11 July 2017

From Management Crisis to Crisis Management? Japan’s Post-2012 Institutional Reforms and Sino-Japanese Crisis (In)Stability

Journal Articles Journal of Strategic Studies

My latest peer-reviewed article has just been published in the newest print issue of Journal of Strategic Studies. I coauthored it with Professor Adam P. Liff of Indiana University. We address the important but under-studied subjects of Japan’s National Security Council (NSC), its post-2012 institutional reforms, and Sino-Japanese crisis (in)stability. In doing so, we analyze the likely implications of recent organizational restructuring and enhancement, especially the new NSC, for Japan’s crisis management capabilities—particularly vis-à-vis tensions with China over competing sovereignty claims in the East China Sea.

Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “From Management Crisis to Crisis Management? Japan’s Post-2012 Institutional Reforms and Sino-Japanese Crisis (In)Stability,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40.5 (2017): 604–38.

Abstract: Since 2012, China’s assertion of its sovereignty claim to the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has significantly raised the risk of a potentially escalatory political-military crisis with Japan. As circumstances worsen, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has championed major institutional reforms aimed at centralizing Japanese security policy decision-making and vastly improving crisis management. This article assesses these reforms’ significance for ameliorating Japan’s long-standing internal crisis management weaknesses, and enhancing its ability to communicate with Beijing promptly under challenging conditions. While significant issues remain, recent developments – especially the establishment of Japan’s first-ever National Security Council – demonstrate significant progress. Bilaterally, however, important firebreaks remain conspicuously absent.

Keywords: Japan, crisis management, security, National Security Council, China

Selected Text:

Since September 2012, China’s employment of military and paramilitary forces to challenge Japan’s decades-old administrative control of the Senkaku (Chinese: Diaoyu) Islands has introduced significant uncertainty and risk into the most volatile flashpoint between the world’s second and third largest economies. Under this ‘new normal,’ China’s civil maritime and air forces, backed by navy and air force power, provocatively assert Beijing’s sovereignty claim. The stakes are high: conflict–even unintended–between China and Japan (with its US ally) over the uninhabited islands could be catastrophic. It would involve the world’s three largest economies and be disastrous for regional and global stability, as well as the world economy.

Despite these manifest costs, and the fact that neither Beijing nor Tokyo wants conflict, the post-2012 operational status quo has significantly increased the possibility of even an unintended miscalculation or incident. Especially in a potentially volatile domestic political context, a subsequent political-military crisis could escalate if not managed rapidly and effectively. History provides particularly sobering lessons regarding the escalation risks in territorial disputes, however ill-advised on material grounds. A vast political science literature demonstrates that disputes over territory are the primary cause of most modern wars.1 During remarks on bilateral tensions at the 2014 World Economic Forum, the Japanese prime minister’s (PM) ominous reference to strong economic ties failing to prevent war in 1914 made global headlines.2

Specific to the East China Sea (ECS), global commentators and political and military leaders from both sides have warned of escalation risks, wisely calling for enhanced crisis management to ensure robust firebreaks and failsafes. In this context, operational realities, especially given deepening regional tensions, power shifts, and North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, have rendered the maturity of Japan’s internal crisis management institutions, and the degree to which Tokyo and Beijing are capable of managing a crisis effectively, important policy concerns to all interested in East Asian peace and stability. This is especially true for Washington–Japan’s sole security ally and China’s top trading partner.

Remarkably, however, how capable the two sides are of actually managing a possible crisis remains a crucial, yet rarely engaged question. This study offers the first systematic assessment of post-2012 developments regarding Japan’s internal and external crisis management capabilities most relevant to the ECS. It complements recent scholarship examining China’s side of the ledger,3 and provides extensive assessment of recent institutional reforms, especially the impact of Japan’s new National Security Council (JNSC).

Not coincidentally, a dynamic environment in Tokyo means the time is ripe for reexamination of Japanese institutions and practices. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Prime Minister Shinzo Abe returned to the Kantei in December 2012. This was only 3 months after his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) predecessor’s decision to have the Japanese government purchase the islands from private Japanese citizens (so-called ‘nationalization’ of the islands), which Beijing had seized upon as a rationale for its own increasingly assertive behavior. Building on the work of his predecessors, Abe has subsequently accelerated and championed new institutional and other reforms designed to directly address long-standing issues with Japan’s security policy- and crisis management-relevant institutions. Chief among these: the 2013 establishment of Japan’s first-ever NSC. Its creation reflects and occurs concomitantly with Abe’s centralization of security decision-making in the executive branch, itself a manifestation of a long-term trend of institutional and security policy reforms driven by external national security challenges (China; North Korea) and deepening US pressure; all enabled by shifting domestic political winds. Externally, Abe’s administration has also pursued negotiations with Beijing on the establishment of robust bilateral crisis management hotlines to serve as diplomatic firebreaks.

Beyond policy relevance, the issues examined herein also have important implications for academic literatures on East Asian international relations, comparative politics, Sino-Japanese relations, and Japanese politics and foreign policy. In assessing the drivers and significance of recent developments, this article draws primarily on newly available Japanese Government and think tank documents, analyses, and interviews with knowledgeable interlocutors in Tokyo, Washington, and Beijing. It also builds on a small but important English-language scholarly literature on Japan’s crisis management.4 … … …

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Thomas Christensen, Thomas Fingar, Taylor Fravel, Michael Green, Takako Hikotani, Ken Kotani, Alexandra Sakaki, Richard Samuels, and Jim Schoff for substantive feedback at earlier stages of this project, as well as audiences at the following venues for insightful questions and comments: Princeton University’s China and the World speaker series, Harvard University’s Program on US–Japan Relations seminar series, Stanford University’s Shorenstein APARC Public Seminar speaker series, and the International Studies Association’s 2016 Annual Conference. They are grateful to Ayumi Teraoka for suggesting valuable resources, and to dozens of experts and current and former officials in Tokyo, Beijing, and Washington for the opportunity to interview them on condition of anonymity.

Additional author information

Adam P. Liff is assistant professor of East Asian International Relations at Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies (SGIS) and Associate-in-Research at Harvard University’s Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies and Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. His research website is https://adampliff.com/.

Andrew S. Erickson is a professor of Strategy at the US Naval War College and associate-in-research at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. He maintains the research websites www.andrewerickson.com and www.chinasignpost.com.

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