U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission releases 2017 Annual Report

“Disputes over islands and other land features in the South China Sea could easily escalate into crises, and in fact already have (notably with China’s seizure and effective blockade of Philippines-claimed Scarborough Reef in 2012 and the destructive skirmish between Chinese and Vietnamese non-naval forces over a Chinese oil rig in 2014). Should China perceive an intolerable challenge to its claimed sovereignty over one of these disputed areas, it could employ a range of options—including island landing operations, blockades, or missile strikes—to seize control of disputed features. Such operations likely would involve (perhaps even exclusively) its non-naval maritime forces, such as the China Coast Guard and maritime militia, creating operational uncertainty and “grey zone” challenges for adversaries.”

p. 153

“CHAPTER 2 U.S.-CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS

SECTION 1: YEAR IN REVIEW: SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Key Findings

China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea and in South Asia flared in 2017. China continued to rely primarily on nonmilitary and semiofficial actors (such as the China Coast Guard and maritime militia) to advance its interests in the disputed South China Sea, straining already-unsettled relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. The 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which overwhelmingly sided against China’s position, has not deterred Beijing. China’s territorial assertiveness was also on display when Chinese armed forces attempted to consolidate control over territory disputed by Bhutan and India. Ultimately, India was more successful than the Philippines and Vietnam in countering Chinese coercion.”

p. 237

“Disputed Claims in the South China Sea

Protecting territory claimed by China in the South China Sea has become an increasingly important mission for the PLA.14 Chinese military scholars at China’s National Defense University and the Academy of Military Science argue that while China does not seek a conflict with the United States, “the South China Sea and the East China Sea are … issues that must be settled in the course of China’s rise.”15 Although China has used force to resolve disputes in the” …

p. 238

… “South China Sea in the past,* it has managed its South China Sea claims in recent years with a mix of naval presence, harassment, and hostilities from maritime law enforcement agencies and maritime militia,† and a massive reclamation and fortification campaign of the features it occupies within its claimed “nine-dash line.”16 Furthermore, in 2012, China Coast Guard ships wrested control of the disputed Scarborough Reef from the Philippines.17”

† China’s maritime militia, a quasi-military force of fishermen that are tasked by and report to the PLA, has a key role in China’s South China Sea strategy. They are trained to participate in a variety of missions, including search and rescue, reconnaissance, deception operations, law enforcement, and “rights protection,” which often entails activities like harassing foreign vessels in China’s claimed waters. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, May 15, 2017, 56; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016 Annual Report to Congress, November 2016, 197; Andrew Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Fishing Militia Is a Military Force in All but Name,” War Is Boring, July 9, 2016.

p. 252

“South China Sea Contingency Operation

China’s military, law enforcement, and maritime militia activity in the South China Sea—particularly the ongoing construction of civil-military facilities on reclaimed features in the Spratly Islands—is intended to enhance China’s control over disputed areas in the region.100 Should Beijing judge that China’s sovereignty claims over occupied features within the South China Sea are challenged by states with overlapping claims, the PLA has a range of campaigns that can be executed to maintain control of these features within the nine-dash line. These campaigns include the aforementioned joint firepower strike, joint blockade, sea force group, and coral reef offensive campaigns. China would certainly incorporate maritime law enforcement operations in conjunction with these campaigns, as well as in the run-up to one or more of these campaigns. This will have significant implications for a contingency in the South China Sea or East China Sea. As numerous analysts have noted, China’s unconventional practice of using its maritime law enforcement agencies and maritime militia to advance its territorial claims and harass neighboring countries’ vessels enables China to effectively assert military might in the “gray zone,” just below the threshold of conflict, putting the onus of escalation on the adversary.101 This approach was on display in the case of the oil rig deployed to Vietnam-claimed waters, discussed earlier in this section: Chinese maritime law enforcement forces effectively waged a small maritime” …

U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, April 26, 2016, 7.
Lyle J. Morris, “The New ‘Normal’ in the East China Sea,” Diplomat, February 24, 2017; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” National Interest, July 6, 2016; Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The PLA and Near Seas Maritime Sovereignty Disputes,” in Andrew Scobell et al., eds., The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China, National Defense University Press, 2015, 290–291.

