30 September 2024

CMSI Translation #7: “Guarantee of Strategic Security: Expert Discusses China’s Strategic Nuclear Submarines Achieving Continuous Duty”

China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) Chinese Language 中文 Translations (Published)

From CMSI Director CAPT Christopher H. Sharman, USN (Ret.):

This translation is rich! A must-read for anyone interested in China’s submarine operations – specifically strategic nuclear submarines, China’s maritime objectives, as well as PRC deterrence plans and intentions! 
Straight from the pages of China’s Ordnance Industry Science Technology Journal, CMSI brings you a translation of an interview with Chi Guocang, a former PLAN submarine officer who taught at the PLAN Submarine Academy.
In this article, Chi discusses how China’s strategic nuclear forces have achieved “continuous readiness duty.”  He defines this as the capability to maintain a nuclear “triad” 24-hours a day under any weather and environmental conditions. For PLAN’s nuclear submarine force, this means multiple SSBNs jointly supporting at least one SSBN having the technical training and C2 to be at a state of at-sea readiness at all times to serve as a strategic deterrent. 
 
There are tons of nuggets in this translation, including:
  • The article discusses SSBN communications.
  • It highlights acoustic vulnerabilities of the Type 094 caused by its design.
  • At least four SSBNs are required to have one SSBN on continuous duty. Six SSBNs provide the PLAN with redundancy to support this capability.
  • Psychological and physiological factors that limit the “duty rate” of SSBNs.
  • Multiple crews operate aboard individual PLAN SSBNs – (p. 16) “at least two boats and four crews capable of skillfully operating …”
  • There is an extensive discussion of how the PLAN sees the South China Sea as a “bastion” for its PLAN SSBNs.
    • The Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and other sea areas are too narrow and not deep enough to serve as a bastion.
    • Military facilities on reefs in the Spratly Islands provide the reconnaissance and defense systems necessary for the SCS to serve as a “bastion.”
    • Within a “bastion” SSBNs need to be escorted by air, surface, and/or subsurface platforms.
  • The article highlights technological developments on the horizon that will enable China to have a “two-ocean” (Pacific and Indian Ocean) sea-based strategic nuclear force.
A very important discussion in this article is on its last pages where Chi addresses the military operational significance Taiwan. “If China does not take back Taiwan and control the surrounding waters, Chinese nuclear submarines …will be subject to the surveillance of the 7th Fleet and U.S. forces…” “Recovering Taiwan island and its surrounding affiliated islands is an inevitable requirement for a strong and prosperous China.”
 
This article was meticulously translated by CMSI affiliate, Professor Nick Henderson. His Bio is HERE.  Mr. Henderson previously served as a research associate to the William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics in the Strategic and Operational Research Department (SORD) of the U.S. Naval War College. We greatly appreciate Professor Henderson’s continued support and his valuable contribution to CMSI’s body translated works. CMSI’s other recent translations are available HERE.
SELECTED TEXT:

In April of this year, the U.S. Department of Defense released a China military power report, which stated that the Chinese Navy currently has at least six Type 094 ballistic missile nuclear submarines, and has the capability for at least one of them to be on continuous readiness duty. It also said that this is the first time it has been possible for the Chinese Navy to permanently maintain at least one strategic missile nuclear submarine at sea to perform strategic duty tasks.

So, what is “continuous readiness duty” (quatianhou zhanbei zhiban),2 how can it be achieved, and why did the Chinese Navy only just now acquire this capability? With these questions in mind, we interviewed Professor Chi Guocang (迟国仓) of the PLAN Submarine Academy and asked him to give us a detailed explanation.3

1 本刊记者 [Staff Reporter], 战略安全之保障—专家谈中国战略核潜艇实现全天候值班 [“Guarantee of Strategic Security: Expert Discusses China’s Strategic Nuclear Submarines Achieving Continuous Duty”], 兵工科技 [Ordnance Industry Science Technology], no. 13 (2023), pp. 41-51.

2 Translator’s Note: The Chinese term for “continuous” (全天候) literally means “under all conditions.”

3 Translator’s Note: Chi Guocang joined the PLA Navy in 1976. After a career serving as a submarine officer (including as a boat CO), Chi was posted to the PLAN Submarine Academy in 2001, mainly teaching courses on operational command. He retired from the Submarine Academy in 2017. Source: https://www.mva.gov.cn/fengcai/tyjrfc/tyjr/202405/t20240520_420140.html

Continuous Strategic Duty

Staff Reporter: Hello, Professor Chi, some time ago a report released by the U.S. Pentagon stated that for the first time, the Chinese Navy can permanently sustain at least one strategic missile nuclear submarine at sea to perform strategic duty missions. The report also said that this marks the first time that the Chinese Navy has achieved continuous readiness of strategic nuclear submarines. May I ask, what is continuous strategic duty?4

4 Translator’s Note: The staff reporter must be referring to the 2022 China Power Report, which states that “the PRC is conducting continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six JIN-class (Type 094) submarines (SSBNs).” See Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2022), U.S. Department of Defense, November 2022, p. 94.

