PRC Researcher on President Biden’s China Experts (中国通)
David Cowhig, “PRC Researcher on President Biden’s China Experts 中国通,” 高大伟 David Cowhig’s Translation Blog, 29 May 2021.
Reposted with permission. For a cornucopia of fascinating and timely insights, fully accessible in natively-nuanced English, check out David’s many other great translations here!
After retirement David Cowhig translated, with his wife Jessie, Liao Yiwu’s 2019 “Bullets and Opium,” and has been “studying things” (格物致知). Cowhig previously spent 25 years as a U.S. State Department Foreign Service Officer, including ten years at U.S. Embassy Beijing and U.S. Consulate General Chengdu and four years as a China Analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Prior to his State service, he translated Japanese and Chinese scientific and technical books and articles into English freelance for six years. Before that, Cowhig taught English at Tunghai University in Taiwan for three years. His earlier experience includes working two summers on Norwegian farms, milking cows and feeding chickens.
PRC Researcher on President Biden’s China Experts (中国通)
Just out on the aisixiang website in China is Chinese USA analyst Xie Hui presenting her views on President Biden’s China Experts [zhongguo tong 中国通] and on their policy orientation based on their publications over the past several months, recent U.S. policy analysis by Chinese scholars, ‘China Expert’ backgrounds and experience. She also looks at the prospects for some improvement in U.S. China relations and what China could do to help make that happen.
Note also The Asan Forum has a February 2, 2021 online article entitled “Biden’s Asia Policymakers.”
URLs attached to text are mine; URLs written out in full were in the Chinese text. In a few places I added Google Translate links to Chinese language articles.
Chinese Scholars (well, not the last one) on U.S. – China Relations
Some other Chinese scholars have been writing about U.S. – China relations lately that I have noticed and written/translated about here include:
- Xiao Gongqin: Dealing with the New Pattern in the U.S. – China Game — U.S.-China Relations III
- “History and Experience of the Chinese Communist Party’s Engagement with the United States”: A Lecture by Professor Zhang Baijia
- PRC Party United Front Journal on U.S. Political Decline, Perspectives on Chinese and Foreign Political Defense Issues
- Beijing Daily: President Trump Highlights Flaws in the American System
First the conclusions. Full translation and Chinese text below.
The New generation of American “China Experts” Views of China and their Influence
Source: 谢卉 [Xie Hui], 中国国际问题研究院美国研究所助理研究员 [Assistant Researcher at the Institute of American Studies, China Institute of International Studies], 原文载《国际研究参考》2021年第四期 [originally published in International Studies Reference, Issue 4, 2021].
The Biden Administration has placed a group of young people in important China-related positions. Most are in their 40s and 50s. Most have been engaged in China studies for many years and have studied and lived in China. They are the new generation of “China Experts” in the U.S. political arena. These people include Laura Rosenberger, Senior Director for China Affairs at the White House National Security Council (NSC), Rush Doshi, Senior Director for China Affairs at the NSC, Julian Gewirtz, Director for China Affairs at the NSC, and Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Advisor for China on the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, Ely Ratner, Principal Assistant for China Affairs at the Department of Defense; Jeffrey Prescott, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Katherine Chi Tai, U.S. Trade Representative. Now that the new U.S. strategy toward China has taken shape and the overall judgment that has been made that China is a “strategic competitor,” Biden has little room to made broad changes in U.S.-China relations. Now he is more interested in refining the competitive partnership at the tactical level. This new generation of “China Experts” will play an important role in the formulation of specific strategies toward China. Studying their backgrounds and policy ideas will help us understand the future direction of U.S.-China relations. This paper selects seven representative new-generation “China Experts” including Laura Rosenberger, systematically compares their experiences and policy views, and summarizes their policy influences.
I. Major figures and backgrounds of the new generation of “China Experts”
The Biden administration’s “China Experts” can be divided into the post-70s and post-80s in terms of age. Kathleen Tai, Ely Ratner, Jeffrey Prescott, and Laura Rosenberger were born in the 1970s and have experience working in the “revolving door” between the government and think tanks. They have close ties to current President Biden, Secretary of State Blinken, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Sullivan. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Rush Doshi, and Gewirtz were born in the 1980s. They got out of school and received their PhDs within the last five years, and made their debut by advising Democratic candidates Hillary Clinton and Joseph Biden on Asia policy during the 2016 and 2020 elections.
(i) Job connections networks. Most of the post-70s “China Experts” such as Kathleen Tai, Ely Ratner, Jeffrey Prescott, and Laura Rosenberger worked at the State Department and the National Security Council during the Obama administration, worked directly for Vice President Biden, or worked for a long time with Secretary of State Blinken and National Security Jake Sullivan.
Laura Rosenberger, 41, graduated from Penn State University and received a master’s degree in international peace and conflict resolution from American University. From 2013 to 2017, she served as senior advisor (during which time Blinken served as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) and Chief of Staff (during which time Blinken served as Deputy Secretary of State), advising Blinken on a range of national security issues and participating in policy advice and development on issues including the Asia-Pacific, arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, U.S.-China relations, and the North Korean nuclear issue. [Laura Rosenberger, https://www.cnas.org/people/laura-rosenberger, (Accessed: February 21, 2021).]
Ely Ratner, 44, studied at Princeton University and the University of California, Berkeley, where he received his Ph.D. in political science in 2009. He served on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee for one year from 2002 to 2003, when Biden was chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and briefly served on the State Department’s China Desk from 2011 to 2012, before returning to the Center for a New American Security, a think tank, for four years. from 2015 to 2017, he replaced Jeffrey Prescott as Biden’s Deputy National Security Adviser. [Ely Ratner https://www.cnas.org/people/ely-ratner, (Accessed: February 21, 2021).] Outside of government, Ely Ratner has served as a senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, [and] a senior Fellow and Executive Vice President of the Asia-Pacific Security Initiative at the Center for a New American Security. Biden announced recently that the Defense Department will establish a “China Strategy Working Group” to conduct a special assessment of U.S. defense policy toward China, and Ely Ratner, who has joined the Department, has been appointed as a member and will be a key leader in that effort.
Jeffrey Prescott, a graduate of Yale Law School, was deputy director and senior fellow at the Yale Center for China Legal Studies from 2002 to 2010, where he founded the Center’s Beijing office and worked in China from 2002 to 2007. During the Obama administration, he served as special advisor to Vice President Biden on Asian affairs and deputy assistant for national security affairs, where he was a working partner with Sullivan. from 2015 to 2017, he was director of Middle East affairs at the White House National Security Council. [Jeffrey Prescott, https://foreignpolicy.com/author/jeff-prescott/, (Accessed: February 22, 2021)] Fluent in Chinese, Jeffrey Prescott has accompanied Biden on visits to Asia and provided intellectual support to Biden on foreign policy during the 2020 presidential election. As Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Prescott will stay primarily in Washington to interact with Congress and serve as the UN ambassador’s representative at ambassador-level meetings.
Kathleen Tai, 45, was born in Connecticut to parents from Taiwan, China. From 1996 to 1998, she taught English at Sun Yat-sen University, and from 2007 to 2014, she served as Chief Trade Enforcement Counsel for China at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, where she handled U.S. disputes against China at the World Trade Organization. Fundraising Committee as Chief Trade Counsel, during which time she pushed for Democratic support of the Forced Uighur Labor Prevention Act. [Ana Swanson, “Biden Picks Katherine Tai as Trade Representative,” https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/business/economy/katherine-tai-us-trade-representative.html (accessed March 1, 2021 March 1).]
(ii) Think Tank connections network. A number of the new generation of American “China Experts” have experience working in think tanks. According to statistics, the largest number of people have worked at the Center for a New American Security, followed by traditional Democratic think tanks such as the Center for China Legal Studies at Yale University and the Brookings Institution. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Rush Doshi, and Julian Gewirtz, as the new generation of “China Experts” in the post-1980s, are fresh out of school and have previously worked at think tanks. This group was able to join the U.S. decision-making circle on China was largely due to the appointment of Kurt Campbell as the National Security Council’s coordinator of Indo-Pacific affairs. Kurt Campbell co-authored several articles with them in Foreign Affairs over the past two years, systematically presenting the Democratic Party establishment’s China policy views.
Rush Doshi, an Indian-American who graduated from Princeton University with a B.A. in East Asian Studies in 2011 and from Harvard University with a Ph.D. in Government in 2018, spent 10 months on a Fulbright exchange at Yunnan University from 2011 to 2012, during which he traveled the Himalayas and studied the China-Myanmar, China-Pakistan, and China-India border issues. Rush Doshi is fluent in Chinese and communicates well with Chinese scholars. [“Young hawk ‘China-comer’ influences Biden’s China policy,” https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20210210-1123232, (accessed February 28, 2021).] Prior to joining the administration, Rush Doshi was director of the China Studies Department at the Brookings Institution, where he focused on Chinese grand strategy and Indo-Pacific security.
