Installing a Safety on the “Loaded Gun”? China’s Institutional Reforms, National Security Commission and Sino-Japanese Crisis (In)Stability
Andrew S. Erickson and Adam P. Liff, “Installing a Safety on the ‘Loaded Gun’? China’s Institutional Reforms, National Security Commission and Sino-Japanese Crisis (In)Stability,” Journal of Contemporary China 25.98 (March 2016): 197-215.
Abstract
As China’s active assertion of its claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has increasingly crowded the surrounding waters and airspace with military and paramilitary forces, the risk of a Sino–Japanese crisis has reached unprecedented heights. Neither side wants conflict, but the increased frequency and proximity at which vessels and aircraft encounter one another means that overall risk has grown proportionately. Were a miscalculation or even an unintended low-level incident to occur, de-escalation would hinge on each side’s respective internal crisis management capabilities and political leaders’ ability to communicate expeditiously. This article analyzes China’s side of the ledger. Specifically, it assesses the extent to which institutional reforms since the 2001 US–China EP-3 crisis have ameliorated longstanding weaknesses in China’s crisis management capabilities and its ability to communicate via hotlines with Japan. While significant issues and obstacles to further urgently needed improvements remain, with the establishment of a Central National Security Commission (CNSC) and other recent reforms, Beijing may finally be achieving modest improvements. Bilaterally, however, no Sino–Japanese crisis hotline exists to date.
I. Motivating the study: minimizing risks
Especially since 2010, China’s increasing employment of military and paramilitary forces to assert vast sovereignty claims has unsettled its neighbors and the United States—an ally or security partner of most disputants. Circumstances are particularly worrisome in the East China Sea. China and Japan are East Asia’s two largest economies, and each has a powerful military. Both enjoy close economic ties with the United States, and each other. Yet in recent years the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have evolved into a symbolic and substantive bilateral flashpoint. Reasons are manifold, involving history, identity, sovereignty and strategic value.
Key questions about China’s relevant capabilities include:
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Is Beijing actively adopting institutional measures to minimize risk and the likelihood that even an unintended, low-level incident could escalate?
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Internally, how effectively can China’s political institutions manage an external crisis of the sort possible in the East China Sea? Have China’s leaders implemented reforms to significantly enhance crisis management? In particular, what role is China’s newly established CNSC likely to play?
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Externally, how capable is Beijing of rapidly and effectively managing a crisis diplomatically? Regarding the East China Sea, is China working with Japan to implement and reliably employ bilateral crisis management mechanisms to maximize the likelihood that escalation can be prevented diplomatically?
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II. Lessons from post-Cold War Chinese crisis management
China–US crisis management
2001 EP-3 crisis.
China–Japan crisis management
Disturbing trend lines in the air and on the sea.
Specific incidents.
2013 PLA fire-control radar incidents.
2013 Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
III. Assessing China’s crisis management weaknesses
IV. Lessons learned? China’s internal crisis management capabilities: progress and prospects
Jiang and Hu eras: NSLSG and failed efforts to establish a Chinese NSC
Xi era: institutional reforms and CNSC’s establishment
China’s CNSC: reasons for establishment.
Organizational structure and current status.
While CNSC’s full membership remains secret, the next rung of authority is probably populated by Standing Committee members—PBSC members and State Councilors responsible for key aspects of security affairs. CNSC reportedly has a Standing Committee with 17–18 principals representing major agencies responsible for Xi’s 11 security areas, including the Ministry of Commerce, National Development and Reform Commission, MSS, Ministry of Public Security (MPS), People’s Bank of China, Taiwan Affairs Office, and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, as well as small working groups.67 CMC Vice Chairman General Fan Changlong is also apparently a member.68 Under Li in the SC, MPS Minister Meng Jianzhu likewise probably plays a vital role, as domestic stability is ensured by the People’s Armed Police, under joint SC–CMC control.69Politburo member Wang Huning, director of the CPCCC’s Policy Research Office, is reportedly a member too.70 Finally, ministerial leaders functionally representing manifold security-related agencies comprise the working level. One foreign expert claims that ‘they have set up an intelligence bureau, but not much more structurally, and they are interviewing/recruiting academics/scholars to be advisors’.71 Xi apparently leads an informatization and Internet security LSG within CNSC.72 Other logical stakeholders from China’s official foreign policy process include:
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agencies under direct Party control, including the CPC International Department (ID) and Central Propaganda Department (CPD);
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agencies under the SC, including MFA, MSS and Xinhua; and
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the PLA.
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Despite present limitations, at least some Chinese stakeholders are championing CNSC’s evolution into a robust US NSC-like organization. One US official the authors interviewed believes Chinese leaders have a vision for making CNSC an effective and influential organization, ‘but are still trying to figure out how to implement it’. A PLA officer states,
(Limited) progress and remaining obstacles
V. Developments in Sino–Japanese bilateral crisis management capabilities
VI. Conclusion
In short, there is no clear evidence that CNSC yet constitutes a major institutional reform likely to have significant implications for external crisis management in the East China Sea or elsewhere.
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CNSC appears focused on preventing terrorism, separatism and domestic unrest.
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Xi’s attention is likely too diffused to effectively run the CNSC he chairs formally. Its efficacy will depend on prioritization.
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Xi, not a dedicated NSA, heads CNSC. Japanese and US NSAs or other officials continue to lack an obvious counterpart with which to diffuse crises with China diplomatically.
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Fundamental internal coordination obstacles to timely, effective crisis management discussed earlier appear largely unaddressed.
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Accordingly, China’s CNSC is unlikely to be effective at the working level (particularly in interaction with other nations) during an actual crisis.
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