Professor Chi Guocang: Continuous strategic duty refers to the national “triad” (including land-based, sea-based, and air-based) of strategic nuclear forces being able to operate 24 hours a day in peacetime at any time and under any weather and environmental conditions, with a certain number of nuclear forces able to maintain a high degree of combat readiness, capable at all times of implementing strategic nuclear deterrence against enemy countries at the direction of the supreme command. In wartime, they can conduct nuclear counter-attack against the enemy at any time, as directed by the supreme command.

The continuous strategic duty of strategic nuclear submarines usually means that multiple strategic nuclear submarines jointly ensure that at least one strategic nuclear submarine maintains a state of at-sea readiness duty 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and under various complex weather and sea conditions, ensuring that at least one strategic nuclear submarine can complete nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack (also called second strike) against enemy countries upon an order from the supreme command.

The continuous strategic duty of strategic nuclear submarines usually means that multiple strategic nuclear submarines jointly ensure that at least one strategic nuclear submarine maintains a state of at-sea readiness duty 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and under various complex weather and sea conditions, ensuring that at least one strategic nuclear submarine can complete nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack (also called second strike) against enemy countries upon an order from the supreme command.

Staff Reporter: Is it difficult to achieve continuous strategic duty? China has had strategic missile nuclear submarines for many years. Why has the PLAN only recently achieved continuous strategic duty?

Professor Chi Guocang: Whether strategic nuclear submarines can achieve continuous strategic duty is not only related to strategic nuclear submarine weaponry and equipment technology, but also to the quantity and support capabilities for strategic nuclear submarine weapons and equipment. And it has an even greater relationship to the level of readiness training of the strategic nuclear submarine force and its submarine command and control (C2) capabilities. It can be said that in all respects the standards are extremely demanding, and it was not easy for China to achieve it. … …

Staff Reporter: Can China’s number of strategic nuclear submarines meet the criteria you just laid out?

Professor Chi Guocang: A recent U.S. Pentagon research report pointed out that the Chinese Navy currently has six Type 094 strategic nuclear submarines in service and has begun continuous strategic duty. Therefore, we can assume that based on the number of strategic nuclear submarines and the multi-year operational employment mechanism of the United States, Russia, Britain, France and other countries, if China’s strategic nuclear submarine force wants to always have one submarine on duty, then it needs at least a total of four subs. Considering that there is still a gap in the technical level of China’s strategic nuclear submarines, and the scope of the sea area [for SSBN operations] is much larger than that of Britain and France, one boat is not adequate assurance. Six is a more reasonable number to ensure that there is enough redundancy to deal with emergencies.

However, six SSBNs is less than half that of the United States and Russia. There is also an obvious gap in the technical level of China’s nuclear submarines and weapons and equipment. Moreover, the at-sea duty of strategic nuclear submarines is a chief standard of evaluation for the effectiveness and reliability of the comprehensive operational and command support system.

This places high demands on strategic nuclear submarines, submarine weapons and equipment technology, on the overall training levels of the nuclear submarine force’s crews, on the planning (mouhua, jihua) and command and control of the submarine command organization, as well as the submarine duty rate (qinwulü). … …

Staff Reporter: What is the longest record of underwater duty time for a nuclear submarine?

Professor Chi Guocang: Several major naval powers have conducted tests in this area. The USS Triton nuclear submarine’s underwater circumnavigation test lasted 84 days. It sailed around the world underwater along the equator. Two Soviet nuclear submarines sailed around the world underwater for 20,000 miles for a total of 52 days. Starting from the Northern Fleet, [the submarines] passed through the Atlantic Ocean – Drake Strait – Pacific Ocean – Kamchatka Peninsula nuclear submarine base strategic transition test [sic]. According to sources, a Chinese Type 091 nuclear submarine sailed at sea for 90 days to verify its maximum self-sufficiency, which is the longest, publicly-disclosed recorded time in the world. … …

Professor Chi Guocang: It can only be set up in the South China Sea, because the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and other sea areas are not only too narrow but also not deep enough. The average water depth of the Yellow Sea is only a few dozen meters, and while the average water depth of the East China Sea is bit deeper, it is still only 300+ meters. Conventional submarines operating are a bit cramped (jucu), and they are surrounded by the dense underwater monitoring networks set up by the United States and Japan. They are not at all suitable for strategic nuclear submarine operational deployment. The South China Sea, however, is different. The average water depth reaches 1,200+ meters, and the sea area is fairly vast. There are many islands, reefs, sand tables, and trenches. The underwater geographical environment is complex. It is a good place for strategic nuclear submarines to maneuver and hide. Moreover, with construction completed on the three large islands and reefs in the Spratly Islands, China can build a relatively complete reconnaissance and defense system in the South China Sea to meet the needs of setting up a strategic bastion. However, regarding the deployment of strategic nuclear submarines in the South China Sea, although their range does not meet the requirements for attacking anywhere [in the territory] of strategic opponents, they can hit most places, which is enough for strategic counterattacks.