Julian Gewirtz entered Oxford University in 2013 after receiving his B.A. from Harvard University, and earned his Ph.D. in modern Chinese history in 2018. After graduating, he first worked as a scholar at Harvard University before joining the Council on Foreign Relations in August 2020 as a senior fellow in China studies. [“Young hawk ‘China-comer’ influences Biden’s China policy,” https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20210210-1123232, (accessed February 28, 2021).] [Chinese language article — English in Google Translate] Gewirtz has studied Chinese since childhood, and in 2009 he also interned at the Chinese magazine Caijing.
Born in 1984, Mira Rapp-Hooper received her undergraduate degree in history from Stanford University and her PhD in political science from Columbia University in 2014. She has worked at the RAND Corporation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Center for a New American Security in the areas of U.S.-China relations, Korean Peninsula issues, and Asian security issues. Senior Fellow, China Center, Yale Law School. [Mira Rapp-Hooper, https://law.yale.edu/mira-rapp-hooper, (accessed February 15, 2021)]
(3) Analysis of the background of the growth of the new generation of “China Experts.” The new generation of American “China Experts” were mostly born after the 1970s and grew up in the 21st century, when the relationship between China and the United States shifted from engagement to competition. The policy views of the new generation of Democratic Party “China Experts” formed influenced both by their generation’s experience growing up and the realpolitik reasons of the current U.S. policy aimed at keeping China down.
First, the background of the era of China’s rise. Most of the new generation of “China Experts” grew up in the period of great development of U.S. power near the end of the Cold War. They are confident in U.S. power. In the past decade or so, they have experienced the historical transition characterized by the decline of U.S. influence and the rise of the developing countries, and so are alert to possible challenges from other countries. Although many of them are fluent in Chinese and have studied and worked in China for a long time, they have not experienced the process of China’s transition from closure to reform and opening up, and lack a deeper understanding of China’s history, and think about China more from the perspective of the power structure of the international system and U.S. hegemonic interests. In contrast, the older generation of American “China Experts” such as Ezra Vogel and David Lampton have real feelings and memories of the devastation of war and the tensions brought by the Cold War.
Secondly, the experience of the older generation as government officials promoting learning. The older generation of “China-literates” such as Ezra Vogel have devoted their lives to the world of ideas, and their research has been conducted from a sociological perspective, not confined to any specific profession or field, stressing obtaining research data through fieldwork, and using major historical events in the development of U.S.-China relations to verify and refine their academic views. Their disciplinary training is more qualitative than quantitative, more practical than theoretical, and therefore they have a sentimental attachment to China. In recent years, the older generation of China experts in the United States have retired from the political scene, and scholars with a “emotional ties to China” such as Roderick MacFarquhar, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Ezra Vogel have passed away, thus completing a generational shift in the “China Experts” in American think tanks.
Compared with the previous generation of China experts, the new generation of “China Experts” focuses on the present and emphasizes differences in their views of China, displaying a distinct tendency towards negativity and confrontation. They are good at expressing themselves, in theoretical framing of issues, and at technical details, but lack emotional feeling for Chinese society and empathy for China. [Song Jing, Si Le Ru, “The Direction of the Biden Administration’s China Policy under the Influence of U.S. Think Tank Factors,” World Economic and Political Forum, Vol. 1, 2021, p. 78]. Some of them have repeatedly “rotated” through the U.S. academic and political worlds, and their previous work and policy experience has influenced the development of their thinking, or even completely reversed their view of China, and enabled them to update themselves in their fields of research. For example, the new generation of “China Experts” generally focuses on emerging technologies. This tends to orient them towards research on “today’s China” and “possible China” rather than historical China as research topics. However, just because they focus too much on “today’s China” and reason only from a particular perspective, they also lack a systematic and comprehensive understanding of China’s history and realities. They often fall into the trap of “not seeing the forest for the trees” when confronted with a grand strategic issue.
Third, the political context of U.S. strategic competition with China. The new generation of U.S. “China Experts” work in a complex political environment. They experienced the “free-fall” decline in U.S.-China relations during the Trump Administration and are deeply influenced by the notion that China is a “strategic competitor of the United States. Moreover, they are working in an American political climate and in a society that is increasingly opposed to globalization and to elites, and is increasingly conservative and laying ever more stress on “America First.” U.S. opinion is characterized by “the younger they are, the more hawkish they are.” A Gallup survey released in March 2021 found that 79 percent of Americans have a negative view of China, the least favorable view of the country since the survey began in 1979. [Mohamed Younis, “New High in Perceptions of China as U.S.’s Greatest Enemy,” https://news.gallup.com/poll/337457/new-high-perceptions-china-greatest-enemy.aspx (accessed March 18, 2021).] A recent Pew Research Center survey shows that nine out of ten Americans view China as a competitor or enemy, and nearly half believe the United States should seek to contain China. [Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, “Most Americans Support Tough Stance Toward China on Human Rights, Economic Issues,” https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/03/04/most-americans-support-tough-stance-toward-china-on-human-rights-economic-issues/ (accessed March 18, 2021).] Trying to appeal to the political correct stance of being tough on China and building capital for their own subsequent advancement in the political arena, the new generation of “China Experts” lack the political will to put U.S.-China relations on the right track. Instead, they try to use their China studies background to conceive new strategies and tools that would help the U.S. contain China more effectively. Some officials who don’t object to extremist views have made allies in Congress. Their strong personal political aspirations are evident.
II. Principal China Perspectives Among the New Generation of American “China Experts”
Even before the Biden administration took office, this new generation of “China Experts” published a series of China-related articles in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the New York Times, and other publications, systematically expounding their views on China. Their perceptions of China and policy ideas are different from those of the older generation of China experts, such as Ezra Vogel and David Lampton, as well as from those of the Trump administration, such as Michael Pillsbury and Matthew Pottinger. The principal views of the new generation of China Experts fall into the following five areas.
(1) China is seen as “a strategic competitor of the United States” and “the biggest challenge to be addressed,” but does not advocate a full “decoupling. Ely Ratner wrote in the Washington Post in July 2020 that the U.S.-China rivalry is not a new Cold War. China lacks anything to represent the Eastern bloc, and the U.S. alliance system is military rather than economic. China is both one of America’s largest trading partners and its biggest geopolitical rival. U.S. allies are also not yet ready for a full-scale confrontation with China, and they want to reap both security and economic benefits from the United States and China. But as China grows in power and influence, the United States will have to embark on a more comprehensive strategy toward China. [Richard Fontaine and Ely Ratner, “The U.S.-China confrontation is not another Cold War. It’s something new,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/02/us-china-confrontation-is-not-another-cold-war-its-something-new/, (online: February 20, 2021).]
The Democratic Party’s “China Connection” advocates a reassessment of the U.S.-China interdependence. In response to the Trump administration’s “decoupling” from China, Ely Ratner said, “…abrupt separation would incur enormous and unnecessary costs. Decoupling—particularly if unilateral and without requisite investments at home—is more likely to isolate the United States than China, engendering a world in which Beijing has control over leading technologies, data, and standards and sets global trade and investment rules in its favor.” [Ely Ratner, Laura Rosenberger, and Paul Scharre, “Beyond the Trade War,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/united-states/2019-12-12/beyond-trade-war, (accessed February 11, 2021).] They also acknowledge that China cannot be excluded from the global governance system and therefore will not forgo opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation in specific areas. Rush Doshi believes that there is room for cooperation between China and the United States, especially on global governance issues such as health and climate change, and believes that this will help to enhance the global influence of the United States.
(2) Profound prejudice against the Chinese system and calls for U.S. reinvestment in democracies. The new generation of American “China Experts” generally believe that China’s development model has deviated from the trajectory that the U.S. expected, and that the U.S. must prevent China from exporting its institutional model and act aggressively to demonstrate its strength on all fronts to achieve deterrence against China. Laura Rosenberger defines China as an “anti-liberal state” and an “authoritarian state” and argues that the key to the U.S. response to China’s “systemic challenge” is to “reinvest” in democratic states. “reinvesting” in guarding Western democratic values by supporting allies, enhancing public education, technological research and development, and investing in infrastructure. [Laura Rosenberger, “China’s Coronavirus Information Offensive,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-22/chinas-coronavirus-information-offensive (accessed February 1, 2021).] She also advocates that the United States coordinate with allies externally and reorganize relevant agencies internally to achieve cross-sector and cross-industry cooperation to prevent China from using high-tech exports and other to promote its institutional model.
