Andrew S. Erickson

Tea Leaf Nation Staff, “Shen Jinlong: Commander, Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy,” in “THE U.S.-CHINA 50: Meet the People Powering the World’s Most Complex and Consequential Relationship,” Foreign Policy, 3 May 2017.

中美关系50强

细数这段全球最错综复杂、举足轻重的关系背后的人物。

作者: Tea Leaf Nation团队 | 插图: Hylton Warburton
译者：融意翻译、刘子菱、孙韵

SHEN JINLONG

Commander, Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy

The next face of China’s increasingly muscular strategic vision.

政府与军事

沈金龙
中国人民解放军海军司令员
中国日益强硬的战略远景的下一位代言人。

Though the South China Sea is perhaps the most dangerous fault line between the United States and China today, direct relations between their two mighty navies used to be a relative bright spot. But in the past two years, as China continues to reclaim land and install military facilities on disputed features despite international calls for it to stop, its activities there have hurtled into U.S. headlines and prompted calls for a tougher U.S. stance.

Enter Shen Jinlong, who in January rode a series of rapid promotions to become the new commander-in-chief of China’s increasingly powerful navy, replacing Wu Shengli. Shen’s international background suggests peace may yet get a chance. In 2014, he led Chinese ships in the country’s first-ever participation in the massive U.S.-led Pacific Rim exercises near Hawaii; in 2016, he attended an influential global symposium at the U.S. Naval War College in Rhode Island. Speaking with the nationalist Chinese outlet Global Times, one anonymous analyst said Shen will likely help increase communication between China’s navy and military forces in other countries. Admiral Wu “is a hard act to follow,” Andrew Erickson, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, told FP. But Admiral Shen “has been groomed for international prime time.” The world must hope he’s ready.

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FOR BROADER CONTEXT, HERE’S MY FULL-LENGTH QUOTE, ONLY PART OF WHICH COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE FOREIGN POLICY ARTICLE ABOVE:

“Admiral Wu Shengli is a hard act to follow, particularly given his Rickover-like elevation of the PLAN as a whole. But Admiral Shen Jinlong, long credited with diligent study and promotion of more realistic training, has been groomed for international prime time by leading delegations to RIMPAC (as reported by Chinese state media sources) and the International Seapower Symposium. Among the challenges now facing him: applying his South China Sea fleet experience to increasingly troubled waters.” 

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HERE’S AN EXCERPT FROM FOREIGN POLICY’S INTRODUCTION TO “THE U.S.-CHINA 50”

… Summitry, propaganda, and presidential bluster may pepper newspaper headlines, but the deep bilateral relationship between the United States and China is fundamentally driven by individual actors from the public and private spheres in the course of their daily work. These include a newly tapped White House potentate with no foreign-policy experience, a Chinese startup founder who never went to college, and a Tiananmen protester turned nationalist provocateur.

Together, the 50 individuals profiled here illustrate the richness of the world’s most important relationship, and illuminate both its fragility and its signal accomplishment: decades of peace between the world’s greatest power and the world’s fastest-rising one.

随着唐纳德·特朗普（Donald J. Trump）登上权力顶峰，中美关系进入了一个充满不确定性的历史性时期。早在竞选期间，特朗普就曾公开指责中国实施汇率操纵、对美国工人“施暴”，成为候任总统后更是做出了惊世之举——质疑中美双边外交的核心要素“一个中国”政策。然而，在正式就任总统之后，特朗普却又推翻了自己那些最为强硬的表态，这在一定程度上也是为了诱使并不情愿的中国政府出手，以消除来自朝鲜政权迅速扩大的核威胁。

现在看来，构成中美长期关系的核心要素越来越有可能在2017年发生变化，其中有的将是逐渐的变化，有的则将是根本的转变。不过，虽然特朗普与中国总统习近平之间“擦出的火花”颇受关注，但仅凭他们二人的指令并不能打造出两国关系的新现状。诚然，中美双边关系越来越频繁地占据新闻头条，但从根本上看，却是由众多来自公共和私人领域的独立个人在日常工作中对这一关系进行推动。这当中包括一位没有任何外交政策经验的新任白宫顾问、一位从未毕业于大学的中国创业家以及一位从天安门事件抗议者摇身变为高举民族主义大旗的挑衅者。以下列出了这50个人的简介，展示了这段世界上最重要的关系有多复杂和脆弱，但同时也阐释了它的重大成就：全球最强大的国家与崛起最快的国家之间长达数十年的和平共处。

RELATED ANALYSIS ON ADMIRAL SHEN JINLONG, ADMIRAL WU SHENGLI, AND OTHER CHINESE NAVAL LEADERS:

Andrew S. Erickson and Kenneth Allen, “China’s Navy Gets a New Helmsman (Part 1): Spotlight on Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong,” Jamestown China Brief 17.3 (2 March 2017).

