运输41。在中华人民共和国于1949年建立后,「海军军官发现水雷武器的独特作战性:威胁时间长、攻击隐匿、难以预料等」42。人民解放军在1949年时,使用渔船清除汕头港的水雷43,解放军必须建立一支扫雷部队以扫除国民党在长江所布下的水雷。在俄国专家的指导下,四艘登陆舰改装成扫雷舰,于当年10月成功地完成扫雷任务44

西方及中国战略家都同样熟悉在元山战役时的联军扫雷作战45。中国消息明确指出北朝鲜成功布下了3千枚水雷,并暂时延缓了美军攻进沿海的时间46。联军成功地扫雷或摧毁了225枚水雷,但也付出了惨痛的代价。4艘美军扫雷舰及1艘舰队拖船被击沉,五艘驱逐舰受到严重的损害。水雷也击沉了南韩的扫雷舰YMS-516,并伤害了几艘南韩舰艇47。在此役中带领前进兵力的美海军准将Allan Smith,这样叙述此事件:「这个国家在没有海军,仅靠一次大战前的武器及过时的船只的状况下,就让我们丧失了制海权」48

人民解放军在韩战期间初次进行了水雷战,这是一个被西方广泛忽略的事实。在1953年2月,北京海军司令部派遣了一只派遣队布署水雷屏障,预防美国两栖渗透兵力进入共产党领土。4月6日,5艘舰艇组成的分遣队抵达清川江口,并根据俄国准则试图布雷(因环境参数影响而适时调整,并革新战术)。49 经此开端后,共产党在韩战的作战经验成了中国近代水雷战的滥觞。解放军海军引进俄国水雷同时也决定开始仿制。

在韩战期间制定的国家政策决定,在此战役结束后购买不同型的外国扫雷舰。1951年制定的政策,对于解放军海军的发展有着长久的影响,让中国决定「从苏联获得技术转移权利并自制军舰」到「从仿制(舰艇)到半本国自制」,而最后「一步一步地从半本国自制到完全自制」。50 中国因此购买并改装了二次大战的扫雷舰,以及苏联在1948年造的数艘扫雷舰。在此动机下,中国同时将渔船改装成扫雷舰,并开始制造首艘专用猎雷舰。根据1953年中俄协议51,莫斯科将6605及6610型扫雷舰的造舰计划及装具交付中国,而后于武昌造船厂组建。在1960年代起开始量产。52

在1950年代中期,根据1956-67年的国防科学及技术开发计划的指导53,中国开始发展水雷建设。北京当局设立了水雷专业委员会,负责指导水雷研发。以及水中武器研究机构,负责相关资料收集及分析。54于1958年,山西省汾西机器厂开始自制中国第一枚水雷:型号M1-3型,为仿制俄国原型之水雷。

在1956年,中国开始设计第一艘自制猎雷舰:057K型,由第一机械制造工业部下的造船工业管理局的第一产品设计室负责55。第一代的港区扫雷舰是由中船重工(CSIC)下的708研究所负责监造,主要的船厂有江南、中华、江西等56。1965年经过海上测试后,首艘猎雷舰便交给解放军。中国在日后会将此舰跟058型舰艇布署到越南。058型舰设计始于1967年,解放军于1972年时接收。此型舰采低磁性特征钢,并使用消磁装备(用以降低磁性特征)57。在1970年代时58,依照东德“Troikas”型舰研发了约50艘312型无人扫雷舰执行河川的扫雷作业;这批舰艇后来也在越南使用。59

水雷发展在文化大革命期间(1966–76)仍持续进行着,也许是因为跟毛泽东的人民战争准则路线相近的关系而保留着。为了建立能抵抗俄国核子攻击下的偏远「第三线」国防建设,打击了中国的军事产业也丧失极大的效率,影响甚至延续到今日60。当时研发许多模块化、简单构造的浅水雷,例如C-4及C-5型沉底雷等61。这个时期的水雷普遍具有开发时间长的问题;后续也多需要升级引信才可延续可用性。现在仍不清楚这些浅水雷在今日中国的战斗序列中能扮演何种角色。

在1972年5月9日,美国海军在越南海防港布雷。中国立即回应河内的求助,并于5月12日时正式地谴责封锁行动62。中国接下来在研讨后,不寻常地派兵至战区,注意当时中国在水雷反制上是缺乏经验的。而且他们亦坦率地承认文化大革命折损了中国原有的实力63。当月稍后中国水雷调查工作队抵达了海防港,并开始分析寻获的美军水雷。在当年7月到1973年8月之间,解放军派遣了12艘扫雷舰、4艘支持舰及318名官兵到越南。64 在多名伤员及至少一人死亡的状况下,中国的扫雷舰航行了27,700海浬,运用了音响触发、水下作业员及其他方式等,清除了46枚美军水雷。65这些清除水雷的经验让解放军在越战后期已经相当熟悉美军水雷战的工法及硬件架构。中国在美国对北越的水雷战中学到的经验还包含了:夜间时空中布雷的战术,以求出人意料的效果。并在心理战上以「布多说少、布少说多」的手段取得上风66。中国后来也在1974到75年间,利用这项水雷反制的经验帮助柬埔寨的赤柬67

在1970年代,解放军固化了其生产基本型、俄式装备的能力。这是一个(军事)起飞的时代;到1980年代时解放军在研发上的能力已大有进展。许多从前构想的设施也成功地开发并生产。早期生产的设施亦能以新科技改良。中国第一型国制水雷M-4型系留雷,在1974年起服役;其改良型水雷后续于1982年及1985年问世。C-3型水雷是中国第一个具抗扫能力的国制水雷,自1974年起服役。后续引信的改良,于1986年产生了改良型C-3B型水雷。在1975年,中国决定了第一个使用晶体管科技设计的水雷:C-2型深水沉底雷。其后续的改良型将改善引信的感应。新型的水雷反制舰,编号082型港区扫雷舰于1976年时建案,在1984年开始兴建,于1987年起服役。68

邓小平于1978年崛起后,降低国防预算以促进经济发展,但「改革开放」政策也鼓励解放军在几十年里,第一次全面地引进外国科技及构想。在1980年代中期,作为「战略转变」的一环,将部分过时的人民战争教范转换为高科技下进行有限、本地的战争,另将大陆作战重心转移到海洋领土防卫,解放军海军将专业布雷舰的发展列为其优先考虑。延续先前的俄国经验,中国开始研发专用布雷舰艇。在1988年,经过从1981年开始的漫长设计及测试阶段,918型布雷舰-舷号814开始加入舰队服勤。69经报导,814号可利用多向吊臂实施无码头补雷,为一机械式的运雷系统,并配有先进射控雷达,可携带300枚水雷。但其航速慢、易被侦测等性质似乎欠缺了作战上的优势;可能是被当作技术测试平台了。也许就是为何到现在也仅造了1艘918型舰的原因吧。70

 

照片1 (涡池级水雷反制舰。詹氏年鉴内列有六艘,由两个船厂兴建。设计上与先前中国建造的俄国型式扫雷舰相似,但舰长多出5米。)

 

在此议题上不应忽略解放军扫雷舰的发展,据报导于2004年4月20日时,求新船厂生产了新型的六百吨扫雷舰71。解放军广州军区政治部门所发行的日报中报导2005年时,海军成功地「开发了新型扫雷舰之新装备训练及作战战法」72。2005年后,解放军接收了两种型式的国造新制水雷反制舰:六艘涡池级,及目前仅一艘的涡藏级73。央视的军事频道CCTV-7基于某种目的,于2007年上半年播放了中国水雷反制操演的特集中,播出涡藏级使用线传遥控载具(ROV)进行水下猎雷作业的画面,此举显然是解放军海军的第一次。74 根据一名水雷战专家指出这个遥控载具可能没有声纳,但似乎能施放引爆炸药,且可能具备扫雷刀,可割断水雷的锚炼。与美军水雷处理系统相当类似。然而就外观而言,它并不像是直接从西方水雷反制系统中仿制而来。75东海舰队的一支扫雷支队76在2008年时以型式相似的遥控载具支持了水雷反制。77 放大标准来看,使用猎雷无人水下载具(UUVs)虽表示中国在水雷反制能力上是新的进展,但相对于当世水平上来说,复杂程度不高。

 

照片2 东海舰队扫雷战队指挥官张建明与猎雷遥控载具。此型遥控线接式猎雷载具在外观上像意大利的冥王(PLUTO)系统,在前端的「泡泡」处有扫雷刀装置,可用于割断水雷炼,在「泡泡」内有摄影镜头,也可能在其下方的黑色金属壳处运用炸药引爆沉底雷。

邓(小平)时代现代化所遗留的资产在于加速了海军水下战技术发展。努力积极地引进外国经验当中,较特别的是源自美国的鱼雷科技。而在水雷反制的领域内,据说中国已从以色列获得了先进的扫雷技术。78

特别是中国自1981年开始发展火箭水雷,于1989年时初次生产。79在后天安门时代,这项研究更获得大笔军事经费、强势经济抬头及稳定国家科技建设等因素支持。美国国防大学80在2002年出版的21世纪海战主要专题论文与一般看法不同,文中认为火箭水雷及其改良型式,在这20年来势必已在解放军弹药库占有一席之地了。

 

中国水雷储备

中国目前的水雷储备包含许多致命性武器。公开、不保密的水雷存量总数约五万到十万之间。81 然而值得注意的是水雷可轻易隐匿储放位置。因此上述估计量因谨慎视之。

 

战斗序列

一篇中国近期的文章宣称中国握有超过五万枚水雷,其中「有超过30种触发感应、磁性感应、声响感应、水压感应、复合感应、遥控水雷、火箭上升水雷及移动水雷等各式水雷。」82在表1列出的是目前公开的中国水雷清单。其范围从较旧型的系留雷、精密的沉底雷到火箭水雷等都有。

系留雷:典型水雷,从一次世界大战开始使用在军事上。1991年及1988年时分别破坏了美军黎坡里号(USS Tripoli)及山姆罗勃号(USS Samuel B. Roberts)可证明其杀伤力依旧。83 系留雷漂浮在海平面下,透过锚固定于定点。通常用直接接触舰艇或旧式的引爆机制来实施引爆。系留雷中,例如中国的EM 31型及EM 32型受限于锚炼(缆)长度及水深不超过两百米。84水雷锚炼及引爆简单等特征,让此类水雷在获知布放情报后,即便以一般扫雷舰也可轻易扫除。85

漂雷:是一种「自由漂浮」的水雷,解放军海军已大量研发及生产。根据报导,解放军在枉顾国际法规下,至少制造了3种漂雷,占其传统水雷类的大宗之一。但目前在生产、存量、布署等信息均不明。

漂雷主要被认为用以攻击水面舰。由中船重工(CSIC)在湖北省宜昌的710研究所研发86,大连起重机厂生产,漂-1型这种自动、稳定、深漂雷有大型及小型两种。用于攻击中小型舰艇,可由军舰或一般民船布放。漂-1型据报于1974年起服役。其施放深度为2到25米、作战寿命为2年、爆炸半径为10米。根据报导,漂-1型具隐匿佳、生产价格低、难扫且可设定漂浮深度。

漂-2型这种小型、自动、稳定、深浮水雷是由710研究所开发,由大连起重机厂生产。漂-2型水雷的外观为长型火箭体,容量相对较小、净重125到150公斤、可漂浮于固定深度,主要用于攻击中小型水面舰艇。漂-2型可实施分解,俾利人工布雷,可利用小艇或渔船之类简单的载台作业。漂-2型原设计用于沿海作战及封锁海上航道。有迹象显示中国已经开发了第三代漂雷。漂-3型:漂浮深度在2到7米间。87 此型漂雷可能将特别用在封锁台湾东部海域的水面舰艇航道,因其深度太深而不适用上升水雷。

 

型式

引信

类型

布放载台

攻击深度(米)

任务目标

尺寸/弹头

寿限(年)

开发历史

改良型式

开发技术

开发单位

C-1 500

1000

音响频率

磁感信号

沉底雷

水面舰

飞机

水面舰

潜舰鱼雷

6–30

6–60

攻击水面舰及潜舰 495公斤; 300公斤炸药; 直径533 MM1080公斤; 700公斤炸药; 直径533 MM

4

1965年起服役 仿制俄国非接触深沉底音响诱发雷 710研究所;西安东风仪表厂;汾西机械厂

C-2 500

1000

   磁感信号

低音波(<20Hz)

沉底雷

水面舰

潜舰

6–50

6–100

攻击中大型沿海舰艇 直径533 MM

2

1965年起开发;1966年海上实测;1975年研发计划终了 针对因淤泥沙掩盖而降低灵敏度进行多种改良 中国第一个使用晶体管技术的水雷 由710研究所设计,先锋(Vanguard)电器厂;汾西机械厂

C-3 500

1000

音响频率

磁感信号

沉底雷

水面舰

潜舰

飞机

6–50

6–100

攻击中大型水面舰、潜舰 直径533 MM

2

1974年11月起服役 1982年改良引信;1986年12月的C-3B型改良施放最大深度到200米 中国的第一个国制研发的水雷,具抗扫及抗干扰功能 由710 研究所设计;上海先锋电器厂生产

C-4

磁感信号

低音波 (<20Hz)

水压感应

沉底雷

海军舰艇

民船

人工

5–15

攻击中小型舰艇,「人民的海上战争」 小型、轻型模块化设计

4

1976年研发计划终了 具强大的抗扫及抗干扰功能 由710研究所设计;东风仪表厂制造

C-5

超音波感应

水压感应

沉底雷

5–15

攻击中小型舰艇 小型、模块化、下半部为短筒状、上半部为半球体:210公斤

4

1973年继续开发计划;1975年服役 因1974-75年间协助赤柬夺取柬浦寨政权而在1978年获得国家科技成就奖 由710研究所设计;东风仪表厂制造

C-6

磁感信号

水压感应

低音波 (<20Hz)

音响频率

10–300

仿制意大利MR-80系列

EM-52

超音波(>20kHz)

磁感信号

使用三种引信:

待机

战斗(音响)

爆炸(水压)

火箭推进直接上升

水面舰艇

2–200

反水面及反潜作战

短粗鱼雷外型,长度3.7 米、直径0.45 米、 629公斤、140公斤炸药

1

1981年开始研发,1987年积极测试及修改原型,1989年继续研发 改良施放深度(目标500 米),1994年起持续改良炸药 从计划深度200米到水面时间5秒, 对周围舰艇达80% 打击率 ,中国产销 由710研究所管理研发。

 

型式

引信

类型

布放载台

攻击深度(米)

任务目标

尺寸/弹头

寿限(年)

开发历史

改良型式

开发技术

开发单位

EM-53

音响/磁性,

磁性影响

沉底雷

遥控

6–60

防御水雷战斗数组,封锁海湾、海峡及航道等

1978年起开发;军方于1986年接收原型 三种功能:-解除启动-战斗-最大战略弹性引爆

EM-54

选择目标:飞机或合适排水量的航母

中国舰船研究室研发

EM-55

主动、音响、被动

EM-52的

改良型

中国产销

EM-56

音响、震动、压力

自走

潜舰

可能由岸基单位发射

从13公里到最大45公里,可漂浮发射

反水面作战

380公斤

中国产销

EM-57

500

1000

音响/磁性

沉底雷

遥控

改良距离至730公里

空中

水面舰

6–100

反水面及反潜作战

300公斤炸药

700公斤炸药

500公斤

1000公斤

中国产销

MAFOS-1

自动搜寻及判别型式

M-1

接触引爆

大型系留雷

水面舰

潜舰

12–263

大型水面舰艇

1

1962年起服役;停产 M-1B,新增非接触引信 仿制俄国水雷

汾西机械厂

M-2

接触引爆

中型系留雷

水面舰

潜舰

15–110

航道及

港口封锁

1

1964年起服役;停产 新增非接触引信 仿制俄国水雷

汾西机械厂

M-3

接触引爆

大型系留雷

水面舰

潜舰

12–430

攻击潜舰

1

1965年起服役;停产 新增非接触引信 仿制俄国水雷

汾西机械厂

M-4

音响信号

超音波 (>20kHz)

系留雷

水面舰

潜舰

200

深水封锁

攻击中型舰艇、潜舰

600公斤

2

1973年11月研发计划终了;1974年服役 1982年M-4A增加浮力及引信稳定度;1985年11月M-4B型改良引信电路整合 中国第一个国产水雷;第一个非接触深水超音波水雷

710研究所研发;汾西机械厂制造

M-5

接触、计时、音频

上升水雷

200

 

型式

引信

类型

布放载台

攻击深度(米)

任务目标

尺寸/弹头

寿限(年)

开发历史

改良型式

开发技术

开发单位

漂-1/2

接触

漂浮、中型自动定深

人工

小艇

渔船

2–8+

攻击中小型船舰

长型火箭体

低容量

125–150公斤

2

中国的漂-1原型缺乏辨别敌我的功能。难以使用,可能已停产 710研究所研发;大连起重机厂生产

漂-3

音响、接触

漂浮

潜舰

水面舰

2–7上下  (+/- 1米)

反水面作战

130公斤

受限于水中最大寿命

PMK-1

感应、计时、音频

(火箭?)

推进鱼雷

水面舰

潜舰

200–400

(1000米锚深)

反水面及反潜作战

350 公斤

俄国制造

PMK-2

被动、主动、音响

(火箭?)

推进鱼雷内装弹头

空中

潜舰

水面舰

400 米

(锚深100–1000米) 可联机

反潜作战

相当于110公斤 TNT 炸药

俄国制造,以MPT-1M热感鱼雷为原型

T5

音响、磁感、水压

自航

特 2-1

遥控「安全/战斗/引爆」等功能

遥控

6–65

1978年开始研发 上海交通大学及海军工程学院协助 上海先锋仪表厂、上海电子装备自动化研究所、海军测试基地

500型

深训水雷

飞机

(特指海军航空部队)

练习海上布雷

1987年12月设计计划终了 可回收 710研究所、汾西机械厂、海军航空部队

训-1

可选择C-1、-2 及 -3 等引信

沉底雷

训雷

潜舰

潜舰布雷练习用

1982年11月后继续开发 操演后浮至水面 710研究所、汾西机械厂

 

表1. 中国水雷一览表

 

来源包含:林长盛「潜龙在渊-解放军水雷兵器的现况与发展」第22-33页;Ling Xiang (凌翔)「Raise Mighty Chinese Sea Mine Warfare Ships on the Sea」第152–61页;詹氏年鉴-水下作战系统,参考网址 www.janes.com  ;Wayne Mason着「Naval Mine Technologies」等。

 

照片3 「漂型」漂雷。中国海军已生产了大量的自由漂雷,但目前生产的状况、存量及部署等都不明。

 

根据某些中国消息来源,解放军因漂雷难以控制的特性,已经停止开发。88但2007年的某中国水雷战教材中讨论了大量漂雷的内容。89而且近期在CCTV-7频道中亦出现了似乎为近代水雷,且「标示为漂雷」的影像。90

 

关于漂雷的研发,中国的实际处置及盘算仍不明确。然而上海国际研究机构的报刊「国际展望」的编辑表示「漂雷…能在桥及港口等设施,用以攻击航行舰及锚泊舰。漂雷并不受限于水深或海上,很可能会漂出海上战区,并伤及非交战国的船只。因此国际条约禁止使用漂雷。当然实际状况下不会如此理想化。」91 漂雷的确在广泛认知的军事冲突法律下是不合法的,主要在于其无差别攻击的特性:它们可以轻易地将民船误认为合法的军事目标般摧毁。而且几乎无法追踪位置。海珊(Saddam Hussein)因在波湾战争(1990–91)中使用漂雷而受世人谴责。只有在施放后不久即成为惰性的漂雷才有可能合法,即便如此,漂雷中仍有危险的化学物质并持续漂流,也让人质疑其正当性。92

相当于中国最新的作战法手册中,说明1907年海牙第8公约「关于敷设自动触发水雷公约」限定水雷使用,但是缔约国在二次大战期间仍多有违反此限制。「因而严重地破坏此协议的规则」93 最后,这群中国分析家总结国家利益无可避免地高于法律协议。不难想象中国在台湾冲突时,使用「维护领土完整」的理由自外于此类国际公约吧。94

沉底雷:顾名思义可知此型雷直接布于海底,感应经过船只的磁场、电场、音响或水压的变化,在满足其触发条件时引爆。95 是一种危险且有效的武器,1991年沙漠风暴时普林斯顿号(USS Princeton)触雷事件可应证。解放军某些旧式沉底雷,例如500及1000型等,被评估具有计算通过船只的功能,在引爆之前最多可感应到15次船只造成的环境变化。它们也具有启动延迟的机制,在实际布署前最多停滞250日,其自毁定时器可设定最多达500天。96中国的C系列沉底雷从1960年中期时的浅水沉底雷开始改良,到1975年后加强深水布署及多重引信等复杂度。97 中国的沉底雷EM-11及EM-53型较系留雷更难侦测及从水里扫除。98 在1991年时,某位水雷专家写过:「依目前状况,满足磁场、音响及水压等条件顺序下,进行扫雷作业几乎是不可能的。」99,710研究所根据报导,在近期已与巴基斯坦共同开发新世代的灵敏引信沉底雷。100 受限于感应范围及炸药等条件,沉底雷被限制布署在水深200米或更浅的深度。101

遥控雷:某些水雷可透过传输编码音响信号而解除,让友舰安全通过后可重新启动,限制敌舰通行。在中国技术文件中明显有许多关于此功能的研究。102 中国被认为可依此方式控制EM-53及-57型沉底雷。103 遥控雷虽符合守势水雷的目的,在攻势作战中一样有用。

潜射自走雷:中国具有一定存量,例如EM-56型。可自行移动至最终目标区域。104 中文称「自航水雷」。 这型水雷可到其他方式无法到达的地点,单纯就鱼雷壳体装填弹药后航至该区。一般使用废弃的鱼雷改制(例如中国YU型系列的早期模型),从潜舰发射。将沿着使用者规划的航线航行一段时间。当抵达预设的终点时(可能是某港口的中心),鱼雷的引擎停机,而雷体就沉到海底。而弹头就由类似其他沉底雷的引信所控制。如大部分的水雷,这型水雷也限用于浅水区。

上升水雷:另一种型式的水雷,以「上升水雷」得名,可被用于深水区。西北工业大学有关火箭上升水雷的一篇学术论文中提到:「它们可用于深水区以扩大制海范围,并适用于中国的海洋环境。」105 这型雷以系留方式固定,但其漂浮炸药的部分-鱼雷或弹头火箭,将在系统侦测到符合的通行船只时释放。而鱼雷或火箭从该深度升起后,导向并摧毁其目标,一般目标为潜舰。某消息指出:所谓的「指向性火箭上升水雷」就是一种具有精准控制、导引及主动攻击能力的高科技水雷…攻击速率(例如攻击潜舰目标)可达每秒80米。106 例如中国从俄国进口的PMK-2型上升鱼雷水雷,据说能在水深2千米的深度施放。107 而系留缆材质的改良可能加深最大的锚深。中国已获得俄国早期的PMK-1型,并可能反向开发出自制型式。中国也已开发出,并出口至少两种上升水雷。108 伊朗于1994年购买了数量不明的中共EM-52型火箭上升水雷,109据报导至少有两百米的作战深度。110

近期对上升水雷研发的关注,显示出中国「对水雷战的新认知」:有必要开发有效的广大深海区域水雷战,并研发并配备能够执行…机动攻击的火箭水雷。111 解放军正扩储1970及80年代时,原用以对抗冷战强权攻击,防御沿海区域的水雷存量;这些武器多数「仅能布署于浅水区」,仅有少数能布署于略深水域中。解放军已经「开始筹购垂直火箭上升水雷,并积极研发指向性火箭水雷、火箭上深导引飞弹水雷及火箭助推水雷。」112

 

俄国的影响

无效率的国防产业氛围不太可能限制中国的水雷开发,因为其国家无法本地开发的部分可能已从俄国获得。中国已获得俄国的水雷、技术,很有可能包含俄国工程师,以强化其本身的自制水雷计划。113 自从冷战结束后,水雷战技术「因前苏联水雷专家出走及世界市场等因素而快速地扩散」。114 一份中国主要海军刊物中的文章引述俄国为「世界的水雷王国」。115 傅金祝相信俄国在水雷上的成就甚至超过英美。116 中国分析家举证三大因素说明俄国的水雷战特色:天然(地理)屏障因素利于水雷战、击溃优势海军的能力、以便宜价格大量生产的能力。117  很明显地,这个分析结果壮盛了中国水雷战的论点。再者,中国战略家已经对俄国及苏联时期的水雷战役有相当透彻的研究。118 这些分析检视了土(耳其)俄战争及日俄战争中水雷的角色。有众多研究检视苏联在二次世界大战时,所设下的约8万枚水雷所扮演的重要角色。119 延续这个主题,近期在「国际展望」于一篇极详细的研究中,附上了1941年时在芬兰海湾所布署的俄、德及芬兰雷区图。120

中国在新的硬件架构中整合了对俄国水雷发展史及准则的认知。中国分析家认为在俄国总理赫鲁晓夫执政期间,俄国在水雷企图上稍有减弱,但于1960年代后期又再次复兴,并认为传统战争想定中的水雷将扮演更吃重的角色。121 另有中国消息来源强调俄国「持续开发高速水下火箭科技」。122 根据此消息及其他中国研究显示,俄国火箭水雷(例如PMK-1)为理想的对抗美国核子潜舰用武器。这些武器具每秒五十米的追杀力,可高速攻击核动力潜舰 (SSNs),使其无法及时反制。它们也被认为是对抗美制的单船体潜舰的有效武器。据说藉由部署此型武器,即使相对旧型的柴油潜舰也能抗衡核能潜舰,此为传统的俄国战略。

而解放军明显在训练中使用R级或明级潜舰,于敌港布放EM-52型火箭上升水雷,暗示这些潜舰的战时任务,并说明了中国保存这些潜舰的理由。123 据报有俄国科学家参与中国的水雷计划。124 在此作战领域中,俄国广泛的支持正符合解放军军事上的优先发展需求,但其合作的规模仍不可知。

 

研究方向

解放军持续地寻求外国装备、科技及专业人才等,支持其快速的水雷发展。但中国并不单纯满足于获得先进的俄国及他国水雷。受其科学及科技革命上的影响,中国已取得了丰富的水雷研究成效。从中国持续的研究焦点,可知她正专注于发展并加强深水上升水雷的效果。125 中国于1981年开始研发火箭上升水雷,1989年生产第一型。青岛潜舰学院的学者已于近期计算出,在某特定海域中,需多少自走雷可完成封锁。126 而实际上,在潜射机动水雷(SLMM)领域上亦有广泛的研究127,特别是其障碍或反制作为。128中国海军航空工程及大连海军学院的科学家已发展出预测火箭推进水雷攻击可能性的方法。129 另外有许多研究分析发射载台稳定性130、水下火箭推进131、及发射轨迹路径132等。如其他国家,中国也广泛地测试水雷战模型。测试领域有「水雷封锁战」133、水雷反制(MCM)134及军舰磁场等。135 某些关键的数学模型证实了中国水雷战及水雷反制是「基于五十年来解放军自身及研究他国海军的成果」。136

中国710研究所作为水雷研发中心已有多年。近几年来,研究人员研发了引信触发137及影像等议题。138 并帮水雷设计出了USB型式的「高容量内部记录器」。139 在与大学及多国机构合作下,开发出「水雷深度量测及控制系统」。140值得注意到,他们推崇在水雷软件开发中采用「国家军事标准」。141 同样地,哈尔滨工程大学的某个学生提倡发展可靠的「军用自动测试系统」,以确认武器战备。142 其他水雷研究则针对目标追踪143、爆炸半径144、最大化145及对舰损害程度146等研究。某中国顶尖的科技大学研究人员则分析在何种程度下,目标能反应并回避深水上升水雷。147 且他们建议使用目标舰艇的被动特性来瞄准水雷。148

另有某些观点认为潜舰适合作为上升水雷的发射载台;在大连海军学院的一篇文章中建议解放军将兴趣放在潜射机动水雷上。149 某位705研究所研究员提倡获得封装鱼雷式水雷,类似美国冷战期间使用的卡普托水雷(Captor)。此型水雷可部署在深水区域,攻击经过的潜舰。150 技术上的需求可经由实地测试确认:

    特定新型水雷的潜舰测试曾于中国南海执行。此测试领域的资深工程师Zhang ZhaokuiJin Shujun在狭隘的鱼雷发射舱间内工作超过2个月,并精确地收集到每个群组资料。之后由海军的军事训练部将这些及珍贵的技术参考数据纳进作战手册内,提供新装备使用上的科学基础。151

引信是中国研究的另一个主题。水雷设计师设计出较精密的引信系统,来解决早期水雷易扫的问题。中国正将其旧型水雷翻新为现代化、高性能,实际上不可能扫除的型式。152 这解决了中国大批库存濒临汰除的水雷问题。其成效就是「聪明」或「智能型」水雷,更能抵抗水雷反制外,亦可具选择特定舰型目标。153 其中一个重要的研究方向就是数字引信,154 这是使用神经网络作为强化抗扫性的一种方法。155 在710研究所及海军工程大学的研究员研讨改良水雷引信压力感应的方法。156 其他研究包含侦测舰艇弱磁场的改良方法。157 中国的M型系留雷系列就展示了这个开发过程:早期在1960年代的最先两种旧式雷,据推测是因容易扫除而不再使用,而M-4A及-B型在1980年代升级时引进了更新、更精密的引信。改良后的引信造就了更加强大的沉底雷。使用这种方法,搭配其他措施,解放军持续与时俱进,抗衡外国更加精密的水雷反制作为。158如解放军报所报导:

     实测不仅要验证对目标的射击,同样仰赖它们收集到大量的科学研究资料。新型水雷的设计最终阶段的测试中,施放后的水雷并没有如默认目标作动,且其测量及记录相关的「黑盒子」也无所获。然而使用同样接口的目标射距测量仪具却清楚地记录了各种数据。从目标射距的科学分析可得知水雷的「脑」在电子系统的设计上有瑕疵。因此目标射距分析数据将让此水雷「脱胎换骨」。一年后,此高效能智能型水雷在评估后已达标准。159