Staff Reporter: Do strategic nuclear submarines need to be escorted by other ships when entering and exiting the bastion?

Professor Chi Guocang: Definitely. Building a strategic nuclear submarine maritime bastion requires not only the guarding [operations] (jingjie) of surrounding surface ships, but also air and underwater cover and guarding.

Staff Reporter: For the Chinese Navy and China, what is the significance of realizing the continuous readiness of strategic nuclear submarines?

Professor Chi Guocang: Achieving continuous combat readiness for strategic nuclear submarines is hugely significant and might even be called a milestone. [It means that] China possesses three types of strengths and capabilities, viz., mature comprehensive technology, skilled crew operation, and reliable submarine command and control. First, it shows that China’s strategic nuclear submarines, the ballistic missiles they carry, and other weapons and equipment are reliable and compatible. All the systems aboard the submarine are adapted to operating in various complex meteorological and sea-state conditions, and the integrated technologies of the nuclear submarines and submarine-launched missiles have matured. Second, it shows that China’s strategic nuclear submarine force maintains the strength and capability of at least two boats and four crews capable of skillfully operating strategic nuclear submarines and launching ballistic missiles. Third, [it shows that] the Central Military Commission and the Strategic Command (zhanlue silingbu) have the strength and capabilities for reliable command and control and combat support. … …

Staff Reporter: What other breakthroughs does China need to make in its strategic nuclear submarine technology? How will it develop in the future?

Professor Chi Guocang: A breakthrough in the comprehensive upgrading of China’s strategic nuclear submarine technology is on the near horizon (zheng zai daolai). At present, the main publicly-reported technologies include single-hull with large-diameter, 16 to 20 ballistic missiles, shaftless or short-axis pump-jet propulsion, electric propulsion system, X rudder, high-power integrated nuclear reactor with an ultra-long-life reactor core, and the “Julang 3” (JL-3) submarine-launched missile with a range of 8,000 to 10,000 kilometers and MIRVs increased to between 6 and 8. The breakthroughs, maturation, and improvements in these technologies will surely provide a reliable guarantee for the scaled development (guimo fazhan) of China’s newtype strategic nuclear submarine force, in order to meet the needs for two-ocean employment (Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean) of China’s sea-based strategic nuclear force.

Staff Reporter: In the future, as China’s nuclear submarine technology improves, will the strategic bastion no longer be limited to the South China Sea and can it be set up in the broader Pacific Ocean?

Professor Chi Guocang: Yes. With the comprehensive improvement of its strategic nuclear submarine weapons and equipment—truly reaching the level of strategic nuclear submarine technologies utilized by the United States, Russia, and other countries—China will inevitably develop a certain scale of strategic nuclear submarine force directed at its strategic opponent(s). If China does not take back Taiwan island and control the surrounding waters, Chinese strategic nuclear submarines moving towards the Pacific will be subject to the surveillance of the 7th Fleet and U.S. forces stationed at military bases in the Asia-Pacific and near Japan and South Korea, especially the underwater sonar monitoring systems deployed in various straits and waterways of the first island chain. Also, there are the reconnaissance and surveillance systems of surface warships, submarines, and unmanned submersibles, all of which constitute a severe threat to Chinese strategic nuclear submarines entering and exiting the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, recovering Taiwan island and its surrounding affiliated islands is an inevitable requirement for a strong and prosperous China. Only by completing this historic mission can China’s strategic depth be moved forward towards the Pacific Ocean. Only by doing so can [China] move beyond the first island chain and be less constrained by imperialist powers. Only then can China’s strategic nuclear submarines form a truly powerful deterrent to strategic opponents.

PREVIOUS TRANSLATIONS IN THE SERIES:

New resource from Newport! Go straight to the source, in the PLA Navy’s own words… Check out the published translations in CMSI’s new product line! We bring you expertly-translated English versions of two articles from a series in Beijing’s official naval newspaper to help PRC naval personnel understand fundamental characteristics of intelligent warfare and grasp key implications of Xi Jinping’s 20th Party Congress report—in which he called for the PLA to “accelerate the development of unmanned intelligent combat forces.” Don’t read 中文? 没问题—CMSI takes you straight to the original source in English!

