Andrew S. Erickson

Kristin Huang, “Chinese Military Fires ‘Aircraft-Carrier Killer’ Missile into South China Sea in ‘Warning to the United States’,” South China Morning Post, 26 August 2020.

• Weapon one of two sent over disputed waters a day after American spy plane reportedly nears Chinese naval drill, source says
• PLA flexes muscle in response to continued US testing of Beijing’s bottom lines, analyst says

China launched two missiles, including an “aircraft-carrier killer”, into the South China Sea on Wednesday morning, a source close to the Chinese military said, sending a clear warning to the United States.

The move came one day after China said a US U-2 spy plane entered a no-fly zone without permission during a Chinese live-fire naval drill in the Bohai Sea off its north coast.

One of the missiles, a DF-26B, was launched from the northwestern province of Qinghai, while the other, a DF-21D, lifted off from Zhejiang province in the east.

Both were fired into an area between Hainan province and the Paracel Islands, the source said.

The landing areas were within a zone that Hainan maritime safety authorities said on Friday would be off limits because of military exercises from Monday to Saturday.

China launched two missiles, including an “aircraft-carrier killer”, into the South China Sea on Wednesday morning, a source close to the Chinese military said, sending a clear warning to the United States.

The move came one day after China said a US U-2 spy plane entered a no-fly zone without permission during a Chinese live-fire naval drill in the Bohai Sea off its north coast.

One of the missiles, a DF-26B, was launched from the northwestern province of Qinghai, while the other, a DF-21D, lifted off from Zhejiang province in the east.

Both were fired into an area between Hainan province and the Paracel Islands, the source said.

The landing areas were within a zone that Hainan maritime safety authorities said on Friday would be off limits because of military exercises from Monday to Saturday.

The DF-26 dual-capable missile is a type of weapon banned by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty treaty signed by the US and Soviet Union towards the end of the Cold War. When the US withdrew from the treaty last year, it cited China’s deployment of such weapons as justification.

The DF-26 has a range of 4,000km (2,485 miles) and can be used in nuclear or conventional strikes against ground and naval targets.

The DF-21 has a range of around 1,800km, with state media describing the most advanced in the series, the DF-21D, as the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile.

The source said the missile launch was aimed at improving China’s ability to deny other forces access to the South China Sea, a disputed region.

“This is China’s response to the potential risks brought by the increasingly frequent incoming US warplanes and military vessels in the South China Sea,” the source said. “China doesn’t want the neighbouring countries to misunderstand Beijing’s goals.”

Song Zhongping, a Hong Kong-based military commentator, said the missile launches were clearly meant to send a signal to the United States.

“The US continues to test China’s bottom line in Taiwan and South China Sea issues, and this pushed China to showcase its military strength to let Washington know that even US aircraft carriers cannot flex their full muscle near China’s coast,” Song said.

China’s defence ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the launches. … … …

RELATED ANALYSIS:

Andrew S. Erickson, “Good Riddance to the INF Treaty: Washington Shouldn’t Tie Its Own Hands in Asia,” Foreign Affairs, 29 August 2019.

In early August, the United States formally withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark 1987 arms-control accord with Russia. Just two weeks later, on a small island off the Californian coast, the Pentagon tested a land-based missile once banned under the agreement. The demise of the INF Treaty is now official, on paper as on the ground.

The treaty’s collapse was a long time coming. An agreement cannot work if only one party honors it, and the INF Treaty’s sole cosignatory, Moscow, had been flouting its rules for years. During his presidency, Barack Obama considered withdrawing from the INF for precisely the same reason that helped drive President Donald Trump’s decision. Still, to many observers, the decision to ditch the treaty is misguided and dangerous. The Trump administration, they argue, is dismantling guardrails that were erected to keep tensions from escalating into a destabilizing arms race. At a time when several elements of the global arms control architecture are fraying, this latest casualty could only make matters worse.

