Andrew S. Erickson

Christopher H. Sharman and Andrew S. Erickson, Dirty But Preparing to Fight: VADM Li Pengcheng’s Downfall Amid Increasing PLAN Readiness, China Maritime Report 44 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 24 January 2025).

• Naval War College’s second-most-popular publication with over 1,700 downloads and counting.

Main Findings

• Although corruption runs deep in the PLA Navy (PLAN) and across China’s armed forces, disciplinary-related removals appear not to have a major impact on naval capabilities or
• The fight against corruption within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has General Secretary Xi Jinping’s attention and appears to be picking up steam for 2025. The Standing Committee of the 14^th National People’s Congress (NPC) issued a report on 25 December 2024 identifying Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng (李鹏程) as one of eight NPC deputies removed for “serious violations of discipline and the law.”
• Li was an officer on the fast track and identified early in his career by PLA press as one to watch. He had the unprecedented distinction of having command of two separate Gulf of Aden anti-piracy escort task force deployments, extensive international maritime experience, and involvement in some of the PLAN’s most significant international navy accomplishments. Li’s career and his operations in the Mediterranean Sea had the personal attention of Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi.
• Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng replaced Vice Admiral Ju Xinchun (鞠新春) as the Commander of the Southern Theater Command (STC) Navy roughly a year ago. Admiral Ju suffered Admiral Li’s same fate. Comparing and contrasting two consecutive PLAN STC commanders serving in the same capacity, sacked one year apart, provides a revealing dataset to analyze the impact of sacking the commander, and of corruption more broadly, on PLAN operational capabilities and how they affect the force.
• The PLAN may be playing high-stakes musical chairs with its leadership, but it has a deep enough talent pool to do so without prohibitive problems. When one leader is purged, another is on deck. Politicized corruption investigations and their imposition of costs are fundamentally a speedbump rather than a showstopper.
• Regardless of corruption’s pervasive persistence, PLAN operational capabilities continue to improve, and cutting-edge, lethal weapons systems regularly enter service. Corruption may contribute to inefficiencies, but it does not curtail PLAN advances. Related removals are neither an indicator of prohibitive incompetence nor a self-defeating constraint on operational capabilities.

From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman:

The drumbeat of China’s Navy leaders purged for corruption is beating loudly. Admiral Miao Hua (苗华) was purged in late November 2024 …. one month later (just weeks ago), the announcement came that Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng (李鹏程), who concurrently held positions of Commander of the Southern Theater Command (STC) Naval Forces and Deputy STC Deputy STC Commander, was also out.

What has been the broader pattern of PLAN flag officer removals over time, and how has it affected the force? If corruption is as endemic as these recent purges suggest, does that reflect negatively on the PLAN as a functioning organization?

This China Maritime Report provides a deep-dive case study into the career rise and fall of Li Pengcheng. It tracks his involvement in historic PLAN milestone events, his leadership of two counter-piracy Gulf of Aden deployments, and how his career had the attention of CMC Chairman, Xi Jinping himself. Li was a modern-day PLAN officer exemplar and destined for positions of greater responsibility. Where did Li run afoul of the system? Why was he removed? More importantly, have there been changes to STC Naval operations since his downfall? This China Maritime Report suggests answers to each of these questions.

The rise and fall of Admiral Li’s career is a useful case study for analyzing the impact of corruption on PLAN operational capabilities. What makes the examination of Li a particularly useful is that his predecessor as the Commander of STC Naval Forces, Vice Admiral Ju Xinchun (鞠新春), suffered Li’s same fate almost exactly one year ago. Comparing and contrasting two consecutive PLAN STC commanders serving in the same capacity, sacked one year apart, provides a robust dataset to analyze. Any manning, training, or equipping impacts on PLAN STC operational trends in 2024 and beyond could suggest a correlation with these PLAN senior leadership purges. This report examines the careers of both Admirals in context.

A key conclusion of this China Maritime Report is that the PLAN may be playing high-stakes musical chairs with its leadership, but it has a deep enough bench of talent to do so without prohibitive problems. When one leader is purged, another is on deck. Politicized corruption investigations and their imposition of costs are fundamentally a speed bump rather than a showstopper. Corruption may contribute to inefficiencies, but it does not curtail PLAN advances. Related removals are neither an indicator of prohibitive incompetence nor a self-defeating constraint on operational capabilities.

This report is rich with citations and references – almost all of which come directly from original PRC Chinese-language sources. It conveys a fascinating story and provides the most detail you will find anywhere about implications stemming from the rise (and fall) of one of the great modern PLAN leaders.

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Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher H. Sharman, “Admiral Miao Hua’s Fall: Further Navy Fallout?” CMSI Note 11 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 28 November 2024).