从空中布雷亦是一个日益重要的主题。举例来说,值得注意在2007年发行的有关水雷战教材发展的共同计划中,参与的五所大学其中两所就有附属的航天研究机构,分别是西北工业大学及北京航空航天大学。160 无人飞行器的研究所已进行水雷降落伞轨迹参数的研究。161太空科技也投入降落伞设计中。162 西北工业大学及中北大学的研究者已于近期发表数篇研究报告,以空投水雷撞击水后的影响为模型。163 某位中国专家已设计出精密的数学模型,可决定空中布雷的最佳参数。164 因此,如同其他研究领域,也已透过实测来决定最佳的施放方法:

    实测中与参与测试的研发机构及单位紧密的接洽及合作,使用了一系列的措施。经过努力后的新装备大型科学研究模型,是一个三维、研发、测试及运用的模型。某个空投鱼雷已具有完善,达世界先进等级的技术文献。但遗憾总有几个小零件容易勾到降落伞,在发生时,水雷就会直接落水并破裂。根据这个缺陷,参与实测的科学研究机构及工业机构共同合作解决了这个困难的问题。165

中国分析家细心地跟随美国海军发展的脚步,持续研究美军的弱点。166 广泛的中国水雷侦测研究中,167 包含青岛潜舰学院的概率论水雷反制决策研究168、海军工程大学的压力与水雷触发参数研究169等,都可适用于此领域上。令人不安的是海军分析中有些假设性研讨,考虑在水雷中使用战略性核子武器。例如在2007年的水雷战教材中就触及了上述议题。170 在论及俄国水雷战的某篇类似分析报告中就谈及了核子水雷可将敌核动力潜舰于2千米外距离击沉,而核子水雷亦可从7百米外距离将航空母舰或其他大型舰船摧毁。171 第二篇研究中发现核子弹药在逻辑上是个增加水雷破坏力的方式。172 而第三篇研究中则认为核能水雷战特别有望运用在未来深水反潜战中。其结论为「许多国家在此时正积极研究这类极强大的核能水雷」。173 在2006年7月的解放军海军期刊-「当代海军」中有篇文章,讨论解放军海军在水雷运用的未来发展,也提及到核子水雷的潜在性战斗价值。174 尚有其他证据显示相关的基础研究,像是某篇水下大爆炸的研究报告。175 这种武器除了违反1971年的海床公约外,也抵触了中国不先动武政策,并削弱其历史性的核子武器中央集权管控力量。虽无直接证据显示中国存有这样的海军战略核子武器计划,仍有必要紧密监控她是否有任何朝此方向发展的迹象。

中国的研发者显然进行破坏力较低,但更具作战潜力的航空器攻击水雷-特别是反直升机的水雷开发。176 某位中国分析师解释,直升机因其明显的优势,使其成为水雷反制的理想工具。然而文中更一步说明,在实施水雷反制时,直升机通常以8到25节飞行速度,并维持在80到100米的高度,这正提供了反直升机火箭上浮水雷的攻击机会。177 此型水雷会受直升机的音响特性触发。178 根据消息来源指出,「现已知710研究所已进入『火箭上浮导引飞弹水雷』研发的进阶阶段」179在2007年水雷战教材中也论及此型「导弹式水雷」,可以新方式攻击水面舰。180 此型水雷似乎比反直升机水雷更加复杂,且可能攻击水面舰艇及海上巡逻艇及其他飞行器。根据这个观念,飞弹透过水雷发射到空中,然后靠降落伞在空中保持位置直到可锁定目标。作者宣称此型先进水雷尚未进入到工程研发阶段,但解放军「仍坚定执行此型水雷的计划…因此问题就在于什么时候会开发成功了」。181

关于这些计划,值得注意的是在2002年中国海军百科全书中,已描绘出上述两种对空水雷观念图。182 另一个潜在的水雷战发明,则是据报中国正研发「火箭助投水雷」,希望在380公里的距离外,在大约几小时内将此种水雷布署到敌港外。183 综合上述观点,这些论调实质上暗示着中国目前已走在水雷科技发展的尖端。

 

水雷布放载台

中国能藉由水面舰、潜舰、飞机及改装的民商船或渔船布放水雷。解放军已经使用过上述载台实施布放演练。184

 

水面舰

解放军的许多水面舰艇都配有布雷的装备,包含四艘现代级驱逐舰(可配载最多40枚水雷)、12艘旅大级驱逐舰(38枚水雷),及约27艘的江湖级护卫舰(最多6枚水雷)。中国并不使用其最先进的江凯II级护卫舰,或旅洋II/旅洲级驱逐舰实施布雷。而她们似乎确未配有执行此类任务的装备。解放军中数百艘「汰除」、老旧及小型炮舰(例如上海级及海南级)、扫雷舰及鱼雷舰等,每艘都能携带并布放少量水雷。解放军的专用水雷舰(舷号814)据报导能携带最多300枚水雷。185 使用水面舰布雷的优点在于她们的携行量大、人员受过训练及指挥管制上较单纯等。缺点则是缺乏隐匿、速度受限及易受攻击等。186

 

照片4. 施放训练用沉底雷。如同照片中的沉底雷操演的环境因素一样,施放水雷的条件包含了吊架、合适的甲板空间、全球定位系统及海象等条件。

 

舰型

载台型式

水雷携行量

现存量

备考

海岸扫雷舰

082型

水面舰艇

10枚 M-1型或8枚 C 1000型

2艘

布雷轨道

舰队扫雷舰5、10型 (T43)

水面舰艇

10枚 M-1型或8枚 C 1000型

37艘

布雷轨道

海珠级驱潜艇

037 I型

水面舰艇

12 枚M-1型或C 500型

2艘

布雷轨道

沪新级驱潜艇

037型

水面舰艇

12 枚M-1型或8枚 C 1000型

?

布雷轨道

黄河级(Huanghe)登陆舰037型

水面舰艇

60枚 M-1型或51枚 C 1000型

?

布雷轨道

江湖级 1 型

053-H 型号

水面舰艇

最多60枚

12艘

布雷轨道

江湖级2 型

053-HI型号

水面舰艇

最多60枚

7艘

布雷轨道

江湖级3 型

053-HG型号

水面舰艇

最多60枚

3艘

江湖级5 型

053-H II型号

水面舰艇

最多60枚

3艘

布雷轨道

旅大级 1型 051型号

水面舰艇

38枚

10艘

布雷轨道

旅大级2型

水面舰艇

12枚 M-1型或20枚 C 1000型

4艘

旅海级 167

水面舰艇

18枚M-1型或30枚 C 1000型

2艘

旅沪级112、113

水面舰艇

18枚M-1型或30枚C 1000型

2艘

海巡艇037 IS型

水面舰艇

12 枚M-1型或C 500型

2艘

?

汕头级炮艇

101型

水面舰艇

8 枚M-1型或6枚 C 1000型

?

布雷轨道

现代级导弹驱逐舰

水面舰艇

24枚M-1型或40 C 1000型

2艘

布雷轨道

 

舰型

载台型式

水雷携行量

现存量

备考

沃雷级布雷舰

水面舰艇

200 枚M型

1艘

布雷轨道

G级潜舰

潜舰

40枚

1艘

汉级核潜舰

潜舰

28枚

4艘

基洛级636型

潜舰

24 枚AM-1型

10艘

基洛级877型

潜舰

24 枚AM-1型

2艘

明级潜舰035型

潜舰

28–32枚

11艘

明级潜舰(改良型)035 G型

潜舰

28–32枚

8艘

R级潜舰SS33型

潜舰

28枚

8艘

商级核潜舰

潜舰

28 枚(?)

2艘

携行量应类似汉级

宋级潜舰

潜舰

24–30枚

13艘

携行量应类似基洛级

元级潜舰

潜舰

24–30枚

3艘 (持续建造中)

携行量应类似基洛级

H-6 轰6轰炸机

飞机

最多到18枚(?)

估算可能为100架

JH-7/7A 战斗轰炸机

飞机

最多到12枚 250公斤等重型式(?)

估算可能为100架

 

表 2. 解放军海军布雷载台一览表。

来源包含:海林「岛内军事利物利载防务专家预测」页次17、18;詹氏年鉴战斗舰艇数据库,参考网址www.janes.com 及Sinodefense.com。

 

潜舰

中国海军战略家似乎相当看重潜舰布雷。例如某位分析家表示「在两次世界大战中,所有国家的潜舰兵力都进行了潜舰布雷,而且成效显然相当卓越」。187 该分析家进一步说明「在敌方控制下的海域及防卫区内作业的潜舰能够实施攻势布雷,进而制造奇袭及长期威慑的效果」。18 解放军的所有潜舰都能够携带水雷,包含约20艘的汰除及噪音大的R级潜舰也能携带28枚水雷。而约为19艘型式类似,但更新、更安静的明级潜舰可携带最大量到32枚水雷;约10到12艘现代化宋级潜舰则可携带到约30枚水雷。中国拥有的12艘基洛级潜舰能够携带24枚水雷。目前3艘或以上数量的新型元级潜舰可携带约最多30枚潜舰,剩余的四艘核动力汉级潜舰携行量为28枚。189

据说解放军潜舰使用的感应水雷沉-1、-2、-3及-6型,适合部署在近港口外海。T-5型自走雷则适合布于港外海域及港口航道上。而俄制PMK-1型及中国制的锚-5型火箭上升水雷适用于港外,水深可高达15公里范围内。190 如下图所示,改良的PMK-2型水雷也加入潜用水雷系列。潜艇外挂布雷舱:是一种外挂式的舱间,设计于携带并施放大量水雷,能装挂于潜舰上。据某消息来源表示「过去几年来,相关的解放军专家均明确地表示出对于潜艇外挂布雷舱的兴趣…解放军很有可能已发展出潜艇外挂布雷舱」。191

 

照片 5.潜舰水雷:正在装载PMK-2推进水雷到宋级柴油潜舰上,摄于青岛。

 

经过系统化分析各种布雷载台的优缺点后,中国分析家们的结论看来,特别在长距离上,潜舰布雷是攻势水雷的最佳方式。利用潜舰布雷的优点包含了她们的隐匿性、精确布雷的能力,以及她们穿越困难目标的能力(可能是透过自走水雷来达成)。另外应注意的是,潜舰布雷的高准确率及成效能以较少量的水雷来达到(其他方式)一样的效果。192根据一则分析报告指出「空中及海上兵力对于潜舰(活动)的限制相对较小,所以进入敌后布雷比较容易」。193 而根据另一篇报告,此载台(潜舰)「具有最高的隐匿性及奇袭能力…因为潜舰停在距港口外10-15公里、水深约40米处,就能发射一枚有战力的自走雷并突破该港」。194 由中国国防大学学者所著作的「战役理论学习指南」中,设想使用潜舰并利用「水雷的定时功能及隐匿的手段,将水雷布署在敌主要港口及重要航道。它们将在进行封锁后开始发挥作用…可在进行封锁约10天前开始实施(布雷)…1-2天前较合适」。并可在敌反潜兵力遭遇恶劣天候,或在离开警戒区域的空隙时,暗中进行水雷补放。195

潜舰布雷的缺点包含雷管弹药有限、运送速度较慢、代价较高(此型水雷需以鱼雷或巡弋飞弹的成本考虑)。另一个缺点与水面舰相同,就是敌人监测舰艇大举出港的能力。一份近期的中国分析报告宣称中国的潜舰布雷操演量及复杂度都在上升。196此主题稍后详述。

 

飞机

北京拥有超过百架轰-6轰炸机,即使其中有因太多任务而需汰除,但每架都可以携载12到18枚500公斤水雷。197 虽无法得知轰-6机是否会被赋予这样的任务,但近期此机型常被用于许多布雷操演中。198 中国数量有限的轰-5轰炸机也可能扮演对台湾进行布雷的角色。中国超过百架的JH-7/7A战斗轰炸机,每架都可携载最多到20枚250公斤炸弹。199 根据解放军海军称,此型机可在「近海」执行布雷,意指第一岛链,也就是从日本岛屿经台湾到菲律宾。200 这些机型以及其他机型都可轻易地携带水雷,其不外乎是将重力炸弹装上磁感应或其他引信。201 根据某消息来源指出「解放军目前沉-1到沉-6型感应水雷,及锚-1到锚-5型系留雷的备储量适用于飞机布雷」。202 在这个类别中,亦可以加进精密的PMK-2型水雷。空中布雷的优点,如同美国军队从1944年就了解到,就是可以快速地施放大量水雷并设立雷区。主要的缺点则是需先建立空优的难度,以及使用现代化战机执行布雷任务的机会成本。

虽然较早的分析家曾检视中国利用水面舰及潜舰布雷的能力,但没有分析家认真地考虑中国是否会透过飞机来布雷。自解放军海军在1949年4月起成立了一支布雷轰炸机分队起,空中布雷就已享有其专属的作业载台。203中国的某份主要海事期刊中,详细地解析美国如何在二次大战时使用空投水雷加速日本的战败,并在之后以相同手段瘫痪北越的运输。204 某位解放军空军指挥学院的教授,在中国最具声望的军事刊物-「中国军事科学」中发表的一篇文章,对于空中布雷的价值也提出类似的论点。205 几篇中国技术论文中,非常细腻地论述实际飞机布雷较艰涩难懂的面向。206 在一场解放军海军航空能力的讨论中,北海舰队的副军团司令员朱光宏(英译:Zhu Guanghong)在最近指出「海军军机具极低高度飞行的优越能力。他们能够执行…港口布雷任务」。207  一支北海舰队航空部队的舰载机部队甚至因「首次直升机使用操雷打声靶」而得到「创造解放军空中反潜历史」美誉的表扬。208 Gidropribor.com网站及詹氏年鉴目前讨论了从飞机布放中国及俄国类似水雷的内容。209 在近期中国海军刊物中有一篇相当详细的文章,讨论中国水雷库储中,哪些可用于空中布雷。210 最后,战役理论学习指南主张「从空中集中布雷」,特别是在「潜舰难以潜入的区域」。211 它认定「布雷封锁兵力」通常包含「海军及空军轰炸航空部队」。212 很清楚可知,中国掌握着空布水雷战的效用,且正在思索如何将它具体地运用在作战中。

 

民间船舶

在上述强大的能力上锦上添花的是可强征使用的数千艘中国渔船及商船。2003年,烟台警备区副司令员荣森芝在一篇军事科学学院附属刊物中,主张使用民船进行扫布雷作业。213 中国2008年国防白皮书中将「扫雷及猎雷」列为解放军海军四大后备部队之一。214根据一篇文章指出「中国目前有3万艘铁壳机械拖渔船(每艘可携载10枚水雷),以及5万艘渔帆船(每艘可携载2到5枚水雷)」。215 「战争科学(Science of Campaigns 2006年)」中就相当明确地指出这一点:「布雷任务通常指派具相对良好隐匿性的潜舰及航空部队执行,但民间船只也可以执行…布雷任务」。216 中国的文章中经常提到将民用运输船纳入例如水雷战之类的军事用途中。217 一篇2005年的文章中用照片描述在许多解放军海军基地内,经常举行的大型「民兵」操演中,使用渔船作为布雷艇。218

 

照片 6. 民兵(船)布雷。两艘在中国海上常见的民间渔船正在施放水雷,这是2004年12月解放军三亚基地的大型「民兵」操演的一部分。此类操演定期的在不同的解放军海军基地实施。在中国港口的周围建立守势雷区时,将使用全球定位系统协助准确布雷,即使是民兵也能实施。

 

某中国消息来源指出「约100-200吨位间的渔船」适用实施水雷战,因为他们符合数量充足、「小型目标」、机动性及掩护性佳等特征。219 此大小之渔船可轻易作业于整个东亚沿海区域,亦可涵盖整个台湾的周遭海域。只需要「稍微改装」就能够「安装简易的布雷装备…且渔民非常熟悉海域」,因此能够善用「地形、海势及天黑」等优点。220 另一中国消息来源则认为「解放军已经有效地组织,并指挥机动拖渔船,在战时能架设布雷轨道,并利用绝佳的伪装实施水雷作战」。此消息来源的结论是「这种非传统型式的水雷布放载台,虽然布放数量不多,但在派出大量船只或再补雷时,仍可建立一个广大的雷区」。221 或许在看到这位中国出色的海军策略家-解放军海军军事学术研究所的李杰大校,近期于2008年5月时解放军赞助的期刊「中国民兵」中所发表的「水下武器的新发展」之主题论文时无需太过讶异。222 此外,(中国)于法律基础上也已经建立战时动员民船之依据,包含1995年所公布的国防运输法,及1997年的中华人民共和国国防法等。此项立法措施根据解放军海军条款,显然已于2003年时就再次修订了。223水雷战因此能够支持终极的「海上人民战争」。224 中国也因此具备所有实施侵略性水雷作战的实际需求要素,包含持续改良的大量水雷存量、充足的布雷载台等等条件。但这并非事物全貌,毕竟硬件若无人员及经验因素也是枉然,而此条件只能透过训练及操演来加强。

 

中国越发拟真的水雷作战操演

解放军支持操演内容涵盖水雷。225 解放军海军专家柯尔教授(Bernard Cole)注意到解放军不像其他国家,中国水面舰艇年年都实施布雷演练,但无法确定其操演实际的规模。 226 近期公开的数据显示解放军实际上正积极地扩大此类操演,并让此类操演逼近真实状况。227 中国近期的水雷操演更纳入潜舰、空中、水面等兵力,甚至民船等载台。此类操演详细地记录在解放军的海军官方报纸-人民海军报中。

中国海军认为潜舰布雷为「潜舰作战最基本的要求」。228 布雷已成为近期加强的中国潜舰兵力训练的一环229,官兵们努力进行的训练具多样化且益发复杂,并与当地环境、水文地理及天气状况相结合。230 在中国海军的观念中,认为潜舰布放水雷是未来水雷封锁作战的关键。231 2002年时,水雷布放已成为最普遍的解放军潜舰战斗手段之一,并让官兵透过训练操控载有大量水雷的潜舰。232 操演的变化中,包含了「隐匿行踪并于深水中布雷」233并配合鱼雷发射等类型作战。234 对抗港口目标的纵深布雷也是重点235,以假设突破敌人防卫为先决条件。236

解放军海军官员认同「突破敌人的反潜兵力及敌后布雷」的固有难度。根据某位舰长的说法「隐密地潜入敌人布署的联合机动数组,是完成布雷任务的先决条件」。237 某些证据显示,中国可能对执行攻势布雷的潜舰采取集中管控。一位中国分析家指出,在执行攻势水雷封锁中,「大部分的潜舰兵力主要以单舰、独立作战模式,若有一个陆岸潜舰指挥所来执行潜舰整体航向的指挥及导引,则不仅将确保其隐匿性,并可改善…所布的水雷之攻击效率」。238

中国海军正努力加强其潜舰官兵的本质,包含他们对于水雷作战的熟练度。青岛潜舰学院的指参学官密集地学习布雷。239 潜舰队已演练「高难度的新战略,例如于极深水中布雷」,240 并藉由如「大深度隐匿布雷战法」241等技术持续破新深度纪录。中国官方电台宣称解放军潜舰特遣队的鱼水雷官赵忠义(英译:Chao Chunyi)在水下布雷训练中达成了16项研究成果、将水雷搭载时间减半、并开发出水雷移动控制装置。242宋级潜舰314号舰长马立新是中国海军官媒的名人,近期带领一支东海舰队潜舰特遣队「发展革新战略」。马立新在前年已研究并开发出超过10项新战法,「包含如何执行封锁,以及如何使用传统潜舰布雷」。在2005年初,马立新「带领他的部队参与海上实操…他(们)抵达预定区域…(布放)水雷」。243 2005年初的水雷操演中,马立新负责回避「敌」反潜机、雷区,以及最困难的-敌潜舰,以遂行近海区域布雷的任务。他成功掌握当地环境、使用最低杂音航行速度、避开「敌」潜舰及岸基雷达,在规定时间内完成了布雷任务。244在潜舰上安全地处理水雷,很自然地成为青岛潜舰学院一个重要的研究领域。245 另有研究报告讨论现代潜舰中常见的「舰首鱼雷管布放水雷」等安全议题。246 目前为止在某些极有意思的文章当中,某篇详细地记录2006年3月12日,似乎南海舰队的某艘「新型潜艇」透过潜射机动水雷(SLMM)实施了「水雷试射」。虽然这是此型潜舰的初次测试,可容许一些犯错空间,但根据报导试射成效相当地准确。247

中国空中兵力透过益增频繁、规模及多样化等方式实施水雷作战。1997年美国国防部的解放军发展报告中提到,中国的军机实施空投水雷。248 东海及南海舰队航空军团的训练计划已于近期内涵盖了布雷249战法,包含采用不同的机种250,以及敌空中封锁等手段。251 在2002年8月的一次南海舰队操演中,演练了「真实」状况下对抗敌军,并于不熟悉的地点使用轰炸机投放水雷。此操演所包含的战斗机群由3架轰炸机分队、1架电子干扰机及护卫战斗机等组成。使用电战机干扰敌方雷达,当战斗机群采最低飞行高度战法时,快速投放数十枚水雷及鱼雷。252 另一篇很有可能针对相同操演的报导中指出,「红军」轰炸机于中国南海域执行布雷任务时,遭「蓝军」战斗机拦截及攻击。253从2006年3月起,南海舰队轰炸机军团便开始演练「远海布雷封锁」。254 在2006年6月6日,作为「复杂气象条件下远海岛礁导弹打击模拟演练」的一部分,一支南海舰队海军航空部队实施「海上布雷」。其飞行员也受过「雾天远海布雷」训练。255 同样于2006年时,一支南海舰队海军航空部队演练「雨天海上布雷」。256 在2008年8月下旬,4架近期翻新的南海舰队航空战斗机模拟「在复杂的电磁环境下」,及不同的天气应变时「于港口及航道实施攻势布雷」。257 在2009年1月初,根据军事训练及评估新纲要,一支东海舰队轰-6轰炸机部队「实施新战法训练:突破远海深层防御,并完成低空攻势布雷任务」。该部队「探索出一些新的战法,例如…夜间大机群攻势布雷」。258同年(2009年) CCTV-7 台报导解放军海军航空部队的「水上飞机能够执行…布雷」。259

解放军布雷手段中有一个令人不安的因素,就是利用民间协助来补强军事资产的概念。在过去几年,每个海军基地都将民兵单位(视为「未来海战的重要兵力」组成)编入训练装备、管理、运用及保安部队运用,给予经验并发展新战法,「以完成任务上的需求」。 中国的2008年国防白皮书中,明确地提出后备部队有可能用于水雷战中(包含布雷及扫雷)。260 在某次使用民船的东海舰队操演中,其中一项重点是清除不同种类的水雷。261 某本中国海事期刊可能披露了第一张于水雷战中使用民船的照片。在2004年12月,三亚海军民兵的紧急维修及布雷特遣队262 动员了6艘民船,执行了一项包含(在许多活动外)侦搜、「渔船布雷」、及战斗中军舰不靠港而于海上补给等操演项目。263解放军于2005年9月264设立在浙江省宁波的第一个后备扫雷支队,在2006年7月初时在东中国海执行了一个月的训练。在紧急征召命令下达后,两百位海军后备军士官兵在半日内就整备了16艘征用渔船。由两位主要军官领军训练了七个项目,包含「指挥所转移」、「防空疏散」、「扫雷」、及「反特种作战」等。透过东海舰队党委员会协调,此实验性质的操演由不同的当地组织支持,并征召「当地渔民中的后备士官兵及退伍军人」。并在经济现实下给予补助:「一艘高马力渔船绑在码头一天要几千块人民币(约几百元美金) 」。少一次出海捕鱼损失的价值超过10万人民币($12,500美元)。265 在2006年后期,蓬莱市(山东省)透过渔业协会及公司,成立了布雷民兵战斗特遣队。这是根据解放军总参谋部「关于调整民兵组织的意见」。266 在2007年3月,某东海舰队扫雷部队与加装扫雷装置的渔船,共同执行了联合水雷反制作战操演。267 循此步调,在2008年12月时,一个海军后备支队演练在困难状况下快速布雷的操演项目。268

另一项报告中详列出远港水雷移载时的装备需求(例如:吊架),这是假设在军事冲突时,主要军港可能因敌精准导引弹药攻击而无法使用。269在许多刊物中都提及此训练要务,例如「无码头」操演。根据「人民海军」报导,2006年8月15日,某北海舰队潜舰队开始使用新开发的「潜艇装雷浮筏专用车」。此型机动(可能用拖的)载具可将水雷载入到鱼雷管中,拥有强大的储放及吊载能力。相信它被改良了加载速度达六倍,并加强隐匿性,可与潜舰在离标准码头位置外的沿海区域会合。270

水雷仓库官员也在近期实施了突发性操演。271 某南海舰队鱼水雷仓库下达新的任务,实施「四种变革」以改善高速、长程机雷的运输。272 某东海舰队鱼水雷仓库执行了独立、机动全天候操演,其目标在于遭空袭时仍能确保水雷的高速运输。官员们协助发展合适的侦测系统及测试仪具。他们利用地势、天气及夜间来实施伪装。273 某北海舰队后勤支持基地成立了一支潜舰水雷的「技术服务团队」,专精于「无船坞时当地紧急加油」。274在2006年3月16日,某北海舰队鱼水雷仓库的「新号手」们进行了「夜间鱼雷应急保障训练」,显示此单位的这项作业在实际状况中属于常态。2006年11月下旬,某行政官员报告,广州支持基地(南海舰队)从基地外超过5百公里的某个「临时补给阵地」实施了水雷机动紧急再补给。275 海军工程大学已于近期提供,改善水雷管理、技术支持及备料等相当大的帮助。276

水雷战是水面舰队的主要任务。解放军海军已加强提升速度、277自动化及电子化278、及「全天候」布雷能力。279 江湖级护卫舰已执行过布雷任务,作为其反潜战训练的一部分。280 扫雷舰的舰长们在旅顺海军基地的特训中心接受训练。281 扫雷单位已于近期演练布放不同型式的系留雷及深水沉底雷作为快节奏、对抗操演中的一环。某个南海舰队扫雷部队已于近期参与超过10次类似的操演,并于操演中「取得了26项科学研究成果」。这是为了与「新全球军事革命」并肩同行,当中包含「网络集中训练」及「水雷的思维」。 282 的确,解放军很明显地视装载「鱼雷」(机动)水雷的扫雷舰为一个可行的反潜载台。此想法亦勾勒出「旧装备 + 网络 + 才能」的潜力,并可「完全说服」那些相信「不可能以旧装备配置载台执行信息化操演」的人。283 在2002年,北海舰队下辖813及811扫雷舰的某部队,并用「国产及外国鱼雷水雷」并在「百分百成功率」下攻击了潜舰。284中国的三大舰队更于近期使用了疑似先进机动水雷施训。在2005年12月北海舰队官兵被拍到吊起「新型水雷」,很有可能要配载到潜舰上。285 此水雷类似美国的Mark 25 Mod 2型水雷,反映出美国及俄国科技对解放军水雷发展的影响。286

 

照片 7. 水雷仓库内含实弹及训雷。在图片左侧的98枚水雷的条纹显示为训练弹,可支持高强度的操演。在右侧数量相仿的水雷固定的颜色显示为实弹。

 

照片8. 解放军扫雷舰。

 

中国水雷战仍留有相当的改进空间。水雷操演中有时依然会发生故障。287 装备支持教材有时只有外国语文(例如俄文),而且需透过翻译或研析。288 而政治工作也消耗了一些时间,尽管比起以往可能较少。289 但很明显地对于解放军模拟真实战斗状况的操演政策仍有些阻力。290 甚至在水雷战操演中有证据显示,解放军持续经历转移到现代化、专业化组织时的挑战。291 但解放军海军的领导人清楚地了解,硬件的进步在没有相关的人力改善下是不完整的。292 解放军海军官员决心要改善水雷作战能力293,设计新训练方式294,并练习更有弹性的程序。295 在2001年初,南海舰队814号扫雷舰改变了其未任命官员的职前准备方式,藉由「不同阶级及水平的训练」,配合先前的经验,避免不必要的重复训练。296 扫雷舰852号则透过竞争及考试来改进官兵评比。297在2005年4月底,某解放军的扫雷舰设定了「未来作战环境的训练」,在「不熟悉的海域」的全天候状况下,演练了扫雷及布雷。298

某些单位因训练的革新而受到奖励。某南海舰队扫雷舰单位「旗舰」,舷号809就连续达成解放军海军楷模而受奖。299 该单位建立了「带领小部队的夜间训练」以增加训练挑战。该单位的官员使用全球定位系统、雷达及手持式定位系统(包含罗盘及六分仪)等,在不熟悉的海域下抵达了指定地点的2米内。300 利用多种航海系统(装备),似乎是应用战斗时任一系统无法使用时的手段。在2000年,为了因应现代化高科技战争,809号扫雷舰设立了「战争及训练方式讨论小组」,此小组研习电子干扰反制、高性能敌水雷、视距外飞弹攻击、假想敌的观念,以及现有及未来中国装备的使用等。从2001年起,809号扫雷舰已经发展出12种「抗电子干扰」、抵抗先进敌水雷及视距外飞弹攻击的新战法。301 在2003年,「人民海军」报导809号舰已执行了解放军的初次实布实扫水雷操演,包含对抗敌军部队及非战时等状况,扫除了比其他解放军舰更多的水雷。到了2003年,809号扫雷舰已常规性并成功地于日夜间、各种天候下扫除了各型式的水雷,可在许多不确定及真实状况下当机立策。302 根据媒体报导,另一艘同样出色的扫雷舰- 804号舰;该舰已有与被称为「新型扫雷装置」的遥控猎雷水下无人载具操演的经验,似乎配有精密、高频、主动数位声纳。303

解放军科学家也对水雷战操演中,使用新仿真系统进行了可能性评估。304在2006年,某东海舰队扫雷支队颁发出色的单位及个人奖励金。305解放军海军专家已发表数篇学术报告,并参与外国水雷反制操演。(例如2007年的新加坡)306

 

照片9. 解放军804号反水雷舰。为中国最现代化的反水雷舰艇之一,此舰曾使用遥控猎雷水下无人载具进行操演,并配有精密、高频、主动数位声纳。

 

