01 November 2020

The China Maritime Militia Bookshelf: Latest Data, Official Statements & Wikipedia Entry

Andrew S. Erickson, “Tracking China’s ‘Little Blue Men’—A Comprehensive Maritime Militia Compendium,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 1 November 2020.

As Coronavirus rages on, fishy things have been happening across the South and East China Seas, home to virtually all of Chinas unresolved maritime disputes… Since Beijing remains far from being fully forthcoming and transparent, it is to be hoped that governments whose nations’ ships have been involved with these bilateral incidents with PRC vessels—as well as any other knowledgeable parties—will release complete information on exactly what has happened. Meanwhile, however, ample information is already available concerning Chinas Peoples Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) and the important role it has played in these waters for decades. You need look no further!

Rarely is a topic so little recognized and so little understood, yet so important and so amenable to research using Chinese-language open sources. To increase awareness and understanding of this important subject, here is a convenient compendium of major publications and other documents available on the matter thus far. If you know of others, please kindly bring them to my attention via <http://www.andrewerickson.com/contact/>.

China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a key component of its Armed Forces, each of which contains the world’s largest sea force of its type by number of ships. Graphic by Conor Kennedy, Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute.

CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIA: DATA & ANALYSIS

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia,” Wikipedia, entry as of 1 November 2020.

The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is the government funded maritime militia of China[1]. For reportedly operating in the South China Sea without clear identification, they are sometimes referred to as the “little blue men”, a term coined by Andrew S. Erickson of the Naval War College in reference to Russia’s “little green men” during the 2014 annexation of Crimea.[2]

The armed fishing fleet are part of China’s power projection[1], and are deployed to seize territory and to target anyone who challenges China’s claims to the entire South China Sea. In 2016, 230 fishing boats swarmed the same islands[1]. In August 2020, more than 100 fishing boats harassed the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands[1].

Overview [edit]

According to research from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, China’s maritime militia is part of their “grey zone” tactics which are used to wage conflict against China’s neighbors without crossing the threshold into conventional war.[3]

History [edit]

The PAFMM began soon after the CCP won the Chinese Civil War and forced the KMT to flee the mainland, the newly victorious communists needed to augment their maritime defenses against the nationalist forces which had repeated offshore and therefore the concept of people’s war was applied to the sea with fishermen and other nautical laborers being drafted into a maritime militia. The nationalists had maintained a maritime militia during their time in power but the communists preferred to craft theirs anew given their suspicion of organizations created by the nationalists. The CCP also instituted a national level maritime militia command to unite the local militias, something the KMT had never done. In the early 1950s, the Bureau of Aquatic Products played a key role in institutionalizing and strengthening the maritime militia as it collectivized local fisheries. Bureau of Aquatic Products leaders were also generally former high ranking PLAN officers which lead to close relations between the organizations. The formation of the PAFMM was influenced by the Soviet “Young School” of military theory which emphasized coastal defense over naval power projection for nascent communist powers.[4]

In the 1960s and 1970s, the PLAN established maritime militia schools near the three main fleet headquarters of QingdaoShanghai, and Guangzhou.[4] Through the first half of the 1970s, the maritime militia mostly stayed near shore and close to China. However, by the later 1970s, the maritime militia had evolved an important sovereignty support function which brought it into increasing conflict with China’s neighbors, especially in the South China Sea. The PAFMM contributed significantly to the Battle of the Paracel Islands, especially in proving amphibious lift capacity to Chinese forces. These early PAFMM successes have led to their use in nearly every maritime operation undertaken by the China Coast Guard and Navy, often harassing vessels from neighboring states.[4]

The maritime militia is believed to be behind a number of incidents in the South China Sea where high powered lasers were pointed at the cockpits of aircraft. This includes an attack against a Royal Australian Navy helicopter.[5]

In 2019, the United States issued a warning to China over aggressive and unsafe action by their Coast Guard and maritime militia.[6]

In August 2020, more than 100 fishing boats harassed the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands[1].

Equipment [edit]

Most vessels are just issued with navigation and communication equipment but some are also issued small arms.[7] The communications systems can be used both for communication and espionage. Often fishermen supply their own vessels, however, there are also core contingents of the maritime militia who operate vessels fitted out for militia work instead of fishing; these vessels feature reinforced bows for ramming and high powered water cannons.[8]

See also [edit]

External Link [edit]

References [edit]

  1. Jump up to: a b c d e Thomas, Jason (2 September 2020). “China’s ‘fishermen’ mercenaries”. The Weekend Australian.
  2. ^Jakhar, Pratik (15 April 2019). “Analysis: What’s so fishy about China’s ‘maritime militia’?”. monitoring.bbc.co.uk. BBC Monitoring. Retrieved 25 July 2020.
  3. ^“DIPLOMACY: Maritime militia warning issued”. Taipei Times. 16 June 2020. Archived from the original on 17 June 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2020.
  4. Jump up to: b c Grossman, Derek; Ma, Logan (6 April 2020). “A Short History of China’s Fishing Militia and What It May Tell Us”. rand.org. RAND Corporation. Archived from the original on 8 July 2020. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
  5. ^Yeo, Mike (31 May 2019). “Testing the waters: China’s maritime militia challenges foreign forces at sea”. Defense News. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
  6. ^Sevastopulo, Demetri; Hille, Kathrin (28 April 2019). “US warns China on aggressive acts by fishing boats and coast guard”. Financial Times. Archived from the original on 8 July 2020. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
  7. ^Owens, Tess (1 May 2016). “China Is Reportedly Training a ‘Maritime Militia’ to Patrol the Disputed South China Sea”. vice.com. Vice News. Archived from the original on 9 July 2020. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
  8. ^Manthorpe, Jonathan (28 April 2019). “Beijing’s maritime militia, the scourge of South China Sea”. Asia Times. Retrieved 9 July 2020.

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If you have trouble accessing the website above, please download a cached copy here.

You can also click here to access the report via the new public CRS website.

KEY EXCERPTS:

p. 9

“Salami-Slicing” Strategy and Gray Zone Operations

Observers frequently characterize China’s approach to the SCS and ECS as a “salami-slicing” strategy that employs a series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a casus belli, to gradually change the status quo in China’s favor. Other observers have referred to China’s approach as a strategy of gray zone operations (i.e., operations that reside in a gray zone between peace and war), of incrementalism,30 creeping annexation31 or creeping invasion,32 or as a “talk and take” strategy, meaning a strategy in which China engages in (or draws out) negotiations while taking actions to gain control of contested areas.33 A March 17, 2020, press report in China’s state-controlled media stated that “Chinese military experts on Tuesday [March 17] suggested the use of non-lethal electromagnetic weapons, including low-energy laser devices, in  [CONTINUED…]

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30 See, for example, Patrick Mendis and Joey Wang, “China’s Art of Strategic Incrementalism in the South China Sea,” National Interest, August 8, 2020.

31 See, for example, Alan Dupont, “China’s Maritime Power Trip,” The Australian, May 24, 2014.

32 Jackson Diehl, “China’s ‘Creeping Invasion,” Washington Post, September 14, 2014.

33 The strategy has been called “talk and take” or “take and talk.” See, for example, Anders Corr, “China’s Take-AndTalk Strategy In The South China Sea,” Forbes, March 29, 2017. See also Namrata Goswami, “Can China Be Taken Seriously on its ‘Word’ to Negotiate Disputed Territory?” The Diplomat, August 18, 2017.

p. 10

expelling US warships that have been repeatedly intruding into the South China Sea in the past week.” 34 A July 15, 2020, press report states

Its navy drills grab most of the attention, but China has also been quietly mounting a range of civilian and scientific operations to consolidate its claims in the South China Sea.

The diversified approach includes setting up a maritime rescue centre in Sansha, a prefecture-level city on Woody Island, which China calls Yongxing. It also involves undisclosed research and oil infrastructure.

Observers said the multipronged approach is meant to bolster China’s presence and consolidate its actual control over the waterway as other counties repeatedly question its claims to the waters.35

Some observers argue that China is using the period of the COVID-19 pandemic to further implement its salami-slicing strategy in the SCS while the world’s attention is focused on addressing the pandemic.36 In a video conference with ASEAN foreign ministers in April 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reportedly stated: “It is important to highlight how the Chinese Communist party is exploiting the world’s focus on the Covid-19 crisis by continuing its provocative behaviour. The CCP [Chinese Communist Party] is … coercing its neighbours in the South China Sea.”37

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34 Liu Xuanzun, “US Intrusions in S.China Sea Can Be Stopped by Electromagnetic Weapons: Experts,” Global Times, March 17, 2020.

