China Issues its Own “Report on U.S. Military Power 2012” & “Report on Japanese Military Power 2012”
On 8 May 2013, in reviewing the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)’s annual report on Chinese military developments, I noted that “China itself needs to know how its military progress is being perceived, even as it remains free to publish whatever reports of its own it might wish.”
Now China has indeed done so, through the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association (中国战略文化促进会), which was established on 5 January 2011.
While this publication by the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association in no way represents the same level of direct, formal authority as does publication by the U.S. DoD, addressing such a potentially politically-sensitive matter in such a public, forthright fashion would not be possible if China’s central government opposed it. Indeed, the People’s Daily headline announcing the documents’ release stated “China Releases Reports on U.S., Japanese Military Power 2012.” Xinhua, meanwhile, credits the report’s release to the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association as a “private think tank” (民间智库). Pictures of the actual hard copy reports can be found here, courtesy of China Youth Daily. Global Times has published an English-language article on the reports, which it describes as having been issued by an “NGO.” In it, Professor Su Hao, director of the Asia-Pacific Research Center at China Foreign Affairs University, which educates many of China’s diplomats, is quoted as stating that “The reports are strong and timely responses to the inaccurate remarks in the US annual report on China’s military and the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s recent white paper.”
Click here for full text of “Report on U.S. Military Power 2012” (2012美国军力评估报道) also appended below.
Click here for full text of companion “Report on Japanese Military Power 2012” (2012日本军力评估报告).
Additional commentary in Chinese concerning the reports’ 19 July 2013 release at a press conference by the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association in Beijing is available here.
Chinese-language editions of these documents were first issued last year, and henceforth will be published annually.
Full Chinese-language text of the “Report on U.S. Military Power 2011” (2011美国军力评估报告) may be accessed here.
Full Chinese-language text of the “Report on Japanese Military Power 2011” (2011日本军力评估报告) is available here.
To me, the contents of the ~12,500+ word report on the U.S. military and the ~7,800+ word report on its Japanese counterpart are testimony to just how much information about the U.S. military, and the Japan Self-Defense Forces, for that matter, is publicly available—in the United States, Japan, China, and around the world. This wealth of accessible data, coupled with lack of U.S. government protest at China’s issuing such a report, offers an important contrast that I hope might—in time—influence Chinese views concerning the dynamics and value of military transparency.
It is also an interesting opportunity to read Chinese analysis of the U.S. military (and its Japanese counterpart) in English. Since I spend much of my time reading Chinese sources, I have long been struck by how much detailed analysis of virtually every aspect of the U.S. military (and the services of U.S. allies, as well as of other major nations) is available in Chinese. Just as China is almost always more transparent in Chinese, Chinese analysis is almost always more extensive in Chinese. This fact, at least, should surprise no one.
In any case, whatever areas of disagreement may persist, publication of reports can potentially represent a positive step toward “seeking truth from facts” (实事求是) through substantive inquiry, discussion, and debate—as opposed to engaging in unsubstantiated, unproductive political sloganeering.
Report on U.S. Military Power 2012
10:05, July 19, 2013
US Military Power 2012
China Strategic Culture Promotion Association
July, 2013
Chapter One Defense Strategy
I. Assessing U.S. Security Environment
II. Specifying Ten Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces
Chapter Two Military Strength and Force Deployment
Chapter Three National Defense Budget and Weapons R&D and Procurement
II. Weapons R&D and Procurement
Chapter Four New Development in Operational Doctrines
I. New Developments in the Air-Sea Battle Concept
II. Development of the “Joint Operational Access Concept”
III. The Concept of Globally Integrated Operations and Its Requirements for joint forces
Chapter Five Alliances and Partnerships
II. Cementing Existing Partnerships and Develop New Partnerships
Chapter Six Military Exercises
I. Military Exercises Conducted by the U.S. Military Alone
II. Exercises Conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces and Other Militaries
US Military Power 2012
In 2012, as Mr. Obama was seeking to win his second term as U.S. President and the nine-year war in Iraq was drawing to an end, the Obama administration proceeded with the strategy of Rebalancing towards the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific Region amid a record-high fiscal deficit, significant cuts in defense expenditure, and domestic unemployment rate hovering high. In terms of military development, the year 2012 is marked by the release of a strategic guidance document–Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense–and is characterized by realignment of U.S. global military deployment, R&D of new weaponry and equipment, innovation in operational doctrines, enhancing alliances and partnerships, and increase in joint military exercises. The U.S. has been seeking to sustain its global leadership by maintaining combat effectiveness while cutting defense spending.
Chapter One Defense Strategy
On January 5th, 2012, U.S. President Obama and then Secretary of Defense Panetta co-signed a new U.S. guidance for defense strategy—Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. The document, stipulated jointly by the Department of Defense (DoD), Joint Chiefs of Staff, service departments, theater commands, and CSCPA Report on U.S. Military Power 2012 relevant government agencies, provides important guidelines for adjusting the size and structure of the U.S. Armed Forces, priorities for weaponry and equipment development, military capabilities, force deployment, and resource allocation.
The document was introduced by both President Obama and then Secretary of Defense Panetta, and is composed of five parts, namely, Introduction, A Challenging Global Security Environment, Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces, Toward the Joint Force of 2020, and Conclusion. The major content of the document is as follows:
I. Assessing U.S. Security Environment
From a geostrategic perspective, the arch extending from the Western Pacific, East Asia to the Indian Ocean and South Asia is closely related to U.S. economic and security interests. Within this vast region, there are emerging powers as well as flash points such as North Korea’s nuclear issue and conflicts centering on resources. Although terrorist forces in the Middle East have suffered serious blows, Al Qaeda and its affiliates remain active in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. South Asia and the Middle East could very likely become the hotbed for violent extremists. The Arab Spring ignited regional turbulences, resulting in government changes. Europe has the most staunch US allies and partners, most of whom are now “producers” not “consumers” of security. On the whole, Europe’s security situation is stable. A fewplaces in Europe, though, are troubled with potential security challenges and conflicts.
To be specific, China and Iran are of particular concern for the U.S.. The document mentions China on the following three occasions: “China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and [U.S.] security in a variety of ways”, “the growth of China’s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region,” and “[s]tates such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter [U.S.] power projection capabilities.” It holds that Iran is taking destructive policies and seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Once there is proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, U.S. national security will be seriously threatened. Interms of the nature of threats facing the U.S., non-traditional security threats have become greater. Such threats include not only terrorist threats from radical terrorism such as remaining Al Qaeda terrorists and Hezbollah, but also new challenges posed by state and non-state actors in global commons such as sea, air, and cyberspace.The strategic guidance document holds that “[b]oth state and non-state actors possess the capability and intent to conduct cyber espionage and, potentially, cyber attacks on the United States, with possible severe effects on both [U.S.] military operations and [U.S.] homeland.”
II. Specifying Ten Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces
“After a decade of counter-terror war, the United States is at a strategic turning point.” The U.S. Armed Forces are in the transitional period of military transformation, and “it is shifting from focusing on fighting and winning the current war on terror to preparing for future challenges.” For capability development and resource allocation, the strategic guidance document specifies ten primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces:
First, to conduct counter terrorism and irregular warfare. As the U.S. draws down in Afghanistan and concludes the war on terror, it will continue with global counter terrorism efforts aiming at disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaeda and its affiliates. The U.S. efforts will be characterized by both direct involvement and security assistance, employing irregular operationalcapabilities and other means of national power.
Second, to deter and defeat aggression. As a nation with important interests in multiple regions, U.S. forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression in one region when its forces are committed to a large-scale joint operation elsewhere.
Third, to project power despite anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges. The strategic guidance document maintains that China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means such as cyber, electronic and missile warfare to counter U.S. power projection capabilities and freedom of activity. Accordingly, the U.S. military is required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in A2/AD environments by implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept.
Fourth, to counter Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD). DoD will enhance its cooperation with other government agencies for the implementation of the CooperativeThreat Reduction Program to improve its capabilities to detect, protect against, and respond to WMD use, so that proliferation and employment of WMD could be prevented.
Fifth, to operate effectively in cyberspace and space. Both cyberspace and space are new domains of military contest and therefore critical to the U.S. military superiority. The strategic guidance document points out that as U.S. networks and space assets and their supporting infrastructure face a range of threats that may take advantage of, disrupt, or destroy assets, their protective capabilities must be improved.
Sixth, to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. The U.S. nuclear forces play a dual role of both deterring potential adversaries and fulfilling its security commitments. The strategic guidance document maintains that U.S. strategic deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force. Accordingly, the number of nuclear weapons and their role in U.S. national security strategy can be reduced.
Seventh, to defend U.S. homeland and provide support to civil authorities. U.S. forces will continue to defend U.S. territory from external attacks. They will also respond actively to a significant or catastrophic event.
Eighth, to give a full play of its overseas military presence. In time of peace, through rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises, the U.S. seeks to increase its influence, strengthen alliance cohesion, and shape an environment which is conducive to its national interests.
Ninth, to address insurgencies with an emphasis on non-military means and military-to-military cooperation. If necessary, U.S. forces will conduct limited counter insurgency and other stability operations, but they should avoid significant and enduring commitments to stability operations.
Tenth, to conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations. U.S. forces should give a full play of its capabilities in airlift and sealift, and medical evacuation. They should also develop joint doctrine and response options to respond to natural disasters and mass atrocities both at home and abroad.
III. Clarifying Principles of U.S. Force and Program Development
The strategic guidance document makes it clear that the U.S. will build a force that is smaller, more agile, and technologically more advanced. To that end, it must adhere to eight principles. First, the future force will possess a range of capabilities for the missions mentioned above. As there are distinctions between these primary missions and other missions in terms of urgency and importance, the development level of all these capabilities will be different from each other. It is impossible to give up any of these mission areas; and it is imperative to protect U.S. forces’ ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands. Second, U.S. forces should seek to differentiate between the investments that should be made immediately and those that can be deferred. This includes an accounting of U.S. ability to make a course change in investment that could be driven by strategic, operational, economic, technological, and other factors. The concept of “reversibility”, therefore, is a key part of the decision-making process. Third, U.S. forces are determined to improve their war preparedness. Even as they reduce their overall capacity, they maintain a ready and capable force. Fourth, DoD must continue to reduce administrative expenditure, find further efficiencies in operating DoD, and reduce its manpower costs and health care costs. Fifth, it is necessary to examine the strategic influence. It is important to evaluate how this strategy will influence existing campaign and contingency plans so that limited resources may be invested in critical areas. Sixth, DoD needs to examine the mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements and to specify the readiness of RC. Seventh, special measures will be taken to retain and build on key advancements in networked warfare in which joint forces can be truly interdependent. Eighth, DoD will maintain an adequate industrial base and investment in science and technology, and encourage innovation in concepts of operation. Over the past decade, the U.S. and its allies and partners have applied innovative approaches in counter terrorism and counterinsurgency operations. The same is true with U.S. forces in A2/AD and cyberoperations.
The strategic guidance document outlines major adjustments in U.S. defense strategy when the war in Iraq has concluded, the war in Afghanistan is drawing near an end, its national economy remains in recession, and its defense budget is suffering significant cuts. In terms of threat assessment, the U.S. takes China as its greatest potential security challenge, and Iran and DPRK as immediate adversaries to be deterred and cautioned against. While continuing to fight against violent and radical terrorists, the U.S. will shift its defense focus from tackling terrorism to dealing with major powers and regional challenges. In terms of war preparedness, the U.S. is prepared to fight and win high-end conventional warfare against a backdrop of nuclear deterrence, focusing on dealing with A2/AD threats. It is determined to ensure fighting and winning a large-scale war, and at the same time deter and defeat attacks launched by a second adversary elsewhere. In terms of force development, the U.S. will amend force structure, shifting from expanding land,maritime, and air forces to developing both joint forces that are smaller, more agile and advanced, and emerging operational forces such as space and cyberspace units. In terms of strategic center of gravity, the U.S. will tilt from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region with Guam as the hub, Japan as a pivot in the north and Australia as a pivot in the south. The result is that U.S. military presence is reinforced with 60% of its warships deployed in both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. U.S. military buildup in the region is now characterized by a multilayered presence with a broad front and depth. The ultimate purpose of this shift is to maintain absolute U.S. military superiority and global leadership in time of decline with strategic realignment.
Chapter Two Military Strength and Force Deployment
As required by the new strategic guidance document, all U.S. armed services have made plans to amend their force size and structure. The U.S. Army plans to cut at least eight combat brigades, thus reducing its strength by 80,000 from 570,000 to 490,000 personnel. One Marine regiment command, five Marine battalions, one artillery battalion, four Marine aircraft groups, and one Marine logistics group will be shed, reducing the overall strength of the Marine Corps from 202,000 to 182,000 personnel. The U.S. Navy plans to decommission seven missile cruisers (six of the mare capable of ballistic missile defense, and one is to be overhauled). The U.S. Air Force will develop a quality force, smaller and leaner but more capable. It plans to cut 9,900 personnel, including 3,900 in active service, 5,100 national guards, and 900 reservists. Six tactical squadrons and one training squadron will be shed; 286 aircraft will retire, including 123 combat fighters, 133 transport and refueling planes, and 30 reconnaissance and surveillance planes.
I. U.S. Military Strength
In 2012, the overall strength of the U.S. Armed Forces is 3,071,000 personnel, among which 1,410,000 are in AC, 859,000 in RC, and 852,000 as DoD civilian employees.
The overall strength of the Army is 1,421,000, among it 558,000 are in AC, accounting for 39.6% of its overall strength. The Army AC is organized into seven army group headquarters, four corps, 11 divisions, over 4,300 main battle tanks, over 25,000 APCs, about 5,000 guns of various types, and more than 4,200 aircraft (mainly helicopters); the Army RC has 561,000 personnel in total, organized into eight divisions, 19 operational and functional commands, 12 support commands, and 19 training commands; the total number of civilian employees is 302,000.
The overall strength of the Navy is 814,000. Among it, 519,000 are in AC, accounting for 36,8% of its total strength. The U.S. Navy is organized into the Pacific Fleet and Fleet Forces Command; the Marine Corps is organized into three marine divisions and is equipped with 298 warships (including 10 aircraft carriers, 22 missile cruisers, 62 missile destroyers, 23 missile frigates, 24 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, four nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines, 54 nuclear-powered assault submarines), 3,847 aircraft of various types (1,821 of them are combat aircraft), and 241 submarine-launched strategic missiles. The naval reserve component has 84,000 personnel and is organized into four reserve air wings, two navy supply support battalions, 12 navy cargo handling battalions, six naval reserve construction regiments, one Marine Corps reserve division, one MarineCorps reserve air wing, and one service support group. The U.S. Navy has 210,000 civilian employees.
The Air Force has a total strength of 729,000 personnel, 333,000 of which are in active service, accounting for 23,6% of its total strength. The active component of the Air Force is organized into 13 air forces and is equipped with various types of 3,934 aircraft (1,917 of which are operational aircraft), and 449 intercontinental ballistic missiles. The reserve component of the Air Force is composed of 33 wings and 14 groups. The U.S. Air Force has 182,000 civilian employees.
DoD has a civilian work force of 107,000 personnel.
II. Military Deployment
In 2012, of the 1,410,000 active-duty personnel, 1,082,000 are deployed in Continental United States(CONUS), 328,000 are deployed overseas.
The U.S. Army: five army group headquarters, three corps, seven divisions, and three independent regiments, with a total strength of 385,300 personnel are deployed in CONUS. Two army group headquarters, one corps, four divisions, and one independent regiment, with a total strength of 172,700 personnel are deployed overseas. Among the overseas deployment, one army group headquarters, two divisions, with an overall strength of 59,800 personnel are deployed in the Pacific region; one army group headquarters, one corps, two independent brigades, one independent regiment, with an overall strength of 42,800 personnel, are stationed in Europe; two divisions with a total strength of 69,300 personnel are deployed in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa; 100 personnel are deployed in central and southern Africa; and 700 personnel are deployed in central and southern America.
The U.S. Navy (Marine Corps included): three numbered fleets, seven carrier air wings, two Marine divisions, two Marine air wings, 3,371 aircraft (including 1,542 combat planes), 241 submarine-launched strategic missiles are deployed in CONUS with a total strength of 435,100 personnel. Three numbered fleets, three carrier air wings, one Marine division, one Marine air wing, 149 warships, 476 aircraft (including 279 combat aircraft) are deployed overseas with an overall strength of 83,900 personnel. Among the naval forces deployed overseas, one numbered fleet, one carrier air wing, one Marine division, one Marine air wing, 82 warships, and 306 aircraft (including 153 combat aircraft) are deployed in the Pacific region with an overall strength of 51,7000 personnel; one numbered fleet, one carrier air wing, 17 warships, and 70 aircraft (including 56 combat aircraft) are deployed in Europe with an overall strength of 16,000 personnel; one numbered fleet, one carrier air wing, 50 warships, and 100 aircraft (including 70 combat aircraft) are deployed in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa with an overall strength of 19,200 personnel; 400 personnel are deployed in central and southern Africa; and 1,000 personnel are deployed in central and southern America.
