Andrew S. Erickson

As part of Ronald O’Rourke’s continuous incremental improvements, this # 26X (!) edition of his report on PRC naval modernization incorporates numbers provided by the U.S. Navy. Given the authoritative analysis supporting these revelations, and the rarity with which they are made publicly available in this manner, they are all worth reading carefully in full!

Bottom line up front: here’s the key table (p. 11):

By 2040, the PLA Navy is thus projected to have the following:

• Ballistic missile submarines (SSBN): 10 (+6)
• Nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN): 16 (+10)
• Diesel attack submarines (SSK): 46 (-1)
• Aircraft carriers (CV): 6 (+4)
• Cruisers and destroyers (CG & DDG): 80 (+39)
• Frigates and corvettes (FFG & FFL): 140 (+38)
• Amphibious Assault Ship-type amphibious ships (LHA): 6 (+6)
• Amphibious Transport Dock-type amphibious ships 14 (LPD): (+7)
• Tank Landing Ship-type amphibious ships (LST): 15 (-15)
• TOTAL of above-mentioned types: 333 (+94)

Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, RL33153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 15 May 2023).

Having trouble accessing the website above? Please download a cached copy here!

You can also click here to access the report via the public CRS website.

Here’s another important table (p. 9):

Note from me (Andrew Erickson): The U.S. Navy is duty bound to count PLA Navy ship numbers strictly according to the criteria listed in SECNAVINST 5030.8C (“General Guidance for the Classification of Naval Vessels and Battle Force Ship Counting Procedures”). The resulting battle force numbers calculated for China therefore correspond numerically with those for the U.S. Navy battle force. To be sure, aspects of the analysis and implications can be complex in practice, and O’Rourke offers thoughtful explanations and implications in his frequently-updated report.

Further references:

• United States Navy ships
• U.S. Navy Ships – Index
• List of naval ship classes in service
• Nomenclature of Naval Vessels

Now, back to the specific contents of O’Rourke’s report…

p. 1

***

1 For an overview of China’s military, see CRS Report R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by Caitlin Campbell. For more on China’s military modernization effort being the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting, see CRS Report R43838, Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. 

2 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, Annual Report to Congress, released on November 29, 2022, 174 pp. Hereinafter 2022 DOD CMSD. 

3 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, 125 pp. Hereinafter 2019 DIA CMP. 

4 Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy, New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, undated but released in April 2015, 47 pp. 

5 IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2021-2022, and previous editions.  

p. 2

Background 

Brief Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort 

Key overview points concerning China’s naval modernization effort include the following: 

• China’s naval modernization effort, which forms part of a broader Chinese military modernization effort that includes several additional areas of emphasis,7 has been underway for about 30 years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has transformed China’s navy into a much more modern and capable force. 
• China’s navy is a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe.
• China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and as shown in Table 2, sometime between 2015 and 2020, China’s navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in numbers of battle force ships (meaning the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy), making China’s navy the numerically largest in the world. DOD states that “the PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of approximately 340 platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries…. This figure does not include approximately 85 patrol combatants and craft that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 400 ships by 2025 and 440 ships by 2030. Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants.”8 The U.S. Navy, by comparison, included 294 battle force ships at the end of FY2021, and the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission projects that the Navy will include 290 battle force ships by the end of FY2030.9
• U.S. military officials and other observers are expressing concern or alarm regarding the pace of China’s naval shipbuilding effort and resulting trend lines regarding the relative sizes and capabilities of China’s navy and the U.S. Navy.10

***

7 Other areas of emphasis in China’s military modernization effort include space capabilities, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, ballistic missile forces, and aviation forces, as well as the development of emerging military-applicable technologies such as hypersonics, artificial intelligence, robotics and unmanned vehicles, directed-energy technologies, and quantum technologies. For more on China’s military modernization effort in general, see CRS Report R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by Caitlin Campbell. For a discussion of advanced military technologies, see CRS In Focus IF11105, Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies, by Kelley M. Sayler. U.S.-China competition in military capabilities in turn forms one dimension of a broader U.S.-China strategic competition that also includes political, diplomatic, economic, technological, and ideological dimensions. 

8 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 52. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 63. 

9 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. 

