Andrew S. Erickson

Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher H. Sharman, “Admiral Miao Hua’s Fall: Further Navy Fallout?” CMSI Note 11 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 28 November 2024).

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From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman:

• Admiral Miao Hua has been suspended from duties as a member of China’s Central Military Commission and Director of the CMC Political Work Department. Miao’s position, which oversees all senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) promotions, may have significant ramifications for his patronage network—including “current” Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun and possibly Secretary of the CMC’s Politics and Law Commission Admiral Wang Renhua, among others.
• This is the first time the CMC has two positions (one-third of six total) vacant simultaneously. The only other time China’s highest military body experienced such upheaval in recent years involved the purging of Vice Chairmen General Xu Caihou and General Guo Boxiong.
• Admiral Miao is the seventh CMC member to be purged since Xi assumed power in 2012. The humiliation of his public removal is especially embarrassing because Xi promoted him to full admiral on 31 July 2015 and elevated him to the CMC in October 2017. His suspension suggests Xi, or others, may have wanted to make his removal an example for the PLA.
• Admiral Dong Jun, China’s Minister of National Defense, may be caught up in this purge. Dong has close ties to Miao and was absent from Singaporean Vice Admiral Aaron Beng’s introductory PRC visit (24–27 November 2024). At a minimum, Admiral Dong normally would have hosted an office call for VADM Beng during his visit.
• Admiral Miao’s removal suggests Xi remains bore-sighted on achieving China’s 2027 Centennial Military Building Goal and seeks to ensure his armed forces reach maximum preparation for Taiwan contingencies on his watch, even at the cost of short-term setbacks and bureaucratic churn.
• In August 2024, the two top Generals commanding the PLA Rocket Force were removed, together with other leading PLARF officers. Admiral Miao’s suspension and the possible implication of Admiral Dong Jun could suggest Xi has shifted his purging focus to the PLA Navy (PLAN).

About the Authors

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is Professor of Strategy at CMSI. CAPT Chris H. Sharman, USN (Ret.) is Director of CMSI. They are solely responsible for the views expressed here, which are based solely on open sources, as well as any errors herein; they made every effort to double-check data during the less than twenty-four hours between the official announcement of Admiral Miao’s suspension and this note’s publication. Unless otherwise specified, date ranges represent an officer’s time in service for their career capstone position, from which they typically retired or were purged directly. The authors thank Ken Allen and numerous anonymous reviewers for invaluable inputs.

The views the authors express here are theirs alone and do not necessarily represent the views, policies, or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or its components, to include the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College.

ADMIRAL MIAO HUA’S FALL: FURTHER NAVY FALLOUT? 

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson and Captain Christopher Sharman, USN (Ret.)[1]

Major news today! Pending investigation, Xi Jinping’s protégé Admiral Miao Hua (苗华) has been suspended from his duties as a member of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) and Director of the CMC Political Work Department. This decision was made by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Central Committee, Defense Spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian announced at the scheduled monthly People’s Liberation Army (PLA) press briefing on 28 November 2024, because Miao is “suspected of serious violation of discipline.”[2] By the time such CCP investigations become public, conviction is a foregone conclusion. Miao’s fall thus raises three principal questions: Why is he being removed, will his cronies suffer similarly, and what does it mean for China’s navy and military?

CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways:

• Admiral Miao Hua has been suspended from duties as a member of China’s Central Military Commission and Director of the CMC Political Work Department. Miao’s position, which oversees all senior PLA promotions, may have significant ramifications for his patronage network—including “current” Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun[3] and possibly Secretary of the CMC’s Politics and Law Commission Admiral Wang Renhua,[4]among others.
• This is the first time the CMC has two positions (one-third of six total) vacant simultaneously. The only other time China’s highest military body experienced such upheaval in recent years involved the purging of Vice Chairmen General Xu Caihou (CCP CMC 19 September 2004–15 November 2012, PRC CMC 13 March 2005–14 March 2013; expelled June 2014, died facing court martial 15 March 2015) and General Guo Boxiong (CCP CMC 15 November 2002–15 November 2012, PRC CMC 16 March 2003–14 March 2013; expelled 30 July 2015, sentenced to life imprisonment 25 July 2016).
• Admiral Miao is the seventh CMC member to be purged since Xi assumed power in 2012. The humiliation of his public removal is especially embarrassing because Xi transferred him to the PLAN in 2014, promoted him to full (three-star) admiral in 2015, and elevated him to the CMC in 2017. His suspension suggests Xi, or others, may have wanted to make his removal an example for the PLA.
• Admiral Dong Jun, China’s Minister of National Defense, may be caught up in this purge. Dong has close ties to Miao and was absent from Singaporean Vice Admiral Aaron Beng’s introductory PRC visit (24–27 November 2024). At a minimum, Admiral Dong normally would have hosted an office call for VADM Beng during his visit.
• Admiral Miao’s removal suggests Xi remains bore-sighted on achieving China’s 2027 Centennial Military Building Goal[5] and seeks to ensure his armed forces reach maximum preparation for Taiwan contingencies on his watch, even at the cost of short-term setbacks and bureaucratic churn.
• In August 2024, the two top Generals commanding the PLA Rocket Force were removed, together with other leading PLARF officers. Admiral Miao’s suspension and the possible implication of Admiral Dong Jun could suggest Xi has shifted his purging focus to the PLA Navy (PLAN).

Background:

The seventh CMC member (current and retired) to be purged since Xi assumed power in 2012, Miao fell from the PLA’s commanding heights as one of four ordinary members (with one vacancy created by former Defense Minister Li Shangfu’s removal and subsequently unfilled) under Commander-in-Chief Xi and Vice Chairmen Zhang Youxia and He Weidong.[6] Over the past year and a half, more than a dozen senior PLA officials and defense industry executives have fallen.[7]

Clearly, this is not about corruption per se. Graft, including promotion-related pay-to-play, kickbacks, and monetizing of (mis)managed resources, has long been a PRC system feature, not a bug. Because corruption is rampant within the PLA, investigating it primarily involves political decisions. Because the Party is inherently above the law, corruption cannot be eradicated without eviscerating the system. Determined to preserve the system and secure his legacy at all costs, Xi instead strives to impose loyalty, control, and ability to execute top-priority military operations—above all, against Taiwan. His core message: nobody is exempt from these unforgiving imperatives. Less clear is who was involved in Miao’s defenestration, and what blowback in credibility Xi may face for his selection of atypical acolytes ultimately deemed unreliable.

Born in Fuzhou, Fujian Province, Miao was a PLA Ground Force officer for most of his career, primarily in units in Taiwan-facing Fujian, overlapping with Xi’s rise in local and regional administration there. Miao served mainly in the 31^st Group Army (Military Unit Cover Designator 73111), based in Xiamen within the former Nanjing Military Region—now part of the Eastern Theater Command.[8] After enlisting in December 1969, Miao served in in the 31^st Group Army’s 92^nd Division’s 274^th Regiment. Also in the Nanjing Military Region, Miao served as the Political Commissar of the 12^th Group Army.[9] In the 1990s, Miao returned to the 31^st Group Army, becoming Director of the 93^rdDivision’s Political Department, and later Political Commissar of the 91^st Division. In August 1999, Miao was appointed Director of 31^st Group Army’s Political Department where he served until July 2005, attaining the rank of Major General in July 2001. Being a protégé of Xi subsequently gave Miao an unusual opportunity: transferring services in December 2014 to become the PLAN’s Political Commissar and receiving his third star on 31 July 2015. In October 2017, Miao reached the pinnacle position of his career—CMC Political Work Department Director—while continuing to wear a navy uniform. This is part of a pattern in which Xi has reassigned and promoted officers unconventionally, apparently to bypass established networks and impose his control.[10]

Implications:

Now speculation swirls as to which of Miao’s associates may likewise succumb to bureaucratic machinations. While Miao was PLAN Political Commissar (December 2014–September 2017), Admiral Dong Jun was one of the PLAN Deputy Chiefs of Staff (December 2014–December 2017)—a substantial overlap. Dong subsequently parlayed experience as a Deputy Commander of the East Sea Fleet and Commander of its newly-established East China Sea Joint Operations Command Center, a Southern Theater Command Deputy Commander (2017–21), and the PLAN’s Commander (2021–24), inter alia, into his present position as PRC Defense Minister. Notably, unlike his predecessor, the now-deposed General Li Shangfu, Dong has neither become a CMC Member nor a State Councilor—despite a longtime vacancy.[11] Spokesperson Wu rejected a Financial Times article[12] (re-reported by the South China Morning Post)[13] claiming Dong was under investigation for corruption and repeated tautologically that Dong remains Defense Minister.[14] China’s Foreign Ministry also denied the story.[15] These dismissals are insufficient to clarify matters, or where things may be heading.