But that line of criticism misses the point. If unilateral U.S. adherence to the treaty was futile in the face of repeated Russian transgressions, it had become outright dangerous in the face of a much more potent adversary—China. During the INF Treaty’s 32-year lifespan, China developed the world’s foremost conventional missile force, brimming with the very weapons that the treaty prohibited the United States from developing: ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. … … …

ANDREW S. ERICKSON is Visiting Scholar at Harvard’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College. He is the author of the book Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories and Strategic Implications.

Click here to access a full-length text-searchable PDF of the book.

JAPANESE-LANGUAGE TRANSLATION OF ARTICLE:

アンドリュー・S・エリクソン [Andrew S. Erickson], 米海軍大学教授（戦略学）、ハーバード大学フェアバンクセンターの客員スカラー [Professor of Strategy, U.S. Naval War College and Visiting Scholar, Fairbank Center, Harvard University], “中国ミサイル戦力の脅威―― ＩＮＦ条約後の米アジア戦略” [Good Riddance to the INF Treaty: Washington Shouldn’t Tie Its Own Hands in Asia], フォーリン・アフェアーズ・リポート [Foreign Affairs Report], 4 September 2019.

中国ミサイル戦力の脅威

――　ＩＮＦ条約後の米アジア戦略

アンドリュー・S・エリクソン　米海軍大学戦略教授

Good Riddance to the INF Treaty Washington Shouldn’t Tie Its Own Hands in Asia

Andrew S. Erickson　米海軍大学教授（戦略学）。現在は、ハーバード大学フェアバンクセンターの客員スカラー。最近の著書にChinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implicationsがある

（ヨーロッパの安全保障に配慮して）米ロが締結したＩＮＦ条約は、これまでもワシントンのアジア戦略に対する拘束を作り出してきた。この間に、中国は世界有数の通常ミサイル戦力を整備し、（米ロ間では）生産が禁止されてきたタイプの地上配備型の射程５００―５５００キロのクルーズミサイル、弾道ミサイルを十分過ぎるほどに開発している。実際、サイバー空間のディスラプティブテクノロジー（破壊的技術）を別にすれば、中国のミサイル戦力を中心とする軍備増強が、アジアにおけるアメリカのパワーと影響力を形骸化させる最大の要因になるかもしれない。ワシントンはこれに対抗して「地上配備型ミサイルを基盤とする抑止」をアジアで構築すべきかもしれない。幸い、ＩＮＦ条約の死滅によって、ワシントンは、自国に有利な形へ軍事バランスをリセットするために必要とされていた機会を手にいれている。

• 中国のミサイル戦力の脅威
• 間隙を縫った中国
• ＩＲＢＭの開発・配備を

Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Massive Military Parade Shows Beijing is a Missile Superpower,” The National Interest, 1 October 2019.

Washington is right to leave a missile-limiting treaty that Beijing won’t even consider joining.

Paramount leader Xi Jinping just presided over the largest, most impressive military parade in the history of the world. The occasion: to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which just exceeded the Soviet Union’s lifespan by one year. The parade indeed showcased numerous military technological accomplishments far exceeding previous Soviet efforts. Showing ironclad resolve, Xi emphasized that China “continue to strive forward [with] the complete unification of our country.”

The bottom line: Missiles, missiles, and more missiles. For coercion, coercion, and coercion. Paraded, ironically, down Beijing’s “Avenue of Eternal Peace” (长安大街). Tradition holds that all systems displayed are already deployed for service in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). For specialists, this just underscores a long-running PRC effort at missile-centric deterrence. For other observers, the sheer scope and scale of hardware displayed—much of it conveniently labeled with large English letters—may well offer a revelation concerning Beijing’s military might and assertiveness.

Robust Rocket Rollouts:

In true PRC fashion, for this national-level effort nothing was left to chance. China’s Military Parade (中国阅兵) was patriotically narrated in confident detail on China Central Television. Since 2015, preparations had been underway at facilities designed to mimic the Beijing setting. And the entire pageant was wrapped in redolent rhetoric along the lines of “strong country dream, strong military dream” (强国梦, 强军梦). But this was not a case of style and symbolism over substance: the sheer array of real strategic systems on display was simply staggering, and shows real strength.