p. 253

… “battle against Vietnam, to the point that at least one Vietnamese vessel sank and several vessels on both sides incurred damage. But because only nonmilitary vessels were involved in the actual fighting, this conflict was characterized in international media as a “standoff,”102 rather than a kinetic conflict initiated by China. This narrative, and the general downplaying of the role maritime law enforcement forces can play in a conflict, greatly benefits China.”

p. 262

“After seizing control of Scarborough Reef from the Philippines in 2012, China has intermittently permitted Filipino fishermen to fish at the reef and has harassed some Filipino fishermen;186 this dispute remains a flashpoint between the two countries.187
In March 2017, China declared its intent to build an environmental monitoring station near Scarborough Reef.188 The Philippines government has declared that any Chinese building at Scarborough would be a “red line.”189 Should China seek to alter the reef through land reclamation or the deployment of PLA equipment such as surface search radars, this would certainly increase tension between the two countries.*
Second Thomas Shoal—where Filipino Marines man a makeshift outpost on the Sierra Madre, a grounded Philippine Navy amphibious ship—is another potential flashpoint.190 China has often challenged the resupply of the grounded ship and threatened to destroy the outpost.† 191
In April 2017, President Duterte declared the AFP would “occupy” all Philippines-claimed features in the Spratly Islands.192 Although he later walked back the statement,193 it illustrates the high level of tension that still pervades the China-Philippines relationship with regard to the South China Sea.”

*In addition to the likelihood that land reclamation activity at Scarborough Reef would in- crease tensions between China and the Philippines, Andrew S. Erickson, a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, in his testimony to the Commission stated, “It’s important to ensure that Scarborough [Reef] is not dredged and developed into a key targeting node for China in the South China Sea, where it would, in effect, be the last big piece in the coverage puzzle.” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, oral testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.

p. 351

“Commercial and semiofficial Chinese actors, such as fishing boats and vessels that are part of China’s maritime militia,* have accounted for the majority of China’s maritime activity near the Senkakus.219 In August 2016, China deployed roughly 230 fishing boats and 15 CCG vessels within 24 nm of the Senkakus—the largest number of vessels China has deployed to the area since tensions spiked in September 2012.220 More than 100 maritime militiamen reportedly were identified on these fishing boats, many of them apparently commanding fishing boats while dressed in Chinese military fatigues.221 With this operation, China demonstrated it can control these vessels and integrate them into operations with law enforcement. This capability has been enabled by multiple joint drills involving Chinese military, law enforcement, and civilian agencies in recent years.222 The huge number of nongovernment vessels at China’s disposal—including roughly 200,000 fishing boats—and the CCG’s growing capabilities increase the possibility that China could swarm and overwhelm the Japan Coast Guard near the Senkakus.223”

*China has the world’s largest maritime militia, a quasi-military force of fishermen that are tasked by and report to the PLA. They are trained to participate in a variety of missions, in- cluding search and rescue, reconnaissance, deception operations, law enforcement, and “rights protection,” which often entails activities like harassing foreign vessels in China’s claimed waters. Andrew Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Fishing Militia Is a Military Force in All but Name,” War Is Boring, July 9, 2016.

p. 358

“With Japan, China has gradually but decisively moved to consolidate its claims in the East China Sea, with its coast guard and maritime militia forces leading the charge. China’s use of nonmilitary actors to advance its claims handicaps Japan’s ability to mount an effective countervailing force; the Japan Coast Guard is highly capable, but will meet significant difficulties engaging China’s maritime forces. China’s growing competence in conducting “gray zone” operations below the threshold of kinetic military conflict could also complicate the United States’ ability to fulfil its treaty obligation to defend Japan from an armed attack.”

p. 390

“The PLA Navy has more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, and missile-armed patrol craft, in addition to China’s highly capable coast guard and maritime militia.162 Taiwan, on the other hand, has 92 naval combatants, comprising four submarines—two of which are only used for training—and 88 surface ships.† 163”

†Taiwan’s coast guard is in the midst of a ten-year shipbuilding program that will bring its forces to 173 ships. Taiwan does not have a maritime militia. Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, “Taiwanese Coast Guard Launches OPV amid Ongoing Force Development Programme,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 28, 2015.

