29 May 2019

With Beijing Considering a “稀土之战” (Battle of Rare Earths), It’s Time to Revisit Chinese Mining & Mineral Activities Strategically

Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “China SignPost™ ‘Greatest Hits’ #6: Mining & Minerals,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国) 78 (23 December 2013).

China SignPost™ 洞察中国–“Clear, high-impact China analysis.”©

China’s rise as a top global mineral consumer and producer creates three key dynamics that we believe investors and policymakers should follow closely.

First, the pursuit of minerals is bringing Chinese miners and energy producers into complex and sometimes dangerous parts of the world. In these zones, the growing presence of Chinese workers on the ground and rising Chinese interests in a secure flow of minerals to be either shipped back to China or traded on the global market increasingly makes Chinese national strategic interests overlap with those of the U.S. in such places as Central Asia and the Middle East.

Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, China’s Economic & Strategic Interests in CENTCOM’s Area of Responsibility: Assessment and Policy Recommendations,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国) 28 (9 March 2011).

Second, China’s mineral leverage is rising. It is the top global producer of strategic rare earth metals. Despite global consumers’ attempts to diversify supply sources over the past several years, Chinese suppliers remain the dominant players, particularly in the area of processing rare earth ores into actual usable materials.

Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, Gray Gold: China’s Rare Earth Power Play, Impacts, and Suggested Consumer Responses,” China SignPost (洞察中国) 5 (3 November 2010).

Third, China’s mining and mineral activities are major wealth generators domestically and abroad. Yet becoming tightly levered to a single country that underpins global metals markets in particular has proved costly for many multinational miners, who have had to scramble to reduce investment budgets and find alternative customers such as India because China’s demand for certain base metals has slowed.

Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Elephant in the Room? Are Mining Companies on Target As They Look to India to Help Compensate for China’s Lost Commodity Demand Growth? China SignPost™ (洞察中国) 69 (23 December 2012).

On the bullish side, rising mineral demand has created fabulous wealth domestically in China’s coal belt (Shanxi and Inner Mongolia) and this wealth creation engine appears poised to spread to Xinjiang as well in coming years.

Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, Kings of Coal to Barons of Bling? Xinjiang’s Coal Boom Will Drive Sales of Bentleys, BMWs, and Other ‘Bling,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国) 66 (21 September 2012).

Finally, the past few years have seen Chinese firms become true market movers in key global commodity markets not just as consumers, but also as investors. For instance, potash—a mineral badly needed by Chinese farmers—has in the span of less than 10 years gone from being a salt like compound few people outside the mining and farming communities followed, to becoming a quasi-strategic food security item of broad concern.

Indeed, we estimate that in China, each 10 kilos of pork consumed requires 1 kilo of potash to produce, since Chinese pigs are increasingly fed with potash-hungry corn and soybeans. Similarly, every 44kg of rice eaten in China likely requires 1 kg of potash to grow, with application intensity likely to rise in the year to come as China runs short of arable land and seeks to produce more grain in a relatively constrained physical space.

Gabe Collins, Salt of the Earth: BHP Billiton’s Bid for Potash Corp Likely to Drive Chinese Potash Investment in Belarus, Russia, and Africa,” China Signpost (洞察中国)™ 3 (18 September 2010).

This and other China Signpost research is in high and growing demand from some of the world’s most sophisticated and exacting consumers of China analysis. As we enter 2014, mining and minerals will remain one of our key areas of focus. China is a big part of that story, and we’ll make sure to keep you posted on key developments and their likely investment impacts.

SEE ALSO:

Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “China’s New Strategic Target: Arctic Minerals,” China Real Time Report (中国事实报), Wall Street Journal, 18 January 2012.

As policymakers in Washington focus on China’s expanding presence in Africa and growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean region, Danish diplomatic assistance is opening the gate for China to establish a strategic foothold in the Arctic.

Denmark has made a strategic decision to prioritize its economic relationship with China and is now becoming the key gateway for Beijing’s commercial and strategic entrée into the Arctic. Denmark advocates giving China a seat at the Arctic policy table. Friis Arne Peterson, the Danish ambassador to China, stated in October that China has “natural and legitimate economic and scientific interests in the Arctic.” Copenhagen likewise supports giving China permanent membership on the Arctic Council, the eight-nation forum that includes the five Arctic Ocean coastal states (the U.S., Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia) as well as Sweden, Iceland and Finland.

Greenland’s substantial deposits of minerals including rare earths, uranium, iron ore, lead, zinc, petroleum, and gemstones make the Arctic island a key bargaining chip as Denmark cultivates Beijing. Copenhagen administers Greenland’s foreign policy and will likely dangle the island’s rich geological potential in front of Beijing as it works to bolster the China-Denmark trade relationship. Indeed, Greenland’s minister for minerals, industry, and labor traveled to China for a trade mission in November that included participation in a major mining and minerals trade show in Tianjin.

Danish exports to China rose 17% and Chinese exports to Denmark rose 25% in 2010, according to figures provided by the Danish embassy in Beijing. Yet Danish exports to China were worth just US$2.6 billion and Chinese exports to Denmark amounted to US$6.9 billion, a small fraction of the volumes traded between China and its primary trade partners. The minerals that lie under Greenland’s snow are the real prize, worth far more in both monetary and strategic terms to China than the imported goods or export market Denmark itself can provide.