Arguably today’s biggest single statement for foreign consumption—literally backstopping the entire parade—was China’s debut of the DF-41 solid-fueled road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). China’s newest, most powerful, and arguably most advanced nuclear weapons system, the DF-41 has clearly been designed and deployed with deterring the United States in mind. It is described as “a cornerstone of China’s nuclear [weapons] power” (我国核力量重要支撑). This is part of Beijing’s comprehensive, missile-centric effort at nuclear and conventional deterrence.

Other missiles displayed for the first time ever in the parade marked China at the cutting-edge of frontier military technologies. These included the little-known DF-100/CJ-100 “supersonic cruise missile,” described as “the newest in the Changjian series,” and the prominently-displayed DF-17 conventional missile with its sleek hypersonic glide vehicle.

Other ballistic missiles on parade included the well-known DF-5B ICBM whose multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) greatly complicate defenses against it, the DF-31AG mobile ICBM with its “high survivability,” the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile, and the DF-26 nuclear/conventional intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of striking land and sea targets. The HQ surface-to-air missile series was well-represented, with -6A, -9B, -12A, -16, and -22 variants. Other cruise missiles included the YJ-12B and YJ-18 supersonic anti-ship weapons.

Aircraft soaring overhead included the  Y-20, -9, and -8 transports; the KJ-2000 airborne warning and control (AWACs) system; the J-20 low-observable fighter; Jst-15 carrier-based multirole fighters representing the “peaks” (高峰) from the aircraft carrier Liaoning; the J-16 and J-10B fighters; the H-6N bomber and H-6U tanker variants; and a swarm of Z-8B, -9, -10, -15, -19, and -20 helicopters. Multiple unmanned aerial vehicles paraded below included the GJ-11 low-observable attack drone. Meanwhile, far removed from their likely natural element in the South China Sea were a pair of HSU001 truck-borne underwater drones.

Marching in exact, increasingly joint formations were all major types of Chinese armed forces personnel. Notably, with Xi having stated that the central government would “maintain long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and Macau,” the People’s Armed Police was showcased as “an important apparatus for social stability” (社会稳定的重要装备), the Strategic Support Force made its lockstep debut, and PLA Rocket Force personnel were hailed for their strength and importance.

But the biggest single theme was the sheer number and variety of conventional missiles.

Chinese Lesson for America: Avoid Unequal Treaties

So what does this mean for U.S. policy? Most importantly, Beijing’s massive missile buildup underscores a major reason why the Trump Administration was right to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: to free Washington to deter aggression with missiles of its own.

It’s common sense that an agreement can’t work if only one party honors it. Unfortunately, that’s precisely what unraveled INF. In formally withdrawing on August 2, 2019, Washington bluntly acknowledged that this increasingly antiquated accord had no future. First, the treaty’s sole cosignatory, Moscow, had been flouting INF rules for years. President Obama himself considered terminating it for precisely that reason. Second, this unilateral American constraint had become particularly costly: during the INF’s 32-year lifespan China developed the world’s foremost conventional missile force precisely within ranges that INF prohibited (ground-launched nuclear and conventional cruise and ballistic missiles of 500-5,500 km). Much of which was on prominent display today.

Yet Beijing wouldn’t join INF—the one way the treaty might have been rejuvenated. It still won’t. And China increasingly threatens the U.S. and its allies and partners, as well regional peace and norms, with a robust missile-centric arsenal. It’s not the INF’s demise itself that should be lamented, therefore, but rather the Russo-Chinese actions that precipitated it. Exiting INF is no panacea, but it opens much-needed possibilities for resetting the military balance and calculus in the Asia-Pacific. There, Chinese missiles pose a significant threat to U.S. and regional security. Freed from the constraints of the INF, the U.S. should take the opportunity to develop and deploy its own missiles to counter that threat.

