Andrew S. Erickson

Raymond Pritchett [“Galrahn”], “It’s Always Nice to Get the Chinese Perspective,” Information Dissemination, 8 January 2008.

Last Thursday we highlighted the Winter 2008 Review at the Naval War College that has an excellent essay titled Chinese Evaluations of the US Navy Submarine Force. We found this essay to be excellent, well cited, indeed well put together and one of the most interesting reads on the Chinese perspective of the US Navy submarine service one can find in the open source. We have taken a few subject specific excerpts from the essay to cover some of the more information we found interesting, but would note that the essay is a must read in its entirety for anyone interested in Chinese submarine development. …

Gabriel Collins, Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray of the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute deserve high praise for this publication, perhaps the best of its type on the China and Submarine centric topic in the open source anywhere. We recommend the full essay to anyone interested in developments from the Chinese perspective on submarine warfare.

http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2008/01/its-always-nice-to-get-chinese.html

Tuesday, January 8, 2008

It’s Always Nice To Get The Chinese Perspective

Last Thursday we highlighted the Winter 2008 Review at the Naval War College that has an excellent essay titled Chinese Evaluations of the US Navy Submarine Force. We found this essay to be excellent, well cited, indeed well put together and one of the most interesting reads on the Chinese perspective of the US Navy submarine service one can find in the open source. We have taken a few subject specific excerpts from the essay to cover some of the more information we found interesting, but would note that the essay is a must read in its entirety for anyone interested in Chinese submarine development.

The first issue that popped out to us in the article was the discussion of Guam.

The operational significance of stationing SSNs on Guam is not lost on Chinese naval analysts. One observes that “if [a submarine] sets out from Guam, especially in a Taiwan Strait crisis, it may only require 2 days or so.” A significant finding of the present study is that even in official journals, Chinese analysts are exploring Guam’s vulnerabilities. The same author notes that Guam, in addition to conferring some advantages to the United States in a Taiwan crisis, also carries self-defense vulnerabilities having strategic implications:

The U.S. military has still not established a defense system of anti-aircraft, antimissile, and other defense systems on Guam—[there exists] only a pittance of coastal patrol forces. Once there are hostilities, Guam’s defense can only rely on the U.S. Navy’s sea-based missile defense system and Air Force joint operations. Consequently, in wartime, Guam’s defense is still a problem; also, because it is in a special position surrounded on four sides by ocean at the intersection of three major international sea lanes, it is impossible to defend effectively. If the other side’s long-range ballistic missiles, submarine-launched cruise missiles, long-range bombers or maritime special forces operations units, etc., can break through Guam’s peripheral warning and defense, [to] destroy or seriously damage its naval port, airfield, munitions warehouse, and communications system, [then] the entire operational system of America in the Pacific Theater can become ineffective, its sustained warfare capability can greatly fall short of requirements [and] its resolution and dynamics of military intervention would have to change.

Regardless of the validity of their specific claims, then, it is clear that some Chinese analysts perceive Guam to be vulnerable to offensive attacks.

Early last year I observed a discussion between a couple of analysts debating the role of Guam in a war on China. One of the first things that stands out is that, if a conflict with China ever goes nuclear, Guam would be a natural target for nuclear weapons because it 1) is not a state and 2) has a very small population. The analyst argued that Guam should be a major part of ballistic missile defense, with its own radar system and extra interceptors.

However, he actually went further. This analyst believed what Guam truly represents to the United States is the strategic counter-balance to a Taiwan Strait scenario. The argument was, the United States could provide ‘just enough’ in military equipment sales for Taiwan and not feel compelled to risk relations with China in defense sales as long as the US was able to make Guam for China what Midway was to Japan, a fortress that cannot be defeated and guarenteed to push back, and insure China understood that.

Personally, I don’t like the idea of putting all your eggs into such a small basket, but I think the idea of Guam being a 21st century Midway is interesting. Certainly a good topic for speculation.

The second issue that stood out to us were the discussions of SSGNs.

Although they clearly recognize the potential value of an SSGN’s embarked special operations forces, Chinese analysts appear to be much more impressed by the implications of one SSGN’s potentially large inventory of Tomahawk cruise missiles and the high readiness rate that SSGNs will be able to maintain. One perceptive article observes that these features will allow other ships to focus on different mission areas:

After being refitted, SSGNs will be deployed 65% of the time each year on average…. As such, the USN will always have at least 2 SSGNs ready for battle at any time, and in wartime, 1 SSGN can take over the duties of many attack submarines and surface ships. Once the SSGN goes into service, this will significantly reduce the land attack burden shouldered by the surface fleet and allow it to focus on providing air defense against missile threats. At the same time, the SSGN will reduce the land attack role of SSNs, enabling them to concentrate on anti-surface and ASW [antisubmarine warfare] missions.

The same analysis also recognizes with some alarm that “it is conceivable that in the future the arsenal ships could from a safe distance simultaneously rain 500 or more guided missiles upon several points of an enemy’s territory. Using [the SSGN] would be stealthier and faster than an air raid by carrier based aircraft and would also avoid pilot losses.”

Chinese literature on SSGNs suggests anxiety regarding this capability and what it may mean for Chinese forces. One analysis calculates that SSGNs will allow the United States to engage in saturation attacks: “The ground forces that have relied on the traditional deception against air attack, such as fake targets and positions, will be severely tested under future conditions in which the U.S. armed forces are able to employ saturation attacks by low-cost [cruise missiles].”