Cai Shenkun, formerly a hard-hitting reporter for Guangdong’s leading journal Southern Weekly with a strong track record of predicting official PRC developments before they become public, maintains that Miao lost Xi’s trust in part through excessive cultivation of a personal network.[16] The potential for such factionalism or “mountaintopism” (山头主义) in the form of Party, State, and Military officials developing their own alternative power centers has long concerned CCP leaders.[17] Cai asserts that since Admiral Dong Jun was promoted by Miao, and Admiral Wang Renhua is a protégé of Miao’s, they are now both vulnerable.[18] Cai further asserts that Xi’s distrust of Miao led him to promote the latter’s deputy He Hongjun (何宏军) to facilitate Miao’s replacement. In April 2019, He became Deputy Director of the CMC’s Political Work Department. Xi promoted He to Lieutenant General (two-star) in December 2019 and full General (three-star) in July 2024.[19] Cai ascribes Dong’s failure to enter the CMC despite a readily-available position to Xi’s distrust of Miao and his recommendation of Dong.[20]

Most recently, Cai asserts that “Dong Jun has been dismissed (董军落马).”[21] The present authors are unable to verify this claim. However, it seems significant that Singapore Chief of Defence Force VADM Aaron Beng’s introductory PRC visit (24–27 November 2024) did not reportedly include a meeting with Dong. Instead, VADM Beng called on CMC Joint Staff Department Chief General Liu Zhenli.[22]

Conclusions:

In August 2024, PLARF leadership was almost entirely removed—a shocking decapitation of the force that controls the bulk of China’s most advanced missiles and nuclear weapons. Admiral Miao’s suspension may suggest that Xi has shifted his focus to purging the Navy. In addition to the reported vulnerability of Admirals Dong Jun and Wang Renhua, former PLAN Commander Yao Cheng—a graduate of China’s former Naval Aeronautical and Astronautical College and Naval Flight College,[23] as well as its Naval Command College—states that current PLAN Political Commissar Admiral Yuan Huazhi (袁华智) and his predecessor Admiral Qin Shengxiang (秦生祥) and are rumored to be under investigation.[24] If Admirals Yuan and Qin are indeed expelled from the PLAN, that would confirm the extent of scrutiny targeting China’s navy. Another source posits that first-ranked CMC Vice Chairman General Zhang Youxia is making an example of the PLAN, possibly as a means of wielding his tremendous power.[25]

Regardless of initial targets and maneuvering, Miao’s investigation is sure to reverberate across PLAN networks. “The history with these investigations in the PLA are that once the string of corruption is pulled many other threads are revealed and the sweater unravels,” observes Georgetown professor and former intelligence analyst Dennis Wilder.[26]It may be a case of “taking out tigers,” “swatting flies,” and “hunting down foxes”—members of a targeted military leader’s patronage network will go down either before or after him, oftentimes within the same service. “My gut tells me that this whole thing revolves around Miao taking bribes to get people promoted in grade (not rank) to flag officer billets,” former Assistant Air Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and longtime PLA analyst Ken Allen told the present authors. “As such, each of them will also most likely be suspended.”

The investigations confirmed and rumored to date would stress any nation’s armed forces and component(s). At the same time, China’s navy and military enjoy globally unrivaled resources and support by many measures. What is clear is that Xi is prioritizing military control and effectiveness for major missions over stopgap internal security efforts or symbolic prestige. Prioritizing either of those latter objectives would be far simpler, easier, cheaper, and more direct than the difficult, sophisticated work that he is visibly pursuing—possibly amid political infighting as well. Perhaps an analogue may be found in Xi’s recent disestablishment of the Strategic Support Force, itself a product of his sweeping post-2015 military reforms, and rapid reassignment of its vitally important activities.

These are the actions of a power-obsessed but rational and formidable authoritarian leader deadly serious about preparing for, and possibly waging, major war. The CCP system suffers endemic weaknesses, including ruthless elite power struggles and the chronic official purging resurfacing now, which questions the loyalty of the PLA and undermines capabilities and readiness.[27] The CCP system also boasts tremendous strengths—including totalitarian means to mobilize and concentrate resources and personnel dramatically. This cuts both ways, deeply.

As the ultimate product and head of this contradictory system, Xi appears dissatisfied with his military and its leaders and distrustful of the sharpness and durability of the sword in his hand—but determined to hone his Party Army to meet his objectives through purges, reorganizations, and new campaigns to strive harder. He is allowing the PLA to struggle now while pursuing the goal of making Taiwan and its supporters struggle and surrender later. He remains large and in charge, but as a man in a hurry who is running short on time on a steepening treadmill, threatened by political enemies eager to push him off if he falters.

Churn and challenges are certain, crisis and conflict may follow. America and its allies, partners, and friends must maximize their own military strengths and prepare accordingly.

The views the authors express here are theirs alone and do not necessarily represent the views, policies, or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or its components, to include the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College.

[1] Dr. Erickson is Professor of Strategy at CMSI. CAPT Sharman, USN (Ret.) is Director of CMSI. They are solely responsible for the views expressed here, which are based solely on open sources, as well as any errors herein; they made every effort to double-check data during the less than twenty-four hours between the official announcement of Admiral Miao’s suspension and this note’s publication. Unless otherwise specified, date ranges represent an officer’s time in service for their career capstone position, from which they typically retired or were purged directly. The authors thank Ken Allen and numerous anonymous reviewers for invaluable inputs.

[2] Li Weichao, “Admiral Miao Hua Suspended from Duty, Pending Investigation: Defense Spokesperson,” China Military Online, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16354908.html.

[3] Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher H. Sharman, “Admiral Dong Jun Engages Friends and Foes: China’s First Naval Defense Minister Brings Joint Operational Experience,” CMSI Note 2 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 30 December 2023), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/2/.

[4] Andrew S. Erickson, “Admiral Wang Renhua: Exemplifying Jointness and Oversight for China’s Navy amid Xi’s Grade-and-Rank Reforms,” CMSI Note 5 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 11 April 2024), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/5/.

[5] Andrew S. Erickson, “PRC Pursuit of 2027 ‘Centennial Military Building Goal’ (建军一百年奋斗目标): Sources & Analysis,” China Analysis from Original Sources, 19 December 2021, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2021/12/prc-pursuit-of-2027-centennial-military-building-goal-sources-analysis/.

[6] Chun Han Wong, “China Targets Senior Admiral in New Round of Defense Purges,” Wall Street Journal, 28 November 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-targets-senior-admiral-in-new-round-of-defense-purges-9f6d3c9e.

[7] Lyle Morris/@LyleJMorris, “The Other Shoe Has Dropped,” 28 November 2024, https://x.com/LyleJMorris/status/1862165925358608867. Deposed PLA officials include Defense Minister Li Shangfu (12 March–24 October 2023) and his retired predecessor General Wei Fenghe (2018–23); former PLA Air Force Commander General Ding Laihang (2017–21, dismissed as 14th National People’s Congress representative 4 December 2023); and PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) Commander General Li Yuchao (January 2022–July 2023, dismissed July 2023), Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Liu Guangbin (~2022–23, removed June 2023) and his predecessors Lieutenant Generals Zhang Zhenzhong (2016–22, removed as CMC Joint Staff Department Deputy Chief of Staff June 2023) and Li Chuanguang (~2018–23, removed December 2023), Political Commissar Lieutenant General Xu Zhongbo (2020–23, removed June 2023), Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sun Jinming (2022–24, expelled July 2024), and Armaments Department Head Lu Hong (removed December 2023). Deposed defense industry executives include former China State Shipbuilding Corporation Chairman Hu Wenming (2012–19), who oversaw China’s aircraft carrier development program—sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment for corruption; and his General Manager, Sun Bo, sentenced to 12 years.

[8] The 31st Group Army operated from 1949–2017.【#中央军委委员苗华被停职检查#】[Miao Hua, A Member of the Central Military Commission, Was Suspended for Inspection], 大公文匯網 [Ta Kung Hui], 28 November 2024, https://m.weibo.cn/p/231440_-_5105787105970507?title=编辑记录.

[9][9] Joel McFadden, Kim Fassler, and Justin Godby, “The New PLA Leadership: Xi Molds China’s Military to His Vision,” in Phillip C. Saunders, Arthur S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow, eds., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019), 570, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi_Chapter-14.pdf?ver=2019-02-08-112005-803.

[10] “Is it True That China is Having its 3rd Chinese Defense Minister in a Row under Investigation?” Wen-Ti Sung, @wentisung, 27 November 2024, https://x.com/wentisung/status/1861644840129437909.

[11] “CPC Central Military Commission” and “PRC Central Military Commission,” PRC Ministry of National Defense, PRC Ministry of National Defense, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Leadership/index.html.

[12] Demetri Sevastopulo, “China’s Defence Minister Placed under Investigation for Corruption,” Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/641446ed-71b1-42f6-a9d8-3bc4d7b7da23.

[13] Hayley Wong and Yuanyue Dang, “Senior PLA Ideology Official Miao Hua Under Investigation for ‘Serious Discipline Violations’,” South China Morning Post, 28 November 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3288499/high-ranking-chinese-military-official-under-probe-serious-rule-violations.

[14] Christian Shepard and Katrina Northrop, “China Announces Top Military Official is Under Investigation,” Washington Post, 28 November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/28/china-military-corruption-investigation-miao-hua/; Dake Kang/@dakekang, “REPORTER: Who is China’s Defense Minister Now?” 28 November 2024, https://x.com/dakekang/status/1862067779551002935.

[15] “China Defence Minister Dong Jun’s Fate Unclear as Differing Accounts Emerge on Corruption Probe,” Straits Times, 28 November 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinese-defence-minister-dong-juns-fate-unclear-as-differing-accounts-emerge-on-corruption.

