How Will China View the New Maritime Strategy
Bryan McGrath, “How Will China View the New Maritime Strategy,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 April 2015.
The military services responsible for American seapower (Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard) recently released their new maritime strategy, entitled “Forward, Engaged, Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” The reviews thus far have been positive, with most analysts praising the specificity of the document, as compared to its 2007 predecessor, as well as its harder, more combat-oriented edge. One set of reviewers have yet to be heard from, however, and that is the large and garrulous community of Chinese military analysts. This analysis attempts to anticipate what that reaction will be.
One of indication of how the Chinese military community will react is its past history. The 2007 strategy did not name China as a challenge or threat, nor did it particularly focus on Chinese strategies already being discussed in navalist circles for denying U.S. freedom of action. As the Team Lead for the production of that document, I was privy to high level conversations about the degree to which the document should “name names.” One discussion in particular occurred late in the development of the strategy, in which the then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen reacted to the insistence of another Navy four-star admiral that China should be explicitly identified in that document. Mullen’s reaction was that he believed they (the Chinese) would “read themselves into the document.”
Within weeks of the October 2007 release of the strategy, Dr. Andrew Erickson of the China Maritime Studies Institute based at the U.S. Naval War College began to survey Chinese open source discussions, and his work largely confirmed Admiral Mullen’s prediction. The strategy advanced an argument about the defense of the global system and this was clearly understood by Chinese analysts as meaning that the United States would defend the system it had designed and led. Additionally, they understood that the strategy intended to help the United States retain its global leadership position. None of these points were particularly appealing to Chinese analysts, even if the message itself was rather nuanced.
The new maritime strategy dispenses with subtlety. …
…it should be obvious to the Chinese that the United States does not wish to quietly fade into the night, and that there is plenty of thought and resources being applied to ensuring naval dominance in the Indo-Asia Pacific region for decades to come. China may have previously been able to quietly “fly under the radar,” but that time is past. A competition is on, and both sides are now acknowledging it. There is far less room for nuance now.
For full text of the translations and analysis mentioned here, see:
Andrew S. Erickson, “Assessing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Window into Chinese Thinking,” (Annotated translation and analysis of three Chinese articles), Naval War College Review 61.4 (Autumn 2008): 35-71.
陆儒德 [Lu Rude], “美海上新战略浮出水面” [The New U.S. Maritime Strategy Surfaces], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 27 November 2007, 3. Translated by Andrew S. Erickson, in “Assessing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Window into Chinese Thinking,” Naval War College Review 61.4 (Autumn 2008): 35-71.
王宝付 [Wang Baofu], “美军 ‘海上战略’ 与未来军事转型” [The U.S. Military’s “Maritime Strategy” and Future Military Transformation], 学习时报 [Study Times], 22 January 2008, www.lianghui.org.cn. Translated by Andrew S. Erickson, in “Assessing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Window into Chinese Thinking,” Naval War College Review 61.4 (Autumn 2008): 35-71.
苏浩, 吴兵 [Su Hao and Wu Bing], “美国海上战略新思路—‘21世纪海权的合作战略’ 报告评述” [The U.S. Maritime Strategy’s New Thinking–Reviewing the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” Report], 领导者 [Leaders] 19 (December 2007): 29-30. Translated by Andrew S. Erickson, in “Assessing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Window into Chinese Thinking,” Naval War College Review 61.4 (Autumn 2008): 35-71.
陆儒德 [Lu Rude], “美海上新战略浮出水面” [La Aparición de una Nueva Estrategia Marítima para los Estados Unidos (The New U.S. Maritime Strategy Surfaces)], 人民海军 [People’s Navy] (27 November 2007), 3. Translated by Andrew S. Erickson, in Paul D. Taylor, ed.,Perspectivas Sobre Estrageica Marítima: Ensayos de las Américas, La Nueva Strategia Marítima de EE UU y Comentario Sobre Una Estrategia Cooperativa para el Poder Naval en el Siglo XXI [Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas, the New U.S. Maritime Strategy and Commentary on a Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower] (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2009), 221-28.
陆儒德 [Lu Rude], “美海上新战略浮出水面” [O Surgimento de Uma Nova Estratégia Marítima para os Estados Unidos (The New U.S. Maritime Strategy Surfaces)], 人民海军 [People’s Navy] (27 November 2007), 3. Translated by Andrew Erickson, in Paul D. Taylor, ed., Perspectivas sobre Estratégia Marítima: Ensaios das Américas, a nova estratégia marítima dos EUA e comentário sobre Uma Estratégia Cooperativa para o Poder Marítimo no Século XXI [Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas, the New U.S. Maritime Strategy, and Commentary on A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower] (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), 219-26.