依上述的扫雷舰作业可以了解,有战力的水雷战需要有效的水雷反制。特别是中国在水雷反制科技上仍落后西方国家,研究者仍在研析先前西方国家的(反制)手段,包含水下火箭炸弹(RBUs)等。307 解放军知道这个缺点并因应整备。308 因此虽然海军底下有才能的反水雷/水雷战年轻军官可能无法潜舰(官员)的战力相比,但他们也同样受到栽培。309基于未来战争中不可避免受损的前提之下,解放军在紧急应变上做缜密的安排。310 或许这就是官兵接受不同的武器系统训练,并让副舰长练习舰长职务的原因。311 在2005年4月10日一场北海舰队反潜操演中,据报导有一组「水雷小组」,演练从「潜猎舰」上发射火箭及深水炸弹。312 在一场2005年6月东海舰队扫雷舰数组操演的描述中,分析家援用中国的越南扫雷经验强调,『扫雷舰被认为是海战中的「敢死队」;它的角色极重要』。313 水雷在解放军海军的相对新领域-红蓝军对抗训练中,正扮演着逐渐重要的角色。在2002年中国南海,某「水下护卫艇」对抗反潜舰、飞机及一场水下雷区封锁。该艇在发射「一种新中国制鱼雷」后成功逃脱。314

某些操演中假设『「敌舰艇」已在特定海域布下水雷,以封锁我战舰通行』。315 水雷反制及水雷战舰艇角色上似乎可互相交换,因此解放军的扫雷舰亦经常演练布雷。316扫雷舰训练已于近期纳入「白天深水扫雷」、「夜间扫雷」及单一船团「通过复合式雷区」等项目。317

 

照片10. 反潜舰上的操控台。这部操控台很可能来自804号反水雷舰,具有游戏杆及遥控观测摄影机的功能。它可观察来自猎雷无人载具所回传的影像。

 

解放军水雷战准则的初步构想

综合中国水雷战的历史发展、目前的能力及先前所述的各项训练作为,可藉此勾绘出当代解放军海军水雷战准则大致上的轮廓。中国的水雷战/反水雷期刊「水雷战与舰船防护」,可能作为宣传此准则的平台。318 这类专业刊物的存在本身就暗示了对于此型战争专业的某种决策。此段之后的准则大纲只是从朦胧难解的中国军事计划(包含水雷战)中描绘出其大致样貌。下列13点是从许多中国水雷战论文中撷取出来,具重复出现性质的句子,在其节录出的论文中被认为具有主要策略及战略性等重要性质。319

1.「易布难扫」。 这个简单的攻势布雷优点公式,普遍地使用于中国水雷战著作中。反映出一个强大的信念,基于历史性分析及海军战争的趋势,中国水雷战的发展已远超越水雷反制发展,并将持续下去。320这是中国水雷战中的核心驱动原则,但此原则也同时建立在认定了美国海军水雷反制上的弱点。但美国海军在水雷反制技术上仍优于解放军,而且水雷反制在各国海军中仍属困难,及资源集中的基本立场并不会改变。

2. 「不惹人注意」。水雷战及水雷反制是现代海军战争中最不精彩的部分。向舷外抛下水雷很难与从航空母舰发射战斗机的兴奋度相比。而且其载台舰艇通常不引起人们的注意。全世界的海军中,水雷战事业亦是较少人选择的道路。除此之外,这些武器基于其易隐匿性,本质上难以监控;中国海军战略家意识到其独特性,并巧妙地利用这些对于水雷战的世俗观念,投注于它们强大的攻击能力将难受到反制,因此可善加运用在战争中。321 也不像发展航空母舰,其间最明显的差异在于,发展水雷并不与中国宣称的「和平发展」策略相冲突,或是引发假想敌(例如日本)间的军武竞赛。

3.「四两可拨千斤」。这个中国水雷战分析中常用的说法可反映出水雷战的不对称特性。322 这个谚语也暗示,水雷战能够造成的战略性影响远大于敌人实际上的战斗损失。323 某中国海军分析家认为,水雷战可造成敌人的「巨大心理压力」。324 此结论呼应美国海军的观念:「(水雷是)高效率的心理武器,怀疑水雷的存在,通常将可能造成港口或运输航道管制,搅乱战斗计划,或迫使人员、武器及补给采取其他路线」。325 同此观点,「战争科学」中讨论利用「假布雷」手段混淆敌人,造成敌人浪费其有限的水雷反制资源。326

4.「控在一定时间一定海域」。解放军的海军领导者了解,他们无法在绝对制海权上以对称作战方式挑战美国海军。某位南京海军指参学院学者在中国军事科学中发表的一篇2005年的文章中指出,中国对「制海权」观念上与美国的差异:「在中国的军事圈中,海权的掌控代表冲突中的一方,在一定的时间内对一定海域有控制权」。327 美国海军寻求对于海域的完全掌控;解放军海军的观念则较为狭窄。水雷战在这种策略上,依据其阻碍敌人势力的巨大潜能,并将敌人导入到特定海域的能力,逻辑上可扮演一个决策性角色。

5.「巨大数量」。 巨大的水雷数量提供解放军许多作战上的可能性,特别是相对老旧的水雷若摆在对的位置时,仍可能造成的巨大心理战因素。依先前引用的解放军海军战略家对于波湾战争的分析指出,布雷数量(1,100枚)相对低的状况下,限制了伊拉克的水雷战果。328 记住这个分析也引起了对于开发「水雷高载舰艇」的注意。329 再者,我们已在之前引用了某篇中国的报告,讨论潜艇外挂布雷舱。330中国对于1945年美国以水雷封锁日本的某篇分析结论,认为「大量的水雷」是关键因素。331 目前封锁台湾所需的水雷数量估计为7千到1万4千枚间,332 相对低于解放军海军的水雷存量总数。「战争科学」强调拥有足够水雷数量的重要性,因此在「联合封锁战争」时,才可储有充足的数量对于雷区再补给。333

6.「先制」。「先发制人」的观念遍布在解放军的准则中,特别是与水雷战相关的部分。这个说法经常出现在中国的水雷战文章中,暗示(中国)强烈的先发制人倾向。秘密布雷有造成奇袭的优势。根据「舰船知识」中的一篇文章,『水雷已成为「第一步控制」…战斗的重要因素』。334 在该期刊中的另一篇文章则认为,「改装后的民船特别适合在敌人了解到我战略意图前,实施攻势布雷作战」。335 中国水雷专家傅金祝在评估台湾水雷战时,便赤裸裸地暗示先制的议题,他宣称「既然已知台湾的布雷能力,就应该能够轻易地扫除」。336而「舰船知识」的另一篇2005年的文章中,则更直接地暗示:「如果布雷无法快速的实施,则在战争爆发之前将可能无法完成水雷战任务」。337

7.「高低技术」。解放军的海军论文中经常提到水雷战的成本效益性质。某张在2004年「舰船知识」文章中的图,将伊拉克在波湾战争中使用的水雷成本(1千5百元到1万元美金)与受雷损的美军舰艇修复成本(高达9千6百万元美金)相列。338同样重要的是2004年中「人民海军」的论述,「中国并非伊拉克…她具有先进的水雷」。339 如前所述,中国已获得也开始生产世界上最先进且致命的水雷。综合运用这种高低技术后,水雷战将让任何假想敌在水雷反制上更加复杂并棘手。340 解放军寻求透过引信改装,并将最先进的水雷用于最困难的任务等方式,来最大化其水雷战能力。

8.「潜载雷为隐蔽,空载雷为多快」。 中国战略家已细心地考虑到,不同布雷载台相对的优势。他们对于波湾战争中伊拉克水雷战的分析强调,水面舰艇实施布雷所面临的弱势。341就潜舰无可比拟的隐匿性而言,潜舰布放被认为是水雷打击硬件目标,例如港口及基地等的最理想方式。342 「潜舰最出名的特色就是其高度隐匿性,可确保(潜舰布放的)雷区比起由飞机或水面舰投放的(雷区)对敌人来说更加的危险。」343 本文先前提及潜舰水雷战需要高水平的训练。虽然潜舰能够相当精确布放水雷,然而其承载量并不大,且出动率低。相对之下,飞机能以更大的速度及效率投放水雷,也可到达潜舰无法进入的浅水区。344 中国分析家也了解,布放特定型式水雷在特定位置功效上的影响因素。345 大连海军学院专家举例这些因素,有「水深、海床地质、海床形式、潮、流、风、波浪、海水能见度、水温、海水盐分、海洋生物、噪音、地震(及)磁暴等」。346

9.「军民联合」。中国的历史分析从二次世界大战到波湾战争中,找到许多战时使用民船执行水雷战及水雷反制的例子。中国分析家更举出国共内战期间实际使用民船清除河道水雷的例子。347 根据2004年在「当代海军」中的一篇文章,「组织快速且有效的民船参与战争是海军战役中胜利的重要保证」。 接着说「中国沿岸(民用)船只现在有丰富的资源…(因此组成)巨大的海战兵力」。文中最后认为水雷/反水雷任务,应作为将民船改装升级做战斗用时的第一优先考虑。348 本文之前举出的演习操演说明了这些想法并非单纯理论。此外,水雷/反水雷中的军民结合与中国贯有的战略文化一致。349

10.「水下卫士」。 虽然中国不敢轻忽美国航空母舰,350但有证据显示解放军的海军战略家也同样或更重视美国核子潜舰。351 虽然解放军潜舰在与美军潜舰交锋时可能不占优势,但水雷战被视为具有对抗此威胁的潜在功效。352 即使海军民兵团的布雷也被视有同样能力,虽然其范围可能局限于沿海区域。353 中国分析家注意到俄国在冷战后期复兴水雷战领域,某种程度上是为了对抗美国核子潜舰。某篇中国反潜战研究解释新型水雷兴起于1980年代,是因为「更加符合现代反潜战的需求」。354 一篇中国对于俄国火箭水雷的详细分析的结论,「这型武器将快速攻击核子潜舰而对方无法实时反制,并且视为能有效对抗美国舰艇的单体船壳构造」。355 中国战略家提出「潜舰特别易受水雷伤害,因为被动声纳无法有效定位水雷,而且潜舰本身具非常有限的反水雷能力」。356 再者,水雷威胁出奇不意的效果可能降低潜舰反制作为的效果。357在2007年出版的中国水雷战教材中,重复地强调反潜战为一项任务,358并已经在红蓝军对抗操演中演练过。359 「战役理论学习指南」明确地要求「反潜雷区」的建立。360 如此一来,中国便可动用先进的俄国水雷,例如PMK-2水雷及中国制的其他型式水雷,就是特别针对美国潜舰而设计的。因此水雷便暗中给予解放军无法以其他形式获得的「穷人的」反潜能力,并作为北京在获得更坚强的反潜实力前的一个权宜之计。美国潜舰生存力极强,但敌方的战略家可以让其无法遂行任务(mission-kill),透过破坏潜舰也等于是消灭它了。361

11.「水雷管理的信息化」。信息技术的整合已成为当代中国军队改革的一个主要目标,此目标也适用于水雷作战。362 后勤管理作法是解放军从韩战起的一项优先事项,其影响特别的突出。中国海军分析家强调有效运送大量不同型式水雷的重要性。363 其他报告指出解放军海军特别重视水雷作战后勤,例如革新仓库领导者,364改善信息流365及后勤管理,366 定期从水雷库存中汰除废弃的武器,367训练军士官技术检查及部署整备等。368 中国认定后勤在水雷作战中的重要角色,在1994年海军后勤部的「海军后勤库储职业管理规定」中规定,从事水雷技术任何工作的干部及士官兵,包含库存管理、维修及处理废弃武器者都需受高等训练。369 解放军的海军弹药支持部(Ordnance Support Department)已公布实施进一步的规定,可让「一个水雷战备等级转换到另一个的时间减少」。370 从2008年起,对于某南海舰队水雷储库的电子「管家」来说,仅仅知道储库中的水雷确切存量已不符需求,他们应该能在不同的复杂状况下,设计出精心构思且详细的备援计划。事实上,由系统自动产生的精确备援计划,不仅能显示出弹药任何零件的特定规格,也可以告知需支持的地点的环境、天候、潮流等信息。371

 

照片11. 运用信息技术。中国技术员使用计算机,链接后方的训练用雷。计算机可大大增加水雷分配、放置及设定特色(例如启动延迟、舰船计数器及其他功能)的准确性,因而优化其功效。

 

据传某个青岛后勤基地「已与军队内外约20个学校、30个研究机构及40个装备生产工厂建立了良好的工作关系」,在信息化下支持实际训练,并且于解决装备开发及维持上取得了极大的进步。且因此『开发出「自动化水雷检查系统」及「海军舰艇装备自动化维保系统」…赢得了全海军的后勤装备技术模范第一级与第二级奖』。372解放军也已开发出「扫雷艇仿真训练系统」。373 在中国期刊「水雷战与舰船防护」中,许多文章展现强烈的中国信念,认为在武器无法可靠的工作下,水雷战无法达成效果。374

12.「布扫雷互相支持」。中国海军战略家了解,在水雷反制上中国传统的弱点,以及其所造成的漏洞。据观察「敌人将极容易…沿着中国东南沿海,沿着众多岛屿及港口,布下大量的水雷」。375 中国水雷反制在近期的未来,仍无法达到西方国家水雷反制的技术水准。虽然现在新的载台及技术已引进到中国的水雷反制范畴,但基本的手段很可能仍维持与西方国家的差异性。376 但先前所提到的操演例子确实显示出复兴水雷反制的决心,例如近几年(参考前文)解放军已接收了数艘新型扫雷舰。另外对于水雷反制研究,似乎也正进行中。377 这项研究包含运用先进的技术,例如直升机378及无人载具379执行水雷反制。「战争科学」观察,中国海军基地有可能成为敌人水雷攻击的目标。380 而水雷反制及水雷作战之间所存在的互补关系,似乎也成为了一个基本信仰,中国的水雷反制基本上将支持扎实的水雷作战。某篇人民海军的文章便替这个观念背书,将其能力视为「双面刃」。381 实际上,为了支持2005年3月到9月的扫雷及布雷操演,解放军「对于舰船执行扫雷及猎雷的整体作业上,进行系统化训练编组、观察并交换角色」。382 反映出他们在中国水雷作战的重要性,也征用了民船参与水雷反制的操演。383

13.「卫星航海」。知道水雷的确切地点,对于建立安全航道并维持安全通过雷区,以及未来扫雷或再布雷来说都是很重要的。过去的水雷作战有个很大的问题就是误袭友军。战时在通信或航行上的失误亦经常导致水雷作战舰艇破坏自己的舰艇。384 值得省思的是全球定位系统科技的问世,能够如何影响水雷战的未来功效,例如此项科技能够更加准确地布署雷区(或是降低实施水雷战的老手人力需求),或将这些雷区的参数透过信息传输给我方单位等。385 关于解放军报告中与全球定位系统相关的训练操演,包含夜间及恶劣天候的水雷战及水雷反制操演等,可能表示这项新科技能够成为水雷战的关键角色。386 某扫雷大队发展可以「提高准确度及扫布雷的作战能力的水雷内部记录仪」也可作为此论点的左证。387

 

照片 12. 扫雷操演。2008年5月时,解放军东海舰队反水雷舰的船员操作噪音器的拖体,此拖体用于扫除音响触发雷。水中的是标示浮标。甲板吊架的右边可见水雷轨道。

 

威胁及反应?西方对太平洋水雷反制作为的趋势分析

整份研究的重点为中国水雷战的能力、训练及准则等。但是完整的战略分析需配合其他面向检讨,也就是可能对抗中国水雷战威胁的水雷反制兵力。

当前局势看来,以美国的水雷反制兵力迅速打击中国水雷作战的前景并不乐观。大部分的美国海军水雷反制部队离战场较远。最近的反制部队为驻地在日本佐世保的两艘(不久后将增编为四艘)扫雷舰。他们离台湾只有一天半的航程。但即使他们抵达也无法稍微改变这不安的情况。美国海军的大部分猎雷部队,最近才将驻地从德州移至加州圣地亚哥基地。388 而可较快抵达战区的水雷反制直升机,若在争夺制空权的环境下作业,则将面临严重的威胁。389 如「战役理论学习指南」中倡导,战场指挥官「组织海上及空中机动兵力,并离岛及沿海火力发动多轮、多向攻击,以求绝对粉碎敌人扫雷及屏卫企图」。390

可以肯定的是,美国海军目前正处于水雷反制计划的历史上,最激进的过渡期中。这次的过渡期将在未来十年内,将所有专业美军反水雷舰艇除役,并以滨海战斗舰(LCS)取代。此型舰是透过「模块」工程的设计来强化战斗力,能力在于不同的作战任务套件(mission packages)下可接受不同的模块。滨海战斗舰的原型舰-自由号(LCS 1)于2008年11月服役,具备改良的「有机化」水雷定位及处理能力,配有先进的声纳系统,及可执行水雷定位任务的无人水下及水上载具。滨海战斗舰搭载配有空中雷射水雷侦雷系统的MH-60S直升机,可搜索水雷。在侦测后,可从专门直升机载机枪发射超空泡射弹(supercavitating projectile),或是透过光纤导引的可抛式炸药UUV摧毁水雷。391 其他水面舰级潜舰也将配载强化的声纳系统,可让他们更有效地侦测及回避水雷。

从专业水雷反制舰改变为「有机」水雷反制,这个过渡期在设计上反应出(水雷反制)领域的主要趋势。水雷反制最传统形式是使用简单的装置切断系留雷的锚炼。然而就沉底雷而言,则需要更进步的方法,像是模拟通过的船只所产生的触发信号。因此直升机拖曳橇(tow sleds)及扫雷舰拖行之扫雷器(tow drogue),产生可满足引爆标准的磁感及音响信号,并将水雷无害引爆。但如先前所述,这种除雷法因沉底雷的逻辑电路及软件日趋精密及难以欺骗,因此难有功效。所以当前的作法是透过高分辨率声纳搜索沉底雷后,以炸药摧毁之。这种方法被称为「猎雷」,是一种费时及艰巨的过程,不仅需要及准确的测深定位,在可疑海域的海床上每个似雷的物体都代表辛苦的调查过程。需要先进、昂贵的科技,专业训练及高水平的准确定位能力。392

美国海军正依规划于2010会计年时筹购至7艘滨海战斗舰,并达最终55艘舰艇的目标前进,393 这是美国国防部长盖兹强烈背书的一个计划。394 依此看来,对滨海战斗舰的承诺可认为是对水雷反制作为的强烈保证。毕竟滨海战斗舰将纳入目前最先进的水雷反制科技,此型舰的最后部署数量应超过专业反水雷舰的现有数量。再者,滨海战斗舰的观念是建造一个相对价廉的舰艇,可强行进入高强度战斗浅滩区,一般有利于水雷反制任务。395 但滨海战斗舰的实验性质及整体「模块」的概念,确实对于官兵熟练度及训练、舰艇及模块的真实任务上带来一定程度风险。很不幸地,即使这个过渡期达到最佳预期成效后,美国海军仍难以有效抗衡这份研究中所提出的威胁。预期的滨海战斗舰数量确实可应付另一场沙漠风暴,甚至可在伊朗军事冲突中开启霍尔木兹海峡。但是这个预想的战斗部队在对抗解放军数以百计,甚至千计的布放载台,以及大量水雷时也将力有未逮。可靠的因应作为可能意味着大幅增加滨海战斗舰的预算,用以建立一支发生军事冲突时,可替打击群在进入潜在重度布雷西太平洋海域前开路的兵力。但依目前的财政限制,这样的部队不太可能实现。

台湾在对抗中国水雷战的前景则更加严峻,她的反水雷兵力弱,且极易受战机及飞弹攻击。与受战壕保护的中华民国空军(ROCAF)战斗机不同(虽然其飞行跑道很容易破坏),台湾的水雷反制部队暴露在外,很可能成为解放军的优先目标。台湾只有12艘水雷作战舰艇。其中四艘为翻修过的永阳级扫雷舰,原于1950年代中期在美国建造。某中国消息来源评估,这四艘舰艇具有「侦测磁场、磁感、音响及传统水雷的其他引爆装置的能力。这型舰的USQS-1声纳…具侦测系留雷的能力,但无法侦测(沉底)雷」。396 台湾的水雷作战兵力中也包含了四艘较小,但较现代化的德制MWV 50 (永丰级)猎雷舰。397 同一个中国消息来源宣称,这些舰艇的猎雷声纳功效不佳,但认为他们的遥控操作炸药-水雷引爆装备具有某种程度的能力。398 最后,台湾的四艘老旧的美国制大鹳级扫雷舰,詹氏年鉴在1996年评估为「多少已到达使用年限了」。399

简而言之,台湾最多有八艘扫雷舰可用来对抗中国水雷。但这些舰艇非常可能均不专精于引爆沉底雷,特别是配有现代化引信的水雷。所以台湾在通过水雷区,开拓安全航道的能力上非常令人存疑。某中国期刊所出版的一篇评估论文就认为,如果台湾的水雷反制部队参战,也只会暴露出它「虚有其表」的能力。这篇分析报告也认为「若台湾海军丧失制空及制海权,接着就不可能使用飞机或军舰布雷」,因此若其(尝试)运用「渔船…布下防御性雷区,此过程等于是这些渔船的自杀行为」。该分析补充台湾海军「没有办法扫除可能用于封锁东部沿海之某些专用水雷」。400

综合美国和台湾在反制能力上的限制,无疑地将促使华盛顿及台北寻求其他可协助之同盟。很明显的支持就是日本与其26艘反水雷舰,这些舰艇作为东京对于水雷反制上的坚定承诺,都是1980年代或较新的旧型舰。401 在2005年2月时,美国与日本的联合声明中「(持续)支持台湾海峡议题透过和平对话解决」,此「普遍战略性目标」在某种程度上,可以相信东京可能考虑于某些想定中,有限的军事支持如扫雷类(的协助)。402 然而日本与中国间持续成长的经济互赖,日本政策中的永续和平主义(伴随日本领导者没有处理军事政治危机上的经验),更不用说中国潜在的报复行为等(可能包含水雷的使用),上述因素都是日本起而对抗中国水雷战的窒碍。但很明显的中国海军战略家了解日本在整体太平洋水雷作战平衡上的重要立场。举例来说,「舰船知识」最近便用了一篇9页的专文单独分析日本水雷反制的发展。403

另外值得注意的是,中国研究家紧紧地盯着美国海军404及其他西方国家405的水雷反制趋势及能力。解放军的海军研究家便努力地了解最先进的美国研究机构下之研究计划,例如罗得岛的海军水下作战中心。406 中国分析家亦紧迫地观察美国海军从专业到有机水雷反制载台之过渡期,试着解析其策略性弱点。407 中国研究家也密切地随着不同的外国无人水下载具(UUV)设计及发展的脚步。408他们对于无人水下载具的战斗能力特感兴趣,例如长期潜伏在敌港附近实施侦搜,并可接战目标的能力。409 他们也敏锐地察觉出反水雷直升机在美军准则中的重要性,因而紧迫盯人地注目着新系统研发及测试的各项细节。410 他们对于维吉尼亚级潜舰也非常有兴趣,特别是其水雷反制能力。411

在分析解放军水雷作战发展上直接反制的形势后,便有可能评估出中国水雷作战的战略意义。

 

想定场景

在想定设想的目的上,我们现在转而检讨中国水雷作战在东亚军事冲突中,最重要的想定内所可能扮演的角色。很自然地,这个想定将偏向关注于台湾议题。然而,以北京在海权领域上持续成长的地缘战略分量看来,中国国防政策的分析家必需分析各种可能的场景。

很少人注意在未来朝鲜半岛军事冲突时,中国对于海事情势的潜在影响。然而,鉴于朝鲜邻近于中国北部,这种冲突将直接冲击到中国的安全利益。如果北京在危机发展的初期并没有立即诉诸大规模使用武力,并试图释出其主导意图时,则水雷战在逻辑上是符合其目标的。412 解放军可从山东半岛尖端到北朝鲜,布出离38度线不远的小型雷区。413 若以较具野心的方式也在解放军的能力范围内,则是将此水雷区从中国最大的海军基地之一的青岛,直接往东延伸到南韩沿海。任何一种方式都将在程度上表现出保护平壤的决心,且都将不只严重限制美海军在黄海的作战任务,也将给首尔带来极大压力。此区域的浅水深度也显示出此类战役相对上的简便性。

第二种想定中考虑中国与东南亚的策略性互动,特别是与中国南海接壤的国家。在此再次说明,当前其外交倾向虽仍相当正面,但潜在的冲突依然存在。越南、菲律宾、马来西亚及印度尼西亚等国,重度仰赖海上浅水区或航道的贸易行为。因此上述国家不管何种想定下,均无法对付中国的水雷。414 而「战争科学」中亦曾假定,使用水雷对「珊瑚礁岛屿进行攻势作战」。415在面对南沙群岛的冲突时,北京可选择在某些特定岛屿周遭布下限制水雷区,以加强宣称其主权;并将之作为派出时间长、昂贵且具潜在挑衅意味的军舰外另一种选择。在东南亚的所有国家当中,越南绝对是最易感受到中国水雷作战压力的国家。416

第三种也是最可能的想定,则是中国与台湾之间的军事冲突。虽然从2008年3月台北方面新的领导人上台后,两岸关系有令人印象深刻的改善;很遗憾地,(两岸)微妙关系间的军事冲突(可能),在可预见的未来内仍无法排除。为了解中国水雷作战在这些想定中可能扮演的角色,可以就解放军「最小化」及「最大化」军事场景来考虑。在政治及策略上有许多理由可解释,为何北京可能降低(最小化)动武的意图。其中最主要的就是降低台湾(人民)的伤亡及物资上的破坏,因而不加深台湾人民的抵抗。这方面,水雷战比起可造成许多台湾人民伤亡的大型飞弹攻击来说更有用。这种展现敌意却不造成大量伤亡的「灰色地带」,不至于催化成宣战的理由或引发与论的作法,可能会让华盛顿(甚至东京)对响应其侵略行为感到进退两难。

在这个想定场景中,最主要的目标将是台湾的港口;鉴于围绕台湾的海域多为浅水区,故多数港口皆易受水雷攻击。417 主要的战斗大致上将受限于台湾海空军兵力受敌抑制。「战役理论学习指南」中叙述,台湾的军队假定下列场景:「海空军封锁将是不可避免的战斗阶段,而使用水雷抵抗封锁将会是最符经济效率的手段。第一阶段的4到6天内,台湾将面临5千到7千枚水雷的封锁;在第二阶段,7千枚以上水雷将加入封锁中;两个阶段将布署低于1万5千枚水雷,已足够切断台湾的国内及国际海上运输及补给航线」。418 大约在两天后,高雄、基隆、台中及花莲港之系统被空投水雷切断。419某台湾分析家认为「藉由100枚空投非接触型水雷来封锁一个军港或中型港口是可能的,且其价格与一枚反舰飞弹相仿」。420 在同时间或甚至不久之前使用延迟起动型水雷,透过中国的潜舰、水面舰及改装民船,都可在台湾附近布下许多水雷。这个想定中,解放军可以保留其最先进的载台及火箭上升水雷来攻击台湾东部港口。同时,北京将吓阻外国势力介入,藉由宣称台湾东部海域,一个作为美国及其同盟军集结海军兵力的合理位置,已用漂雷,或甚至火箭上升水雷等「大量地布雷」。鉴于台湾社会早已呈现的分裂感,经济上对封锁的脆弱性,中国政治目标的复杂及弹性(例如:大陆无需派兵驻扎台湾)等,这个想定将有合理的成功机会。综合下列各种因素,这对于北京是相当富有吸引力的:包含其所牵涉的广大实际距离、水雷本质上无法缩短的排除作业时间、421中国水雷的精密性、中国再次补设雷区,以及美国可用的水雷反制兵力限制等。

从北京角度来看上述想定的最大缺点,在于它不仅依赖台北方面意志迅速崩溃,并提供美国及其同盟军一个在解放军泄漏明显意图后,抢占先机的机会。「最大化」的解放军策略,为透过两栖部队入侵,使用侵略性及大范围先发制人兵力对抗美国(可能含日本)部队,在另外一方面则排除上述之可能性,或许采用攻击之前先发动台湾领导人斩首行动。

如果北京判断华盛顿将干预台湾事务,则中国可能攻击美国在太平洋的部队。可能的作法,包含使用潜舰在冲绳的美军基地外海、日本其他地区、关岛或甚至夏威夷等海域布雷。某篇中国的反潜作战研究提倡,对敌潜舰的水雷作战最好的方式为「将水雷布在靠近敌基地的出口航线…进而限制敌潜舰出海的能力」422 这些海域范围都在解放军潜舰的航程限制内,并可用自走雷布在有用航道上,利用自走雷难以侦测、自抵目标的能力。423 至于长程攻势水雷作战方面,或许值得注意到中国海军分析家们曾评估二次世界大战时,德国潜舰沿美国海岸布雷的「成功」。日本南琉球群岛周遭海域也易受中国攻势水雷作战。另一篇文章叙述:「在大量的研究基础上,解放军相信美国核子潜舰非常的安静,难以…反击…(而)必须受到牵制」。424 根据该分析,这个考虑一直是中国在自走雷研究的主要动力;并主张在关岛附近实施水雷作战,其优先等级为「在太平洋第一岛链的每个航道布下(自走)水雷,连结后形成(一条)封锁线,(并)防止美国核子潜舰进入到中国周围海域」。425

中国研究家特别研究过水雷如何用于支持两栖作战,426 以及如何使用反登陆水雷对抗敌人。427 根据「战争科学」,反水雷作战是假定中两栖作战的关键。428 例如台湾的西边、北边及南边水域,以及南琉球群岛周遭水域等,皆易受中国攻势水雷攻击。429 在这些水域布雷,能限制美国水面舰及快攻潜舰在台湾东部海域活动;而中国可集中较强大的武器系统于此区域,包含中国先进的柴油潜舰。解放军分析家明显地考虑使用水雷建立出一个在第一岛链内的避难所,在内解放军舰艇及潜舰可以无惧美国潜舰的攻击。 430 所以在第二个场景中(最大化军事手段),水雷作战的焦点将置于拦截敌海军兵力;而第一个场景中(最小化军事手段)则是封锁台湾的港口。

 