They also advocate “joining forces with other countries” to pressure China in the hope of disrupting China’s strategic path. Julian Gewirtz advocates that the United States should revive its economy at home, control the new epidemic, rationalize its defense budget, and expand its research and development to prove to China that the United States is still strong and to show the world that it is still a beacon of freedom and equality. He suggests that the United States publicly point out China’s weaknesses, including its “aging population, ecological crisis, numerous border disputes, and declining international prestige,” and argue that China’s strategic path can be shaken. [Julian Gewirtz, “China Thinks America Is Losing,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/china-thinks-america-losing (Accessed: February 5, 2021).] Jeffrey Prescott called for a human rights diplomatic offensive against China in the multilateral arena.
(3) “Competition on issues” in the fields of trade, security, and science and technology. On the issue of U.S.-China trade, Kathleen Tai believes that although the Trump administration appeared to be aggressive, but it was still essentially defensive. The U.S. should increase offensive tactics and use subsidies and other incentives to reduce the U.S. overdependence on Chinese imports, while continuing to use human rights issues, the World Trade Organization system and allies to put pressure on China. [“Biden Trade Representative Nominee Dyche Says She Will Fight Chinese Censorship, Other Trade Barriers,” https://cn.reuters.com/article/ustr-nominee-china-0301-mon-idCNKCS2AU03U [Note: previous link to Chinese translation; original at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-trade/bidens-trade-rep-pick-says-she-will-fight-chinese-trade-barriers-including-censorship-idUSKCN2AT3OZ (Accessed: March 6, 2021).]
On the subject of security, Rush Doshi and Kurt Campbell, co-authored an article the January 2021 issue of Foreign Affairs, noting the need for the United States to promote a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region by deploying long-range conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, unmanned naval strike aircraft and underwater delivery vehicles, missile submarines, and high-speed strike weapons in the region, and encouraging U.S.-centric military and intelligence partnerships among regional states. [Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How America Can Shore Up Asian Order,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-12/how-america-can-shore-asian-order (accessed February 12, 2021).] Mira Rapp-Hooper recommends that the U.S. government focus on investing in high-end nuclear and conventional deterrence capabilities, as well as the development of next-generation military technologies that defend U.S. interests without resorting to war.
In the area of critical technologies, Ely Ratner advocated that the United States encourage U.S. companies to compete with China through increased R&D spending, tax incentives and government purchases; expand highly skilled visa programs to attract the best talent from around the world; and work with allies to establish a new intergovernmental body to promote cooperation and coordination on R&D spending, supply chain security, standards development, export controls, foreign investment reviews and the use of sensitive technologies. cooperation and coordination in R&D spending, supply chain security, standard setting, export control, foreign investment review, and regulation of sensitive technology use, to reduce economic dependence on China and build an international coalition to curb China’s technological progress. [Ely Ratner, Laura Rosenberger, and Paul Scharre, “Beyond the Trade War,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-12-12/beyond-trade-war, (accessed February 11, 2021).]
(4) Accept “cooperation on certain issues” with China on global issues such as climate change and epidemic control. According to the new generation of American “China Experts” the main areas of cooperation between the two sides are global issues and crisis management. According to Julian Gewirtz, the U.S. and China need to manage their competitive relationship to avoid the “worst possible outcome” of competition. The two countries must work together to address major challenges such as climate change, epidemics and nuclear proliferation. The two countries also need to negotiate on the “most dangerous” areas, such as cyber warfare and disputes in the South China Sea, to draw clear warning lines and to implement effective crisis management and conflict de-escalation mechanisms. [Julian Gewirtz, “China Thinks America Is Losing,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/china-thinks-america-losing (Accessed: February 5, 2021).]
At the same time, the U.S. side intends to act as a “referee” to evaluate the effectiveness of cooperation. Rush Doshi said he wants to develop “meaningful” cooperation, while “creating incentives and penalties” to build a strong alliance system with allies, using a predictable business environment, climate and international health cooperation as incentives to make China accept the U.S.-led regional order. The U.S.-led regional order. Once China threatens the regional order envisioned by the United States, the United States and its allies should impose penalties. [Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How America Can Shore Up Asian Order,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/united-states/2021-01-12/how-america-can-shore-asian-order (Accessed: February 12, 2021).]
(5) Rebuilding a “New” Liberal International Order. The new generation of “China Experts” advocates that the United States should take the lead in “multilateralism” and diversified cooperation mechanisms covering various fields. According to Rush Doshi, the United States should lead the Indo-Pacific countries in negotiations on supply chains, standards, investment regimes, and trade agreements, and seek to move supply chains back to the United States and to other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. should seek to provide additional financing and technical assistance to hedge against China’s “Belt and Road” initiative.
Mira Rapp-Hooper argues that the post-Cold War liberal international order no longer exists, and that the new U.S. administration should begin to build an international order that is appropriate for the 21st century, advancing an “open world” view of the international order. This new world order is neither the traditional free world order nor isolationism, and the focus is on meeting U.S. interests. The United States needs to lead the “modernization” of international institutions such as the WTO to prevent China from taking advantage of the openness of the free world to benefit from trade, technology, and other areas and to promote its institutional model globally. [Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “A Foreign Policy for the Day After Trump,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-09-30/foreign-policy-day-after-trump, (Accessed: February 3, 2021).]
Mira Rapp-Hooper also argued that the United States should rebuild the U.S. alliance system in Asia and Europe and push for allies to share more responsibilities. She noted that Trump’s demand for allies to share more responsibilities has an element of rationality. The U.S. allies in Eurasia are facing threats from Russia and China respectively, and the alliance strategy formed during the Cold War no longer meets the current reality. A new structure should be formed in which the U.S. is primarily responsible for high-end military defense and regional allies are primarily responsible for low-end defense and deterrence.
III. Influence of the New Generation of “China Experts” on the Biden Administration’s China Strategy
Before the Biden administration took office, it was widely expected that Biden’s primary problem would be domestic, requiring him to first control the epidemic, boost the economy, and bridge domestic differences before he would be freed to deal with China relations issues. But judging from the Biden administration’s actions over the past two months in office, Biden himself and his key cabinet members have mentioned China far more often than during the campaign. This is partly because being tough on China is one of the few bipartisan issues that can keep the U.S. together, and Republican senators have repeatedly questioned Biden’s cabinet members about their attitudes toward China during their nomination hearings. They made it clear that China policy has become a topic that Biden cannot get around. A review of the U.S. government’s words and actions toward China reveals that they are largely consistent with the policy proposals of these new-generation “China Experts”.
(1) Strengthen the concept of U.S. “strategic competition” with China. In his first foreign policy address since taking office at the State Department on February 4, 2021, President Biden called China “the most formidable competitor” of the United States and said that the United States would respond to China’s “aggressive” posture on human rights, intellectual property rights, and global governance. He said the U.S. will respond to China’s “aggressive” posture on human rights, intellectual property and global governance, but is willing to work with Beijing when it is in the U.S. interest to do so. Biden stressed that to better compete, the U.S. must first deal with domestic issues, and later join forces with its allies to take its place in the international community and rebuild U.S. credit and moral authority.
Secretary of State John Blinken delivered his first major foreign policy speech in office on March 3. He listed eight priorities for U.S. diplomacy, one of which is addressing the China challenge. He noted that China is the only country that can pose a serious challenge to the existing stable and open international order, and that the United States will compete with China when it should, cooperate when it can, and confront it when necessary. But in either way, “we’re going to engage with China from a position of strength.”
The White House National Security Council on March 3, 2021 also released the Biden Administration’s Medium-Term National Security Strategy Guidelines (hereinafter referred to as the Guidelines). In the section on China, this report states that the distribution of power in the world is changing and poses new threats, particularly to China. Among U.S. competitors, only China has the potential to combine economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to sustainably challenge a stable and open international system. [“Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf, (Accessed: March 5, 2021).]
(2) “Encircle” China by joining forces with other countries. The Policy states, “The strength of international alliances is America’s greatest strategic asset, and the Biden administration will work with NATO, Australia, New Zealand, and allies in Asia (such as Japan and South Korea) to stand together internationally, move toward a coherent vision, and unite their efforts to establish more effective international norms that hold countries like China accountable for their actions.”