[16] Miao “promoted and recommended a group of his own people to Xi Jinping, which is something Xi Jinping cannot accept….” 蔡慎坤 [Cai Shenkun]/@cskun1989, “中央军委政治工作部主任, 海军上将苗华前天被中央军委军纪委直接带走…” [The Director of the CMC’s Political Work Department, Admiral Miao Hua, Was Taken Away Directly by the CMC’s Military Discipline Committee the Day before Yesterday….], 11 November 2024, https://x.com/cskun1989/status/1855859390177497127.

[17] “山头主义” [Mountaintopism], https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/山头主义.

[18] “Anyone who wants to be promoted needs Miao Hua’s approval and recommendation. Miao Hua himself came from the navy, so he promoted a large number of naval flag officers he was familiar with during his tenure, such as the current Minister of Defense Dong Jun, who is a navy admiral.” Similarly, “In addition to placing his people in various military branches as commanders, Miao Hua also intervened in some disciplinary inspection work under the CMC. Miao Hua appointed…Wang Renhua, who was also promoted to admiral and then served as the secretary of the CMC’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission. Wang Renhua also came from the navy and was Miao Hua’s man.” Cai Shenkun, “The Director of the CMC’s Political Work Department…”

[19] 梅常伟 [Mei Changwei], “中央军委举行晋升上将军衔仪式 习近平颁发命令状并向晋衔的军官表示祝贺” [The Central Military Commission Holds a Ceremony to Promote to the Rank of Flag and General Officers. Xi Jinping Issues an Order and Congratulates the Promoted Officers), 解放军报 [PLA Daily), 10 July 2024, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/20240709/b5ad5f32ad3146078e9453b826b71b29/c.html.

[20] 蔡慎坤/@cskun1989, “中央军委政治工作部主任, 海军上将苗华前天被中央军委军纪委直接带走…” [The Director of the CMC’s Political Work Department, Admiral Miao Hua, Was Taken Away Directly by the CMC’s Military Discipline Committee the Day before Yesterday….], 11 November 2024, https://x.com/cskun1989/status/1855859390177497127.

[21] 蔡慎坤/@cskun1989, “尽管外交部用“捕风捉影”来回应董军出事的传闻, 但外交部没有办法让董军出来溜溜” [Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Responded to the Rumors of Dong Jun’s Accident by “Chasing rumors,” There Was No Way for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Let Dong Jun Escape], 28 November 2024, https://x.com/cskun1989/status/1862022676120027420.

[22] “Chief of Defence Force, Vice Admiral (VADM) Aaron Beng, made his introductory visit to the People’s Republic of China from 24 to 27 Nov.,” Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 28 November 2024, https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=985971203568198&id=100064659825216. As Defence Force Chief, Beng ranks below Singapore’s Defence Minister. However, China’s Defense Minister handles all foreign exchanges.

[23] 姚诚 [Yao Cheng]/@Yaochen64034657, https://x.com/Yaochen64034657. In 2017 these institutions were merged to become Naval Aviation University. “Section 3-19: Naval Aviation University,” in Kenneth Allen and Mingzhi Chen, The People’s Liberation Army’s 37 Academic Institutions (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 11 June 2020), 130, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Other-Topics/2020-06-11%20PLA%20Academic_Institutions.pdf.

[24] 伍宇亮 [Wu Yuliang], “张又侠拿海军开刀 习军权被削弱迹象” [Zhang Youxia Takes on the Navy. Signs of Xi’s Military Power Being Weakened.], 人民报 [“People’s Daily”—not the official CCP paper], 11 October 2024, https://renminbao.com/rmb/articles/2024/10/11/85702.html.

[25] 燕銘時評 [Yan Ming Commentary]/@yanmingshiping, “习近平军中亲信上将苗华传被带走调查” [Admiral Miao Hua, A Close Military Confidant of Xi Jinping’s, is Reportedly Taken Away for Investigation], 28 November 2024, https://x.com/yanmingshiping/status/1862063226353061893.

[26] Trevor Hunnicutt, Idrees Ali, and Laurie Chen, “China Defence Minister Dong Jun’s Fate Unclear as Corruption Probe Sparks Differing Account,” Reuters, 28 November 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-defence-minister-placed-under-investigation-corruption-ft-reports-2024-11-27/.

[27] A priority for research and public sharing of findings should be the extent to which corruption and ensuing investigations might slow down or sidetrack the PLA’s pursuit of Xi’s 2027 Goal. Investigations concerning research, development, and acquisition, as well as major construction projects, could slow PLA development. Any inability of the purges and investigations during Xi’s time in power might undermine his confidence in PLA political reliability or operational capability.

PREVIOUS NOTES IN THIS CMSI SERIES:

CMSI Notes are short, timely analyses of recent China maritime events.

From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman:

The summer of 2024 saw more People’s Republic of China (PRC) activity in the Arctic and near-Arctic than any year in the past.

Most of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) activities have been well-documented.

What has not been well documented – until now – are details about the deployment of two Chinese oceanographic survey ships, which conducted marine scientific research activities in the Bering Sea.

The Bering Sea is a key segment in the sea lanes connecting China with the Arctic Ocean. Therefore, the operations of these two vessels should be understood as part of the unprecedented ramp-up in Beijing’s Arctic endeavors that occurred in 2024.

Their actions represented a significant expansion of PRC marine data collection in this region.

So what?

Both ships conducted marine scientific research in waters above the U.S.-claimed extended continental shelf. If their operations involved surveys of the seabed, they would constitute a direct challenge to the U.S. maritime claim.

CMSI is proud to bring you CMSI Note #10 “China’s Summer of 2024: The Missing Chapter.” This CMSI Note meticulously researched and authored by CMSI’s own Professor Ryan Martinson.

This CMSI note includes photos of the survey ships, tracking of their deployments, a discussion of historic PRC Arctic survey operations, and raises interesting questions about PRC-Russian Arctic cooperation as well as policy questions about challenges to the U.S.-claimed extended continental shelf.

Professor Martinson’s conclusions are eye opening. Highly recommended reading!

About the Author

Ryan D. Martinson is a researcher at the China Maritime Studies Institute. The views and opinions expressed here are the author’s alone and do not reflect the assessments of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government entity. The author thanks Dan Caldwell, Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, and Chris Sharman for providing valuable feedback on earlier versions of this article. Any errors or omissions are his alone.

Key Takeaways

• In the summer of 2024, two Chinese oceanographic survey ships—the Xiang Yang Hong 01 and Kexue—conducted marine scientific research activities in the Bering Sea. Their actions represented a significant expansion of PRC marine data collection in this region.
• The Bering Sea is a key segment in the sea lanes connecting China with the Arctic Ocean. Thus, the operations of these two vessels should be understood as part of the unprecedented ramp-up in Beijing’s Arctic endeavors that occurred in 2024.
• The main purposes of the two Bering Sea cruises are unknown. However, both ships were built to meet military requirements, at least in part. Even if they were just conducting basic marine science, the data they collected is inherently dual-use and will be shared with the Chinese military, improving its awareness of the operating environment.
• The Xiang Yang Hong 01 operated in Russia’s EEZ and visited a Russian military port, demonstrating a high degree of Russian support for PRC activities in the region.
• Both ships conducted marine scientific research in waters above the U.S.-claimed extended continental shelf. If their operations involved surveys of the seabed, they would constitute a direct challenge to the U.S. maritime claim.

Introduction

The summer of 2024 saw more People’s Republic of China (PRC) activity in the Arctic and near-Arctic than any year in the past.2 Most of these activities have been well-documented. They include a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) task force sailing north of the Aleutian Islands in the first week of July; PLA Air Force H-6K bombers patrolling the Chukchi Sea, Bering Sea, and North Pacific with Russian aircraft later that month; three Chinese ice-breakers conducting separate cruises in the high north in August and September; and, most recently, in late September, two China Coast Guard cutters navigating north through the Bering Strait in the company of two Russian Border Guard ships.3 These events alone constitute a dramatic expansion in China’s Arctic and near-Arctic operations, laying the groundwork for China’s pursuit and defense of its Arctic interests.4 But there is another episode that has not been highlighted, but should be, as it adds further clarity to PRC ambitions in northern latitudes and the role of China-Russian cooperation to help realize them. It involves the separate but overlapping scientific research cruises of two PRC oceanographic survey ships in the Bering Sea in August.

Background

The PRC possesses the world’s largest fleet of oceanographic survey ships. These vessels conduct marine scientific research in all the world’s oceans, with a special focus on the strategically important western and central Pacific Ocean. The bulk of the fleet is owned and operated by Chinese government research organizations, most concentrated in the Ministry of Natural Resources. The Chinese Academy of Sciences and individual Chinese universities also own/operate large-displacement research ships that cruise beyond East Asia.5

The operations of China’s oceangoing survey fleet are comparatively transparent. While at sea, these ships generally transmit their location, course, speed, and other information via Automatic Identification System (AIS); PRC media outlets often publish news about their activities; and at least some of the data they collect results in academic publications. This differs from the PLAN’s fleet of hydrographic survey ships, the activities of which are largely unknown, except by the foreign militaries that track them.