A new leader has just taken the helm of the world’s second largest navy. Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong (沈金龙) reportedly replaced Admiral Wu Shengli (吴胜利) as PLAN Commander on January 17, 2017 (Global Times Online, January 20). On the morning of January 20, Shen offered Lunar New Year greetings to sailors on patrol in the Gulf of Aden via video-teleconference (Chinese Navy Online, January 20). Authoritative state media reports have offered few details on Shen, making it important to analyze a broad array of Chinese-language sources to distill what his elevation may mean for China as a maritime power. Given Xi Jinping’s sweeping and ongoing military reforms, the organizational dynamics surrounding Shen’s rise merit particularly close examination. Understanding these dynamics can help outside observers anticipate the identity, experience, promotion of PLAN leaders, as well as the positions that they hold relative to the PLA and its key commands.

Shen’s Selection

Admiral Sun Jianguo, long viewed as Wu’s natural successor as PLAN commander by many, represented China at the 2015 and 2016 Shangri-La Dialogues. Sun is now expected to retire by the end of February 2017. Sun’s impending retirement opened up possibilities for a set of Vice Admirals considered by foreign observers to be potential candidates to succeed Wu, namely Tian Zhong, Liu Yi, Ding Yi, Jiang Weilie, Yuan Yubai, Su Zhiqian—and, most importantly, Shen Jinlong …

Andrew S. Erickson and Kenneth Allen, “China’s Navy Gets a New Helmsman (Part 2): Remaining Uncertainties,” Jamestown China Brief 17.4 (14 March 2017).

Part 1 of this series discussed Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong’s background, meteoric rise, and recent promotion to PLAN Commander. However, his appointment raises a number of questions about his role in the PLA Navy’s modernization, his promotion’s implication for China’s promotion system, and about his predecessor’s continued presence on the Central Military Commission. Part 2 will explore these important factors in depth and suggest possible conclusions and implications.

Promotion to commander of the PLA Navy has traditionally carried with it appointment to the PLA Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s highest military decision-making body. However, the latest Chinese state media reports state that Admiral Wu Shengli still serves on the CMC (Xinhua, March 5). In his capacity as a high-ranking CCP member, Wu has been a full member of the CCP Central Committee since 2007, serving on the 17th and 18th Committees. It remains uncertain when and how, or even if, Shen will assume similar roles. Perhaps there is a deliberate overlap so that Wu can help Shen learn the ropes.

During the 1990s and 2000s, there was a generally consistent path to full general/admiral and to CMC Member, combining rank and grade promotions that rarely occur simultaneously (China Brief, July 22 and August 5, 2010). However, it has always remained unclear who decides the appointment of any key leadership positions in the CMC, including the vice chairmen, the minister of national defense, directors of the four departments, and the services, as well as the theater command leaders. Shen’s appointment then raises a number of questions:  1) did Wu Shengli submit Shen’s name, or not, or as one of several names; 2) did the PLAN Party Standing Committee submit several names and then vote; 3) did the CMC vice chairmen or Xi Jinping submit Shen’s name; and 4) does the full CMC vote on the final contenders? 5) What if any role did personal connections (guanxi)—known to be a key factor in selecting any PLA leaders at multiple levels—play in his selection? [1] Examination of the general steps used for promotion and notable exceptions to these rules provides a framework for understanding the dynamics at play during Shen’s promotion.

Although none of the six previous PLAN commanders, including Shen, have had similar career paths, they have met the required time-in-grade and  time-in-rank requirements (See Table 2 in Part 1 of this series) (China Brief, July 22, 2010; August 5, 2010). [2] While the bullets below show the pattern in 2010; it is clear that the PLA is already adjusting past practices to meet Xi’s new requirements. …

Andrew S. Erickson, “The Next Generation of China’s Navy: Transformation and Transition for the PLAN,” The Diplomat, 30 January 2017.