The U.S. Air Force: Nine air force headquarters, 53 air wings/groups, 114 air squadrons, nine intercontinental ballistic missile squadrons, 3,212 aircraft (including 1,391 combat aircraft), and 449 intercontinental missiles are deployed in CONUS with a total strength of 261,600 personnel. Four air force headquarters, 14 air wings/groups, 42 air squadrons, and 722 aircraft (including 526 combat aircraft) are deployed overseas with a total strength of 71,400 personnel. Among them, three air force headquarters, nine air wings/groups, 29 air squadrons, and 359 aircraft (including 280 combat aircraft) are deployed in the Pacific region with a total strength of 33,900 personnel; one air force headquarters, five air wings/groups, 13 air squadrons, and 223 aircraft (including 176 combat aircraft) are deployed in Europe with a total strength of 30,700 personnel; 140 aircraft (including 70 combat aircraft) and altogether 6,500 personnel are deployed in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa; 300 personnel are deployed in central and southern America.
III. Military Bases
In terms of geographic locations, DoD manages a worldwide real property portfolio that spans all 50 states, seven U.S. territories, and 40 foreign countries.
The latest round of base realignment and closure (BRAC) began in 2006 and ended in 2011. In the process, 22 major domestic bases were closed, 33 were realigned, and 775 small installations were either closed or realigned. 70,000 troops who had been deployed in Europe or Asia were redeployed to other bases. By 2011, 34 U.S. bases and installations in ROK and 13 in Germany had been returned respectively to the host nation; and the I Corps Forward Headquarters had been relocated from CONUS to Camp Zama in Japan. In another line of development, however, the U.S. is making plans to build new military bases in areas of diminishing U.S. influence but of increasing importance to the U.S..
In FY 2006, the U.S. had altogether 3,731 military bases, including 2,888 in CONUS, 77 in U.S. territories, and 766 in foreign countries (among them, 293 in Germany, 111 in Japan, and 105 in ROK). Six years into the latest round of BRAC, by FY 2011, there were 2,825 military bases in CONUS, 87 in U.S. territories, and 611 in foreign countries (among them, 194 in Germany, 108 in Japan, and 82 in South Korea.)
The latest round of BRAC can be seen as being guided by the following strategic considerations: hedging against Russia and China, ensuring security of energy resources, and maintaining global hegemony. Its basic pattern is to take the homeland as the core and foreign bases as the front, to streamline different fronts while paying special attention to key points in the whole network. The realignment has shown the following characteristics: globally, the focus lies in the optimization of U.S. military bases in Asia; in Europe, the trend is to close on military bases in Old Europe and to open up military bases in New Europe; in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, the U.S. plans to secure permanent use of bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to place more prepositioned installations in Diego Garcia; in the Middle East and Central Asia, the U.S. tries to make permanent its military presence; in Africa, the U.S. is reinforcing its military presence; and in Latin America, the U.S. maintains military presence for countering terrorism. In sum, the most recent round of BRAC favors small sites, sites capable of hosting joint training, and sites located in CONUS.
The most notable characteristic, however, is that the number of U.S. military sites has increased by about 26.6%, from 3,731 to 4,825, instead of a drawdown. The latest round of BRAC was intended to meet the requirements of the new defense strategy, cut spending, and improve cost-effectiveness. In order to cut spending, the U.S. had to reduce the number of overseas military sites, and to deploy U.S. forces back to CONUS, as overseas military sites are more costly than those based in CONUS. In order to decentralize force deployment for rapid response and to reduce vulnerability inherent in large military sites, the U.S. has been focusing on building small bases. By FY 2011, the number of small sites had been increased by 1,035, while those of large and medium-sized sites had increased respectively by 22 and 7. To improve cost-effectiveness of military sites, the U.S. has attached special importance to service jointness and civil-military integration. U.S. military bases used to be divided along service lines, and Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps bases were independent from one another; as a result, it was difficult to conduct joint training or operations. After the latest round of BRAC, most bases are used by units from at least two services. Co-location of units from different services fosters coordination and cooperation through mutual understanding, thus making them more capable in future combined and joint operations.
Chapter Three National Defense Budget and Weapons R&D and Procurement
I. National Defense Budget
Annual U.S. National Defense budget is prepared for a fiscal year which begins on October 1st and ends on September 30th the following year. The National Defense functions of the federal budget include: DoD military activities; atomic energy defense activities of the Department of Energy; and defense-related activities of other Federal agencies. More specifically, DoD is responsible for budget for DoD military activities which include funding for military personnel, war preparedness, military equipment, R&D, military construction, military housing, etc.; the Department of Energy is responsible for budget for atomic energy defense activities which include the R&D, production and maintenance of nuclear weapons and defense nuclear material, and disposal of defense nuclear waste materials. Government agencies, such as the Selective Service System, Federal Investigation Bureau, and Coast Guard, are responsible for the share of the budget for their defense-related activities.
The overall FY2012 National Defense budget is $690.9 billion, including a $553.1 billion base budget, and a $117.8 billion budget for overseas contingency operations. When compared with that of the previous fiscal year, there is a slight decrease, mainly because the budget for wars in Pakistan and Afghanistan has been reduced by $41.5 billion. In fact, FY2012 National Defense budget has been increased despite a seeming decrease. According to a review in Washington Post, as the core of National Defense budget, the base budget is $553.1 billion, an increase of $4.2 billion from FY2011, and an increase of $25.1billion from FY2010. Compared with FY2001, the base budget has increased by over 80%.
The allocation of the base budget in FY2012 is as follows: functionally, $142.8 billion will go to military personnel, $204.4 billion will go to operation and maintenance, $113 billion to procurement, $75.3 billion to R&D, and $17.6 billion for miscellaneous purposes; accounting respectively for 25.8%, 37%, 20.4%, 13.6%, and 3.2% of the base budget. In light of services and government agencies receiving the fund, the Army receives $144.9 billion, the Navy (including the Marine Corps) $161.4 billion, the Air Force $150 billion, agencies directly affiliated to the DoD and other agencies receive $96.8 billion, accounting respectively for 26.2%, 29.2%, 27.1%, and 17.5% of the base budget.
The allocation of FY2012 National Defense budget has the following characteristics: First, reduction in funding for overseas contingency operations, and increase in base budget. Budget for overseas contingency operations is $117.8 billion, reduced by $41.5 billion from that of FY2011; the base budget is $553.1 billion, increased by $4.2 billion from that of FY2011. Second, increase in funding for operations and maintenance, and reduction in the other areas. When compared with FY2011, funding for procurement in FY2012 is reduced by 0.6%, that for R&D is reduced by 0.4%, and that for miscellaneous purposes is reduced by 0.8%, while funding for military personnel and that for operations and maintenance is increased by 0.8% and 1% respectively. Third, significant cut in Army strength and relatively small cuts in Navy and Air Force. Although both the Army and the Navy has a 0.2% increase in budget allocation in FY2012, the Army will have to be reduced by 80,000 while the Navy and Air Force will be reduced by 6,200 and 4,200 respectively by 2017, as required by the Defense Budget Priorities and Choices. These characteristics show that the National Defense budget allocation is in line with the principle of maintaining combat effectiveness despite budget cuts as required by the strategic guidance document.
II. Weapons R&D and Procurement
There are three characteristics in terms of U.S. weapons R&D and procurement. First, upgrading of conventional weapons has been accelerated. In terms land operations systems, the R&D focuses on tactical command, communications, and individual combat systems. In terms of maritime operations systems, the R&D focuses on maritime platforms for air defense, anti-missile, land attack, and littoral operations. Interms of air operations systems, the R&D focuses on stealth, general-purpose, long-range strike, and operational support equipment. Second, great efforts have been made to develop new types of weaponry and equipment. Several anti-missile interception tests have been conducted. DARPA has issued an announcement for the Foundational Cyberwarfare Project (Plan X) to develop new systems for cyberspace operations and to define network maps. Test flights of hypersonic spacecraft such as X-37B, X-51A, and HTV-2 were conducted several times to improve prompt global strike capabilities. As to unmanned systems, DoD has continued to purchase UAVs such as MQ-9 Reaper which is capable of both reconnaissance and attack, and unmanned combat vehicles; meanwhile, it has stepped up efforts to develop new UAVs and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs). Third, DoD has begun nuclear weapons modernization. While it began to improve and extend life cycles of active-service nuclear weapons systems, it is also committed to the R&D of next-generation strategic bombers and long-range standoff weapons. To sum up, the focus of U.S weapons systems development is on networking, stealth, precision, and automation.
Major U.S. weapons and equipment R&D and procurement projects are as follows:
1. Aircraft ($54.2 billion)
DoD continues to purchase F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, V-22 Osprey, F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, etc. The budget for aircraft R&D and procurement keeps
growing, reaching $54.2 billion, of which $6.798 billion will be used for modifications, $4.523 billion for support, $4.354 billion for technological development, $17.842 billion for procurement of combat aircraft, $3.881 billion for the procurement of UAVs, $9.317 billion for the procurement of cargo aircraft, and $7.473 billion for the procurement of support aircraft.
MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper: $2.5 billion from FY2012 National Defense base budget is appropriated for the purchase of 84 UAVs. DoD’s goal is to field a sufficient number of Predators and Reapers for 50 CSCPA Report on U.S. Military Power 2012 combat air patrols (CAP) by the end of FY 2011, and 65 CAPs by the end of 2013.
RQ-4 Global Hawk: $1.6 billion is appropriated for the purchase of 3 Global Hawks.
RQ-7 Shadow and RQ-11 Raven: Designed to provide ground commanders with reconnaissance capabilities, these UAVs are capable of battlefield surveillance and control, targeting, and damage assessment. $340 million is appropriated for the purchase of 1,272 such UAVs.
C-130J Hercules: A relatively smaller budget, i.e., $1.257 billion, is appropriated for the purchase of 12 C-130Js in FY2012, compared with the purchase of 17 such planes in FY2011.
C-27J Spartan: C-27J is a joint cargo aircraft for intra-theater light-cargo airlift. $599 million is appropriated for the procurement of nine C-27Js in FY2012.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: The Joint Strike Fighter Program is rescheduled to strike a balance between cost and time. In FY2012, $9.732 billion is appropriated for 32 F-35 fighters, including seven for the Navy, six for the Marine Corps, and 19 for the Air Force.
JPATS T-6B Texan II: In 2000, the Navy and the Air Force chose T-6 as their Joint Primary Aircraft Training System for training programs designed for pilots and navigators. $274 million is ppropriated in FY2012 for 36 T-6Bs.
V-22 Osprey: $2.971 billion is appropriated for 36 V-22 Ospreys, among which there are 30 MV-22Bs and six CV-22Bs.
AH-64D Apache Block 3: DoD is continuing with the AH-64 Block 3 program which includes upgrading AH-64 Apache and the procurement of the upgraded version. In FY2012, $816 million is appropriated for remanufacturing 19 AH-64s to AH-64Ds. The first new helicopter will be funded in the FY2013 National Defense Budget.
CH-47 Chinook: $1.409 billion is appropriated in FY2012 for the acquisition of 47 aircraft, of which 32 will be newly built aircraft and 15 will be remanufactured / ServiceExtension Program aircraft.
UH-60 Black Hawk: $1.619 billion is appropriated in FY 2012 for the purchase andR&D of 75 UH-60 Black Hawks.
C-17 Globemaster: In FY012, $539 million is appropriated for modifications of the existing C-17s and continued development and testing of C-17.
KC-X New Tanker: $877 million is appropriated in FY2012 for continued R&D of next-generation KC-X tankers.
F-22 Raptor: In FY2012, $1.064 billion is appropriated for the R&D and upgrading of F-22s for enhanced land-attack capabilities.
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye: In FY2012, $1.386 billion is appropriated for the purchase of six E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes.
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: In FY2012, $2.662 billion is appropriated for the purchase of 28 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and for relevant R&D and testing. It is estimated that in FY2013 28 more such aircraft will be purchased.
EA-18G Growler: In FY2012, $1.125 billion is appropriated for the purchase of 12 EA-18G Growlers and for continued R&D and testing of relevant electronics systems and technology. DoD plans to purchase 12 more such aircraft in FY 2013.
P-8A Poseidon: It is the new generation of multi-mission maritime aircraft, capable of anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, surveillance and reconnaissance,
and intelligence gathering. In FY2012, $2.997 billion is appropriated for the purchase of 11 P-8As and continued R&D and testing of the system. DoD plans to purchase 13 more such aircraft in FY2013.
DoD will also purchase four HH-60M Pave Hawks, 24 MH-60R Seahawks, and 18 MH-60Ss.
2. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer System (C4 System, $10.9 billion)
$10.9 billion is appropriated for C4 System in FY2012. Specifically, $8.881 billion is allocated for battlefield command, control, communications, and service; $400 million for automation systems; $91 million for inter-base communications; $799 million for information security, and $745 million for R&D.
JTRS (Joint Tactical Radio System): JTRS was planned in 1997 by DoD to use software to replace hardware for controlling of radio functions. DoD intends to build a family of software-defined radios that could integrate various radio functions. In FY2012, $1.542 billion is used for the design and R&D of simulation for JTRS; and the production of relevant software and hardware has begun.
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T): WIN-T will provide U.S. troops with Motorola Atrix smartphones for secure battlefield communications, providing the U.S. Army with real-time, high-speed, and highly efficient command, control, communications, intelligence, and reconnaissance. In FY2012, $1.273 billion is appropriated for the R&D of WIN-T.
3. Ground Systems
In FY2012, $16.1 billion is appropriated for ground systems. Specifically, $1.088 billion is appropriated for heavy tactical vehicles, $865 million for medium tactical vehicles, $323 million for light tactical vehicles, $7.859 billion for support equipment, $5.218 billion for combat vehicles, and $723 million for weapons.
Joint Tactical Vehicle Family: In FY2012, $244 million is appropriated for the procurement of joint light vehicles, $448 million for the procurement of 2,422 medium tactical vehicles, and $680 million for the procurement of 1,598 heavy tactical vehicles.
M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank: In FY2012, $191 million is appropriated for the upgrading of M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tanks.
Stryker Family of Armored Vehicle: In FY2012, $834 million is appropriated for 100 Stryker armored fighting vehicles.
4. Missile Defense System($10.6 billion)
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System: In FY2012, $1.526 billion is appropriated for the system, including updating five Aegis ship-borne combat systems.
Ground-based Midcourse Defense System: This system is used for intercepting long-range ballistic missiles. In FY2012, $1.161 billion is appropriated for the deployment of this system, including the installation of 30 interceptor missiles in a second missile defense field at Fort Greely, Alaska.
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS): In FY2012, $345 million is appropriated for the development and experiment of this system. It is estimated that the first JLENS will be deployed in the fourth quarter of FY2013.
5. Missiles and Munitions ($11 billion)
In FY2012, $11 billion is appropriated for procurement and R&D of missiles and munitions, including $4.381 billion for conventional munitions, $2.041 billion for strategic missiles, and $4.608 billion for tactical missiles.
The detailed list of the procurement plan includes: 46 SM-3 Block IBs, 89 SM-6s, 24 Trident II D-5 Fleet Ballistic Missiles, 379 AIM-120s, 372 AIM-9X Block IIs, 142 JASSMs, 196 Tomahawk cruise missiles, 266 JSOWs, 100 Small Diameter Bombs, 4,588 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), 710 Javelin Advanced Anti-tank Weapons, 802 TOW 2 missiles, 2,994 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, 35 Evolved Seasparrow Missiles, and 61 Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM).
6. Shipbuilding and Maritime Systems
In FY2012, $24 billion is appropriated for shipbuilding and maritime systems, including $11.396 billion for surface combatants, $5.969 billion for submarine combatants, $521 million for support ships, $2.857 billion for support, $293 million for outfitting and post delivery, and $3.132 billion for R&D.
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV): JHSV is a shipbuilding program dominated by the U.S. Navy. As a critical asset for maritime forces, it is a high-speed shallow draft vessel with high effective payload, designed for transporting troops, military vehicles, goods and equipment across the world. $416 million is appropriated for funding two JHSV ships, one for the Army and the other for the Navy in FY2012.
DDG 51 Aegis Destroyer: In FY2012, $2.08 billion is appropriated for one DDG 51 Aegis Destroyer.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): In FY2012, $2.169 billion is appropriated for four LCS seaframes.
The San Antonio Class Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD 17) ships: LPD 17 is the first craft capable of carrying three main equipment—AAAV, LCAC, and MV-22 Osprey—for the Marines for high-speed, long-distance tactical sealifting, and will be the pivot for future naval expeditions. In FY2012, $1.848 billion is appropriated for the final 11th ship and line shutdown.
SSN 774 Virginia Class Submarine: In FY2012, $4.955 billion is appropriated for two Virginia Class submarines; two additional ships will be built in FY 2013 and FY2014.