从不同的观点切入

检视中国水雷战在东亚军事冲突想定中的角色的研究极少。有一篇值得探讨的研究,学者Michael Glosny在2004年春天发表在国际安全议题(后续以IS标示)中的论文,他与本文的结论上有极大的差异。Glosny的研究极为有益,因为它点出台湾海峡想定中水下作战的重要。同样值得称赞的是,他以严谨的方法工具来处理这些复杂的问题。但很遗憾地,论文的结论认为对台封锁威胁为「言过其实」,是基于令人质疑的假设,而且至今已显然不合时宜。

最重要的是2004年的国际安全议题(IS)研究,大多低估了中国水雷作战的量及快速(成长)。其作者在评估时,忽略了中国大部分的水雷战可用载台,只留下了特定百分比的东海舰队潜舰。并指称中国广大的空中兵力(解放军的海军航空部队及空军部队本身)与此无关,因为他们无法取得「制空权」。431 同样地,解放军的海军舰艇也从水雷作战的方程式中除去,因为「他们在没有制空权的状态下,非常容易受到攻击」。中国巨大的商船及渔船团也不列入考虑因素,因为「他们无法布放先进水雷,而且(部署商船进行水雷战)极为复杂」。在将数以千计的水雷布放可能载台,缩小到少于1百艘解放军潜舰之后,国际安全议题(IS)的作者更进一步减低此数量,并主张只有东海舰队的舰艇将涉入(而不含其他两个主要舰队的舰艇),而最后再次修改这个数值,以反映各潜舰部队的通常妥善率。最后他的结论是超过六个月时间下,解放军海军能够布放水雷最多为1,768枚,大致上应在858枚到1,248枚水雷之间。432 这些数值与伊拉克在1991年波湾战争中布下约1千枚的数量相仿,大大低于北朝鲜在元山布下的约3千枚的数量;在两个数值都远不对称的状况下,可说明2004年国际安全议题(IS)的研究非常不准确。本文充分证明中国水雷作战能力是坚强的,而且在其范围或广度上绝不亚于伊拉克或北朝鲜。

其实,2004年国际安全议题研究报告的结论,在它受人质疑的制空权论点上便已垮台。我们主张解放军若不是在几个小时内,也可以在几天内就将台湾全部的空中兵力摧毁,或使其无法使用。433 即使「大胆假设」中华民国空军有残存兵力,这项假设还是在解放军海军航空部队(及空军部队),在战斗空域中执行空投水雷任务的可能范围内,且为假设中国兵力在承受敌火攻击丧失某种程度时之状况。434 本文中指出可观的证据显示中国对于动员民船执行水雷作战是很慎重的。2004年国际安全议题研究报告认为这个说法将会「很复杂」,虽然理论上合理,但却忽视了中国领导者们已考虑这个想定将近60年的事实。与几乎同时在世界各个角落进行复杂作战的美国军队所面临的挑战相比,特别是在全球定位系统及相关航海科技问世后,中国于沿海遂行水雷作战、于民船上加装装备及组织大型舰队等议题则相对地单纯。最后,我们预想在对台想定当中,解放军的各大舰队(实际上也包含解放军空军部队)会全面性的参战。

在2004年国际安全议题研究报告的其他主要瑕疵,则是台湾抵抗中国水雷作战的能力。该作者不认同航向台湾的商船在中国片面宣布封锁海域后,就会停止运输的传统看法,他提出历史资料左证:「船运公司在战时藉由进入危险区域制造巨大利益…船货主会持续运输」。然而他所提供的历史案例(克罗地亚、黎巴嫩及两伊战争)与中国封锁台湾时致命的战斗环境迥然不同。435 如果认为世界大战是这方面更好的指针,则2004年国际安全议题的作者就严重误解了商船及货主的动机。436 某些货主在利益趋使下,可能会说服其船长铤而走险穿越中国封锁区,但认为海运频率将与平时相似的想法是站不住脚的。2004年国际安全议题研究报告定量模型的另一个问题,是他们并没有考虑到台湾的水雷反制(或反潜)能力不强。很明显地在弹道飞弹、巡弋飞弹及其他精准武器之下,中国民国空军兵力的存活率令人质疑,这个原则同样地适用台湾海军部队;特别在奇袭攻击下,奇袭的效果可令中华民国空军更措手不及。在与世界大战时的英国或德国各种面向比较后,对2004年国际安全议题研究报告的最后一点质疑是,台湾反击的意志。437 即使台北方面拥有某些主权的外在形象,但英国或德国都不会有军官团公开地赞同敌人的某些目标,这个奇怪的现象是2004年国际安全议题的作者所承认的。438

也许在2004年国际安全议题研究中最遗憾的方面,是它仅限制在中国与台湾间的军事冲突,并没有评估美国或其它盟军的参与。虽然其作者并没有直接说明,但似乎暗示如果台湾可以应对中国的水雷作战(及潜舰)威胁,那么美国海军更能够轻易地击败中国水雷作战。事实上,依本文详细的研究显示,中国水雷战实质上已作为迎击优势敌人的主要作战方式,也就是美国海军及其同盟军。漠视面前这明确的危机是毫无意义的。

 

对于政策上的影响

本文阐明了中国海军发展鲜为人知的一面。它揭示了中国水雷战代表解放军海军雄心勃勃及充满野心的一面,并以快速的步伐迈向现代化。439 显示出中国在水雷战上广泛地吸收外国经验,并佐以自身惊人的丰富及相关的历史。

中国的水雷存量不仅多,而且可能包含某些世界上最致命的水雷作战系统。实际上,中国已走在水雷战科技及观念发展的尖端,她的军火库中已经拥有先进国家(例如美国)都没有的系统。解放军策略家了解现代战争中人的面向,在中国水雷战中特别明显。事实上,中国海军期刊中显示人员培训方案上惊人的增加,已超出以往死记硬背、照本宣科的演练型态。本文指出中国水雷战准则的初步纲要,强调速度、心理、欺骗、新旧技术混用、不同的布署手段等,另外其主要目标就是针对美国海军及其准则。

北京的军事现代化计划是全面性的,同样注重广度及集中并行。中国水雷战值得注意的地方在于,它是少数能够配合其他作战能力,出其不意并完全颠覆西太平洋权力平衡的作战类型。台湾的水雷反制部队战力小,且可能在第一击时被摧毁。日本的水雷反制舰队实力坚强,但在两岸冲突中,东京在政治上仍「难以预料」。最基本上,美国及其盟国的水雷反制兵力在编队或编制上,并非于争取制空及制海权的作战环境下「打入战场」。即使在优势水域中,水雷反制部队在作战显著改变上只是缓不应急。因此中国水雷战所代表的是北京在中国攻击及美国防御能力不对称上的一个主要施力点,甚至比起反舰巡弋飞弹、潜舰及信息战等其他类型战争更加的有利。

 

鉴于上述对于美国海权的重大挑战,提供海军及国际政策制定者下列的建议:

l   在战术层级上,所有美国海军舰艇应该完全作好在可能布雷水域下航行的准备。海军持续从专业水雷反制兵力转换到各舰有机作战能力,表示这个需求是被认可的。这对于潜舰兵力特别的重要,因快攻潜舰无疑将于战斗中担任先发。强烈的证据显示中国正以部署先进、深水水雷为主,遂行反潜作战。但美国海军如果在没有适当地判断水雷战的威胁之前,迅速地投入战斗部署是充满风险的作法,而这样作则需在痛苦的资源与训练优先中取舍。对水面舰队来说,滨海战斗舰代表的是美海军水雷反制的未来,支持此战斗技术的模块的筹购应该列为最优先等级。但藉由模块化所获得的载台弹性不可与较低的训练标准妥协,或甚至将水雷反制任务边缘化。最后,中国的技术似乎将美海军的直升机及海巡舰艇作为水雷战的可行目标。为了对抗新兴且前所未有的威胁,现在将战略调整还不算太晚。

l   在作战层级上,美国太平洋指挥部很明显地缺乏适当的水雷反制兵力,这个弱点在过去十年间很可能鼓励了中国的水雷战计划。在2005年「基地调整及关闭委员会」决议将水雷反制中心从德州英格赛基地迁移到加州圣地亚哥基地,就是走向修正此缺点,且值得称赞的第一步。而从中再将几个分队移防到珍珠港或甚至关岛,将会是合理的第二步骤,并对于中国冒险主义起有效威慑作用。在新型有机系统舰船完建并验收之前,将这些「老」船好好保存,并维持高战备等级是很重要的。此外,将美国攻势水雷计划重启,包含再次重视透过空军进行空投水雷的手段。为了让中国领导人了解对抗美国的联合(all-out)水雷战可能为中国带来的毁灭性后果,此计划应被考虑作为威慑敌人的手段。大大小小的演习及兵推都应该纳入相当的水雷战元素,包含一个在质与量上强大的敌人、广阔的地理参数、军事或非正规部队目标,及在中国熟练的水雷战攻击下,美国海军潜在的高伤亡数。简而言之,他们应该面对中国的不对称海上挑战之事实。

l   在战略层级上,美国军队及外交领袖必须要了解中国在封台能力上已绰绰有余。440 此外在过去十年间,中国惩罚在台湾冲突中介入的美国军队的能力已激进地上扬,部分是因中国发展中的海军水雷威胁,但也包含其他的战力。伴随着中国军事挑战上的诸多面向,地理因素似乎是其中的王牌。这个情形下,美国或其潜在的盟友根本就没有办法部署适当的兵力,有效地拦截全面的中国水雷战攻击,一如本文所示,在规模上可能极为浩大。一旦水雷被布放后,对作战区中的美军部队可能造成极大危险。面对这项威胁,特别再加上全球反恐战争,及持续进行的大中东地区军事作战等主要军事承诺,华盛顿似乎已无选择余地,而只能在台湾议题上采取谨慎的策略,并面对一个难以接受的事实,就是它无法长期地在军事上捍卫台湾。台北及北京从2008年起便开始重新进入新的对谈阶段,在台湾军事上的脆弱事实暴露在战斗之前,这个对谈过程绝对符合美国的战略性利益。在支持这种外交方案的同时,华盛顿应该帮助台北强化其水雷反制能力,并鼓励东京及其他地区的盟军维持有效的反水雷部队,以抵抗最坏的打算。不管怎样,在水雷反制的竞技场上,盟军的协助并不是万灵丹,且绝不能成为依赖,如此反而抑制了广泛的美国海军能力在这个领域下的重要发展。

关于中国海军的扩张,特别针对水雷作战领域的议题就此打住。我们面前的挑战应是掌握北京快速的海事发展中带来的严峻挑战,同时也要在这个重要的关系中,整备我们海军战力以应付意料之外的动荡不安。

 

注释及参考文献:

1. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service [hereafter CRS] Report to Congress, Order Code RL33153 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, updated 8 October 2008), p. 12.

2. See, for example, Bill Gertz, “Chinese Produce New Type of Sub,” Washington Times, 16 July 2004, available at www.washtimes.com.

3.王慧[Wang Hui], “攻击航母的武器装备” [Weaponry and Equipment for Attacking Carriers],当代海军[Modern Navy], no. 10 (2004), p. 34. Identical phrasing is also found in other sources, for example,刘复森[Liu Fusen] and 王丽 [Wang Li], “美航母七大致命弱点” [Seven Big Weak Points of U.S. Carriers],人民海军 [People’s Navy], 9 December 2004, p. 3. For additional PRC analyses of the significance of mine warfare, see 崔峰, 尹小功 [Cui Feng and Yin Xiaogong], “有效的海战武器—水雷” [An Effective Naval Warfare Weapon: The Sea Mine], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (2001); 傅金祝. [Fu Jinzhu], “水雷战技术发展研究” [Sea Mine Technology Development Research], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2000); “现代水雷综述” [Modern Sea Mine Summary],水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (1999); and 夏立新 [Xia Lixin], “现代水雷的发展趋势”[Modern Sea Mine Development Trends], 水雷战与舰船防护[Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (1999). For a recent discussion of sea mine trends, see 廉斌 [Lian Bin], 中国船舶重工集团公司第七一O研究所[710 Research Institute, CSIC], “现代水雷武器的技术特点与发展趋势” [The Technological Characteristics and Development Trends of Modern Sea Mine Weapons], 水雷战与舰船防护[Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2006).

4.迎南 [Ying Nan], “攻势布雷的兵力运用和特点” [The Military Employment and Characteristics of Offensive Mine Warfare], 舰船知识,[Naval and Merchant Ships], no. 40 (September 1999), p. 10.

5. 王伟 [Wang Wei], “历久弥新话水雷” [Enduring and Yet Fully Relevant: A Discussion of Sea Mines], 国防 [National Defense] (November 2002), p. 58. See also 傅金祝 [Fu Jinzhu], “水雷战不容忽视” [Mine Warfare Must Not Be Ignored], 现代舰船 [Modern Ships], no. 156 (November 1998), p. 1.

6. 侯建军 [Hou Jianjun], “美国海军水雷战装备” [U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Equipment],当代海军[Modern Navy], no. 6 (2003), p. 27.

7. 河山 [He Shan], “‘弗吉尼亚’号能否成为新世纪海上霸主” [Can the Virginia Class Become the New Century’s Maritime Hegemon?],当代海军[Modern Navy], no. 10 (2004), p. 21.

8. Shao Delun, Gao Chunzhan, and Xu Feng, “Underwater Firing Range: Torpedoes Become ‘Smarter’ in Drills: A Naval Testing Area Takes Aim at the Future Battlefield and Probes Ways to Enhance the Effectiveness of New Equipment,” 解放军报[Liberation Army Daily], 26 November 2006, OSC CPP20061129705003.

9. Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2008,” January 2009, pp. 33, 51, available at www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html.

10. 腾兆新, 张旭,钱江 [Teng Zhaoxin, Zhang Xu, and Qian Jiang], “基于理想方案布雷方案评估” [Evaluation of Minelaying Plans Based on Ideal

Plans], 兵工学报 [Acta Armamentarii] (November 2007), pp. 1405–408.

11. Zhang Yuliang, Yu Shusheng, and Zhou Xiaopeng, 战役学[Science of Campaigns] (Beijing: 国防大学出版社[National Defense Univ. Press], 2006), chap. 12. There is also a 2000 edition, but this study will refer only to the more sophisticated 2006 edition.

12. The term “assassin’s mace” is best translated in colloquial English as “silver bullet.” It is widely used in the Chinese strategic-studies literature. There is little evidence that it refers to specific hidden capabilities or “black” programs. An intelligent discussion of this issue is found in Alastair Iain Johnston, “Towards Contextualizing the Context of a Shashoujian (Assassin’s Mace)” (August 2002, Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences), available at www.people.fas.harvard.edu/.

13. 闾勇政,张庆洲 [Lu Yongzheng and Zhang Qingzhou], “北海舰队某舰艇支队砍掉12个不实用的战法” [A Certain North Sea Fleet Submarine Flotilla Discards 12 Impractical Combat Methods],人民海军 [People’s Navy], 11 December 2006, p. 3.

14.孙文德 [Sun Wende], “高科技海上杀手—水雷” [High Tech Maritime Assassin’s Mace: The Sea Mine], 金属世界 [Metal World], no. 5 (2001);“航母的三大杀手: 潜艇, 水雷, 反舰导弹” [Three Assassin’s Maces for an Aircraft Carrier: Submarines, Mines, and Antiship Missiles], 舰船电子工程 [Ship Electronic Engineering], no. 5 (May 2001), p. 80; 宣恒, 新华 [Yi Heng and Xin Hua], “航母煞星: 对付航母的六大撒手涧” [Six Trump Cards to Cope with Aircraft Carriers], 国际展望[World Outlook], no. 3 (February 2001), pp. 60–61; 任道南 [Ren Daonan], “潜艇布雷” [Submarine Minelaying], 现代舰船 [Modern Ships] (February 1998), p. 26.

15. Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001), p. 29.

16. Michael Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea?” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 125–60.

17. 韩鹏,李玉才 [Han Peng and Li Yucai, eds.], 水中武器概论 (水雷分册) [Outline of Undersea Weaponry: Sea Mine Volume] (Xian: Northwest Industrial College Press, in cooperation with Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Harbin Industrial College, and Harbin Engineering College, 2007), p. 1. For estimates of 1,100,000 and 3,700 respectively, see 熊武—主编 [Xiong Wuyi, chief ed.], “水雷” [Sea Mine], 当代军人辞典 [Modern Soldier Dictionary] (Beijing:新华出版社 [Xinhua], 1988), p. 432. For an estimate of 2,500, see 陆建勋 [Lu Jianxun, ed.],海军武器装备 [Naval Weaponry and Equipment] (Beijing: Atomic Energy, 2003), p. 108.

18.陈冬元  [Chen Dongyuan], “神秘的水下卫士 —反潜水雷的发展” [The Mysterious Underwater Sentry: Developments in Antisubmarine Mines],国防科技  [Defense Science] (January 2001), p. 42.

19. Wang Wei, “Enduring and Yet Fully Relevant,” p. 58. Han Peng and Li Yucai, eds., Outline of Undersea Weaponry, p. 1. Interestingly, Chinese analysts have also studied Japan’s aerial sea-mine operations during the Pacific War:闻舞,边磊 [Wen Wu and Bian Lei], “目标冲绳:二战间日本仅有记载的一次航空布雷行动” [Target Okinawa: Japan’s One Attempt at Air-Dropping Mines during the Second World War], 环球军事 [Global Military] (March 2007), pp. 54–56.

20. Ying Nan, “Military Employment and Characteristics of Offensive Mine Warfare,” p. 10

21. 史滇生 [Shi Diansheng], 世界海军军事史概论 [A Survey of the World’s Naval War History] (Beijing: Sea Tide, 2003), p. 521. Royal Navy MCM operations in preparation for landings in the Falklands are also reviewed in丁一平[VADM Ding Yiping, PLAN], 世界海军史[World Naval History] (Beijing: Sea Tide, 2000), p. 771.

22. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2002), p. 74.

23. Ibid., p. 69. See also Paul H. B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine,” in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 46.

24. See, for example, 茹呈瑶,夏银山  [Ru Chenyao and Xia Yin Shan], “海湾战争中的水雷和反水雷” [Mine and Counter-mine in the Gulf War], 现代舰船 [Modern Ships], no. 64 (April 1991), pp. 51–58; and 陈书海,陈颖涛  [Chen Shuhai and Chen Yingtao], “水雷:多国部队海上的唯一障碍” [Sea Mines: The Coalition Forces’ Single Naval Obstacle],舰船知识 [Naval and Merchant Ships], no. 141 (June 1991), pp. 28–29.

25. This holds true for articles of scientific nature—for example,田路,陈伏虎,钟铁城 [Tian Lu, Chen Fuhu, and Zhong Tiecheng], “反水雷技术的发展概况和声系统实现构想” [A Survey of MCM Technology and Sonar Development],声学与电子工程[Acoustic and Electrical Engineering] (April 2004), p. 17; and 刘忠 [Liu Zhong], “网络雷阵及其被动定位员李” [Mine Array Networks and Passive Location Principles], 海军工程大学学报[Journal of Naval University of Engineering] 13, no. 6 (December 2001), p. 20. It holds true also for naval reference materials, such as in 陆建勋[Lu Jianxun], ed., 海军武器装备[Naval Weaponry and Equipment] (Beijing: Weapons Industry, 2003), p. 108, as well as in the conventional military press—for example, “对付航母战斗群的九个招数” [Nine Tactics for Coping with Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups], 当代海军[Modern Navy] 3, no. 90 (March 2001), p. 33.

26. Unless otherwise indicated, material in this paragraph is derived from 傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “海湾战争中的水雷战” [Mine Warfare in the Gulf War], 现代舰船[Modern Ships], no. 75 (March 1992), pp. 30–33.

27. The statement as written is somewhat ambiguous. This could be interpreted as Fu’s suggestion that China, as a “strong country,” should also engage in mine warfare. Another possible interpretation is that Fu is emphasizing that strong states—the United States, for example—have employed mine warfare extensively and could do so against China in the future.

28. Unless otherwise indicated, material in this paragraph is derived from 沈游 [Shen You], “海湾战争中舰船装备‘十思’” [Ten Reflections on Naval Equipment Deployed in the Gulf War], 现代舰船[Modern Ships], no. 67 (July 1991), p. 10.

29. For doctrinal statements that embody this bifurcation, see “172. How Does One Determine the Main Cover Targets in a Naval Base Defense Campaign?” and “191. How to Attack and Block the Enemy’s Unloading Harbors in a Maritime Traffic Sabotage Campaign?” in 薛兴林 [Bi Xinglin], ed.,战役理论学习指南 [Campaign Theory Study Guide] (Beijing: National Defense Univ. Press, 2002). For a discussion of offensive and defensive uses of mines, see傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “防御布雷和攻势布雷” [Defensive and Offensive Mining], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 4 (2008).

30. 傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “伊拉克水雷失效的哪般” [What Explains the Failure of Iraq’s Mines?], 舰船知识[Naval and Merchant Ships] (August 2004), p. 45. A similar article that highlights U.S. MCM weaknesses is 大鹏 [Da Peng], “难说谁胜谁负” [It Is Difficult to Say Who Won and Who Lost], 当代海军[Modern Navy] (June 2003), pp. 14–15.

31. Fu Jinzhu, “What Explains the Failure of Iraq’s Mines?” p. 45

32. Ibid

33.刘夏森 [Liu Xiasen], “台海战争一旦爆发:美国真敢出兵吗?” [If a Taiwan Strait War Erupted: Would the U.S. Really Dare to Dispatch Troops?], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 21 August 2004, p. 3.

34. “八,中国海军援越水雷战” [China’s Navy Assists Vietnam with Sea Mine Warfare], in 金玮 李杰 [Jin Wei and Li Jie, eds.], 水雷战舰艇 [Modern Sea Mine Warships], 舰船知识丛书 [Naval Ship Series] (Beijing: 中国人民公安大学出版社 [Chinese People’s Public Security Univ. Press], 1999), chap. 8, p. 117.

35. Han Peng and Li Yucai, eds., Outline of Undersea Weaponry, p. 1; Joseph Needham and Robert Temple, The Genius of China: 3,000 Years of Science, Discovery and Invention (New York: Prion, 1998).

36. “水底龙王炮” [The Underwater Dragon King Cannon], in 军事大辞海·上 [Great Military Dictionary], 熊武一,周家法 总编 [Xiong Wuyi and Zhou Jiafa, chief eds.] (Beijing: 长城出版社 [Great Wall], 2000), vol. 1, p. 564; “混江龙” [The All-Capable River Dragon], in Xiong Wuyi and Zhou Jiafa, chief eds., Great Military Dictionary (Beijing: Great Wall, 2000), vol. 2, p. 2787; “水雷” [Sea Mine], in刘秋霖,刘健,王亚新等编[Liu Qiulin, Liu Jian, Wang Yaxin et al., eds.], 中国古代兵器图说 [Illustrations of China’s Ancient Weapons], (Tianjin:天津古籍出版社 [Tianjin Ancient Book], 2003), p. 408; “China’s Navy Assists Vietnam with Sea Mine Warfare,” in Jin Wei and Li Jie, eds., Modern Sea Mine Warships, p. 116.

37. Srikanth Kondapalli, China’s Naval Power (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2001), p. xvii.

38. Stephen Turnbull, Fighting Ships of the Far East: China and Southeast Asia 202 BC–AD 1419 (Oxford: Osprey, 2002), pp. 33–35

39. 林长盛 [Lin Changsheng], “潜龙在渊:解放军水雷兵器的现况与发展” [The Hidden Dragon in the Deep: The Present Situation and Development of PLA Mine Weaponry],国际展望 [World Outlook], no. 9 (May 2005), p. 22. This article is perhaps the most comprehensive analysis to date of PRC sea-mine capabilities. Although this is a PRC source, Lin is actually a former Taiwanese military officer who recently spent time in the United States on a research fellowship. While Lin includes frank analysis of continued PRC weakness in such areas as ASW, he also offers more recent details unavailable in other publications. Some are currently impossible to confirm and will be referred to accordingly in this article. For Lin’s background, see William Chien, “U.S. Military—Iraq,” VOA News Report, 22 April 2003, available at www.globalsecurity.org/ and www.1n0.net/2004/12-22/0442319087-7.html. Lin’s other publications include “Counting China’s ICBMs,” Studies on Chinese Communism 37, no. 7 (July 2003), pp. 80–90.

40. 王广仁 [Wang Guangren], “东局子史话” [A History of the Eastern Bureau, Part 4], 汽车运用 [Automobile Applications] 102, no. 4 (2001), p. 49.

41. 胡胜利 [Hu Shengli], “国共两党军队合作布水雷考” [Kuomintang–Chinese Communist Cooperation in Inspecting the Laying of Sea Mines],江淮文史 [Jianghuai Literature & History], 2001, no. 2

42. Unless otherwise specified, material in the PRC sea-mine history, development, and research sections to follow is derived from 凌翔 [Ling Xiang], 第六章 “扬威海上的中国水雷战舰艇” [Chapter 6: Raise Mighty Chinese Sea Mine Warfare Ships on the Sea], in 当代水雷战舰艇大观 [Modern Sea Mine Warships Spectacle], 当代水雷战舰艇大观丛书之五[Modern Warship Spectacle Book Series, vol. 5] (Beijing: World Knowledge, 1995), pp. 152–61 (p. 152 for this reference).

43. 汪光鑫,陈逸静 [Wang Guangxin and Chen Yijing], “东海目击:军民联合海上扫雷演练” [On the Scene in the East China Sea: A Joint Military-Civilian Mine Sweeping Exercise], 舰船知识[Naval and Merchant Ships] (January 2001), pp. 5–6.

44. For the Yangtze and Shantou operations, see also “China’s Navy Assists Vietnam with Sea Mine Warfare,” p. 92.

45. Han Peng and Li Yucai, eds., Outline of Undersea Weaponry, p. 1; 曾筱晓,董爱群 [Zeng Xiaoxiao and Dong Aiqun], “日本曾在朝鲜战争中出兵” [Japan Dispatched Troops to the Korean War], 环球军事[Global Military], no. 20 (2002), p. 29.

46. 张宝善 [Zhang Baoshan], “水雷封锁—打击‘台独’图谋的一种选择” [Mine Blockade: An Option to Foil the Conspiracy of “Taiwan Independence”], 现代舰船[Modern Ships], no. 149 (April 1998), p. 10; 王维广 [Wang Weiguang], “‘水中伏兵’—水雷” [‘Underwater Ambush’: Sea Mine], 国防 [National Defense], no. 4 (1996), pp. 36–37.

47. Gregory K. Hartmann with Scott C. Truver, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 80, 106

48. Edward J. Marolda, “Mine Warfare,” Naval History and Heritage Command, www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/minewar.htm.

49. Unless otherwise indicated, information in this paragraph is derived from 林有成 [Lin Youcheng], “亿赴朝鲜西海岸清川江口布设水雷” [Recollection of Laying Sea Mines at the Qingquan River’s Mouth on Korea’s Western Seacoast], 军事历史 [Military History], no. 5 (2003), pp. 65–66. The seventeen soldiers from China’s Huadong Military Region were unsure of the depth at which their Soviet-manufactured moored buoyant mines should be laid and found that the methods suggested by their Soviet navy adviser were “inappropriate for immediate mission conditions.” They were forced to improvise, and in the process learned the value of basing their methods on actual conditions.

50. Srikanth Kondapalli, “China’s Naval Equipment Acquisition,” Strategic Analysis 23, no. 9 (December 1999).

51. Soviet guidance and assistance were secured by the February 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. The Chinese Communist Party launched its first Five-Year Plan for industrial and agricultural development and production in 1953. By soliciting extensive Soviet aid and focusing on the development of heavy industrial plants and equipment, China doubled its industrial capacity within five years and established a comprehensive, if rudimentary, military-industrial base. Soviet advisers were withdrawn in September 1960 following deterioration of the bilateral relationship

52. Ling Xiang, “Raise Mighty Chinese Sea Mine Warfare Ships on the Sea,” p. 158.

53. Deng Liqun et al., eds., China Today: Defense Science and Technology (Beijing: National Defense Industry, 1993), vol. 1, p. 32

54. 海林 [Hai Lin], “岛内军事利物利载防务专家预测—2010台岛困死水雷阵:解放军水雷战战力评估” [Taiwan’s Own Military Affairs Experts’ Forecast: In 2010 Taiwan Will Be Surrounded with a Sea Mine Battle Array: An Evaluation of the People’s Liberation Army’s Sea Mine Warfare Combat Strength],国际展望 [World Outlook], no. 9 (May 2005), p. 16.

55. Kondapalli, China’s Naval Power, pp. 98–99.

56. Kondapalli, “China’s Naval Equipment Acquisition.”

57. Ling Xiang, “Raise Mighty Chinese Sea Mine Warfare Ships on the Sea,” p. 159.

58. Kondapalli, China’s Naval Power, pp. 98–99.

59.竹繁[Zhu Fan], “中国海军出国扫水雷” [China’s Navy Goes Abroad to Sweep Mines], 炎黄春秋 [Yanhuang Chunqiu], no. 4 (1997), p. 35.

60. Preparation for “early war, big war, and all-out nuclear war” caused Mao to order roughly half of military production dispersed among a “Third Line” network in China’s vast interior. This process, which occupied much of the 1960s and ’70s and may have consumed as much as half of defense expenditures, dispersed scarce human and material resources and further challenged China’s then-limited transportation infrastructure. The Cultural Revolution threw all but the most highly prioritized weapons programs into disarray, dividing bureaus into rival factions and even threatening rail links critical to the development of advanced weapons systems.

61. Ling Xiang, “Raise Mighty Chinese Sea Mine Warfare Ships on the Sea,” pp. 154–55.

62. Qiang Zhai, China & the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 203.

63. 蔡朋岑 [Cai Pengcen], “人民海军援越扫雷始末” [The People’s Navy’s Minesweeping Operations in Support of Vietnam from Beginning to End], 舰载武器[Shipborne Weapons] (March 2007), p. 34

64. Zhu Fan, “China’s Navy Goes Abroad to Sweep Mines,” p. 35.

65. 雷冬 [Lei Dong], “中国海军扫雷纪实 (二):援越扫雷扬军威” [A Record of PLAN Minesweepers (Part 2): Helping Vietnam Raise Impressive Military Minesweeping Strength], 现代舰船[Modern Ships] (October 2004), pp. 32–34.