p. 555

“Military Modernization

China’s advanced weapons programs align with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) overall modernization drive over the past several decades. China’s military modernization began under then President Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1978, and its programs to develop the advanced weapons discussed in this section appear to have originated in the 1980s and early 1990s 4 (with the exception of a 1960s military laser research program geared toward missile defense,5 and unmanned and AI technologies, which emerged more recently). China’s modernization efforts have specifically sought to narrow gaps in the PLA’s ability to defend national interests and “win informationized local wars”6 (wars incorporating information technology and networked information operations 7), an objective reinforced by several crises that have highlighted the limited options available to Beijing in contingencies.8 These events included the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the collision of a PLA fighter with a U.S. EP–3 reconnaissance aircraft in 2001. The 1991 Gulf War and 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervention in Serbia, while they did not directly involve China, also underscored the capability gaps China would face in a potential conflict and lent urgency to PLA modernization. All of these encounters contributed to Beijing’s recognition of the need to address the limited options and capability gaps it might face in regional contingencies involving its core interests. This solidified the requirement for an antiaccess/ area denial (A2/AD) or “counterintervention” component within PLA missions* in anticipation of potential outside interference.9 In continuation of these efforts, the PLA is developing weapons at the global technological frontier.”

Military Competition with the United States

In relation to its past modernization activities, China’s advanced weapons programs appear to reflect a more careful degree of planning as to the U.S. weaknesses they are designed to exploit. In 1999, China’s then President Jiang Zemin used the accidental bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade to underscore military gaps in relation to the United States. He initiated and reinforced major programs for the construction of asymmetric weapons designed to exploit U.S. weaknesses, stating, “That which the enemy fears most, that is what we must develop.”10 This objective is reflected in the Chinese term shashoujian, translated as “assassin’s mace weapon,” which general-” …

Maneuverable reentry vehicles and hypersonic weapons: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Mark Stokes, February 23, 2017; high energy lasers: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Timothy Grayson, February 23, 2017; high-powered microwave weapons: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Richard D. Fisher, Jr., February 23, 2017; electromagnetic railguns: Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “An Electromagnetic Arms Race Has Begun: China Is Making Railguns Too,” Popular Science, November 23, 2015; counterspace weapons became more relevant following the 1991 Gulf War: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Todd Harrison, February 23, 2017; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, oral testimony of Kevin Pollpeter, February 23, 2017.
8. Andrew S. Erickson, “Showtime: China Reveals Two ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missiles,” National Interest, September 3, 2015; David Lai and Marc Miller, “Introduction,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009, 9–10; David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, University of California Press, 2002, 4–5; Harry J. Kazianis, “America’s Air-Sea Battle Concept: An Attempt to Weaken China’s A2/AD Strategy,” China Policy Institute, 2014, 2.
10. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.

p. 556

… “ly refers to the idea of a weaker power utilizing a certain capability to defeat a stronger one.11 The term has been applied in Chinese strategic writings and top leadership statements to antiship ballistic missiles in particular.12 In addition, Chinese military writings on elements of the U.S. Third Offset strategy—which sets forth U.S. requirements for developing many of these advanced military technologies—often assess that the pursuit of these new systems is aimed at China,13 and the PLA’s focus on advanced weapons has only intensified in response to the Third Offset Strategy.14 Breakthroughs in any of the advanced weapons categories discussed in this section would contribute strongly to China’s A2/AD capabilities and directly challenge U.S. advantages. Dr. Timothy Grayson, president of Fortitude Mission Research LLC, former senior manager at Raytheon, and former program manager at the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), termed China’s pursuit of advanced weapons “the next phase” of China’s modernization strategy, testifying to the Commission: Instead of simply relying upon overwhelming the U.S. with “catch-up” capabilities in large numbers, China is now developing weapons in key areas that may leapfrog the U.S., attempting to negate specific U.S. strengths. … Hypersonics [are] an extension of existing ballistic missile and cruise missile capabilities, but instead of saturating missile defenses with numbers, the speed and maneuverability of hypersonic weapons may make kinetic missile defenses obsolete. Directed energy and space control target the current overwhelming U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) advantage. … New capability in directed energy threatens U.S. sensor capabilities with blinding or damage, and space control systems threaten U.S. satellites themselves.15 To these observations can be added the potential effects of maneuverable reentry vehicles and large numbers of unmanned/AI-equipped weapons on large U.S. platforms and fixed bases key to the U.S. security posture in the Asia Pacific.”