I think it is noteworthy the Chinese see the threat of the SSGN to be that of the original stated threat of the DDG-21, as a land attack arsenal ship able to reign huge numbers of missiles against an Army, and if this article is highlighting true feelings, indicates the Chinese think this threat would be greater than that of an air raid by carrier based aircraft. I tend to agree, although I think that advantage only lasts until long range, fast, stealthy unmanned bombers are flying off US carriers, at which time I think the Chinese will conduct a reassessment of that conclusion. That could happen as soon as 2020 btw.

Third, there are a few technology specific comments that caught my attention.

The techniques used to build Virginia and its sister ships also evoke respect, with one author noting, “The use of modular construction has been a major breakthrough in the construction of the Virginia-class SSN…. This construction method is a revolutionary breakthrough compared to the methods used to build the Los Angeles–class.” Modular construction is widely perceived as a tremendous advantage, allowing the United States to “promptly design and build new nuclear submarines on the basis of new circumstances and requirements.” Plans for Virginia, it is implied, having been generated by computer-aided design tools and relying on modular construction, could be used as the basis of a new SSBN design.

…

American efforts at exploiting advancements in commercial off-the-shelf technology have received attention. One article observes that “the updated (COTS) CCS MK II [fi re control] system is not only used on the Los Angeles and Ohio classes, but is also used on the new Seawolf and Virginia class submarines”; another points out that “92% of the hardware and 90% of the software used in non-publicly available projects in fact come from popular commercially available technologies.” China’s intense interest in the U.S. Navy’s use of COTS may stem in part from Beijing’s effort to develop a world-class commercial information technology industry and to incorporate its products into the PLA.

Gary added a comment to our first post on this essay, and it was specific to these issues as translated.

I attended a UDT Conf in Hawai’i in 2004. As it was an open forum there were a number of Chinese there who were clearly harvesting (they were enthusiastically taking happy snaps of the models of the Seawolf and Virginia, and apparently believed that the sterns of the models were actual representations of the real thing).

What is pointed however, is that the comments that are attributed to Chinese commentators are almost literal translations of the session commentary made by the NG Project team leader, and an opening speech given by CINCPAC about the build and development issues for modular construction.

The same is true for the “92% of the hardware and 90% of the software used in non-publicly available projects in fact come from popular commercially available technologies” comment, because that is almost verbatim from a certain brochure I have from an IT mil conference I attended in 2005. I’m not sure what to make of that, either the industry is doing a good job with its PR, or in fact China sees the value of the tech…, both are probably true.

There is no question modular construction and use of COTS have had significant impacts on scalability of submarine technology, but it seems to me the Chinese have either missed or passed up on some of the more impressive industry capabilities that really separates the US and China. It is a real feat of engineering how the US submarine industry is able to bend the hull of a submarine. US submarines have a single hull, while Chinese submarines like Russian submarines have two hulls. Consider the USS San Francisco got some attention by the Chinese in this essay, but only from the perspective of the crew, which rightfully so as the Chinese focused on damage control of the crew, 25 casualties on that boat left 1 in 5 crew out of action.

From a technology perspective though, it seems one of the most impressive things about the USS San Francisco incident is that it rammed a mountain head on at 33 knots (35 mph), and with a single hull not only did it survive, they had only 1 death as a result, the sub was able surface, return to port, and will be repaired to return to service. I could be wrong, but if the Chinese have missed the aspect of bending the thick single hull of a US submarine, they have missed one of the most impressive aspects of the US submarine industry.

Finally, this point sounds very familiar…

While the overall impression is that of Chinese ASW weakness, there is one notable exception. Significant prioritization appears to be given to the use of sea mines for the antisubmarine mission, as if to produce a “poor man’s ASW capability.” One discussion explains, “Because of a tremendous change in the maritime strategic environment, since the early 1990s the PLA has made mobile ASW sea mines a focal point of weapons development.” The analysis continues, “[China] is energetically undertaking the research mission [of] using [mobile ASW sea mines] against U.S. nuclear submarines.” The same discussion also hints at a possible PLA Navy ASW role: “The major mission of self-guided sea mines is to isolate American nuclear submarines outside the First Island Chain.”

We have read a lot of this ourselves, even said as much in the past, the consideration of MIW for destroying submarines is more than just theory but we imagine it would be difficult to practice. I remember a few years ago reading some rough drafts by a former RAN submariner who believed that the biggest danger the Collins would ever face in wartime against China was a lure/bait trap into a minefield, as it would be the deadly combination of wolf packs and mines that would equalize the playing field for the PLAN.

This review didn’t raise the wolf pack issue, so we remain the only source highlighting those discussions and the exercises observed by both Singapore and the RAN. However, the west has stayed very quiet regarding what it knows regarding PLAN submarine issues, including the platforms, and it continues to be the open source where virtually all discussion takes place. This review is a rare, professional contribution.

Gabriel Collins, Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray of the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute deserve high praise for this publication, perhaps the best of its type on the China and Submarine centric topic in the open source anywhere. We recommend the full essay to anyone interested in developments from the Chinese perspective on submarine warfare.

Posted by Galrahn at 12:00 AM