Click here to access CMSI’s series of translations.

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Liu Lijiao and Jia Benjia, “Building a World-Class Navy in a Comprehensive Way: Its Logic in Theory, History, and Practice,” CMSI Translation 6 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 11 September 2024).

From CMSI Director CAPT Christopher H. Sharman, USN (Ret.):

China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) Friends and Colleagues –

Xi Jinping first called for building a “World Class Navy” at a fleet review off Hainan Island in April 2018. But what does is Xi’s directive mean? What are its practical implications? What are the characteristics of a World Class Navy?

Since Xi’s call for a “World Class Navy”, several Chinese military authors have speculated about its meaning. Few articles, however, address this idea as extensively and as straightforwardly as today’s CMSI translation. CMSI is pleased to provide you with the translation of an article titled, “Building a World Class Navy in a Comprehensive Way”.

This article is pulled from the pages of Military History, a bimonthly journal published by the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS). Its authors are affiliated with the PLAN’s Naval Research Institute – suggesting they likely have insights into the requirements driving the construction of China’s future navy. The authors frame their article with a clear goal –  a World Class Navy must focus on wining wars against the Strong Enemy opponent – a euphemism for defeating the United States and its Navy.

This CMSI translation is a must read for anyone who wants to know about the first rate maritime force that China seeks. Here are a few of the highlights pulled from the article:

  • The authors trace the comments Mao, Deng, Jiang, and Hu, about PLAN development and highlight how Xi’s directives are unique and how Xi has made China’s Navy buildup a strategic priority.
  • The article highlights four characteristics of a World Class Navy. These include improving its capability to wage war in the near seas, improving overseas security capabilities and the ability to safeguard China’s overseas interests, the incorporation of advanced technologies and developing weapons systems that mix man and machine, and advancing the Community of Common Destiny – a governance system at sea that strengthens China’s voice and influence in international maritime governance. The authors elaborate on each of these characteristics or “strategic needs” in the article.
  • It details the guiding principles that shape how the PLAN will develop its World Class Navy capabilities and highlights the PLAN focus on innovation, reorganization for far seas operations, talent development, and weapons and equipment.

This CMSI translation is a goldmine – one that warrants a careful read.  It was meticulously translated by CMSI’s own Professor Ian Easton whose attention to nuanced detail helps to ensure the important concepts addressed in this article are accurately translated.  Our thanks to Professor Easton for his painstaking work!

EXCERPT:

“Building a world-class navy in a comprehensive way” is a vivid embodiment and concrete manifestation of the Chinese Communist Party’s goal of building a strong military in the new era, as expressed in the domain of naval building and operations. This is both a major theoretical issue and practical issue. When it comes to realizing the centenary military building goal and creating a new situation via naval modernization, this will have major and far-reaching importance. [We must] deeply understand its internal logic in theory, history, and practice to accelerate naval transformation and development, and elevate at-sea deterrence and combat capabilities. … … …

***

Yu Yunxian and Zhang Pengxuan, “Strengthen National Defense Mobilization and Reserve Force Construction,” CMSI Translation 5 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 14 August 2024).

From CMSI Director CAPT Christopher H. Sharman, USN (Ret.):

China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) Friends and Colleagues –

The authors of this article work at China’s National Defense University within the College of Joint Operations. They beat the drum on reforms to national defense mobilization and reserve forces – a topic that has received increased attention since the 20th National Congress report, which proposed “strengthening national defense mobilization and reserve force construction.”
This translation complements CMSI Note #7, which was published by CMSI last week. The CMSI Note addressed efforts to improve the PLAN Reserve. Reading this translation in conjunction with the CMSI Note underscores the PLA emphasis on enhancing the intellectual and technological support of the Reserve forces.
The authors of this article make several key points:
  • Strengthening national defense mobilization and reserve force construction is necessary to achieve the PLA’s 2027 centennial military goal and helps to enhance deterrence.
  • The article identifies disaster relief and maritime rights protection as some of the missions for these forces.
  • There is an emphasis on realistic combat training, integrating high-tech cutting-edge technologies, and mil-civ fusion so that these forces can maximize support to PLA combat power in future wars.
  • The article highlights the need to actively manage Reserve talent through academic training, training in the field, and professional military education.
There is much more in this translation that will likely pique your interest. We ask that you forward this translation to those who need to see it.
EXCERPTS:

The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party proposed “strengthening national defense mobilization and reserve force construction.” In the face of the Era’s requirements for strengthening the country and the military, the serious situation of national security, and the real existence of the risk of war, we must place the construction of national defense mobilization and reserve forces in a more important strategic position, and strive to promote the high-quality development of national defense mobilization and reserve force construction from a new starting point.