LHA-R Amphibious Assault Ship: As a new-generation large amphibious warfare ship, it is intended to replace the decommissioning TARAWA Class LHA whose service life is expected to end. It is used for power projection and front military presence. In FY2012, $2.02 billion is appropriated for a second LHA-R.
7. Space-Based and Related Systems ($10 billion)
The FY2012 overall space program budget request is $10.2 billion, a 3% increase from that of FY2011, including $2.054 billion for launches, $5.839 billion for atellites, and $2,336 billion for support.
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): This is the next-generation DoD advanced narrow band Ultra High Frequency (UHF) tactical communications system. In FY2012, $482 million is appropriated for the launch vehicle for satellite #4 and relevant research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT & E).
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites: they will be a constellation of communications satellites that will replace the existing EHF system MILSTAR satellites launched between 1994 and 2003. The AEHF constellation will provide secure, survivable, anti-jam communications for military users in the U.S., the U.K., Canada, and the Netherlands. A fund of $975 million is provided for SV-1 on-orbit tests and operations, SV-2 launch and on-orbit/operations support, and Mission Control Segment development in FY2012.
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: In FY2012, $176 million is appropriated for the procurement of four launch vehicles and associated launch services and support activities.
Global Positioning System: In FY2012, $1.462 billion is appropriated for themaintenance and upgrading of the system.
Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS): IN FY2012 the U.S. Air Force requested $445 million for DWSS, but the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act appropriates $43 million for the conclusion of DWSS and $125 million for an unspecified follow-on meteorological satellite program.
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS): This is the next-generation space-based infrared monitoring system developed by the U.S. Air Force.It is also part of the U.S. National Missile Defense System. Its mission includes: early warning for strategic and theatre missiles; and tracking missiles from initial stage to mid-course so as to provide technical information for missile targeting and to improve situational awareness. The system is also a follow-on project to the Defense Support Program (DSP). In FY2012, $995 million is appropriated for relevant procurement and R&D.
Chapter Four New Development in Operational Doctrines
In 2012, the U.S. military keeps on developing and enriching operational theories. Apart from furthering studies on existing concepts such as the Air-Sea Battle, DoD released new operational concepts and doctrines by publishing new documents such as “Joint Operational Access Concept: Gaining and Maintaining Access”, “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020”, “Counter-IED Operations, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations”, and “U.S. Army Social Media Handbook”.
I. New Developments in the Air-Sea Battle Concept
On January 17th, 2012, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment published “Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats”. According to the report, Iran poses a unique A2/AD threat to the U.S.. The U.S. Armed Forces would pay a high cost if they responded to the threat with the present posture. They should give up the Cold-War approach of force projection from nearby bases; instead, they should conduct long-distance operations to deal with Iran’s threats.
On February 20th, General Norton Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, and Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations. co-authored an article entitled “Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty“ in The American Interest , the first time when high-ranking U.S. officers expressed their opinions on the concept. The article states that the Air-Sea Battle is “networked, integrated attack-in-depth“ and is used to pursue three lines of effort to disrupt, destroy and defeat adversary A2/AD capabilities.
On April 19th, 2012, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment published a report entitled “Changing the Game: the Promise of Directed-Energy Weapons”, calling DoD to change the current budget priorities in order to step up the R&D of directed-energy weapons, improve combat effectiveness of new operational concepts such as “Air-Sea Battle“, promote service integration, and facilitate the shift from a resource-intensive development approach to a technology-intensive one. The report argued that only by a change of current budget priorities could the U.S fend off A2/AD threats and maintain the generation gap between the U.S. and other countries in terms of military technologies.
In addition, think tanks such as RAND, CSIS, Institute for Defense Analyses, and Center for Naval Analyses, and scholars such as Mark Schantz, Philip Davidson, and Randy Forbes are also actively engaged in furthering the concept of “Air-Sea Battle”.
II. Development of the “Joint Operational Access Concept”
On January 17th, 2012, DoD released “Joint Operational Access Concept”. This is the first official document going public with a complete analysis on how to achieve operational access in the face of armed opposition from a variety of potential enemies. The document is composed of 12 parts, including introduction, purpose, scope, the nature of operational access, operational access in the future operating environment, the military problem: opposed operational access in an advanced anti access/area-denial environment, operational access precepts, capabilities required by this concept, etc. The main contents of the document are as follows:
1. Clarification of Key Terms
According to the “Joint Operational Access Concept”, “operational access” refers to “the ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom ofaction to accomplish the mission. As war is the extension of politics by other means, operational access does not exist for its own sake, but rather serves broader [U.S.] strategic goals,whether to ensure strategic access to commerce, demonstrate U.S. resolve by positioning forces overseas to manage crisis and prevent war, or defeat an enemy in war. Operational access is the joint force contribution to assured access, the unhindered national use of the global commons and select sovereign territory, waters, airspace and cyberspace. The global commons, in turn, are areas of air, sea, space, and cyberspace that belong to no one state. While operational access is achieved through the projection of military force, assured access is achieved by projecting all the elements of national power.”
Anti access refers to those capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an advancing enemy from entering an operational area, including medium-and-long-range missiles, long-range reconnaissance and surveillance systems, kinetic and nonkinetic antisatellite weapons, submarine forces and cyber attack capabilities, terrorists, and special operations forces. Antiaccess actions not only tend to target forces approaching by air and sea predominantly, but also can target the cyber, space, and other forces that support them.
Area-denial refers to those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area, including air forces and air defense systems, shorter-range antiship missiles and submarines, precision-guided rockets, artillery, missiles, mortars, chemical and biological weapons,computer and electronic attack capabilities, land and naval mines, armed and explosives-laden small boats and craft, land maneuver forces, special operations forces, and unmanned systems such as unmanned underwater vehicles. Area-denial capabilities target forces in all domains, including land forces. The distinction between anti access and area-denial is elative rather than strict, and many capabilities can be employed for both purposes. For example, the same submarine that performs an area-denial mission in coastal waters can be an anti access capability when employed on distant patrols.
2. A2/AD as the gravest challenge to the U.S.
According to the “Joint Operational Access Concept“, the future operating environment will be characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and rapid change, posing three challenges to the U.S. operational access: a. improvement and proliferation of weapons systems and other technologies capable of denying access or restricting freedom of movement; b. changing U.S. overseas defense posture; and c. emergence of space and cyberspace as contested domains. Future enemies, both state and nonstate actors, will take A2/AD strategies against the United States. Rivals equipped with cross-domain, multi-layered, and highly-integrated A2/AD defense systems are likely to try to deny U.S. operational access, while those who are not as capable might try to inflict what they think as unbearable political losses on the United States. Therefore, potential enemies’ A2/AD capabilities might be the gravest challenge to the United States for the coming several decades.
3. Cross-Domain Synergy as the Thesis of Joint Operational Access Concept
Attaining cross-domain synergy requires effective application of the capabilities across the five domains, namely, land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Cross-domain synergy is “the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others.“ DoD believes that as the scope of war is extending, no single service possesses the means and capabilities to effectively attack the enemy. Only by way of mutual support and close coordination can the U.S. Armed Forces defeat the enemy even when the enemy manages to avoid damage by any one U.S. armed service. In light of this understanding, DoD will focus on resolving the following three issues to enhance integrated joint operational capabilities. First，greater integration of operational capabilities is needed. DoD emphasizes developing service capabilities to support one another, making sure that each service is able to support other services. Second, integration at tactical level is emphasized. Joint operations should not be limited to the operational level among service components; instead, they should be extended to lower levels. When necessary, different services could be organized tactically into tailored joint formations for specific threats. Third, construction of information networks is critical. It is necessary to step up the construction of information infrastructure, focusing on compatibility of information networks of different services, so that information can be shared and real-time command can be achieved. Cross-domain synergy is realized, therefore, by enhanced joint operations.
4. Basic Principles of Joint Operational Access Concept
To deal with A2/AD threats and ensure access into operational areas, Joint Operational Access Concept describes the following 11 guiding principles: a. conduct operations to gain access based on the requirements of the broader mission, while planning subsequent operations to lessen access challenges; b. prepare the operational area in advance to facilitate access; c. consider a variety of basing options; d. seize the initiative by deploying and operating on multiple, independent lines of operations; e. exploit advantages in one or more domains to disrupt enemy A2/AD capabilities in others; f. disrupt enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts while protecting friendly efforts; g. create pockets or corridors of local domain superiority to penetrate the enemy’s defenses and maintain them as required to accomplish the mission; h. maneuver directly against key operational objectives from strategic distance; i. attack enemy A2/AD defenses in depth rather than rolling back those defenses from the perimeter; j. maximize surprise through deception, stealth, and ambiguity to complicate enemy targeting; k. protect space and cyber assets while attacking the enemy’s space and cyber capabilities.
5. Development of Eight Categories of 30 Capabilities Required by Joint Operational Access
To tackle A2/AD threats, DoD calls on the development of 30 capabilities classified into eight categories, namely, command and control, including the following five capabilities: reliable connectivity and interoperability among major war fighting headquarters, effective command and control in a degraded communications environment, the ability to integrate cross-domain operations, situational awareness across the domains, and task-based command; intelligence, including the following three capabilities: to detect and respond to hostile computer network attack, to conduct timely and accurate cross-domain all-source intelligence fusion, and the ability to develop all categories of intelligence in any necessary domain; fires, including the following four capabilities: to locate, target, and suppress or neutralize hostile A2/AD capabilities while limiting collateral damage, to deter, disrupt or destroy enemy systems, to conduct electronic attack and computer network attack, and to interdict enemy forces and materiel; movement and maneuver, including the following five capabilities: to conduct operational maneuver along multiple axes of advance, to gain entry into hostile digital networks, to conduct en route rehearsal and assembly of deploying forces, to conduct forcible entry operations, and to mask the approach of joint maneuver elements; protection, including the following six capabilities: to defeat enemy targeting systems, to provide missile defense, to protect and reconstitute bases and other infrastructure, to protect forces and supplies, to protect friendly space forces, and to conduct cyber defense; sustainment, including the following three capabilities: to deploy, employ, and sustain forces, to establish non standard support mechanisms, to manage and integrate contractors; information: the ability to inform and influence selected audiences; engagement, including the following three capabilities: to share capabilities to ensure access and advance long-term regional stability, to secure basing, navigation, and overflight rights, and to provide training, supplies, equipment, and other assistance to regional partners.
III. The Concept of Globally Integrated Operations and Its Requirements for joint forces
On September 10th, 2012, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) released the “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020“. It is composed of Introduction, Future Security Environment, The Concept, Select Implications For Joint Force 2020, Risks of Adopting This Concept, and Conclusion. The main ideas of the document are as follows:
1. Specifying Future Challenges Facing Joint Forces
As pointed out in the document, future security environment is characterized by proliferation of WMD, rise of modern competitive states, violent extremism, regional in stability, transnational criminal activity, and competition for resources. Besides, the diffusion of advanced technology in the global economy means that middle weight militaries and non-state actors can now muster weaponry once available only to superpowers. The proliferation of cyber and space weapons, precision munitions, ballistic missiles, and A2/AD capabilities will grant more adversaries the ability to inflict devastating losses; adversaries continue to explore symmetric ways to employ both crude and advanced technology to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities; they will have more advanced capabilities in every domain, and meanwhile, more of them will have the ability to simultaneously conduct operations across multiple domains; space and cyberspace will play a particularly important role in the future; diffusion of technology is transforming warfare and reshaping global politics; and digital technology is profoundly transforming command and control of the U.S. Armed Forces.
Taken together, these factors give rise to a future security environment that is more unpredictable, complex, and dangerous in which armed conflicts are inevitable. The major challenge facing the U.S. joint forces in the future, therefore, is to protect U.S. national interests from the threats of increasingly strong enemies in an uncertain, complicated, changing, and increasingly ransparent world with constrained resources.
2. Defining Key Elements of Globally Integrated Operations
Globally Integrated Operations is a concept prepared for the U.S. joint forces for future security environment, requiring globally postured joint forces to quickly combine capabilities with themselves and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations. The purpose of the concept is to create a decisive force. At its heart, the concept envisions the integration of emerging capabilities—particularly special operations forces, cyber, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance—with new ways of fighting and partnering. Together, this will achieve higher levels of military effectiveness against the threats the U.S. will most likely face. The concept contains eight key elements:
First, mission command. Mission command exploits the human element in joint operations, emphasizing trust, will power, intuitive judgment, and creativity. A new generation of digital communications and sensor technologies enables auto-command which in turn helps overcome obstacles posed by time and space and facilitates communications across echelons and with friends and neighboring forces; thus mission command can be free from subjectivity or lack of experience on the part of individual commanders.
Second, the ability to seize, retain and exploit the initiative. In cross-domain conflicts, it is important to maintain aggressiveness, forcing the enemy to be controlled by U.S. course of action and pace of operation while maintaining U.S. freedom of movement. Controlling the pace of operations is critical to maintaining military advantage; to that end, the U.S. Armed Forces must decide and direct faster than the enemy and control the timing and tempo of enemy operations.
Third, global agility. Being agile means swifter response than the enemy. The complexity of future security environment requires swift and adaptable military responses. To that end, globally integrated joint forces will use cyber and global strike to rapidly bring combat power to bear. Massed formation will gradually phase out, and in its place there will be smarter positioning of forces, greater use of prepositioned stocks and rapid expeditionary basing, and more nimble command-and-control cells.
Fourth, partnering. The complexity of future security environment requires more than the military instrument of national power. Joint force must be able to integrate effectively with U.S. governmental agencies, partner militaries, and indigenous and regional stakeholders. This integration must be flexible, ranging from a functional non-state actor to multinational operations.
Fifth, flexible formation of joint forces. Joint forces must be formed and employed according to specific security challenges. Mission-based joint forces will not replace geographically and functionally-based forces completely, as geography remains the logical basis for conducting theater cooperative security, while some missions, such as strategic deterrence, remains functionally distinct. Joint forces can better accomplish a given mission if hybrid command is arranged to provide greater flexibility.
Sixth, cross-domain synergy. It is the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities across domains. Cross-domain synergy provides the U.S. military with advantage in every domain, so that freedom of movement for a mission is achieved.
Seventh, employment of flexible and low-signature capabilities. They include cyberspace, space, special operations, global strike and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and are unique sources of U.S. military advantage. They will play significant roles in future joint operations.
Finally, tailored operations to minimize unintended consequences. Future operations will not consist solely of surgical operations; when necessary, military force can be applied overwhelmingly and broadly, but its effects must be limited as much as possible to the intended targets in order to maintain U.S. international credibility.
3. Predicting Its Implications for Force Development
According to the document, the concept of “Globally Integrated Operations” will exert significant influence on U.S. force development in terms of command and control, intelligence, fire power, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and partnership strategies. The implications are as follows: a. use joint professional education to realize mission command in joint operations; b. develop portable, cloud-enabled command and control technologies for commanders and their staffs; c. enhance U.S. ability to operate effectively in a degraded environment; d. explore how the notion of mutually supporting command can help construct command relationships tailored to specific future threats; e. become pervasively interoperable both internally and externally; f. maintain and enhance the integration of general-purpose force and special operations force; g. develop analytic capabilities that correspond with the wider array of threats and contexts in which they will occur; h. improve capabilities that better fuse, analyze, and exploit large data sets; i. provide a fire support coordination capability that integrates all fires, including cyber; j. improve capabilities to defeat A2/AD threats; k. rapidly employable on a global scale; l. develop deep regional expertise; m. improve strategic and operational mobility; n. improve tactical maneuver; o. synchronize global distribution; p. standardize tactics, techniques and procedures across combatant commands to facilitate force rotation; q. improve cyber defense capabilities; r. continue to improve defensive space capabilities; s. integrate missile defense systems; t. continue to develop and implement the Joint Logistics Enterprise; u. reduce operational energy requirements and develop operationally viable alternative energy sources; v. identify those agencies with which Joint Forces will work most often and develop common coordinating procedures; w. field a mission-partner information environment to facilitate integration with various external partners.
4. Identifying Risks ofAdopting the Concept
The document holds that the concept of Globally Integrated Operations is conducive to maintaining current and future U.S. military edge by helping commanders in not only outsmarting the enemy amid uncertainty, complexity, and volatility in future combats but also facilitating adjustments in the size of force based on requirements. Yet, there are also risks in adopting this concept: a. the communications required by this concept may be unavailable; b. partners may be unable or unwilling to integrate; c. the pursuit of advanced technology may prove unaffordable; d. an overemphasis on decentralization may lead to lack of coordination and inefficient use of scarce resources; e. the armed forces may fail to achieve the required level of global agility; f. standardization may lead to decreased diversity, flexibility, versatility, and ultimate effectiveness; g. elimination of redundancies may lead to operational brittleness and risk; h. emphasis on organizational flexibility may limit operational effectiveness.