Andrew S. Erickson, “Raining Down: Assessing the Emergent ASBM Threat,” Jane’s Navy International, March 16, 2016.

p. 557

“China’s Advanced Weapons Programs

Although information regarding China’s advanced weapons programs is not always readily available in the public domain, numerous open source writings, government statements, and testing and deployment activities indicate Beijing has undertaken vigorous efforts in these areas. The following pages define each weapons type, summarize China’s activities and objectives in each area, and evaluate their current status in relation to comparable U.S. programs.

Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles

Definition. A maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) is a ballistic missile reentry vehicle that is capable of maneuvering after reentering Earth’s atmosphere, in contrast to a standard reentry vehicle, which continues on its trajectory without any course correction capability.20 MaRVs can be more difficult to intercept and therefore better able to penetrate adversary missile defenses.21 They also offer greater potential than standard reentry vehicles for striking moving targets, if configured to do so.

China’s Activities. China likely began preliminary research into MaRV technology in 1991 and engineering research and development (R&D) on its first ballistic missile system incorporating this technology in 2002.22 Beijing publicly revealed two ballistic missile” …

p. 558

… “systems that reportedly have MaRV capabilities in 2010 and 2015, respectively:

China fielded the world’s first antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) in 2010, a variant of the DF–21 family of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) known as the DF–21D. It reportedly features a range of at least 1,500 kilometers (km) (932 miles [mi]) and is road mobile, meaning it can be driven by vehicle and launched from multiple locations.23 At its maximum extent, this range would cover an area beyond the first island chain,* including large portions of the East, Philippine, and South China seas.24
China unveiled the DF–26 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) in 2015, reportedly also with an ASBM variant. The DF–26 has a credited range of 3,000–4,000 km (1,800–2,500 mi), and is also road mobile. At its maximum extent, this would cover U.S. military installations on Guam and most of the area within the second island chain.25 This has prompted some analysts and netizens to refer to the missile as the “Guam Express” or “Guam Killer” (similar to the term “carrier killer” sometimes used to refer to the DF–21D).26

China’s activities have also centered on developing the reconnaissance-strike complex necessary for these missiles to successfully strike a moving target at sea. As ASBMs require accurate “over-the-horizon” targeting support, this complex likely involves a combination of satellites and ground-based radar, possibly including microsatellites and even unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for temporary augmentation.27

Questions regarding these ASBMs’ true capabilities persist, and their combat effectiveness may never be fully certain to observers in the public domain outside of their actual employment in a conflict.28 Seven years after the DF–21D’s unveiling, neither ASBM has yet been reported to have been tested against a moving target at sea.29 Dr. Andrew Erickson, professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, testified to the Commission in 2017 that “the missiles themselves work,” but “the ability of China’s reconnaissance-strike complex to provide accurate targeting for its ASBMs remains unclear.”30 To successfully strike a moving target at sea, China would need to master an extremely complex process.31 Put simply, the ship must be located, current location data must be uploaded to the reentry vehicle’s sensors before firing, the vehicle must conduct a mid-course maneuver upon reentry to identify the target’s signature, and then the vehicle must conduct a terminal maneuver to strike the ship before the ship has moved beyond the pre-programmed “box” within which it was originally detected to be operating. This presents several obstacles (notwithstanding any potential U.S. countermeasures):

China probably does not yet have sufficient intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) coverage, particularly at the far end of its ASBM ranges, to obtain this data in the first place.”

Wang Changqin and Fang Guangming “PRC Military Sciences Academy Explains Need for Developing the DF–26 Anti-Ship Missile,” China Youth Daily, November 30, 2015. Translation; Andrew S. Erickson, “Showtime: China Reveals Two ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missiles,” National Interest, September 3, 2015; Wendell Minnick, “China’s Parade Puts U.S. Navy on Notice,” Defense News, September 3, 2015; Charles Clover, “China Unveils ‘Guam Express’ Advanced Anti-Ship Missile,” Financial Times, September 5, 2015; Franz-Stefan Gady, “Revealed: China for the First Time Publicly Displays ‘Guam Killer’ Missile,” National Interest, August 31, 2015.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017; James M. Acton, “Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, 100.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.