Deeply understand the significance of strengthening national defense mobilization and reserve force construction in this Era.

The deepest source of the power of war lies within the people. Looking back at history, national defense mobilization and reserve forces always provided us with strong backing as we went from victory to victory; in the New Era, national defense mobilization and reserve forces are still where our strength, foundation, and confidence lie in shaping the security situation, containing crises and conflicts, and winning local wars.

Strengthening national defense mobilization and the construction of reserve forces is an inherent requirement for striving to achieve the People’s Liberation Army centennial goal.3 Striving to achieve the People’s Liberation Army centennial goal is the will of the Party and the expectation of the people. National defense mobilization and reserve force construction is not only a part of the Party’s military strengthening, but also an important support for winning future wars. At present, national defense mobilization and reserve force construction is in a critical stage of improving quality and efficiency. We must focus on changes in science and technology, war, and opponents, actively adapt to the characteristics and laws of information technology-based (xinxihua) and intelligent (zhinenghua) warfare, change mobilization concepts, optimize mobilization modes, enhance mobilization capabilities, innovate mobilization means, and deliver a satisfactory answer in the great journey of strengthening and revitalizing the military. … … …

Focus on high-end warfare and further enhance mobilization capabilities. Against the backdrop of great power competition, future wars will be high-end wars that unfold in multi-dimensional spaces and are mainly characterized by full depth (quan zongshen), high intensity, and new technology. We need to deeply study the essential characteristics and winning mechanisms of high-end warfare, and accurately grasp the new demands and requirements that high-end warfare puts forward for national defense mobilization and reserve force construction. We need to accelerate the development of high-tech industries, increase military and local civilian cooperation in high-tech fields, and further cultivate the potential of national defense to support winning high-end wars. We need to expand the construction of mobilization information network systems and information technology-based and intelligent command means, strengthen the case-based preparation and actual combat training of national defense mobilization and reserve forces, and further enhance national defense mobilization capabilities that cross peace and wartime, operate in all domains, and are precise and efficient. … … …

***

Wang Chengfei, Director of a research office and senior engineer at the Naval Research Academy, has presided over the initiation and evaluation of several major comprehensive information system equipment projects. He has compiled a development guide and technical requirements for Navy unmanned intelligent equipment technology systems, filled many specifications gaps, won a second-class Military Science and Technology Progress Award, obtained eight national defense patents, and was once awarded a third-class citation.

From CMSI Director CAPT Christopher H. Sharman, USN (Ret.):

China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) Friends and Colleagues –

A focus of CMSI’s research efforts over the next year is the People of China’s Military Maritime Domain – with specific focus on influential PLAN leaders and organizations.

In this spirit, CMSI is pleased to provide you with our latest translation, “Charging into Battle – A Deeply Entwined Network:  Anchoring Victory, Filling Many Gaps.  A Profile of Wang Chengfei, Director of a Research Office at the Naval Research Academy.”

This article first appeared in People’s Navy – the mouthpiece of China’s Navy. What stands out in this article is the close coordination between PLAN scientific research and other defense industry research units. It highlights a case where Wang Chengfei and his team coordinated with 100 PRC scientific research defense industry units (which could include PRC civilian universities) to address the integration of unmanned and manned combat systems. Their work resulted in an unmanned equipment interoperability technical guide.

The article also highlights his work with network information systems employed by the PLAN – specifically the “combat information network” and its role influencing the composition and tactical disposition of far-seas ship formations. The article suggests this system has a role in weapon selection, command and control, helps to make PLAN training more realistic, and appears to feed the overall PLA military information system.

In sum, a quick read about a PLAN organization you may know little about, which provides insights into the types of work performed at the Naval Research Academy.

INITIAL EXCERPT:

Late at night, over the South China Sea, the stars are twinkling. The clock points to 2 am, and the light is still on in an office on a certain [PLA-occupied] reef.

“Based on the collected data, this information flow can still be optimized…” Wang Chengfei, the director of a research office at the Naval Research Academy, is focused on comparing and analyzing data charts, carefully modifying the assessment report.

As an expert member of an evaluation group for a major exercise, he leads other members in living, eating, and training with the officers and men, staying on the reef for over a month. During the day, he stays at various battle positions to record exercise data, and conducts in-depth evaluation analysis at night.

For ten years, this fast-paced, fully-loaded state has been the norm in Wang Chengfei’s scientific research career. During a phone interview while on a break from work, the first thing he said to the reporter was: “Being able to realize the dream of wearing a military uniform and being a scientist at the same time is the greatest happiness of my life.”