35 Kristin Huang, “The Under-the-Radar South China Sea Projects Beijing Uses to Cement Its Claims,” South China Morning Post, July 15, 2020. See also Nguyen Thuy Anh, “Science Journals: A New Frontline in the South China sea Disputes,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), July 15, 2020.

36 See, for example, Tsukasa Hadano and Alex Fang, “China Steps Up Maritime Activity with Eye on Post-pandemic Order,” Nikkei Asian Review, May 13, 2020; Harsh Pant, “China’s Salami Slicing overdrive: It’s Flexing Military Muscles at a Time When Covid Preoccupies the Rest of the World,” Times of India, May 13, 2020; Veeramalla Anjaiah, “How To Tame Aggressive China In South China Sea Amid COVID-19 Crisis—OpEd,” Eurasia Review, May 14, 2020; Robert A. Manning and Patrick M. Cronin, “Under Cover of Pandemic, China Steps Up Brinkmanship in South China Sea,” Foreign Policy, May 14, 2020. Another observer, offering a somewhat different perspective, states

Recent developments in the South China Sea might lead one to assume that Beijing is taking advantage of the coronavirus crisis to further its ambitions in the disputed waterway. But it’s important to note that China has been following a long-term game plan in the sea for decades. While it’s possible that certain moves were made slightly earlier than planned because of the pandemic, they likely would have been made in any case, sooner or later.

(Steve Mollman, “China’s South China Sea Plan Unfolds Regardless of the Coronavirus,” Quartz, May 9, 2020.)

A May 3, 2020, press report stated

Analysts reject the idea that Beijing has embarked on a new South China Sea campaign during the pandemic. But they do believe the outbreak is having an effect on perceptions of Chinese policy. “China is doing what it is always doing in the South China Sea, but it is a lot further along the road towards control than it was a few years ago,” said Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS, the Washington-based think-tank.

(Kathrin Hille and John Reed, “US Looks to Exploit Anger over Beijing’s South China Sea Ambitions,” Financial Times, May 3, 2020.)

37 As quoted in Kathrin Hille and John Reed, “US Looks

USE OF COAST GUARD SHIPS AND MARITIME MILITIA ………………………………………………………………………………………. 12

p. 12

Use of Coast Guard Ships and Maritime Militia

China asserts and defends its maritime claims not only with its navy, but also with its coast guard and its maritime militia. Indeed, China employs its coast guard and maritime militia more regularly and extensively than its navy in its maritime sovereignty-assertion operations. DOD states that China’s navy, coast guard, and maritime militia together “form the largest maritime force in the Indo-Pacific.”42

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42 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 16. See also Andrew S. Erickson, “Maritime Numbers Game, Understanding and Responding to China’s Three Sea Forces,” Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, January 28, 2019.

p. 17

In an April 22, 2020, statement, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated

In an April 22, 2020, statement, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated Even as we fight the [COVID-19] outbreak, we must remember that the long-term threats to our shared security have not disappeared. In fact, they’ve become more prominent. Beijing has moved to take advantage of the distraction, from China’s new unilateral announcement of administrative districts over disputed islands and maritime areas in the South China Sea, its sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel earlier this month, and its “research stations” on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef. The PRC continues to deploy maritime militia around the Spratly Islands and most recently, the PRC has dispatched a flotilla that included an energy survey vessel for the sole purpose of intimidating other claimants from engaging in offshore hydrocarbon development. It is important to highlight  [CONTINUED…]

p. 18

how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is exploiting the world’s focus on the COVID19 crisis by continuing its provocative behavior. The CCP is exerting military pressure and coercing its neighbors in the SCS, even going so far as to sink a Vietnamese fishing vessel. The U.S. strongly opposes China’s bullying and we hope other nations will hold them to account too.52

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52 Department of State, “The United States and ASEAN are Partnering to Defeat COVID-19, Build Long-Term Resilience, and Support Economic Recovery,” Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, April 22, 2020. See also A. Ananthalakshmi and Rozanna Latiff, “U.S. Says China Should Stop ‘Bullying Behaviour’ in South China Sea,” Reuters, April 18, 2020; Gordon Lubold and Dion Nissenbaum, “With Trump Facing Virus Crisis, U.S. Warns Rivals Not to Seek Advantage,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2020; Brad Lendon, “Coronavirus may be giving Beijing an opening in the South China Sea,” CNN, April 7, 2020; Agence France-Presse, “US Warns China Not to ‘Exploit’ Virus for Sea Disputes,” Channel News Asia, April 6, 2020.

p. 28

Recent Specific Actions

Recent specific actions taken by the Trump Administration include but are not necessarily limited to the following:

  • As an apparent cost-imposing measure, DOD announced on May 23, 2018, that it was disinviting China from the 2018 RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise.77
  • In November 2018, national security adviser John Bolton said the U.S. would oppose any agreements between China and other claimants to the South China Sea that limit free passage to international shipping.78
  • In January 2019, the then-U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, reportedly warned his Chinese counterpart that the U.S. Navy would treat China’s coast guard cutters and maritime militia vessels as combatants and [CONTINUED…]

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77 RIMPAC is a U.S.-led, multilateral naval exercise in the Pacific involving naval forces from more than two dozen countries that is held every two years. At DOD’s invitation, China participated in the 2014 and 2016 RIMPAC exercises. DOD had invited China to participate in the 2018 RIMPAC exercise, and China had accepted that invitation. DOD’s statement regarding the withdrawal of the invitation was reprinted in Megan Eckstein, “China Disinvited from Participating in 2018 RIMPAC Exercise,” USNI News, May 23, 2018. See also Gordon Lubold and Jeremy Page, “U.S. Retracts Invitation to China to Participate in Military Exercise,” Wall Street Journal,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2018. See also Helene Cooper, “U.S. Disinvites China From Military Exercise Amid Rising Tensions,” New York Times, May 23, 2018; Missy Ryan, “Pentagon Disinvites China from Major Naval Exercise over South China Sea Buildup,” Washington Post, May 23, 2018; James Stavridis, “U.S. Was Right to Give China’s navy the Boot,” Bloomberg, August 2, 2018.

78 Jake Maxwell Watts, “Bolton Warns China Against Limiting Free Passage in South China Sea,” Wall Street Journal, November 13, 2018.

p. 29

respond to provocations by them in the same way as it would respond to provocations by Chinese navy ships.79

  • On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated, “As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty [with the Philippines].”80 (For more on this treaty, see Appendix B.)
  • As discussed earlier, on July 13, 2020, Secretary Pompeo issued a statement that strengthened, elaborated, and made more specific certain elements of the U.S. position regarding China’s actions in the SCS.
  • On August 26, 2020, Secretary Pompeo announced that the United States had begun “imposing visa restrictions on People’s Republic of China (PRC) individuals responsible for, or complicit in, either the large-scale reclamation, construction, or militarization of disputed outposts in the South China Sea, or the PRC’s use of coercion against Southeast Asian claimants to inhibit their access to offshore resources.”81

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79 See Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “US Warns China on Aggressive Acts by Fishing Boats and Coast Guard; Navy Chief Says Washington Will Use Military Rules of Engagement to Curb Provocative Behavior,” Financial Times, April 28, 2019. See also Shirley Tay, “US Reportedly Warns China Over Hostile Non-Naval Vessels in South China Sea,” CNBC, April 29, 2019; Ryan Pickrell, “China’s South China Sea Strategy Takes a Hit as the US Navy Threatens to Get Tough on Beijing’s Sea Forces,” Business Insider, April 29, 2019; Tyler Durden, “‘Warning Shot Across The Bow:’ US Warns China On Aggressive Acts By Maritime Militia,” Zero Hedge, April 29, 2019; Ankit Panda, “The US Navy’s Shifting View of China’s Coast Guard and ‘Maritime Militia,’” Diplomat, April 30, 2019; Ryan Pickrell, “It Looks Like the US Has Been Quietly Lowering the Threshold for Conflict in the South China Sea,” Business Insider, June 19, 2019.

