Edward Wong, New York Times: “China State TV Deletes Video Implying Hacking of Western Sites”
Edward Wong, “China State TV Deletes Video Implying Hacking of Western Sites,” New York Times, 26 August 2011.
The main Chinese state television network has deleted from the Internet a video that some foreign military and Internet security analysts say implies China has engaged in hacking attacks on Web sites in the West.
The video was the July 16 episode of a program on China Central Television 7 called “Military Science and Technology.” The episode, called “The Internet Storm is Coming,” was about cyberwarfare. …
An online article published on China SignPost on Wednesday by two military analysts, Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, said there were questions as to whether the television program was using a mock-up to demonstrate cyberwarfare, or whether it revealed real hacking software and an actual attack. The technology shown was at least a decade old, the authors wrote. But “it is significant that an official Chinese state television channel showed even a symbolic representation of a cyberattack, particularly one on entities clearly located in a foreign sovereign nation,” they wrote.
… By Friday, a video of that episode had been removed from a CCTV Web site that still has other recent episodes of “Military Science and Technology.”
CCTV has declined to comment. There has been at least one notable example of the network’s using fake footage in a report on the military: In January, it tried to pass off a scene of a fighter jet getting blown to bits in the 1986 movie “Top Gun” as images of a military training exercise done by the People’s Liberation Army.
For full text of the report referenced and quoted here, see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “A Smoking Cursor? New Window Opens on China’s Potential Cyberwarfare Development: CCTV 7 program raises new questions about Beijing’s support for hacking,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 46 (24 August 2011).
Also, the U.S. Department of Defense has just released the following content regarding PRC cyberwarfare capabilities:
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011
pp. 5-6
Cyberwarfare Capabilities. In 2010, numerous computer systems around the world, including those owned by the U.S. Government, were the target of intrusions, some of which appear to have originated within the PRC. These intrusions were focused on exfiltrating information. Although this alone is a serious concern, the accesses and skills required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct computer network attacks. China’s 2010 Defense White Paper notes China’s own concern over foreign cyberwarfare efforts and highlighted the importance of cyber-security in China’s national defense.
Cyberwarfare capabilities could serve PRC military operations in three key areas. First and foremost, they allow data collection through exfiltration. Second, they can be employed to constrain an adversary’s actions or slow response time by targeting network-based logistics, communications, and commercial activities. Third, they can serve as a force multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks during times of crisis or conflict.
Developing capabilities for cyberwarfare is consistent with authoritative PLA military writings. Two military doctrinal writings, Science of Strategy, and Science of Campaigns identify information warfare (IW) as integral to achieving information superiority and an effective means for countering a stronger foe. Although neither document identifies the specific criteria for employing computer network attack against an adversary, both advocate developing capabilities to compete in this medium.
The Science of Strategy and Science of Campaigns detail the effectiveness of IW and computer network operations in conflicts and advocate targeting adversary command and control and logistics networks to impact their ability to operate during the early stages of conflict. As the Science of Strategy explains, “In the information war, the command and control system is the heart of information collection, control, and application on the battlefield. It is also the nerve center of the entire battlefield.”
In parallel with its military preparations, China has increased diplomatic engagement and advocacy in multilateral and international forums where cyber issues are discussed and debated. Beijing’s agenda is frequently in line with the Russian Federation’s efforts to promote more international control over cyber activities. China has not yet agreed with the U.S. position that existing mechanisms, such as International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, apply in cyberspace. China’s thinking in this area is evolving as it becomes more engaged.