In 2011, after earning his doctorate degree, Wang Chengfei was assigned to a research institute. He was deeply inspired by the growing maturity and strength of the Navy’s fleet. However, his urgent sense of mission was stimulated by research gaps in areas such as how to construct and use a future far-seas combat command system and how to better leverage combat capabilities.

At that time, some people believed that information systems were merely a tool for operational command. However, Wang Chengfei firmly believed that network information systems are informatized operations systems, information is the key to victory, and systems (tixi) are the key to winning. … … …

***

Ma Liang, Guo Liqiang, Zhang Hui, Yang Jing, and Liu Jian, “Discussion on the Requirements and Methods of Intelligent Decision-Making in Torpedo Attacks by Unmanned Underwater Vehicles,” CMSI Translation 3 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 14 May 2024).

All authors work at the PLAN Submarine Academy. First author Ma Liang is a professor. Her main research areas include the theory and technology of underwater launch.

CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD A CACHED COPY.

From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman:

The authors of this report work at the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Submarine Academy, suggesting they may be familiar with the latest PLA research into UUVs and their employment.

The article examines several concepts related to unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) employment in combat to include swarms of UUVs used for reconnaissance, pre-deployment of UUVs near chokepoints for an ambush, long-duration autonomous underwater patrols, and UUV communication methods.

It compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of UUVs compared to manned platforms for attacks and suggests there may be willingness to assume greater risk with UUVs.

This is a rich paper and will be of particular interest to those who research machine learning as it relates to UUVs and undersea warfare.

Summary

Autonomous technology in unmanned equipment is currently the most dynamic frontier technology field, and improving the level of intelligent decision-making is an inevitable trend in the development of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Torpedo attack decision-making is an important part of attack-type UUVs’ attack missions, and it is also the basis and premise for forming self-organizing cross-domain collaboration, autonomous cluster confrontation, and other operational capabilities. Beginning by sorting through the characteristics of operational use and typical mission styles, this article summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of UUVs compared to manned platforms, analyzes the decision-making content different from traditional torpedo attacks, expounds on the key issues that need to be resolved in implementing decision-making functions, and, based on the development status of machine learning technology, proposes an intelligent decision-making method suitable for solving problems such as large uncertainty in observation data, difficulty in guaranteeing real-time attack decision-making, and weak model perception interaction capabilities. This research can serve as a reference for future research in unmanned equipment development and intelligent decision-making fields.

Introduction

With the rapid development of equipment technology and military applications, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) have become an important part of underwater offense and defense systems, and are pushing the development of underwater warfare from being human-led to a combination of human and unmanned. From the perspective of combat concepts, new styles of warfare such as unmanned system cluster warfare and cross-domain collaborative warfare have emerged. From the perspective of combat missions, the mission field of unmanned platforms has begun to expand from support to main combat. From the perspective of operational entities, unmanned platforms are gradually replacing some manned platforms as important forces impacting war. As an American think tank pointed out in a research report entitled “The Emerging Era in Undersea Warfare,” the future style of underwater warfare will develop towards the systematization of submarines/unmanned platforms, and submarines need to gradually transform from front-line tactical platforms similar to aircraft to collaborative platforms similar to aircraft carriers.3

Autonomous technology in unmanned equipment is currently the most dynamic frontier technology field, and improving the level of intelligence in decision-making is an inevitable trend in the development of UUVs. Torpedo attack decision-making is an important part of UUVs’ attack missions, and it is also the premise and foundation for unmanned equipment to form self-organizing cross-domain collaboration, autonomous cluster confrontation, and other operational capabilities. The torpedo attack decision-making of weaponized UUVs needs to be completed autonomously by the platform, which poses a series of new challenges and demands for its behavior modeling and intelligent decision-making methods. If the methods of manned platform torpedo attack decision-making are still used, the combat potential of unmanned platforms cannot be fully utilized. Therefore, it is urgent to study the intelligent decision-making methods that can meet its torpedo attack decision-making needs based on the operational characteristics and mission styles of UUV equipment, focusing on the special underwater battlefield environment. … … …

5     Conclusion

Intelligent decision-making in torpedo attacks has significant research implications for the generation of new-quality underwater combat capabilities. Currently, machine learning is in the stage of developing from “perceptual intelligence” to “cognitive intelligence.” Although it is relatively mature in dealing with problems in fields such as data mining and pattern recognition, the state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance in knowledge representation and logical reasoning still has difficulties in reaching the level of engineering application. Therefore, UUV torpedo attack intelligent decision-making requires the joint action of combat simulation technology, heuristic optimization algorithms, and machine learning technology. By fully utilizing the unique multimodal data fusion and general adaptive capabilities of machine learning, it can solve the above key problems and compensate for the shortcomings of traditional simulation decision-making methods in terms of dynamics and flexibility, and jointly serve the development of equipment control systems and software. For the next step, it is suggested to start from specific issues such as tactical situation recognition, effective position decision-making, and position maneuver planning, select key aspects suitable for intelligent decision-making research, and by introducing prior knowledge and task behavior simulation modeling methods, shrink the solution space in advance to improve the convergence efficiency of the intelligent learning model and prevent problems such as gradient disappearance or dimension disaster.