Experts embarked on PRC oceanographic survey ships mostly conduct basic scientific research. However, the data they collect are shared with the Chinese military, which uses them to improve its own awareness of and ability to predict the maritime operating environment. Moreover, the knowledge civilian oceanographers help generate informs the development of oceanographic and meteorological monitoring systems employed by Chinese government agencies, which share their reports and other products with the military. This type of “civil-military fusion” has been integral to the PLAN’s successful expansion into the “far seas” that began in 2008.6 … … …

Discussion

The summer of 2024 saw a significant ramp-up of PRC activities in the Arctic and near-Arctic. The overlapping cruises of the of the Xiang Yang Hong 01 and Kexue in the Bering Sea in August were a noteworthy, but hitherto unexplored, chapter in that expansion. This episode amplifies and reinforces the theme of accelerating PRC operations in northern latitudes. The Bering Sea is a key segment in the sea route connecting China and the Arctic. It could be used by Chinese merchant ships, coast guard cutters, surface combatants, and submarines, both in war and peace. Thus, it is vital that China develop a detailed knowledge of its seabed and water column. The summer 2024 cruises of the Xiang Yang Hong 01 and the Kexue clearly contributed to that end.

Their operations also shed light on the evolving China-Russia relationship. The Xiang Yang Hong 01 spent several days operating in Russia’s EEZ—a very rare, maybe unprecedented, event, that could not have happened without Russian permission. Perhaps more noteworthy, Russia allowed the ship to access Avacha Bay, home of key elements of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, including its submarine units. This too has likely never happened before. These two events provide a valuable index of the current state of China-Russia maritime cooperation.

This episode also highlights the Bering Sea as a new arena of U.S.-China contention in the realm of international maritime law. In December 2023, the U.S. formally described the outer limits of an extended continental shelf beyond its EEZ, including in the Bering Sea.19 See Figure 6 below. This move brought a significant portion of the seabed in the center of the Bering Sea under U.S. jurisdiction, giving it exclusive rights to explore for and exploit any resources therein (both living and non-living).20 The U.S. now asserts jurisdiction over marine scientific research related to the continental shelf in large swaths of high seas areas.21 Because the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, the PRC rejects its extended continental shelf claim, describing it as “illegal, null and void.”22 Both the Xiang Yang Hong 01 and Kexue completed surveys within the bounds of the U.S. extended continental shelf in the Bering Sea. See Figure 7 below. Depending on what these surveys entailed, their actions may have represented a direct PRC challenge to a U.S. maritime claim—perhaps for the first time in the history of U.S.-China relations.

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Key Takeaways

• Since December 2008, the PLAN has deployed 46 counter-piracy escort task forces (TFs) to the Gulf of Aden on a UN-authorized mission.
• Most TFs have included two combatants—a combination of destroyers, frigates, and amphibious transport docks—and a supply ship. Starting with the 33^rdTF, which departed China in August 2019, every TF has comprised one Type 052D destroyer, one Type 054A frigate, and one supply ship.
• One TF generally is on station near the Horn of Africa at all times, while for less than half that time another TF is either on the way to relieve it or returning home after completing its mission.
• Until recently, the PLAN had normally dispatched three TFs per year, at roughly four-month intervals.
• However, the 45^thand 46^th TFs departed China on five-month intervals, suggesting a shift in deployment patterns.
• The PLAN has not explained the rationale for this apparent shift in its deployment pattern. It is possible that more onerous requirements for its surface fleet in operations around Taiwan and in the South China Sea have forced the PLAN to draw forces away from the Gulf of Aden mission, at least temporarily. Or it is possible that the PLAN may be desirous of keeping its ships clear of waters threatened by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

Introduction

Since the PLA Navy (PLAN) dispatched its first three-ship Gulf of Aden Escort Task Force in December 2008, it has maintained a permanent presence halfway around the world to protect civilian shipping from pirates on this UN-authorized mission.2 To date, 46 task forces (TFs, called “escort formations,” i.e., 护航编队) have been rotated into and out of this mission. Over time, adjustments have been made in the manner these TFs are formed, deployed, and supported. However, a new wrinkle has appeared in the last two deployments.

TF Composition

While on station, each TF has comprised two combatants, a supply ship, a few helicopters, and a 70-man special operations force (or Marine) detachment. At least one submarine also has participated in this mission.3 The two combatants mostly have been a combination of destroyers and frigates, with three different Type 071 amphibious transport docks taking part in four rotations. Prior to the establishment of the PLA’s first overseas base in Djibouti in 2017 to support “anti-piracy, UN peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief missions in both Africa and Western Asia,” one supply ship frequently would stay in place to support two TFs in succession.4

For the first 32 TFs, the combination of destroyers and frigates varied considerably (sometimes one of each, often two frigates, but with two destroyers only on the first deployment). Starting with the 33rd TF, which deployed in August 2019, each task force has comprised one Type-052D destroyer, one Type-054A frigate, and a supply ship.5 (The first Type-052D did not deploy on this mission until five years after the first ship of its class entered service; none of the newer, larger Type-055 cruisers/destroyers have yet to participate in this mission.)

Responsibility for providing the ships for each task force has been rotated among the three fleets, with the Southern Theater (former South Sea) Fleet providing ships for 18 task forces, the Eastern Theater Fleet for 15, and the Northern Theater Fleet for 13. (The former North Sea Fleet was not assigned this mission until the 11th TF in 2012.6) According to my analysis of official Chinese military media reporting (which may be slightly off due to the renaming of ships and is subject to correction by professional naval analysts), a total of 67 distinct, individual ships (of all types) have participated in these missions, including 23 destroyers, 32 frigates, three Type-071s, and nine supply ships. Among that group, four destroyers, 12 frigates, one Type-071, and all the supply ships have been deployed with more than one task force. The number of individual ships that have participated in this mission is significantly lower than Chinese reporting of 150 vessels (as of last December) because nearly 30 ships have been assigned to multiple task forces.7 Nonetheless, roughly two-thirds of the PLAN’s destroyers and frigates have been deployed on at least one rotation to the Gulf.8 See appendix below.

Recent Changes

For most of the years since the PLAN initiated its Gulf of Aden mission, task forces have departed China three times a year, roughly four months apart. Both en route and during redeployment to China, ships from the task forces could stop along the way for foreign port calls and exercises/events with foreign militaries. Thus, their total time away from home ports could vary considerably according to foreign visitation requirements. In general, one three-ship TF would be on station in or around the Gulf (perhaps with one or two of its ships leaving the immediate area for short diversions/emergency missions or replenishment) while another task force was returning to China or deploying from China usually taking several weeks in transit. A new TF routinely overlaps with the departing TF on station for a few days.

This general pattern for three task force rotations a year seemed to have been the system until the 45th TF left Qingdao in September 2023. However, the amount of time between the 45th TF’s departure in September 2023 and its predecessor, the 44th TF’s departure in April, was five months.9 Likewise, the 46th Gulf of Aden escort task force left Zhanjiang on its current mission in February 2024, also five months after its predecessor.10 The 46th TF is now in its fifth deployed month and there has been no reporting about a 47th TF departing to relieve it.

Furthermore, the 46th TF dispatched one or two of its ships to conduct port visits to distant locations while it was still responsible for conducting the anti-piracy mission. In May, the frigate Xuchang made a three-day “technical stop” in Cape Town.11 In July, two of its ships, the destroyer Jiaozuo and supply ship Honghu, traveled all the way to Casablanca for a five-day port visit and then to St. Peterburg for the celebration of the Russian Navy’s founding and a joint exercise in the Gulf of Finland.12 For the duration of these extended diversions, the number of PLAN ships on station in the Gulf would have been below its normal operating level.

Conclusion

With no reporting to date about a 47th TF to relieve the 46th, the PLAN might be changing its operational deployment patterns for the Gulf of Aden mission, favoring longer intervals between TF’s departing China. This would result in the task forces remaining on station for longer periods of time, but also allow for ships to participate in more ancillary pre-planned or emergency missions while deployed or in transit. The Djibouti Base’s capabilities for in-region repair and maintenance and general logistics support (such as fuel, food, and uniforms) likely has contributed to the decision to extend deployment periods. Prolonged time on station would require fewer ships on average per year, but would also decrease the number of days when two task forces are in the Indian Ocean region (one on station and one in transit).

The PLAN has not offered any explanation behind these anomalous deployments—and may never do so. It is possible that the PLAN needs ships for more pressing missions closer to home, perhaps due to its other ongoing operational missions in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, East China Sea, and Philippine Sea. Or it is possible that the PLAN may desire to keep its ships clear of waters threatened by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

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Tiffany A. Tat, “PLA Navy Reserve: Out of the Shadows and into the Forefront?” CMSI Note 7 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 5 August 2024).

From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman:

China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) Friends and Colleagues –

A few days ago, the PLA celebrated “PLA Day” – a military holiday commemorating the founding of the PLA in 1927. As part of the commemoration, Xi Jinping called for building strong border, sea and air defenses to protect the country’s territorial sovereignty and maritime interests. While a common refrain from Xi, his statements influence the trajectory of the PLA’s development.

Reforming and improving the PLA military Reserve is one way China’s military is incorporating Xi’s guidance. With this in mind, CMSI is pleased to provide you with CMSI Note #7.

This CMSI Note breaks new ground on an understudied and underreported topic – the PRC’s efforts to enhance the capabilities of the PLA Reserve. This CMSI Note identifies the locations of several Chinese Navy Reserve units, discusses their roles and missions, as highlights distinguishing markings on Reserve uniforms and on Reserve warships. It also addresses potential challenges the PLA may face as seeks to integrate more civilian expertise into its Reserve forces.