80 State Department, Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr., Remarks [by] Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, March 1, 2019, accessed August 21, 2019 at https://www.state.gov/remarks-withphilippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/. See also James Kraska, “China’s Maritime Militia Vessels May Be Military Objectives During Armed Conflict,” Diplomat, July 7, 2020. See also Regine Cabato and Shibani Mahtani, “Pompeo Promises Intervention If Philippines Is Attacked in South China Sea Amid Rising Chinese Militarization,” Washington Post, February 28, 2019; Claire Jiao and Nick Wadhams, “We Have Your Back in South China Sea, U.S. Assures Philippines,” Bloomberg, February 28 (updated March 1), 2019; Jake Maxwell Watts and Michael R. Gordon, “Pompeo Pledges to Defend Philippine Forces in South China Sea, Philippines Shelves Planned Review of Military Alliance After U.S. Assurances,” Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2019; Jim Gomez, “Pompeo: US to Make Sure China Can’t Blockade South China Sea,” Associated Press, March 1, 2019; Karen Lema and Neil Jerome Morales, “Pompeo Assures Philippines of U.S. Protection in Event of Sea Conflict, Reuters, March 1, 2019; Raissa Robles, “US Promises to Defend the Philippines from ‘Armed Attack’ in South China Sea, as Manila Mulls Review of Defence Ttreaty,” South China Morning Post, March 1, 2019; Raul Dancel, “US Will Defend Philippines in South China Sea: Pompeo,” Straits Times, March 2, 2019; Ankit Panda, “In Philippines, Pompeo Offers Major Alliance Assurance on South China Sea,” Diplomat, March 4, 2019; Mark Nevitt, “The US-Philippines Defense Treaty and the Pompeo Doctrine on South China Sea,” Just Security, March 11, 2019; Zack Cooper, “The U.S. Quietly Made a Big Splash about the South China Sea; Mike Pompeo Just Reaffirmed Washington Has Manila’s back,” Washington Post, March 19, 2019.

81 Department of State, “U.S. Imposes Restrictions on Certain PRC State-Owned Enterprises and Executives for Malign Activities in the South China Sea,” press statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, August 26, 2020. See also Susan Heavey, Daphne Psaledakis, and David Brunnstrom, “U.S. Targets Chinese Individuals, Companies amid South China Sea Dispute,” Reuters, August 26, 2020; Matthew Lee (Associated Press), “US Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Defense Firms over Maritime Dispute,” Defense News, August 26, 2020; Kate O’Keeffe and Chun Han Wong, “U.S. Sanctions Chinese Firms and Executives Active in Contested South China Sea,” Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2020; Ana Swanson, “U.S. Penalizes 24 Chinese Companies Over Role in South China Sea,” New York Times, August 26, 2020; Tal Axelrod, “US Restricting Travel of Individuals Over Beijing’s Moves in South China Sea,” The Hill, August 26, 2020. U

p. 52

1972 Convention on Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs)

China and the United States, as well as more than 150 other countries (including all those bordering on the South East and South China Seas, but not Taiwan),136 are parties to an October 1972 multilateral convention on international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, commonly known as the collision regulations (COLREGs) or the “rules of the road.” 137 Although [CONTINUED…]

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136 Source: International Maritime Organization, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions, As at 28 February 2014, pp. 86-89. The Philippines acceded to the convention on June 10, 2013.

137 28 UST 3459; TIAS 8587. The treaty was done at London October 20, 1972, and entered into force July 15, 1977. The United States is an original signatory to the convention and acceded the convention entered into force for the United States on July 15, 1977. China acceded to the treaty on January 7, 1980. A summary of the agreement is  [CONTINUED…]

p. 53

ccommonly referred to as a set of rules or regulations, this multilateral convention is a binding treaty. The convention applies “to all vessels upon the high seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.”138 It thus applies to military vessels, paramilitary and law enforcement (i.e., coast guard) vessels, maritime militia vessels, and fishing boats, among other vessels.

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138 Rule 1(a) of the convention.

p. 70

Use of Coast Guard Ships and Maritime Militia

Coast Guard Ships

DOD states that the China Coast Guard (CCG) is the world’s largest coast guard.182 It is much larger than the coast guard of any country in the region, and it has increased substantially in size in recent years through the addition of many newly built ships. China makes regular use of CCG ships to assert and defend its maritime claims, particularly in the ECS, with Chinese navy ships sometimes available over the horizon as backup forces.183 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) states the following:

Under Chinese law, maritime sovereignty is a domestic law enforcement issue under the purview of the CCG. Beijing also prefers to use CCG ships for assertive actions in disputed waters to reduce the risk of escalation and to portray itself more benignly to an international audience. For situations that Beijing perceives carry a heightened risk of escalation, it often deploys PLAN combatants in close proximity for rapid intervention if necessary. China also relies on the PAFMM—a paramilitary force of fishing boats—for sovereignty enforcement actions….

China primarily uses civilian maritime law enforcement agencies in maritime disputes, employing the PLAN [i.e., China’s navy] in a protective capacity in case of escalation.

The CCG has rapidly increased and modernized its forces, improving China’s ability to enforce its maritime claims. Since 2010, the CCG’s large patrol ship fleet (more than 1,000 tons) has more than doubled in size from about 60 to more than 130 ships, making it by far the largest coast guard force in the world and increasing its capacity to conduct extended offshore operations in a number of disputed areas simultaneously. Furthermore, the newer ships are substantially larger and more capable than the older ships, and the majority are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, and guns ranging from 30-mm to 76-mm. Among these ships, a number are capable of long-distance, long-endurance out-of-area operations. In addition, the CCG operates more than 70 fast patrol combatants ([each displacing] more than 500 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations, and more than 400 coastal patrol craft (as well as about 1,000 inshore and riverine patrol boats). By the end of the decade, the CCG is expected to add up to 30 patrol ships and patrol combatants before the construction program levels off.184

In March 2018, China announced that control of the CCG would be transferred from the civilian State Oceanic Administration to the Central Military Commission.185 The transfer occurred on July 1, 2018.186 On May 22, 2018, it was reported that China’s navy and the CCG had conducted  [CONTINUED…]

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182 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 71.

183 See Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, pp. 3, 7, and 44, and Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, undated but released August 2015, p. 14.

184 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, pp. 66, 78. A similar passage appears in Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, pp. 71-72.

185 See, for example, David Tweed, “China’s Military Handed Control of the Country’s Coast Guard,” Bloomberg, March 26, 2018. 186 See, for example, Global Times, “China’s Military to Lead Coast Guard to Better Defend Sovereignty,” People’s Daily Online, June 25, 2018.

p. 71

their first joint patrols in disputed waters off the Paracel Islands in the SCS, and had expelled at least 10 foreign fishing vessels from those waters.187

Maritime Militia

China also uses the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM)—a force that essentially consists of fishing ships with armed crew members—to defend its maritime claims. In the view of some observers, the PAFMM—even more than China’s navy or coast guard—is the leading component of China’s maritime forces for asserting its maritime claims, particularly in the SCS. U.S. analysts in recent years have paid increasing attention to the role of the PAFMM as a key tool for implementing China’s salami-slicing strategy, and have urged U.S. policymakers to focus on the capabilities and actions of the PAFMM.188

***

187 Catherine Wong, “China’s Navy and Coastguard Stage First Joint Patrols Near Disputed South China Sea Islands as ‘Warning to Vietnam,’” South China Morning Post, May 22, 2018. For additional discussion of China’s coast guard, see Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst, “Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime LawEnforcement Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2019; Teddy Ng and Laura Zhou, “China Coast Guard Heads to Front Line to Enforce Beijing’s South China Sea Claims,” South China Morning Post, February 9, 2019; Ying Yu Lin, “Changes in China’s Coast Guard,” Diplomat, January 30, 2019. 188 For additional discussion of the PAFMM, see, for example, Chung Li-hua and Jake Chung, “Chinese Coast Guard an Auxiliary Navy: Researcher,” Taipei Times, June 29, 2020; Gregory Poling, “China’s Hidden Navy,” Foreign Policy, June 25, 2019; Mike Yeo, “Testing the Waters: China’s Maritime Militia Challenges Foreign Forces at Sea,” Defense News, May 31, 2019; Laura Zhou, “Beijing’s Blurred Lines between Military and Non-Military Shipping in South China Sea Could Raise Risk of Flashpoint,” South China Morning Post, May 5, 2019; Andrew S. Erickson, “Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),” April 29, 2019, Andrewerickson.com; Jonathan Manthorpe, “Beijing’s Maritime Militia, the Scourge of South China Sea,” Asia Times, April 27, 2019; Dmitry Filipoff, “Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson Discuss China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), March 11, 2019; Jamie Seidel, “China’s Latest Island Grab: Fishing ‘Militia’ Makes Move on Sandbars around Philippines’ Thitu Island,” News.com.au, March 5, 2019; Gregory Poling, “Illuminating the South China Sea’s Dark Fishing Fleets,” Stephenson Ocean Security Project (Center for Strategic and International Studies), January 9, 2019; Andrew S. Erickson, “Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China’s Maritime Militia to Deter its Use,” National Interest, November 25, 2018; Todd Crowell and Andrew Salmon, “Chinese Fisherman Wage Hybrid ‘People’s War’ on Asian Seas,” Asia Times, September 6, 2018; Andrew S. Erickson, “Exposed: Pentagon Report Spotlights China’s Maritime Militia,” National Interest, August 20, 2018; Jonathan Odom, “China’s Maritime Militia,” Straits Times, June 16, 2018; Andrew S. Erickson, “Understanding China’s Third Sea Force: The Maritime Militia,” Fairbank Center, September 8, 2017; Andrew Erickson, “New Pentagon China Report Highlights the Rise of Beijing’s Maritime Militia,” National Interest, June 7, 2017; Ryan Pickrell, “New Pentagon Report Finally Drags China’s Secret Sea Weapon Out Of The Shadows,” Daily Caller, June 7, 2017; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: All Hands on Deck for Sovereignty Pt. 3,” Center for International Maritime Security, April 26, 2017; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: Development Challenges and Opportunities, Pt. 2” Center for International Maritime Security, April 10, 2017; Andrew Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: China Builds A Standing Vanguard, Pt. 1,” Center for International Maritime Security, March 25, 2017; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report No. 1, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, March 2017, 22 pp.; Michael Peck, “‘Little Blue Sailors’: Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming (In the South China Sea and Beyond),” National Interest, December 18, 2016; Peter Brookes, “Take Note of China’s Non-Navy Maritime Force,” The Hill, December 13, 2016; Christopher P. Cavas, “China’s Maritime Militia a Growing Concern,” Defense News, November 21, 2016; Christopher P. Cavas, “China’s Maritime Militia—Time to Call Them Out?” Defense News, September 18, 2016; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Riding A New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security, September 1, 2016; John Grady, “Experts: China Continues Using Fishing Fleets for Naval Presence Operations,” USNI News, August 17, 2016; David Axe, “China Launches A Stealth Invasion in the South China Sea,” Daily Beast, August 9, 2016; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia Before They’re Used Again,” National Interest, July 6, 2016; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia, What It Is and How to Deal With It,” Foreign Affairs, June 23, 2016.

p. 72

DOD states that “the PAFMM is the only government-sanctioned maritime militia in the world,” and that it “has organizational ties to, and is sometimes directed by, China’s armed forces.”189 DIA states that

The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization to perform basic support duties. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban subdistricts, and enterprises, and they vary widely from one location to another. The composition and mission of each unit reflects local conditions and personnel skills. In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part of broader Chinese military doctrine that states that confrontational operations short of war can be an effective means of accomplishing political objectives.

A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and support the PLA and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, protecting fisheries, and providing logistic support, search and rescue (SAR), and surveillance and reconnaissance. The Chinese government subsidizes local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia ships to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside their regular commercial roles. The PAFMM has played a noteworthy role in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the harassment of Vietnamese survey ships in 2011, a standoff with the Philippines at Scarborough Reef in 2012, and a standoff involving a Chinese oil rig in 2014. In the past, the PAFMM rented fishing boats from companies or individual fisherman, but it appears that China is building a state-owned fishing fleet for its maritime militia force in the South China Sea. Hainan Province, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the construction of 84 large militia fishing boats with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage for Sansha City, and the militia took delivery by the end of 2016.190

***

189 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 71.

190 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, p. 79. A similar passage appears in Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 72.

p. 86

A January 18, 2020, press report states

Before assuming his post as commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip S. Davidson issued a stark warning about Washington’s loosening grip in the fiercely contested South China Sea.

“In short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios, short of war with the United States,” Davidson said during a Senate confirmation hearing ahead of his appointment as the top US military official in the region in May 2018.

For many analysts, the dire assessment was a long-overdue acknowledgement of their concerns. Today, there is a growing sense it did not go far enough.

Washington’s strategic advantage in the waterway, which holds massive untapped oil and gas reserves and through which about a third of global shipping passes, has diminished so much, according to some experts, that it is powerless to prevent Beijing from restricting access during peacetime and could struggle to gain the upper hand even in the event of an outright conflict with Chinese forces.

China, which claims almost the entire waterway, has tipped the balance of power not just through a massive build-up of its navy, they say, but also through the presence of a de facto militia made up of ostensibly non-military vessels and an island-building campaign, the profound strategic value of which has been lost on US policymakers.… “The US has lost advantage throughout the spectrum of operations, from low-level interaction against China’s maritime militia to higher-end conflict scenarios,” said James Kraska, a former US Navy commander who lectures at the Naval War College. … … …

REPORT SUMMARY

In an international security environment described as one of renewed great power competition, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition. U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS forms an element of the Trump Administration’s more confrontational overall approach toward China, and of the Administration’s efforts for promoting its construct for the Indo-Pacific region, called the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

China’s actions in the SCS in recent years—including extensive island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China’s claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China’s near-seas region—meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.

Potential general U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and resisting the emergence of an alternative “might-makes-right” approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia; and pursing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China.

Potential specific U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: dissuading China from carrying out additional base-construction activities in the SCS, moving additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it occupies in the SCS, initiating island-building or base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, declaring straight baselines around land features it claims in the SCS, or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS; and encouraging China to reduce or end operations by its maritime forces at the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, halt actions intended to put pressure against Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands, provide greater access by Philippine fisherman to waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal or in the Spratly Islands, adopt the U.S./Western definition regarding freedom of the seas, and accept and abide by the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China.

The Trump Administration has taken various actions for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS. The issue for Congress is whether the Trump Administration’s strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both.

AUTHOR’s BIOGRAPHY—RONALD O’ROURKE

Mr. O’Rourke is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the Johns Hopkins University, from which he received his B.A. in international studies, and a valedictorian graduate of the University’s Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, where he received his M.A. in the same field.

Since 1984, Mr. O’Rourke has worked as a naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. He has written many reports for Congress on various issues relating to the Navy, the Coast Guard, defense acquisition, China’s naval forces and maritime territorial disputes, the Arctic, the international security environment, and the U.S. role in the world. He regularly briefs Members of Congress and Congressional staffers, and has testified before Congressional committees on many occasions.

In 1996, he received a Distinguished Service Award from the Library of Congress for his service to Congress on naval issues.

In 2010, he was honored under the Great Federal Employees Initiative for his work on naval, strategic, and budgetary issues.

In 2012, he received the CRS Director’s Award for his outstanding contributions in support of the Congress and the mission of CRS.

In 2017, he received the Superior Public Service Award from the Navy for service in a variety of roles at CRS while providing invaluable analysis of tremendous benefit to the Navy for a period spanning decades.

Mr. O’Rourke is the author of several journal articles on naval issues, and is a past winner of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Arleigh Burke essay contest. He has given presentations on naval, Coast Guard, and strategy issues to a variety of U.S. and international audiences in government, industry, and academia.

CLICK BELOW FOR THE FULL TEXT OF SOME OF THE PUBLICATIONS CITED IN O’ROURKE’S CRS REPORT:

Andrew S. Erickson, “Maritime Numbers Game: Understanding and Responding to China’s Three Sea Forces,” Indo-Pacific Defense Forum Magazine 43.4 (December 2018): 30-35.

Peter A. Dutton and Andrew S. Erickson, “When Eagle Meets Dragon: Managing Risk in Maritime East Asia,” RealClearDefense, 25 March 2015.

Andrew S. EricksonJoshua Hickey, and Henry Holst, “Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond,” Naval War College Review 72.2 (Spring 2019): 11-25.

Andrew S. Erickson,“Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 29 April 2019.

Dmitry Filipoff, “Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson Discuss China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 11 March 2019.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China’s Maritime Militia to Deter its Use,” The National Interest, 25 November 2018.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Exposed: Pentagon Report Spotlights China’s Maritime Militia,” The National Interest, 20 August 2018.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Understanding China’s Third Sea Force: The Maritime Militia,” Harvard Fairbank Center Blog Post, 8 September 2017.

Andrew S. Erickson, “New Pentagon China Report Highlights the Rise of Beijing’s Maritime Militia,” The National Interest, 7 June 2017.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: All Hands on Deck for Sovereignty, Pt. 3,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 26 April 2017.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: Development Challenges and Opportunities, Pt. 2,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 10 April 2017.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: China Builds a Standing Vanguard, Pt. 1,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 26 March 2017.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, March 2017).

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Riding a New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 1 September 2016.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” The National Interest, 6 July 2016.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia: What It Is and How to Deal With It,” Foreign Affairs, 23 June 2016.

Andrew S. Erickson and Emily de La Bruyere, “Crashing Its Own Party: China’s Unusual Decision to Spy on Joint Naval Exercises,” China Real Time Report (中国实时报), Wall Street Journal, 19 July 2014.

Andrew S. Erickson and Emily de La Bruyere, “China’s RIMPAC Maritime-Surveillance Gambit,” The National Interest, 29 July 2014.

Andrew S. Erickson, “PRC National Defense Ministry Spokesman Sr. Col. Geng Yansheng Offers China’s Most-Detailed Position to Date on Dongdiao-class Ship’s Intelligence Collection in U.S. EEZ during RIMPAC Exercise,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 1 August 2014.

Prashanth Parameswaran, “Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson on China and the Maritime Gray Zone,” The Diplomat, 14 May 2019.

Ryan D. Martinson and Andrew S. Erickson, “Re-Orienting American Sea Power For The China Challenge,” War on the Rocks, 10 May 2018.

***

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Appendix II—China’s Maritime Militia: An Important Force Multiplier,” in Michael McDevitt, China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power: Theory, Practice, and Implications (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2020), 207-29.

APPENDIX II

China’s Maritime Militia

An Important Force Multiplier

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a state-organized, -developed, and -controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct Chinese state–sponsored activities.1 The PAFMM is locally organized and resourced but answers to the very top of China’s military bureaucracy: the commander in chief, Xi Jinping. While the PAFMM has been part of China’s militia system for decades, it is receiving greater emphasis today, because of its value in furthering China’s near-seas “rights and interests.”

Traditionally, the PAFMM has been a military force raised from civilian marine industry workers (e.g., fishermen). Personnel keep their “day jobs” but are organized and trained in exchange for benefits and can be called up as needed. Recently, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA— in this context, the military generally) has been adding a more professionalized, militarized vanguard to the PAFMM, recruiting former servicemen (by offering them high salaries) and launching formidable purpose-built vessels. This vanguard has no apparent interest in fishing.

This chapter focuses on the current organization and employment of Chinese maritime-militia organizations. It first puts this force into historical context by surveying the PAFMM’s background and its changing role in China’s armed forces. Next, it examines the PAFMM’s current contributions toward China’s goal of becoming a great maritime power, in both old and new mission areas. The remaining sections will address specific maritime-militia modes of command and control, intelligence gathering, organization and training and will suggest possible scenarios and implications.

Decades-Long History

China’s militia system originated before the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power, but the system of recruiting numerous state- supported maritime militias from coastal populations was not fully implemented until the communists began to exercise greater control of the coastline in the 1950s. This segment of China’s population had been relatively isolated from the turmoil of the Civil War; these regions had been under either Japanese or Republic of China (ROC) control in the decades before CCP rule was established. The CCP targeted the fishing communities by creating fishing collectives and work units, enacting strict organizational and social controls, and conducting political education. Factors motivating and shaping this transformation included:

  • The PLA’s early use of civilian vessels after Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party decamped to Taiwan.
  • The fact that fishermen constituted the bulk of China’s experienced mariners.
  • The requirement during the 1950s and 1960s to defend against Nationalist incursions along the coast.
  • Increasingly frequent confrontations with other states’ fishing and naval vessels as China’s fishermen gradually began to fish farther offshore.
  • The transformation of many shore-based coastal-defense militias to the at-sea maritime militia.

The PAFMM has played significant roles in manifold military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years:

  • In the 1950s, support of the PLA’s island seizure campaigns off the mainland coast
  • In the 1960s, securing of China’s coast against Nationalist infiltrations
  • In 1974, seizure of the western portion of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea from South Vietnam
  • In 1976, harassment of “foreign” naval ships east of the Zhoushan Archipelago (south of Shanghai)
  • In 1978, presence mission in the territorial sea of the Senkaku Islands
  • In 1995, Mischief Reef encounter with the Philippines stemming from the occupation and development of that reef
  • In 2009, harassment of USNS Impeccable
  • In 2012, Scarborough Shoal stand-off with the Philippines
  • In 2014, blockade of Philippine-occupied Second Thomas Shoal
  • In 2014, repulse of Vietnamese vessels from disputed waters surrounding the China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC’s) oil rig HYSY 981
  • In 2014, harassment of USNS Howard O. Lorenzen
  • In 2016, large surge of fishing craft near the Senkaku Islands
  • In 2017, envelopment of Philippine-claimed Sandy Cay in the northern Spratly Islands.2 … … …

VOLUME INFORMATION:

About the Author

During his 34-year Navy career, Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.) had four at sea commands including an aircraft carrier battle group. He was a Pacific Ocean sailor with experience in all the waters he has written about. He began a 30-year involvement with U.S. security policy and strategy in Asia when he was assigned to the Office of Secretary of Defense in 1990 as Director and then as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. This professional interest continues to this day.

Summary

Xi Jinping has made his ambitions for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) perfectly clear, there is no mystery what he wants, first, that China should become a “great maritime power” and secondly, that the PLA “become a world-class armed force by 2050.” He wants this latter objective to be largely completed by 2035. China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power focuses on China’s navy and how it is being transformed to satisfy the “world class” goal.

Beginning with an exploration of why China is seeking to become such a major maritime power, author Michael McDevitt first explores the strategic rationale behind Xi’s two objectives: China’s reliance on foreign trade and overseas interests such as China’s Belt and Road strategy. In turn this has created concerns within the senior levels of China’s military about the vulnerability of its overseas interests and maritime life-lines: a major theme. McDevitt dubs this China’s “sea lane anxiety” and traces how this has required the PLA Navy to evolve from a “near seas”-focused navy to one that has global reach; a “blue water navy.” He details how quickly this transformation has taken place, thanks to a patient step-by-step approach and abundant funding. The more than 10 years of anti-piracy patrols in the far reaches of the Indian Ocean has acted as a learning curve accelerator to “blue water” status.

McDevitt then explores the PLA Navy’s role in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. He provides a detailed assessment of what the PLAN will be expected to do if Beijing chooses to attack Taiwan, potentially triggering combat with America’s “first responders” in East Asia, especially the U.S. Seventh Fleet and U.S. Fifth Air Force.

He conducts a close exploration of how the PLA Navy fits into China’s campaign plan aimed at keeping reinforcing U.S. forces at arm’s length (what the Pentagon calls anti-access and area denial [A2/AD]) if war has broken out over Taiwan, or because of attacks on U.S. allies and friends that live in the shadow of China. McDevitt does not know how Xi defines “world class” but the evidence from the past 15 years of building a blue water force has already made the PLA Navy the second largest globally capable navy in the world. This book concludes with a forecast of what Xi’s vision of a “world-class navy” might look like in the next fifteen years when the 2035 deadline is reached.

Reviews

“Rear Admiral Mike McDevitt delivers the definitive study on China’s ambitious quest for greatness at sea. Armed with decades of operational experience, he renders persuasive judgments about China’s nautical ascent. For those looking for an authoritative yet accessible appraisal of the Chinese navy, this is it.”

— Toshi Yoshihara, senior fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, co-author of Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, 2nd ed.

“In order to counter China’s willful and persistent challenges against the stabilizing PAX-AMERICANA global framework, an accurate and comprehensive understanding of China’s security and naval strategies is required. In this context, RADM Mike McDevitt’s superb book is a ‘must-read’ for naval/security specialists, as well as national leaders and thinkers.”

— Yoji Koda, Former Commander in Chief, JMSDF Fleet

“Admiral Michael McDevitt has written an important book about China as a world power. Few Americans possess his knowledge of maritime strategy and China. He has combined this knowledge with his background as a historian and a sea-going officer with more thirty years’ experience. China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power is a must read for military officers, China specialists, and historians.”

— Captain Bernard D. Cole, USN (Ret.), Professor Emeritus, National War College, author of China’s Quest for Great Power: Ships, Oil, and Foreign Policy

“Admiral McDevitt has written the definitive book on China’s maritime ambitions and its ability to fulfill them. His years of careful research following a career of high-level Navy and Defense Department positions are blended into a carefully detailed and documented, yet practical and sensible examination of China’s security shift from land defense to control of the seas. The discussions of Taiwan and the South China Sea are especially informative and sobering. The implications are judicious and very clear – the United States must urgently and intelligently increase its own maritime and air capability.”

— Dennis C. Blair, former Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command and former Director of National Intelligence

“Rear Admiral McDevitt has studied the Chinese navy from the decks of destroyers in the South China Sea to the corridors of leading think tanks around the world. His expertise is legendary, and this new book is a commanding analysis of the course China will steer over the coming decades in their voyage to become the leading global maritime power.”

— Adm. James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), 16th Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and author of Sailing True North: Ten Admirals and the Voyage of Character

“As he explores the rationale for China’s unprecedented accretion of maritime power and quest for a ‘world-class’ navy, McDevitt provides perceptive insights into Beijing’s obsessive pursuit of sea-lane security, regional-hegemony and, eventually, global-dominance. The vivid future-scenarios, painted by this former practitioner of seapower, could prove prophetic, and deserve our closest attention.”

— Adm. Arun Prakash (Ret.), former Indian Navy Chief and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

Product details

Publisher : Naval Institute Press (October 15, 2020)

Subject: Fall 2020 Catalog | China and the Asia Pacific

Item Weight : 2.5 pounds/40 oz

Product Dimensions: 9 × 6 × 1 in

Hardcover : 320 pages

Illustrations: 5 maps, 7 tables, 5 b/w illustrations

ISBN-10 : 1682475352

ISBN-13 : 978-1682475355

***

Manfred Meyer (edited by Larry Bond and Chris Carlson), Modern Chinese Maritime Forces (Admiralty Trilogy Group, 1 October 2020).

  • “A compilation of all ships and boats of the Chinese Navy, Coast Guard, Maritime Militia and other state authorities”
  • In terms of ship numbers, each of China’s three sea forces is the world’s largest by a large margin. For the scenarios that most concern the U.S. and its regional allies, these numbers matter greatly.
    • This suggests an important conclusion: China’s numerical sea force supremacy and the corresponding need for power projection and presence to counter it effectively demonstrates the need for a substantially-sized U.S. Navy. This book can help inform related deliberations and development. All the more reason to consult this handy compendium today!
  • Click here to download sample content.
  • Check out the crane ship coverage on pp. 141-43!
  • Unique PAFMM ship silhouettes and related information on pp. 105-07!
  • You can order a copy here. Volume is updated periodically and single purchase includes access to future updates.

The Admiralty Trilogy Group (ATG) is pleased to announce that in addition to publishing games supporting its tactical naval game system, the Admiralty Trilogy, it has released its first nonfiction book. Click here to read the announcement.

Modern Chinese Maritime Forces, by Manfred Meyer, a noted artist and illustrator, provides up-to-the minute information on Chinese sea power. It lists all Chinese state vessels – not just the People’s Liberation Army Navy, but the Coast Guard, China Maritime Surveillance, China Fisheries law Enforcement Command, and many other state-sponsored agencies that carry out China’s policies at sea.

Over 570 drawings show everything from aircraft carriers to buoy tenders, accompanied by detailed information on their characteristics. Additional supporting material includes theater navy assignments for individual ships as well as descriptions of the Chinese systems for hull numbers and equipment designations. This compact book has the most complete unclassified information on Chinese state-owned vessels available anywhere.

I was honored to contribute a Foreword, in which I write: “Today, China’s maritime forces have the most ships of any nation. This pathbreaking book documents their force structure in unprecedented detail.”

Modern Chinese Naval Forces is available as either a searchable .pdf or a softcover 139-page book. Both can be bought as a bundle for a reduced price.

  • Andrew S. Erickson, “Foreword,” in Manfred Meyer (edited by Larry Bond and Chris Carlson), Modern Chinese Maritime Forces (Admiralty Trilogy Group, 2020), 3.

FOREWORD

Ships are the ultimate embodiment of maritime strategy. Today, China’s maritime forces have the most ships of any nation. This pathbreaking book documents their force structure in unprecedented detail, making it an invaluable reference for all who seek to understand Beijing’s seaward surge and its manifold implications.

While remaining shackled to undeniable geostrategic realities on land, and hemmed in by “island chains” surrounding peripheral seas, China has gone to sea dramatically in both commercial and military dimensions. It is arguably the first continental power in two millennia to become a successful hybrid land-sea power and keep that sea change on course sustainably. Rather than operate freely on exterior lines like such geographically advantaged sea powers as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, China must radiate sea power from interior lines in a way that currently prioritizes the assertion of increasing control over its disputed sovereignty claims in the Yellow, East, and South China Seas while seeking growing influence across the Indo-Pacific and nascent global access and presence.

To pursue these radiating ripples of maritime interests and activities, China draws on three sea forces, each the maritime component of one of its three armed forces: the (1) People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), (2) China Coast Guard (CCG), and (3) People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Each Chinese sea force has the world’s most ships in its category. The volume covers in great depth China’s first and second sea forces, the PLAN and CCG, which contain the vast majority of its purpose-built government vessels. This fully-updated new edition has been revised to also include key PAFMM vessels. In doing so, it uniquely elucidates the three-pronged trident of Bejiing’s maritime force structure.

China’s ship numbers matter, greatly. First, China increasingly enjoys both quantity and quality at sea. In recent years China has overcome Cold War shipbuilding that produced crude Soviet-style hulks. The PLAN, naturally China’s most advanced sea force technologically, has most dramatically replaced backward rustbuckets with increasing numbers of sophisticated platforms. But the CCG and PAFMM are also modernizing significantly. Of China’s three sea forces, its coast guard has grown the most rapidly in numbers and enjoys the greatest global numerical superiority.

China’s shipbuilding juggernaut, powered by what until very recently was indisputably the world’s fastest-growing multi-trillion-dollar economy, has sustained rapid modernization of all three sea forces even as numbers of modern vessels grow substantially. China’s commercial shipbuilding juggernaut subsidizes overhead costs for construction of all three sea forces’ vessels, an impossibility for America’s military-focused shipbuilding industry. CCG construction is thus both economical and efficient. Commercial off-the-shelf drivetrains and electronics, together with a lack of complex combat systems and weapons, facilitate rapid assembly with multiple units constructed simultaneously.

Second, when it comes to deployment, even the most advanced ship simply cannot be in more than one place at once. Numbers matter significantly when it comes to maintaining presence and influence in vital seas. This is particularly true regarding the growing Sino-American strategic competition where the United States is playing a distant away game. U.S. Coast Guard cutters are focused near American waters, far from any international disputes, while the U.S. Navy is dispersed around the world, with many forces separated from maritime East Asia by responsibilities, geography, and time. Meanwhile, all three major Chinese sea forces remain focused first and foremost on the contested “Near Seas” (the Yellow, East, and South China Seas) and their immediate approaches, close to China’s homeland bases, land-based air and missile coverage, and supply lines.

For all these reasons, a complete unclassified order of battle for China’s Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia is long overdue. This pioneering volume finally fills that vital void. I commend it to everyone seeking to understand how China is making such great waves on the world’s oceans, and what course it may take in coming years.

Andrew S. Erickson

China Maritime Studies Institute

Newport, Rhode Island

REVIEWS

“This is a phenomenally thorough project, and I suspect it is both more complete and up to date than anything available to our armed forces at a classified or unclassified level. Herr Meyer’s meticulous research and superb drawing skills have produced a reference resource of unparalleled usefulness for anyone needing a handy reference for China’s vast naval and paranaval forces.” 

– A.D. Baker III, former editor of Combat Fleets of the World

“I think it is for the first time that such a nearly complete overview of the Chinese maritime services has been made available to the public. The Chinese navy has risen in twenty years from a regional outdated navy to one of the global players which cannot be overlooked by the other world and regional powers.”

– Werner Globke, editor of Weyer’s Warships

“This is a badly-needed book: an accessible, compact guide to the ships of the Chinese navy and its related paramilitary services. All of the ships are shown in very clear scaled drawings, which give a good sense of size and configuration. No other guide of this type exists. That makes this quite possibly the only good reference to the Chinese fleets. No one concerned with current naval affairs can afford to miss it.”

– Dr. Norman Friedman, technical naval author

“I devoured this book. This is perhaps the most important and most comprehensive technical naval analysis book to appear in a generation. With the advent of Cold War II and the announced return to great power competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, this book should be on the bookshelf of every serious U.S. Navy officer and naval analyst. It will be the standard reference.”

– Captain Jerry Hendrix, USN (ret.), Center for a New American Security

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “Breaking Down the Pentagon’s 2020 China Military Power Report: A Quest for PLA Parity?” The National Interest, 2 September 2020.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020 (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 1 September 2020).

p. 29

Militia. The militia is an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization. It is distinct from the PLA’s reserve forces. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and vary widely in composition and mission. The PRC’s 1997 National Defense Law authorizes the militia to assist in maintaining public order. The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a component of the militia and its tasks include safeguarding maritime claims, which it often performs in conjunction with the PLAN and the CCG.

p. 34

p. 69

INCREASING INTEROPERABILITY WITH PARAMILITARY AND MILITIA

Key Takeaway

  • Interoperability and integration between the PLA and the PRC’s paramilitary forces continues to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination between the PLAN, the CCG, and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).

People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a paramilitary police component of the PRC’s armed forces and an armed wing of the CCP. Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and assisting the PLA in times of war. In early 2018, the CMC assumed direct control of the PAP after the CCP ended the previous CMC-State Council dual-command system. As part of this reform, the PAP also assumed control of the China Coast Guard (CCG) in July 2018 from the PRC’s State Oceanic Administration. In addition to these changes, the PAP has undergone a comprehensive reorganization and shed missions and some specialized forces for border defense, firefighting, natural resource protection (forests, gold mines, and hydropower), allowing the PAP to focus more on internal security. The PAP is comprised principally of the Mobile Corps, the Internal Security Corps, and the CCG. …

p. 70

China’s Coercive Approach

China’s leaders use tactics short of armed conflict to pursue China’s objectives. China calibrates its coercive activities to fall below the threshold of provoking armed conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region. These tactics are particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas as well as along its border with India and Bhutan.1 In recent years, the PLA has also increased patrols around and near Taiwan using bomber, fighter, and surveillance aircraft to signal Taiwan. China also employs nonmilitary tools coercively, including economic tools during periods of political tensions with countries that China accuses of harming its national interests.

China Coast Guard (CCG). The CCG is subordinate to the PAP and is responsible for a wide range of missions under the umbrella of maritime rights protection, including enforcement of the PRC’s sovereignty claims, surveillance, protection of fisheries’ resources, anti-smuggling, and general law enforcement. In July 2018, the CCG completed its merger into the CMC command structure through its subordination to the PAP, which itself is under the CMC like the PLA. This could facilitate closer coordination between the CCG and the PLAN. The PRC primarily uses paramilitary maritime law

p. 71

enforcement agencies in maritime disputes, selectively using the PLAN to provide overwatch in case of escalation.

The CCG’s rapid expansion and modernization has improved China’s ability to enforce its maritime claims. Since 2010, the CCG’s fleet of large patrol ships (more than 1,000 tons) has more than doubled from approximately 60 to more than 130 ships, making it by far the largest coast guard force in the world and increasing its capacity to conduct simultaneous, extended offshore operations in multiple disputed areas. Furthermore, the newer ships are substantially larger and more capable than the older ships, and the majority are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, and guns ranging from 30 mm to 76 mm. A number of these ships are capable of long-endurance and out-of-area operations. These characteristics give CCG vessels the ability to intimidate local, non-PRC fishing boats, as occurred in an October 2016 incident near Scarborough Reef.

In addition, the CCG operates more than 70 fast patrol combatants (more than 500 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations, more than 400 coastal patrol craft, and approximately 1,000 inshore and riverine patrol boats. The CCG is likely to add another 25-30 patrol ships and patrol combatants by the end of the decade before the construction program levels off.

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).

The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission. In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve the PRC’s political goals without fighting, part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational operations short of war as an effective means of accomplishing political objectives. The militia has played significant roles in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the 2009 harassment of USNS Impeccable conducting normal operations, the 2012 Scarborough Reef standoff, the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou-981 oilrig standoff, and a large incursion in waters near the Senkakus in 2016.

A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and assist the PLAN and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistic support, and search and rescue. The government subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia vessels to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities.

The PAFMM often rents fishing vessels from companies or individual fishermen. However, China has also built a state-owned fishing fleet for at least part of its “maritime militia” in the South China

p. 72

Sea. The Hainan provincial government, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage, which the militia received by the end of 2016, along with extensive subsidies to encourage frequent operations in the Spratly Islands. This particular PAFMM unit is also China’s most professional. Its forces are paid salaries independent of any clear commercial fishing responsibilities and recruited from recently separated veterans.

p. 95

EASTERN THEATER COMMAND

Key Takeaway

  • The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea.

The Eastern Theater Command likely executes operational control over national defense matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. In 2019, the Eastern Theater Command focused on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of longdistance training and mobilization, aerial combat, and live-fire training. PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, and one missile base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while conducting Senkakus-related operations.

p. 99

SOUTHERN THEATER COMMAND

Key Takeaway

  • The Southern Theater Command is oriented toward the South China Sea, Southeast Asia border security, and territorial and maritime disputes.

The area of responsibility of the Southern Theater Command covers mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea. This geographic area implies that the Southern Theater Command is responsible for securing the South China Sea, supporting the Eastern Theater Command in any invasion of Taiwan, responding to territorial disputes, and assuring the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) seen as vital to China’s global ambitions. PLA units located within the Southern Theater Command are two group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, and two Rocket Force bases. The Southern Theater Command is responsible for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, and likely commands all CCG and maritime militia ships conducting operations within China’s claimed “nine-dash line.”

p. 165

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces

Note: In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the PLA’s Eastern and Southern Theater Navies would participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The Northern Theater Navy (not shown) would be responsible primarily for protecting the sea approaches to China, but could provide mission-critical assets to support the other fleets. In conflict, China may also employ China Coast Guard (CCG) and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) ships to support military operations.

***

Christian Vicedo, “China’s PAFMM Grey Zone Maritime Challenge to the Philippines,” East Asia Forum, 13 August 2020.

China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is key to understanding Beijing’s grey-zone operations in the South China Sea (SCS). The PAFMM is organised and linked to the People’s Liberation Army chain of command through the People’s Armed Forces Districts. PAFMM members are trained in maritime claims enforcementlogistics supportintelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and sabotage. Operating about 84 large vessels with reinforced hulls and water cannons, the PAFMM serves as China’s third force in the SCS.

The Philippines currently occupies nine features in the SCS. But through its PAFMM, China can prevent the Philippines from exercising sovereignty within and surrounding these features. Given precedents such as the seizure of the Paracels in 1974 and the occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995, the PAFMM may be employed to seize any of the Philippine-occupied features and to construct artificial islands and facilities on them. … … …

***

David R. Stilwell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “The South China Sea, Southeast Asia’s Patrimony, And Everybody’s Own Backyard,” Remarks at Center for Strategic and International Studies (Virtual), 14 July 2020.

Remarks as prepared

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Greg. I’m honored to join you. I commend CSIS for regularly convening leading thinkers on the Indo-Pacific and on the South China Sea in particular. Your work is an invaluable resource to us all.

This is a timely and important discussion. In recent months, while the world has focused on the fight against COVID-19, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has doubled-down on its campaign to impose an order of “might makes right” in the South China Sea. Beijing is working to undermine the sovereign rights of other coastal states and deny them access to offshore resources – resources that belong to those states, not to China. Beijing wants dominion for itself. It wants to replace international law with rule by threats and coercion.

In recent months, Beijing has sunk Vietnamese fishing vessels, sent an armed flotilla to harass Malaysian offshore energy exploration, and wielded maritime militia to surround Philippine outpostsBeijing has further militarized its artificial islands in the Spratlys with new aircraft deployments. It has announced unilateral fishing bans. It has conducted destabilizing military exercises in contested waters around disputed features. And it increasingly uses its artificial islands as bases for harassment operations – to curtail access of Southeast Asian coastal states to offshore oil, gas and fisheries.

We all know why this matters. By claiming “indisputable sovereignty” over an area larger than the Mediterranean and trampling the rights of others, Beijing threatens the existing order that has given Asia decades of prosperity. That order has been based on freedom and openness, ideas that Beijing opposes.