Since taking office, the Biden administration has been rebuilding its Asia-Europe alliance system, using the old G-7 mechanism while also trying to create new mechanisms to take advantage of geopolitical or issue changes, such as the “Democracy 10,” the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” the “Science and Technology 12,” and the “Democracy 12.” The “Science and Technology 12,” “Democratic Governance Alliance” and so on. Biden attended two international conferences, the G-7 Summit and the Munich Security Conference, by video conference on Feb. 19, where he emphasized the importance of transatlantic alliance relations, called on major market economies and democracies to cooperate in addressing the challenges posed by major powers such as China and Russia. Biden also called for cooperation on transnational challenges such as nuclear proliferation, climate change and cybersecurity, and pledged to strengthen cooperation with allies to jointly address the unique challenges of our time. President Biden also pledged to strengthen cooperation with allies to address the unique challenges of our time. [“Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference/ (Accessed: February 23, 2021)] 23 February).]
Blinken and U.S. Defense Secretary Austin chose Japan and South Korea as destinations for their first trip on March 15, 2021. According to the Wall Street Journal, Blinken’s meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi included discussions about China that took up most of their 90-minute meeting. White House spokesman Jen Pusaki made clear that senior U.S. officials met with senior Chinese officials after meeting with Asian allies, indicating that the Biden administration will approach relations with China in lockstep with its allies.
(3) The “small yard with a high fence” builds a solid U.S. technology blockade network against China. Members of the U.S.-China Science and Technology Relations Expert Panel under the U.S. Congressional Task Force on China released a lengthy policy report in November 2020, “How to Meet the Chinese Challenge: A New Strategy for U.S. Technology Competition. The report reflects on the Trump administration’s comprehensive science and technology embargo policy against China and advocates a “small yard with a high fence” approach to targeting China in the science and technology sector: identify specific technologies and research areas directly related to national security (i.e., “small yards”) and define appropriate strategic boundaries. and drawing appropriate strategic boundaries (i.e., “high fences”). [David E. Sanger and Michael Crowley, “As Biden and Xi Begin a Careful Dance, a New American Policy Takes Shape,” https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/17/us/politics/us-china-relations.html (accessed March 19, 2021)] This strategy was quickly implemented when senior U.S. administration officials said on February 10, 2021, that the Biden administration would consider working with allies to add “new targeted restrictions on certain sensitive technology exports to China” to prevent China from using and enhancing its military capabilities.
Both U.S. political parties want the U.S. to “strengthen itself” in response to China’s technological advances. U.S. Senate Democratic Leader Schumer said Feb. 23, 2021, that the Senate is actively working on a bill designed to compete with China across the board, hoping to raise $100 billion in funding to spur domestic research in key technology areas, including areas ranging from artificial intelligence to quantum computing to semiconductors. The bill is expected to go to the Senate in April, and given the bipartisan consensus on China-related issues, it has a good chance of passing. [Alex Leary, “Republicans Push Biden to Take Aggressive Stance Toward China,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/republicans-push-biden-to-take-aggressive-stance-toward-china-11615800601 (Accessed: March 17, 2021).]
(iv) Return to multilateral institutions to “hedge against Chinese influence.” In the Trump era, the United States has withdrawn from more than ten international organizations and treaties, including UNESCO and the Paris Agreement on climate change. Unlike Trump, Biden pursues a more positive view of multilateralism, hoping to lead the world agenda through negotiations and lead the world by building an international order. After Biden was sworn in as President on January 20, 2021, he signed a number of executive orders that same night, including the U.S. return to the Paris Agreement to address climate change and stop withdrawing from the World Health Organization. Blinken said Feb. 8 that the U.S. would return to the UN Human Rights Council as an observer. In the Biden administration’s view, “where we withdrew, China took advantage of the situation.”
Linda Thomas Greenfield, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, who took office on February 25, 2021, pledged at a Senate nomination hearing that she “will counter China at the United Nations, fight all Chinese efforts to include harmful rhetoric in U.N. resolutions, and resist China’s practice of placing too many Chinese citizens in key U.N. positions.”
Compared to the Trump administration’s unilateralist, “America First” and simple brutal approach to China, the Democratic Party’s “China Talk” policy toward China appears to be more structured: relying on cooperation with allies, emphasizing multilateralism, and making precise moves. This is precisely why their China strategy faces more external constraints in its implementation, rendering it much less effective.
First, although Trump lost the election, Trumpism still has a strong appeal in the United States. In essence, Trumpism is based on the logic of nativism and populism. Trump looks at America’s own problems and seek solutions to internal problems with isolationism and “America First.” In the Trumpists’ view, not only China, but also Europe, Latin America, and the Asia-Pacific region are among the root causes of America’s problems. The current U.S. presidential election and the subsequent chain of events reflect that Trumpism has deep political roots in the United States and has become the mainstream ideology of the current Republican Party. Given this context, the U.S. will likely return to isolationism and “America First” again in the future and so U.S. allies obviously will not bet on the United States.
Second, how much can the Biden administration’s “China encirclement” actually constrain China’s actual progress. U.S. allies are far from forming a “united front” on how to confront China. It remains to be seen how many countries will be willing to risk responding to the U.S. call to arms. Among the countries that the U.S. is trying to bring together, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, India and Australia all have China as their largest trading partner, and the Chinese market and industrial chain are very important to them, preferring to seek a balance between the U.S. and China rather than a one-sided approach. As the New York Times commented on February 18, 2021: “The era of U.S. decisions and Europe following is over, and European countries will not act as wingmen in a battle defined by the United States. China may be a competitor of the United States, but it has long been an important trading partner for Europe.”
Third, the U.S. economic and trade community and technology companies advocate continued cooperation with China, making it harder to build a “whole-of-government,” “whole-of-society” strategy toward China. There are three major multinational interests that support Biden and the Democratic Party: Wall Street capital groups, Silicon Valley high-tech companies, and Hollywood’s DreamWorks, all of which want the Biden administration to improve relations with China. On March 15, 2021, Protocol, a U.S. technology media outlet, released a survey entitled “How Tech Workers See China, Artificial Intelligence, and the Tremendous Power of Tech Giants.” According to the survey, 56 percent of respondents believe the U.S. is overly restrictive of Chinese technology companies, 60 percent support closer cooperation with Chinese technology companies, and 58 percent believe the U.S.-China technology conflict could weaken the U.S. technology industry. [Zhang Mengxu, “Survey Shows Most U.S. Tech Industry Practitioners Support Cooperation with China, “http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2021-03/17/nw.D110000renmrb_20210317_7-16.htm, (accessed March 18, 2021).] [Note: Google Translation English version.] An article in Newsweek on March 10 noted that the Biden administration’s hard-line China policy has put some of his biggest donors at business risk, from Wall Street to Silicon Valley to Hollywood, which have always focused on the large and still growing Chinese market, hoping that the countdown to tensions between the U.S. and China is on. [Bill Powell, “Biden’s Tough China Policy Poses Business Risk to Some of His Biggest Donors,” https://www.newsweek.com/2021/03/26/bidens-tough-china-policy-poses-business-risk-some-his-biggest-donors-1574781.html (accessed March 20, 2021).]
IV. Conclusion
To sum up, if the Trump administration was a period of historic turnaround in Sino-U.S. relations, then the Biden administration will be an important for the formation of the new U.S. China strategy. Currently, a bipartisan consensus has been formed on the overall goals of the new U.S. strategy toward China, but it remains to be seen which specific tactics the Biden administration will employ to implement a three-pronged relationship with China that combines competition, cooperation, and confrontation.
What is certain is that the new generation of “China Experts” appointed by the Biden administration will play an important role. The so-called China specialists that the Trump Administration placed in important positions people had long been outside the academic mainstream and who had no previous experience in government or in think tanks. It was just his group of people under the thumb of Trump’s people who pushed irrational, extreme policies. They took the scattered bits and pieces of Trump’s China policy and created a complete, systematic anti-China policy that became a strong anti-China force within the U.S. government. [Zhou Qi, “Trump’s “Political Legacy” and the Biden Administration’s China Policy Outlook,” Contemporary World, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2021, p. 5 周琪：特朗普的“政治遗产”及拜登政府对华政策展望] [Note: Here is Google Translate English version.]
Looking at this new generation of Biden administration’s “China Experts,” however, we see people who have been long-time immerses in U.S. policy circles who have tried their best to make suggestions for the U.S. to maintain its strategic interests and hegemonic position. They have broader connections and resources in the political, business, and academic circles and are more skilled at building consensus building and political mobilization. It is extremely important therefore for China to do a good job in helping the new generation of American “Chinese communicators” to get relations back on track.
