CMSI Note 25—“Precluding the Powerful Enemy: A New PLA Concept for a Taiwan Conflict”
Ryan D. Martinson, “Precluding the Powerful Enemy: A New PLA Concept for a Taiwan Conflict,” CMSI Note 25 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 14 October 2026).
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From CMSI Director CAPT Christopher Sharman, USN (Ret.):
China PLA Watchers: What does the PLA think it must do to dissuade the United States from intervening in a Taiwan conflict?
And if deterrence fails, how does it plan to stop the U.S. military from contributing to Taiwan’s defense?
The PLA has a term for this two-part challenge: preclusion or shezu (慑阻). The concept combines deterrence and denial into a single approach for countering U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan conflict.
The term has appeared with increasing frequency in PLA reporting and academic writing since 2022.
So what exactly is preclusion? Moreover, what can this emerging PLA concept tell us about PLA strategy?
To find out, download China Maritime Studies Institute’s (CMSI) Note #25 authored by Professor Ryan Martinson.
This note offers unique insights into a new PLA concept for a Taiwan conflict. Certainly worth your time!
Key Takeaways:
- In recent years, the PLA has employed a new concept—“preclusion” (shezu)—that captures the two related missions of deterring and denying U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan conflict.
- While the precise origin of the term is unknown, as early as 2019 it appeared in an internal PLA article written by a PLA Navy admiral with direct responsibility for commanding forces in a Taiwan campaign. This early use of the concept suggested that “deterrence” (慑) and “denial” (阻) were two steps in a three-step graduated PLA response to U.S. military intervention.
- Since the intensification of PLA operations around Taiwan that began in 2022, the term has frequently appeared in both PLA reporting and academic writing.
- In Chinese military strategy, “preclusion” would seek to combine defensive operations on “interior lines” and offensive operations on “exterior lines.” The former would rely on shore based cruise and ballistic missiles “to use the land to control the sea,” while the latter would favor long-range air and naval operations to envelop the approaching enemy.
- The “preclusion” concept is essential to PLA thinking on “cognitive warfare,” which seeks, among other aims, to deprive the adversary of the will to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf.
- Precluding U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan conflict is an apparent driver of the PLA Navy’s development and employment of carrier strike groups. It is the core focus of PLA Air Force training and operations beyond the First Island Chain.
