28 January 2015

Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall, Senior Pentagon Weapons Developer, Describes Rapid Chinese Ballistic & Cruise Missile Advances–Even “Going Beyond What [the U.S. Has] Done”

Click here for more information on the House Armed Services Committee Hearing at which Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics), U.S. Department of Defense, recently testified.

House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Defense Department Technological Logistics

28 January 2015

Frank Kendall, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition:

[Underlining added]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We’re at risk and the situation is getting worse. I came back to the Pentagon in 2010 after being away for about 15 years. And the intelligence estimates when I left in 1994, were that China was really not much of a problem for us. But in 10 or 15 years, they possibly could be, based on their economic rate of growth at that time.

I came back and the intelligence estimates were correct. And I became — I think it’s fair to say, alarmed as soon as I started seeing technical intelligence reports on Chinas modernization programs. And I can say the same with Russia’s modernization programs as well. We came out of the Cold War with a very dominant military. We demonstrated that military conclusively in the first Gulf War. And we’ve used it very effectively against any conventional force in the period since.

Since 2001 we’ve been involved in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns, which are a very different kind of threat. No one observed more carefully the dominance that we demonstrated in 1991 than the Chinese. And we demonstrated what Bob Work calls the second offset strategy, which is the capability of precision munitions in particular, but also stealth network forces and wide-area surveillance. And its technologies which an integrated fashion, gave a very dominant capability to our forces.

People had a long time. That was a long time ago. People have had quite a bit of time to think about and to do things about to defeat that force. And what I’m seeing in foreign modernization, again, particularly China’s, is a suite of capabilities that are intended, clearly to me, at least, to defeat the American way of doing power projection — American way of warfare when we fight in an expeditionary manner far from the United States.

Our systems depend upon what I would fall a few high-value assets. And we start with space-based assets, satellites which in relatively small numbers, provide an important function for intelligence, targeting and communications. And I would conclude aircraft carriers, which are the basis for our Naval power projection, which we have a small number, and airfields, which are the basis by which the Air Force is able to project power using mostly fighter aircraft.

Those targets that those represent to an adversary are finite. They’re there in limited numbers. And the precision munitions revolution that we demonstrated has been emulated by others. So if I were worried about one aspect of the threat, I would start by talking about missiles. Both ballistic and cruise missiles that can attack those high-value assets.

I was an Army air defender years ago. And our best air defense systems could get maybe a 70 probability of killed. If you were good, maybe a ninety percent probability killed, against one incoming airplane or missile.

It doesn’t take much to do the math to figure out that if you send a large number of missiles against a single asset, that you are going to get some through. And once those missiles become highly accurate and can kill the thing that you’re trying to actively penetrate, then you have a problem. That’s the change that has occurred. And we’ve pioneered that change, but it’s now been emulated by others. And without saying too much about the Chinese, in particular, and again, through a lesser extent, the Russians, are going beyond what we have done.

They are making advances beyond what we currently have filled. And it’s designed to threaten largely those various high-value assets. Now the department is recognizing this. Dr. Carter who’s here and will be next week, I think, and I have talked about this group. He understands it. Bob Work understands it. Secretary Hagel understands. So we have been doing some things to try to address this problem. But we also have global commitments. We also have readiness concerns. We also have the threat of sequestration in front of us. So this is a serious problem for the country.

And I gave a testimony here in the last year where I talked about the U.S. being challenged at an unprecedented rate. It’s not just missiles, it’s other things, such as electronic warfare capabilities, it’s anti-satellite capabilities and a spectrum of things to defeat our space systems. It’s a number of things, which I think are being developed very consciously to defeat the American way of projecting power and we need to respond to that.

Bill Gertz, “Pentagon Warns of Chinese Arms Dominance, ‘Alarmed’ at PRC Buildup over Last 15 Years,” Washington Free Beacon, 28 January 2015.

[Underlining added]

China’s development of precision weapons and other advanced capabilities has undermined U.S. military superiority, the Pentagon’s senior weapons developer told Congress on Wednesday.

“We’re at risk and the situation is getting worse,” Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, said. …

No one observed more carefully the dominance that we demonstrated in 1991 than the Chinese,” Kendall said, referring to U.S. precision arms capabilities, stealth forces, and ability to conduct wide area surveillance.