Zhao Xiangang and Su Yanqin, “Dominating the Battlefield—The Advantages of Unmanned Intelligent Combat Forces,” CMSI Translation 2 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 25 April 2024).

Translator’s Note

This article was part of a series of articles published by People’s Navy for the purpose of helping Chinese naval personnel to understand the characteristics of intelligent warfare and grasp the implications of Xi Jinping’s 20th Party Congress report in which he called for the PLA to “accelerate the development of unmanned intelligent combat forces.”

CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD A CACHED COPY.

Summary

In his report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping emphasized the need to accelerate the development of unmanned intelligent combat forces. Looking at the practice of local wars in recent years, unmanned combat forces as represented by drones have become an important part of the joint operational force system, playing an increasingly prominent role as an effectiveness multiplier. Especially with the advent of artificial intelligence technology and its rapid development and widespread use in the military field, unmanned systems are becoming more intelligent and autonomous, and unmanned intelligent operations are showing advantages and effectiveness that are different from those in the past.

Sample Text

Increased Flexibility, Able to More Effectively Achieve Sudden Strike Effects

General unmanned systems have the inherent advantage of carrying out surprise attacks due to their small radar cross section and stealthy design. However, due to their reliance on program control or command control mode, they have poor adaptability and can only rely on favorable environmental conditions to attack fixed or relatively slow targets. Intelligent unmanned systems, on the other hand, can carry out autonomous reconnaissance, identification, decision-making, and actions in more complex battlefield environments, with increasing operational flexibility, without relying on rear control, based on operational authority given beforehand, and can additionally carry out surprise attack operations within a wider range of mission sets.

They can implement agile attacks. On the informatized battlefield, the enemy’s key high-value targets usually appear suddenly and randomly in time and space. Attacking them is therefore subject to strict time window restrictions. The opportunity to attack is fleeting, but once the attack is successful, it will produce better combat effects and achieve greater results, leading to greater combat efficiency. Intelligent unmanned systems have strong autonomous decision-making capability, which solves the delay problem of rear command and control in transmission time and platform response. It can take advantage of its long endurance to carry out area mobile cruising to important mission areas and conduct persistent reconnaissance and surveillance, quickly and accurately attacking targets when they are discovered, and effectively seizing advantageous combat opportunities. In January 2020, the US military’s raid to assassinate Soleimani, the top commander of Iran’s “Quds Force,” used the semi-intelligent MQ-9 “Reaper” integrated surveillance and attack drone, supported by other intelligence information, entering the skies above Baghdad in advance, and successfully carrying out reconnaissance and a subsequent attack on the target.

They can achieve infiltrative, surprise attacks. Entering deep, core areas of enemy territory to carry out attacks on important targets has always been risky with a low success rate. As the intelligence level of small and micro unmanned systems increases, there is an emerging capability to spread drones deep into the enemy territory by utilizing airdrops or artillery fire, and then use independently-powered flight or ground maneuvers to automatically compare data and autonomously approach the intended target or directly attack it. They can penetrate key parts of large-scale weapon systems and even penetrate internal core locations such as the enemy’s combat decision-making, command and control systems, etc. to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance. Additional capabilities could include the timely release of high explosives carried to destroy key points and target nodes or releasing high-energy chemical weapons to kill or injure key or core personnel, implementing “inner-scope reconnaissance” and “minimally invasive strikes,” degrading the enemy’s operational systems, disrupting the enemy’s operational plans, and interrupting the enemy’s operational rhythm, thereby instilling a strong psychological shock and confusion. In November 2017, a highly intelligent micro-autonomous attack robot called “Killer Bee” was displayed at the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons conference. It is less than the size of an ordinary person’s hand, is equipped with wide-angle cameras and tactical sensors, and contains three explosives. The Killer Bee can be used in a swarm and can capably fly indoors, entering through small holes for precise identification and attack. … … …

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Zhang Long,  “The ‘Cans’ and ‘Cannots’ of the Military Application of Artificial Intelligence,” CMSI Translation 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 25 April 2024).

Translator’s Note

This article was part of a series of articles published by People’s Navy for the purpose of helping Chinese naval personnel to understand the characteristics of intelligent warfare and grasp the implications of Xi Jinping’s 20th Party Congress report in which he called for the PLA to “accelerate the development of unmanned intelligent combat forces.”