66. Cai Pengcen, “People’s Navy’s Minesweeping Operations in Support of Vietnam from Beginning to End,” p. 34.

67. Zhu Fan, “China’s Navy Goes Abroad to Sweep Mines,” p. 37; Ling Xiang, “Raise Mighty Chinese Sea Mine Warfare Ships on the Sea,” p. 155.

68. Information in this paragraph from Ling Xiang, “Raise Mighty Chinese Sea Mine Warfare Ships on the Sea,” pp. 153–54, 160.

69. Ibid., p. 160.

70. Observations concerning hull 814 are derived from Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 32.

71. Mikhail Barabanov, “Contemporary Military Shipbuilding in China,” Eksport Vooruzheniy, 1 August 2005, OSC CEP20050811949014.

72. “Chronicle of Events of Military Training,” Guangzhou Zhanshi Bao, 27 December 2005, pp. 1, 3, OSC CPP20060224318002.

73. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 9 February 2009, www.janes.com.

74. See post 38 of 1 March 2007 by “Xinhui” in the “PLAN Mine Warfare Threat” section of the China-Defense.com Forum, at www.china-defense.com.

75. George Pollitt, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory mine warfare expert, e-mail exchange with authors, February 2009.

76. A zhidui (支队) is a division-leader level organization (using the PLA’s fifteen-grade structure, which is based on army terminology). The best English translation is “flotilla.” A dadui (..) is a regiment-leader level organization; the best English translation is “squadron” for naval vessels and “group” for PLAN aviation, coastal defense, marine corps, and maintenance troops. For a detailed explanation of these and related terms, see Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007, pp. 4–5.

77. 郑振麒,方立华 [Zheng Zhenqi and Fang Lihua], “反水雷作战淌出实战化训练新路—东海舰队某扫雷舰大队创造4项海军记录” [Anti-Mine Operations Set Out on a New Path of Training Made Realistic to Actual War: A Certain East Sea Fleet Minesweeper Squadron Sets Four Navy Records], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 31 October 2008, p. 1.

78. Hai Lin, “In 2010 Taiwan Will Be Surrounded with a Sea Mine Battle Array,” p. 18

79. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 26.

80. Thomas R. Bernitt and Sam J. Tangredi, “Mine Warfare and Globalization: Low-Tech Warfare in a High-Tech World,” in Sam J. Tangredi, ed. Globalization and Maritime Power, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 2002), p. 395. The authors do not recognize that China has this weaponry.

81. See Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 103, for the high estimate and “Naval Mine-Hunting Unit Featured,” Lien-Ho Pao, 20 April 1997, OSC FTS19970716000491, for the low. Both these guesses are now roughly a decade old.

82. Hai Lin, “In 2010 Taiwan Will Be Surrounded with a Sea Mine Battle Array,” p. 16. For PRC research on remote-control sea mines, see 龙兴祖 [Long Xingzu], “遥控水雷及其在未来海战中的特殊作用” [Remote-Control Sea Mines and Their Use in Future Special Sea Warfare], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (2000); 陈川 [Chen Chuan], “激光致声在水雷遥控中的应用研究” [The Sound-Sending Laser in Remote-Control Sea Mine Applied Research], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (1999).

83. 茹呈瑶 [Ru Chengyao], “水雷” [Sea Mine], in 陈德第, 李轴, 库桂生主编 [Chen Dedi, Li Zhou, and Ku Guisheng, chief eds.] 国防经济大辞典 [National Defense Economy Dictionary], (Beijing: 军事科学出版社 [Military Science], 2001), p. 906.

84. The depth limitations of Chinese mines are not known but are probably quite similar to those of Russian mines. The deepest waters in which most Russian bottom mines can be effectively laid range from fifty to two hundred meters. See Anthony Watts, “Russian Federation Underwater Weapons,” Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems, 21 January 2005, www.janes.com.

85. Minesweepers can tow submerged cables with cutting devices attached. This apparatus, dragged through a suspected minefield, snags and severs the cables that attach the mines to their anchors. The Russian mine-manufacturing firm Gidropribor offers such sweeping mechanisms for sale; see its website, www.gidropribor.ru/eng/products/91/index.php4.

86. Chinese sources, including Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” also refer to a “701 Research Institute” (中国舰船研究院701研究所), likewise located in Yichang. Confusing the matter further, the most detailed article available on the Institute’s location calls it the “701 Research Institute” in English and the “710 Research Institute” in Chinese. See 刘见,张玮,齐小丹 [Liu Jian, Zhang Wei, and Qi Xiaodan], “中国船舶重工集团公司七一O研究院” [Plan and Building Design of CSIC-No.701] (original English title), 华中建筑 [Huazhong Architecture], no. 4 (2006). For an earlier reference to a “701 Institute,” see “七O一研究院引进计算器辅助设计系统” [701 Research Institute Introduces Computer-Aided Design System], 船海工程 [Ship and Ocean Engineering], no. 4 (1985). For purposes of clarity, this study uses the term “710 Research Institute” throughout.

87. The paragraphs on Piao-1 and -2 are derived primarily from Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 24; and Wayne Mason, “Naval Mine Technologies,” (briefing, Mine Warfare Association Spring 2009 Regional Conference, Panama City, Fla., 19 May 2009).

88. Ibid.

89. Han Peng and Li Yucai, eds., Outline of Undersea Weaponry, pp. 137–42.

90. The video clip, originally at web.search.cctv.com, has been removed from the CCTV website. An image from the television footage has been posted on China Defense Forum at www.china-defense.com/forum/index .php?showtopic=160&st=75.

91. See Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” pp. 24–25.

92. The authors thank Professor Peter Dutton for these legal insights.

93. The following text is excerpted from 赵培英 [Zhao Peiying, ed.], 当代军人国际法基础 [Basis of International Law for Modern Soldiers], “全军军事科研工作‘八五’计划列项课题” [Armywide Military Affairs Research Work Eighth Five-Year Plan Study Subject] (Beijing:解放军出版社 [PLA Press], 1996), pp. 258–59. “(2) Rules Regarding the Usage of Sea Mines and Torpedoes“At the beginning of the 20th century sea mines were widely used in naval warfare, posing an enormous threat to international shipping and the interests of neutral nations. Consequently, their use had come under the regulation of international law. According to the 1907 Hague Convention (VIII) relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, although it is impossible to forbid the employment of sea mines, it is nevertheless desirable to restrict and regulate their employment in order to mitigate the severity of war and to ensure the security of peaceful navigation in times of war. The Convention prohibited the laying of unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they were so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them ceases to control them. It prohibited the laying of anchored automatic contact mines which did not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings; or the use of torpedoes which did not become harmless when they have missed their mark. Likewise it was forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping. When anchored automatic contact mines were employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping. Neutral Powers which laid automatic contact mines off their coasts must observe the same rules as were imposed on belligerents, and they must inform ship owners and the Governments where mines have been laid through the diplomatic channel. The belligerents were likewise obliged to notify ship owners of the danger zones should their mines cease to be under surveillance, as soon as military exigencies permitted. At the close of the war, the Contracting Powers were obliged to remove the mines which they have laid, each Power removing its own mines. At the time a total of 44 nations became signatories to the Convention, although during the two World Wars both sides employed sea mines on a massive scale, declaring danger zones all around the world, thereby seriously undermining the rules of the Convention.”

94. See ibid. See also 刘进 [Liu Jin], “水雷使用中涉及的国际法” [The Involvement of International Law in Sea Mine Use], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (2000); 夏立新  [Xia Lixin], “水雷和军备控制” [Sea Mines and Arms Control], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (2000).

95. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” pp. 22–23.

96. Rob Hewson, “Type 500 and 1000 Mines,Underwater Weapons,” Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, www.janes.com. According to this source, these mines also have “eight operating modes, which are believed to be mixtures of fuze and logic settings to meet different operational or environmental conditions.”

97. Ling Xiang, “Raise Mighty Chinese Sea Mine Warfare Ships on the Sea,” pp. 154–55.

98. This has not always been the case. The first U.S. Destructor mines laid in Haiphong Harbor (simply converted gravity bombs detonated by magnetic signature change) were so sensitive, having been adjusted to destroy passing trucks when used against land targets, that a solar magnetic storm detonated the entire field prematurely. Hartmann with Truver, Weapons That Wait, pp. 72–80, 244.

99. Ibid., pp. 72–80, 129.

100. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 24.

101. As implied in note 84 above, the very deepest that any of the very large Russian bottom influence mines can be laid is two hundred meters. Seventy meters is the maximum depth for the smaller Russian bottom mines. See Watts, “Russian Federation Underwater Weapons.”

102. See, for example, 王伟,郭大江 [Wang Wei and Guo Dajiang], “基底频摇控 水雷全向数字接收机的研究” [Research on All-Around Digital Receiver for Very Low Frequency Remote-Controlled Naval Mines], 现代电子技术 [Modern Electronics Technology] (December 2007), pp. 1–3.

103. See U.S. Defense Dept., Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: November 1998), p. 14, available at www.fas.org/news/china/

104. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: June 2000), p. 16, available at www.defenselink.mil/.

105. 肖敏 [Xiao Min],西北工业大学,交通运输规划与管理[Northwest Polytechnic University, Communications and Transportation Planning and Management], “主动攻击水雷鲁棒控制和仿真研究” [Research on Robust Control for Initiative Attack Mine and Simulation] (master’s thesis, 9 June 2006); 肖敏,史忠科 [Xiao Min and Shi Zhongke], 三峡大学, 西北工业大学[Three Gorges University, Northwest Polytechnic University], “主动攻击水雷鲁棒跟踪控制研究” [Research on the Tracking and Robust Control of Initiative Attack Sea Mines], in中国航空学会控制与应用第十二届学术年会论文集, 2006 . [The Collected Works of the China Aviation Institute’s Twelfth Annual Academic Meeting on Control and Applications, 2006].

106. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 27.

107. Watts, “Russian Federation Underwater Weapons.” Gidropribor more modestly claims a maximum depth of one thousand meters for its PMR-2 rising torpedo mine and for its PMR-2E rising rocket mine. See www.gidropribor.ru/eng/products.php4.

108. See Richard Fisher, “Chinese Notes from AeroIndia and IDEX,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, 28 February 2005, www.strategycenter.net/.

109. Samuel Morison, Guide to Naval Mine Warfare (Arlington, Va.: Pasha, 1995), pp. 88–89.

110. Rob Hewson, “EM 52 Mine, Underwater Weapons,” Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, 14 April 2005, www.janes.com. This depth is probably a significant understatement of the true maximum operating depth, since a two-hundred-meter depth would severely limit its versatility and usefulness.

111. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 26.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid., p. 28.

114. U.S. Navy Dept., U.S. Naval Mine Warfare Plan, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: 2000). See also 李宝祥 [Li Baoxiang], “俄罗斯水雷武器的现状和未来” [The Present Situation and Future of Russian Sea Mine Weapons], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (1999).

115. “俄罗斯:世界上的‘水雷王国’” [Russia: The World’s Sea Mine Kingdom], “外国海军纵横” [Foreign Navy Crisscross], 当代海军  [Modern Navy], no. 6 (2003).

116. 傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “俄罗斯的火箭上浮水雷” [Russia’s Rocket Rising Sea Mines], 舰载武器[Shipborne Weapons] (April 2004), p. 65.

117. 焦方金 [Jiao Fangjin], “双头鹰的水中伏兵” [The Double-Headed Eagle’s Ambush at Sea], 国防科技 [Defense Science] (July 2003), p. 90.

118. Ibid.

119. See, for example, ibid.

120. 郑宇 [Zou Zi], “芬兰潜艇:装备与作战历史” [Finnish Submarines: Equipment and Fighting History],国际展望 [World Outlook], no. 490 (May 2004), p. 56.

121. Jiao Fangjin, “Double-Headed Eagle’s Ambush at Sea,” p. 91.

122. This quote and the remainder of this paragraph are drawn from 李克峰 [Li Kefeng], “俄罗斯火箭上浮水雷” [Russian Rocket Rising Sea Mines], 舰船知识[Naval and Merchant Ships] (October 2002), pp. 34–36.

123. 刘新民,徐红明 [Liu Xinmin and Xu Hongming], “新厉潜艇布战雷” [Firsthand Experience with Submarine Minelaying], 舰船知识 [Naval and Merchant Ships] 285, no. 6 (June 2003), pp. 6–7; “EM-52 Fast Rising Rocket Mine,” Sinodefence.com. For details on a commanding officer of a Ming submarine practicing how to evade ASW defenses to “mine an ‘enemy’ harbor” (likely a Taiwan port), see李振林,张圣江 [Li Zhenlin and Zhang Shengjiang], “隐踪洋底练绝杀—312艇艇长胡文明;蔡一清式一线指挥员风采录27” [Hiding the Trail at the Bottom of the Ocean to Practice Unique Kill: Submarine 312 Captain Hu Wenming; Series on Gallantry of Frontline Commanders in the Style of Cai Yiqing, Part 27], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 22 July 2008, p. 2.

124. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 28.

125. See茹呈瑶[Ru Chengyao], “现代鱼雷,水雷技术发展研究” [Modern Torpedo and Mine Technology Research], 舰船科学技术  [Ship Science and Technology] 25, no. 4 (August 2002), p. 42; 任德奎 [Ren Dekui], “水雷技术保障系统发展研究” [Sea Mine Technology Safeguard System Development and Research], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (1999); and傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “21世纪水雷发展预测.” [Developments in Mines Expected for the 21st Century], 现代舰船[Modern Ships], no. 140 (July 1997), p. 26.

126. 刘检,黄文斌 [Liu Jian and Huang Wenbin], “一种自航水雷布概率的计算方法” [A Method of Calculating the Dispersion Probability of Self-Propelled Mines], 鱼雷技术  [Torpedo Technology] 13, no. 3 (September 2005), pp. 43–45.

127. See, for example, 倪永杰,王建国[Ni Yongjie and Wang Jianguo],大连舰艇学院装备系统与自动化系 [Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, Equipment and Automation Systems Department], “潜艇布自航水雷障碍的效力计算方法” [Effectiveness Calculation Method for Submarine-Laid Self-Propelled Sea Mines], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (2007); and 许三祥 [Xu Sanxiang], 710 Research Institute, CSIC,“自导水雷及其自导装置发展初探” [The Development of Self-Guided Sea Mines and their Guidance Devices], 舰船科学技术  [Ship Science and Technology] (February 2008).

128. See卢楠,张旭 [Lu Nan and Zhang Xu], “自航水雷雷位误差对障碍伤概率影响分析” [Analysis on the Influence of an SLMM Position Deviation as It Relates to the Destruction Probability of a Mine Barrier],指挥控制与仿真 [Command Control and Simulation] (May 2008); and朱江波, 宋保维,赵娥 [Zhu Hong, Song Baowei, and Zhao E], “一种自航水雷障碍效力的计算方法” [A Calculation Method of the Effectiveness of the SLMM Barrier],弹舰与制导学报 [Journal of Projectiles, Rockets, Missiles and Guidance] (April 2007).

129. Ni Yongjie, Wang Jianguo, “Effectiveness Calculation Method for Submarine-Laid Self-Propelled Sea Mines,” Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense, no. 1 (2007); 洪星,洪志平,马爱民 [Hong Xing, Hong Zhiping, and Ma Aimin], “定向攻击水雷打击概率模型研究” [Striking Probability of Directional Attack Sea Mines], 情报指挥控制系统与仿真技术 [Information Command Control System and Simulation Technology] 26, no. 5 (October 2004), pp. 50–52, 60; 孙明太 [Sun Mingtai et al.], “应用统计法计算主动攻击水雷命中概率的仿真研究” [Application of Calculation of the Hitting Probability of Floating Rocket Mines by Simulation Methods], 弹舰与制导学报[Journal of Projectiles, Rockets, Missiles and Guidance] 22, no. 2 (2001), pp. 48–51; 孙明太[Sun Mingtai et al.], “应用统计法计算主动攻击水雷命中概率的仿真研究” [Simulation Study of the Active Attack Mine’s Hitting Probability Using Statistical Methods], 系统仿真学报 [Journal of System Simulation] 12, no. 6 (November 2000), pp. 678–84.

130. 张宇文,谢建辉 [Zhang Yuwen and Xie Jianhui], “自航水雷沉底稳定性与自航性能的兼容性问题” [The Problem of Compatibility between Stability of Self-Propelled Mines on the Ocean Floor and Their Moving Performance], 舰船工程[Ship Engineering] 5, 1997, pp. 46–49.

131. 陈雄洲,舒旭光,廉斌 [Chen Xiongzhou, Shu Xuguang, and Lian Bin], “水下火箭发动机喷管出口压强研究” [Study on the Pressure Strength of Nozzle Exit for Underwater Rocket Motor], 舰船科学技术  [Ship Science and Technology] 26, no. 6 (December 2004), pp. 38–40;刘乐华 [Liu Lehua et al.], “自主攻击水雷发射流场分析与数值仿真” [Analysis and Numerical Simulation of Automatic Attacking Mines’ Jet Flow Field], 实验力学 [Journal of Experimental Mechanics] 17, no. 4 (December 2002), pp. 488–91.

132. 刘乐华, 张宇文[Liu Lehua and Zhang Yuwen], “深海垂直发射内弹道研究” [Study on the Interior Trajectory for Vertical Launch under Deep Sea], 舰船科学技术  [Ship Science and Technology] 26, no. 1 (February 2004), pp. 24–26; 李体方,张志峰[Li Tifang and Zhang Zhifeng], “海浪作用下的水下弹道数学模型” [Mathematical Modeling of the Effect of Sea Waves on an Underwater Missile Trajectory], 弹道学报 [Journal of Ballistics] 11, no. 3 (September 1999), pp. 47–51; 袁绪龙, 张宇文, 查展鹏,刘乐华 [Yuan Xulong, Zhang Yuwen, Zha Zhanpeng, and Liu Lehua], “机于高端平台的水雷弹道视景仿真研究” [Torpedo Sea Mine Trajectory Visual Simulation Based on High-End Platforms], 舰船科学技术  [Ship Science and Technology] 26, no. 1 (February 2004), pp. 35–38.

133. 张旭, 腾兆新[Zhang Xu, Dalian Naval Vessel Academy; and Teng Zhaoxin, Northwestern Polytechnical University], “水雷封锁作战决策科学化的思考” [Thoughts on Scientific Decision Making in Mine Blockade Warfare], 军事运筹与系统工程[Military Operations Research and Systems Engineering] (June 2008), pp. 59–62.

134. 王容,李庆民,李华 [Wang Rui, Li Qingmin, and Li Hua], Department of Weaponry Engineering, Naval University of Engineering, Wuhan, supported by the National Defense Preliminary Research Fund, “马尔科夫链扫雷效果评估模型可信度验证” [Validation of Credibility of Markov Chain Mine Sweeping Effectiveness Evaluation Model], 海军工程大学学报 [Journal of Naval University of Engineering] 19, no. 6 (December 2007), pp. 108–12.

135.胡红波,马爱民 [Hu Hongbo and Ma Aimin], Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, “MATLAB神经网络的舰船磁场强度估算” [Estimation on Intensity of Magnetic Field around Warship Based on NN in MATLAB], 火力与指挥控制 [Fire Control and Command Control] 32, no. 2 (February 2007), pp. 77–79.

136. See 赵晓哲,沈治河主编 [Zhao Xiaozhe and Shen Zhehe, chief eds.],海军作战数学模型 [Mathematical Models for Naval Warfare] (Beijing: National Defense Industry, 2004), foreword, pp. 25–37, 44–45.

137.陈孟君,赵治平,谭华 [Chen Mengjun, Zhao Zhiping, and Tan Hua], 710 Research Institute, CSIC, “通电二电极对水雷的干扰性研究” [Research on Two Electrodes’ Interference on Sea Mines], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2007).

138. 吴中平,韩召,赖建芸 [Wu Zhongping, Han Zhao, and Lai Jianyun], 中国船舶重工集团公司第七一O研究所[710 Research Institute, CSIC], “高速摄影的照明测试与分析” [Illumination Testing and Analysis of High-Speed Photographs], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (2006).

139. 胡敏 [Hu Min], 中国船舶重工集团公司第七一O研究所[710 Research Institute, CSIC], “一种新型大容量水雷内记仪” [A New Large Capacity Mine Internal Recorder], 舰船科学技术  [Ship Science and Technology], no. 2 (2007).

140. 杨翠云, 李永红, 闾建生,张玉东,熊志红 [Yang Cuiyun, Li Yonghong, Yan Jiansheng, Zhang Yudong, and Xiong Zhihong], 中北大学电子工程系; 科泰微技术有限公司技术中心; 中国船舶重工集团公司第七一O研究所[Zhongbei University Electronic Engineering Department; Elcoteq Micro Technology Co., Ltd. Technology Center; and 710 Research Institute, CSIC], “水雷用定深测控系统的设计和实现” [Design and Implementation of a Sea Mine Depth Measurement and Control System],微计算器信[Microcomputer Information], no. 28 (2007).

141. 彭荆明,李兴生; 中国船舶重工集团公司七一O研究院[Peng Jingming and Li Xingsheng, Yichang Testing Technique Research Institute/710 Research Institute, CSIC] and帅高山,海军驻宜昌地区军事代表室,湖北宜昌[Shuai Gaoshan, Military Representives Office of the Chinese Navy in Yichang], “国军标在水雷软件工程化中的应用” [National Military Standard and Its Application in Mine Software Engineering], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (2007).

142. The system should be based on “analog circuit fault diagnosis techniques.”赵延安 [Zhao Yanan], 西北工业大学,检测技术及自动化装置[Northwest Polytechnic University, Detection Technology and Automation Devices], “某型水雷引信故障诊断技术研究及测试系统设计” [Research on Fault Diagnosis Techniques for Certain Mine Fuses and Design of a Testing System] (master’s thesis, 23 May 2007). For similar research, see寇京月,艾华,宋磊 [Kou Qiongyue, Ai Hua, and Song Lei; Mailbox 1014 18, Beijing 102249] and 黄天啖, 95202部队计量站[Huang Tianyan, PLA Unit 95202, Guangdong 528227], “水雷专用测试设备计量校准系统的设计与实现” [Design and Realization of the Metrological Calibration System for Special Sea Mine Test Equipment],电子测量技术[Electronic Measurement Technology], no. 11 (2008).

143. 周丰 [Zhou Feng et al.], “卡尔曼滤波在水雷引信目标定位中的应用” [Application of Kalman Filter to Target Location of the Mine Fuse], 海军工程学院学报[Journal of Naval University of Engineering] 89, no. 4 (1999), pp. 21–25.

144.刘军,王树宗[Liu Jun and Wang Shuzong], “两种水雷破坏半径计算方法比较与实力分析” [Two Methods of Calculating a Mine’s Blast Radius: A Comparison and Sample Analysis], 舰船科学技术  [Ship Science and Technology] 27, no. 4 (August 2005), pp. 59–61.

145. 刘进[Liu Jin], “水雷壳体厚度对水雷性能的影响” [The Influence of Sea Mine Shell Thickness on Sea Mine Function], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (2000).

146. 腾兆新, 张旭[Teng Zhaoxin and Zhang Xu], Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, “水雷对舰船的毁伤概率计算模型及仿真” [Model for Calculating the Damage Probability of Sea Mines against Warships],系统仿真学报 [Journal of System Simulation] 20, no. 16 (August 2008), pp. 4241–43; 描锦,帅高山 [Miao Jin and Shuai Gaoshan], “水面爆炸损失模型的探讨” [Evaluation of a Surface Explosion Model], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (2008);张志宏 [Zhang Zhihong], “预测航线上的水压水雷对舰船损伤的新方法” [A New Way to Calculate Damage to Shipping by Hydraulic (Water Pressure) Sea Mines in Shipping Lanes], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2000).

147. 方毓景,冯陵波,刘维基,李青梅 [Fang Yujing, Feng Linbo, Liu Weiji, and Li Qinmei], “火箭上浮水雷噪声特性测量分析” [The Measurement and Analysis of the Noise Characteristics of Rocket-Propelled Rising Mines], 现代引信 [Modern Fuses], no. 1 (1998), pp. 58–62.

148.王海燕 [Wang Haiyan], “利用目标噪声频域信息的定位方法研究” [Research on Localization Method Using the Information of Frequency Domain of a Target-Radiated Noise], 现代引信[Modern Fuses], no. 2 (1998), pp. 46–49.

149. 张旭,冷相文 [Zhang Xu and Leng Xiangwen], “自航水雷雷为次序坐标散布特性” [The Distributed Characteristics of Ordering Coordinates of a Submarine-Launched Mobile Mine’s Position],火力与指挥控制 [Fire Control and Command Control] 29, supplement (June 2004), pp. 47–48, 51;张云海 [Zhang Yunhai], “水雷潜布弹道研究” [Submarine-Laid Sea Mine Trajectory Research], 舰船科学技术  [Ship Science and Technology], no. 1 (1995), pp. 26–31.

150. 刘旭晖 [Liu Xuhui], “水鱼雷发展趋势探讨” [Mine Torpedo Development Trends], 鱼雷技术  [Torpedo Technology] 11, no. 2 (June 2003), pp. 4–7.

151. Shao Delun, Gao Chunzhan, and Xu Feng, “Underwater Firing Range.” For similar effort expended in perfecting “safety support and underwater tracking and positioning” for “a high precision and long-range mine test,” see Mao Jinxiong, Xiao Delun, and Chen Wanjun, “Miraculous Sword Holding Up Sea and Sky,” Liaowang, no. 41, 13 October 2008, pp. 52–53, OSC CPP20081023710017.

152. This process is conceptually similar to the addition of a JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) tail kit or the U.S. upgrading of “dumb” bombs into Destructor mines through use of film transistors as magnetic fuses for employment in North Vietnam’s Haiphong Harbor.

153. See, for example,詹广平, 倪华,张光法 [Zhan Guangping, Ni Hua, and Zhang Guangfa], “专家系统在智能水雷引信中的应用研究” [Applications Research Concerning Expert Systems on Intelligent Mine Fuse Systems], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and ShipSelf-Defense], no. 4 (2007).

154.谢磊,上海船舶电子设备研究所[Xie Lei, Shanghai Marine Electronic Equipment Institute] and 李秀坤,哈尔滨工程大学 [Li Xiukun, Harbin Engineering University], “水雷目标的亮点信息提取及融合研究” [Research on the Extraction and Fusion of Sea Mine Highlight Information], 声学技术[Technical Acoustics] 27, no. 5, part 2 (October 2008), pp. 508–509.

155.周穗华 [Zhou Suihua et al.], “智能化水雷引信及其评估方法” [The Intelligized Sea Mine Fuse and its Fuzzy Evaluation Method], 海军工程大学学报[Journal of Naval University of Engineering] 16, no. 1 (February 2004), pp. 48–53, 82; 李艳丽,程赛先[Li Yanli and Cheng Saixian], “人工神经网络技术在目标识别中的应用” [Application of Artificial Neural Network Based on Target Recognition], 舰船电子工程[Ship Electronic Engineering] 24, no. 5 (2004), pp. 92–95; 韩鹏 [Han Peng et al.], “适于水雷工作的软件引信研究” [Study on Software Fuses for Mines],探测与控制学报 [Journal of Detection and Control] 25, no. 1 (March 2003), pp. 44–47; 周穗华[Zhou Suihua], “现代水雷控制电路中开关器件可靠性分析及其应用” [Reliability of Switching Components in the Mine Control Circuit], 海军工程大学报[Journal of Naval University of Engineering] 15, no. 1 (February 2003), pp. 38–41; 傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “水雷的非触发引信” [Influence Fuses of Mines], 现代舰船[Modern Ships], no. 137 (May 1997), p. 30.

156. 郑新明,郝力勤,陈刚 [Zheng Xinming, Hao Liqin, and Chen Gang], 中国船舶重工集团公司第七一O研究所[710 Research Institute, CSIC], “基于功率谱的舰船水压信号检测方法研究” [A Method of Ship Hydraulic Pressure Signal Detection Based on Power Spectrum], 指挥控制与仿真 [Command Control and Simulation], no. 1 (2008); 张晓兵,玄兆林 [Zhang Xiaobing and Xuan Zhaolin], “使用双水压船感器抗风浪干扰原理” [Principles of Counteracting Wave Disturbance by Two Pressure Sensors], 海军工程大学学报[Journal of Naval University of Engineering] 15, no. 5 (October 2003), pp. 65–67, 74. See also傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “非触发引信用的流体动力换能器原理样机的结构与实验” [Construction and Testing of Prototype Hydrodynamic Transducers for Influence Sea Mine Fuses], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (2008).

157. 王闵,董大群,孙玉兰,刘叶红[Wang Min, Dong Daqun, Sun Yulan, and Liu Yehong], “弱信号自适应检测技术研究” [Research on the Adaptive Weight Vector Technique of Detecting Weak Signals],探测与控制学报[Journal of Detection and Control] 27, no. 2 (June 2005), pp. 45–47, 54.

158. Naval University of Engineering researchers, for example, are studying how to make mines more resistant to sweeping by altering their shapes. 谭新, 玄兆林, 张晓兵[Tan Xin, Xuan Zhaolin, and Zhang Xiaobing], “水雷不同外形目标强度的计算与测量” [Calculating and Measuring the Target Strength of Different Shapes of Mines], 海军工程大学学报[Journal of Naval University of Engineering] 16, no. 2 (April 2004), pp. 69–73; 程锦房,何希盈,王文水 [Cheng Jinfang, He Xiying, and Wang Wenshui], “基于舰船声磁相关的水雷抗扫性能研究” [Sea Mine Antisweeping Performance Research Based on the Correlation of Ship Magnetic Fields and Acoustic Fields], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (2008); 玄兆林, 谭新, 张晓兵[Xuan Zhaolin, Tan Xin, and Zhang Xiaobing], “水雷总体的升学问题” [The Acoustical Problem of Sea Mine Collectivity], 海军工程大学学报[Journal of Naval University of Engineering] 14, no.6 (December 2002), pp.10–12, 18. For research concerning sweeping resistance, see傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “水雷发火判据的数学理论” [Mathematical Theory for Sea Mine Detonation Criteria], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (2000); and傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “海中类似水雷目标引起的声散射自回归分析” [An Autoregressive Analysis of Acoustic Scattering Caused by Minelike Targets in the Ocean], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (1999).