Beijing’s own official statements indicate that it will not accede to any other substantive arms control agreements for the foreseeable future. On the contrary, earlier this summer China fired six anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) into the South China Sea. Ironically, by forcing the withdrawal and destruction of U.S. Pershing II active radar-homing ballistic missiles at the end of the 1980s, INF may have provided China key technologies facilitating the development of its ASBMs—potent systems the United States and Russia could have produced themselves long before absent INF restrictions. At a minimum, PRC researchers studied Pershing II missiles extremely closely.

The several dozen “carrier killer” weapons China fields today are but a fraction of its potent arsenal. China “controls the largest and most diverse missile force in the world, with an inventory of more than 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles,” Admiral Harry Harris, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, testified in 2017. “Approximately, 95% of [China’s] missiles would violate the INF if China was a signatory.” Put another way, up to 2,650 PRC missiles wouldn’t comply. Importantly, Beijing appears to believe that a nuclear arsenal far smaller than Russia’s or America’s is sufficient for deterrence. Chinese strategists view conventionally-armed missiles as far more acceptable, and hence far more useful. Thus, China’s conventional missiles exceed its nuclear missiles by at least a 7:1 ratio. That happens to exploit an enormous loophole in even general arms control discussions, let alone actual enforceable restrictions.

All too often, Beijing’s official statements and arms control discourse more broadly focus exclusively on nuclear weapons—which of course merit attention—to the exclusion of addressing the high-end conventional weapons systems that China has deployed on an industrial scale. This missile myopia must end now: Aside from increasingly disruptive cyber technologies, China’s missile-centric military buildup may be the single biggest factor eroding American power and influence in Asia. If not countered effectively, it could restructure the region away from the peace and prosperity-promoting alliances and rules that Washington has spent tremendous blood and treasure to cultivate over the last eight decades.

For years, China has made meteoric military progress by persistently pursuing technologies that potentially place opponents on the wrong end of physics—in a capabilities competition favoring China designed to become extremely expensive and risky for the United States to even wage, let alone win. And that’s precisely the point: Beijing wants to win without fighting and compel Washington and its regional allies to yield to its self-proclaimed “core interests” by intimidating with a fait accompli of deterrent military might—just like the display it paraded so prominently today.

The ballistic missile has been the cornerstone of Beijing’s effort. Whereas aerodynamically-guided cruise missiles must operate within aircraft-like altitudes, longer-range ballistic missiles maximize speed by flying above the atmosphere mid-course. Ballistic missiles of all ranges close on their targets at multiple times the speed of sound, leaving little time and few opportunities to intercept them. For China—a technologically capable power that has prioritized their development since the late 1950s—ballistic missiles can be developed, deployed, and employed far more cheaply and effectively than they can be defended against.

Moreover, although China is finally dipping its toe in the water regarding sea-based nuclear weapons deployment, the vast majority of its missiles remain land-based. This exploits two formidable factors. First, as the Iraq War ‘Scud Hunt’ demonstrated, even in exposed desert it is extremely difficult to find mobile missiles in real time and neutralize them prior to their launch. This is true all the more for China’s full range of concealing terrains, extensive underground facilities that provide protection for the missile force, ability to deploy road-mobile missiles, and potential to communicate securely by having launch brigades access secure fiber optic networks at pre-designated locations. Second, large INF-range missiles are substantially easier and cheaper to develop and operate in land-based form than in equivalent variants for submarines, surface ships, and aircraft. Third, launching missiles from deep in the interior of a large nation like China makes certain types of intercept (e.g., boost-phase) impossible.

Faced with increasing competition from a China determined and able to pursue concerning scenarios such as coercion of Taiwan as never before, the United States can no longer afford to pursue only the costliest technologically superior, but operationally defensive, approaches of the past. Rather, it must increasingly take pages from China’s own post-Cold War playbook. And expanding emphasis on missiles is one of the most potent pages yet written: Washington’s INF withdrawal offers important possibilities.