First, we need to strengthen exchanges between U.S. and Chinese think tanks and using Track Two to promote strategic communication between the two countries. The two countries need to re-conceptualize and properly handle their relations at both the strategic and operational levels to create a new pattern of active cooperation and peaceful competition between the two countries. China and the U.S. need to establish a framework, including bottom lines and rules for competition to contain competition so that it does not become vicious and lead to a loss of control. Through the Sino-U.S. think tank contacts, we can effectively communicate with each other on how to accurately grasp the policy intentions of the other side, to clarify the main issues in Sino-U.S. relations, explore and to prevent sensitive issues from disrupting the relationship, and resolve obstacles and reduce risks.
Second, we will continue to pay attention to the views of the new generation of U.S. “China Experts” and promote first steps in potential areas of cooperation between the two sides. Supporting cooperation between the two countries in areas that are in the U.S. interest is a distinctive feature of these Democratic Party “China Experts.” It is now clear that there is room for cooperation between the United States and China on global issues such as climate change, combating epidemics, and economic recovery, as well as on bilateral issues such as law enforcement, counter-narcotics, and cybersecurity. It is appropriate for China to map out the U.S. position on cooperation on these issues, moving from the easy to the difficult, interact positively, build trust, and contribute to getting the relationship back on track. But we should also be wary of the new generation of U.S. “China Experts” in the field of multilateral cooperation and new initiatives in order to avoid falling into their policy traps that they might set.
Third, we should continue to do work on exchanging young scholars between China and the United States and gradually resume exchanges in the humanities between the two countries. Many of these new-generation “China Experts” have visited or worked in China and have a first-hand understanding of the importance of humanities exchanges in the relationship between our two countries. Traditionally, the Democratic Party has been interested in the export of “soft power. Therefore, it is important to continue the exchange of young scholars between China and the U.S., broaden the channels of communication through joint conferences, joint research, and post-epidemic field visits, promote a more objective and comprehensive understanding of China, and lay a more solid foundation for maintaining exchanges in the humanities between China and the U.S., so as to effectively respond to the new changes in U.S. domestic and foreign affairs in the future.
(Xie Hui, Assistant Researcher, Institute of American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, originally published in International Studies Reference, Issue 4, 2021)
谢卉：美国新生代“中国通”对华认知及其影响
选择字号：大中小 本文共阅读 1622 次 更新时间：2021-05-26 09:24:49
进入专题： 中美关系 ● 谢卉
美国拜登政府执政后，一批年轻人在重要涉华岗位上亮相。他们正值40至50岁的壮年时期，多数人长期从事中国问题研究，并有在中国学习、生活的经历，堪称美国政坛新生代的“中国通”。例如：美国白宫国家安全委员会(国安会)中国事务高级主任劳拉·罗森伯格（Laura Rosenberger）、国安会中国事务高级主任杜如松（Rush Doshi）、国安会中国事务主任朱利安·格维茨（Julian Gewirtz）、国务院中国政策规划高级顾问米拉·拉普-胡珀（Mira Rapp-Hooper）、国防部中国事务首席助理伊莱·拉特纳（Ely Ratner）、美国常驻联合国副代表蒲杰夫（Jeffrey Prescott）、以及美国贸易代表戴琦（Katherine Chi Tai）等。如今，美国对华新战略正在形成之中，中国是美国“战略竞争者”的总体判断已经定调，拜登在中美关系大方向上的回旋余地很小，更多的是在战术层面细化竞争性合作关系。可以预见，这些新生代“中国通”将在具体对华战略制定中发挥更大作用。研究他们的成长背景和政策主张，对于研判未来中美关系走向具有重要意义。本文选出了劳拉·罗森伯格等7名较有代表性的新生代“中国通”，系统梳理他们的成长经历和政策观点，并对他们的政策影响等做出总结。
一、新生代“中国通”主要人物及成长背景
拜登政府启用的这几位“中国通”，从年龄上可划分为70后和80后。戴琦、伊莱·拉特纳、蒲杰夫和劳拉·罗森伯格等人出生于20世纪70年代，具有在政府和智库间的“旋转门”工作经历，与现任总统拜登、国务卿布林肯和总统国家安全事务助理沙利文等人关系密切。米拉·拉普-胡珀、杜如松和格维茨则出生于20世纪80年代，最近五年内刚刚走出校门并拿到博士学位， 2016年和2020大选中为民主党候选人希拉里和拜登提供亚洲政策咨询，得以崭露头角，此番首次进入政府部门任职。
（一）工作关系网。戴琦、伊莱·拉特纳、蒲杰夫和劳拉·罗森伯格等70后“中国通”，多数曾在奥巴马政府时期就职于美国国务院和国家安全委员会，曾为副总统拜登直接工作,并与现任国务卿布林肯和国家安全事务助理沙利文长期共事。
劳拉·罗森伯格现年41岁，毕业于宾州州立大学，后于美利坚大学获国际和平与冲突解决专业硕士学位。她2004年进入国务院工作。2013～2017年间，她先后担任布林肯的高级顾问（其间布林肯担任总统副国家安全事务助理）和办公室主任（其间布林肯担任常务副国务卿），为布林肯在一系列国家安全议题上提供咨询，参与了亚太、军控与核不扩散、中美关系、朝核等议题的政策咨询与制定。[ Laura Rosenber，https://www.cnas.org/people/laura-rosenberger，（上网时间：2021年2月21日）]
伊莱·拉特纳现年44岁，他先后就读于普林斯顿大学和加州大学伯克利分校，于2009年获政治学博士学位。伊莱·拉特纳与拜登渊源很深，他2002～2003年曾在参议院外事委员会工作了一年，拜登时任参院外事委员会主席。2011～2012年，他短暂任职于国务院中国科，后回到智库新美国安全中心工作4年。2015～2017年，他接替蒲杰夫任拜登的副国安顾问。[ Ely Ratner，https://www.cnas.org/people/laura-rosenberger，（上网时间：2021年2月21日）]在政府之外，伊莱·拉特纳曾在外交关系委员会担任过中国研究高级研究员，新美国安全中心亚太地区安全计划的高级研究员和执行副总裁。日前拜登宣布国防部将成立“中国战略工作小组”，对美国对华防务政策进行专门评估，而加入国防部的伊莱·拉特纳已被任命为成员，将是有关工作的重要牵头人。