p. 559

“For this reason, it continues to launch Yaogan and Gaofen ISR satellites—as well as Beidou navigation satellites to improve missile guidance—to enable coverage of a greater area of the Pacific.32

Coordination among the different service elements of the PLA involved in data fusion and command and control presents an organizational challenge. Erickson assesses that China’s military reforms, aimed at making the PLA more joint and better structured to wage modern wars, will be helpful in this regard.33 The creation of the Strategic Support Force in particular may enable better coordination of space-based functions.34 The Force’s mission is to integrate China’s space, cyber, electronic warfare,35 and signals intelligence capabilities.36 Therefore, responsibility for the intelligence and reconnaissance functions involved in locating and tracking targets will be centralized rather than dispersed among different units.37 Furthermore, some expert observers of the PLA have debated whether strategic level human intelligence collection capabilities have also been absorbed by the Force. The addition of these capabilities could likewise aid in focusing national-level collection assets for targeting purposes.*38
The warheads and terminal guidance sensors themselves must be able to withstand the rigors of atmospheric reentry without adverse effects to their required performance.39 Although the DF–21D reportedly includes a terminal guidance system,40 its utility against an uncooperative target is again untested. The performance of China’s ASBMs is difficult to assess, given a decline in the availability of public Chinese technical writings, likely to conceal sensitive details.41 However, Erickson notes that “China is constantly extending and improving its reconnaissance-strike complex. It is launching satellites at a pace that only the United States and Russia can hope to match.”42 In coming years, he assesses China is likely to achieve a robust architecture for finding carriers and large surface vessels.43 In the nearer-term, Dr. Erickson states that placing ground-based radar on all of the Spratly and Paracel islands features China occupies in the South China Sea (one such installation is already in place on Cuarteron Reef in the Spratlys) would likely enable China to detect and target carrier strike groups across the vast majority of the South China Sea.44

China’s Objectives. The PLA seeks the ability to hold adversaries’ vessels at risk via multi-axis strikes launched from a wide range of platforms as part of its suite of A2/AD capabilities, of which ASBMs are a key component. The DF–21D in particular has been referenced as” …

Andrew S. Erickson, “Raining Down: Assessing the Emergent ASBM Threat,” Jane’s Navy International, March 16, 2016.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017; Andrew S. Erickson, “Raining Down: Assessing the Emergent ASBM Threat,” Jane’s Navy International, March 16, 2016.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.
John Costello, “The Strategic Support Force: Update and Overview,” China Brief, December 21, 2016.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.
Peter Mattis, “China Reorients Strategic Military Intelligence,” IHS Jane’s, 2017, 3–4; Lincoln Davidson, “China’s Strategic Support Force: The New Home of the PLA’s Cyber Operations,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 20, 2016.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Offensive Missile Forces, written testimony of Dennis M. Gormley, April 1, 2015.
James Acton, Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, interview with Commission staff, June 17, 2017.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017; Andrew S. Erickson, “Raining Down: Assessing the Emergent ASBM Threat,” Jane’s Navy International, March 16, 2016.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017; Andrew S. Erickson, “Raining Down: Assessing the Emergent ASBM Threat,” Jane’s Navy International, March 16, 2016.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Raining Down: Assessing the Emergent ASBM Threat,” Jane’s Navy International, March 16, 2016.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Raining Down: Assessing the Emergent ASBM Threat,” Jane’s Navy International, March 16, 2016.

p. 560

… “an “assassin’s mace” weapon by China’s leaders,45 while the DF–26 is likely designed to reach Guam, viewed in PLA strategic and academic writings as an “anchor” of the United States’ regional presence and its ability to surge forces into the region in a contingency.46”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017; People’s Network, “Dong Feng 21D Troop Review Gives PLA Navy an Asymmetric ‘Assassin’s Mace,’” September 9, 2015.

p. 572

“The PLA Navy is exploring options for unmanned surface vehicles (USVs),159 and some Chinese research institutes have made progress on these systems. However, DGI’s 2016 report assessed that Chinese military strategists appear to be minimally interested in USVs, potentially because China’s maritime militia can already be mobilized for a variety of missions to support the PLA Navy.160”