10 See, for example, Chris Bradford, “Point of No Return, US Navy Faces Being Totally Outgunned by China in Just Seven Years—We Need a Fleet Ready to Fight War Now, Says Expert,” U.S. Sun, March 1, 2023; Keith Griffith, “China’s Naval Fleet Is Growing and the US ‘Can’t Keep Up’ with the Warship Buildup as Beijing Uses Its Sea Power to Project an ‘Increasingly Aggressive Military Posture Globally,’ Navy Secretary Warns,” Daily Mail (UK), February 23, 2023; Brad Lendon and Haley Britzky, “US Can’t Keep Up with China’s Warship Building, Navy Secretary Says,” CNN, February 22, 2023; Meredith Roaten, “Shipyard Capacity, China’s Naval Buildup Worries U.S. Military Leaders,” National Defense, January 26, 2023; Oliver Parken and Tyler Rogoway, “Extremely Ominous Warning 

(continued…) 

p. 3

• China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War. China’s navy forms a key element of a Chinese challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific. 
• China’s naval ships, aircraft, and weapons are much more modern and capable than they were at the start of the 1990s, and are comparable in many respects to those of Western navies. DOD states that “as of 2021, the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors.”11 ONI states that “Chinese naval ship design and material quality is in many cases comparable to [that of] USN [U.S. Navy] ships, and China is quickly closing the gap in any areas of deficiency.”12 
• China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles (UVs),13 and supporting C4ISR (command and control, 

***

About China From US Strategic Command Chief, Admiral Richard Says ‘The Big One’ with China Is Coming and the ‘Ship Is Slowly Sinking’ in Terms of U.S. Deterrence,” The Drive, November 6, 2022; Xiaoshan Xue, “As China Expands Its Fleets, US Analysts Call for Catch-up Efforts,” VOA, September 13, 2022; Aidan Quigley, “Chinese Navy Narrowing Capability Gap with U.S., Analysts Say,” Inside Defense, November 16, 2021; Alex Hollings, “Just How Big Is China’s Navy? Bigger Than You Think,” Sandboxx, July 28, 2021; Kyle Mizokami, “China Just Commissioned Three Warships in a Single Day, That’s Almost Half as Many as the U.S. Will Induct in One Year,” Popular Mechanics, April 27, 2021; Geoff Ziezulewicz, “China’s Navy Has More Ships than the US. Does That Matter?” Navy Times, April 9, 2021; Dan De Luce and Ken Dilanian, “China’s Growing Firepower Casts Doubt on Whether U.S. Could Defend Taiwan, In War Games, China Often Wins, and U.S. Warships and Aircraft Are Kept at Bay,” NBC News, March 27, 2021; Brad Lendon, “China Has Built the World’s Largest Navy. Now What’s Beijing Going to Do with It?” CNN, March 5, 2021; Andrew S. Erickson, “A Guide to China’s Unprecedented Naval Shipbuilding Drive,” Maritime Executive, February 11, 2021; Stephen Kuper, “Beijing Steps Up Naval Shipbuilding Program with Eyes on Global Navy,” Defence Connect, January 11, 2021; James E. Fanell, “China’s Global Navy—Today’s Challenge for the United States and the U.S. Navy,” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2020, 32 pp.; Ryan Pickrell, “China Is the World’s Biggest Shipbuilder, and Its Ability to Rapidly Produce New Warships Would Be a ‘Huge Advantage’ in a Long Fight with the US, Experts Say,” Business Insider, September 8, 2020; Ryan D. Martinson, “Deciphering China’s ‘World-Class’ Naval Ambitions,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2020; Dave Makichuk, “China’s Navy Shipbuilders Are ‘Outbuilding Everybody,’” Asia Times, March 11, 2020; Jon Harper, “Eagle vs Dragon: How the U.S. and Chinese Navies Stack Up,” National Defense, March 9, 2020; H. I. Sutton, “The Chinese Navy Is Building An Incredible Number Of Warships,” Forbes, December 15, 2019; Nick Childs and Tom Waldwyn, “China’s Naval Shipbuilding: Delivering on Its Ambition in a Big Way,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), May 1, 2018; James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Taking Stock of China’s Growing Navy: The Death and Life of Surface Fleets,” Orbis, Spring 2017: 269-285. 

For articles offering differing perspectives, see, for example, David Axe, “The Chinese Navy Can’t Grow Forever—The Slowdown Might Start Soon,” Forbes, November 12, 2020; Mike Sweeney, Assessing Chinese Maritime Power, Defense Priorities, October 2020, 14 pp. 

11 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 50. 

12 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 3. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission. 

13 See, for example, H. I. Sutton, “China Reveals New Heavily Armed Extra-Large Uncrewed Submarine,” Naval News, February 23, 2023; Ryan Martinson, “Gliders With Ears: A New Tool in China’s Subsea Surveillance Toolbox,” Maritime Executive, March 21, 2022; Gabriel Honrada, “Underwater Drones Herald Sea Change in Pacific Warfare,” Asia Times, January 12, 2022. 

Ryan Fedasiuk, “Leviathan Wakes: China’s Growing Fleet of Autonomous Undersea Vehicles,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), August 17, 2021.

p. 4

• communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China’s naval modernization effort also includes improvements in logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.14 
• China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for, among other things, addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; achieving a greater degree of control or domination over China’s near-seas region, particularly the South China Sea; enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ);15 defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and a major world power.16 Additional missions for China’s navy include conducting maritime security (including antipiracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations. 
• Observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. 
• The planned ultimate size and composition of China’s navy is not publicly known. In contrast to the U.S. Navy, China does not release a navy force-level goal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total ship procurement quantities, planned ship retirements, and resulting projected force levels. 
• Although China’s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China’s naval capabilities, China’s navy currently is assessed as having limitations or weaknesses in certain areas,17 including joint operations with other parts of China’s military,18 anti-submarine warfare (ASW), long-range targeting, a limited capacity for carrying out at-sea resupply of combatant ships operating far from home waters,19 a limited number of overseas bases and support facilities,20 a need 

***

14 See, for example, Roderick Lee, “The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series: Supporting Offensive Strike on the High Seas,” China Brief, April 13, 2020. 

15 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. 

16 For additional discussion, see Ryan D. Martinson, “Deciphering China’s ‘World-class’ Naval Ambitions,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2020. 

17 For a discussion focusing on these limitations or weaknesses, see Mike Sweeney, Assessing Chinese Maritime Power, Defense Priorities, October 2020, 14 pp. See also Tai Ming Cheung, “Russia’s Ukraine Disaster Exposes China’s Military Weakness,” Foreign Policy, October 24, 2022. 

18 See, for example, Ben Noon and Chris Bassler, “Schrodinger’s Military? Challenges for China’s Military Modernization Ambitions,” War on the Rocks, October 14, 2021. 

19 See, for example, Felix K. Chang, “Sustaining the Chinese Navy’s Operations at Sea: Bigger Fists, Growing Legs,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 3, 2023; Will Mackenzie, “Commentary: It’s the Logistics, China,” National Defense, June 10, 2020. 

20 See, for example, Kristin Huang, “Size of China’s Navy May Be Closing Gap on US Fleet But What Can the PLA Do with Just One Overseas Naval Base?” South China Morning Post, March 14, 2021.  

 p. 5

• to train large numbers of personnel to crew its new ships,21 and a lack of recent combat experience.22 China is working to reduce or overcome such limitations and weaknesses.23 Although China’s navy has limitations and weaknesses, it may nevertheless be sufficient for performing missions of interest to Chinese leaders. As China’s navy reduces its weaknesses and limitations, it may become sufficient to perform a wider array of potential missions. 
• In addition to modernizing its navy, China has substantially increased the size and capabilities of its coast guard. DOD states that China’s coast guard is “the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world.”24 China also operates a 

***

21 See, for example, Minnie Chan, “China’s Navy Goes Back to Work on Big Ambitions but Long-Term Gaps Remain,” South China Morning Post, August 22, 2020. 

22 Alastair Gale, “China’s Military Is Catching Up to the U.S. Is It Ready for Battle?” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2022; Benjamin Brimelow, “China’s Military Is Growing Rapidly, But It Hasn’t Been ‘Tested’ Like US Troops Have, Former Top US Admiral Says,” Business Insider, March 29, 2022. See also Andrew Scobell, “Xi Jinping’s Worst Nightmare: A Potemkin People’s Liberation Army,” War on the Rocks, May 1, 2023. 

The use of a dual command structure in the crews of larger Chinese ships, involving both a commanding officer and a political officer, has been raised as a source of potential reduced command effectiveness in certain tactical situations. See “Leadership: China Cripples Naval Officers,” Strategy Page, July 18, 2020. 

Some observers argue that corruption in China’s shipbuilding companies may be a source of weaknesses in China’s naval modernization effort. See, for example, Zi Yang, “The Invisible Threat to China’s Navy: Corruption,” Diplomat, May 19, 2020. See also Frank Chen, “Ex-PLA Navy Chief in Deep Water Amid War on Graft,” Asia Times, June 26, 2020. 

23 For example, China’s naval shipbuilding programs were previously dependent on foreign suppliers for some ship components. ONI, however, states that “almost all weapons and sensors on Chinese naval ships are produced in-country, and China no longer relies on Russia or other countries for any significant naval ship systems.” (Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, pp. 2-3. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission.) Regarding the ASW capabilities of China’s Navy, DOD states 

The PLAN is also improving its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities through the development of its surface combatants and special mission aircraft, but it continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability. By prioritizing the acquisition of ASW capable surface combatants, acoustic surveillance ships, and fixed and rotary wing ASW capable aircraft, the PLAN is significantly improving its ASW capabilities. However, it will still require several years of training and systems integration for the PLAN to develop a robust offensive deep water ASW capability. 

(2022 DOD CMSD, p. 53.) 

See also Felix K. Chang, “Sustaining the Chinese Navy’s Operations at Sea: Bigger Fists, Growing Legs,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 3, 2023; Bryan Clark, “Submarines Will Not Solve America’s Eroding Undersea Advantage,” Washington Examiner, December 5, 2022; Ryan D. Martinson and Conor Kennedy, “Using the Enemy to Train the Troops—Beijing’s New Approach to Prepare its Navy for War,” China Brief, March 25, 2022; Samuel Cranny-Evans, “China’s Maritime Surveillance Network: Bold Moves for Ocean Dominance,” Jane’s International Defence Review, February 17, 2022; Ma Xiu and Peter W. Singer, “How China Steals US Tech to Catch Up in Underwater Warfare,” Defense One, June 8, 2021; Amanda Rivkin, “German Engine Technology Found in Chinese Warships—Report,” Deutsche Welle (dw.com), November 6, 2021. 

24 DOD states that 

The CCG’s [China Coast Guard’s] rapid expansion and modernization has made it the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world. Its newer vessels are larger and more capable than older vessels, allowing them to operate further offshore and remain on station longer. A 2019 academic study published by the U.S. Naval War College estimates the CCG has over 140 regional and oceangoing patrol vessels (of more than 1,000 tons displacement). Some of the vessels are former PLAN vessels, such as corvettes, transferred to the CCG and modified for CCG operations. The newer, larger vessels are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, interceptor boats, and guns ranging from 20 to 76 millimeters. In addition, the same academic study indicates the CCG operates more than 120 regional patrol combatants (500 to 999 tons), which can 

(continued…) 

p. 6

p. 7

Number of Ships Is a One-Dimensional Measure, but Trends in Numbers Can Be of Value Analytically 

Relative U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities are sometimes assessed by showing comparative numbers of U.S. and Chinese ships. Although the total number of ships in a navy (or a navy’s aggregate tonnage) is relatively easy to calculate, it is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out numerous other factors that bear on a navy’s capabilities and how those capabilities compare to its assigned missions. As a result, as discussed in further detail in Appendix A, comparisons of the total numbers of ships in China’s navy and the U.S. Navy are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities and how those capabilities compare to the missions assigned to the two navies. At the same time, however, an examination of trends over time in these relative numbers of ships can shed some light on how the relative balance of U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities might be changing over time. 

Three Tables Showing Numbers of Chinese and U.S. Navy Ships 

Table Showing Figures from Annual DOD Reports 

Table 1 shows numbers of certain types of Chinese navy ships—those that might be thought of as the principal combat ships of China’s navy—from 2005 to the present, along with the number of China coast guard ships from 2017 to the present, as presented in DOD’s annual reports on military and security developments involving China. As can be seen in Table 1, every type of Chinese navy ship shown in the table has increased numerically since 2005. 

As can be seen in Table 1, about 61% of the increase since 2005 in the total number of Chinese navy ships shown in the table (a net increase of 83 ships out of a total net increase of 135 ships) resulted from increases in missile-armed fast patrol craft starting in 2009 (a net increase of 33 ships) and corvettes starting in 2014 (50 ships). These are the smallest surface combatants shown in the table. The net 33-ship increase in missile-armed fast patrol craft was due to the construction between 2004 and 2009 of about 60 new Houbei (Type 022) fast attack craft30 and the retirement of about 27 older fast attack craft. The 50-ship increase in corvettes is due to the Jingdao (Type 056) corvette program discussed later in this report. ONI states that “a significant portion of China’s Battle Force consists of the large number of new corvettes and guided-missile frigates recently built for the PLAN.”31 As can also be seen in the table, most of the remaining increase since 2005 in the number of Chinese navy ships shown in the table is accounted for by increases in cruisers and destroyers (21 ships) and amphibious ships (14 ships). 

Table 1 lumps together less capable older Chinese ships with more capable modern Chinese ships. In examining the numbers in the table, it can be helpful to keep in mind that for many of the types of Chinese ships shown in the table, the percentage of the ships accounted for by more capable modern designs was growing over time, even if the total number of ships for those types was changing little. 

For reference, Table 1 also shows the total number of ships in the U.S. Navy (known technically as the total number of battle force ships), and compares it to the total number of the types of 

***

30 The Type 022 program was discussed in the August 1, 2018, version of this CRS report, and earlier versions. 

31 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission.

p. 8

Chinese ships that are shown in the table.32 The result is an apples-vs.-oranges comparison, because the Chinese figures exclude certain ship types, such as auxiliary and support ships, while the U.S. Navy figure includes auxiliary and support ships but excludes patrol craft. Changes over time in this apples-vs.-oranges comparison, however, can be of value in understanding trends in the comparative sizes of the U.S. and Chinese navies. 

On the basis of the figures in Table 1, it might be said that in 2015, the total number of principal combat ships in China’s navy surpassed the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships (a figure that includes not only the U.S. Navy’s principal combat ships, but also other U.S. Navy ships, such as auxiliary and support ships). It is important, however, to keep in mind the differences in composition between the two navies. The U.S. Navy, for example, has many more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China’s navy has many more diesel attack submarines, frigates, and corvettes. 

Table Showing ONI Figures from February 2020 

Table 2 shows comparative numbers of Chinese and U.S. battle force ships (and figures for certain types of ships that contribute toward China’s total number of battle force ships) from 2000 to 2030, with the figures for 2025 and 2030 being projections. The figures for China’s ships are taken from an ONI information paper of February 2020. Battle force ships are the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy. For China, the total number of battle force ships shown excludes the missile-armed coastal patrol craft shown in Table 1, but includes auxiliary and support ships that are not shown in Table 1. Compared to Table 1, the figures in Table 2 come closer to providing an apples-to-apples comparison of the two navies’ numbers of ships, although it could be argued that China’s missile-armed coastal patrol craft can be a significant factor for operations within the first island chain. 

As shown in Table 2, China’s navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in terms of total number of battle force ships sometime between 2015 and 2020. As mentioned earlier in connection with Table 1, however, it is important to keep in mind the differences in composition between the two navies. The U.S. Navy, for example, currently has many more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China’s navy currently has many more diesel attack submarines, frigates, and corvettes. 

Table Showing U.S. Navy Figures from October 2020 

Table 3 shows numbers of certain types of Chinese navy ships in 2020, and projections of those numbers for 2025, 2030, and 2040, along with the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in 2020, and projections of those numbers for 2025, 2030, and 2040. The figures for China’s ships were provided by the Navy at the request of CRS. As with Table 1, the result is an apples-vs.-oranges comparison between the Chinese navy and U.S. Navy totals, because the Chinese total excludes certain ship types, such as auxiliary and support ships, while the U.S. Navy total includes auxiliary and support ships. 

***

32 The DOD report generally covers events of the prior calendar year. Thus, the 2021 edition covers events during 2020, and so on for earlier years. Similarly, for the U.S. Navy figures, the 2021 column in Table 1 shows the figure for the end of FY2020, and so on for earlier years.

p. 9

Figures for Chinese ships taken from annual DOD reports on military and security developments involving China for the years 2005-2022 

Table 1. Numbers of Certain Types of Chinese and U.S. Ships Since 2005

Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on 2005-2022 editions of annual DOD report to Congress on military and security developments involving China (known for 2009 and prior editions as the report on China military power), and (for U.S. Navy ships) U.S. Navy data as presented in CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Consistent with the DOD report, which shows data for China for the year prior to the report’s publication date, the U.S. Navy data here shows data for the year prior to the prior to the DOD report’s publication date. For example, the figure of 294 shown for the U.S. Navy for 2022 shows the number of U.S. Navy ships at the end of FY2021. 

Key to abbreviations: n/a = data not available in annual DOD report. SSB = ballistic missile submarines. SSN = nuclear-powered attack submarines. SS = diesel attack submarines. CV = aircraft carriers. CG = cruisers. DD = destroyers. FF = frigates. FFL = corvettes (i.e., light frigates). PC = missile-armed coastal patrol craft. LST = amphibious tank landing ship. LPD = amphibious transport dock ship. LSM = amphibious medium landing ship. (Starting with the 2021 edition, the annual DOD report shows a combined figure for LST/LPD and LSM.) Column for Total PLAN ship types shown to right, which shows what might be thought of as the principal combat ships of China’s navy, does not include other PLAN ship types not shown to right, such as auxiliary and support ships. CCG = China Coast Guard ships. U.S. total = Total U.S. Navy battle force ships, which includes 

p. 10

auxiliary and support ships but excludes patrol craft. U.S. vs. PLAN ship types shown = total U.S. Navy battle force ships compared to the column for Total PLAN ship types shown to right. 

Notes: The DOD report generally covers events of the prior calendar year. Thus, the 2021 edition covers events during 2020, and so on for earlier years. Similarly, for the U.S. Navy figures, the 2021 column shows the figure for the end of FY2020, and so on for earlier years.

Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort 

This section provides a brief overview of elements of China’s naval modernization effort that have attracted frequent attention from observers. 

Anti-Ship Missiles 

Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) 

China is fielding two types of land-based ballistic missiles with a capability of hitting ships at sea at extended ranges—the DF-21D (Figure 1), a road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers (i.e., more than 910 nautical miles), and the DF-26 (Figure 2), a road-mobile, multi-role intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a maximum range of about 3,000 kilometers (i.e., about 1,620 nautical miles) that DOD says is “capable of conducting both conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets as well as conventional strikes against naval targets.”33

***

33 2022 DOD CMSD, p. 64. A map on page 67 of the report shows the DF-26 with a range of 4,000 kilometers (about 2,160 nautical miles).

p. 12

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)—Officially Revealed at 3 September Parade—Complete Open Source Research Compendium,” AndrewErickson.com, September 10, 2015, accessed August 28, 2019.

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Missile Defense Project, “Dong Feng-26 (DF-26),” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 8, 2018, last modified January 15, 2019, accessed August 28, 2019.

Until 2020, reported test flights of DF-21s and SDF-26s had not involved attempts to hit moving ships at sea. A November 14, 2020, press report stated that an August 2020 test firing of DF-21 and DF-26 ASBMs into the South China resulted in the missiles successfully hitting a moving target ship south of the Paracel Islands.34 A December 3, 2020, press report stated that Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “confirmed, for the first time 

***

34 Kristin Huang, “China’s ‘Aircraft-Carrier Killer’ Missiles Successfully Hit Target Ship in South China Sea, PLA Insider Reveals,” South China Morning Post, November 14, 2020. See also Peter Suciu, “Report: China’s ‘Aircraft-Carrier Killer’ Missiles Hit Target Ship in August,” National Interest, November 15, 2020; Andrew Erickson, “China’s DF-21D and DF-26B ASBMs: Is the U.S. Military Ready?” Real Clear Defense, November 16, 2020.  

p. 13

from the U.S. government side, that China’s People’s Liberation Army has successfully tested an anti-ship ballistic missile against a moving ship.”35 

Observers have expressed strong concerns about China’s ASBMs, because such missiles, in combination with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to attack aircraft carriers, other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies operating in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. For this reason, some observers have referred to ASBMs as a “game-changing” weapon. 

In April 2022, it was reported that China may have developed a new type of ASBM, perhaps designated the YJ-21, that is small enough to fit into the vertical launch tube of a surface combatant, and that China had test fired such a weapon from a Type 055 cruiser (or large destroyer).36 

China reportedly is developing hypersonic glide vehicles that, if incorporated into Chinese ASBMs, could make Chinese ASBMs more difficult to intercept. A February 2, 2023, press report states 

For the first time, the PLA has officially revealed the performance of its advanced anti-ship hypersonic missile, sending a warning to the US amid high tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Chinese analysts said. 

China’s YJ-21, or Eagle Strike-21, has a terminal speed of Mach 10, cannot be intercepted by any anti-missile weapons system in the world and can launch lethal strikes towards enemy ships, according to an article posted by the official Weibo account of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force on Monday [January 30]…. 

The article declares that the missile travels six times the speed of sound all the way, and has a terminal speed of 10 times the speed of sound, meaning a speed of 3,400 metres per second (11,155 feet per second) when it hits the target. 

“Such a terminal speed cannot be intercepted by any anti-missile weapon system at this stage. Even if it is dropped directly at this terrifying speed [hitting the target] without an explosion it will cause a fatal strike to the enemy ship,” the article stated. 

The debut of its export variant, the YJ-21E, at last year’s Airshow China “shows that the domestic version of the Eagle Strike-21 ship-borne hypersonic missile is no longer the navy’s most advanced ship-borne hypersonic missile, and more advanced ship-borne hypersonic missiles are likely to have appeared,” it said. 

The article was first published on the website of China Science Communication, Guangming Online last year, but it was reposted by an official PLA account for the first time, a development experts described as a clear message for the US.37

***

35 Josh Rogin, “China’s Military Expansion Will Test the Biden Administration,” Washington Post, December 3, 2020. 

36 Rick Fisher, “China Deploys New Missiles Against the US Navy,” Epoch Times, April 29, 2022; Minnie Chan, “Chinese Navy Shows Off Hypersonic Anti-Ship Missiles In Public,” South China Morning Post, April 20, 2022; Tyler Rogoway, “Mysterious New Missile Launched By China’s Giant Type 055 Destroyer,” The Drive, April 20. 

37 Amber Wang, “Chinese Military Announces YJ-21 Missile Abilities in Social Media Post Read as Warning to US Amid Tension in Taiwan Strait,” South China Morning Post, February 2, 2023. Material in brackets as in original. See also Gabriel Honrada, “China’s Hypersonic Triad Pressing Down on US,” Asia Times, April 4, 2023.

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Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) 

China’s extensive inventory of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) (see Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5 for examples of reported images) includes both Russian- and Chinese-made designs, including some advanced and highly capable ones, such as the Chinese-made YJ-18.38 … …

p. 16

Source: Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier, Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions, Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 2014. The image appears on an unnumbered page following page 14. The caption to the photograph states, “YJ-83A/C-802A ASCM on display at 2008 Zhuhai Airshow.” The photograph is credited to Associated Press/Wide World Photos. … …

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Submarines 

Overview 

China has been steadily modernizing its submarine force, and most of its submarines are now built to relatively modern Chinese and Russian designs.41 Qualitatively, China’s newest submarines might not be as capable as Russia’s newest submarines,42 but compared to China’s earlier submarines, which were built to antiquated designs, its newer submarines are much more capable.43 … …

***

41 For a discussion of Russian military transfers to China, including transfers of submarine technology, see Paul Schwartz, The Changing Nature and Implications of Russian Military Transfers to China, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 2021, 8 pp. See also Joseph Trevithick, “Top Russian Submarine Design Bureau Hit By Cyber Attack With Chinese Characteristics,” The Drive, May 10, 2021. 

42 Observers have sometimes characterized Russia’s submarines as being the most capable faced by the U.S. Navy. See, for example, Joe Gould and Aaron Mehta, “US Could Lose a Key Weapon for Tracking Chinese and Russian Subs,” Defense News, May 1, 2019; Dave Majumdar, “Why the U.S. Navy Fears Russia’s Submarines,” National Interest, October 12, 2018; John Schaus, Lauren Dickey, and Andrew Metrick, “Asia’s Looming Subsurface Challenge,” War on the Rocks, August 11, 2016; Paul McLeary, “Chinese, Russian Subs Increasingly Worrying the Pentagon,” Foreign Policy, February 24, 2016; Dave Majumdar, “U.S. Navy Impressed with New Russian Attack Boat,” USNI News, October 28, 2014. 

43 For an additional overview of China’s submarine force, see U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, Quick Look Report “Chinese Undersea Warfare: Development, Capabilities, Trends,” undated [5 May 2023], 2 pp., which summarizes an academic conference on China’s undersea warfare capabilities that was held by the China Maritime Studies Institute on April 11-13, 2023. … …

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