These new developments in military theories are conducive to joint operations. First, they are promoting cross-domain jointness. On the basis of existing service jointness and military technology advantage, the U.S. Armed Forces are stepping up integration between traditional operational domains—land, sea, and air— and emerging operational domains such as space and cyberspace. As capabilities in both traditional and emerging operational domains complement one another, such integration will generate cross-domain synergy; as a result, success can be achieved at the lowest cost. Second, they are also enhancing cross-region jointness. With U.S. military advantage in strategic power projection, prompt global strike, and flexible deployment, forces deployed in the rear or at the front, in different theaters and various operational domains share operational information and battlefield situations, so that globally integrated operations can be achieved through improved rapid responses. Third, they emphasize cross-agency coordination and cooperation. DoD is fostering coordination and cooperation with other U.S. governmental agencies, NGOs, volunteer groups, and international organizations, for integrated employment of political, military, economic, diplomatic, and cultural instruments of national power, in order to improve combat effectiveness. Fourth, they give enough attention to tactical-level jointness. Joint operations were limited to strategic and operational levels due to weaponry, equipment, tactical, technological, and command and control restraints. With better information systems, networks and information sharing, and with improved command and control systems, battlefield and C2information flows rapidly across various echelons, thus extending joint operations from strategic and operational level to tactical level.
Chapter Five Alliances and Partnerships
It is an unchanging theme in U.S. military strategy to seek to establish and consolidate alliance and partnerships which supports the U.S. role as a global leader and the prime shaper and mover of the world. In 2012, the U.S. adopted various measures to consolidate and strengthen its alliances and partnerships.
I. Expanding Alliances from Bilateral to Multilateral Ones in the Asia-Pacific Region, with U.S.-JapanAlliance as the CentralAxis
Former U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton pointed out in “America’s Pacific Century” that “[by] virtue of our unique geography, the United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. We are proud of our European partnerships and all that they deliver. Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across theAtlantic.” (Foreign Policy, Nov. 2011)
To build this web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific, the U.S. has taken the following measures:
First, strengthen strategic dialogues and improve security consultation mechanisms. By January, 2012, the U.S. had conducted two rounds of bilateral strategic dialogues with the Philippines, promising to build more stable military alliance. In April, the two countries held the first “2 plus 2” consultation. So far the U.S. has established regular “2 plus 2” consultation and coordination mechanisms with all its Asia-Pacific allies. In June, the U.S. and Thailand held strategic dialogues, seeking to establish a new type of alliance; the U.S. and New Zealand jointly released “Washington Declaration” for further bilateral cooperation.
Second, follow the pattern of “U.S.-Japan plus 1” and “U.S.-Japan plus X” in expanding military alliance. Japan and the ROK, the two U.S. allies in Western Pacific, were in the final stages of consultation before signing the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) for cooperation in humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and exchange of military information (ROK withdrew from signing the documents at the last minute). In order to better policy coordination to tackle DPRK’s increasing threats and China’s rising military clout, the U.S., Japan, and the ROK announced the establishment of a trilateral security consultation mechanism in July. In February, Australia joined “Cope North”—a joint air combat exercise conducted by the U.S. and Japan—for the first time. In June, the U.S., Japan, and Australia conducted a joint maritime exercise off the eastern coast of Kyushu. In September, the U.S., Japan, the ROK, and Australia carried out a military exercise as part of the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative. The drill took place in waters 100 kilometers off the South Korean port city of Busan.
Third, sell advanced weaponry and equipment or provide military assistance to allies to increase their military strength. The U.S. approved a deal of selling 40 F-35 fighters to Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF), and intends to sell MV-22 Osprey to Japan. The U.S. agreed to double its military assistance to the Philippines from $15 million to $30 million. It also promised to provide the Philippines with two coastal patrol ships. In addition, it will share real-time information about the South China Sea with the Philippines and help it build national coastal monitoring center. In June, 2012, the U.S. and the ROK reached an agreement, allowing the latter to increase the range of its deployable missiles from 300 kilometers to 800 kilometers.
Fourth, increase force deployment in allies to maintain a powerful military presence. In April, 2012, over 200 U.S. marines were stationed in Darwin, Australia for rotational training, and that number will be increased to 2,500 in 2017. U.S. bombers, fighters, and UAVs will also be deployed to the military base in Darwin. In July, the first group of 12 MV-22 Ospreys were delivered to U.S. military base in Iwakuni, and the U.S. plans to deploy more than 30 MV-22 Ospreys in Okinawa. In September, the U.S. and Japan reached an agreement, allowing the U.S. to deploy a second Sea-Based X-Band Radar in Japan. The U.S. is also considering regular deployment of P-8s or UAVs in either the Philippines or Thailand to improve maritime early-warning.
Fifth, enhance joint exercises with allied forces to improve joint and coordinated operations. In April, 2012, the U.S and Japan decided to jointly build and share training ranges in both Guam and Northern Mariana Islands for better training of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the U.S. Marine Corps. Apart from joint training with allied forces, the U.S. Armed Forces also frequently conducted bilateral and multi-lateral joint exercises with allied forces, fostering coordinated and integrated combat capabilities in close-to-real-combat environment.
II. Cementing Existing Partnerships and Develop New Partnerships
U.S. Rebalancing towards the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific relies not only on traditional allies but also on various partners. U.S. partners in theAsia-Pacific region include India, Indonesia, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Brunei, island states in the Pacific, and China. In 2012, what the U.S. did to cement existing partnerships and create new partnerships is as follows:
First, get India into the U.S.-Japan-India trilateral security cooperation mechanism. In 2012, the three countries conducted security consultations on April 23rdand October 29th on regional security situations, maritime security cooperation, combating piracy, shaping Asia-Pacific strategic framework, and so on.
Second, deploy U.S. forces in partner countries. In June, 2012, the U.S. and Singapore jointly announced deployment of the first U.S. littoral combat ship USS Freedom in Singapore for ten months starting from the spring of 2013. Up to four U.S. LCSs will be deployed in Singapore in the future.
Third, continue to strengthen military cooperation with Vietnam. At the beginning of June, 2012, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Panetta visited Vietnam. The two sides agreed to further implement the U.S.-Vietnam 2011 memorandum of defense cooperation. According to the memorandum, the two countries will enhance cooperation in establishing regular high-level dialogues, maritime security and disaster relief, military medical training, and so on.
Fourth, the U.S. sent high-ranking officials for the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) for the first time. From 25thto 26thMay, 2012, PALM 6 was held in Okinawa. High-ranking U.S. officials were invited for the first time to the meeting, seeking partnerships with the Pacific islands.
Fifth, enhance military exchanges with Myanmar. In September 2012, U.S. held talks with Myanmar on military exchanges; and in October, U.S. invited Myanmar to observe Exercise Gold Cobra; on November 9th, Mr. Obama became the first incumbent U.S. president to visit Myanmar.
To sum up, the U.S. is actively expanding bilateral military alliances to multilateral coalitions; it is seeking to develop new partnerships while cementing existing ones; and it is also committed to creating an Asian version of NATO based on shared values. Yet, as current international security environment is totally different from that of the Cold War era, it is very hard for the U.S. to achieve its ambition.
Chapter Six Military Exercises
U.S. military exercises include exercises conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces alone and those conducted jointly by the U.S Armed Forces and other militaries. In 2012, the numb er of U.S. military exercises, the countries participating in the exercises, and weaponry and equipment and personnel involved in the exercises are all on the rise.
I. Military Exercises Conducted by the U.S. Military Alone
Exercise Red Flag-Alaska 2012. From 7thto 22ndJune, the U.S. Air Force conducted Red Flag-Alaska 2012, an exercise of simulated air combats. Different from previous drills, the Opposition Force employed advanced jet planes, surface-to-air missiles and satellite jamming devices, with F-15 and F-16 fighters painted to represent Russian Federation Air Force fighters. As revealed by the U.S. Air Force officials, there was a specially designed program of attacking underground targets, the purpose of which was to train pilots for bombing missions against underground nuclear facilities in Iran and DPRK.
Schriever Wargame 2012 International Game (SW12IG). The 7thin a series of Air Force Space Command wargames conducted at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada on April 20th, SW12IG was the first game in the series history that used a combined team led by NATO and Australia. The SW12 IG scenario depicted NATO/Australian combined counter-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa. The scale and scope of SW series have kept on expanding since 2001.
Exercise Internal Look. From mid-February to the beginning of March, the Central Command secretly conducted Exercise Internal Look to assess the likely impact of an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Two results came out of the exercise: first, Iran launches a missile against a U.S. warship in the Persian Gulf, killing around 200 U.S. sailors; the U.S takes revenge, thus involving itself in the war; second, Iran is unwilling to confront the U.S. directly; instead, it uses Afghan armed groups as proxies to launch attacks on U.S. and NATO forces. “Internal Look” is one of the most important wargames conducted by the Central Command, usually twice a year. In recent years, they have been used to rehearse DoD’s Middle East operational plans.
II. Exercises Conducted by the U.S.Armed Forces and Other Militaries
Joint anti-submarine exercise by the U.S. and the ROK. From 20thto 24thFebruary, the ROK and the U.S. carried out an anti-submarine drill off the western coast of ROK in response to DPRK’s submarine threats. The drill is aimed at improving coordinated operations of the two militaries in order to tackle the threats posed by DPRK’s submarines in the disputed Western Waters.
Key Resolve 2012, a joint US-ROK exercise. From February 27thto March 9th, over 2,100 U.S. military personnel and around 200,000 ROK soldiers took part in Key Resolve 2012, an annual joint exercise. The exercise focused on defense operations, making preparations for the handover of wartime operational command from the U.S. to the ROK. The two countries also conducted a joint field maneuver drill, code named Foal Eagle, from March 1stto April 30th. Around 11,000 U.S. and ROK soldiers participated in the exercise with a focus on landing operations.
Joint US-ROK Air Force Exercises. From May, 7thto 18th, units from the ROK Air Force and the U.S. 7thAir Force conducted an air defense exercise based on theU.S.-led multinational Red Flag air exercise. Under the leadership of the ROK Air Force and set in the west of the Korean Peninsula, the exercise was the largest ever air defense exercise with 60 military aircraft.
The Joint Yellow-Sea Exercises. From June 23rdto 25th, the U.S. and the ROK conducted a regular exercise in the Yellow Sea, involving USS George Washington and over ten warships and submarines, including King Sejong the Great-class Aegis destroyer from the ROK Navy. The aim of the exercise is to improve coordination within the U.S. carrier strike group and joint operations between U.S. carrier-born fighters and ROK fighters.
Exercise Ulchi Freedom Guardian 2012. From August 20thto 31st, the U.S. and the ROK carried out Exercise Ulchi Freedom Guardian 2012 in the ROK. The exercise, for which the Combined Forces Command is responsible, involved 56,000 ROK soldiers and over 30,000 U.S. soldiers. As an annual defense-oriented exercise, it is a comprehensive test of the joint operations capabilities of the two militaries. Ulchi Freedom Guardian is the new name of the military exercise previously known as Ulchi-Focus Lens, a combined exercise between the U.S. and the ROK held annually since 1975.
Exercise Carat 2012. From July 2ndto 11th, a joint U.S.-Philippines maritime military exercise, code-named Carat, was carried out in southern Philippines. About 950 sailors and coast guards participated in the exercise which includes such subjects as maritime interdiction, diving, maritime firing, and maritime search and rescue. The purpose of the exercise is to improve maritime security capabilities and foster coordination among units involved in the exercise.
Philippines-U.S. Balikatan Expercise 2012. From April 16thto 28th, 2,300 Philippine soldiers and 4,500 U.S. soldiers took part in a 12-day joint exercise in Luzon and Palawan. Training subjects include evacuation, live-ammunition firing, landing assault using small boats, amphibious landing, and so on. Military observers from Japan, the ROK, and Australia were invited for the first time.
Joint exercise involving the U.S., the ROK, and Japan. From June 21st to 22nd, the U.S., the ROK, and Japan conducted a joint maritime military exercise in the waters south of the Korean Peninsula. Destroyers, logistics support ships, anti-submarine helicopters from the ROK and the U.S. navies and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force took part in maritime search and rescue and interdiction drills. Such trilateral exercises were conducted many times in either Hawaii or Japan, but this is the first time when it was conducted off the coast of the Korean Peninsula.
Exercise Cope North 2012: From February 11th to 24th, the U.S. Air Force, JASDF, and the Royal Australian Air Force conducted “Cope North 2012”, a joint exercise in the Pacific. It is the first time when Australian Air Force took part in “Cope North” series which used to be hosted in the Anderson AFB and participated by air units from USAF and JASDF. F-16 fighters from the 18th Aggressor Squadron of the Eielson AFB played the Opposition Force, B-52 bombers from the 23rd Bomber Squadron of the Minot AFB played the role of both the friendly force and the enemy. The training subjects in the exercise include humanitarian disaster relief efforts, air combat involving various planes, land attack, and so on. From these subjects it is easy to infer that the exercise is targeted at potential rivals in Northeast Asia.
Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)2012: The world’s largest international maritime exercise led by the U.S. was carried out in and around Hawaii from June 29thto August 3rd. 42 warships, six submarines, over 200 military planes and 25,000 military personnel from 22 countries were involved in the joint action. The scale of the RIMPAC series keeps on increasing, with only eight countries in 2006, 14 in 2010, and 22 in 2012. The main subjects include amphibious landing, artillery firing, missile attack, anti-submarine operations, air defense, anti-piracy, mine sweeping, explosive ordnance disposal, surface and underwater rescue, humanitarian aid, and so on. During RIMPAC 2012, U.S. military did not take up all the command and control; except that Rear Admiral Gerald Beaman, commander of the Third Fleet acted as Command in Chief, all key commanding roles were taken up by non-U.S. officers. It is of note here that among the new participants of the exercise, there are not only the ROK, a traditional U.S. ally, but also India and Russia. China, as a major Asia-Pacific power, was not invited.
Exercise Gold Cobra 2012. From February 7th to 17th, Exercise Gold Cobra 2012, a multinational joint exercise was held in Thailand. 13,000 service members from the U.S., Thailand, Japan, the ROK, Indonesia, New Zealand, and Malaysia took part in the exercise. Australia, France, Canada, U.K., Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Vietnam were invited to work out the scenario of the exercise. New Zealand, Brunei, China, Laos, the Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, East Timor, UAE, and Myanmar were invited to send observers. The Third Expeditionary Force of the U.S. Marine Corps, which is stationed in Okinawa, played a major role in the exercise which staged such subjects as live-ammunition firing and evacuation of non-combatants.
Exercise Eager Lion 2012: From May 7th to 30th, Exercise Eager Lion 2012, a multinational joint military exercise led by the U.S. took place in Southern Jordan. 12,000 military personnel from 19 countries participated in the exercise which is the largest ever military drill in the past decade in the Middle East.
Exercise Initial Link: the U.S. joined many Middle Eastern countries in Exercise Initial Link from April 8th to April 18th. The exercise was aimed at fostering defense cooperation among participating countries.
Mine-sweeping drill in the Persian Gulf. From September 16th to 27th, the U.S., together with some 20 other countries, conducted a large-scale mine-sweeping drill in the Persian Gulf. The scenario of the drill is that extremist groups have placed huge numbers of underwater mines in the strategic waters in the Middle East, namely, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Oman. Eight mine-sweeping ships from the U.S. took part in the exercise, together with USS Ponce, a logistics and support ship. four MH-53 Sea Stallions were also involved in the exercise.
These exercises demonstrate new characteristics when compared with previous ones:
First, the scale of some of the exercises is unprecedented. Take the RIMPAC series as an example. In 2006, there were only eight participating countries. In 2010, that number rose to 14. In 2012, the number rose again to a record high of 22. 42 surface warships, six submarines, over 200 aircraft, and 25,000 military personnel took part in the 36-day exercise, making it the largest and longest of the RIMPAC series so far.
Second, training subjects in these exercises cover both non-traditional and traditional security issues. Multinational joint exercises led by the U.S. used to include mainly non-traditional security subjects such as maritime search and rescue, anti-piracy, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian relief. The 2012 exercises focus more on traditional subjects such as air combat, air defense, ground attack, close-air support, landing operations, anti-submarine operations, and maritime mine-sweeping, emphasizing joint efforts against military crises.
Third, exercises prepared against the so-called A2/AD threats are clearly targeting China and Iran. Exercises such as Internal Look 2012 and Austere Challenge 2012 are clearly aimed at Iran, while exercises such as Gold Cobra 2012, Balikatan 2012, RIMPAC 2012 are clearly targeting China. The exercises which were large in scale, high in frequency and intensity, and especially those that took place when tension in the region rose, naturally caused concern and anxiety, which in turn further intensified the situation, exerting a negative impact on world peace, stability, cooperation, and development.