As China’s navy undergoes a change in leadership, what lies ahead for the rapidly modernizing service?

On January 17, 2017, 71-year old Admiral Wu Shengli retired from a 41-year career culminating in nearly 11 years as commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), making him the second-longest-serving Chinese naval head in history. The longest-serving was Xiao Jinguang, who led the PLAN, albeit with some political interruption, during a particularly difficult three decades from 1950-79.

The events of the previous month offered a fitting capstone to Wu’s career. On December 8, Wu attended a high-profile ceremony commemorating the “70th Anniversary of China’s Recovery of the Xisha (Paracel) and Nansha (Spratly) Islands” in the South China Sea, having previously inspected some of China’s increasingly fortified installations there. On December 29, Wu participated in a video-teleconference commemorating the eighth anniversary of the PLAN’s anti-piracy escort mission in the Gulf of Aden. Most dramatically, on December 23, in a widely-reported display of naval and national prestige, Wu guided flight and formation training including “air refueling and air confrontation” from aboard China’s first aircraft carrier. Liaoning’s circumnavigation of Taiwan and passage through the Taiwan Strait on January 11, 2017 must have been a sweet swan song for him just days before he stepped down.

History tends to remember major personalities who lead the achievement of dramatic progress. Here Wu has made a name for himself that will be remembered and ultimately rediscovered by all who follow Chinese naval developments, in his case as a leading career-long naval officer who took his service far out to sea. Wu will also be linked to an even more powerful leader who is leaving an even greater mark on history – Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. Wu’s retention in October 2012, when all other service-grade military leaders of his age were forced to retire, suggested both the Chinese leadership’s prioritization of naval modernization and its particular confidence in him. Wu’s position was greatly facilitated by support from Xi, who when he assumed all three offices of Chinese executive leadership in 2012 was not only determined to further China’s maritime interests and capabilities but also unusually well-placed to do so. Wu’s father’s status as a former vice governor of Zhejiang province, made the admiral, like Xi, one of China’s “princelings.” Also like Xi, however, Wu made his own achievements and would ultimately surpass his father in prominence.

Read the full story here, in The Diplomat magazine:

Andrew S. Erickson, “The Next Generation of China’s Navy: Transformation and Transition for the PLAN,” The Diplomat Magazine 27 (February 2017).

Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Naval Modernization: The Implications of Seapower,” World Politics Review, 23 September 2014.

This month, the heads of the world’s navies and coast guards converged on the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, for the International Seapower Symposium (ISS). ISS assembles distinguished international naval leaders to enhance common bonds of friendship and to discuss challenges and opportunities, this time under the theme of “Global Solutions to Common Maritime Challenges.” This was the 21st iteration of ISS, which was first held in 1969. It was the first with Chinese attendance.

After years of invitations that Beijing did not accept, coupled with last year’s cancellation of the event due to sequestration, the head of China’s navy, Adm. Wu Shengli, led a nine-officer delegation. Participants in the plenary and regional breakout sessions no doubt wondered who exactly Wu is, what mandate he has, what sort of navy he leads, where it is heading and how it will be interacting with the U.S. Navy. This article addresses these timely questions.

Leading China’s Rapid Naval Modernization

The son of a former vice governor of Zhejiang province, Wu is one of China’s “princelings.” According to a report by Cheng Li, director of the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center, Wu “formed a client relationship with Jiang Zemin in the late 1980s, when Jiang was party secretary in Shanghai and Wu was the deputy chief-of-staff of the Shanghai Base of the East China Sea Fleet.”

Dr. Andrew Erickson with Admiral Wu Shengli on his Sept. 20, 2014 visit to Harvard University. Photo courtesy of Adam Mitchell.

Wu joined the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1964 at the age of 19, when he was admitted to the PLA Institute of Surveying and Mapping in Xian. Since graduating from the institute in 1968, he has enjoyed a meteoric rise, attaining the rank of rear admiral in 1994, vice admiral in 2003 and admiral on June 20, 2007. Wu also serves on the PLA Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s highest military decision-making body. In his capacity as a high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member, Wu has been a full member of the CCP Central Committee since 2007, serving on the 17th and 18th Committees. …