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From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman:

• Admiral Miao Hua has been suspended from duties as a member of China’s Central Military Commission and Director of the CMC Political Work Department. Miao’s position, which oversees all senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) promotions, may have significant ramifications for his patronage network—including “current” Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun and possibly Secretary of the CMC’s Politics and Law Commission Admiral Wang Renhua, among others.
• This is the first time the CMC has two positions (one-third of six total) vacant simultaneously. The only other time China’s highest military body experienced such upheaval in recent years involved the purging of Vice Chairmen General Xu Caihou and General Guo Boxiong.
• Admiral Miao is the seventh CMC member to be purged since Xi assumed power in 2012. The humiliation of his public removal is especially embarrassing because Xi promoted him to full admiral on 31 July 2015 and elevated him to the CMC in October 2017. His suspension suggests Xi, or others, may have wanted to make his removal an example for the PLA.
• Admiral Dong Jun, China’s Minister of National Defense, may be caught up in this purge. Dong has close ties to Miao and was absent from Singaporean Vice Admiral Aaron Beng’s introductory PRC visit (24–27 November 2024). At a minimum, Admiral Dong normally would have hosted an office call for VADM Beng during his visit.
• Admiral Miao’s removal suggests Xi remains bore-sighted on achieving China’s 2027 Centennial Military Building Goal and seeks to ensure his armed forces reach maximum preparation for Taiwan contingencies on his watch, even at the cost of short-term setbacks and bureaucratic churn.
• In August 2024, the two top Generals commanding the PLA Rocket Force were removed, together with other leading PLARF officers. Admiral Miao’s suspension and the possible implication of Admiral Dong Jun could suggest Xi has shifted his purging focus to the PLA Navy (PLAN).

Andrew S. Erickson, “Admiral Wang Renhua: Exemplifying Jointness and Oversight for China’s Navy amid Xi’s Grade-and-Rank Reforms,” CMSI Note 5 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 11 April 2024).

From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman:

China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) Friends and Colleagues –

CMSI is pleased to provide you with CMSI Note #5. It elucidates the background, significance, and implications of the 28 March promotion of Admiral Wang Renhua (王仁华) to full Admiral (three-star rank in the PLA); and the apparent elevation of CMC Politics and Law Commission he heads to Theater Command Leader grade, on the same level as the theaters and services.

This CMSI Note continues our efforts to focus on the People in China’s Military Maritime Domain.

What do you know about the CMC’s Politics and Law Commission? What role will Admiral Wang play? What might it mean for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) specifically? Finally, what does this promotion suggest about the future of grade-and-rank promotions of other senior officers?

Dr. Andrew Erickson tackles these questions and so many more in this comprehensive CMSI Note that examines Wang, his career as a political officer, and his role at the Politics and Law Commission. His painstaking research efforts helps to paint a picture of this Navy officer and a CMC Commission you may know very little about.

Summary

A microcosm of China’s ongoing military advancement, Admiral Wang Renhua (王仁华) embodies some of the subtle, complicated efforts underway to make the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a sophisticated fighting force that is more than the sum of its parts and whose human capital is narrowing the gap with its profusion of formidable hardware. On 28 March 2024, in a ceremony at the Central Military Commission (CMC)’s Bayi Building in Beijing, Xi Jinping concurrently promoted Wang to full admiral—three-star rank in the PLA (which, unlike the U.S. military, does not have a four-star rank)— and, apparently, Theater Command Leader grade.2 Doing so in his capacity as CMC Chairman, Xi also oversaw the implementation of one of the key new management dynamics nearly a decade into his sweeping military reforms: simultaneous promotion in grade and rank in an effort to transition from the PLA’s longstanding grade-centric system to a more Western-style rank-centric system.3 As in other professions, approaches to promoting personnel matter greatly in military performance. China heretofore employed a billet-grounded grade system, whereby not only every officer but also every organization is assigned one of fifteen grades; whereas agile, professional Western militaries have long benefitted from an individually-portable rank system. China’s transformation toward the latter approach remains a work in progress, but Wang’s trajectory is an important bellwether of things to come. More broadly, Wang’s career advancement and rise to CMC insider status as the Secretary of the CMC’s Politics and Law Commission also offers living testimony to other PLA efforts underway, particularly at increasing jointness. His varied resume includes a shift from Army to Navy officer in 2017 as well as service in the East Sea Fleet and at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center.4

CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways:

• Admiral Wang Renhua’s promotion is the latest indication of efforts to synchronize grade-and-rank promotions at the full admiral/general level (three stars in the PLA).
• Wang’s role may be best understood as a military loyalty enforcement boss.
• A key responsibility for Wang may well be to root out and destroy Xi’s enemies within the PLA.
• A potential component of Wang’s portfolio in the navy realm could be to maintain a tight grip on the wardrooms aboard China’s growing fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).
• Having Wang serve in the Navy, and currently as head of the CMC’s powerful Politics and Law Commission, helps the PLA shift to a more joint force as part of Xi’s post-2015 reforms.
• Wang is not originally from the Navy and does not represent the institutional interests of the PLA Navy.
• It is not uncommon for a PLA Army political officer to switch uniforms to the Navy and retain them from that time forward, as Wang has done. … … …