This CMSI Note is an excellent primer on the People’s Liberation Army Navy Reserve – a topic that warrants far more research. Its timely release coincides with President Xi’s PLA Day directives just a few days ago. This CMSI Note was authored by CMSI’s own, Professor Tiffany Tat. Her insights and efforts to uncover new details about the PLAN Reserve provide a vital addition to the body of literature on China’s Navy. Kudos to her for her painstaking efforts to begin to address this important topic – more to follow!

Summary

As a part China’s goal to build a fully modernized military by 2035, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is improving its reserve forces through increased defense spending, critical policy changes, and organizational restructuring. Reserve forces (后备力量) encompass the PLA Reserve (预备役部队) and paramilitary forces, such as the militia, which fall under the leadership of the Central Military Commission and can be mobilized by the National Defense Mobilization Department to support combat.2 The many components that make up China’s fighting force such as active-duty PLA forces, China Coast Guard, and the militia have been studied in depth; however, the PLA Reserve remains an understudied and underreported topic. While the PLA Reserve represents a fraction of the force structure of their active-duty counterparts, recent changes in military reform specific to the PLA Reserve highlight the importance of this relatively small force and the evolving role reservists (预备役人员) may play within the PLA.3

CMSI Perspectives and Key Takeaways:

• A focus on reforming the PLA Reserve signals ongoing efforts at military readiness and may be an indicator China is preparing for a scenario in which additional resources are required to replace active-duty casualties.
• The PLA seeks to shrink the Army Reserve and grow the Reserves of the PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) which may indicate the PLA is preparing to engage more in these non-ground force domains.
• New reforms affecting the PLA Reserve seek to attract civilian talent in addition to retaining former active-duty veterans. The widening of eligibility and recruitment to civilians with no prior active-duty service is another form of attempted military-civilian fusion as the PLA aims to capitalize on specific technical skills from the civilian sector.
• Reserve forces, and more specifically the PLAN Reserve, can be mobilized in a cross-Strait invasion scenario, giving the PLAN a source of strategic depth in manpower capabilities.

Discussion

Initial research efforts have identified at least five distinct PLAN Reserve units, but the exact size of the PLAN Reserve and number of units is not currently publicly available.5 Three of these units are Mobile Radar and Observation Battalions located in Qingdao, Xiamen, and Shenzhen. A Reconnaissance Ship Squadron is based in Yantai and a Minesweeper Squadron is based in Ningbo.6 The primary mission set of the PLAN Reserve varies depending on time, place, situation, and unit capabilities. Of the five units identified, their duties may include but are not limited to performing tasking related to maritime reconnaissance, countermine warfare, service support for other vessels, electronic warfare, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), search and rescue, or local level security. PLAN Reserve units operate either independently or in coordination with active-duty PLAN forces. Notably, PLAN Reserve units have been observed participating in several active-duty PLAN exercises, which is a testament to this force’s ability to mobilize and integrate with their active-duty counterparts in increasingly realistic scenarios.7

PLAN reservists are distinct in appearance, capabilities, and purpose; and therefore, should not be confused or conflated with the China Coast Guard, the Maritime Militia, active-duty PLA, or any other reserve force. As depicted in Graphic 2, PLAN reservists wear the PLAN uniform while on duty and a ‘Y’ insignia on their uniform distinguishes reservists from their active-duty counterparts.8 The PLAN Reserve has historically drawn primarily from prior service active-duty veterans and their experience operating heavy weaponry and specialized military equipment makes this force uniquely positioned to support, augment, and even replace active-duty PLAN forces. When not in duty status, PLAN reservists are able to maintain civilian employment and are excused from their civilian duties when called to military service.9

At present, there are three major reforms affecting the evolution of PLAN Reserve. The first is a commitment to decrease PLAA Reserve and increase PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF Reserves. The second reform is to optimize the PLA Reserve organizational structure to adapt to future combat needs and integrate with the active-duty component.10 The third reform, codified in the 2023 Reservist Law, widens the net of eligibility to include, notably, non-prior service individuals with special technical or professional skills from the civilian sector.11 These reforms are being implemented through a series of changes in military legislation and new policies governing the PLA Reserve specifically. … … …

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Daniel Clayton Rice, “Sharpening the Sword: Chinese Navy Aircraft Carrier Battle Group Defense Zones,” CMSI Note 6 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 16 July 2024).

From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman:

China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) Friends and Colleagues –

CMSI is pleased to provide you with CMSI Note #6. This CMSI Note details Chinese Central Television-7 (the CCTV Defense and Military channel) reporting about three concentric defensive rings (or zones) that surround People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) aircraft carriers.

The videos were part of CCTV-7’s popular military technology series, “Sharpening the Sword.”  They were aired to commemorate the PLAN’s 75th anniversary.

Not only do the videos detail the three zones, they also address carrier battle group (CVBG) command and control, roles and responsibilities of ships, submarines and aircraft that support carrier operations, and the types of carrier-based flight operations the PLAN conducts. This CMSI Note captures many of these details.

This Note will be of particular value to those who are interested in some of the terms of art used to describe PLAN CVBG operations.  While far from authoritative, the videos from the “Sharpening the Sword” series provide a window into possible PLAN thinking about the organization and structure of both current and future carrier CVBG operations.

This CMSI note was authored by Mr. Dan Rice. Mr. Rice is a China Political and Military Strategy Subject Matter Expert at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfare at the Marine Corps University. CMSI thanks Dan for flagging this program and capturing its details for this CMSI Note.

Perspectives and Key Takeaways

• Chinese state media’s Channel 7 recently released a series of videos that described China’s aircraft carriers and the carrier battle groups, including their history, composition, and operational theory.

• The videos describe the carrier battle group (CVBG) “Outer Defense Zone” (外防区), also called the “Depth Defense Zone” (纵深防区), as 185 km to 400 km away from the aircraft carrier.

• The “Middle Defense Zone” (中防区), or the “Area Defense Zone” (区域防区) is described as 45 km to 185 km away from the aircraft carrier.

• The video details the “Inner Defense Zone” (内防区), otherwise called the “Point Defense Zone” (点防区), as 100 meters to 45 km away from the aircraft carrier.

• According to the videos, air operations from the carriers are generally divided into two types of flight operations: the “Split wave operational pattern” (分波作业方式) and the “Continuous operational pattern” (连续作业方式).

Context

To commemorate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Chinese state media’s Channel 7 released a series of videos on 25 April 2024 showcasing PLAN capabilities.2 The videos were part of CCTV 7’s popular military technology series, “Sharpening the Sword.” Likely intended for domestic consumption, the videos focused on Chinese navy operations as the PLAN continues “Going towards the Deep Blue (走向深蓝)”. Chinese media frequently uses this phrase to describe efforts to expand PLAN fleet operations, which is based on the title of a maritime strategy book sharing the same name.3

The video series included a discussion of how CVBGs could be organized for future fleet operations. According to the video, the organization of a CVBG is broken down into three concentric rings centered on the aircraft carrier. Each expanding ring emphasizes different warfare disciplines. Table 1 summarizes these zones. While mission requirements are likely to dictate the composition of specific ships supporting future CVBG operations, the zones depicted in the videos provide a glimpse into the potential organization of CVBG operations. … … …

Conclusion

The PLAN is entering into what Chinese media often refers to as the “three carrier generation” (三航母时代) – when it will have three operational aircraft carriers that can be employed to project power.16 In the PLAN’s “three carrier generation”, the PLAN will likely deploy its CVBGs deeper into the western Pacific and possibly into the Indian Ocean. Many of these deployments are also likely to be experimental, serving as a proving ground to test PLAN power projection capabilities. The disposition of the three zones described in the Sharpening the Sword video series may be one of several ideas the PLAN is experimenting with as it integrates CVBG into routine fleet operations. The videos seem to suggest that operational insights can potentially be gleaned through observations of CVBG operations. The type of flight operations – split wave or continuous operational pattern – may reveal the PLAN’s training focus and the disposition of surface ships around the carrier may indicate the tasks and responsibilities assigned to individual ships. While far from authoritative, these videos provide a window into possible PLAN thinking about the organization and structure of current and future carrier battle group operations.

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Andrew S. Erickson, “Admiral Wang Renhua: Exemplifying Jointness and Oversight for China’s Navy amid Xi’s Grade-and-Rank Reforms,” CMSI Note 5 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 11 April 2024).

From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman:

China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) Friends and Colleagues –

CMSI is pleased to provide you with CMSI Note #5. It elucidates the background, significance, and implications of the 28 March promotion of Admiral Wang Renhua (王仁华) to full Admiral (three-star rank in the PLA); and the apparent elevation of CMC Politics and Law Commission he heads to Theater Command Leader grade, on the same level as the theaters and services.

This CMSI Note continues our efforts to focus on the People in China’s Military Maritime Domain.

What do you know about the CMC’s Politics and Law Commission? What role will Admiral Wang play? What might it mean for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) specifically? Finally, what does this promotion suggest about the future of grade-and-rank promotions of other senior officers?

Dr. Andrew Erickson tackles these questions and so many more in this comprehensive CMSI Note that examines Wang, his career as a political officer, and his role at the Politics and Law Commission. His painstaking research efforts helps to paint a picture of this Navy officer and a CMC Commission you may know very little about.