159. Shao Delun, Gao Chunzhan, and Xu Feng, “Underwater Firing Range.”

160. Han Peng and Li Yucai, eds., Outline of Undersea Weaponry.

161. 何诘莹 [He Jieying], “水雷伞的飞行轨迹研究” [Study on the Flight Path of Mine Parachutes],南京航空航天大学学报 [Journal of Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics] 26, no. 4 (August 1994), pp. 545–50.

162. 高大全 [Gao Daquan], “‘航天器回收技术’在兵器上的应用” [The Application of “Space Recovery Technology” in Armaments], 航天返回与摇感[Spacecraft Recovery and Remote Sensing] 19, no. 3 (August 1998), pp. 16–20.

163. 韩光智[Han Guangzhi],中北大学,测试计量技术及仪器[Zhongbei University, Testing Measurement Technology and Instrumentation],空投水雷冲击过载测试技术研究 [Research on the Impingement Acceleration Test of the Air-Drop Mine] (master’s thesis, 14 October 2008);宋保维,杜晓旭,孟锐,李家旺,绍成[Song Baowei, Du Xiaoxu, Li Jiawang, and Shao Cheng], “空投水雷入水冲击力仿真” [Numerical Simulation of Water-Entry Impact Force for Air-Launched Mines], 鱼雷技术  [Torpedo Technology] (March 2008); 潘光,伟刚 ,杜晓旭[Pan Guang, Wei Gang, and Du Xiaoxu], “空投水雷入水及水下弹道的设计与仿真” [The Design and Simulation of Water Entry and Underwater Trajectory for an Air-Dropped Sea Mine],火力与指挥控制 [Fire Control and Command Control] (March 2007), pp. 85–93.

164.于汉玉 [Yu Hanyu], “飞机布雷效能评估—数模建立和指数分析” [An Evaluation of Minelaying by Aircraft: An Analysis That Establishes a Mathematical Model and Index], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (1998).

165. Shao Delun, Gao Chunzhan, and Xu Feng, “Underwater Firing Range.”

166. See, for example, 徐阳 [Xu Yang], “国外反水雷技术装备的发展” [Foreign Development of MCM Technology and Equipment], 舰载武器[Shipborne Weapons], no. 1 (2002), pp. 39–42.

167. See, for example, 郑洋 [Zou Yang], 哈尔滨工程大学, 信号与信息处理[Harbin Engineering University, Signals and Information Processing], “水雷目标识别信号融合方法研究” [Research on Methods of Information Fusing for Mine Recognition] (master’s thesis, 21 August 2007); 陈萍 [Chen Ping], 哈尔滨工程大学,信号与信息处理 [Harbin Engineering University, Signals and Information Processing], “分数阶Fourier变换在水雷目标特征提取中的应用” [The Application of the Fractional Fourier Transform in the Extraction of Mine Characteristics] (master’s thesis, 21 August 2007); 迟慧广 [Chi Huiguang], 哈尔滨工程大学,水声工程 [Harbin Engineering University, Acoustical Engineering], “希尔伯特—黄变换在水雷目标特征提取中的应用” [The Application of the Hilbert-Huang Transform in the Extraction of Mine Characteristics] (master’s thesis, 21 August 2007); 于妮娜 [Yu Ninuo], 哈尔滨工程大学,通信与信息系统[Harbin Engineering University, Communication and Information Systems], “基于支持向量机的水雷目标识别研究” [Research on the Mine Target Recognition Based on Support Vector Machines] (master’s thesis, 2007); 郭丽华,王大成,丁士祈 [Guo Lihua, Wang Dacheng, and Ding Shiqi], “水下目标特征提取方法研究” [Research Concerning the Extraction of Underwater Targets’ Features], 声学技术 [Technical Acoustics] 24, no. 3 (September 2005), pp. 148–51, 156; 郭丽华,王大成,丁士祈[Guo Lihua, Wang Dacheng, and Ding Shiqi], “水雷目标识别中的数据融合技术” [Data Fusion Technology for Recognition of Mine Characteristics], 海洋技术 [Ocean Technology] 24, no. 2 (June 2005), pp. 36–38, 45.

168. 赵祚德 [Zhao Zuode], “基于概率推断网的水雷战专家系统” [An Expert System for Mine Warfare Based on a Probabilistic Inference Network], 情报指挥控制系统与仿真技术 [Information Command Control Systems and Simulation Technology] 27, no. 2 (April 2005), pp. 52–56.

169. 缪涛,张志宏 ,顾建农 [Miao Tao, Zhang Zhihong, and Gu Jiannong],海军工程大学理学院[College of Science, Naval University of Engineering, Wuhan], “浅水低速舰船通过雷区危险航速的预报模型” [Forecast Model of Dangerous Speed When Ships Pass a Mine Area in Shallow Water at Low Speed], 舰船科学技术  [Ship Science and Technology], no. 5 (2008).

170. Han Peng and Li Yucai, eds., Outline of Undersea Weaponry, p. 4

171. Jiao Fangjin, “Double-Headed Eagle’s Ambush at Sea,” p. 91.

172. Wang Wei, “Enduring and Yet Fully Relevant,” p. 58.

173. Chen Dongyuan, “The Mysterious Underwater Sentry,” p. 45.

174.刘衍中,李祥 [Liu Yanzhong and Li Xiang], “实施智能攻击的现代水雷” [Carrying Out Intelligent Attacks with Modern Mines], 当代海军[Modern Navy] (July 2006), p. 29

175. 沈国光,李德袀,李润珊,王继红 [Shen Guoguang, Li Deyun, and Wang Jihong], “大当量爆炸兴波的数值模拟” [A Mathematical Simulation of a Wave from a Large Explosion],海洋学报 [Acta Oceanologica Sinica] (September 1996), pp. 128–33.

176. Some European countries have reportedly fielded sea mines with antiaircraft capabilities, and the United States has apparently conducted research in this area as well.

177. Wang Wei, “Enduring and Yet Fully Relevant,” p. 59. This capability is also hinted at in the introduction of Han Peng and Li Yucai, eds., Outline of Undersea Weaponry, p. 1.

178. Wang Wei, “Enduring and Yet Fully Relevant,” p. 59.

179. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 28.

180. Han Peng and Li Yucai, eds., Outline of Undersea Weaponry, p. 155.

181. Ibid., p. 29.

182. 李宝祥, 董大群[Li Baoxiang and Dong Daqun], “导弹水雷” [Guided Missile Sea Mines], in 荣恩杰 [Luan Enjie, chief ed.],国防科技名词辞典:船舶 [National Defense Science & Technology Phrase Dictionary: Shipping] (Beijing: 航空工业出版社/兵器工业出版社/原子能出版社 [Aviation Industry Press/Weapons Industry/Atomic Energy], 2002), p. 78.

183. One article states that the system would use a thousand bottom mines—with sonar, magnetic, or pressure fuses—in six salvoes from twenty-eight launchers to blockade a port in three hours. Hai Lin, “In 2010 Taiwan Will Be Surrounded with a Sea Mine Battle Array,” p. 18. China has over three decades of experience with relatively simple, shorter-range rocket deployment of the smaller types of land mines and has developed advanced multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRSs).沙兆军 [Sha Zhaojun],炮兵学院南京分院[Nanjing Artillery Academy], “火箭布雷弹抛撒均匀性评定模型及仿真研究” [Rocket Minelaying Bomb Distribution Assessment Model and Simulation Study], in ed. 陈宗海 [Chen Zonghai], 2007系统仿真技术及其应用学术会议论文集 [The Collected Works of the 2007 Systems Emulation Technology and Applications Science Conference], 高云飞,李小燕 ,王宁 [Gao Yunfei, Li Xiaoyan, and Wang Ning],解放军理工大学工程兵工程学院 [Engineering Corps Institute, PLA University of Science and Technology, Nanjing], “蒙特卡罗法在火箭布雷中的应用” [The Application of the Monte Carlo Method in Rocket Minelaying], in陈光亚 [Chen Guangya, ed.],科学发展观与系统工程—中国系统工程学会第十四届学术年会论文集, 2006 . [Scientific Outlook on Development and Systems Engineering: Proceedings of the 14th Annual Conference of Systems Engineering Society of China, 2006],兰宁远[Lan Ningyuan], “‘现代雷神’李创 ” [Li Zhao, “The Modern Mine God”], 海内与海外[At Home and Overseas], no. 11 (2004); “中国74式布雷火箭系统” [China’s Type 74 Minelaying Rocket System], 现代兵器 [Modern Weapons], no. 11 (1998); 田思明,申小健 ,陈振有 [Tian Siming, Shen Xiaojian, and Chen Zhenyou; Resident Military Representative Roon in 743 Factory, Taiyuan], “122 mm火箭布雷系统训练仿真弹结构设计” [Structure Design of 122 mm Rocket Minelaying System Practice Simulation Projectile], 弹箭技术 [Rocket Technology], no. 2 (1997); “火箭布雷车” [Rocket Minelaying Truck], “火箭布雷” [Rocket Minelaying], in Modern Soldier Dictionary, chief ed. Xiong Wuyi, pp. 379, 383–84. Chinese MLRSs include the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology’s A-100 300 mm, ten-tube variant, which is similar to Russia’s Smerch 9K58 300 mm rocket system. For recent research, see 王锋 [Wang Feng],南京理工大学,兵器发射理论与技术 [Nanjing University of Technology and Engineering, Weapons Launch Theory and Technology], “舰载多功能火箭炮系统分析与研究” [Systems Analysis and Research on Shipborne Multifunction Rocket Launchers] (PhD dissertation, 21 November 2007). A student at Nanjing University of Science and Technology, who has received guidance from a PLA unit and an expert on missiles and submunitions, has conducted research and testing of a rudimentary canister holding two mine-sized objects, which are released one at a time so their trajectories can be observed.江宏寿 [Jiang Hongshou], 南京理工大学[Nanjing University of Science and Technology], 兵器发射理论与技术 [Weapons Launch Theory and Technology Discipline], “空投水雷抛撒过程数值仿真与实验研究” [Numerical Simulation and Experiment Study of Mine Throwing] (master’s thesis, 6 December 2006). For an article that “puts forward two rocket launchers, a firing switchimplementation mechanism, and technical means” (提出了两座火箭发射装置实现调转发射的机理与技术途径), see 燕飞,周晓明 [Yan Fei and Zhou Xiaoming], 中国船舶重工集团公司第七一O研究所[710 Research Institute, CSIC], “火箭炮交替调转发射的机理与实现” [Alternating Reverse Rocket-Launch Mechanism and Implementation], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (2006).

184. A major flaw in Michael Glosny’s analysis is his dismissal of the use of all but East Sea Fleet submarines in a Taiwan-blockade MIW scenario. Why would China invest time and resources in practicing with platforms that it did not intend to use?

185. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 32.

186. As a textbook elaborates, “When employing surface vessels to lay mines, they maneuver slowly, passage requires a long time, and they tend to expose the goal of the operations. . . . Only beyond the range of the opponent’s main coastal firepower and with cover from strong naval and airborne forces is it possible to fully utilize [their] advantages . . . such as the ability to carry large quantities of mines, the ability to lay out a long string of mines, accurate positioning of mines, the ability to deploy a tight, large area of mines and obstructions, and the ability to deploy multiple types of mines.” “174. How Does One Determine the Main Attack Targets in a Naval Base Defense Campaign?” in Bi Xinglin, ed., Campaign Theory Study Guide.

187. Ren Daonan, “Submarine Minelaying,” p. 26. See also 刘定平[Liu Dingping], “水雷在战场上的运用” [The Use of Sea Mines in Battle], 现代兵器[Modern Weapons], no. 3 (2002).

188. Ren Daonan, “Submarine Minelaying,” p. 26. Ren adds that submarine-laid mines can “baffle the enemy, and thus achieve exceptional combat results.”

189. Unless otherwise specified, information in this paragraph is from Hai Lin, “In 2010 Taiwan Will Be Surrounded with a Sea Mine Battle Array,” pp. 17, 18.

190. Ibid., p. 16.

191. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 33. Another source notes, however, that “submarines built after World War II rarely carry mines externally.” See “潜艇布雷” [Submarine Minelaying], 现代舰船[Modern Ships] (July 2002), p. 44.

192. Ying Nan, “Goals of Offensive Minelaying Discussed,” Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval Merchant Ships], no. 241 (September 1999), pp. 10–11, OSC FTS19991022001765

193. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 33.

194. Hai Lin, “In 2010 Taiwan Will Be Surrounded with a Sea Mine Battle Array,” p. 16.

195. “32. How to Conduct Barrier Blockade Combat?” in “II. Blockade Campaign,” in Bi Xinglin, ed., Campaign Theory Study Guide.

196. Ibid., p. 16; Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 33.

197. This estimate is based on the nine-thousand-kilogram internal payload capacity of the H-6 as reported in “H-6 Bomber,” Sinodefence.com. The estimate of one hundred H-6 aircraft is from “China, Armed Forces,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: China and Northeast Asia, 12 July 2005, www.janes.com.

198. “Military Report,” CCTV-7, 12 January 2009, OSC CPM20090304013025.

199. The payload capacity is based on study of Internet photos

200. 计生文,姜毅,王松涛 [Ji Shengwen, Jiang Yi, and Wang Songtao], “金戈铁甲啸海疆—回眸改革开放以来海军装备建设成就” [Steel Weapons, Armor Roar through the Coastal Areas and Territorial Seas: Looking Back at the Achievements in the PLA Navy’s Equipment Effort since the Beginning of Reforms and Opening Up], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 6 October 2008, p. 1.

201. China’s seventy-six SU-30MKK fighters could conceivably carry several mines, since they are designed to carry Russian free-fall bombs. However, it is unlikely that such a high-value platform (e.g., fourth-generation aircraft) would be used in this role when less sophisticated aircraft would suffice. PLA Navy aviation force J-8s (numbering approximately fifty) and Q-5s (approximately thirty) could also conceivably perform the MIW mission, as could the two hundred obsolete, and even expendable, PLA Navy aviation force J-6s. If the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assumes the MIW mission, it will have many more candidate platforms, including J-7s (620), J-8s (184), Q-5s (300), and J-6s (350). But if the objective of aerial mining is the quick placement of large numbers of weapons, platforms that carry significant numbers of mines make much more sense than larger numbers of planes that carry only one or two each

202. Hai Lin, “In 2010 Taiwan Will Be Surrounded with a Sea Mine Battle Array,” p. 17.

203. Yao Jun, ed.,中国航空史 [A History of China’s Aviation] (Zhengzhou: Dajia, September 1998), pp. 183–89.

204. See Ying Nan, “Goals of Offensive Minelaying Discussed.”

205. Min Zengfu, “A Glimpse at 21st-Century Air Combat,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [China Military Science], 20 February 1995, OSC FTS19950220000008

206. See, for example, the detailed operational parameters suggested in Yu Hanyu, “An Evaluation of Minelaying by Aircraft.” See also the analysis of the effects of parachute drag on the trajectory of a mine dropped from a plane in He Jieying, “Study on the Flight Path of Mine Parachutes,” pp. 545–50, and Gao Daquan, “The Application of ‘Space Recovery Technology’ in Armaments,” pp. 16–20.

207. “Report on Role of China’s Naval Air Force,” “China Today” program, CCTV-9, 2300 GMT, 22 April 2009, OSC CPM20090423017042.

208. 刘文平,孙樱,李斌富[Liu Wenping, Sun Ying, and Li Binfu], “叱咤海天30载与满清武报国志;填补空白18项痴心反潜为打赢;北航某舰载机团反潜战术主任赵树民—堪称‘航空反潜先锋’” [Thirty Years of Commanding the Sea and the Sky Filled with a Determination of Serving the Country with Superb Military Skills; Filling in Eighteen Voids by Focusing Whole-Heartedly on Winning in Antisubmarine Warfare; Zhao Shumin, Antisubmarine Tactical Director of an Unidentified Ship-Board Aircraft Regiment of North Sea Fleet Aviation Force: Worthy of Being Called an “Aviation Antisubmarine Pioneer”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 16 December 2008, p. 1.

209. The Russian series of AMD bottom mines, in production since the late 1950s, is designed to be delivered by air and is believed to have been exported to, and copied by, China. See Watts, “Russian Federation Underwater Weapons,” and Hewson, “Type 500 and 1000 Mines.” Gidropribor’s MDM-2 bottom influence mine and PMR-2 rising influence mine are both designed to be delivered by aircraft. See www.gidropribor.ru/eng/products.php4.

210. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 32.

211. “32. How to Conduct Barrier Blockade Combat?”

212. “182. What Force Groups are Usually Assembled in a Naval Blockade Campaign?” in “XI. Naval Blockade Campaign,” in Bi Xinglin, ed., Campaign Theory Study Guide.

213.荣森芝,烟台警备区副司令员[Rong Senzhi, Deputy Commander, Yantai Garrison District], “构筑海上民兵民船,建用分级保障体系 ” [Construct a Civilian-Ship-Based Sea Militia, Build and Employ Support System with Different Levels],”国防[National Defense], 15 September 2003, p. 42.

214. Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in 2008,” pp. 50–51. This is introduced by Chen Zhou, one of the drafters, as new information. Bai Ruixue, Wang Jingguo, and Xiong Zhengyan, “(Interpreting White Paper on National Defense) Focus the First Time in the New White Paper on National Defense,” Xinhua, 20 January 2009, OSC CPP20090120172004.

215. Hai Lin, “In 2010 Taiwan Will Be Surrounded with a Sea Mine Battle Array,” p. 18.

216. Zhang Yuliang, Yu Shusheng, and Zhou Xiaopeng, Science of Campaigns, chap. 13. More forceful advocacy appears in “148. During a Sea Transportation Defense Campaign, How Does One Rely on Island Shores and Comprehensively Employ Various Forces to Ensure the Safety of Transportation Lines on Nearby Shores?” “VI. Naval Shipping Protection Campaigns,” in Bi Xinglin, ed., Campaign Theory Study Guide.

217. “Military Report,” CCTV-7, 1130 GMT, 19 October 2008, OSC CPP20081019091002.

218.查春明,王秋阳[Zha Chunming and Wang Qiuyang], “海军某基地 民兵海上训练纪实” [An On-the-Spot Report of a People’s Militia Sea Drill at a Certain Navy Base],舰船知识 [Naval and Merchant Ships], no. 3 (5 February 2005), p. 4.

219. Ying Nan, “Goals of Offensive Minelaying Discussed,” pp. 10–11.

220. Ibid.

221. Hai Lin, “In 2010 Taiwan Will Be Surrounded with a Sea Mine Battle Array,” p. 18.

222.李杰[Li Jie], “新秀闪亮水下战场” [A New Harvest of Weapons for the Undersea Battlefield],中国民兵 [China Militia] (May 2008).

223. Jia Yeliang and Guo Yike, “A Para-Naval Force from among the People: Civilian Ships,” Dangdai Haijun [Modern Navy] (February 2004), pp. 46–47, OSC CPP20041102000199.

224. The concept of “People’s War at Sea” has been endorsed by recently retired Major General Peng Guangqian—who has served as a research fellow at China’s Academy of Military Sciences and who, as an adviser to China’s powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and Politburo Standing Committee, has enjoyed significant influence in the shaping of PLA strategy. See Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science, 2005), p. 456.

225. Indeed, the PLA has outfitted sea mines for use in sub-laying and air-dropping training. These include the Xun-1 submarine-laid deep-bottom sea mine and the Model 500 air-laid deep-bottom sea mine. Xun-1’s distinguishing feature is its ability to utilize a fuse from either C-1, C-2, or C-3 to mimic those mines in exercises. Ling Xiang, “Raise Mighty Chinese Sea Mine Warfare Ships on the Sea,” p. 156.

226. Cole, Great Wall at Sea, p. 156.

227. See, for example, 李建生[Li Jiansheng], “考核内容,海域,程序不,予提前通报:某扫雷舰大队训练考核从严从难” [The Content, Sea Area, and Procedures of the Proficiency Assessment Will Not Be Revealed in Advance: A Certain Minesweeper Squadron’s Exercises Assesses Training in a Strict and Difficult Manner], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 10 November 2006, p. 1; 张建,李德,张军红  [Zhang Jian, Li De, and Zhang Hongjun], “突围,不按‘规则’出牌—北海舰队某型舰艇布雷演练目击记” [To Break Out of Encirclement, Don’t Play Cards according to the “Rules”: An Eyewitness Report of a Minelaying Drill by a Certain Type of North Sea Fleet Submarine], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 18 October 2006, p. 1; and 曹明,陈建族 [Cao Ming and Chen Jianzu], “某扫雷舰大队:战场逼真火药味浓,” [A Certain Minesweeping Unit: A Realistic Battlefield with a Strong Smell of Gunpowder], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 18 February 2003, p. 2.

228.奏泅敬,徐红明,余子富 [Zou Qinjing, Xu Hongming, and Yu Zifu], “马立新:大洋深处走蛟龙” [Ma Lixin: The Dragon Cruises the Ocean Depths], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 5 February 2005, pp. 1, 3.

229. Kondapalli, China’s Naval Power, p. 142;张罗山,向延波,彭赳 [Zhang Luocan, Xiang Yanbo, and Peng Jiu], “某支队新艇首射水雷3发3中” [A Certain Flotilla’s New (Submarine) Boat Launched Sea Mines for the First Time: Three Shots, Three Bullseyes], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 17 April 2006, p. 1.

230.徐红明,刘新民,邱智勇[Xu Hongming, Liu Xinmin, and Qiu Zhiyong], “既练 ‘攻击术’又训‘隐身法’:东海舰队某潜艇支队能打能藏设有‘软肋’” [Train in Both “Attack Techniques” and “Concealment Methods”: A Certain East Fleet Submarine Detachment Can Attack and Hide without “Weak Spots”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 9 November 2002, p. 3; 李兵,向延波[Li Bing, Xiang Yanbo], “3月下旬,南海舰队某潜艇支队军港保障大队利用潜艇训练时机. . .” [During the Last 10 Days of March, A Certain South Sea Fleet Submarine Flotilla Port Support Squadron Seized an Opportune Moment to Carry Out Exercises . . . ], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 21 April 2006, p. 1.

231.刘荣华,龙运河,钟魁润 [Liu Ronghua, Long Yunhe, and Zhong Kuirun], “中华第一是官方阵” [China’s First Petty Officers Take Position], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 9 April 2002, p. 2

232. 特约通讯员 闾勇政[Lu Yongzheng], “某潜艇支队 临战处置能力大幅跃升” [A Certain Submarine Detachment Makes a Great Leap in Battle Management Capability], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 31 October 2002, p. 2.

233.张罗山 [Zhang Luocan], “案港教练室攻难关:某潜艇支队长魏学义” [Littoral Port Training Room Attacks Difficulty: A Certain Submarine Detachment Exercises], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 23 March 2002, p. 1.

234.桂平电,吴中秋,唐幸芳,郝跃民 [Gui Pingdian, Wu Zhongqiu, Tang Xingfang, and He Yuemin], “海军航空兵:高难科目励新招” [Navy Airmen: High, Difficult Subjects Sharpen New Recruits], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 8 August 2002, p. 2

235.孙施伟,金伟,张罗山 [Sun Shiwei, Jin Wei, and Zhang Luocan ], “既能‘一剑封喉’又能‘金蝉脱壳,’某潜艇支队训练讲求攻防兼备” [Can Already Both “Seal the Throat with One Sword” and “Escape by Cunning Maneuvering”: A Certain Submarine Unit’s Training Stressing Both Attack and Defense], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 20 July 2002, p. 1. Col. Lo Ch’eng-lieh, Air Force Academy, “The Chinese Communist Military Revolution and Inherent Threat,” Kuo Hun, 1 April 1999, pp. 42–45, OSC FTS19990627000936.

236.虞章才[Yu Zhangcai et al.], “怒海练剑—探寻某潜艇支队315艇艇长蔡一清谋打赢之路” [Forge Swordsmanship in the Raging Sea: A Look at How Captain Cai Yiqing of Submarine 315, Subordinate to a Certain Submarine Flotilla of the North Sea Fleet, Sought the Path to Winning Victory], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 22 February 2008, p. 1; 魏垂高,李德,闾勇政  [Wei Chuigao, Li De, and Lu Yongzheng], “358艇艇长代胜杰—胸怀韬略,驾艇淌过封锁线” [Dai Shengjie, Captain of Submarine 358: A Strategy That Is Hidden Within; Driving a Submarine through a Blockade], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 24 August 2007, p. 2; 江山, 闾勇政[Jiang Shan and Lu Yongzheng], “走出浅滩浅入远海练蛟龙—某潜艇支队坚持训战一致苦练真打本领” [Away from Shallow Waters and into the Distant Sea to Train the Dragon: A Certain Submarine Flotilla Persists in Training-Operation Integration to Practice and Cast Real Capabilities Painstakingly], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 1 May 2006, p. 1.

237. 徐红明, 刘新民[Xu Hongming and Liu Xinmin], “‘敌后’布雷—中国海军某潜艇突破反潜编队训练目击记” [Lay Mines “in the Enemy’s Rear Area”: An Eyewitness Account of a Certain PLAN Submarine Exercise involving Breaking Through Antisubmarine Formations], 当代海军[Modern Navy], no. 4 (2003), p. 38; Liu Xinmin and Xu Hongming, “Firsthand Experience with Submarine Minelaying,” pp. 6–7

238. Ying Nan, “Goals of Offensive Minelaying Discussed,” pp. 10–11.

239.刘剑 [Liu Jian], “潜艇学院突出复杂和应急条件下的教学训练—课堂项训练场靠拢,教员向战斗员转换” [Submarine Academy Emphasizes Teaching and Training under Complex and Emergency Conditions: Classroom Moves to the Training Ground; Instructors Switch with Warriors], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 15 December 2006, p. 1.

240. Ch’i Le-yi, “Chinese Communists Conspicuously Increase Military Intelligence Gathering on Taiwan,” Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao, 28 May 2002, OSC CPP20030528000033; Zhang Luocan, “Littoral Port Training Room Attacks Difficulty,” p. 1.

241. Lu Yongzheng and Zhang Qingzhou, “A Certain North Sea Fleet Submarine Flotilla Discards 12 Impractical Combat Methods,” p. 3.

242. Kondapalli, China’s Naval Power, p. 143.

243. “PLA Navy Captain Ma Lixin Leads Drill Using New-Type Submarine,” CCTV-1, 27 February 2005, OSC CPP20050302000014.

244. Zou Qinjing, Xu Hongming, and Yu Zifu, “Ma Lixin,” pp. 1, 3.

245. See, for example,李伟,钱学东,王桂芹[Li Wei, Qian Xuedong, and Wang Guiqin], “面向多对象的水雷保险器综合参数测试仪研究与设计” [Study and Design on Multi-Objective-Oriented Mine Safety Device Comprehensive Parameter Testing Instrument], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (2008); and 秦锋,逢洪照 [Qin Feng and Pang Hongzhao], “基于第二类拉格朗日方程的水雷内未弹道仿真” [Simulation of Interior Trajectory Termina for Sea Mines Based on the Second Lagrange Formulation], 鱼雷技术  [Torpedo Technology] (May 2008).

246. “Submarine Minelaying” (July 2002), p. 44. A translation of this article has been produced by Gabriel Collins.

247. Zhang Luocan, Xiang Yanbo, and Peng Jiu, “A Certain Flotilla’s New (Submarine) Boat Launched Sea Mines for the First Time: Three Shots, Three Bullseyes,” p. 1. Three mines reached the “furthest distance” (最远航行距离) and their “dispersion error” (散步误差) was “completely within the pre-determined scope” (预设范围之内). Because this type of mine was “very technical” (科技含量高), because the mines were to be “fired a long distance” (射程远), and because it was the new type of submarine’s first time carrying out the “furthest distance test launch” (最远距离试射), the crew members had to meet very high requirements. Also on submarine mine testing, see高春占,肖德伦  [Gao Chunzhan and Xiao Delun], “试验场腾起烽火硝烟—海军某试验区瞄准未来战场鉴定某新型装备纪实;科学发展现在海疆:使命,责任”[Flames of War and Smoke of Gunpowder Erupt on Testing Ground: A Certain Navy Test Base Evaluates New Armaments with View to Future Battlefield; Scientific Development Concept on the Coastal Seas and Territorial Waters: Mission and Duty], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 30 January 2008, p. 1.

248. Regarding sea mines, the 1997 report states, “China conducts training exercises using surface ships, submarines, and aircraft in coastal areas and is well-prepared to conduct both mine laying and mine sweeping operations in these areas.” U.S. Defense Dept., Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1305 of the FY 97 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington, D.C.: 8 April 1997), p. 5, available at www.fas.org/. The 1998 report states, in part, “The [Chinese] Navy has made some improvements in its sea denial military capabilities, particularly with respect to sea mines and submarines.” U.S. Defense Dept., Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: 1998), p. 13, available at www.fas.org/.

249. See, for example,高宏伟,寇永强  [Gao Hongwei and Kou Yongqiang], “战场环境不再似曾相识:南航部队苦练远海陌生战场破敌硬功” [Battlefield Environments Will No Longer Be Familiar Ones: South Sea Fleet Aviation Troops Train Hard to Develop Superb Enemy-Defeating Skills to Be Used on Unfamiliar Battlefields in Distant Seas], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 8 April 2008, p. 1; 张秀锦 [Zhang Xiujin], “超额完成年度训练任务:东航某飞行团十六大精神指引下” [Accomplish Annual Training Assignment above Quota: A Certain East Sea Fleet Aviation Regiment Vigorously Leads the Way after the 16th Party Congress], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 19 December 2002, p. 2.

250. Kou Yongqiang, “The Building of Fighting Capacity Begins with an Emphasis on Details,” Liberation Army Daily, 14 February 2008, OSC CPP20080225088001; Qian Xiaohu, Liang Qingcai, and Kou Yongqiang, “Forging a ‘Naval Aviation Iron Fist’: Naval Bomber Regiment Seeks Truth from Facts in Training,” Liberation Army Daily, 12 February 2006, p. 1, OSC CPP20060216502001.

251. 张秀锦,方立华[Zhang Xiujin and Fang Lihua], “空中鹰长途袭击深海鱼鲨—东航某飞行团大机群陌生海域成功布雷” [Eagles in the Sky Launch Long-Range Attacks on Deep-Sea Sharks: The Air Fleet of a Flight Regiment of the East Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy Successfully Lays Mines in Unfamiliar Waters], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 27 June 2007, p. 1.