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Report on Japanese Military Power 2012
10:05, July 19, 2013
Japanese Military Power 2012
China Strategic Culture Promotion Association
July, 2013
A. “Normalization” of national defense is stepped up under conservative governments.
C. Defense realignment and reinforcement in response to island dispute between China and Japan
B. Continuing to construct anti-missile air defense systems.
C. Updating conventional equipment for greater rapid response and deployment capabilities.
D. Enhancing air warfare superiority under current circumstances.
E. Increasing military investment in space technology.
A. Integration with U.S. military command systems.
B. Force modernization and base realignment.
C. Internal reorganization within the defense establishment.
VII. Military Training and Exercises
B. Joint military exercises between Japan and the U.S.
C. Multinational maritime exercises between Japan and other countries.
VIII. Military and Security Exchanges
A. Expanding regional and multilateral security networks
B. Trend of development after the revision of “Three Principles on Arms Exports”
Japanese Military Power 2012
For more than 60 years after World War II, leading the world in terms of military technology, performance of military equipment, and training, Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) has developed into one of the strongest militaries in Asia in spite of legal and policy restraints imposed by the “Peace Constitution”. In recent years, Japan has begun a new round of military adjustments according to changes in both international and regional security situation and U.S. strategic realignment. At the end of 2010, the Japanese government approved the National Defense Program Guidelines for Fiscal Year 2011 (2010 NDPG), and laid out the Mid-term Defense Program from FY 2011 to FY 2015 (2011 MTDP), outlining the force development plan in the next 5 to 10 years, focusing specifically on changes and adjustment in its security strategy, size of military force, military deployment and weaponry and equipment. Japanese military strength has developed along the guidelines set in the foregoing two documents; yet, under the two conservative governments led respectively by Mr. Yoshihiko Noda and Mr. Shinzo Abe, Japan has stepped up efforts to “normalize” national defense and become a major military power. This report aims at assessing Japanese military development in 2012 in terms of strategic realignment, military strength, military deployment, defense budget, weaponry and equipment, organizational adjustment, military training and exercises, and international military and security cooperation.
I. Policy Adjustment
According to the 2010 NDPG, Japan is committed to three major security and strategic objectives by four means. The three major objectives include ensuring Japan’s peace and security, improving Asia-Pacific security environment and guaranteeing international security; and contributing to world peace, stability and security. The four means are, namely, effort on the part of Japan, cooperation with allies, cooperation within the Asia-Pacific region, and global cooperation. In other words, Japan, in order to maintain national security and realize its security interests, is ready to conduct multi-layer security cooperation with the U.S., Asia-Pacific powers, and the international community. There seems no change or revision in the objectives and means, yet, significant changes did take place in Japan’s security policies.
A. “Normalization” of national defense is stepped up under conservative governments.
Firstly, progress was made by Noda’s conservative government in its bid for national defense “normalization”. When the Democratic Party came to power in 2012, “strengthening military power” was not included in Japan’s efforts to seek a major-power status. For more than three years in power, from Hatoyama to Noda, the security policy of the Democratic Party had been gaining momentum, gradually swinging from the leftist to the rightist policy platform. In the 2009 campaign of the House of Representatives, the Democratic Party represented by moderate Hatoyama did not mention its defense doctrine in its campaign platform. By 2010, after the ship collision near the Diaoyu Islands and other incidents, Kan’s administration returned to the military and security policy of“guarding against China while being close with the U.S.” with its new defense program outlines. The 2010 NDPG echoed the guidelines previously released by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). But Kan’s government had been unstable, and as a result, did not score much in its military buildup. Formed as a conservative and hawkish government in 2011, the Hatoyama administration was rather ambitious in “normalizing” national defense. In the 2012 general election, military-related ideas such as “unswervingly maintaining sovereignty, developing defense force, improving mobile defense force, attaching importance to the Southwest, participating in maintaining security of global commons such as air, space, sea and cyberspace” have been incorporated into its campaign platform. From December 2011 to the end of 2012, the Hatoyama administration has made significant progress in easing the “three principles concerning weapons exportation”, revising the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and making amendments to relevant legal documents for future military employment of space and nuclear energy, and establishing an independent satellite surveillance system. All these are important issues concerning Japan’s defense principles and policies. Led by the Hatoyama administration, security policy of the Democratic Party is similar to that of the LDP; in actuality, there is a tendency of convergence in security policies of the two parties.
Secondly, the Abe administration, formed in December 2012, has been more enthusiastic and ambitious in pushing forward “defense normalization” and “military rise”. To certain extent, principles and policies adopted by the Abe administration is areinforced version of his predecessor’s. Mr. Abe has long sought to get rid of the so-called “postwar regime” and make Japan a normal nation, especially in terms of national defense. At the beginning of 2013, he created two special councils for discussions of collective self-defense and a Japanese version of National Security Council (NSC). In fact, for the few months since Mr. Abe became Prime Minister, the Japanese government has taken historic steps in attempting to revise Japanese constitution, create national defense force, amend the 2010 NDPG, exercise collective self-defense, establish an NSC, raise military expenditure, and build up military strength. Mr. Abe is keen on making breakthroughs in easing restrictions on Japan’s military buildup, indicating Japan’s will and resolve in pursuing defense “normalization” and a major-military-power status.
B. Dynamic defense cooperation—military adjustment in support of theU.S. strategy of rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region
In 2012, to be supportive of the U.S. strategy of rebalancing towards the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region and its Air-Sea Battle concept, Japan initiated dynamic defense cooperation with the U.S.. The cooperation is intended to strengthen the JSDF, and accelerate its military transformation into a major military power. Meanwhile, the U.S. is in urgent need of its allies’ support, especially that from Japan, for the implementation of its new strategic shift amid fiscal restraints and insufficient resources. Since the latter half of 2011, the U.S. has begun implementing its strategic rebalance with military deployment. Almost at the same time, in December 2011, the concept of dynamic defense cooperation came out of the talks between U.S. Secretary of Defense and Japanese Defense Minister. From the end of April to the beginning of May, 2012, “2 plus 2” conference between Japan and the U.S. and the talks between the two heads of state declared that dynamic defense cooperation was both a link in alliance deterrence and a new initiative of the coalition. The “2 plus 2” conference also reached a new agreement on relocating Futenma Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), isolating the issue from the redeployment of U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam, so that reorganization of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), transformation of Japanese defense and realignment of Japanese military deployment, and dynamic defense cooperation between the two countries will proceed smoothly against a backdrop of U.S. strategic rebalance. As tension was building up around the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands in the latter half of 2012, U.S. Defense Secretary and Japanese Defense Minister conducted two separate talks in August and September. As a result, the two countries decided not only to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, but also to step up efforts for dynamic defense cooperation which the Japanese side interprets in the following three aspects: a. Joint training. For example, the two countries held their first joint exercise in overseas real-combat context for recapturing islands in Hawaii, Guam, and the Tinian in September 2012. Then in November, the two countries conducted Exercise “Keen Sword” off Kyushu and Okinawa. 37,000 troops, nearly 30 warships and 240 aircraft from the JSDF joined 10,000 U.S. troops in island defense involving maritime and air operations; b. Sharing bases and facilities. U.S. forces could use Japanese bases while the JSDF were not allowed to use U.S. bases until an agreement on sharing military facilities was reached. The agreement is conducive to improving the interoperability of the two militaries. The JSDF also benefits from the agreement in that it is now able to play a greater role within the coalition framework and its ambition to step outside its borders can be fulfilled; c. Closer cooperation in combat and support. Japan-U.S. cooperation in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in the Western Pacific, in anti-missile, anti-submarine, and base protection operations is to be greatly enhanced. Besides, the Japan-U.S. Cooperation Initiative released after the talk in April 2012 between U.S. and Japanese heads of state announced bilateral cooperation in space situational awareness (SSA) using FPS-5, IT, etc. Along a similar line of development, Japan has been pushing for the deployment of V-22 Osprey cargo helicopters in Okinawa since the latter half of 2012.
C. Defense realignment and reinforcement in response to island dispute between China and Japan
As tension kept building up in 2012 around the disputed Diaoyu Islands, Japanese military adjustment has attracted global attention. In the past, Japanese media, when reporting JSDF’s “Southwest Defense Program” and military drills on “recapturing islands”, would more or less reveal Japanese military preparation for island disputes. Yet these reports did not represent official attitude or government policy. Military-related strong statements on the dispute around the Diaoyu Islands on public occasions began with Mr. Hatoyama. When he was questioned in a hearing held in the House of Representatives on July 26th, 2012, Mr. Hatoyama replied, “if illegal activity by any neighboring country takes place within Japan’s territorial land and sea including the ‘Senkaku’ [Chinese Diaoyu] Islands, the Japanese government will respond without hesitance, exhausting all means and methods including the use of the JSDF, if necessary.” In a press conference held the following day, Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto reiterated the position, emphasizing that what Mr. Hatayama said was necessary measures within the framework of Japanese laws. On December 26th, 2012, in a press conference right after he was elected Prime Minister, Mr. Abe promised that Japan would be committed to defending its territorial land and sea, stressing that “right now, on the seas around the ‘Senkaku’ [Chinese Diaoyu] Islands, officers and men from the Japan Coast Guard and JSDF are protecting Japan’s air and sea. Japan’s security does not rely on others; it is in danger now.” Both Mr.Hatayama and Mr. Abe, within their capacity as Prime Minister, visited Japan Coast Guard’s and JSDF’s bases in Okinawa, respectively in June 2012 and February 2013, which is rather rare among post-WWII Japanese prime ministers. On the whole, Japan’s military policies for the disputed islands are implemented in three steps: the first step is to use Japan Coast Guard, a paramilitary force, to control the situation; the second step is to step up JSDF’s preparation for medium- and low-intensity armed conflicts; the third step is to ensure U.S. military involvement and support in case the conflicts escalate out of control. At the same time, Japan has been strengthening Japan-U.S. military alliance and displaying its effectiveness, both as a deterrent to China and as a policy support to the three steps mentioned above. The evolution of Japanese military stance related to the Diaoyu Islands is the result of both the development of its southwestern defense policies and Japan-U.S. “Dynamic Defense Cooperation” in the context of U.S. strategic rebalance amid growing dispute over the Diaoyu Islands around mid-2012. The Japanese government slipped further in the direction of armed conflict under the Hatoyama administration and the Abe administration that followed. As a result, military deployment, equipment upgrading, military drills and construction of military facilities have been sped up. Specific measures include: pushing forward Japan-U.S. Dynamic Defense Cooperation focusing on the Southwest, reinforcing F15 fighter wing based in Naha Air Base, considering transferring the Shimogishima Airport to military use, deploying E-2s and E-767s in Okinawa on a regular basis, studying the possibility of deploying a second X-band early warning radar in the Southwest or other locations, initiating revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, fielding PAC-3 missiles on “Southwestern islands” under the pretext of guarding against DPRK’s missile threats, discussing whether to purchase AAV-7 and to deploy V-22 Osprey cargo helicopters, considering the establishment of the Japanese version of Marines Corps, etc. In addition, Mr. Abe also asked the Defense Ministry and relevant agencies to revise in advance the 2010 NDPG and MTDP, to work out comprehensive defense doctrines for retaking islands through joint operations, and to study the possibility of introducing U.S. Global Hawks to enhance surveillance and reconnaissance of the Diaoyu Islands. He also asked them to study the feasibility of building 10 more 1,000-ton patrol vessels for Japan Coast Guard and reorganizing its branch in Naha into Senkaku Exclusive Force composed of 600 troops and 12 patrol vessels. All these are interpreted in Japanese media as measures intended to enhance surveillance and reconnaissance of the Diaoyu Islands and responding to Chinese military “threats”. Although they are not meant to provoke China into military actions, they have undoubtedly complicated and endangered the situation in which accidents might be triggered, and the dispute that already existed might escalate out of control.
In 2012, the three trends of development in Japan’s security policies have negative implications on both regional strategic balance and China’s security environment. Japan usually interprets “defense normalization” as an internal issue; however, in the specific historical context and guided by the rightist ideas and narrow nationalism, “normalization” will inevitably cause concern and anxiety. In terms of national politics, “normalization” reveals itself in Japan’s attempts to revise the constitution and outgrow the postwar regime for military buildup and involvement in overseas military activities; in terms of diplomatic relations, it is seen in Japan’s pursuit for closer Japan-U.S. military alliance amid closer bilateral relations, exploitation of “China Threat”, and a strategy of military buildup aimed at curbing and containing China. To that end, Japan’s “normalization” efforts have been involving more and more military aspects, thus poisoning the security relations between Japan and China.
II. Military Strength
According to statistics released by Japanese Ministry of Defense website, at the end of FY2012, the JSDF has an authorized strength of 255,347 personnel (including 8,175 ready reserve personnel). Specifically, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) has an authorized strength of 151,063 personnel with an effective strength of 140,028; the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has an authorized strength of 45,517 personnel with an effective strength of 41,937; the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) has an authorized strength of 47,097 personnel with an effective strength of 43,195; the Combined Task Force (composed of SDF Intelligence Security Command and SDF C4 Systems Command) has an authorized strength of 1,227 personnel, the authorized number of personnel of the Joint Staff and the Intelligence Headquarters is respectively 361 and 1,907. The establishment of the Ready Reserve is 8,175 personnel, and that of the Reserve is 47,900 personnel.
Compared with FY 2011, there are minor adjustments in terms of the established strength of the JSDF. The total establishment was reduced from 247,446 in FY 2011 to 247,172 in FY2012. To be specific, the authorized strength of the Ready Reserve was reduced from 8,479 in FY2011 to 8,175 in FY2012, the JGSDF was reduced by 578 personnel from 159,816 in FY2011 to 159,238 in FY2012. The authorized strength of the JMSDF, the Combined Task Force, the Joint Staff and the Intelligence Headquarters remains unchanged.
The adjustments detailed above are in line with the 2010 NDPG which aims at streamlining JSDF force structure. The reforms include downsizing the active component and raising the ratio of Ready Reserve in the total force, thus making the JSDF smaller but faster, more efficient and mobile.
III. National Defense Budget
Japan’s national defense budget has been second only to that of the U.S. from 1993 to 2008. As a result of low economic growth in recent years, there has been a slight decrease in Japan’s defense budget since 2002. According to the Defense of Japan 2012, the defense budget for FY 2012 is 4,713.8 billion yen (including an 8.6 billion-yen budget for the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)-related projects and a 59.9 billion-yen budget for U.S. military bases), 1.3% lower than that of the previous year. As part of the budget for disaster relief for the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake is defense related, the final defense budget for 2012 is 4,827.4 billion yen.
Since 2008, both the institutional budget for Japan’s Security Council and the special budget for JSDF space development have become invisible, as neither has been included in the overall national defense budget. According to the 2011 MTDP, Japan’s national defense budget from 2011 to 2015 is 23.49 trillion yen. In addition, the government will add 100 billion yen for contingencies. The huge defense budget will greatly boost Japanese military strength in the next five years. Japan’s national defense budget for FY 2012 is based on what it thinks lessons learned from more serious security environment and the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake. It is also prepared in accordance with the 2010 NDPG and 2011 MTDP. Japan claims that the main objectives of the defense budget include enhancing effective deterrence and response, improving security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and the world, upgrading missile defense systems; strengthening warning, surveillance and responsive capabilities for the Southwestern region, etc. All these objectives not only reveal Japan’s ambition to step up efforts for a major military power, but also explain its efforts to continue stirring up “China Threat”. To realize those objectives, budget priorities of FY2012 are set accordingly. From 2012, Japan will spend 115.5 billion yen in building a 195,000-ton frigate, 54.7 billion yen in building a 2,900-ton submarine, 39.5 billion yen in procuring four F-35 fighters, 34.5 billion yen in modifying Patriotic anti-missile systems, and 122.4 billion yen in operating the X-Band SATCOM system. All these huge investments are aimed at strengthening peripheral air and maritime warning and surveillance and improving maritime and air operational capabilities, for the purpose of preparing for the so-called “China Threat” against the “Southeastern islands”.
What can be concluded from the two sections above is that it will be hard for the Japanese government to rapidly build up its military power through significant defense budget increase in a foreseeable future amid economic stagnation, fiscal difficulties, and an aging society. However, thanks to its economic and fiscal scale, Japan is still able to make impressive progress in its military buildup in a gradual and accumulative manner by giving a full play of both existing capabilities and potentials, setting up priorities, and improving effectiveness. This is verified by the fact that into the 21st century, there has been no increase in Japan’s defense budget, yet there has been continuous increase in its military strength.
IV. Military Deployment
The changes in JSDF military deployment in 2012 are based on the 2010 NDPG, highlighting the shift of center of gravity to the Southwest instead of a balancedposture. The spec ific measures in this regard are as follows:
The JGSDF will continue with its efforts to reorganize and reinforce the 15th Brigade based in Okinawa by 2015, and to deploy a coastal surveillance unit or border security unit on the Miyako Island and Yonaguni Island. It is worth noting that in 2012 the plan to deploy coastal surveillance units was impeded, forcing the Ministry of Defense to postpone the plan beyond 2013 in March, 2012.
According to the 2010 NDPG, by 2015, the JMSDF will increase the number of submarine fleet from four to six, and the total number of submarines from 16 to 22, and reorganize the five local fleets based at five marine garrisons into four local fleets with four vessels for each fleet. At the same time, it will also develop new types of destroyers, submarines and anti-submarine patrol aircraft to enhance anti-submarine and anti-ship capabilities. These measures are intended mainly to reinforce military deployment for the defense of the Southwest.