Danish diplomacy is literally following the money as some of the country’s policy elites turn away from the U.S. Copenhagen’s largest embassy is in Beijing, and is twice the size of its embassy in Washington. Denmark’s ploy to pull China closer is likely to work: From Beijing’s perspective, having Chinese companies buy several billion dollars per year worth of pharmaceuticals and machinery and doing container shipping business with Maersk is well worth it to gain access to Arctic negotiating tables and Greenland’s minerals.

Greenland is the best geographic entry point for Chinese entities interested in Arctic mineral resources because its government lacks the ability to develop mineral resources independently and because its Danish overseer will likely actively support Chinese investment in the island’s resources. Companies from Russia, the U.S., Canada and Norway already dominate the development of oil, gas and other natural resources within their home countries’ respective territorial zones.

With this politically and geologically favorable backdrop, Greenland’s high mineral production potential will likely attract Chinese interest despite the risk and uncertainty inherent in developing a new mineral source. London Mining aims to produce 15 million tonnes per year of high grade iron ore pellets by 2015 at its Isua project, which includes investment from Sinosteel and China Communications Construction Corp. Greenland Minerals and Energy claims its Kvanefjeld deposit could produce 20% of the global rare earth supply and large amounts of uranium with first production in 2016 (pdf). Kvanefjeld’s potential to influence global prices would make it a project of strategic interest to Chinese companies like Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth, the world’s largest rare earth metals producer.

Chinese firms will not have first-mover advantages in Greenland, as small miners from Australia and the UK dominate the local investment scene. That said, they stand to enjoy active support from the Danish government should they choose to invest on the island. We anticipate that larger companies, including buyers from China, will seek strategic stakes in mining projects initiated by enterprising smaller firms like those mentioned above. It is also very likely that given Greenland’s small population, Chinese firms will import substantial numbers of workers from China to build the power plants, transmission lines, ore processing facilities and other supporting infrastructure for Chinese-invested mines in Greenland.

As in so many other areas, China is entering a new global arena. It remains to be seen whether it will follow existing norms, or attempt to change the system over time. “China has a legitimate right to be interested in and participate in what happens in the Arctic, but it requires that the rules are observed,” Greenland premier Kuupik Kleist said in November. Countries like China “must not believe that they can come and decide about the residents and just take care of the resources in the Arctic, which are regulated by laws, treaties and binding agreements. Those cannot be tampered with.”

It will be interesting to watch how Danish and other regional experts’ perceptions evolve on this issue as China’s Arctic presence increases. According to SIPRI researcher Linda Jakobson, “There is some irony in the statements by Chinese officials calling on the Arctic states to consider the interests of mankind so that all states can share the Arctic. These statements appear to be contrary to China’s long-standing principles of respect for sovereignty and the internal affairs of other states.” (pdf)

In the three Near Seas (Yellow, East China and South China), Beijing promotes an extreme minority perspective on international law at odds with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that holds that coastal states have the right to regulate and restrict non-resource-related activities between the 12 nautical mile limit of their territorial waters and the 200 nautical mile limit of their claimed exclusive economic zone, or EEZ. Beyond its own region, by this logic, Beijing must honor similar claims by Arctic states. Canada, for instance, maintains that foreign vessels must obtain permission before transiting its vast northern archipelago.

Transit permission may become important if China continues building its icebreaker fleet and summer passage through the Canadian and Russian Arctic routes becomes increasingly viable. China currently has only one operational icebreaker, the Xuelong, but a new 8,000 tonne vessel is due to enter the fleet in 2014. The likely westbound route from Nuuk in Western Greenland to Qingdao via the Canadian Arctic is around one-half the distance to Qingdao through the Panama Canal, while the likely eastbound route via the Russian Arctic is less than two-thirds the distance to Qingdao via the Cape of Good Hope.

The Great Game for Arctic resources is heating up and China is likely to play an expanding role as Denmark opens the door for Beijing to enter the Arctic on the diplomatic front and on the investment front via mining projects in Greenland.

About Us

China Signpost™ 洞察中国–“Clear, high-impact China analysis.”©

China SignPost™ aims to provide high-quality China analysis and policy recommendations in a concise, accessible form for people whose lives are being affected profoundly by China’s political, economic, and security development. We believe that by presenting practical, apolitical China insights we can help citizens around the world form holistic views that are based on facts, rather than political rhetoric driven by vested interests. We aim to foster better understanding of key Chinese developments, with particular focus on natural resource, technology, industry, and trade issues. 

 China SignPost™ 洞察中国 founders Dr. Andrew Erickson and Mr. Gabe Collins have more than a decade of combined government, academic, and private sector experience in Mandarin Chinese language-based research and analysis of China. Dr. Erickson is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and an Associate in Research at Harvard’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Mr. Collins is a J.D. candidate at the University of Michigan Law School. His research focuses on commodity, security, and rule of law issues in China, Russia, and Latin America.

The positions expressed here are the authors’ personal views. They do not represent the policies or estimates of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Government, or any other organization. The authors have published widely on maritime, energy, and security issues relevant to China. An archive of their work is available at www.chinasignpost.com.

  • Tim

    Why not?