蒲杰夫毕业于耶鲁大学法学院。2002～2010年，他曾担任耶鲁大学中国法律研究中心副主任、高级研究员，其间他创建了中心设于北京的办公室，并于2002～2007年在中国工作。奥巴马执政时期，他曾担任副总统拜登的亚洲事务特别顾问、副国家安全事务助理，与沙利文是工作搭档关系。2015～2017年，他在白宫国家安全委员会中东事务主任。[ Jeffrey Prescott，https://foreignpolicy.com/author/jeff-prescott/，（上网时间：2021年2月22日）]蒲杰夫汉语流利，曾陪同拜登访问亚洲，并在2020年总统选举期间为拜登提供外交政策智力支持。作为常驻联合国副代表，蒲杰夫将主要待在华盛顿与国会互动，并在大使级会议中担任大使代表。
戴琦今年45岁，出生于美国康涅狄格州，父母来自中国台湾。她先后获得耶鲁大学历史学学士及哈佛大学法律博士学位。1996～1998年，她在中山大学教授英文。2007～2014年，她在美国贸易代表办公室担任负责中国事务的贸易执法首席顾问，期间处理美国在世界贸易组织对中国提出的争端诉讼。2014～2021年，她在美国众议院筹款委员会担任首席贸易律师，期间曾推动民主党支持《防止强迫维吾尔劳动法》。[ ANA SWANSON，“Biden Picks Katherine Tai as Trade Representative”，https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/business/economy/katherine-tai-us-trade-representative.html?_ga=2.218661913.1403957684.1616299771-875165792.1595034020，（上网时间：2021年3月1日）]
（二）智库关系网。多位美国新生代“中国通”有智库工作经历。据统计，曾在智库新美国安全中心任职的人数最多，其次为耶鲁大学中国法律研究中心和布鲁金斯学会等民主党传统智库。米拉·拉普-胡珀、杜如松和朱利安·格维茨作为新生代“中国通”中的80后，刚走出校门不久，此前一直在智库任职。他们之所以能够迅速跻身美国对华决策圈，同国家安全委员会印太事务协调员坎贝尔的提携有密切关系。过去2年中坎贝尔分别与他们在《外交事务》杂志联合发表了数篇文章，系统阐述了民主党建制派的对华政策观点。
杜如松是印度裔美国人，2011年毕业于普林斯顿大学获东亚研究学士学位，2018年获哈佛大学政府系博士学位。2011～2012年，杜如松通过富布莱特项目在云南大学进行为期10个月的交换学习，在这期间，他游历喜马拉雅山，研究中缅、中巴、中印边界问题。杜如松中文流畅，与中国学者有较好的交流。[ “年轻鹰派“中国通” 影响拜登对华政策”，https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20210210-1123232，（上网时间：2021年2月28日）]在加入政府前，杜如松任布鲁金斯学会中国研究部主任，主要研究中国大战略和印太安全。
朱利安·格维茨2013年从哈佛大学取得学士学位后进入牛津大学深造，并在2018年获得中国现代史博士学位。毕业后他先是在哈佛大学担任学者， 2020年8月进入美国外交关系协会，任中国研究高级研究员。[ “年轻鹰派“中国通” 影响拜登对华政策”，https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20210210-1123232，（上网时间：2021年2月28日）]格维茨自幼学习中文， 2009年他还曾在中国《财经》杂志社实习。
米拉·拉普-胡珀出生于1984年,本科就读于斯坦福大学历史系，2014年在哥伦比亚大学获得政治学博士学位。她曾在智库兰德公司、美国战略与国际研究中心、新美国安全中心工作，研究领域为中美关系、朝鲜半岛问题、亚洲安全问题等。2016年，她还担任希拉里·克林顿总统竞选团队的亚洲政策协调员。2021年担任政府职务前，她是美国外交关系委员会高级研究员、耶鲁大学法学院中国中心高级研究员。[ Mira Rapp-Hooper，https://law.yale.edu/mira-rapp-hooper，（上网时间：2021年2月15日）]
（三）新生代“中国通”成长背景分析。美国新生代“中国通”普遍出生于20世纪70年代以后，成长于21世纪中美关系由接触转向竞争的历史大背景下。民主党新生代“中国通”政策观点的形成，既有这一代人成长的时代背景，也有当前美国对华打压的现实政治原因。
第一，中国崛起的时代背景。新生代“中国通”大多成长于冷战结束前后美国实力大发展这段时期，对美国力量充满自信。近十多年来又切身体会了美国影响力下行和发展中国家崛起的历史转换，对他国的可能挑战充满警觉。尽管他们中很多人能讲流利汉语，也曾在中国长期学习与工作，但是他们没有经历中国从封闭走向改革开放的过程，缺乏对中国历史的深入感知，更多是从国际体系权力结构、美国霸权利益角度来思考中国，对中国持有戒备之心，以更为现实主义的强硬态度看待中美关系发展方向。相比而言，美国老一代“中国通”如傅高义、蓝普顿等对于战争的毁灭性和冷战带来的紧张感有着真实的感受与记忆，他们还经历了中美苏大三角关系的转换过程，更懂得接触政策和中美互利共赢的重要意义。
第二，以“仕”促“学”的研究背景。老一代“中国通”如傅高义等终生投身于思想界，其研究从社会学角度出发，不囿于特定专业或领域，倾向于通过田野调查获得研究数据，并以中美关系发展历程里的历史重大事件来验证和完善其学术成果，学科训练重定性、轻定量，重实践、轻理论，因而对中国有感性的情愫。随着近年来美国老一代知华派相继退出政治舞台，且有“中国情结”的麦克法夸尔、布热津斯基、傅高义等学者相继离世，美国智库“中国通”已经完成了代际转换。与美国上一代中国问题专家相比，新生代“中国通”在对华认知上关注当下、强调分歧，表现出了鲜明的消极性和对抗性；他们擅长语言表达、理论构架和技术性细节，但却缺乏对中国社会的情感认知和换位思考精神。[ 宋静，司乐如：“美国智库因素影响下的拜登政府对华政策走向”，《世界经济与政治论坛》，2021年第1期，第78页。]他们中的一些人屡次“旋转”于美国学界、政界，以往在政界的工作经历会影响其思维路径,或扭转其看待中国的视角，或更新其研究领域。例如，新生代“中国通”普遍关注新兴技术领域等，促其基于“当今中国”“可能的中国”而不单纯是历史经验中的中国来进行研究判断。但因其过于关注“当今中国”和单方面推理，亦缺乏对中国历史与现实的系统全面的理解，在面对一个宏大的战略问题时，往往会陷入“只见树木不见森林”的困境。
第三，美对华战略竞争的政治背景。美国新生代“中国通”所处的政治环境相对复杂。他们经历特朗普任内中美关系的“自由落体式”下滑，深受中国是“美国战略竞争对手”观念的影响。并且，他们面对一个反全球化、反精英、日趋保守主义的社会思潮环境，以及更讲求“美国优先”的大众舆论氛围,表现出“越年轻，越鹰派”特点。盖洛普(Gallup)2021年3月公布的一项调查显示，对中国持负面看法的美国人占79%，这是这项调查自1979年开始以来美国人对中国好感度最差的一次。[ MOHAMED YOUNIS，“New High in Perceptions of China as U.S.’s Greatest Enemy”，https://news.gallup.com/poll/337457/new-high-perceptions-china-greatest-enemy.aspx（上网时间：2021年3月18日）]皮尤研究中心最近的一项调查显示，10个美国人中有9个将中国视为竞争对手或敌人，近半数人认为美国应寻求遏制中国。[ LAURA SILVER, KAT DEVLIN AND CHRISTINE HUANG，“Most Americans Support Tough Stance Toward China on Human Rights, Economic Issues”，https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/03/04/most-americans-support-tough-stance-toward-china-on-human-rights-economic-issues/ （上网时间：2021年3月18日）]为了迎合对华强硬的政治正确，为自身在政坛后续发展积累资本，新生代“中国通”缺乏将美中关系引入正轨的政治意愿，相反，竭力用其中国研究背景，为美更有效地遏制中国构思新战略、新工具。一些官员对极端声音包容附庸，在国会广交盟友，也可以感受其有强烈的个人政治诉求。
二、美国新生代“中国通”的主要对华认知
早在拜登政府就任前，这批新生代“中国通”就在《外交事务》《外交政策》《纽约时报》等刊物上发表了一系列与中国有关的文章，系统阐述了他们的中国观。他们的对华认知和政策主张上既不同于美国傅高义、蓝普顿等老一代中国问题专家，也和特朗普政府重用的白邦瑞、波廷杰等人有鲜明区别。其主要对华认知有以下五个方面：
（一）视中国为“美国的战略竞争对手”和“需要应对的最大挑战”，但不主张全面“脱钩”。伊莱·拉特纳2020年7月在《华盛顿邮报》撰文称，美中竞争并非新冷战。中国缺乏任何代表东方集团的东西，而美国的联盟体系是军事的而非经济的。中国既是美国最大的贸易伙伴之一，也是最大的地缘政治对手。美国的盟友也还没有准备好与中国全面对抗，他们希望从美国和中国同时获得安全和经济利益。但随着中国实力和影响力越来越大，美国要着手制定更全面的对华战略。[ Richard Fontaine and Ely Ratner，“The U.S.-China confrontation is not another Cold War. It’s something new “，https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/02/us-china-confrontation-is-not-another-cold-war-its-something-new/，（上网时间：2021年2月20日）]