According to the 2010 NDPG, the JASDF plans to reorganize the aircraft control and warning units which were composed of an eight-unit warning group and a 20-unit warning corps into a four-unit warning group and a 24-unit warning corps, in order to enhance air defense command; and at the same time, the JASDF intends to increase the number of flight squadrons at Naha Air Base from one to two for rapid response in the Southwestern region. In order to improve intelligence collection, warning, and surveillance in the Southwestern region, the JASDF also plans to field warning radars to maintain a seamless warning and surveillance posture. The JASDF plans to deploy in a balanced way PAC-3 missiles to all six surface-to-air guided missile groups across the country in addition to modifying and deploying one set of PAC-3 missile system to improve missile-defense capabilities in the Southwestern direction. In 2012 the JASDF also procured a set of short-range surface-to-air missile system, two sets of surface-to-air missile systems for base air defense, and was equipped with medium-range surface-to-air missile squadrons, in order to improve air defense.
To sum up, all the military deployment and measures mentioned above point to three purposes: first, to improve capabilities in intelligence collection and warning and surveillance; second, to improve rapid-response capabilities; third, to improve mobility. All the measures are in line with those taken in the previous year, yet they are relatively more conspicuous in that they focus on strengthening defense of the “Southwestern islands” which are far away from the Japanese homeland and therefore are relatively weak in defense. These measures are also military preparation for both possible future conflicts over the Diaoyu Islands and intervention in conflicts across theTaiwan Straits. At the same time, they are obstacles for the PLA Navy to go beyond the first island chain for the deep blue sea.
V. Weaponry and Equipment
Generally speaking, JSDF expenditure on weaponry acquisition in 2012 maintained the level of the previous year. It also followed the general trend of the recent years, emphasizing the development of naval and air weapons systems. According to Japan’s National Defense 2012,the JSDF spent 756.5 billion yen on weapons and systems acquisition, 3% less than that in FY 2011, and accounting for 16% of national defense budget. Among it, ship building cost 172.8 billion yen, which is a rather significant increase from last year, indicating Japan’s intention to strengthen its maritime power. Aircraft purchase cost 136 billion yen. In FY 2012, the JSDF spent 102.7 billion yen on equipment R&D, 1% higher than that of last year.
The main characteristics and changes in JSDF weapons development in 2012 are as follows:
A. Strengthening maritime surveillance and deterrence with a focus on preparation for “island invasion”. To that end, Japan has deployed FPS-5 radar in Okinawa, and is stepping up R&D of FPS-7 anti-stealth radar. The new generation of radar is significant in that its antenna is fed signals from several feed horns arranged in a vertical stack, making it much better than its predecessors in terms of agility, reconnaissance range and responsiveness. It is considered a pillar equipment for coastal monitoring and surveillance, especially that of the “Southwestern islands”. In 2012 Japan also began R&D of two new weapons, one is a new type of torpedo to replace existing torpedoes on Japanese submarines, and the other is the Variable Depth Sonar to improve reconnaissance and anti-submarine operations. Meanwhile, Japan is continuing with the R&D of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). It has also purchased two sets of SSM-1 to enhance anti-ship capabilities. The JMSDF has been commissioning new warships at a planned pace. In March 2012, Destroyer Akizuki, the lead ship of the new Akizuki-class destroyers (with a 5,000-ton displacement), and Submarine Kenryu (with a 2,900-ton displacement) were commissioned. Destroyer Akizuki is a general-purpose destroyer with enhanced Anti-Aircraft Warfare capability. The remaining three ships of the same class, namely, Destroyers Teruzuki, Suzuzuki, and Fuyuzuki will be commissioned respectively in 2013 and 2014. Kenryu is Japan’s fourth AIP-equipped submarine, and as Hakuryu which was commissioned last year, it has superior submerged maneuverability and stealth capabilities. According to the 2012 budget, Japan also plans to construct a helicopter carrier with a 19,500-ton displacement to replace the Shirone-class Destroyer Kurama which is to be decommissioned in 2016. In terms of carrier-borne aircraft, the JMSDF purchased 3 MCH-101 minesweeping/transportation helicopters, the largest purchase in recent years, and additional SH-60K anti-submarine helicopters.
B. Continuing to construct anti-missile air defense systems. According to the FY 2012 defense budget, the JSDF will spend 4.1 billion yen on additional PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles, and it will also develop infra-red detectors against new types of cruise missiles. It will upgrade 2 Atago-class Aegis combat systems with SM-3Block II A missile interceptors.
C. Updating conventional equipment for greater rapid response and deployment capabilities. In 2012, in order to speed up the formation of rapid-response units, the JGSDF purchased additional 13 Type 10 tanks to replace Type 90 tanks, and the JGSDF and JASDF together purchased 51 light-armored vehicles. Meanwhile, the JGSDF purchased additional UH-60JAs, CH47-JAs, and AH-64Ds, and appropriated additional fund for the R&D of new multi-functional helicopters to replace UH-1Js the JGSDF are currently equipped with. The JGSDF has also equipped its divisions, brigades, and regiments with the most advanced field communications systems to improve field and special operations capabilities.
D. Enhancing air warfare superiority under current circumstances. Japan has been proactively taking part in international joint production of F-35s, and pushing forward the R&D of ATD-X, a new generation of native stealth fighters. In March 2013, the Japanese government formally announced that domestic defense corporations were allowed to participate in international joint production of F-35s. As new types of fighters are still in the process of R&D, the JADSF focuses on modifying existing fighters to improve its capabilities in air operations and rapid response to
contingencies. Specific modifications include installing new types of radars, Fighter Data Links, Helmet Mounted Displays, and Precision Guided Ammunitions (PGAs).
E. Increasing military investment in space technology. According to the FY 2012 defense budget, Japan will appropriate over 190 billion yen to enhance C4SIR capabilities using space and satellite technologies. Japan also invested 120 billion yen on X-band SATCOM, and planned to launch between 2015 and 2016 two such satellites which can operate for 15 years. Besides, in January 2013, Japan launched IGS-Radar 4 which had been planned to be launched within 2012. As a result, a space reconnaissance and surveillance system composed of two radar satellites and two optical satellites was completed.
It is quite obvious that Japan’s weaponry and equipment development in 2012 is intended to strengthen capabilities for maritime, air, space, and anti-missile operations, focusing on cutting-edge technologies, large platforms, rapid response and long-range capabilities. It is evident that Japan is militarily prepared against China, a country described by Japan as a “military threat”, among all its neighbors. It is also evident that Japan’s military development is tailored for the defense of “Southwestern islands”. The purpose of Japanese violations of the Peace Constitution and the postwar regime and its determination to develop weaponry and equipment is therefore self-evident.
VI. Organizational Amendments
In 2012, institutional and organizational amendments in Japanese Ministry of Defense and the JSDF focus on the following three categories. As guided by 2010 NDPG and 2011 MTDP, most of the amendments were completed in 2012. Changes aimed at improving the integration of Japanese and U.S. command for anti-missile and rapid response operations, improving JGSDF mobility and rapid response, and strengthening leading organs for planning and foreign cooperation, are worthy of special attention.
A. Integration with U.S. military command systems. In March 2012, Air Defense Command, JASDF moved from Fuchu Air Base to Yokota Air Base, headquarters ofr the 5th Air Force, USFJ. This relocation, detailed in the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation in 2006, is aimed at improving contingency liaison and decision-making between the JSDF and USFJ regarding missile defense. Air Defense Command, JASDF created a Bilateral and Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) to facilitate Japan and U.S. sharing of information collected by early-warning satellites, ground radars and airborne warning and control systems. The FY 2012 defense budget also plans to continue to push for relocation of the JGSDF Central Rapid Response Command to Camp Zama, the headquarters of USFJ to enhance command coordination between the JSDF and USFJ. The relocation was completed in March, 2013.
B. Force modernization and base realignment. According to the FY2012 defense budget, the 4th Division of the Western Army and the 12th Brigade of the Eastern Army will be reorganized into rapid response division (brigade). The chemical protection units which used to be part of each brigade are directly affiliated to the brigade now. The 14th Brigade which was reorganized from the 2nd Mixed Regiment in 2006 was relocated from the Kochi Prefecture to the Tokushima Prefecture in March, 2012.
C. Internal reorganization within the defense establishment. To promote the implementation of the Roadmap for Structural Reform of Defense Capability and to improve policy making, in April, 2012, the Ministry of Defense began reorganization. A defense policy officer was added to the Department of Defense Policy under the Bureau of Defense Policy. An Office of Maintenance Planning was established within the Department of Facility and Maintenance under the Bureau of Finance and Equipment to provide policy support for reorganization of the defense establishment. At the same time, to promote defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in general and coordination of USFJ reorganization in particular, the Section of U.S. Army Realignment was created within the Department of Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation under the Bureau of Defense Policy. Also, to promote defense cooperation between Japan and Asian countries, the 3rd Section of Operational Policy was created withinthe Department of International Cooperation of the Bureau of Operational Policy. Besides, the Bureau of Personnel and Education, National Defense Academy and some other agencies within the Ministry of Defense have also carried out institutional adjustments in order to improve administrative management in personnel reform and military education.
Apart from reforms mentioned above, the Japanese government has planned to significantly reform the command system of the Ministry of Defense. It is also considering the establishment of Secretary for Defense Review, a deputy-ministerial post in addition to Minister of Defense, Deputy Minister of Defense, and Parliamentary Secretary for Defense. But such an amendment to the “Organization of the Ministry of Defense Act” failed to pass into law in the 177th and 180th Congress.
VII. Military Training and Exercises
Service and joint exercises within the JSDF, bilateral exercises with U.S. forces and multi-national exercises were frequent in 2012. As maritime and island disputes between Japan and its neighbors, especially China, have intensified, the focus of various JSDF exercises is maritime operations. The scenario of these exercises mostly deals with island defense and landing operations and their purposes are self-evident.
A. Regular JSDF exercises
JSDF exercises in 2012 include routine exercises such as coordinated transfer exercises and real-troop exercises. The Northeastern Army conducted a coordinated transfer exercise between June and July, Eastern Army in August, Northern Army between October and November. Among them, the Northeastern Army exercise was on the division-regiment level. In 2012, 7,700 JSDF troops, about 2,100 vehicles and 30 aircraft participated in the coordinated transfer exercises, involving long-distance mobilization training using various means of transport, and covering subjects such as live-ammunition firing, explosion, and landing by both individual troops and armored units. Specifically, the Eastern and Northern Armies were transferred to the Western Army’s territory, i.e. the bases in Kyushu. In terms of real-troop exercises, JSDF Northern Army conducted its annual real-troop drills in Hokkaido, in which 9,000 members from the 2nd and 7th Division, 11th Brigade, over 1,000 vehicles, and more than 20 aircraft were involved. The exercise covered subjects such as warning and surveillance, defense, civilian protection, construction of field hospitals, firing, etc. The Western Army conducted annual real-troop exercises from Nov. 2nd to 22nd in Kitakyushu. 5,400 personnel from the 4th and 8th Divisions, Central Readiness Force and the 12th Brigade, more than 1,500 vehicles and 30 aircraft took part in the exercise which covers such training subjects as warning and surveillance, defense, base protection, construction of troop stations, etc.
On August 26th, 2011, the JSDF conducted its annual Fuji Firepower Demonstration which was the largest live-ammunition exercise of the year. 2,400 personnel, over 80 armored vehicles, 80 guns, and 30 aircraft took part in the exercise which took island defense as the main scenario. It is worth noting that Type 10 tanks made its debut in this exercise. To simulate real-life island offense and defense, the JASDF dispatched F-2 fighters as an opposing force. The JMSDF also dispatched its P-3C early warning and control system for the first time.
B. Joint military exercises between Japan and the U.S.
From Nov. 5th to 16th, 2012, Japan and the U.S. conducted a joint exercise codenamed Keen Sword in the waters near Kyushuk, Hokkaido, and Akita. 37,000 officers and men from the Service Staff, Western and Northern Army of the JGSDF, Central Readiness Force, JSDF Fleet, and Japan Air Defense Command, 30 vessels, and 240 aircraft from the Japanese side, as well as around 10,000 officers and men from the USFJ, the 7th Fleet, Pacific Air Forces and Marine Corps from the U.S. side took part in the exercise. Keen Sword is a bilateral joint training exercise conducted every other year since 1985, featuring joint operations in island defense. An island retaking operation had been planned on the uninhabited Irisuna Island, but given China’s attitude and local protests, the operation was cancelled.
Annual Japan-U.S. Joint Regional Army command post exercise takes place in both the U.S. and Japan. From July 10th to 21st, 2012, the command post exercise was held in Hawaii. Over 200 senior officers from JGSDF Staff and Northeastern Army and from the USFJ took part in the exercise. From Dec. 1st to 13th, around 4,500 personnel from the Northeastern Army and 1,500 personnel from the U.S. Pacific Command, USAJ Command, the 8th Army and Marine Corps participated in the exercise held at a JSDF base in Sendai. During the exercises, both sides carried out operational simulation and map maneuver to improve command-post level coordination.
There have also been frequent regiment-level exercises between Japan and the U.S.. From August 19th to 30th, some battalions from the 4th Division of the JSDF and the 3rd U.S. Marine Corps conducted a joint training exercise in Hijyudai Exercise Ground, Kyushu. From August 21st to September 26th, some battalions from the 3rd Division of the JSDF and the 3rd U.S. Marine Corps conducted joint training in U.S. air and naval bases in Guam and Northern Mariana Islands. From September 4th to 24th, battalions from the 2nd Division of the JSDF went to the State of Washington to conduct joint training with U.S. forces. From October 24th to November 7th, battalions from the 10th Division of the JSDF conducted joint training with the 25th U.S. Infantry Division and other units in Aibano Exercise Ground and Imazu Base. Although there were differences in terms of training subjects and equipment, all the joint training exercises were aimed at enhancing rapid response capabilities.
C. Multinational maritime exercises between Japan and other countries.
From June 23rd to August 3rd, the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) 2012 was held in Hawaii. 46 warships, over 200 aircraft and 250,000 personnel from 22 countries took part in the exercise. JS Myoko (DDG-175), JS Shirane (DDH-143), JS Bungo (MST-464), SH-60J Seahawk, and P-3C Orion from the JSDF took part in the maritime exercise.
Japan was also involved in other multinational exercises. From June 4th to 8th, 2012, naval forces from Japan, the U.S., and Australia conducted a joint exercise off the coast of Kyushu. JS Shimakaze (DDG-172) joined the other two destroyers from U.S. and Australian navies in the exercise focusing on anti-submarine and combined tactical operations. From September 9th to 23rd, the three countries conducted an other multinational maritime exercise off the coast of Guam. Two P-3C Orions from the 21st Tactical Fighter Squadron from the JASDF took part in the exercise.
On June 9th, 2012, maritime forces from Japan and India conducted their first ever joint exercise in Sagami Bay. JS Hatakaze (DDG-171) and JS Onami (DD-111) from the JMSDF and INS Rana (D 52) from the Indian Navy took part in the exercise which was considered a hallmark in defense cooperation and maritime strategic coordination between the two countries.
From June 21st to 22nd, 2012, naval forces from Japan, the ROK, and the U.S. conducted a joint maritime exercise off the southern coast of the Korean Peninsula, involving JS Kurama (DDH-144), JS Kirishima (DDG-174), and JS Yuudachi (DD-103) from the JMSDF, and USS George Washington (CVN 73) and several cruisers from the U.S. Navy. The main training subjects include tactical operation, onboard inspection, and search and rescue operation, directly targeting the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula and the East China Sea.
From August 22nd to 24th, 2012, Japan, Australia, and Singapore conducted a joint exercise off the coast of Guam. JS Shimakaze (DDG-172) took part in the exercise. This is the second such trilateral exercise which began in 2010. The main training subjects include tactical maneuver and communications.
VIII. Military and Security Exchanges
Japan’s military and security exchanges with foreign countries in 2012 followed the following two lines: to expand regional and multilateral security networks, and to push for arms exports and international cooperation in joint R&D of weaponry and equipment as “Three Principles on Arms Exports” is easing. These two lines of development reveal Japan’s intention to speed up its efforts to be self-reliant, to expand its strategic space and exert international influence, and to counter-balance China. And it follows naturally that Japan tries to contain the rise of China with increased military and security options.
A. Expanding regional and multilateral security networks
Japan maintains that after the financial crisis, it is difficult to rely solely on itself or Japan-U.S. alliance for security. With the U.S. decline and complication of world security situation, the tendency of diversification of security approaches has been self-evident. To set up a security network will not only help reinforce Japan’s ability in tackling security issues, but also expand its diplomatic space and increase its strategic options. Japan seeks to become a shaper of new regional security order also because it tries to elevate its status in the international community and increase its international clout. Japan is now promoting the establishment of a cooperative regional security network with either the U.S. or Japan-U.S. alliance (the so-called “Japan plus X” or “Japan-U.S. plus X” pattern) as its center, linking Australia, the ROK, India and relevant countries in Southeast Asia. Such a network is sometimes titled “democratic alliance” or “the arch of freedom and prosperity”, but it is essentially a maritime alliance. It has undeniably an element of hedging against or containing China.
