Andrew S. Erickson

Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Coast Guard: Organization, Forces, and Yellow Sea Applications,” in Andrew S. Erickson, ed., Maritime Gray Zone Operations: Challenges and Countermeasures in the Indo-Pacific (New York, NY: Routledge Cass Series: Naval Policy & History, 2022), 54–76.

Introduction

China has by far the world’s largest Coast Guard by number of ships, with the world’s largest Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) ships by size.2 By 2017, following an historically unprecedented two-decade buildup, China’s 17,000-plus CCG personnel crewed 225 ships of over 500 tons capable of operating offshore, and at least another 1,050 vessels confined to closer waters, for a total of over 1,275—more hulls than the Coast Guards of all its regional neighbors combined.3 Five years later, fleet size has stabilized at approximately this level.

This MLE juggernaut is proportionate to China’s other superlative elements of national power. China has the world’s second largest defense budget, funded by what is at least the world’s second largest economy. Among many other defense distinctions, it also has the world’s largest Navy and Maritime Militia by number of ships. Together, China’s three sea forces “form the largest maritime force in the Indo-Pacific.”4 Still more germane to MLE issues, China has the world’s largest fishing fleet and world’s most fishers. It has the world’s largest merchant marine, largest aquaculture and pisciculture industries, and largest marine sector overall. Managing them—together with fisheries enforcement, marine traffic supervision, ensuring safety of life at sea, and customs administration more generally—constitutes a vital mission set for the CCG, inherently requiring numerous ships and personnel to execute fully and effectively.5

But here’s the rub: China also has the world’s most numerous and ex-tensive disputed maritime and island/feature claims, with the largest number of other parties. Addressing them is likewise an important mission for the CCG. The CCG and its predecessor white hull counterparts (the “Five Dragons”—State Oceanic Administration, China Marine Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement, etc.) have been involved in sovereignty disputes for years. (Admiral Swift cites a case with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1960 in his Preface; a more recent example is CCG enforcement of Beijing’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal from 2012 onward.) Beijing employs its MLE forces to advance its disputed sovereignty claims to a greater degree than most other powers, and on a greater scale than all. Moreover, the CCG’s force structure, organization, and leadership have evolved dramatically in recent years, with further developments unfolding as you read these words. An updated understanding of China’s second sea force is therefore long overdue, although it will be far from the final word.

From the CCG’s perspective, the operational environment and key dynamics of the Yellow Sea may be distilled concisely. As Admiral Swift relates from operational experience in his Preface to this volume, the Yellow Sea is a confined, congested, contested zone. Characteristics specific thereto include political sensitivities stemming from proximity to Beijing—as well as Seoul and Pyongyang—and the absence of contested land features between China and either of the Koreas6 (which dispute the status of maritime zones near the Northern Limit Line,7 as Terence Roehrig details in his chapter). This suggests that in the Yellow Sea Beijing places less emphasis on gray zone operations, and the CCG’s role is somewhat different, than in the East and South China Seas. Gregory Poling surveys the key flashpoints in his chapter, the most extensive of which involve fishing rights disputes stemming from overlapping exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims, particularly between China and South Korea. Beijing also opposes the operations of U.S. Navy and other U.S. government vessels in its claimed EEZ, which covers much of the Yellow Sea, and discourages their participation in military exercises nearby. Further complicating matters is North Korean proximity to this waterway and the fact that North Korea has its own fleet of fishing vessels operating in the area—a potential friction point between Beijing and Pyongyang. From the PRC’s perspective, fishing disputes alone justify extensive CCG involvement. All major CCG vessels are potentially relevant to this area of operations, in the sense that they are potentially deployable there even if this is rarely done in practice. This chapter therefore examines China’s overall MLE forces, centered on the CCG, with a particular focus on their leadership, organization, force structure, future trends, and operational employment. … … …

VOLUME INFORMATION

Author of:

• Andrew S. Erickson, “Introduction: Understanding Chinese and North Korean Gray Zone Operations in the Yellow Sea,” 1–18.
• Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Coast Guard: Organization, Forces, and Yellow Sea Applications,” 54–76.