Summary

A microcosm of China’s ongoing military advancement, Admiral Wang Renhua (王仁华) embodies some of the subtle, complicated efforts underway to make the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a sophisticated fighting force that is more than the sum of its parts and whose human capital is narrowing the gap with its profusion of formidable hardware. On 28 March 2024, in a ceremony at the Central Military Commission (CMC)’s Bayi Building in Beijing, Xi Jinping concurrently promoted Wang to full admiral—three-star rank in the PLA (which, unlike the U.S. military, does not have a four-star rank)— and, apparently, Theater Command Leader grade.2 Doing so in his capacity as CMC Chairman, Xi also oversaw the implementation of one of the key new management dynamics nearly a decade into his sweeping military reforms: simultaneous promotion in grade and rank in an effort to transition from the PLA’s longstanding grade-centric system to a more Western-style rank-centric system.3 As in other professions, approaches to promoting personnel matter greatly in military performance. China heretofore employed a billet-grounded grade system, whereby not only every officer but also every organization is assigned one of fifteen grades; whereas agile, professional Western militaries have long benefitted from an individually-portable rank system. China’s transformation toward the latter approach remains a work in progress, but Wang’s trajectory is an important bellwether of things to come. More broadly, Wang’s career advancement and rise to CMC insider status as the Secretary of the CMC’s Politics and Law Commission also offers living testimony to other PLA efforts underway, particularly at increasing jointness. His varied resume includes a shift from Army to Navy officer in 2017 as well as service in the East Sea Fleet and at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center.4

CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways:

• Admiral Wang Renhua’s promotion is the latest indication of efforts to synchronize grade-and-rank promotions at the full admiral/general level (three stars in the PLA).
• Wang’s role may be best understood as a military loyalty enforcement boss.
• A key responsibility for Wang may well be to root out and destroy Xi’s enemies within the PLA.
• A potential component of Wang’s portfolio in the navy realm could be to maintain a tight grip on the wardrooms aboard China’s growing fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).
• Having Wang serve in the Navy, and currently as head of the CMC’s powerful Politics and Law Commission, helps the PLA shift to a more joint force as part of Xi’s post-2015 reforms.
• Wang is not originally from the Navy and does not represent the institutional interests of the PLA Navy.
• It is not uncommon for a PLA Army political officer to switch uniforms to the Navy and retain them from that time forward, as Wang has done. … … …

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Conor M. Kennedy, “Deck Cargo Ships: Another Option for a Cross-Strait Invasion,” CMSI Note 4 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 8 February 2024).

From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman:

Deck cargo ships. It’s possible you know little about them. Virtually absent from discussions about cross-Strait contingencies is any reference to how deck cargo ships might support a Cross-Strait Invasion or another Island Landing Campaign.

While images of the PLA’s employment of traditional roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ferries frequently appear in PRC media, you don’t hear much about this other type of RO-RO vessel. Deck cargo ships are numerous, easy to build, and readily available along China’s coast. Moreover, they can be rapidly constructed at multiple Chinese shipyards. The PLA’s integration of deck cargo ships into PLA’s calculus for a cross-Strait contingency has several operational and tactical implications.

CMSI’s own Conor Kennedy authored this important CMSI note. It is another groundbreaking piece that will influence discussions about PLA amphibious lift capabilities for years to come. I highly recommend you read this CMSI Note, which flags several critical operational and tactical considerations.

“CMSI Notes” are a relatively new product line from the team at CMSI. “CMSI Notes” are short quick turn analysis of potential high-interest China & Taiwan events or topics that have critical maritime policy, DoD, and U.S. Navy significance. They are designed to be a timely reference for senior DoD/Navy leaders, warfighters, and policymakers to help inform both near term and future decision-making. I encourage you to read through this CMSI note and forward it to those who need to see it today.

About the Author

Conor Kennedy is an assistant professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute. The views expressed here are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the views, policies, or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or its components, to include the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College.

Summary

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has in recent years increased its use of civilian shipping to augment its sea lift capacity. The incorporation of commercial roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ferries into the amphibious lift equation, has likely altered assumptions on the PLA’s total amphibious lift.2 The PLA intends to use RO-RO vessels to deliver PLA amphibious and non-amphibious wheeled and tracked vehicles into target port facilities or across landing area beaches, further enabled by lighterage and floating causeway systems.3 Ensuring an accurate assessment of all components of lift is vital to determining the PLA’s ability to launch and succeed in a cross-strait invasion. The inclusion of the major RO-RO ferries in these assessments has been key to assessing lift. However, the PLA also employs another important, but largely ignored type of RO-RO vessel, the deck cargo ship.4

CMSI Perspectives and Key Take-Aways:

• In addition to RO-RO ferries, the PLA also uses another class of RO-RO ship, the deck cargo ship, in sea transport training exercises.
• Deck cargo ships are widely used in China’s ocean engineering and construction industry, constituting an existing and large-scale volume of lift capacity.
• The simple design and relative ease of construction of deck cargo ships means they can quickly be built in large numbers.
• These vessels may be tasked to bring in large columns of logistics and follow-on forces to consolidate landing areas, possibly in waves not far behind landing assault forces.
• Deck cargo ships can distribute the risk for many units making transits and force an adversary to find suitable kill solutions to strike numerous lower value targets.

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Julia M. Famularo, “‘Choose the Right Person, Choose the Right Path’: Taiwan’s Cross-Strait, National Security & Defense Policies Under a Lai/Hsiao Administration,” CMSI Note3 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 19 January 2024).

From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman:

While much has been written about last Saturday’s Presidential elections in Taiwan, few have dared to focus on what Taiwan’s Cross-Strait, National Security and Defense Policies are likely to look like under President-elect Lai’s administration.

What are the implications for Taiwan’s development of its maritime domain awareness capabilities under the Lai administration? How might this administration differ (or remain) consistent with President Tsai’s cross-Strait security policies? How is the Lai administration likely to respond to China’s all-domain pressure campaign against Tawain?

CMSI Note #3 answers these questions and more. It is written by Dr. Julia Famularo, who is a visiting scholar with CMSI and a Postdoctoral Fellow in Taiwan Studies at the Harvard University Fairbank Center. Dr. Famularo began studying Taiwan electoral politics in 2000. She was a Fulbright Fellow in Taiwan during the 2007-2008 academic year, at which time she conducted research on the historical development and rise of ethnonationalism in Taiwan and its impact on electoral politics and cross-Strait relations. Since then, she has returned to Taiwan to observe every subsequent presential and legislative election (she has observed the 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020, and most recently was in Taiwan for the 2024 election).

“CMSI Notes” are a relatively new product line from the team at CMSI. “CMSI Notes” are short quick turn analysis of high-profile China & Taiwan events or topics that have critical maritime policy, DoD, and U.S. Navy significance. They are designed to be a timely reference for senior DoD/Navy leaders, warfighters, and policymakers to help inform both near term and future decision-making.

About the Author

Dr. Julia M. Famularo has worked extensively on Taiwan, ethnographic Tibet, East Turkestan, and Hong Kong. Her current research project focuses on whole-of-society resiliency in Taiwan, with an emphasis on Taiwan’s government-sponsored “alternative civilian service” program. Famularo earned her PhD in modern Asian political history at Georgetown University, where she also served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.

Famularo earned an M.A. in East Asian Studies from Columbia University and a B.A. in East Asian Studies and Spanish Literature from Haverford College. She previously served as an International Security Studies Predoctoral Fellow at Yale University.

Research interests: Modern history; international security; Taiwan including cross-Strait security issues; Tibet; East Turkestan; Hong Kong; human rights

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CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways

• The incoming William Lai/Bi-khim Hsiao administration almost certainly intends to continue to execute and deepen President Tsai’s defense reforms. Lai has also stated his support for the implementation of an Indo-Pacific Strategy concept.
• Lai has an opportunity to leverage the national security experience of President Tsai’s outgoing advisors, who may potentially help his administration calibrate Taiwan’s responses to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military provocations in and around the Taiwan Strait.
• The Lai administration likely would prove receptive to U.S. and partner overtures that contribute to Taiwan’s ability to strengthen its maritime domain awareness and security; enhance maritime law enforcement and search and rescue capabilities; conduct maritime patrols; and improve information sharing.
• Lai intends to maintain the cross-Strait status quo, and has stated that he is willing to conduct dialogue with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the basis of mutual respect and equality.
• Lai almost certainly will seek to continue President Tsai Ing-wen’s policy of diversifying Taiwan’s economy and expanding sustainable trade partnerships with democratic nations. He has stated that overdependence on the PRC leaves Taiwan vulnerable to economic coercion, and thus opposes pursuing further economic agreements with China under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) or a potential Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (CSTSA).