In 2012, apart from building the network mentioned above, Japan has made other significant achievements in this regard.
First, Japan is proactively promoting the so-called “coalition of democracies” by enhancing defense cooperation with the ROK and Australia. The basic line of thought for Japan is to make use of the Japan-U.S. coalition framework to enhance security cooperation with the ROK and Australia. Japan and Australia reached the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in 2010; and in 2012, the two countries also signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The ministerial-level defense talks between Japan and Australia in September 2012 laid out guidelines for bilateral defense cooperation centering upon defense equipment and technology. The deepening of security cooperation between Japan and the ROK is also worthy of note. With the conservative Lee Myung-bak in power, and with the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula since 2010, Japan intended to make Japan-ROK defense cooperation the key to its regional security strategy. Beginning in 2010, Japan started negotiations with the ROK on reaching both ACSA and GSOMIA. The two countries all but reached the objective in May 2012, when ROK gave up in the last minute.
Second, Japan is proactively promoting defense cooperation with India. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda visited India in December 2012, and the two countries signed a joint statement entitled “Vision for the Enhancement of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership”. In the statement, the two countries agreed to greater maritime security cooperation. In line with the statement, Japan and India conducted their first ever joint maritime exercise in June, 2012.
Third, Japan is seeking to enhance security cooperation and partnership with Southeast-Asian countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam. As friction arose since 2010 between the Philippines and Vietnam and China in the South China Sea, Japan saw opportunities to engage in regional security affairs for greater political influence. When Mr. Noda became Prime Minister in September 2011, Japan has significantly enhanced security cooperation with both the Philippines and Vietnam, and had signed joint statements concerning maritime security cooperation with both countries. Since 2012, Japan has decided to provide both countries with patrol ships and help improve their coast guard capabilities with Official Development Assistance (ODA). Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited Japan in April, 2012; and in July of the same year Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba visited India. In both visits, the two countries highlighted their intention to enhance maritime security cooperation. In addition, three training vehicles of the JMSDF arrived in the Philippines for a five-day goodwill visit in May, 2012, when China and the Philippines were having dispute over the Huangyan Island. In August, 2012, Shikishima (PLH), the largest patrol vessel from Japan Coast Guard participated separately in maritime drills with the Philippines and Vietnam. In January 2013, Mr. Shinzo Abe visited Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia, and Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida conducted parallel visits to the Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei. During all these visits, both Mr. Abe and Mr. Kishida emphasized maritime security cooperation.
Apart from multinational exercises, Japan was also actively engaged in regional multilateral security consultations and dialogues in 2012. It tried to increase its influence in regional security affairs by laying out topics, setting agenda, and dominating the discourse. On internal forums such as the ARF, EAS, ADMM+ and ASD (a track-II dialogue), Japan sided with the U.S. and relevant ASEAN members on such issues as maritime security and China’s defense buildup.
B. Trend of development after the revision of “Three Principles on Arms Exports”
In December, 2011, the Noda administration agreed to relax significantly the ban on arms exports, based on “Three Principles on Arms Exports”, allowing Japan to participate in international joint development and production of defense equipment and to provide equipment to humanitarian operations. According to various analyses at the time, the revision was intended not only to tackle domestic industrial and economic problems, but also to promote and extend defense cooperation between Japan and Southeast-Asian countries, European countries, Australia, and India. What followed proved that such analyses were right. The world is concerned with what Japan would do in terms of arms exports after the revision.
In 2012, Japan made substantial progress in arms exports and international joint R&D. As mentioned earlier in the report, Japan provided defense equipment including patrol ships to the Philippines and Vietnam with ODA. It was reported by TBS in May, 2012 that Japan would provide patrol ships to the Philippines and Vietnam as part of strategic ODA. The Japanese authorities confirmed in July, 2012 that Japan would provide 12 advanced patrol ships to Philippine Coast Guard in order to improve its maritime capabilities. Relevant consultations between the two countries have already begun. Also, on April 10th, 2012, Prime Minister Noda and his British counterpart Mr.Cameron reached an agreement on joint R&D of weapons equipment, the first such agreement since Japan significantly eased the “Three Principles on Arms Exports”. In line with this new development, in September, 2012, the ministerial-level defense talks between Japan and Australia laid out the guidelines for joint weapons R&D between the two countries. After that, “Japanese Economic News” reported on February 18th, 2013 that Japanese Ministry of Defense was considering transferring submarine technology to Australia. In addition, it was reported by Kyodo News Service on July 7th, 2012 that Japan had begun negotiating with France on joint R&D of weapons equipment, hoping to cooperate with France which has already possessed cutting-edge technology for high-performance fighters. Again, according to Yomiuri Shimbun report on March 25th, 2013, the Japanese government expressed on the previous day its intention to export US-2 rescue hydroplanes to India, and the two countries were now engaged in negotiations on the export.
Conclusion
What can be concluded from the above analysis and assessment of Japanese military buildup in 2012 is that Japanese military force is essentially a well-equipped, highly-trained, medium-scale armed force with a large defense budget and advanced technologies although it is supposed to be restrained by the Peace Constitution and is titled a “Self-Defense Force”. It is now undergoing significant transformation. Japan has been expanding the objectives and enriching the approaches for its security and defense strategies. It seeks to ensure its national security interests by way of self-reliance and multi-layer cooperation. In terms of the trends of military buildup, Japan formulated the concept of “Dynamic Defense Force” in support of U.S. strategic rebalance towards East Asia; it also promoted “Dynamic Defense Cooperation”between Japan and the U.S., focusing on rapid maneuver, active response, and dynamic deterrence. As a result, Japan has become increasingly more active and offensive in its military operations. In terms of foreign security cooperation, Japan continues to enhance multilateral security cooperation between Japan and the U.S., ROK, Australia, India, and ASEAN countries in the form of “Japan plus X” or “Japan-U.S. plus X” on the basis of Japan-U.S. alliance. In terms of its policy towards China, while emphasizing military exchanges between the two countries, Japan has intensified its efforts to contain and hedge against China. Specific measures include enhancing surveillance and reconnaissance of China, reinforcing military deployment on “Southwestern islands”, highlighting military means in dealing with disputes over the Diaoyu Islands, and being proactively engaged in the South China Sea issues. These measures and trends of development have imposed pressure on China’s peripheral as well as regional security environment. They have also brought uncertainties and negative impacts on the healthy development of Sino-Japanese relations.
2012美国军力评估报告（民间版）（全文）
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电子报【多维财经】由军科院世界军事研究部副部长罗援少将领衔研究、撰写的“2012美日军力报告”（民间版）6月5日上午在北京发布。这两个报告，属于非官方、非涉密性质，力求公正、客观地介绍美国和日本的军事思想、军事力量、军事部署，以及对外军事关系，并作出理性、公允的评估。以下是民间版美国军力评估报告的全文：《民间版美国军力评估报告》第一章《美国战略》美国战略是一个体系，分为国家安全战略（又称国家战略、大战略）、国防战略、军事战略和战区战略4个层次。一、美国国家安全战略。2010年5月27日，奥巴马政府公布了其首份《国家安全战略》报告。报告针对美国面临的战略环境，提出了“重振美国，领导世界”的战略，试图通过“国内建设、国外塑造”的方式，恢复美国的全球领导力量。其主要内容包括：（一）确认大规模毁伤武器是美国面临的最严重威胁（二）确认安全、繁荣、价值观和国际秩序是美国的长期利益（三）提出“国内建设、国外塑造”的战略途径奥巴马与小布什安全战略的区别有两点：一是放弃了单边主义，主张全面接触，希望通过加强与其他力量中心的有效合作，促进世界稳定与和平。二是避谈“先发制人”思想，主张慎用军事手段，要求在用尽其他手段之前避免采用军事手段，如果确需使用，也必须仔细衡量成本与风险。“重振美国，领导世界”战略是奥巴马政府根据正在下降的美国实力地位、变化了的国际安全环境和新的国际战略格局提出来的，能否收到“亡羊补牢”的效果，还有待于观察。二、美国国防战略2010年2月1日，美国防部颁布新版《四年防务审查报告》，重申了“平衡”思想。总体看，“平衡”思想主要包括以下内容：（一）重新评估美国战略环境，强调威胁的多样性和非常规性（二）确立五大战略目标及实现途径，强调综合运用硬软两种实力确保美国安全 “平衡”思想明确提出保卫国土、打赢长期战争、促进安全、慑止冲突、打赢国家间战争等5大战略目标和实现这些目标的5个途径：影响关键国家的政策选择、阻止敌人获得和使用大规模毁伤武器、加强和拓展联盟与伙伴关系、确保美国拥有“战略进入”能力和行动自由、整合与统一美国的行动。同时，强调综合运用“新三位一体”战略威慑力量、前沿部署、精确打击等硬实力和跨机构合作、盟友与伙伴关系、国际组织协作等软实力，实现国家安全战略的总目标。（三）提出防务能力建设具体措施，强调通过深化转型提高联合作战能力 “平衡”思想认为，必须通过深化军事转型提高联合地面、联合海上、联合空中、特种作战、“新三位一体”、抗击大规模毁伤武器、联合机动、情报监视侦察、网络中心战、联合指挥与控制等10种联合作战能力。（四）继续防范中俄，强调通过合作弱化潜在威胁 “平衡”思想明确将中国定位为“正在崛起的国家，拥有与美国竞争的潜力”，强调要防范中国的军队现代化；认为俄罗斯在“开放和民主程度上倒退”可能会“对美国及其盟国和伙伴国的安全产生重大影响”。三、美国军事战略2011年2月8日，美军参联会公布新版《国家军事战略报告》，阐述了美军面临的战略环境，明确了美军事战略目标。其主要内容包括：（一）认为国际政治正在向“多节点”的世界演进（二）战略关注点指向亚太从防范打击的对手来看，美军主要针对的是地区性对手，分为两类：一类是遏制打击的对象，包括亚太的朝鲜和中东的伊朗；另一类是防范的对象，如中国。（三）提出了“打赢、慑止、合作和准备”的战略目标 2010年的《四年防务审查报告》提出在当前的战争中取胜；预防和慑止冲突；在应急行动中击败敌人；保持和加强“全志愿部队”。据此，新版军事战略报告提出美军事战略的四大战略目标：打击暴力极端主义；慑止和击败侵略；加强国际和地区安全；塑造未来部队。（四）突出重振美军事领导地位的思想（五）坚持合作与防范的对华战略 报告既强调发展对华关系，又明确表示要更加关注中国军力的发展对美的挑战，特别是在亚太地区对美军事存在的挑战。报告提出深化同中国的军事交流，加深理解，减少误解，防止误判，要在打击海盗、防扩散、朝核问题等方面，加强同中国的合作。同时，重复了美对中国军事发展的不信任和忧虑。指出美军方将继续监视中国军力的发展及其对台海军事平衡的影响。要关注中国军事现代化以及中国积极发展空间、网络空间能力的长远和战略意图。还表示美军将坚决挫败任何试图阻止美军进入和使用公共空间的行为，击败对美盟国构成威胁的国家。四、美国核战略核战略属于国家安全战略范畴。2010年4月6日，奥巴马政府公布新版《核态势审查报告》，把“减少核危险，寻求无核武器世界”作为美国核战略的根本目标。4月8日，美国与俄罗斯在捷克首都布拉格签署《新战略武器裁减条约》，向“无核武器世界”迈出了一步。4月12~13日，全球核峰会在美国首都华盛顿召开，47个国家的领导人（或代表）和联合国、国际原子能机构、欧盟等国际组织负责人出席了本次核峰会，签署了在4年内核查和管控核材料、防范核恐怖主义的文件。美国核战略的主要内容包括：（一）“无核武器世界”是一个远期目标（二）全球核大战威胁下降，但核攻击的危险上升目前，世界主要面临四类核威胁：一是恐怖组织可能得到核武器并用于大城市；二是存在意外、未授权或蓄意使用核武器的危险（世界9个国家共拥有23000件核武器）；三是正在出现新的核武装国家，如朝鲜、伊朗等；四是控制核扩散的条约组织和工作机制可能崩溃。