民主党“中国通”主张重新评估中美相互依存关系。针对特朗普政府的对华“脱钩”，伊莱·拉特纳表示，“突然的分离会带来巨大和不必要的成本，‘脱钩’更有可能孤立美国而不是中国，从而产生一个北京控制领先技术、数据和标准，并制定有利于自己的全球贸易和投资规则的世界。”[ Ely Ratner, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Paul Scharre，“Beyond the Trade War”，https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-12-12/beyond-trade-war，（上网时间：2021年2月11日）]他们也承认中国不可能被排除在全球治理体系之外，因此不会放弃中美在特定领域的合作机会。杜如松认为中美存在合作空间，尤其在卫生和气候变化等全球治理议题上，并认为这有助于提升美国的全球影响力。
（二）对中国制度偏见深刻，呼吁美国对民主国家再投资。美国新生代“中国通”普遍认为，中国的发展模式偏离了美国预想的轨道，美务必阻止中国输出制度模式，并积极行动，全方位展现其强大的实力，以实现对中国威慑。劳拉·罗森伯格将中国定义为“反自由主义国家”“威权主义国家”，认为美国应对中国“制度挑战”的关键是对民主国家“再投资”，通过支持盟友、增强公众教育、技术研发、基础设施的投资等方式守护西方民主价值观。[ Laura Rosenberger，“China’s Coronavirus Information Offensive”，https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-22/chinas-coronavirus-information-offensive （上网时间：2021年2月1日）]她还主张美对外协调盟友，对内重组相关机构，实现跨部门、跨行业合作，防止中国利用高科技出口等推销其制度模式。
他们还主张通过“合纵连横”给中国“加压”，希望伺机动摇中国战略道路。朱利安·格维茨主张美国应在国内重振经济、控制新冠疫情、合理安排国防预算、扩大研发投入，向中国证明美国仍然强大，向世界展示美国仍然是自由和平等的灯塔。他建议美国公开指出中国的弱点，包括“人口老龄化、生态危机、大量边界争端以及国际声望下降等”，认为中国战略道路是可以动摇的。[ Julian Gewirtz，“China Thinks America Is Losing”，https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/china-thinks-america-losing （上网时间：2021年2月5日）]蒲杰夫呼吁在多边舞台针对中国展开人权外交攻势。
（三）在经贸、安全、科技等领域开展“议题竞争”。在中美贸易议题上，戴琦认为，特朗普政府看似激进，但本质上仍属守势。美国应增加攻势手段，运用补贴等激励措施以降低美国对中国进口的过度依赖，同时继续利用人权问题、世界贸易组织体系及盟友对华施压。[ “拜登贸易代表提名人戴琪称将抗击中国审查制度等贸易壁垒“，https://cn.reuters.com/article/ustr-nominee-china-0301-mon-idCNKCS2AU03U （上网时间：2021年3月6日）]
在安全议题上，杜如松和坎贝尔于2021年1月联合在《外交事务》杂志撰文指出，美国需要推进印太地区权力均势，在该地区部署远程常规巡航和弹道导弹、无人舰载攻击机和水下运载器、导弹潜艇和高速打击武器，并鼓励地区国家间建立以美国为中心的军事和情报伙伴关系。[ Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi，“How America Can Shore Up Asian Order “，https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-12/how-america-can-shore-asian-order （上网时间：2021年2月12日）]米拉·拉普-胡珀建议美国政府着重投资于高端核威慑和常规威慑能力，以及下一代军事技术的研发，在不诉诸战争的情况下捍卫美国利益。
在关键技术领域，伊莱·拉特纳主张美国通过增加研发支出、税收优惠和政府购买等措施，来鼓励美国公司与中国竞争；扩大高技能签证计划，吸引世界各地优秀人才；与盟友合作，建立一个新的政府间机构，以促进在研发支出、供应链安全、标准制定、出口控制、外国投资审查和敏感技术使用规范等方面的合作与协调，减少对中国的经济依赖，构建遏制中国技术进步的国际联盟。[ Ely Ratner, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Paul Scharre，“Beyond the Trade War”，https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-12-12/beyond-trade-war，（上网时间：2021年2月11日）]
（四）在气候变化、控制疫情等全球性议题上，接受对华“菜单式合作”。美国新生代“中国通”认为，双方合作领域主要是全球性议题和危机管理。朱利安·格维茨称，美中需要管理器其竞争关系，避免竞争带来“最糟糕的结果”。两国必须共同应对气候变化、疫情、核扩散等重大挑战。两国也需要在网络战以及南海争端等“最危险”的领域通过谈判来划定警戒线，并实施有效的危机管理和冲突降温机制。[ Julian Gewirtz，“China Thinks America Is Losing”，https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/china-thinks-america-losing （上网时间：2021年2月5日）]
与此同时，美方有意充当评价合作效果的“裁判”。杜如松表示，要开展“有意义”的合作，同时“建立激励和惩罚机制”，与盟友建立强有力的联盟体系，以可预测的营商环境、气候和国际卫生合作等作为激励杠杆，促使中国接受美国主导下的地区秩序。一旦中国威胁到美国所设想的区域秩序，美国及其盟友则应实施惩罚。[ Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi，“How America Can Shore Up Asian Order “，https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-12/how-america-can-shore-asian-order （上网时间：2021年2月12日）]
（五）重建“新型”自由国际秩序。新生代“中国通”主张美国以“多边主义”主导覆盖各领域的多元合作机制。杜如松认为，美国应主导印太国家围绕供应链、标准、投资体制和贸易协定展开谈判，谋求将供应链回流美国和转移至印太地区其他国家。美国应设法提供其他融资和技术援助，以对冲中国“一带一路”倡议。
米拉·拉普-胡珀认为，冷战后的自由国际秩序已经不复存在，新一届美国政府应该着手建立一个适合21世纪的国际秩序，推进“开放世界”的国际秩序观。这一新的世界秩序既非传统的自由世界秩序，也非孤立主义，重点是符合美国利益。美国需要主导对世贸组织等国际机构的“现代化”，防止中国利用自由世界的开放特征在贸易、科技等领域获益，并在全球推广其制度模式。[ Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper，“A Foreign Policy for the Day After Trump”，https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-09-30/foreign-policy-day-after-trump，（上网时间：2021年2月3日）]
米拉·拉普-胡珀还认为，美国应该重建美国在亚欧的联盟体系，推动盟友分担更多责任。她指出，特朗普要求盟友分担更多责任的要求有理性成分。美国在欧亚的盟友分别面临着俄罗斯和中国的威胁，冷战期间形成的联盟战略已经不符合现在的实际情况，应形成一种美国对高端军事防御负主要责任，地区盟国对低端防务和威慑承担主要责任的新结构。
三、新生代“中国通”对拜登政府对华战略的影响
在拜登政府就职前，人们普遍预计拜登上任后面临的首要问题是国内问题，需要首先控制疫情、提振经济、弥合国内分歧，其后才会腾出手来处理对华关系议题。但从拜登政府上任两个多月的举动来看，拜登本人及主要阁员提及中国的次数远比竞选阶段多。这部分是因为，对华强硬是美国两党所能维系团结的少数议题之一，共和党参议员在拜登内阁成员的提名听证会上反复质询他们的对华态度，对华政策显然已成为拜登绕不开的话题。梳理美国政府的对华言行可以发现，在很大程度上同这些新生代“中国通”的政策建议保持了一致。
（一）强化美国对华“战略竞争”概念。美国总统拜登2021年2月4日在美国国务院发表了他上任后的首次外交政策讲话，他在演讲中称中国是美国“最严峻的竞争者”，表示美国将在人权、知识产权和全球治理方面回应中国“咄咄逼人”的态势，但愿意在符合美国利益的情况下与北京合作。拜登强调，要更好的竞争，美国必须先处理好国内问题，之后与盟友联手，在国际社会占有一席之地，并重建美国的信用与道德权威。
美国国务卿布林肯3月3日发表了其任内首场主要外交政策演讲。他列出了美国外交的八大优先，其中之一是应对中国挑战。他指出，中国是唯一能对现有稳定开放的国际秩序构成严重挑战的国家，美国将与中国在应该的时候竞争，在可以的时候合作，在必要时对抗。但无论是哪种形式，“我们都要以实力地位来跟中国接触”。
白宫国家安全委员会2021年3月3日还公布了拜登政府的《国家安全战略中期指导方针》（以下简称《方针》）。在涉华部分，这份报告指出，世界权力分配正在改变，也带来新的威胁，特别是中国。在美国竞争者当中，只有中国有潜力结合经济、外交、军事与科技力量来持续挑战一个稳定和开放的国际体系。[ “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance “，https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf，（上网时间：2021年3月5日）]