Context

Taiwan’s national elections took place on January 13, 2024. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Dr. William LAI Ching-te (賴清德), and his running mate, Ms. HSIAO Bi-khim (蕭美琴), will serve as the next President and Vice President of Taiwan. Their ticket won 40.05% of the vote. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate HOU Yu-ih (侯友宜, also rendered Hou You-Yi) came in second with 33.49%, and Taiwan People’s Party candidate KO Wen-je (柯文哲) came in third with 24.46%.2 

William Lai is the current Vice President (VP). He previously served as a Tainan legislator (1999-2010), Tainan mayor (2010-2017), and as Premier (2017-2019) prior to successfully running as President Tsai’s VP in 2020.3 4 Bi-khim Hsiao most recently served as Taiwan’s diplomatic representative in Washington (2020-2023), where she possessed a strong working relationship with both the Trump and Biden

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During the election campaign, the DDP exhorted voters to “choose the right person, choose the right path.” Now that Dr. Lai, Ms. Hsiao, and other senior officials will collectively shape Taiwan’s cross-Strait, national security, and defense policies, what do they believe the “right path” looks like?

Cross-Strait Policy

According to a December 2023 survey, more than 60% of Taiwanese are moderately to extremely concerned that the PRC may attempt to invade Taiwan.11 It is thus unsurprising that defending Taiwan’s sovereign status has remained a cornerstone of President Tsai Ing-wen’s presidency, and such a policy would continue under a William Lai administration.12 13 DPP leaders consistently argue that there is no need to declare independence, as the Republic of China (ROC) is already a sovereign country and the PRC and Taiwan are not subordinate to one another.14 15 16 Lai states that his priority is to maintain the status quo by means of a “pragmatic and consistent” cross-Strait policy.17 18 He is willing to hold dialogue with China on the basis of mutual respect and equality, but criticizes the PRC for curtailing exchanges based on the DPP’s refusal to accept the so-called “1992 Consensus.”19 20 21 22 23 The supposed “Consensus” refers to a “political strategy” devised following the conclusion of 1992 meetings between representatives from PRC and ROC semiofficial government organizations, which enabled the KMT and CCP “to shelve their differing positions concerning which government is the legitimate, exclusive representative of ‘China,’” and subsequently allowed them to proceed to negotiations on practical cross-Strait agreements.24 

PRC authorities have repeatedly linked the so-called “Consensus” to their own “One China” Principle, which maintains that “there is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China,” and the PRC “is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.” 25 26 Conversely, the KMT asserts that the “Consensus” is intentionally ambiguous, enabling each side to interpret whether “One China” constitutes the ROC or PRC. 27 The DPP argues that as China has “never acknowledged the existence of the ROC,” accepting the “1992 Consensus” implies that Taiwan is part of China.28 29 

According to Lai, pursuing a peace agreement with authoritarian China—as previously advocated by a number of prominent pan-blue politicians—is thus futile, as the fates of Tibet and Hong Kong demonstrate that “peace without sovereignty is not genuine peace.”30 31 Former DPP Premier and party heavyweight Su Tseng-chang also underscored this point during election rallies by calling attention to ongoing PRC human rights abuses against the Uyghurs and Hong Kongers.32 

William Lai almost certainly would maintain President Tsai’s policy of diversifying Taiwan’s economy and expanding sustainable trade partnerships with democratic nations, and states that dependency on China has “created vulnerabilities” that the CCP can exploit “through economic coercion.”33 34 35 36 For this reason, Lai remains opposed to pursuing further economic agreements with China under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) or Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (CSTSA). He also supports Taiwan joining the Western-led Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans- Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 37 38 39 40

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National Security and Defense Policy

Although Lai—unlike Hsiao—did not serve on the Foreign Affairs and National Defense (FAND) Committee, as the DPP Caucus Whip he supported strongly U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and famously excoriated KMT legislators for repeatedly blocking the special budget for arms procurement in 2005.41 42 43 He almost certainly intends for his administration to execute and deepen President Tsai’s defense reforms. 44 45 46 47 48 He has pledged to “expedite” Taiwan’s “transition into an asymmetric fighting force, focusing on cost-effective and mobile capabilities.”49 He also stated that he would “seek greater cooperation with partners and allies, particularly in training, force restructuring, civil defense, and information sharing.”50 Moreover, Lai has specifically stated that he seeks comprehensive security cooperation with Japan.51 

Vice President Lai has expressed his support for the Indo-Pacific Strategy concept. He stresses the importance of ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; strengthening maritime domain awareness and security; enhancing maritime law enforcement and search and rescue capabilities; enhancing Taiwan’s ability to conduct maritime patrols, including with international partners; and “establishing consultation mechanisms to jointly maintain maritime security.”52 53 

Lai has argued that under his leadership, the potential for a cross-Strait conflict would decrease due to his focus on strengthening Taiwan’s national security and defense capabilities.54 55 It is possible that Bi-khim Hsiao may play an important role in helping to shape the future trajectory of Taiwan’s national security, defense, and foreign policies.

Implications

Throughout the election campaign, Lai and Hsiao made it clear that they would continue to lean toward and seek deeper cooperation with key democratic partners as they safeguard Taiwan’s robust democratic society and freedoms. Their administration’s policies will inevitably influence the trajectory of Taiwan’s security landscape by shaping Taiwan’s deterrence posture, national defense readiness, and ultimately its ability to counter an increasingly aggressive PRC all-domain pressure campaign.

Notes

1 Dr. Famularo is a Visiting Scholar at CMSI and a Postdoctoral Fellow in Taiwan Studies at the Harvard University Fairbank Center. The views expressed here are hers alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense. She is grateful to her colleagues at CMSI and fellow Taiwan specialists who reviewed and provided constructive feedback on this memo. 

2 “Presidential and Vice Presidential Election Candidate Votes,” Central Election Commission, January 13, 2024, https://vote2024.cec.gov.tw/en/indexP.html. 

3 Tainan is a city in southern Taiwan, and the former capital. “Vice President Lai,” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/543. 

4 “H.E. Lai Ching-te, Vice President, R.O.C. (Taiwan),” in “Start a New Blueprint for Asian Development,” Yushan Forum: Asian Dialogue for Innovation and Progress, October 10-12, 2023, https://taef.yushanforum.org/img/Booklet_202310101206.pdf. 

5 Michael Crowley, “One of the Most Influential Ambassadors in Washington Isn’t One,” The New York Times, January 22, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/21/us/politics/taiwan-diplomat-china.html. 

6 “Hsiao, Bi-khim,” Legislative Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), https://www.ly.gov.tw/EngPages/List.aspx?nodeid=12167. 

7 “候選人簡介: 蕭美琴 [Candidate Introductions: Bi-khim Hsiao],” 挺台灣 [Team Taiwan] 2024 Presidential Campaign Website, https://taiwan2024.tw/about.

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8 “候選人簡介: 蕭美琴 [Candidate Introductions: Bi-khim Hsiao],” 挺台灣 [Team Taiwan] 2024 Presidential Campaign Website, https://taiwan2024.tw/about. 

9 “Ambassador Bi-khim Hsiao, Taiwan Representative to the United States,” McCain Institute, https://www.mccaininstitute.org/the-sedona-forum/speaker/amb-bi-khim-hsiao/. 

10 Brian Hioe, “What Do the Vice Presidential Choices Indicate About 2024 Elections?” New Bloom Magazine, December 4, 2023, https://newbloommag.net/2023/12/04/2024-vp-picks/. 

11 Timothy Rich, “What Is Taiwan’s New President Going to Do About China?” Foreign Policy, January 17, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/17/taiwan-president-election-china-policy/ 

12 Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, “William Lai: Taiwan just chose a president China loathes. What now?” BBC, January 13, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67920530. 

13 Christopher Bodeen, “Taiwan presidential candidate Lai says he is willing to reopen talks with China,” AP, January 9, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-china-politics-reopen-talks-lai-election-d1181df3d51fa3c25c9e6a5a75e7fd72. 

14 Ben Blanchard and Faith Hung, “Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs to its people, presidential frontrunner says,” Reuters, December 31, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwans-sovereignty-belongs-its-people-presidential-frontrunner-says-2023-12-30/. 

15 “Presidential hopeful Lai says Taiwan’s sovereignty is ‘a fact,’” Al Jazeera, August 25, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/25/taiwan-vice-president-emphasises-islands-autonomy. 

16 Nathan Batto, “Lai explains independence,” Frozen Garlic, January 6, 2024, https://frozengarlic.wordpress.com/2024/01/06/lai-explains-independence/. 

17 [William] Lai Ching-te, “My Plan to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait,” The Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-plan-to-preserve-peace-between-china-and-taiwan-candidate-election-race-war-7046ee00. 

18 Matthew Mazzetta and Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Taiwan’s 2024 presidential candidates: Where they stand on key issues,” Focus Taiwan, December 27, 2023, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202312270010. 

19 Matthew Mazzetta and Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Taiwan’s 2024 presidential candidates: Where they stand on key issues,” Focus Taiwan, December 27, 2023, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202312270010. 

20 Lu Chia-jung and Lee Hsin-Yin, “Beijing highlights ‘1992 consensus’ in response to Tsai’s National Day address,” Focus Taiwan, October 11, 2023, https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202310110025. 

21 Brian Hioe, “Tsai Ing-wen Criticizes 1992 Consensus in New Year Remarks,” New Bloom Magazine, January 1, 2024, https://newbloommag.net/2024/01/01/tsai-new-year-remarks/. 

22 Jessica Drun, “The KMT Continues to Grapple with its ‘1992 Consensus,’” Global Taiwan Brief 17, no. 19 (September 21, 2022), https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/09/the-kmt-continues-to-grapple-with-its-1992-consensus/. 

23 Yu-Jie Chen and Jerome A. Cohen, “China-Taiwan Relations Re-Examined: The “1992 Consensus” and Cross-Strait Agreements,” University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review 14, no. 1 (2019): 1, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=alr. 