(三）美国防核武器扩散的具体措施
包括：采取严格措施落实《核不扩散条约》，扩大核不扩散机制，确保核材料不落入恐怖分子手中；寻求批准和执行《全面核禁试条约》，立即开始《核禁产条约》谈判；采用增强型“消极安全保证”，宣布美国不对加入了《核不扩散条约》并履行其义务的非核武器国家使用或威胁使用核武器；寻求批准和执行《新战略武器裁减条约》；消除海基核“战斧”巡航导弹；继续与中俄进行高层对话，促进更为稳定、透明和非威胁性的战略关系等13项。
（四）美国将把强化《核不扩散条约》作为合作的基础确保有核武器国家将裁减核武器，无核武器国家将不获取核武器，所有国家都可以和平利用核能。
（五）美国必须确保恐怖分子永远得不到核武器
根据美俄新签订的《削减和限制战略武器条约》，美将在10年内把部署的核弹头数量削至1550枚以下，已部署的战略武器运载工具数量削至700件以下。但这并不会严重影响美军的核威慑能力。
首先，美国核武器数量庞大，一定程度的削减，不会影响其战略优势。根据美国务院最近公布的数据，截至2011年9月1日，美国拥有1790枚核弹头，部署核武器运载工具822件。
其次，美战略核导弹部队的战备水平总体较高。90%的“民兵Ⅲ”型导弹部队处于一级戒备状态，导弹发射准备时间最快为32秒；30%的战略轰炸机部队处于二级戒备状态，轰炸机升空准备时间最快为32分钟；弹道导弹潜艇部队中，有60%～70%长期在海上执勤，其中一半处于二级戒备状态，另一半处于三级戒备状态。
再次，美将通过升级核弹头，提高核威慑质量。2010年5月3日，奥巴马政府提请国会批准未来10年拨款1800亿美元升级核武器。最后，美核政策存在较大变数。美军方和保守势力对“无核武器世界”主张持反对态度，美国政府能否真正执行“无核武器世界”主张，令人怀疑。
五、美国“反恐战略”
“反恐战略”属于国家安全战略范畴。2011年5月初，美国特种作战部队击毙基地组织头目本•拉登，使持续10年之久的反恐战争有了象征性结果。6月29日，美国公布了新版《国家反恐战略》，对10年反恐战争进行了总结，同时提出了“反恐战略”的重点、目标和方向。
（一）规定美国“反恐战略”的原则和目标原则是：
（1）坚持美国的核心价值观念；
（2）建立安全伙伴关系；
（3）合理运用反恐手段和能力；
（4）建立一种坚忍不拔的文化氛围。
目标是：
（1）保护美国人民、本土安全以及维护美国国家利益；
（2）遏制并击败“基地”组织及其分支和追随者；
（3）阻止恐怖组织发展、购买和使用大规模杀伤性武器；
（4）清除恐怖分子的藏匿点；
（5）建立持久的反恐伙伴关系和能力；
（6）切断“基地”组织与其分支和追随者之间的联系；
（7）遏制“基地”组织传播其意识形态；
（8）削弱“基地”组织进行恐怖活动的各种具体手段。
（二）强调“反恐”不再是美国安全战略的重中之重
奥巴马政府上台之初便放弃了布什政府奉行的“反恐高于一切”、“以反恐划线”的政策，改变了以反恐为核心的国家安全战略。
（三）首次将本土列为“反恐”最重要“战场”，反恐重点由“域外打恐”转向“境内防恐”
（四）将“基地”分支组织及其追随者列为重点打击对象
2011年年初，美国宣布“基地”也门分支首领奥拉基是对美国威胁最大的恐怖分子。最近，又把“基地”也门分支和北非分支列为主要打击目标。表明美国反恐目标呈现进一步收缩之势。
（五）在“反恐”手段上强调运用“巧实力”
第二章《美国军事实力与兵力部署》
一、美国军事实力
2011年美军现役部队143.5万人，其中陆军57.1万人，海军52.9万人（含陆战队20.1万人），空军33.5万人。预备役部队85.3万人，文职人员80.3万人。
二、兵力部署
根据2005年的“基地关闭与重组建议”，美军于2006年初开始全面调整全球军事部署，展开冷战结束以来最大规模的基地关闭与重组行动。此次调整关闭主要军事基地22个，重组主要军事基地33个，美军现役部队143.5万人，分别驻扎在美国本土和海外美军基地中。在太平洋地区，美军驻有部队135300人，战机618架，舰艇80艘，其中陆军55800人；海军44000人，舰艇80艘，战机280架；空军35500人，战机338架。在欧洲地区，美军驻有85700人，战机290架，舰艇20艘，其中陆军43700人；海军11000人，舰艇20艘，战机70架；空军30900人，战机220架。
第三章《国防预算与武器装备采购》
2011财年奥巴马政府的国防预算达6870亿美元，其中国防基准预算为5280亿美元,1590亿美元为海外应急行动开支，主要用于阿富汗和伊拉克战争。预算还包括190亿美元与国防相关的原子能项目经费和80亿美元国防部直属机构经费，此外，用于退伍军人的费用为1220亿美元。所有这些花费共计8360亿美元，约占联邦预算的22%。
一、2011年国防预算总的来看，美军2011年国防预算仍按人事费、战备费、采购费、科研费和其他费用进行分配，没有什么大的变化，但仍表现以下特点：
（一）军队人员开支增加。2011年，军队人员费用增长1.4%，与就业成本指数持平。
（二）作战与装备保养经费较2010年增长7.8%。作战与装备保养经费平均到每个任务部队是21万美元，为历史较高水平。
（三）2011年国防预算提出新的武器削减计划。排在前两位的是C-17运输机和F-35联合攻击战斗机替代引擎研发。
（四）2011年是连续第二年向伊拉克和阿富汗战争提供全年拨款。2011财年向美军海外应急行动拨款1590.3亿美元，其中1100.3亿用于阿富汗战争，430.4亿用于伊拉克战争
（五）2011财年是实施从2005年开始的“基地改组与关闭”项目的最后一年。2011年预算中该项目拨款为27亿美元。
二、武器研发与采购：
（一）飞机
AH-64“长弓阿帕奇”攻击直升机：2011年国防预算提供10.09亿美元用于购买和改进陆军“阿帕奇”直升机。
B-2轰炸机现代化改造升级：2011年用于B-2轰炸机现代化改造的经费达3.05亿美元。
C-130J大力神运输机：2011年国防预算继续增加空军C-130J运输机的采购数量。
C-17环球霸王运输机：奥巴马政府决定停止1.4亿美元的C-17运输机制造计划。
C-27J斯巴达联合货运飞机：C-27J运输机是以商业用途为主的飞机，美军主要将其用于战场之间轻型货物的运输。 C-5运输机现代化改造：2011年预算拨款10亿美元进行C-5运输机现代化改造。
CH-47“支奴干”直升机：美国陆军要求分别拨款11.8亿美元和7100万美元用于购买31架CH-47F“支奴干”直升机并对11架直升机进行改造。
E/A-18G咆哮者：2011财年共划拨11亿美元用于E/A-18G战斗机研发项目。未来，E/A-18G将在电子战中取代EA-6B。 F-35联合打击战斗机：2011财年拨款115亿美元用于F-35战机研发。
KC-X空中加油机：该型机将取代美军500多架KC-135加油机。最终美军将会装备179架该型机，耗资预计将超过350亿美元。
MQ/RQ-1捕食者和MQ-9死神无人机：2011财年国防基准预算中拨款16亿美元购置62架该机，海外应急行动预算拨款2.63亿美元购置15架该机。美国防部的目标是2011年底前装备足够数量的捕食者级无人机用于完成50场空中战斗巡逻任务，2013年底前完成65场空中战斗巡逻任务。
RQ-4全球鹰战略无人侦察机：该机型主要用于广域海上监视，2011财年划拨16亿美元用于购买4架该型飞机。
UH-60黑鹰直升机：2011财年划拨14亿美元用于购买和研究开发74架UH-60黑鹰直升机。
（二）地面系统
模块化旅战斗队：模块化旅战斗队是美陆军叫停的未来作战系统的延续。2011国防预算拨款32亿美元用于组建两支旅战斗队。
远征战车：2011年国防预算拨款2.43亿美元用于继续研发该武器系统。
中型战术车族：2011年，国防基准预算划拨9.22亿美元用于制造2960辆，海外应急行动预算拨款5.16亿美元用于制造1692辆该型车。
防地雷反伏击车：美军最新款的防地雷反伏击车为MRAP-ATV型，计划总共采购27000辆反伏击车。
（三）军舰
“尼米兹”级核动力航母更换项目：2011年，国防预算划拨27亿美元用于“尼米兹级”核动力航母更新项目，美国政府决定延长航母更新年限，由四4年延长至5年。
“阿利•伯克”级“宙斯盾”导弹驱逐舰：2011年国防预算拨款30亿美元用于采购两艘“阿利•伯克”级宙斯盾导弹驱逐舰。
滨海战斗舰：海军计划总共采购55艘滨海战斗舰。
“弗吉尼亚”号潜艇：美海军2011年花费54亿美元采购两艘“弗吉尼亚”号潜艇，并以每年两艘的速度递增。
（四）太空系统
改进型一次性运载火箭：2011年，预算划拨12亿美元采购了3只运载火箭。
移动用户目标系统：该系统是美海军目前负责在轨的特高频窄带通信卫星的下一代移动通信卫星星座的开发项目。
国家极轨业务环境卫星系统：2011年，国防预算划拨3.52亿美元用于该卫星系统的研发。
（五）导弹防御系统
陆基中层防御系统：用于拦截远程弹道导弹。2011年国防预算划拨13亿美元用于该部署系统。包括在阿拉斯加格里利堡第二导弹防御阵地部署14口发射井和30枚拦截导弹。
联合地面攻击巡航导弹防御空中感应网：美军2011年花费3.73亿美元用于开发和实验该系统。预计最终将会发展16个该系统，共耗资74亿美元。
（六）通信电子系统
联合战术无线电系统：2011年国防预算划拨11亿美元用于继续开发并初始生产该系统的软硬件。
海军波段终端：该项目将完成304个终端，耗资21亿美元。
（七）导弹及弹药
联合空对地防区外攻击导弹：2011年国防预算拨款2.36亿美元采购171枚该导弹，最终计划耗资76亿美元购买5000枚联合空对地防区外攻击导弹。
标准导弹家族（标注2型和标准6型）：标准6型攻击的范围更广，对固定翼和螺旋桨飞机、无人机、巡航导弹具有有效打击能力。2011年国防预算总共为标准导弹拨款4.54亿美元。
三、保持高额国防预算的意图
首先，由于自2001年发动阿富汗战争以来，直升机数量不足,美国分别投入96亿美元和27亿美元用于购买多款直升机和无人侦察机。其中直升机包括为陆军配备的UH－60“黑鹰”、“支奴干”直升机，以及为海军配备的“海鹰”直升机。美国计划在国防预算之外，再为这两场战争追加330亿美元军费。
其次， 2011年国防预算案把战略重点放在了维护和增强常规力量上面，意在维持美国全球优势地位。除了继续发展弹道导弹反导系统外，2011年美国国防预算开始向新的远程导弹和巡航导弹项目倾斜，努力升级B-2和B-52战略轰炸机。值得注意的是，自2001年以来美国基准国防预算已增加了40%，随着两场战争费用的增加，美国国防开支的增幅已高达70%。自2001年“9•11”事件以来，美国政府在伊拉克和阿富汗战争上的开支已经达到1万亿美元左右。随着奥巴马医改法案的通过，美国社会福利负担越来越重，高额的军费开支很可能难以为继。
第四章 美军体制编制改革
一、调整高层领导指挥机构，提高指挥效能
（一） 扩大战略司令部编成
主要是在战略司令部内新增全球打击司令部和网络空间司令部。
（二） 撤销联合部队司令部
于2011年8月3日正式退出美军编制。
（三） 调整战区司令部的责任区域。
一是非洲司令部开始独立运作后，其责任区域覆盖除埃及以外的所有非洲国家（埃及仍在中央司令部的责任区域内）。
二是根据2011年国防部最新修订的《联合司令部计划》，太平洋司令部不再负责北极和阿拉斯加地区，北极由欧洲司令部和北方司令部共管，阿拉斯加地区和美大西洋、太平洋沿岸约1000公里以内海域划入北方司令部辖区。
主要包括：终止国防部下属两个部门（负责网络与信息一体化的助理部长办公室、商务转型局）的运行，削减至少50个将军职位和150个高级文职职位，提升参联会作战计划与联合部队发展部（J7）的级别（提升至中将级），在国防部长办公厅增设“海空一体战”办公室等。
二、推进模块化建设，增强遂行多种作战任务的能力
（一） 陆军建设旅级模块化部队——旅战斗队其基本设想是把以师（大约1.5万人）为基本战术兵团的结构变成以旅战斗队（3000～4000人）为基本战术兵团的结构，以便于轮换或编入联合部队。旅战斗队有3种类型：重型旅（装甲旅）、中型旅（“斯特赖克”旅）和轻型旅（步兵旅或空降旅）。根据美国防部2010年发布的《四年防务审查报告》，陆军旅战斗队规模将维持在73个（现役45个、预备役28个）。其中包括25个装甲旅（现役18个、预备役7个）、8个“斯特赖克”旅（现役7个、预备役1个）和40个步兵旅（现役20个、预备役20个）。
（二）海军打造远征打击部队美海军提出把海上作战兵力改编成可灵活编组的远征打击部队，包括11支航母打击大队、12支远征打击大队、9支导弹防御水面作战大队和4支巡航导弹潜艇打击大队。美海军现已组建12支远征打击大队，并在过去几年多次派遣“埃塞克斯”号和“佩勒利乌”号远征打击大队前往西太地区巡航。
（三）空军组建航空航天远征部队为了更好地完成“全球警戒、全球到达、全球力量”的能力目标，美空军于20世纪90年代中后期开始组建航空航天远征部队。目前美军共有10支航空航天远征部队。
第五章 美军作战理论新发展
一、“海空一体战”（AirSea Battle）
2009年9月，美国空军参谋长施瓦茨与海军作战部长拉夫黑德签署“海空一体战”秘密备忘录，同时成立空海军联合工作组，负责协调“海空一体战”的具体事宜。这标志着“海空一体战”项目正式启动。2010年2月1日,美国防部发布新版《四年防务审查报告》，正式确认“美国空军和海军正在共同开发一种新的联合海空一体战概念，以击败军事行动领域的所有对手，包括拥有尖端‘反进入’和‘区域拒止’能力的对手。”
（一）认为中国军队对美军构成了新的严重挑战
中国军队一直设法在第二岛链建立“禁入区”，如果不采取措施抵消中国军队力量建设的效果，美军在西太平洋行动的代价可能急剧上升到令人望而却步的程度。
（二）认为“海空一体战”包括初始和后继两个阶段
初始作战阶段从冲突爆发开始，包括4条不同的行动路线：一是抵挡初期攻击，减少美军、盟军部队和基地的损失；二是对中国军队的作战网络实施致盲行动；三是对中国军队的远距离情报、监视、侦察和打击系统实施压制行动；四是在空中、海上、太空和网络空间夺取和保持主动权。后续作战阶段包括持久作战、远距离封锁、维持战役后勤、增加工业生产（尤其是精确制导弹药生产）等行动，旨在通过创造有利条件解决持久常规冲突。
（三）提出实施“海空一体战”的基本战法
为了挫败中国军队的作战行动，美军需要采取以下战法：一是空军实施反太空作战，致盲中国军队的天基海洋监视系统，从而阻止中国军队打击海军航母等高价值水面目标；二是海军“宙斯盾”舰补充其他导弹防御系统，保卫空军前沿基地和日本；三是使用海军的潜基和舰载情报、监视与侦察和火力支援，削弱中国军队的综合防空体系效能，确保空军能够实施空中打击；四是空军实施远距离渗透打击行动，摧毁中国军队的陆基远程海上监视系统和远程弹道导弹发射架；五是海军舰载战斗机积极反击中国军队的有人和无人机载情报、监视与侦察平台和战斗机，支援空军加油机及其他支援飞机的前沿行动；六是空军以隐形轰炸机的攻势布雷支援反潜战，以非隐形轰炸机的持续打击支援实施远距离封锁作战的海军舰只。
（四）提出加强“海空一体战”建设的主要措施
1、减少对关岛和其他重要基地以及海上力量的导弹威胁；2、纠正中国军队与美国在对高价值和时间敏感目标远程打击方面的不平衡，包括研发和部署距离更为遥远的渗透性和防区外情报、监视与侦察和精确打击能力；3、增强水下作战能力，包括潜艇、水下机器人系统和水雷；4、弥补天基指挥与控制、通信、情报、监视与侦察能力的漏洞，包括部署高能的机载指挥、控制与通信中继网络，支持天基系统；5、加强未来数据链、数据结构、指挥与控制以及情报、监视与侦察基础设施的标准化和互通性；6、强调跨军种电子战能力并加大投入；7、增强“网空作战”攻防能力；8、研发和部署定向能武器。
二、“网空作战”（cyberspace operations）
2010年2月1日，美军公布《四年防务审查报告》，首次公开使用“网空作战”和“网空攻击”（cyberspace attack）两个概念，2010年2月22日，美国陆军训练与条令司令部发布525-7-8小册子《2016-2028年网空作战概念能力计划》，指出“网空作战”是“全谱作战”的组成部分，其目的是获取信息优势、保护信息优势和置敌于不利境地。
（一）“网空作战”内容
从美军《网空作战国家军事战略》看，“网空作战”思想主要包含以下内容：
1、由公众、私人和政府创造、维持、拥有和运作，遍及全球；2、随着技术、构造、程序和专门技术的共同发展而变化，产生新的能力和运作结构；3、受制于电磁频谱的可用性；4、利用高质量的决策信息，可实施接近光速的作战机动；5、使空中、地面、海上和太空的作战行动成为可能；6、超越通常定义的组织和地缘政治边界；7、由信息和数据传输系统的相互连接、支持性关键设施、储存、处理与传输数据的设备、软件硬件的应用等构成；8、包括静止的和运动的数据、声音和视频；9、其他国家、组织、伙伴、私人部门和对手都可不同程度地轻易进入；10、构成信息环境的基础。
（二）厘清关系，明确任务
美军在网络空间的任务是：1、在网络空间设定条件，确保网络空间的可用性；2、拥有与对手进行决定性交战、建立网络空间控制和优势的能力；3、拥有实施“网空作战”行动、达成军事、情报、公务活动预期效果的能力。
（三）阐明“网空作战”的目的、方法和手段
采用网络作战、信息作战、动力行为（Kinetic Actions）、执法与反情报、主题与消息等5 种基本方法。
(四）指出网络空间存在的威胁和薄弱环节
“网空作战”理论认为，美国网络空间存在传统的、非正规的、灾难性的、破坏性的、自然的、意外的等6类威胁。
（五）要求建设“网空作战”能力
1、提高在网络空间、网络情报环境准备和事后公开辩论分析中实施和分享军事效果分析的能力；2、增加对“网空作战”手段的投入和采购，适当建设网络空间双重利用能力；3、进行适当的审查和来源代码测试，识别恶意代码和非授权功能；4、建立确保系统结构能够促进联合作战的机制和程序；5、设计能够支持不同层次信息保证和信息控制的全球信息栅格；6、建立临时联合体“网空作战”程序，并进行演习；7、把“网空作战”纳入现在的军事演习；8、使教育和训练适应“网空作战”的特殊需要；9、扩大信息作战范畴，将一体化的“网空作战”训练和演习纳入其中；10、使信息可见、可接近、可理解。
第六章 美军联合军事演习
美军每年都要和其他国家举行联合军事演习。近两年来，美军军事演习的力度不断加大，每年大约进行各类军事演习达数百次之多。总的来看，这些演习主要服务于军事战略，有很强的针对性；注重联军作战，具有广泛的联合性；验证技术战术，具有明确的目的性；当然有时也故意炫耀武力，具有一定的威慑性。
2010年以来，美国借助“天安号”事件、美越建交15周年以及延坪岛炮击事件，连续在中国北部、东部和南部周边地区举行以海上兵力为主的联合军演，对中国施加压力，牵制中国快速崛起。除“金色眼镜蛇2010”、“卡拉特2010”系列联合军演、“环太平洋2010”演习等年度例行性演习外，特别值得关注的是在东亚西太举行的针对性很强的联合军演。例如：2010年7月25～28日美韩在日本海举行“无畏精神”联合军事演习；2010年9月12日至21日，美海军在关岛海域重启了中断3年之久的“英勇盾牌”系列联合军演；美韩于2011年2月28日至3月10日举行了代号为“关键决心•鹞鹰”的年度例行联合军事演习；美日两国的“宙斯盾”舰首次联网实施弹道导弹拦截模拟演习；2011年4月6日，美国与菲律宾举行“肩并肩2011”双边联合军事演习；美韩于8月16日开始举行为期10天的2011年度“乙支•自由卫士”联合军演；2011年6月23日，美国与马来西亚举行代号为“CARAT-2011”的年度联合军事演练，等。
结论
对美国近两年军力的评估表明，尽管阿富汗战争、伊拉克战争和2008年开始的金融危机对美国的综合实力产生了重要影响，但对美国军事能力的影响暂时还没有表现出来。美国军队仍然是世界上最强大的军队，仍然具备同时遂行两场较大规模地区战争和一些小规模应急作战的能力，能够为美国重返亚太和战略重心东移提供有力支撑。因此，中国一方面要对美国“重返亚太”、插手南中国海领海争端和战略“重心”东移保持警惕，另一方面又要看到中美在经济上深度融合，在维护世界和平、稳定、发展、合作与繁荣方面存在许多共同利益，双方应该本着互尊互信、平等互利的原则，加强中美两国特别是中美两军之间的合作与交流，共同应对21世纪面临的挑战与威胁。
