Andrew S. Erickson

This seminal analysis is destined to become a classic in the field. I consult it frequently when researching Chinese naval development, and commend it most highly to anyone serious about understanding the subject.

Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to ‘Far Seas’,” Asian Security 5.2 (May 2009): 144-69.

Abstract: This study first shows that China’s naval strategy has undergone two major changes: from “near-coast defense” prior to the mid-1980s to “near-seas active defense” after the mid-1980s, and then to the advancement of a “far-seas operations” strategy. Related to the evolution of naval strategy is the change in naval capabilities: from limited capabilities for coastal defense to more expansive capabilities to operate more effectively in China’s near seas by the late 2000s. The new strategy of “far-seas operations” endorsed since the mid-2000s may have major implications for the future development of China’s naval capabilities. Second, this study argues that changes in naval strategy and capabilities can be accounted for by a combination of major variables, including the role of naval leadership and personal experience, endorsement of civilian leadership, changing perception of external security environment, availability of funding and technologies, and institutionalization of naval research. Also, while a major change in naval capabilities may be related to a change in naval strategy, it may also be driven by other highly contingent or idiosyncratic reasons.

How have China’s naval strategy (haijun zhanlue, or 海军战略) and capabilities evolved over time? What factors drive this evolution? What are the major implications for future Chinese naval development? Answering these questions is important mainly because such answers have important implications for Asian security. This essay addresses these research questions in order to offer empirical insights to scholars, military planners, and strategists.

Empirically, scholarly literature on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) illuminates significantly the dynamics of China’s naval modernization. It addresses issues such as how change in China’s overall military strategy has affected the PLAN, particularly in terms of a new emphasis on local war, on offense and on technical expertise over politics; whether and when the PLAN will acquire an aircraft carrier; how mature the PLAN is, and what strategic dilemmas Washington might encounter as a result of China’s modernizing submarine force. It also offers detailed accounts of the historical, geostrategic and economic contexts underlying China’s maritime and naval development, and the PLAN’s organization, hardware and personnel. Because these studies have specific analytical emphases, they are relatively unconcerned with a diachronic comparison of China’s naval strategy and capabilities over time, or with issues such as what has changed in China’s naval strategy and capabilities over time, and what drives these changes. This study provides a systematic answer to these questions, and thereby fills a significant void in existing literature.

This study first shows that China’s naval strategy has undergone two major changes: from the “near-coast defense” (“jin’an fangyu,” or “近岸防御”) strategy prior to the mid-1980s to the “near-seas active defense” (“jinhai jiji fangyu,” or “近海积极防御”) after the mid-1980s, and then to the advancement of a “far-seas operations” (“yuanhai zuozhan,” or “远海作战”) strategy by the mid-2000s. Related to the evolution of the naval strategy is the change in naval capabilities: from limited capabilities for coastal defense to more expansive capabilities to operate more effectively in China’s nears seas by the late 2000s. The new strategy of “far-seas operations” endorsed since mid-2000s may have major implications for the future development of the PLAN capabilities.

Second, this study argues that changes in naval strategy and capabilities cannot be accounted for by just one variable or factor, but rather by a combination of major or more important variables or factors. These include the role of naval leadership and personal experience, endorsement of the civilian leadership, changing perception of the external security environment, availability of funding and technologies, and institutionalization of naval research. A related point is that while a major change in naval capabilities may be related to a change in naval strategy, sometimes it may be driven more by other highly contingent or idiosyncratic reasons.

This study employs an approach of what Arend Lijphart calls “diachronic comparison,” or to identify changes/differences over time in a single country, and attempt to explain these changes/differences. An ideal approach to explanation is 1) to concentrate on major or more important variables and 2) to control for all other variables, or to establish the condition of “other things being equal,” similar or constant. This is because such a control increases the confidence level that a particular change/difference is caused by a particular variable or factor that the researcher has hypothesized, but not by others. But what is closer to reality, particularly for social sciences, is that a particular change/difference may not be caused by a change in one variable, but by changes in a few major and more important variables. As a result, a more realistic and reasonable approach to explanation is a multi-variable explanation based on “necessary and sufficient” conditions, which this study employs. An endorsement of a change by the naval leadership in naval strategy, for instance, is necessary but not sufficient to cause a change in naval capabilities. For such a change to take place, other things also need to happen: civilian leadership needs to endorse the new strategy; naval analysts need to articulate and socialize the new strategy; and money and technologies need to become available. Indeed, this second approach can explain why a particular change takes place at a particular time and place but not others.

The study has four sections. The first discusses the “near-coast defense” strategy and related capabilities. The second examines the “near-seas active defense” strategy and related capabilities, and answers the question on what that drive the shift from “near-coast defense” to “near-seas active defense.” The third section discusses the advancement of the “far-seas operations” strategy and addresses the question on what that can account for this new development. The concluding section discusses major implications of the findings. …