252. Gui Pingdian, Wu Zhongqiu, Tang Xingfang, and He Yuemin, “Navy Airmen,” p. 2.

253. He Yuemin and Xie Xi, “A Unit Organizes Sea-Air 3D Confrontational Exercise to Improve Its Emergency Maneuvering Capability,” Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily], 30 August 2002, p. 1, OSC CPP20020830000027. For a similar exercise, see Wang Shijun and Tang Zhongping, “Our Reporter Experiences Actual Combat Confrontation Integrated Training Carried Out by a Certain Regiment of the South Sea Fleet: ‘Flames of War’ Spread over the Ground, Sea and the Sky,” Liberation Army Daily, 12 September 2008, p. 3, OSC CPP20080912710003.

254. 余五海,章光辉 [Yu Wuhai and Zhang Guanghui],“战鹰,子夜起飞—南航某轰炸机团下半夜飞行训练目击 ” [Fighting Eagles Take Off at Midnight: Witnessing a Certain South Sea Fleet Naval Aviation Bomber Regiment Conduct Flight Exercises after Midnight], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 24 April 2006, p. 1; Zhang Guanghui, “‘Fighting Eagles’ Take to the Sky on Rainy Night: An Eye-Witness Account of Nighttime Long-Range Precision Bombing Flight Exercises Conducted by a South China Sea Fleet Bomber Regiment,” Liberation Army Daily, 15 August 2006, p. 2, OSC CPP20060815710006.

255. 余贺,王世均[She He and Wang Shijun], “空投64枚炸弹全部命中—南航某团复杂气象展现训练高水平” [64 Air-Dropped Bombs All Hit Their Targets: A South Sea Fleet Naval Aviation Air Regiment Trains at a High Level under Complex Meteorological Conditions], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 21 June 2006, p. 1.

256. Zhang Jian, Li De, and Zhang Hongjun, “To Break Out of Encirclement, Don’t Play Cards according to the ‘Rules’: An Eyewitness Report of a Minelaying Drill by a Certain Type of North Sea Fleet Submarine,” p. 1.

257.胡朋,陈勇[Hu Peng and Chen Yong], “攻势布雷课题演练取得突破—南航某师提高复杂电磁环境下遂行作战能力”[Breakthroughs Are Made in Offensive Mine-Laying Drills: An Aviation Division of the South Sea Fleet Raises the Ability to Fulfill Operational Tasks under a Complex Electromagnetic Environment], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 17 September 2008, p. 2.

258. “Military Report,” CCTV-7, 12 January 2009.

259. “Military Report,” CCTV-7, 1130 GMT, 15 April 2009, OSC CPP20090416091001.

260. Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense in 2008, p. 51

261. Wang Guangxin and Chen Yijing, “On the Scene in the East China Sea,” pp. 5–6.

262. As identified in Du Wenlong, “Look for Militia around You,” Bingqi Zhishi [Weapons Knowledge] (April 2008), pp. 26–27, OSC CPP20080728436001.

263. Unless otherwise specified, information for this paragraph derives from Zha Chunming and Wang Qiuyang, “An On-the-Spot Report of a People’s Militia Sea Drill at a Certain Navy Base,” p. 4.

264. “Military Report,” CCTV-7, 1130 GMT, 26 July 2008, OSC CPP20080727091001.

265.汪鲁迅,李建生[Wang Luxun and Li Jiansheng],“海军预备役部队首次成建制海上训练” [The Navy Prepares the First Reserve Unit to Conduct At-Sea Training as an Organization], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 17 July 2006, p. 1. According to the reserve minesweeper squadron’s Political Commisar, Dong Huasen (董华森), more than 95 percent of the reserve officers participating in the training “came from Party and government organizations” (来自党政机关), 30 percent were former “military members converted to cadre status” (军转干部), and 80 percent were party members. The East Sea Fleet party committee assigned a full quota of “active duty cadres/officers” (现役干部). Responsible organizations, including the “city Party Committee Organization Department and the transportation and fisheries departments in the city where [the unit] was stationed” ( 驻地市委组织,交通,渔业部门 ), along with the “Military Sub-District” (军分区) and a “ship squadron(s)” (舰艇大队), adopted the “area of jurisdiction authorization and allocation method” (属地编配方法) to requisition ships in advance. Funding came from the public finance budgets of the city and the “county” (县) and “district” (区). To create at-sea operational capability as quickly as possible and manage the contradiction between production and training, in early 2006, the reserve squadron’s party committee decided to conduct training at the same time as fishing. It developed a full understanding of fishing status before the reserve unit was formed. Itpaid attention to each boat’s fishing goals and set training activities rationally. It used the time when the fishing boats were going out to sea and returning as opportunities to conduct training in driving the vessel and in mechanical and electrical maintenance. It used times when fishing boats were assembling and putting to sea as opportunities to conduct training in assembling, forming up for a voyage, and changing formation. In 2006, the squadron arranged for more than two hundred reserve officers and enlisted personnel to go aboard a minesweeper in groups for training. Standardized training corrected the reservists’ peacetime tendency to rely on their senses and experience and got them in the habit of plotting courses as required, keeping a voyage log, and plotting course-change points.

266.郑广科,何名享[Zheng Guangke and He Mingxiang], “遂行任务由陆地向海空拓展—山东省蓬莱市民兵组织结构发生新变化” [Fulfilling the Expansion of Missions from Land to Sea and Air—The Structure of the Militia Organizations in Shandong Province’s Penglai City Undergoes a New Transformation], 解放军报[Liberation Army Daily], 31 March 2007, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/.

267.代宗锋,郑光辉,武新广,谭依娜 [Dai Zongfeng, Zheng Guanghui, Wu Xinguang, and Tan Yina], “扫雷舰与渔船联合扫雷” [Minesweepers and Civilian Fishing Boats Work Together to Sweep Mines Jointly], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 1 March 2007, pp. 30–31.

268. 李高建,孙樱 [Li Gaojian and Sun Ying], “预备役船队成为海上训练新锐—海军某预备役大队主动为破解训练难题” [Reserve Ship Unit Becomes New Force for Training At Sea—Naval Reserve Squadron Takes the Initiative toward Resolving Difficult Problems], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 15 December 2008, p. 2.

269. 牛朋,孙飞 [Niu Rong and Sun Fei], “中国海军918型布雷舰” [The Chinese Navy’s Type 918 Minelaying Ship],舰船知识 [Naval and Merchant Ships] 7, no. 310 (2005), p. 11. See also 石景山 [Shi Jingshan], “10月11日,北海舰队某水警区进行防空袭条件下舰艇紧急吊装水雷演练…” [On 11 October, a Certain North Sea Fleet Water Garrison District, under Air-Raid Defense Conditions, Urgently Carried Out a Sea-Mine Hoisting Exercise . . .], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 3 November 2006, p. 1.

270. 孙铁富[Sun Tiefu], “某支队研制成功新型转雷专用车” [A Certain Flotilla Has Successfully Developed a Special-Purpose Mine-Loading Vehicle], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 30 August 2006, p. 2.

271.王松岐,章汉亭[Wang Songqi and Zhang Hanting], “在转变中求发展” [Strive for Development in the Course of Transformation], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 1 May 2006, p. 2.

272.汪祖峰,盛长峰,李文喜 [Wang Zufeng, Sheng Changfeng, and Li Wenxi], “南海舰队某鱼水雷仓库引导官兵:接新使命任务要求主动作为” [A Certain South Sea Fleet Torpedo and Sea Mine Depot Guides Officers: Receive New Mission Assignment Requiring Independent Initiative], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 8 October 2005, p. 1.

273.高尔健,宋云云,李建生  [Gao Erjian, Song Xueyun, and Li Jiansheng], “东海舰队某水雷库立足实战:练就全天候野外无依托保障” [A Certain East Sea Fleet Sea Mine Depot Has a Foothold in Actual Combat: Training in All-Weather Field [with] Independent Safeguards], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 8 October 2005, p. 1.

274.张建,李文杰,李德[Zhang Jian, Li Wenjie, and Li De], “现代海战催生保障新模式” [Modern Naval Warfare Hastens Development of a New Mode of Logistics Support], 解放军报[Liberation Army Daily], 26 February 2007, p. 3.

275. 周亚文[Zhou Yawen], “千里之外崛起临时保障阵地—南海舰队某保障基地成功完成新型导弹水雷应急补给”[A Temporary Support Base Arises from Far Away—A Certain South Sea Fleet Support Base Successfully Accomplishes Emergency Supply for New Types of Missiles and Sea Mines], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 5 December 2006, p. 2. For a similar exercise, see Shi Yuanming, “Ordnance Technical Support Team Uplifts Mobile Support Capacity,” Liberation Army Daily, 24 March 2008, OSC CPP20080325702016.

276.高广,谭依娜 [Gao Qing and Tan Yina], “ 军民一体,精确高校—海军新型鱼水雷保障能力大幅提升 ” [The Military and the Civilian Work Together to Ensure Precise and Highly Efficient Support Work—The Chinese Navy Significantly Improves Its Support Capability for New-Type Torpedoes and Sea Mines], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 2 December 2008, p. 2.

277. 林在连,王亚军,张文西,张汉亭[Lin Zailian, Wang Yajun, Zhang Wenxi, and Zhang Hanting], “时不我待立硬功—北海舰队某扫雷舰大队抓紧点滴时间训练” [Time and Tide Await No Man Sharpening Good Achievements: A Certain North Sea Fleet Minesweeper Squadron Pays Close Attention to Training Times], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 5 June 2006, p. 2.

278. Kondapalli, China’s Naval Power, p. 141

279. 张军红 [Zhang Junhong], “冰海之中破雷阵:北海舰队某水警区在-16C进行扫雷训练实录[Destroying a Mine Array in Icy Water: A Certain North Sea Fleet Water Garrison District Sets a Record by Conducting Minesweeping Exercises in -16C],” 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 18 April 2006, p. 1.

280. “突出副长训练提高副训质量:北海舰队某军舰让副长挑训练‘大梁’” [Outstanding XO Exercise Improves Complex Training Quality: Some North Sea Fleet Frigates Let XOs Lead Training “Big Bridge”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 23 February 2002, p. 2.

281. Chen Wanjun and Zhang Wenxi, “The Chinese Navy Established the First Ship Captain Training Center at Lushun Naval Base,” Xinhua, 24 October 2006, OSC CPP20061024442016.

282.杜喜尔,宋晓彪[Du Xier and Song Xiaobiao], “穿过‘死亡海’” [Passing Through “Deadly Seas”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 25 January 2005, p. 2;成斌 [Cheng Bin],谋打赢风采录—有奖摄影比赛:新职手励兵忙 [A Splendid Record of Strategizing to Fight and Win—Photography Contest: Rookies Busy Honing Their Crafts], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 22 January 2005, p. 1. For additional evidence of the PLAN MCM force’s embracing of revolution of military affairs, see程建华,刘健忠,陈泽锦[Cheng Jianhua, Liu Jianzhong, and Chen Zejin], “明确新要求—接受新挑战:某扫雷舰大队紧贴军事改革实际淬炼党员先进性” [Understand Well the New Requirements and Accept the New Challenges: A Certain Minesweeper Squadron Forges the Vanguard Character of Party Members in Strict Adherence to Military Reforms], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 29 July 2004, p. 1. On “intelligization,” see also 高春占,肖德伦[Gao Chunzhan and Xiao Delun], “让鱼水雷越打越‘聪明’—某实验区瞄准未来战场提高水下靶场实验效能纪实” [Making Torpedoes and Sea Mines More and More “Intelligent”—An On-the-Spot Report of a Certain Test Area Taking Aim at the Future Battlefield and Raising the Experimental Efficacy of an Underwater Shooting Range], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 24 November 2006, p. 2

283.孙涛,乔燕飞,吴超[Sun Tao, Qiao Yanfei, and Wu Chao], “帆正自可行千里—某扫雷舰大队推进信息化建设的一段经历/谜题一串:扫雷舰怎拿了那么多第一?/谜底揭开:原来他们有信息化帮忙/谜的背后:信息化老装备上‘着陆’” [Set the Sail Right and You Can Travel for a Thousand Leagues: A Certain Minesweeper Unit’s Experience in Carrying Out Informationalization Construction/A String of Puzzles: How Did the Minesweeper Capture So Many First Places?/Unraveling the Puzzles: They Had the Help of Informationalization/Behind the Puzzles: Informationalization Makes Its Landing on Old Equipment], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 1 November 2003, p. 2.

284. Ibid.

285.张守军,王松岐,王龙起[Zhang Shoujun, Wang Songqi, and Wang Youqi], “大洋深处历精兵” [Ocean Depths Sharpen Crack Troops], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 27 December 2005, p. 3.

286. See photograph of AD-2 Skyraider at Pawtuxet River, Maryland, in 1949, at www.navweapons.com/.

287. Liu Ronghua, Long Yunhe, and Zhong Kuirun, “China’s First Petty Officers Take Position,” p. 2.

288.范保峰,张庆洲 [Fan Baofeng and Zhang Qingzhou], “具有多种弹型技术保障能力-某导弹技术对教导员耿焱” [Possessing the Ability to Support Many Types of Missile Technology—Geng Yan, [Battalion Level] Political Instructor of a Certain Missile Technology Group], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 25 October 2006, p. 2.

289. 范保峰,廖天保,孙政[Fan Baofeng, Liao Tianbao, and Sun Zheng], “知权利义务明肩上责任—某鱼水雷仓库采取多种形式组织党员学习党章” [Knowledge Is a Right and a Duty, Brilliantly Shoulder the Responsibility: A Certain Torpedo and Sea Mine Depot Adopts Multiform Formation of Party Members Studying the Party Constitution], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 18 February 2006, p. 3.

290.陈启正,罗明新,周涌军,张剑[Chen Qizheng, Luo Mingxin, Zhou Yongjun, and Zhang Jian], “目标锁定未来战场—九一七O八部队某扫雷舰大队勇闯雷阵练硬功纪事” [The Goal is to Lock in on the Battlefield of the Future: Recording a Certain Minesweeper Brigade from Unit 91708’s Heroic Efforts at Difficult Minesweeping Exercises], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 21 March 2002, pp. 1–2.

291.代宗锋,余子富 [Dai Zongfeng and Yu Zifu], “守着水库洗澡难,住在山上上山难—某扫雷舰大队10万元营造三战士舒心环境” [Have a Reservoir but Can’t Take a Bath, Being Stationed on a Hill That is Difficult to Climb: A Minesweeping Squadron Invests 100,000 Yuan So That Three Enlisted Soldiers Will Have a Comfortable Environment], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 12 May 2006, p. 2.

292. See, for example,李根苗,代宗锋 [Li Genmiao and Dai Zongfeng], “多个训练弱项发尾‘回炉’:东海舰队某扫雷舰大队组织1个月补差训练” [“Return to the Furnace” [to Be Recast after] Many Deficiencies in Training at the End of the Year: An East Sea Fleet Mining Squadron Organizes a Month of Remedial Training], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 29 November 2006, p. 2; 桂喜尔,周拥军 [Gui Xier and Zhou Yongjun], “把军事比武融入训练全过程—某扫雷舰大队立足现有装备和未来实战” [Integrate the Military Contest into the Whole Process of the Training—A Certain Minesweeper Squadron Has a Foothold in Both Existing Equipment and Future Combat], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 9 February 2006, p. 2; and李大军 [Li Dajun], “水雷战舰的总指挥” [Commander of Mine Warfare Vessels], 现代舰船[Modern Ships], no. 129 (September 1996), p. 18.

293. 刘备战,林在连,刘文平 [Liu Beizhan, Lin Zailian, and Liu Wenping], “剑胆琴心—记某护卫舰大队大队长王滨” [Brave Sword: Recording a Certain Frigate Unit’s Commander Wang Bin], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 28 March 2002, p. 1;刘备战,北海战记者林在连[Liu Beizhan and Lin Zailian] “一部新大纲几多新景观:值更官走上操舰台” [A New Set of Guidelines and Many New Outlooks: Watch Officers on Duty Engage in New Ship Exercises], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 7 March 2002, p. 1.

294.林在连,孙飞,崔军[Lin Zailian, Sun Fei, and Cui Jun], “实践先进性高扬先锋旗—某扫雷舰大队八一四舰党支部发挥战斗堡垒作用纪实” [Put the Vanguard Status into Practice and Raise High the Banner of the Pioneer: A Firsthand Report on How the Boat 814 Party Branch Fulfilled Its Duty as a Combat Stronghold], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 30 March 2002, p. 3

295.蒋敏军,梁广才[Jiang Minjun and Liang Qingcai],“借得东风好行船—南海舰队某驱逐舰支队新大纲试训改革实录” [Take Advantage of the East Wind to Navigate Well: A Firsthand Record of New Outline Test Exercises by a Destroyer Detachment from the South Sea Fleet], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 5 March 2002, pp. 1–2

296. Lin Zailian, Sun Fei and Cui Jun, “Put the Vanguard Status into Practice and Raise High the Banner of the Pioneer,” p. 3

297. 温上京,王志海,陈建族 [Wen Shangjing, Wang Zhihai, and Chen Jianzu], “852建创新训法取得实效” [Warship 852 Obtains Substantial Results in Innovating Training Methods], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 11 May 2002, p. 2.

298. 张佐委,储建国,崔小龙 [Zhang Zuowei, Chu Jianguo, and Cui Xiaolong] “‘海上工兵’磨励硬功” [“Sea Engineers” Temper Themselves through Meritorious Service],舰船知识 [Naval and Merchant Ships], no. 310 (July 2005), p. 3.

299. Information in this paragraph is derived from 曹明,梁广才[Cao Ming and Liang Qingcai], “随南海舰队‘809’舰海上扫雷” [Following South China Sea Fleet Unit “809” Ship Sweeping Mines at Sea], 当代海军[Modern Navy], no. 4 (2003), pp. 18–19; Chen Qizheng, Luo Mingxin, Zhou Yongjun, and Zhang Jian, “The Goal is to Lock in on the Battlefield of the Future,” pp. 1–2.

300. For an identical paragraph describing Unit 91708’s achievements, see 罗明新, 周拥军,张剑 [Luo Mingxin, Zhou Yongjun, and Zhang Jian], “和平时期,他们在海上淌雷” [In Times of Peace, They Are at Sea Measuring Mines], 当代海军[Modern Navy](April 2002), pp. 2–3.

301. Research along these lines includes李志远,赵治平[Li Zhiyuan and Zhao Zhiping], “水雷相关引信技术及其干扰研究” [Research Related to Fuse Technology and Jamming], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (2007)

302. The last three sentences are derived from曹明,梁广才[Cao Ming and Liang Qingcai], “809舰:为战场开道” [Ship 809: Clearing the Way for the Battlefield], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 22 February 2003, pp. 1–2.

303. Qian Xiaohu, Wang Luxun, and Mao Zhaosheng, “Boom! With a Noise as Loud as Thunder, the Channel Was Open—Officers and Men of a Certain East Sea Fleet Squadron Set Off Urgently on a New Type of Minesweepers,” Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily], 30 January 2007, p. 11, CPP20070130710007; Qian Xiaohu, Wang Luxun, and Mao Zhaosheng, “Experiencing the Chinese Navy’s New Type of Minesweeper,” Zhongguo Guofang Bao [China Defense News], 30 January 2007, p. 5, OSC CPP20070205721039.

304. 傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “MINEA—先进的非触发教练水雷系统” [MINEA: The Advanced Multi-Influence Exercise Mine System], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2008).

305. 代宗锋,余子富 [Dai Zongfeng and Yu Zifu], “重奖之下为何难觅勇夫?—某扫雷舰大队鼓励官兵岗位成才的一段经历” [Why Is It Difficult to Seek Courageous Workers When Emphasizing Awards?—The Experience of a Certain Minesweeping Group Encouraging Officers and Enlisted to Grow into Accomplished Talents at the Post], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 25 March 2006, p. 3.

306. Mao Zhaosheng, Yu Zifu, and Wang Luxun, “A Point Man in Mine Clearance and Obstacle Elimination—Record of Zhang Jianming, the Commander of a Certain Mine Sweeper Squadron, East Sea Fleet, Chinese Navy,” Dangdai Haijun [Modern Navy], April 2007, pp. 46–49, OSC CPP20070620325003.

307. 龙小航,中国船舶重工集团公司江苏自动化研究所,江苏连云港 [You Xiaohang, Jiangsu Automation Research Institute of CSIC, Lianyungang], “舰载申弹武器系统发展思路探讨” [Discussion on Development of Ship-borne Depth Charge Weapon System],指挥控制与仿真 [Command Control & Simulation] 28, no. 3, June 2006, pp. 1–5.

308.毛敬雄[Mao Jingxiong], “目击舰艇抗大当量战雷实爆试验” [Bearing Witness to Live Tests of Mine Countermeasures Equipment], 现代舰船[Modern Ships] (January 2008), pp.4–5.

309. One officer, for example, was twice profiled in People’s Navy in 2006. See 汪鲁迅,毛昭胜 [Wang Luxun and Mao Zhaosheng], “‘雷海先锋’有新作为—记 ‘海军十杰青年,’某扫雷舰大队大队长张建明” [The Sea Mine Vanguard Has a New Accomplishment: Recording One of Navy’s Most Outstanding Youth, Zhang Jianming, Commander of a Certain Minesweeper Squadron], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 8 September 2006, p. 8.

310.贾峰华,闾勇政[Jia Fenghua and Lu Yongzheng], “以优异成绩迎接党的十六大召开:北海舰队某潜艇支队自设困境苦练自救能力” [Greeting the 16th Party Congress with Excellent Performance Records: A Certain Submarine Detachment from the North Sea Fleet Trains Hard to Improve Survivability through Self-Designed Contingencies], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 31 August 2002, p. 2.

311.桂喜尔,周拥军 [Gui Xier and Zhou Yongjun], “某扫雷舰大队立足现有装备和未来实战—把军事比武融入训练全过程” [A Certain Minesweeper Group Has a Foothold in Both Existing Equipment and Actual Future Combat—To Integrate the Military Contest into the Entire Process of Training], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 9 February 2006, p. 2.

312. “Military Report,” CCTV-7, 30 April 2005, OSC FBS20050430359682.

313. 毛昭胜,蔡善明,吴罗春 [Mao Zhaosheng, Cai Shanming, and Wu Luoqun], “扫雷舰部队:走向深海‘敢死队’” [Minesweeper Unit: The “Dare-to-Die Corps” Heads for the Deep Sea],当代海军[Modern Navy], no. 143 (August 2005), pp. 14–15.

314.刘相林,虞章才,许森 ,米晋国,李德 [Liu Xianglin, Xu Sen, Mi Jinguo, and Li De], “骑鲸蹈海竞风流—记北海部队某潜艇基地‘水下先锋艇’ (下)” [Reporting on a Certain North Sea Fleet Submarine Base’s “Underwater Vanguard Boat” (Part 2)], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 14 October 2004, p. 2.

315.李义保,张善标,代宗锋 [Li Yibao, Zhang Shanbiao, and Dai Zongfeng], “点击834扫雷艇艇长朱德保我海军深海扫雷能力迅速提升” [A Brief Introduction to 834 Minesweeper Captain Zhu Debao: China’s Deep-Sea Minesweeping Capability Rapidly Elevates], 当代海军  [Modern Navy] (January 2005), pp. 16–18; 郭江山,李义保 [Guo Jiangshan and Li Yibao], “攻潜计划临时更改之后” [The Plan to Attack Submarines after Temporary Changes], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 30 March 2002, p. 3; “PLA Maritime Engineering Unit Conducts Rapid Minesweeping Exercises,” Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily], 10 July 2003, OSC CPP20030712000062.

316. “一次布扫水雷‘大战’—东海舰队某扫雷舰大队训练素描” [A “Big War” of Laying and Sweeping Sea Mines: A Sketch of a Certain East Sea Fleet Minesweeper Exercise], 当代海军  [Modern Navy] (September 2000), pp. 38–39.

317.周亚文,陈建族 [Zhou Yawen and Chen Jianzu], “心系‘数字战场’” [Core System “Digital Battlefield”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 13 July 2002, p. 1.

318. This quarterly publication was established in early 1993. It is published by CSIC’s 710 Research Institute, a major center of Chinese sea-mine development. Information derived from journal abstracts and www.chinamag.com.cn/, gotoread.com/, slzyjcfh.periodicals.net.cn/, and www.zazhicom.com/. For this study, this journal’s abstracts were consulted, as full-length articles were unavailable.

319. Phrases in quotation marks represent specific Chinese-character phrases; phrases without quotation marks represent ideas that are conveyed through various sets of characters.

320. See 肖占中[Xiao Zhanzhong], “对抗猎雷技术的机器人水雷” [Anti–Mine Hunting Technology Robotic Sea Mines],机器人技术与应用 [Robotic Technology and Application], no. 3 (2001).

321. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 22.

322. See, for example, Shen You, “Ten Reflections on Naval Equipment Deployed in the Gulf War,” p. 10.

323. 赵太勇,冯顺山,董永香 [Zhao Taiyong, Feng Shunshan, and Dong Yongxiang], “水雷武器的现状及发展趋势” [Summary of Modern Development Trends for Sea Mines],中北大学学报 [Journal of the Northern University of China] (December 2007), pp. 27–30.

324.徐阳[Xu Yang], “水雷武器过时了吗?” [Is Sea Mine Weaponry Obsolete?],国际展望 [World Outlook], no. 10 (1996), p. 27.

325. “Mine Warfare: Understanding the Basics,” USS Pioneer (MCM 9), www.pioneer.navy.mil/

326. Zhang Yuliang, Yu Shusheng, and Zhou Xiaopeng, Science of Campaigns, chap. 12.

327.刘一建[Liu Yijian], “控制权理论及发展趋势” [Theory of the Command of the Sea and Its Trends of Development], 中国军事科学[China Military Science] 18, no. 1 (2005), p. 43

328. Fu Jinzhu, “Mine Warfare in the Gulf War,” pp. 30–33.

329. Shen You, “Ten Reflections on Naval Equipment Deployed in the Gulf War,” p. 10.

330. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 33.

331. Ying Nan, “Goals of Offensive Minelaying Discussed,” pp. 10–11

332. Chen Fu-cheng, “Mine and Anti-Blockade Operations,” book excerpt, Fang-wei Ta Tai-wan, 1 November 1995, pp. 226–35, OSC FTS19990317001886

333. Zhang Yuliang, Yu Shusheng, and Zhou Xiaopeng, Science of Campaigns, chap. 12.

334. Wang Guangxin and Chen Yijing, “On the Scene in the East China Sea,” pp. 5–6

335. Ying Nan, “Goals of Offensive Minelaying Discussed,” pp. 10–11 [emphasis added].

336. Fu Jinzhu, “Taiwan’s Problematic Mine Warfare Capability,” Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval and Merchant Ships], 4 October 1999, pp. 33–34, OSC FTS19991108001755

337. Niu Rong and Sun Fei, “Chinese Navy’s Type 918 Minelaying Ship,” p. 11.

338. Fu Jinzhu, “What Explains the Failure of Iraq’s Mines?” p. 45.

339. Liu Xiasen, “If a Taiwan Strait War Erupted,” p. 3.

340. Zhang Yuliang, Yu Shusheng, and Zhou Xiaopeng, Science of Campaigns, chap. 12

341. Fu Jinzhu, “Mine Warfare in the Gulf War,” p. 32.

342. Ying Nan, “Goals of Offensive Minelaying Discussed,” pp. 10–11.

343. “Submarine Minelaying” (July 2002), p. 44.

344. Ying Nan, “Goals of Offensive Minelaying Discussed,” pp. 10–11.

345.陈建华 [Chen Jianhua, ed.], 舰艇作战模拟理论与实践[Naval War Gaming Theory and Practice] (Beijing: National Defense Industry, 2002), pp. 150, 196.

346. 胡红波,邱继进,马爱民[Hu Hongbo, Qiu Jijin, and Ma Aimin], “机于德尔菲法的未知水雷性能分析” [Performance Analysis of an Unknown Mine Based on the Delphi Method],情报指挥控制系统与仿真技术 [Information Command Control System and Simulation Technology] 27, no. 2 (April 2005), pp. 12–14. Campaign Theory Study Guide alludes to some of these factors, adding enemy navigation routes, the influence of enemy bases and harbors on PLAN surface ships, and the enemy’s schedule and defenses, which determine opportunities for attack. “205. What Major Situations Shall Be Ascertained and What Main Issues Shall Be Verified by Campaign Commanders in the Preparation Stage of a Maritime Shore-Raiding Campaign?” in “XIII. Maritime Shore-Raiding Campaign,” in Bi Xinglin, ed., Campaign Theory Study Guide

347. Wang Guangxin and Chen Yijing, “On the Scene in the East China Sea,” pp. 5–6.

348. Jia Yeliang and Guo Yike, “A Para-Naval Force from among the People: Civilian Ships,” pp. 46–47.

349. Notions concerning the comingling of the Chinese military and society can be traced to Mao Zedong’s writings from the 1930s.

350.田国垒,乔玉明 [Tian Guolei and Qiao Yuming], “现代航母的六大‘克星’” [The Modern Aircraft Carrier’s Six Great “Nemeses”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 6 November 2006, p. 4.

351. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 31. For further details, see Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray, “China’s ‘Undersea Sentries’: Sea Mines Constitute Lead Element of PLA Navy’s ASW,” Undersea Warfare 9 (Winter 2007), pp. 10–15; and Gabriel Collins, Erickson, Goldstein, and Murray, “Chinese Evaluations of the U.S. Navy Submarine Force,” Naval War College Review 61, no. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 68–86.

352. Of flagship minesweeper 809’s fifteen major training missions over the past few years, for instance, four involved responsibility for “submarine escort” [护潜任务]. Cao Ming and Liang Qingcai, “Ship 809,” p. 1.

353.唐水福,张彦中 [Tang Shuifu and Zhang Yanzhong], “从保障单一陆军向保障三军转变从保障陆战场向保障立体作战转变我国民兵队伍中有了‘海空军’” [Transformation from Exclusively Supporting Ground Forces into Supporting the Three Armed Branches, from Supporting Land Battlefields into Supporting Multi-Dimensional Operations; Our Militia Forces Now Have Their ‘Naval Forces, Air Forces, and Ground Forces’”], 解放军报[Liberation Army Daily], 30 September 2006, p. 1.