Jonathan Ray et al., “China’s Industrial and Military Robotics Development,” Defense Group, Inc. Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis (prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission), October 2016, 68.

p. 579

“China has often relied on foreign technology to boost its advanced weapons programs. China may have incorporated technologies from the U.S. Pershing II MRBM into its ASBMs,233 and its HGV may be an enhanced version of a MaRV developed for an existing ballistic missile, for example.234”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.

p. 580

“Implications for the United States

Direct Military Implications

China’s objectives for its advanced weapons programs, if realized, could have disruptive military effects and necessitate altering U.S. strategic calculations in the Asia Pacific.244

Maneuverable reentry vehicles, a key component of China’s larger counterintervention effort,245 have already raised questions regarding whether U.S. surface ships would need to avoid venturing into the “range ring” of China’s ASBMs in a contingency.246 If China succeeds in building a system capable of successfully targeting moving aircraft carriers—which may never be fully known by public observers outside of actual combat—U.S. defensive options will be expensive and attempts to strike before launch highly escalatory. Ultimately, by compounding existing A2/AD challenges, these and other advanced weapons could delay or significantly increase the costs of a U.S. intervention in a regional contingency.247 The United States has been investing in responses to these weapons since at least 2004, although the competition between defensive and offensive measures will likely be an ongoing one. China’s development of the reconnaissance-strike complex to target these ASBMs will be expensive and increase its reliance on space-based assets, while the missiles themselves will be reliant on satellite data links, making them vulnerable to electronic warfare countermeasures such as jamming.248”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.
Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications, Jamestown Foundation, May 2013, 119.
248. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.

p. 582

“Broader Competitive Implications

Given Beijing’s commitment to its current trajectory, and the lack of fundamental barriers to advanced weapons development beyond time and funding, the United States cannot assume it will have an” …

p. 583

… “enduring advantage in developing next frontier military technology.274 In addition, current technological trends render the preservation of any advantage even more difficult.275 The United States now faces a peer technological competitor in an era in which commercial sector research and development with dual-use implications increasingly outpaces and contributes to military developments 276—a country that is also one of its largest trading partners and that trades extensively with other high-tech powers. As the United States seeks to ensure it is prepared to deter aggression and defend key interests in the Asia Pacific region, such as the security of allies and partners, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and freedom of navigation,277 recognizing this challenge will be crucial.”

White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, November 15, 2015; Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “Guam and American Security in the Pacific,” in Andrew S. Erickson and Carnes Lord, eds., Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific, Naval Institute Press, 2014, 17, 25; Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security, Columbia University Press, 2012, 357.

LINKS TO FULL TEXT OF SELECTED SOURCES CITED:

Andrew S. Erickson, ed., Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain Course (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016).

Andrew S. Erickson and Adam P. Liff, “China’s Military Spending Swells Again Despite Domestic Headwinds,” China Real Time Report (中国实时报), Wall Street Journal, 5 March 2015.

Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,” The China Quarterly 216 (December 2013): 805-30.

Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, “The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting,” Asian Security, 8.2 (Summer 2012): 115-37.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Fishing Militia Is a Military Force in All but Name,” War Is Boring (Blog), 9 July 2016.

Reprint of Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” The National Interest, 6 July 2016.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development and Counter-intervention Efforts,” testimony at Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons held by U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, 23 February 2017.

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China’s Strategic Rocket Force: Sharpening the Sword (Part 1 of 2),” Jamestown China Brief 14.13 (3 July 2014).

Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, [Xu Qi], “21世纪初海上地缘战略与中国海军的发展” [Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early 21st Century], 中国军事科学 [China Military Science] 17.4 (2004): 75-81, Naval War College Review 59.4 (Autumn 2006): 46-67.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” The National Interest, 6 July 2016.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Showtime: China Reveals Two ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missiles,” The National Interest, 3 September 2015.

Timothy Heath and Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Turn Toward Regional Restructuring, Counter-Intervention: A Review of Authoritative Sources,” Jamestown China Brief 15.22 (16 November 2015): 3-8.

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael Monti, “Trouble Ahead? Chinese-Korean Disputes May Intensify,” The National Interest, 20 February 2015.

Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, May 2013).

Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “Guam and American Security in the Pacific,” in Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson, eds., Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 14-35.