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Summary

The application of artificial intelligence (AI) in the military field is an important force for promoting improvements in military technology and progress in the revolution of military affairs and is a key driver changing operational patterns and disrupting the form of war. In the upsurge of military applications of AI, we must think carefully about future decisions, deeply understand the technological hub (jishu shuniu) role of AI, dialectically view the functional boundaries of military applications of AI, and accurately grasp what AI “can” and “cannot” do. We must oppose both contemptuous and omnipotent theories of AI military application, comprehensively and objectively clarify what AI “can” and “cannot” do in military applications, and strive to seize the opportunity, win the initiative, develop systematically, and make breakthroughs in the military application of AI.

Sample Text

AI Can Disrupt the Form of War, But It Cannot Change the Essence of War

The form of war is the manifestation and overall state of war in different historical stages demonstrated through the progression of manufacturing and production in human society applied to the military domain. Major breakthroughs in science and technology and the landmark developments of cutting-edge weapons and equipment will subsequently lead to new changes in military organization, operational methods, and operational theories, culminating in overall changes in warfare, thereby creating a new form of war. At present, intelligent warfare is revealing new characteristics that disrupt previous forms of war. For example, intelligent military organizational form will be reshaped and restructured; leadership command systems will feature flat network aggregation, matrix interaction, and global coupling characteristics; scale and structure will be more streamlined and efficient, aggregated across multiple domains, and integrated; human-machine hybrid and unmanned swarm formations will become the primary method, while the proportion of intelligent unmanned operational forces continues to increase; the status and role of virtual space in the operational system will gradually increase; the geographic, physical, information, and cognitive domains will achieve deep integration and harmonization, with multi-domain and cross-domain [operations] becoming the basic forms of warfare; weapon systems without a center, or a weak center, or with a center, with hybrid compatibility between them, will become the development trend, which will completely change the human-centered control and decision-making model.

It is now obvious that AI technology is increasingly used in the military field, which has heightened the level of intelligent warfare. This in turn may cause a lowering of the threshold of war, a blurring of the appearance of war, and a diversification of the agents of war. However, any advancement in technological means cannot change the nature of war; nor can it change the basic laws and guidelines of warfare. In the intelligent age, the essence of warfare is still the politics of bloodshed. The development of smart technology and its application in the military field is also a direct manifestation of the political and military strategies of various countries and political groups. There is still a clear distinction between the justice and injustice of war, and the fate of the war is still determined by the officers, soldiers, and masses of common people (renmin qunzhong) participating in the war. A war involving national independence, opposition to oppression and exploitation, and promotion of people’s liberation and social progress requires the courage to “do it when you know that you cannot do it” and the determination to “win when you meet the enemy on a narrow road and only one person can pass.” In terms of war guidance, no matter how AI technology develops, we must adhere to the fundamental principle that war serves politics and persist in the fundament principle of defeating unjust wars with just wars. … … …

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Click here to access CMSI’s new series of translations.

From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman:

This month CMSI is providing two translations for your review. Both address the PLA’s integration of cutting-edge technologies. They are pulled from recent pages of Renmin Haijun(People’s Navy) as part of a series of articles focusing on helping PLAN personnel understand the characteristics of intelligent warfare and to grasp the implications of Xi Jinping’s 20th Party Congress report in which he called for the PLA to “accelerate the development of unmanned combat forces.”  People’s Navy is an authoritative Navy journal, which makes these translations particularly useful.

We frequently receive questions about about the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI).  The first article, “‘Cans’ and ‘Cannots’ of the Military Application of Artificial Intelligence” examines the relationships between AI and humans in combat. It looks at the strengths AI brings, but highlights that it is not a panacea. The article provides a sober assessment of some of the challenges the PLAN must address as it further integrates AI into its martime operations.

The second article, “Dominating the Battlefield – The Advantages of Unmanned Intelligent Combat Forces” examines the prominent role of unmanned combat systems play in combat. The article addresses a wide range of strengths of these systems. It highlights how intelligent unmanned systems enhance operational flexibility by eliminating the need for command and control, it trumpets their utility for strikes on targets deep within enemy territory, and addresses their applicability for swarming operations. The article describes different applications for unmanned intelligent systems and how they can help build efficiencies into warfare.

Professor Nick Henderson, a Research Professor within the NWC Strategic and Operational Research Department who specializes in Chinese language and Chinese international economic policy, teamed up with CMSI to translate these two challenging articles. Our thanks to Nick for his painstaking efforts, from which we all benefit. Thanks as well to CMSI’s own Ryan Martinson, who helped to ensure the accuracy of these challenging translations.

As with other CMSI products, we ask that you help to get the word out about these products and to forward them to those who need to know.

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