“And what I’m seeing [now] in foreign modernization, again, particularly China’s, is a suite of capabilities that are intended, clearly to me, at least, to defeat the American way of doing power projection, [the] American way of warfare when we fight in an expeditionary manner far from the United States,” Kendall said. …

“So if I we’re worried about one aspect of the threat, I would start by talking about missiles.,” he said. “Both ballistic and cruise missiles that can attack those high-value assets.”

China has been aggressively building up its missile forces with as many as six or seven new types of ballistic and cruise missiles of varying ranges, including three new land-based ICBMs and a new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as new intermediate and medium-range missiles. …

“And once those missiles become highly accurate and can kill the thing that you’re trying to actively penetrate, then you have a problem,” he said. “That’s the change that has occurred. And we’ve pioneered that change, but it’s now been emulated by others. And without saying too much about the Chinese, in particular, and again, though to a lesser extent, the Russians, are going beyond what we have done.” …

Heres the bottom line: You don’t need access to the same information as Under Secretary Kendall to reach similar conclusions. Consider the major Chinese missile progress documented below:

ANTI-SHIP BALLISTIC MISSILE (ASBM):

Andrew S. EricksonHow China Got There First: Beijing’s Unique Path to ASBM Development and Deployment,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13.12 (7 June 2013).

Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications, Jamestown Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, May 2013).

Andrew S. Erickson, “China Channels Billy Mitchell: Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Alters Region’s Military Geography,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13.5 (4 March 2013).

Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “China Deploys World’s First Long-Range, Land-Based ‘Carrier Killer’: DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches ‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC),” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 14 (26 December 2010).

Andrew S. Erickson, “Take China’s ASBM Potential Seriously,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 2 (February 2010), p. 8.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Ballistic Trajectory—China Develops New Anti-Ship Missile,” China Watch, Jane’s Intelligence Review 22 (4 January 2010): 2-4.

Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review 62.4 (Autumn 2009): 53-86.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese ASBM Development: Knowns and Unknowns,” Jamestown China Brief 9.13 (24 June 2009): 4-8.

Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 135.3 (May 2009): 26-32.

Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches Equivalent of ‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC)—Where It’s Going and What it Means,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 12 July 2011.

Andrew S. Erickson, “China Testing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM); U.S. Preparing Accordingly–Now Updated With Additional Sources,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 25 December 2010. 

Andrew S. Erickson, A Statement Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “PLA Modernization in Traditional Warfare Capabilities” panel, “China’s Military Modernization and its Impact on the United States and the Asia-Pacific” hearing, Washington, DC, 29 March 2007, 72-78; published in 2007 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 110th Congress, 1st Session, November 2007, 91.

OTHER BALLISTIC MISSILES:

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China’s Strategic Rocket Force: Upgrading Hardware and Software (Part 2 of 2),” Jamestown China Brief 14.14 (17 July 2014).

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China’s Strategic Rocket Force: Sharpening the Sword (Part 1 of 2),” Jamestown China Brief 14.13 (3 July 2014).

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China Goes Ballistic,” The National Interest 131 (May-June 2014): 58-64.

Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, “A Competitive Strategy with Chinese Characteristics? The Second Artillery’s Growing Conventional Forces and Missions,” in Thomas Mahnken, ed., Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 206-18.

Andrew Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, “China’s Ballistic Missiles: A Force to be Reckoned With,” China Real Time Report (中国事实报), Wall Street Journal, 24 August 2012.

Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, “The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting,” Asian Security, 8.2 (Summer 2012): 115-37.

Christopher T. Yeaw, Andrew S. Erickson, and Michael S. Chase, “The Future of Chinese Nuclear Policy and Strategy,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, eds., Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 53-80.

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China’s SSBN Force: Transitioning to the Next Generation,” Jamestown China Brief, Vol. 9, No. 12 (10 June 2009).

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “An Undersea Deterrent? China’s Emerging SSBN Force,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 135, No. 4 (June 2009), pp. 36-41.

Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, and Christopher T. Yeaw, “The Future of Chinese Deterrence Strategy,” Jamestown China Brief, Vol. 9, No. 5 (4 March 2009), pp. 6-9.

Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, and Christopher T. Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32.1 (February 2009): 67-114.

CRUISE MISSILES:

Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, “A Potent Vector: Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments,” Joint Force Quarterly 75 (4thQuarter/30 September 2014): 98-105.

Dennis GormleyAndrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, “China’s Cruise Missiles: Flying Fast Under the Public’s Radar,” The National Interest (12 May 2014).

Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2014).