Chinese Maritime (Militia) Strategy: Increasingly More Exceptional Than Unique
“Chinese Maritime (Militia) Strategy: Increasingly More Exceptional Than Unique,” in Peter Lorge, ed., Smashing the Sun Tzu Myth: Chinese Strategy in Context (New York: Routledge Politics in Asia book series, 2026).
CHAPTER SUMMARY
Is Chinese maritime strategy part of universal strategic thought, or a distinct intellectual tradition incompatible with Western concepts? The answer depends on how specifically one frames the question. This analysis examines Chinese and foreign cases at a level of specificity sufficient to understand China’s sea forces—useful for scholars, strategists, and practitioners alike. Understanding China’s maritime strategy requires examining its three sea forces: the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the China Coast Guard (CCG) under the People’s Armed Police, and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Each is a component of China’s Armed Forces and the world’s largest force of its kind by ship numbers, exhibiting distinctive “Chinese characteristics” within a universal framework allowing unified scholarly inquiry. The PLAN is least distinctive; the PAFMM is most distinctive. This raises a critical question: within the People’s Republic of China’s historical context, do the PAFMM and other maritime activities represent an extant application of Maoist strategy, or have they evolved distinctively? Most pointedly, does China’s Maritime Militia practice “People’s War at Sea” today? While authoritative Chinese sources suggest this and many Western observers accept it as conventional wisdom, the reality is far more complicated. My conclusion: China’s sea forces and their informing strategy have become progressively less distinctive over time, and these trends continue today.
VOLUME ABSTRACT
Smashing the Sun Tzu Myth: Chinese Strategy in Context explores the historical foundations, contemporary relevance, and enduring influence of Chinese strategic thought from antiquity to the present day.
Bringing together leading scholars of Chinese military history and strategic studies, this volume examines the evolution of Chinese strategy through diverse historical periods, intellectual traditions, and geopolitical contexts. Moving beyond simplistic interpretations of texts such as The Art of War, the contributors reassess key concepts of Chinese strategic culture, including shi, tianxia, and “winning without fighting,” while exploring their historical origins, modern reinterpretations, and practical application. Through case studies spanning the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, cross-Strait relations, maritime strategy, and the People’s Liberation Army, the book investigates the relationship between classical strategic thought and contemporary Chinese military and foreign policy. It also considers the transmission, translation, and global reception of Chinese strategic ideas, offering new perspectives on their place within both Chinese history and the broader field of strategic studies.
This book will appeal to students and scholars of Chinese politics and history, military history, security studies, international relations, and strategic studies, as well as policymakers and practitioners seeking a deeper understanding of China’s strategic traditions and their relevance to contemporary global affairs.