24 Yu-Jie Chen and Jerome A. Cohen, “China-Taiwan Relations Re-Examined: The “1992 Consensus” and Cross-Strait Agreements,” University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review 14, no. 1 (2019): 1-2, 7, 9-10, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=alr. 

25 Yu-Jie Chen and Jerome A. Cohen, “China-Taiwan Relations Re-Examined: The “1992 Consensus” and Cross-Strait Agreements,” University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review 14, no. 1 (2019): 7-8, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=alr. 

26 Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, “Questions and Answers Concerning the Taiwan Question (2): What is the one-China principle? What is the basis of the one-China principle?” August 15, 2022, http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/more/20220812Taiwan/202208/t20220815_10743591.htm. 

27 Yu-Jie Chen and Jerome A. Cohen, “China-Taiwan Relations Re-Examined: The “1992 Consensus” and Cross-Strait Agreements,” University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review 14, no. 1 (2019): 9-10, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=alr. 

28 Lu Chia-jung and Lee Hsin-Yin, “Beijing highlights ‘1992 consensus’ in response to Tsai’s National Day address,” Focus Taiwan, October 11, 2023, https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202310110025. 

29 Chung Yu-chen, “DPP’s VP candidate challenges applicability of ‘1992 consensus,’” Focus Taiwan, December 19, 2023, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202312190020. 

30 Lin Chiao-lien and Chung Yu-chen, “Hong Kong, Tibet show why China ‘peace agreement’ not viable: Lai,” Focus Taiwan, September 11, 2023, https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202309110005. 

31 Brian Hioe, “Gou’s Notion of a Peace Treaty between Taiwan and China Revives Longstanding KMT Proposal,” New Bloom Magazine, September 13, 2023, https://newbloommag.net/2023/09/13/gou-peace-treaty/. 

32 The author directly observed Su Tseng-chang discuss PRC human rights issues during multiple 2024 election rallies.

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33 [William] Lai Ching-te, “My Plan to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait,” The Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-plan-to-preserve-peace-between-china-and-taiwan-candidate-election-race-war-7046ee00. 

34 Wen Kuei-hsiang and Frances Huang, “Tsai urges China not to use ECFA to politically threaten Taiwan,” Focus Taiwan, January 1, 2024, https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202401010006. 

35 Christopher Bodeen, “Taiwan presidential candidate Lai says he is willing to reopen talks with China,” AP, January 9, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-china-politics-reopen-talks-lai-election-d1181df3d51fa3c25c9e6a5a75e7fd72. 

36 Stuart Lau, “Taiwan’s new president: 5 things you need to know about William Lai,” Politico, January 13, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/five-things-you-need-to-know-about-taiwan-new-president-william-lai-elections-dpp/. 

37 Matthew Mazzetta and Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Taiwan’s 2024 presidential candidates: Where they stand on key issues,” Focus Taiwan, December 27, 2023, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202312270010. 

38 Teng Pei-ju, “DPP’s Lai commits to preserving cross-strait status quo,” Focus Taiwan, October 26, 2023, https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202310260021. 

39 Kentaro Iwamoto, “RCEP kicks in as China seeks to lead regional economic integration,” Nikkei Asia, January 1, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/RCEP-kicks-in-as-China-seeks-to-lead-regional-economic-integration. 

40 Brian Hioe, “Presidential Debate Mostly Plays Out As Expected, with Cross-Strait Issues Playing Significant Role,” New Bloom Magazine, December 30, 2023, https://newbloommag.net/2023/12/30/2024-presidential-debate/. 

41 Ko Shu-ling, “DPP asks Lien to break the ongoing legislative deadlock,” Taipei Times, May 4, 2005, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/05/04/2003253075. 

42 “Parties spar over Pentagon report,” Taipei Times, July 21, 2005, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/07/21/2003264366. 

43 “超派！賴清德曾為軍購槓藍委 「飆國罵」影片曝光 [So fierce! Video clip of Lai Ching-te lashing out and cursing at [pan-] blue legislators on arms procurement committee],” 鏡新聞 [Mirror News], YouTube, October 4, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tue-yzK0D3E. 

44 [William] Lai Ching-te, “My Plan to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait,” The Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-plan-to-preserve-peace-between-china-and-taiwan-candidate-election-race-war-7046ee00. 

45 Brian Gray, “What Are Taiwan’s Presidential Candidates Saying About Defense?” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, December 18, 2023, https://www.gmfus.org/news/what-are-taiwans-presidential-candidates-saying-about-defense. 

46 Christopher Bodeen, “Taiwan presidential candidate Lai says he is willing to reopen talks with China,” AP, January 9, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-china-politics-reopen-talks-lai-election-d1181df3d51fa3c25c9e6a5a75e7fd72. 

47 Alastair Gale, “Delayed U.S. Weapons Raise Taiwan’s Vulnerability to Invasion,” The Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/delayed-u-s-weapons-raise-taiwans-vulnerability-to-invasion-d98c6635. 

48 Ben Blanchard, “Taiwan presidential front-runner vows to speed up defence reforms,” Reuters, July 6, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-presidential-front-runner-vows-speed-up-defence-reforms-2023-07-06/. 

49 [William] Lai Ching-te, “My Plan to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait,” The Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-plan-to-preserve-peace-between-china-and-taiwan-candidate-election-race-war-7046ee00. 

50 [William] Lai Ching-te, “My Plan to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait,” The Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-plan-to-preserve-peace-between-china-and-taiwan-candidate-election-race-war-7046ee00. 

51 林翠儀 [Lin Cui-yi], “談「台灣有事」籲避戰 賴清德接受NHK專訪：台日應全方位合作 [NHK Japan interviews Lai Ching-te, who discusses a potential Taiwan contingency and how to avoid war: Taiwan and Japan Should Engage in Comprehensive Cooperation],” 自由時報 [Liberty Times], October 6, 2023, https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4450125. 

52 賴清德 [William Lai], “[政見願望] 國家希望工程：海洋國家，航向世界 [[Political Vision] National Project of Hope: Maritime Nation Navigates toward the World],” 挺台灣 [Team Taiwan] 2024 Presidential Campaign Website, November 11, 2023, https://taiwan2024.tw/policies/11. 

53 William Lai, “National Project of Hope: Ocean Nation, Sailing to Join the World,” Democratic Progressive Party Press Release, December 20, 2023, https://www.dpp.org.tw/en/press_releases/contents/105. 

54 【下班瀚你聊】[Let’s Chat After Work] Episode 110, 風傳媒 [Storm Media], YouTube, November 5, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DBLqKQEB7cs&t=4055s. 

55 Brian Gray, “What Are Taiwan’s Presidential Candidates Saying About Defense?” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, December 18, 2023, https://www.gmfus.org/news/what-are-taiwans-presidential-candidates-saying-about-defense.  

***

Key points summarized in: Julia Famularo, “Economic Diversification and Defense Reform Will Likely Continue,” in Frank Zhou, Taiwan Elections 2024 Recap: Democracy Prevailed, And Now the DPP Has Work to Do, Harvard Fairbank Center Blog Post, 26 January 2024.

Economic Diversification and Defense Reform Will Likely Continue

by Dr. Julia Famularo, Postdoctoral Fellow in Taiwan Studies, Harvard University

Throughout the election campaign, Lai Ching-te and Hsiao Bi-khim made it clear that they would continue to lean toward and seek deeper cooperation with key democratic partners as they safeguard Taiwan’s robust democratic society and freedoms. Their administration’s policies will inevitably influence the trajectory of Taiwan’s security landscape by shaping Taiwan’s deterrence posture, national defense readiness, and ultimately, its ability to counter an increasingly aggressive PRC all-domain pressure campaign.

Here are some key takeaways from my recent article for the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Initiative, “Choose the Right Person, Choose the Right Path”: Taiwan’s Cross-Strait, National Security, and Defense Policies Under a Lai/Hsiao Administration:

• The incoming William Lai/Bi-khim Hsiao administration almost certainly intends to continue to execute and deepen President Tsai’s defense reforms. Lai has also stated his support for the implementation of an Indo-Pacific Strategy concept.
• Lai has an opportunity to leverage the national security experience of President Tsai’s outgoing advisors, who may potentially help his administration calibrate Taiwan’s responses to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military provocations in and around the Taiwan Strait.
• The Lai administration likely would prove receptive to U.S. and partner overtures that contribute to Taiwan’s ability to strengthen its maritime domain awareness and security; enhance maritime law enforcement and search and rescue capabilities; conduct maritime patrols; and improve information sharing.
• Lai intends to maintain the cross-Strait status quo, and has stated that he is willing to conduct dialogue with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the basis of mutual respect and equality.
• Lai almost certainly will seek to continue President Tsai Ing-wen’s policy of diversifying Taiwan’s economy and expanding sustainable trade partnerships with democratic nations. He has stated that overdependence on the PRC leaves Taiwan vulnerable to economic coercion, and thus opposes pursuing further economic agreements with China under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) or a potential Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (CSTSA).

***

Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher H. Sharman, “Admiral Dong Jun Engages Friends and Foes: China’s First Naval Defense Minister Brings Joint Operational Experience,” CMSI Note 2 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 30 December 2023).

From CMSI Director Christopher Sharman: