05 April 2016

China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms

Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2016).

The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (CSCMA), part of National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, has just published INSS Strategic Forum 294—“China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms.” Written by CSCMA Director Dr. Phillip Saunders and Research Fellow Dr. Joel Wuthnow, the new publication assesses the major reforms of the Chinese military announced earlier this year.  

Key Points:

  • The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is undertaking its most significant restructuring since 1949, including changes to all of the PLA’s main organizational pillars—the Central Military Commission, services, and theaters.
  • The reforms are modeled partly on the U.S. military structure, where combatant commanders lead operations and the services train and equip troops. However, the PLA remains a Leninist military responsible for defending Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. 
  • The reforms aim to tighten CCP supervision over a force seen as corrupt and unaccountable and to enhance the PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations across multiple domains.
  • Theater commanders will be able to develop force packages drawn from all the services, and a new Strategic Support Force will provide C4ISR support.
  • The reforms will create a short-term organizational disruption, but may enable more effective joint warfighting over the long term. The PLA will have to overcome significant obstacles such as continued ground force dominance and inter-service rivalry to make the reforms succeed. 

In the past few months, China has announced a series of major reforms to the organizational structure of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA): the Central Military Commission (CMC) has been revamped, the four general departments dissolved, new service headquarters created, and five new theater commands established in place of the seven military regions (MRs). These changes are part of a sweeping transformation of PLA institutions, force structure, and policy that will be ongoing through 2020. In pursuing these reforms, China’s leaders hope both to tighten central political control over a force that was seen as increasingly corrupt and to build the PLA into a credible joint warfighting entity. Yet important obstacles remain, and it may be years before the implications of these reforms come into full view. …

About the Authors

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (CSCMA), Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. Dr. Joel Wuthnow is a Research Fellow in CSCMA.

ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS OF ONGOING PLA REFORMS:

Andrew S. Erickson, “Sweeping Change in China’s Military: Xi’s PLA Restructuring,”China Real Time Report (中国实时报), Wall Street Journal, 2 September 2015.

Chinese President Xi Jinping needs some positive achievements, immediately. The year began with his striking consolidation of leadership at home and abroad but has become mired in problems and widely perceived blundering on economic issues. This only strengthens incentive to commemorate the sensitive 70th anniversary of Chinese victory in World War II with history’s most exciting Beijing military parade. Glimpses of new missiles and other armaments will rightly attract widespread attention — so don’t miss the show.

Long after the soldiers and crowds disperse, however, China stands to experience far more lasting impact from a move that may be announced following the pomp and circumstance: major military reforms. Propelled by Xi’s vigorous efforts to realize his dream of a strong country with a strong military, reform plans long underway are finally surfacing. Now reportedly afoot: a sweeping transformation of China’s military, with tremendous implications for its strategy and operations. The parade “will provide Xi a good opportunity to announce his ambitious plans on how to transform the PLA into a real modern army capable of winning wars,” a leading Chinese naval analyst . …

Kenneth Allen, Dennis Blasko & John Corbett on “The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What is Known, Unknown & Speculation” (Parts 1 & 2)

Kenneth AllenDennis J. Blasko, and John F. Corbett, “The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What is Known, Unknown and Speculation (Part 2),” Jamestown China Brief 16.4 23 February 2016).

Note: This article is part of a series examining changes to China’s Military organizational structure and personnel. Part 1 examines what is known and unknown.Part 2 contains speculation as to changes that may occur in the future.  Parts 1&2 are available as a single document here.

Accompanying files:

The_PLA_s_New_Organizational_Structure_Parts_1_and_2_01.pdf

_CB_16_4_-_3.pdf

Kenneth AllenDennis J. Blasko, and John F. Corbett, “The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What is Known, Unknown and Speculation (Part 1),” Jamestown China Brief 16.3 (4 February 2016).

Note: This article is part of a two-part series examining changes to China’s Military organizational structure and personnel. Part 1 examines what is known and unknown. Part 2 contains speculation as to changes that may occur in the future.
Accompanying files:
PLA_Theater_Commands.png
_CB_16_3_2.pdf
The_PLA_s_New_Organizational_Structure_Part_1.pdf

HERE IS FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE SEMINAL REFERENCE CITED ABOVE:

Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen, eds., The PLA as Organization v2.0 (Vienna, VA: Defense Group Inc., 2015).

This is an updated version of the earlier classic reference volume:

James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization Reference Volume v1.0, CF-182-NSRD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002).

This book is the product of a conference, held in October 2000, that brought together many of the nation’s top experts to evaluate issues of structure and process in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The editors believe that fundamental knowledge about the PLA can be ascertained from the study of its organizational structure, and that this type of structure and process analysis is the critical first step toward a revolution in our understanding of the central issues, including how the PLA will fight. The papers in this volume present a comprehensive view of the administrative and operational structure of the PLA. In exhaustive detail, they discuss the leadership, history, organization, functions, and possible future direction of each of the PLA’s Commissions and Military Departments.

Table of Contents

Preface

Figures

Tables

Editors’ Note

Acknowledgments

Glossary

Chapter 1
  Introduction to the PLA’s Administrative and Operational Structure

Chapter 2
  The Central Military Commission and Military Policy in China

Chapter 3
  The Pinnacle of the Pyramid: The Central Military Commission

Chapter 4
  The General Staff Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Organization, Roles, & Missions

Chapter 5
  The General Political Department and the Evolution of the Political Commissar System

Chapter 6
  The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Logistics Department (GLD): Toward Joint Logistics Support

Chapter 7
  The General Armament Department

Chapter 8  
PLA Ground Forces: Moving Toward a Smaller, More Rapidly Deployable, Modern Combined Arms Force

Chapter 9
  PLA Air Force Organization

Chapter 10
  The Organization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)

Chapter 11
  The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence

Chapter 12
  The Institutional Lessons of Disaster: Reorganizing The People’s Armed Police After Tiananmen