A Martian strategist reviewing Earthly conditions for the first time today might well ask why the United States had watched China’s missile might grow so fast and alter the military balance so much, while making so few missile moves of its own. They would doubtless note that China had not only deployed the world’s most numerous and diverse land-based missile force, but also stuffed its submarines to the gills with conventional missiles, even at the expense of torpedoes. They might ask why the United States had voluntarily kept its missiles off land in East Asia, and moreover heretofore armed its astronomically expensive submarines primarily with nuclear missiles but few conventional missiles. (Encouragingly, the Block V Virginia-class attack sub will have six large-diameter tubes that could hold a total of 42 Tomahawk cruise missiles.) They might note that many INF-related arms control concerns were decidedly Eurocentric at a time when many of the most dramatic and destabilizing military developments were occurring unrestrained in Asia. Such an outside observer might well rapidly comprehend the INF-imposed constraints on U.S. deterrence and operations in the Asia-Pacific.

Policy Implications:

Unshackled from INF, what can the United States do now? First, it can resume development and testing of medium- and intermediate-range missiles that don’t require Navy or Air Force platforms to deploy and employ. Testing has already begun on a ground-launched variant of the Tomahawk, allowing deployment within approximately 18 months. The U.S. will eventually test a new mobile, ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). Lacking the Tomahawk’s long-proven heritage, or any post-INF American analogue, this 3,000-4,000-km-range missile will likely take several years to develop.

Second, the United States can begin to deploy land-based cruise and ballistic missiles as they become available. The most realistic and promising Asia-Pacific location is the sovereign American territory of Guam, together other Pacific possessions. Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are also potential locations. To be sure, smaller islands may be limited in concealing terrain, and foreign missile hosting may face popular pushback. So initial deployment may well be confined to Guam. But whatever limits the United States may experience in basing ground-launched missiles abroad, it can still pursue agreements with allies and partners to allow the rapid introduction of missiles in various contingencies to support their defense.

Even if peacetime politics precluded permanent deployment, more concerning scenarios could tip the balance in favor of local support. Additionally, the more growing Chinese military capabilities and intentions increase regional concerns, the more support for hosting deterrent weapons may increase. Conversely, should China somehow pursue a more peaceful path, U.S. and allied missile deployment could become less urgent. In short, opening this new window affords new possibilities for calibrated counter-coercion.

Third, in the arcane world of military deterrence, increasing options and room for maneuver forces competitors and potential adversaries to think in new ways by factoring in potential capabilities and actions. Simply by withdrawing from INF, Washington has put new options on the table. Russia remains free to work with the United States to limit nuclear weapons—as well as emerging hypersonic and undersea nuclear weapons and its uniquely hazardous nuclear-powered cruise missile program, none of which are currently limited by any agreement. And if Beijing eventually sits down at the arms control negotiating table at all—rather than expecting others to make all the concessions, as before—it will be because Washington allowed itself new options, not because it further tied its hands unilaterally. Chinese state spokespeople and media are already decrying U.S. IRBM development and pressuring the U.S. and its allies, but should be paid no heed. Washington should not be swayed by one-sided propaganda embodying the hypocritical notion that “The magistrates are free to set fires, while the common people are forbidden even to light lamps.”

These steps represent one of the most straightforward ways to advance U.S. security and regional interests by reclaiming the right end of physics and cost competition regarding advanced weapons, reassuring regional allies and partners, deterring Chinese aggression, and enabling options for addressing any security threats that do materialize.

The bottom line: a new U.S. posture involving some mobile conventional IRBMs on Guam, and some capability to deploy them on relatively short notice to other locations, will offer a reasonably useful if relatively limited set of options. It will complicate Chinese military planning and have deterrent effect. With an increasingly assertive Beijing bullying its neighbors and pressuring the U.S. and its allies to yield to unilateral demands, resetting the military missile calculus will be a victory in itself. And, as China’s 70^th anniversary military parade just made it unmistakably clear, the time to act is now.

ANDREW S. ERICKSON is a Visiting Scholar at Harvard’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College. He is the author of the book Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories and Strategic Implications.