354. See also袁茂钱 [Yuan Maoqian],西南交通大学,光学工程 [Xinan Communications University, Optical Engineering], “水雷反潜中探测技术的研究与分析” [Study and Analysis of Detection Technology on Antisubmarine Mines] (master’s thesis, 13 November 2008).

355. Li Kefeng, “Russian Rocket Rising Sea Mines,” pp. 34–36.

356. Chen Dongyuan, “The Mysterious Underwater Sentry,” pp. 42–43.

357. Ibid.

358. Han Peng and Li Yucai, eds., Outline of Undersea Weaponry, pp. 2, 4, 27.

359. 张剑,袁珍军 [Zhang Jian and Yuan Zhenjun],“‘海战实验室’打响现代海战—东海舰队某驱逐舰支队网上战术对抗演习目击记”[“Sea Warfare Laboratory” Wins Initial Success in Modern Warfare: An Eyewitness Account of a Certain East Sea Fleet Submarine Chaser Flotilla Network Tactics Confrontation Exercise], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 28 June 2006, p. 1

360. “168. How Is the Defense System Structure Established in a Naval Base Defense Campaign?” in Bi Xinglin, ed., Campaign Theory Study Guide.

361. As a recent article notes, “submarine[s] . . . cannot use all the mine-clearing tools available to surface ships. . . . [P]re-cursor sweeping before transiting a minefield is generally not an option.” John Holmes, “Underwater Stealth: Mine Countermeasures’ Ace in the Hole,” Undersea Warfare (Spring 2006), available at www.chinfo.navy.mil/.

362. See, for example, 薛大伟,周开华,徐先勇 [Xue Dawei, Zhou Kaihua, and Xu Xianyong], “水雷战信息化建设初步探讨” [Primary Discussion of Mine Warfare Informationization Construction], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (2007); and 郑锴,陆文骏,童利标[Zheng Kai, Lu Wenjun, and Tong Libiao], “联网水雷阵及其关键技术研究” [Study on Key Techniques Related to Mine Networks],兵工自动化[Ordinance Industry Automation] (January 2008).

363. Niu Rong and Sun Fei, “Chinese Navy’s Type 918 Minelaying Ship,” p. 11.

364.汪祖峰,盛长峰,李文喜 [Wang Zufeng, Sheng Changfeng, and Li Wenxi], “一年打了翻身仗—某鱼水雷仓库分库教导员徐和平带领‘一班人’改变后进面貌纪事” [Turning Around Weaponry in One Year: A Record of a Certain Torpedo and Sea Mine Depot Instructor Xu Heping Leading “Squad Members” to Transform Backwardness], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 22 October 2005, p. 2.

365.黄艳儒,曾志鹏,卢杏忠 [Huang Yanru, Zeng Zhipeng, and Lu Xingzhong], “广州军区航务军代处积极探索一体化联合作战保障新模式—为保障打赢当好‘代表’” [Guangzhou Military Region Military Traffic Representative Office Actively Explores New Patterns of Integrated Joint Operations Support: Being Good “Representatives” in Support of Fighting and Winning], 解放军报[Liberation Army Daily], 3 January 2007, p. 3.

366. 周拥军,成斌,桂喜尔 [Zhou Yongjun, Cheng Bin, and Gui Xier], “为了雷场奏凯歌—某扫雷舰大队党委求真务实抓装备管理纪实” [A Victorious Song for the Minefield: An On-the-Spot Report of a Certain Minesweeping Squadron’s Party Committee Demanding Concrete Work in Equipment Management], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 9 February 2006, p. 1.

367. 张存先[Zhang Cunxian], “浅谈水雷仓库技术兵的培训” [A Discussion of the Training of Sea Mine Depot Technology Soldiers],海军院校教育[Education of Naval Academies], no. 1 (1995), pp. 68–70.

368. “南海舰队某基地—‘高级蓝领’成为练兵‘磨刀石’” [A South Sea Fleet Base’s “Senior Blue Collar” Personnel Become “Whetstones” for Sailor Training], in Qian Xiaohu and Zhou Yawe, “三军开训 亮点频现” [Three Services Start Training, Bright Spots Seen Everywhere], 解放军报[Liberation Army Daily], 8 January 2007, p. 2.

369. Zhang Cunxian, “Discussion of the Training of Sea Mine Depot Technology Soldiers,” pp. 68–70.

370. Wu Dengfeng and Guan Jingchong, “Chinese Naval Ordnance Support Forces Possess All-Weather Support Capabilities,” Xinhua, 27 October 2006, OSC CPP20061027329006.

371. Li Gencheng, “Naval Vessel Ordnance Depot Enhances Support Capability,” Liberation Army Daily, 1 July 2008, OSC CPP20080702702004.

372. 李文杰,李德,范保峰 [Li Wenjie, Li De, and Fan Baofeng], “让战斗力成为敲动革新的支点—青岛保障基地探索科研与战斗力接轨的一段经历” [Make Combat Strength the Lever for Shifting Renovation’s Center of Balance: A Qingdao Logistics Base’s Experience in Exploring Ways to Link Scientific Research and Combat Strength], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 16 May 2007, p. 3.

373. Mao Zhaosheng, Yu Zifu, and Wang Luxun, “A Point Man in Mine Clearance and Obstacle Elimination,” pp. 46–49.

374.周开华,徐先勇,李鸿雁 [Zhou Kaihua, Xu Xianyong, and Li Hongyan], “影响水雷操作可靠性常见问题及解决对策” [Common Problems Influencing Mine Operation Reliability and Solutions], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2008); 左传友,刘海波 [Zuo Zhuanyou and Liu Haibo], “浅析水雷备件储备量” [Analysis of the Storage Quantity of Mine Spare Parts], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2008);徐森丰,任德奎[Xu Senfeng and Ren Dekui], “基于层次分析法的水雷效能灰色评估” [Gray Evaluation of Mine Efficiency Based on AHP], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (2008);尹美方,李鸿雁,郭东,白正勤 [Yin Meifang, Li Hongyan, Guo Dong, and Bai Zhengqin], “水雷设计中的人性化问题思考” [Humanization in Mine Weapon Design], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 4 (2007); 马莉,刘成,程志[Ma Li, Liu Cheng, and Cheng Zhi], “基于虚拟仪器技术的水雷引信测试系统” [Mine Fuse Test System Based on Virtual Instrument Technique], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2007); 于文峰[Yu Wenfeng], “水雷用一次锂池组的安全保护” [Protection of Primary Lithium Battery Packs for Sea Mines], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2007).

375. Wang Guangxin and Chen Yijing, “On the Scene in the East China Sea,” pp. 5–6.

376. The different Chinese MCM approach is likely the result of lower force capitalization, higher tolerance for casualties, different operational goals, and, most fundamentally, the primary anticipated conflict scenarios.

377. China is also conducting significant MCM research. The synergies with MIW research are readily apparent. See, for example,徐维川, 马爱民[Xu Weiquan and Ma Aimin], “机率条件下雷区范围估计研究” [Study on the Evaluation of the Scope of a Minefield Using Probability],指挥控制与仿真[Command Control and Simulation] (May 2008); 薛山花,田杰,李宇,黄海宁,张春华 [Xue Shanhua, Tian Jie, Li Yu, Huang Haining, and Zhang Chunhua], “基于时变AR预白绿坡处理的水雷飞水雷识别算法” [Classification Algorithm for Sea Mines Based on an Autoregressive Model],微计算器应用 [Microcomputer Applications] (February 2008);徐维川, 马爱民[Xu Weiquan and Ma Aimin], “虚假雷区判别研究” [Research on Discrimination of False Minefields], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2008); 倪永杰,徐晓刚 [Ni Yongjie and Xu Xiaogang], “基于粒子系统的水雷冲刷掩埋过程三维仿真方法” [3D Simulation Method of Mine Burial Process by Scouring Based on Particle System], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2008); 倪永杰,徐晓刚[Ni Yongjie and Xu Shaogang], “水雷掩理研究” [Research on Mine Burial], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (2007); 马爱民, 郭伟民,洪星[Ma Aimin, Guo Weimin, and Hong Xing], “高频声纳回波影像仿真技术” [Sound Reflection and Sound Shadow Simulation Technology of High-Frequency Sonar], 系统仿真学报 [Journal of System Simulation] (December 2006), pp. 3342–45;佳水[Jia Shui], “以光子系统排除水雷” [Using a Photon System to Remove Sea Mines],激光与光电子学进展 [Laser and Photoelectron Research Progress], no. 11 (2001); 夏立新 [Xia Lixin], “掩埋水雷电磁探测的可行性分析” [Feasibility Study of Buried Sea Mine Electromagnetic Probes], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2001);刘进[Liu Jin], “使用极低频电磁场探测浅水水雷的可行性研究” [Feasibility Study: Using an Ultra-Low-Frequency Electromagnetic Field to Survey Shallow-Water Sea Mines], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2000);王金根,李林[Wang Jingen and Li Lin], “手持式水雷穿透系统” [Handheld-Style Sea Mine Penetration Systems], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2000); 傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “对水雷和未爆武器进行磁探和磁性识别的进展” [Progress Concerning the Carrying Out of Magnetic Surveying and Recognition on Sea Mines and Unexploded Weapons], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (1999);是海梅[Shi Haimei], “水雷通用自检仪中舰船仿真信号设计探讨” [A Discussion on the Design of Simulated Vessel Signals in General Self-Testing Devices for Sea Mines], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (1999);张智 [Zhang Zhi],“舰船的电磁特征及其减少措施” [Electromagnetic Signatures of Ships and How to Effect Their Depression],现代舰船[Modern Ships], no. 142 (September 1997), p. 29; 刁海龙 [Diao Hailong], “反水雷新途径:快速探测航道” [Rapid Channel Detection: A New Approach to Mine Countermeasures], 现代舰船[Modern Ships], no. 129 (September 1996), p. 27.

378. 李凝[Li Ning], “利用护卫舰上的直升机艘所水雷” [Organic Mine Searching with Helicopters from Frigates], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2007).

379. 崔荣鑫,徐德民,严卫生 [Cui Rongxin, Xu Demin, and Yan Weisheng], “一种自主水下航行器路径规划算法” [Path Planning Algorithm for Autonomous Underwater Vehicle],系统仿真学报[Journal of System Simulation], (December 2006), pp. 3373–76.

380. Zhang Yuliang, Yu Shusheng, and Zhou Xiaopeng, Science of Campaigns, chap. 26.

381.王冰川,王亚军 [Wang Bingchuan and Wang Yajun], “贴近实战演练,盯着问题完善—北海舰队某保障基地30余种新战法推向演兵场” [Conducting Exercises That Closely Approximate to Actual Combat, Perfecting Combat Methods by Focusing on Problems—A North Sea Fleet Support Base Puts Some 30 New Combat Methods to Use on the Exercise Field], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 3 June 2008, p. 2.

382. “Chronicle of Events of Military Training,” Guangzhou Zhanshi Bao, 27 December 2005, pp. 1, 3, OSC CPP20060224318002.

383. Wang Guangxin and Chen Yijing, “On the Scene in the East China Sea,” pp. 5–6.

384. See, for example, Arnold S. Lott, Most Dangerous Sea (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1959), p. 77. Zhang Yuliang, Yu Shusheng, and Zhou Xiaopeng, Science of Campaigns, chap. 12, demonstrate an understanding of this crucial problem, noting that “one must conduct close monitoring of our own mine obstacles that have been dispositioned.”

385. See, for example, 陈可志 [Chen Kezhi], “GPS在水道扫雷中的应用” [Application of GPS Techniques to Hydrographic Minesweeping],地矿测绘[Surveying & Mapping of Geology & Mineral Resources] 17, no. 3, pp. 43–45.

386. Cao Ming and Liang Qingcai, “Following South China Sea Fleet Unit ‘809’ Ship Sweeping Mines at Sea,” pp. 18–19; Chen Qizheng et al., “The Goal is to Lock in on the Battlefield of the Future,” pp. 1–2.

387.孙涛[Sun Tao], “某大队研制水雷内部记录仪” [A Certain Unit Develops a Sea Mine Interior Recording Instrument], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 4 December 2004, p. 1

388. See Fifi Kieschnick, Naval Station Ingleside Public Affairs, “Mine Warfare ‘Shifts Colors’ to Southern California,” Pentagon Brief, pentagonbrief.wordpress.com/2008/12/28/mine-warfare-shifts -colors-to-southern-california/. Four U.S. mine countermeasure ships are now based in Bahrain. See MCM and MSC links at the new Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command, http://www.nmawc.navy.mil.

389. These two mine countermeasures helicopter squadrons, located in Virginia Beach, Virginia, and in Ingleside, Texas, each have ten aircraft.

390. The textbook adds: “When the enemy unfolds minesweeping and barrier clearing forces, campaign commanders shall organize mobile forces from the Navy and Air Force operating groups, coastal missile and coastal artillery forces, and far-range artillery troops to seize the favorable opportunity to resolutely launch attack when the enemy ships towing minesweeping tools are blocked by barriers and are not easy to maneuver. The best time to attack the enemy minesweeping helicopter carrier and minesweeping hovercraft carrier is when the enemy enters our inshore sea and when the minesweeping helicopters and minesweeping hovercraft have not yet left the carrier.” Bi Xinglin, ed., Campaign Theory Study Guide, pp. 448–49.

391. See U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Plan, 4th ed., www.exwar.org/Htm/ConceptDocs/Navy_USMC/MWP4thEd/contents.htm. For a cogent description of the future of U.S. mine countermeasures, see Paul Ryan, RADM, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “LCS Will Transform Mine Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December 2004), pp. 37–39

392. The requirement to map or survey an area suspected of containing mines suggests that the vehicle performing the mapping must itself have sufficiently small signatures that it can operate in the presence of sensitive mines without causing their detonation. Furthermore, the vehicle must know its location precisely, so that if it detects a minelike object, the suspected object can be accurately located to later be identified and reported. The mapping vehicle must also have sufficient endurance and speed to map the desired waters in an operationally useful length of time. These requirements tend to increase the size, complexity, and costs of candidate systems, making them difficult to develop.

393. Ron O’Rourke, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL3741, updated 17 November 2008, p. 1.

394. Bettina H. Chavanne, “DDG-51 and LCS Winners in Gates Budget,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 7 April 2009, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/PROG04079.xml.

395. According to the consultant described in an earlier footnote, the initial LCS ships will both cost between $700 and $900 million each. As the program enters serial production, the unit cost is expected to become as low as $350 million.

396. Fu Jinzhu, “Taiwan’s Problematic Mine Warfare Capability,” pp. 33–34.

397. Taiwan purchased the Yung Fung vessels from Germany in the early 1990s as “offshore oil support vessels.” Taipei subsequently converted the ships into mine hunters by installing remotely operated underwater vehicles and advanced high-frequency sonar systems. See Commodore Stephen Saunders, RN (Ret.), “Yung Feng (MWV 50) Class Minehunters-Coastal (MHC),” Jane’s Fighting Ships, 17 February 2005, www.janes.com.

398. Fu Jinzhu, “Taiwan’s Problematic Mine Warfare Capability,” pp. 33–34. See also岩文 [Yan Wen], “台湾水中兵器研制揭密” [Taiwan’s Undersea Weapons Development Revealed], 舰船知识[Naval and Merchant Ships] 295, no. 4 (April 2004), p. 9.

399. Raymond Cheung, “Fleet Review, Standing Guard across the Taiwan Strait,” Jane’s Navy International 101, no. 8 (October 1996), p. 48. The intervening decade has not improved these vessels’ condition or Western appraisals of them. “All are in very poor condition,” states Stephen Saunders, Commodore, RN (Ret.), in “Adjutant and MSC 268 Classes,” Jane’s Fighting Ships, 17 February 2005, www.janes.com.

400. Hai Lin, “In 2010 Taiwan Will Be Surrounded with a Sea Mine Battle Array,” pp. 19–21.

401. This inventory includes twelve of the Sugashima- class coastal minesweepers, three of the Yaeyama- class ocean mine hunter/sweepers, and eleven Hatsushima/Uwajima-class mine hunter/sweepers. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 28 February 2008, www.janes.com.

402. See U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” 19 February 2005, www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html.

403. See, for example, 陶爱月 [Tao Aiyue], “日本水雷战舰艇综览” [A Survey of Japanese Mine Warfare Ships],舰船知识 [Naval and Merchant Ships], no. 312 (September 2005), pp.44–47; 傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “数量最多,更新最快:日本海上自卫队的反水雷实力” [Greatest Quantity, Fastest Renewal: The JMSDF’s MCM Strength], 舰船知识[Naval and Merchant Ships], no. 312 (September 2005), pp. 48–49;侯建军[Hou Jianjun], “挑战智能水雷的570吨级新型猎扫雷艇” [A New Type of 570 Ton Mine Hunter/Sweeper to Challenge Intelligent Sea Mines], 舰船知识[Naval and Merchant Ships], no. 312 (September 2005), pp. 50–51; 傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “体现反水雷装备发展方向的日本新型S-10猎雷据” [Japan’s New Type of S-10 Mine Hunting Tool Reflects the Development Direction of MCM Equipment],舰船知识 [Naval and Merchant Ships], no. 312 (September 2005), pp. 52–53.

404. See, for example, 侯建军[Hou Jianjun], “美国海军水雷战装备” [United States Navy Mine Warfare Equipment], 当代海军[Modern Navy], no. 6 (2003);张云广 [Zhang Yunqing], “航空激光水雷监测系统的进展” [The Development of an Aviation Laser Sea Mine Monitoring System], 光电子技术与信息[Optoelectronic Technology & Information], no. 4 (2002); 夏立新  [Xia Lixin], “掩埋水雷探测研究” [Buried Sea Mine Detection Research], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 4 (2001); 傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “美海军的中等深度滨海水雷开发” [U.S. Navy Medium-Depth Surf-Zone (Shallow Water) Mine Development], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (1999); 夏立新[Xia Lixin], “美国的反水雷,水雷和特种战计划” [American Mine Countermeasures, Sea Mines and Special Operations Plans], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (1999); 刘平,杨洋,王青 [Liu Ping, Yang Yang, and Wang Qing], “国外反水雷舰艇装备现况及发展趋势” [The State-of-the Art and Development Trends of Equipment of Foreign Mine Countermeasures Ships], 舰船工程[Ship Engineering] 26, no. 6 (2004), pp. 1–3; and张豪娟[Zhang Haojuan], “美国海军对电池的需要及研制” [U.S. Navy Battery Requirement and Development Efforts], 电池工业[Battery Industry] 4, no. 2, April 1999, pp. 71–74.

405. For analyses of other Western MCM developments, see 王晓娟[Wang Xiaojuan], “最新水雷对抗系统” [The Latest Counter–Sea Mine Systems],情报指挥控制系统与仿真技术 [Information Command Control System and Simulation Technology], no. 10 (2001); 张宝善[Zhang Baoshan], “多国部队未来水雷对抗作战研究” [The Future Sea Mine Opposition Warfare Research of Various Countries’ Militaries], 情报指挥控制系统与仿真技术[Information Command Control System and Simulation Technology], no. 7 (2001); 夏立新  [Xia Lixin], “英国的水雷全仿真系统” [England’s Complete Sea Mine Simulation System], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (2001);赵祚德 [Zhao Zuode], “澳大利亚的三维声水雷成像声纳” [Australia’s Three-Dimensional Acoustic Sea Mine AMI Sonar], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2000); 赵祚德[Zhao Zuode], “英国的‘铺路者’综合水雷战武器系统” [British Comprehensive Mine Warfare Weapon System], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2000); 傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “探测混水中水雷的声成像系统” [The Turbid Water Sea Mine Sound Imaging System], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 1 (1999); 付伟[Fu Wei], “国外激光水下侦察设备发展综述” [A Survey of the Development of Foreign Underwater Laser Surveillance Equipment],舰船电子对抗[Ship Electronic Resistance], no. 6 (2001), pp. 21–23;周智超[Zhou Zhichao et al.], “水面舰艇对水雷防御训练评估的AHP-Fuzzy方法” [The AHP-Fuzzy Evaluation Method of Training on Surface Ship Anti-mine Defense],系统工程与电子技术[Systems Engineering & Electronics] 23, no. 9 (September 2001), pp. 56–59; 范军,万琳,汤渭霖[Fan Jun, Wan Lin, and Tang Weilin], “沉底水雷目强度预报” [Predicting Target Strength of Mines Lying on the Seabed], 声学技术 [Technical Acoustics] 20, no. 4 (2001), pp. 145–48; and张晓兵, 周穗华[Zhang Xiaobing and Zhou Suihua], “一种基于模糊理论和神经网络的水雷状态识别方法” [A Method of Mine State Classification Based on Fuzzy Sets and Artificial Neural Networks], 海军工程大学学报[Journal of Naval University of Engineering] 92, no. 3 (2000), pp. 77–80.

406.钱东[Qian Dong], “美国海军水下战中心NUWC” [The U.S. Naval Undersea Warfare Center], 鱼雷技术[Torpedo Technology] 11, no. 2 (June 2003), pp. 50–51; 钱东[Qian Dong], “美国未来的大型UUV—MANTA” [The Future U.S. Large-Scale Unmanned Undersea Vehicle—MANTA], 鱼雷技术  [Torpedo Technology] 11, no. 1 (March 2003), pp. 47–50; 傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “利用敌方水雷开发有效的反水雷方法” [Using an Effective Anti-mine Method from Enemy Sea Mine Development], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 4 (1999).

407.周丽萍[Zhou Liping], “水下‘猎雷者’—美国AN/WLD-1型遥控猎雷系统” [Underwater ‘Mine Hunter’—The U.S. AN/WLD-1 Remote Control Mine Hunting System], 环球军事[Global Military], pp. 26–27; 黄江飞[Huang Jiangfei], “AN/WLD-1型遥控猎雷系统” [The AN/WLD-1 Remote Control Mine Hunting System], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (2000).

408. 乔迿超, 张旭;海军大连舰艇学院研究生队,海军大连舰艇学院水武与防化系 [Qiao Changchao, Graduate Student Team; Zhang Xu, Department of Underwater Weapons and Chemical Defense Systems; Dalian Naval Vessel Academy], “AUV探查水雷搜索模式仿真比较研究” [Research on Comparison and Simulation of Mine Detection Search Mode by AUVs], 水雷战与舰船防护[Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 4 (2008); 傅金祝[Fu Jinzhu], “反水雷自主式水下航行器” [Anti-mine Independent AUVs],舰船知识 [Naval and Merchant Ships] 292, no. 2 (2004), p. 39

409. 李杰[Li Jie], “新型无人潜艇的战力” [The Battle Power of a New Type of Unmanned Submarine], 当代海军[Modern Navy], no. 10 (2004), pp. 48–50; 孙云利 [Sun Yunli], “美国海军的水下无人潜水器展望” [The Prospects for Future U.S. Navy Submarine UUVs], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 4 (2003).

410. See杨毅[Yang Yi], “美国海军航空反水雷的发展趋势” [The Development Trend of U.S. Navy Aviation MCM], 航海[Navigation], no. 2 (2003), pp. 41–42; 夏立新 [Xia Lixin], “美国直升机反水雷的研究和开发” [The Research & Development of U.S. Helicopter MCM], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (1999).

411. He Shan, “Can the Virginia Class Become the New Century’s Maritime Hegemon?” pp. 18–21.

412. At the moment, Beijing is playing a relatively positive role in the Six-Party Talks. However, a future return to a more belligerent posture that involves siding explicitly with Pyongyang cannot be ruled out at this time.

413. This would be consistent with the PLA’s Cold War effort to defend the Bohai Sea by fortifying the Miaodao and Changdao islands between the Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas. Interview, Beijing, 2007.

414. For a Chinese analysis of Southeast Asia’s vulnerability to sea mines, see 夏立新  [Xia Lixin], “水雷对东南亚地区的潜在威胁” [The Potential Sea Mine Threat to Southeast Asia], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2001).

415. Zhang Yuliang, Yu Shusheng, and Zhou Xiaopeng, Science of Campaigns, chap. 14.

416. This is determined by the shallow littoral waters, for example, in the Gulf of Tonkin, and also, of course, by Vietnam’s proximity to Chinese bases, particularly on Hainan Island. Japan might also become a target of a limited Chinese MIW campaign under worst-case circumstances. Clearly, submarines (and perhaps civilian vessels) would have to lead such operations given the potentially high-intensity battle environment and the distances involved. However, one-third of the Chinese submarine force (approximately twenty vessels) fully loaded could deliver almost 500 sophisticated mines, enough to close several ports or sea lines of communication for at least a week or two, causing substantial damage, possibly in the form of psychological-strategic effects.

417. The bathymetry of the waters proximate to Taiwan immediately reveals that the Taiwan Strait itself, as well as waters to the immediate north and south (adjacent to the island’s largest ports), are shallow enough to create a wholly appropriate environment for the use of all types of mines. Although Taiwan’s eastern coast has deeper waters, the authors nevertheless believe that by relying on a combination method of deployment (air, surface, submarine, and civilian) a major Chinese MIW campaign could efficiently blockade Taiwan, especially if working in concert with the PLA Navy’s submarine force. Chinese analysts, moreover, assess that Taiwan’s MCM are inadequate to this challenge and that efforts by Taiwan to deploy its own mines could be dealt with by the PLA.

418. “16. How Is Sea Mine Warfare and Anti-blockade Combat Carried Out?” in “One. The Basic Combat Theory of the Taiwanese Army,” in Bi Xinglin, ed., Campaign Theory Study Guide. Another source states that “the PLA can execute offensive mining against any of Taiwan’s ports [naval, commercial, oil off-loading areas], sea channels or adjoining sea areas, cutting off Taiwan’s sea lines of communication, destroying its economy and energy lifeblood.” Hai Lin, “In 2010 Taiwan Will Be Surrounded with a Sea Mine Battle Array,” p. 16.

419. A discussion of how Taiwan’s air force could be rendered ineffective by current Chinese weapons is included in William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008), pp. 13–38.

420. Mei Lin, “Analysis of the CPC Armed Forces’ Development of New Methods of Operations,” Taipei Chung Kung Yen Chiu, 15 November 1997, pp. 50–60, OSC FTIS19980310000807.

421. Technology does not appear to ameliorate this enduring reality, according to one practitioner. See Lt. Cdr. Patrick Molenda, U.S. Navy, “Don’t Forget Dedicated Mine Countermeasures,” U.S. Navy Institute Proceedings (October 2001), p. 41

422.丁信成[Ding Xincheng], “高技术战争中的反潜战” [Anti-submarine Warfare under Circumstances of High-Tech War], 中国民兵[China Militia], (December 1996), p. 37.

423. In WWII, Germany successfully mined several U.S. ports via submarine, and closed the ports to traffic for periods of roughly two weeks. See Hartmann with Truver, Weapons That Wait, pp. 69–70. Special MIW operations of this nature—limited, but high-profile strikes—could have important psychological effects early in a Sino-American military crisis, for example dramatically shifting U.S. Navy resources toward protecting sea areas closer to home, and thus enabling China’s swift conquest of Taiwan. As the recent 2003 Iraq War (not to mention Hurricane Katrina) so powerfully demonstrates, strategists and military planners must work with worst-case, not best-case, assumptions for planning purposes

424. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 32

425. Ibid., p. 30.

426. 周洪光,徐维川,曾松林  [Zhou Hongguang, Xu Weichuan, and Zeng Songlin], “浅析登陆作战中水雷武器的使用” [Simple Study on the Use of Sea Mine Weapons in Landing Operations], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 2 (2007).

427.杨掠[Yang Qiong], “抗登陆水雷” [Anti-landing Mines], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 3 (2007). A detailed survey of Taiwan’s sea-mine capabilities is reviewed in the PRC article 邓又辉 [Deng Youhui], “水雷—‘台独’幻想的救命稻草,” [Sea Mines—The Illusory Lifesaving Sustenance of “Taiwan Independence”], 环球军事[Global Military] (2005), pp. 22–23.

428. Zhang Yuliang, Yu Shusheng, and Zhou Xiaopeng, Science of Campaigns, chap. 13.

429. The continental shelf extends from China about 250 miles out into the East China Sea (more than halfway to Japan) enabling the use of relatively primitive (shallow water) minefields

430. Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” p. 31. For PLAN Submarine Academy research on this topic, see赵祚德 [Zhao Zuode], “水雷障碍封潜作战的效率评定模型” [An Assessment Model for the Effectiveness of Sea Mine Barriers in Antisubmarine Warfare], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 4 (2002).

431. Quotations in this paragraph from Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea?” pp. 133, 140, 143.

432. See figures in “Total Mines Laid” in Table 4, “Results of Mine-Laying Analysis (after 6 months),” p. 144. These figures are for “scenarios one and two.” In footnote 81, Glosny rejects the maximum finding of 10,166 mines for scenario 3, “[a] situation that looks worse for Taiwan,” because this scenario involves “heroic assumptions.” Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea?” p. 145.

433. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” pp. 13–38.

434. USAF doctrine has long promulgated the notion that all missions are secondary to achieving “air dominance.” This was not the case in World War II (before 1944) when massive raids were undertaken under dangerous circumstances. If the ROCAF survives the initial attack, moreover, its aircraft will be preoccupied with defending high-priority targets (leadership, air bases, missile defense sites, population centers) rather than chasing Chinese aircraft sowing mines at sea.

435. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea?” p. 148.

436. Sailors of the U.S. merchant marine had a higher proportion of deaths in combat than any other service in the Second World War. See www.usmm.org/men_ships.html.

437. See, for example, Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea?” p. 145.

438. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea?” p. 150.

439. On the imperative of accelerating PLAN MIW development, see 张光法,黄江华 [Zhang Guangfa and Huang Jianghua], “充分利用研制资源 促进在研水雷尽快形成战斗力” [Make Full Use of Development Resources, Accelerate Existing Sea Mine Research to Form Fighting Capacity as Quickly as Possible], 水雷战与舰船防护 [Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense], no. 4 (2001).

440. “Blockade,” defined narrowly, simply means a very significant reduction in sea borne trade, because of the closing of ports by adversary forces.