（二）合纵连横构建围堵中国“包围圈”。《方针》中说：“国际联盟优势才是美国最大的战略资产，拜登政府将通过与北约、澳大利亚、新西兰还有亚洲地区的盟友（如日本跟韩国等）合作，在国际上站在一起，迈向一致的愿景，并且团结各国力量，来建立更有效的国际规范，让像中国这样的国家为其行为负责。”
就职以来,拜登政府一直在重建其亚欧盟友体系,在利用七国集团这一旧机制的同时,还试图利用地缘政治或者议题变化创设新机制，如“民主十国”“四方安全对话”“ 科技12国”“ 民主治理联盟”等。拜登2月19日先后视频出席了七国集团峰会和慕尼黑安全会议两场国际会议，他在会上强调了跨大西洋联盟关系的重要性，呼吁主要市场经济体和民主国家必须合作应对中俄等大国带来的挑战，以及核扩散、气候变化和网络安全等跨国挑战，并承诺将加强与盟友合作，共同应对当今时代所面临的独特挑战。[ “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference”， https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference/ （上网时间：2021年2月23日）]
布林肯和美国防部长奥斯丁2021年3月15日首次出访，选择了日本和韩国作为目的地。据《华尔街日报》报道，布林肯与日本外相茂木敏充的会谈，有关中国的讨论占据了90分钟会晤的大部分时间。白宫发言人普萨基明确指出，美国高级官员在与亚洲盟友会晤后再与中国高级官员会晤，这显示出拜登政府将以与盟友步调一致的方式处理对华关系。
（三）“小院高墙”筑牢美国对华科技封锁网。美国国会“中国特别工作组”下设的中美科技关系专家小组的成员，2020年11月发表了长篇政策报告《如何应对中国的挑战：美国的技术竞争新战略》。这篇报告对特朗普政府的对华全面科技封锁政策进行了反思，主张在科技领域对中国采取“小院高墙”的针对性打击办法：确定与国家安全直接相关的特定技术和研究领域（即“小院”），并划定适当的战略边界（即“高墙”）。[ David E. Sanger and Michael Crowley，“As Biden and Xi Begin a Careful Dance, a New American Policy Takes Shape”，https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/17/us/politics/us-china-relations.html?_ga=2.144351669.1403957684.1616299771-875165792.1595034020 （上网时间：2021年3月19日）]这一战略很快得到落实，美高级政府官员2021年2月10日表示，拜登政府将考虑与盟国合作，对向中国出口的某些敏感技术增加“新的有针对性的限制”，以防中国运用并增进其军事能力。
美国两党也在“强化自身”以应对中国技术进步。美国参议院民主党领袖舒默2021年2月23日表示，参议院正积极制定一项旨为与中国展开全面竞争的法案，希望筹措1000亿美元资金以刺激美国国内关键科技领域的研究，包括了从人工智能、量子计算到半导体等领域。这份法案有望在4月份送交参议院审议，鉴于两党在涉华议题上态度比较一致，该法案最终通过的可能性很大。[ Alex Leary，“Republicans Push Biden to Take Aggressive Stance Toward China “，https://www.wsj.com/articles/republicans-push-biden-to-take-aggressive-stance-toward-china-11615800601 （上网时间：2021年3月17日）]
（四）重返多边机构“对冲中国影响力”。在特朗普时代，美国退出了包括联合国教科文组织、气候变化《巴黎协定》等10多个国际组织和条约。与特朗普不同，拜登奉行较为积极的多边主义观，希望通过谈判引领世界议程，通过构建国际秩序来领导世界。拜登在2021年1月20日宣誓就职后，当晚签署了包括美国重返应对气候变化《巴黎协定》、停止退出世界卫生组织等多项行政令。布林肯2月8日表示，美国将以观察员身份重返联合国人权理事会。在拜登政府看来，“我们退出之处，中国已经趁虚而入。”
2021年2月25日走马上任的美国常驻联合国大使琳达·托马斯-格林菲尔德在参议院提名听证会上承诺，她“将在联合国抗衡中国，抗击所有中国在联合国决议中加入有害言辞的努力，并抵制中国在联合国关键岗位安插过多中国公民的做法。”
与特朗普政府奉行的单边主义、“美国优先”、简单粗暴式对华政策相比，民主党“中国通”奉行的对华政策显得更有章法：倚重盟友合作、重视多边主义、重在精确打击。也正因为如此，这套对华战略在实施中面临更多外部因素制约，使其有效性大打折扣。首先，特朗普虽然败选，但特朗普主义在美国仍有强大号召力。特朗普主义本质上是从本土主义和民粹主义的逻辑出发来看待美国自身问题，以孤立主义和“美国优先”为内部问题求解。在特朗普主义者看来，不仅是中国，欧洲、拉美、亚太等都是美国问题的根源之一。本次美国总统选举及其后的一连串事件反映出，特朗普主义在美国有深厚的政治土壤，已成为目前共和党的主流意识形态。在美国未来极有可能再次转向孤立主义和“美国优先”的背景下，美国盟友显然不会把赌注全部压在美国上。其次，拜登政府拉拢的“对华包围圈”能对中国构成多大制约，要看实际进展。美国盟国在如何对抗中国上，远未结成“统一战线”。有多少国家愿冒险响应美国号召有待观察。在美国极力拉拢的国家中，欧盟、日本、韩国、印度和澳大利亚的最大贸易伙伴都是中国，中国市场和产业链对自身非常重要，更希望在美中间寻求平衡而非一边倒。正如2021年2月18日美国《纽约时报》评论所说：“美国决策、欧洲跟随的时代已经结束了，欧洲国家不会在美国定义的战斗中充当僚机。中国可能是美国的竞争对手，但长期以来一直是欧洲的重要贸易伙伴。”第三，美国经贸界和科技企业主张与中国继续合作，构建“全政府”“全社会”对华战略较难如愿。支持拜登与民主党的有三大跨国利益集团，分别是华尔街资本集团、硅谷的高科技企业、好莱坞的“梦工厂”，这三者都希望拜登政府改善与中国关系。美国科技媒体“Protocol”2021年3月15日公布了一份题为《科技工作者如何看待中国、人工智能和科技巨头的巨大力量》的调查报告。调查报告显示，56%的受访者认为美国对中国科技公司限制过头，60%的受访者支持与中国科技公司进行更紧密合作，58%的人认为美中科技领域冲突可能会削弱美国科技产业。[ 张梦旭，“调查显示多数美科技行业从业者支持对华合作”，http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2021-03/17/nw.D110000renmrb_20210317_7-16.htm，（上网时间：2021年3月18日）]美国《新闻周刊》3月10日的一篇文章指出，拜登政府的强硬对华政策使他的一些最大捐助者面临商业风险，从华尔街到硅谷再到好莱坞，它们始终专注于庞大且仍在增长的中国市场，希望美中间的紧张关系进入倒计时。[ BILL POWELL，“Biden’s Tough China Policy Poses Business Risk to Some of His Biggest Donors”，https://www.newsweek.com/2021/03/26/bidens-tough-china-policy-poses-business-risk-some-his-biggest-donors-1574781.html （上网时间：2021年3月20日）]
四、结语
综上所述，如果说特朗普执政是中美关系发生历史性转折的时期，那么拜登执政将是美国对华新战略的重要形成期。当前，美国两党在对华新战略总体目标上已经形成共识，但在具体战术上，拜登政府如何实施与中国“竞争、合作、对抗”三者相结合的关系，还有待观察。可以肯定的是，拜登政府任用的这一批新生代“中国通”，将发挥重要作用。特朗普时期重用的一批所谓中国问题专家，此前长期游离在主流学术圈之外，并无政府或重要智库工作经历，正是这样一批缺乏理性、政策极端、完全听命于特朗普的人，把特朗普零散的、不成体系的对华政策拼凑成为一个完整和系统的反华战略，在美国政府中形成了一股强大的反华势力。[ 周琪，“特朗普的“政治遗产”及拜登政府对华政策展望”，《当代世界》，2021年第2期，第5页]而纵观拜登政府的这批新生代“中国通”，一方面他们是美国精英体系培养出来的建制派人才，遵循美国官僚体系的传统思维模式，决策行为会有较强的可预测性和稳定性；另一方面，他们长期浸染在美国政治圈，竭力为美国维护其战略利益和霸权地位出谋划策，在政商学界有更广泛的人脉和资源，有着更为娴熟的凝聚共识和政治动员手腕。因此，中国如何趋利避害、做好美国新生代“中国通”工作，对于力促两国关系重回正轨极为重要。
一是加强中美智库交流，借助二轨平台推动两国战略沟通。两国需要从战略和行动两个层面来重新认识、稳妥处理两国关系，以创造两国积极合作、和平竞争的新格局，为竞争建立有框架、底线和规则的“笼子”，防止恶性竞争和失去控制。可通过中美智库交往平台，就如何准确把握彼此的政策意图、厘清中美关系的主要症结、探寻管控敏感问题、化解风险障碍进行前期有效沟通。
二是持续关注美新生代“中国通”观点，推进双方在潜在合作领域迈出第一步。支持两国在符合美国利益的领域展开合作，是这些民主党“中国通”的鲜明特点。现在比较明确的是，中美在气候变化、抗击疫情、经济复苏等全球性议题上，在执法、禁毒、网络安全等双边问题上存在合作空间。中国宜摸清美方在这些合作上的合作立场，由易到难、积极互动、构建信任，促成两国关系重回正轨。但我们也要警惕美新生代“中国通”在多边合作方向的新提法和新倡议，避免陷入其预设的政策陷阱。
三是继续做好中美青年学者交流工作，逐步恢复两国人文交流。这些新生代“中国通”有多人曾在中国访学或工作，对人文交流在两国关系的重要性有着切身体会。从传统来看，民主党对于“软实力”输出历来很感兴趣。因此，继续做好中美青年学者交流工作，通过共同办会、联合研究、疫情后实地走访等方式拓宽交流渠道，推动其更加客观全面地认识中国，并为保持中美人文交流打下更坚实的基础，能够有效应对未来美国内政外交的新变化。
（谢卉，中国国际问题研究院美国研究所助理研究员，原文载《国际研究参考》2021年第四期）
