01 February 2009

Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States

Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, and Christopher Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32.1 (February 2009): 67-114.

Keywords: ChinaNuclear StrategyBallistic Missiles

The People’s Republic of China (PRC), no longer content with its longstanding ‘minimalist’ nuclear posture and strategy, is enhancing the striking power and survivability of its theater and strategic missile forces and rethinking its nuclear doctrine in ways that may pose serious challenges for the United States. Although the modernization of Chinese nuclear and missile forces may ultimately result in greater strategic deterrence stability, this change will not come about immediately or automatically. Indeed, it is entirely possible that China’s growing missile capabilities could decrease crisis stability under certain circumstances, especially in the event of a US–China conflict over Taiwan.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), once widely dismissed as a bloated, poorly trained military with an enormous, but largely antiquated collection of weapons and equipment, is becoming a leaner, more professional, and increasingly operationally capable fighting force. Major increases in Chinese defense spending over the past decade have enabled an accelerating military modernization program. As part of this ongoing transformation, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has clearly prioritized the improvement of its missile capabilities. Although much attention has been focused on China’s rapidly growing arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), its theater and strategic conventional and nuclear missile forces are undergoing equally important changes. Many analysts have portrayed Chinese longer range missile and nuclear forces as modernizing very slowly, but recent developments, including advances in technology, increasingly realistic training, and doctrinal evolution, underscore the necessity of updating the conventional wisdom on China’s theater and strategic missile capabilities and the US–China strategic relationship. Indeed, China is currently enhancing the striking power and survivability of its theater and strategic missile forces and rethinking its nuclear doctrine in ways that may pose serious challenges for the United States. The principal drivers of these developments are China’s assessment of its changing external security environment, especially vis-a -vis the United States, and its growing concerns about the viability of its traditional deterrent posture, particularly in a missile defense environment.

China’s transition from its longstanding ‘minimalist’ strategic posture to one that consists of a much more potent combination of theater and strategic missile and nuclear systems raises several important questions: Most fundamentally, what is the actual composition of China’s missile forces at this time and how will this force structure evolve over the next few years? How is the Chinese military training to use the new weapons it is adding to its arsenal? How will Chinese planners and decisionmakers think about using these emerging capabilities? What doctrinal tensions might arise in the future now that China no longer has to make virtue out of necessity? What are the implications for the US–China strategic relationship and deterrence stability in a Taiwan Strait crisis or conflict? … … …

Acknowledgements

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Naval War College, Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense. The authors thank several anonymous reviewers for their incisive comments.

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