Nearly $4 trillion in trade transits the South China Sea each year. More than $1 trillion of that is linked to the U.S. market. The sea is home to an estimated $2.6 trillion in recoverable offshore oil and gas. It also has some of the world’s richest fishing grounds that employ an estimated 3.7 million people in coastal Southeast Asian states.

These resources are the birthright of Southeast Asian nations, the lifeblood of their coastal communities, and the livelihood of millions of their citizens. They are the inheritance of each nation’s children and grandchildren. Beijing’s behavior is an assault on the people of Southeast Asia today, and from generation to generation.

ANNIVERSARY OF TRIBUNAL RULING

This week marks the anniversary of a historic statement on international law in the South China Sea: the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling.

This case of peaceful arbitration was brought – with real courage – by the Philippines. And the verdict was unanimous: Beijing’s Nine-Dash line maritime claim has no basis in international law. The tribunal sided squarely with the Philippines on the bulk of its legal claims.

Beijing has since tried to delegitimize and ignore the verdict, despite its obligations to abide by it as a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Beijing likes to present itself as a champion of multilateralism and international institutions, but it has dismissed the verdict as “nothing more than a piece of paper.”

Only the gullible or the co-opted can still credit Beijing’s pretense of good global citizenship. Today we are hearing more and more voices raised against Beijing’s aggressiveness and unilateralism.

We welcome the clear insistence last month by Leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that South China Sea disputes should be resolved on the basis of international law, including UNCLOS.

The wider world is also speaking up and taking action, in recognition that Beijing’s actions pose the greatest threat to freedom of the seas anywhere on the planet. South China Sea issues have direct bearing on the future of the Arctic, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, and other vital waterways. What is at stake in the South China Sea has a direct impact on every nation and person who relies on freedom of the seas and the free movement of maritime commerce to ensure their nation’s prosperity.

U.S. POLICY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The United States has strengthened our own approach to the South China Sea.

Our policy is to champion a free and open Indo-Pacific in which all the region’s diverse nations can live and prosper in peace. Our policy appreciates the diversity of those nations. It defends sovereignty, independence, and pluralism. A free and open Indo-Pacific means a region where countries are secure in their sovereignty and equal in their shared use of the global commons. No hegemonic power dominates others or turns international waters into a zone of exclusion.

Our approach builds on America’s long record in the Pacific of preserving the peace, upholding freedom of the seas in line with international law, maintaining the unimpeded flow of commerce, and supporting peaceful settlement of disputes. These are important and abiding interests we share with our many allies and partners.

In recent years we have deepened our collaboration across the region. We have increased our maritime capacity-building support for Southeast Asian partners, reaffirmed alliances, and maintained a robust tempo of military activities to keep the peace. These include freedom-of-navigation operations, including five in the South China Sea so far this year; presence operations, including dual-carrier operations earlier this month; strategic bomber patrols; and combined operations and exercises with our allies and partners.

The United States continues to be the largest source of commercial investment in the region, by far. Our nearly $300 billion in annual trade in goods and services with the 650 million people of ASEAN help ensure the growing prosperity of that dynamic region. ASEAN nations now produce almost $3 trillion of annual GDP. Living standards have improved tremendously, thanks to ASEAN’s incredible energy, and a global system that has long sustained stability, security, and prosperity.

Yesterday, Secretary Pompeo announced an important step to strengthen our policy, and to stand firmly with our Southeast Asian partners in defense of their sovereign rights. The Secretary issued a statement of policy on maritime claims in the South China Sea, on the occasion of the anniversary of the 2016 tribunal ruling. Since that ruling, we have said that it is “final and legally binding” on both parties, China and the Philippines. This announcement goes further, to make clear: The PRC has no right to bully Southeast Asian states for their offshore resources.

Specifically, Secretary Pompeo said three main things:

First, the PRC has no lawful maritime claim vis-a-vis the Philippines over waters determined by the Tribunal to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf. Within those areas, Beijing’s harassment of Philippine fisheries and offshore energy development is unlawful, as are any unilateral PRC actions to exploit those resources. Nor does the PRC have a legal claim to Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal, both of which are under Philippines jurisdiction.

Second, because Beijing has failed to put forth a lawful, coherent maritime claim in the South China Sea, the United States rejects any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands. This means that the United States rejects any PRC maritime claim in the waters surrounding Vanguard Bank (off Vietnam), Luconia Shoals (off Malaysia), Natuna Besar (off Indonesia), or in the waters of Brunei’s EEZ. Any PRC action to harass other states’ fishing or hydrocarbon development — or to unilaterally carry out such activities on its own – is unlawful. Period.

Third, the PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to James Shoal, off Malaysia. This one deserves a moment of study. James Shoal is a submerged feature on the sea floor some 20 meters beneath the surface. It is also only 50 nautical miles from Malaysia – and over 1,000 nautical miles from the Chinese mainland. Yet Beijing claims it as the “southernmost point of China”! The claim is absurd – appearing to derive from an erroneous old British atlas and a subsequent translation error, suggesting the underwater shoal was actually a sandbank above the waves. But it isn’t. And yet Beijing’s propaganda touts James Shoal as PRC territory and PLA Navy ships deploy there to stage ostentatious oath-swearing ceremonies. International law is clear: An underwater feature gives no rights. James Shoal is not and never was Chinese territory, nor can Beijing assert any lawful maritime rights from such spurious claims.

In all these cases, the United States stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in upholding their sovereign rights, and with all the rest of the law-abiding world in defending the freedom of the seas. As the Secretary has said, the world cannot – and will not – allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire.

BEIJING’S PLAYBOOK

Let me briefly raise four other important aspects of the South China Sea issue: (1) the role of Beijing’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs); (2) the negotiations between China and ASEAN over a Code of Conduct; (3) Beijing’s push for “joint development” of Southeast Asian resources; and (4) Beijing’s campaign for a seat on the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).

First, on state-owned enterprises: In the South China Sea, as elsewhere, Beijing has used state-owned enterprises as tools of economic coercion and international abuse.

They have been used to dredge, construct, and militarize the PRC’s artificial island fortresses in the Spratlys, from which Beijing now violates the exclusive economic zones of Southeast Asian states. One of Beijing’s leading infrastructure contractors that works all around the world – China Construction & Communications Corporation, or CCCC – led the dredging for Beijing’s South China Sea military bases, with terribly destructive effects on the marine environment and regional stability.

State-owned enterprises have been used as battering rams to attempt to enforce Beijing’s unlawful “Nine Dashed Line.” China National Offshore Oil Corporation, or CNOOC, used its mammoth survey rig HD-981 to try intimidating Vietnam off the Paracel islands in 2014. It is telling that CNOOC’s chief executive touted that oil rig as “mobile national territory.” The implications of such a statement should give pause to every nation that relies on the freedom of the seas for prosperity and security.

Other PRC commercial survey ships and rigs have been sent repeatedly into Southeast Asian waters in which China has no rights. Numerous PRC state-owned tourism, telecom, fisheries and banking firms invest in ways to enable Beijing’s unlawful claims and bullying. PRC fishing fleets in the South China Sea often operate as maritime militia under the direction of  China’s military, harassing and intimidating others as a tool of violent state coercion.

These state-owned enterprises are PRC instruments of abuse, and we should highlight their improper behavior. We should also shine light on how these companies operate around the world, including across Southeast Asia and in the United States. In all our societies, citizens deserve to know the differences between commercial enterprises and instruments of foreign state power. These state enterprises are modern-day equivalents of the East India Company.

Second, on Code of Conduct talks: There are clear red flags about Beijing’s intentions. For years Beijing has insisted that ASEAN states keep silent on the proceedings. Press reports have shown why: Behind closed doors, the PRC has pushed ASEAN states to accept limits on core matters of national interest.

These include limits on who ASEAN states can partner with for military exercises and offshore oil and gas work. Beijing is also pressuring ASEAN nations to cut ties with “outside” states and to dilute references to international law. These are demands of a bully, not a friendly neighbor. Beijing may have backed off its arbitrary 2021 deadline for concluding the talks, but its hegemonic goals remain.

U.S. interests are clearly at stake in the Code of Conduct process, as are those of all states who value freedom of the seas. A Code of Conduct that in any way legitimates Beijing’s reclamation, militarization, or unlawful maritime claims would be severely damaging, and unacceptable for many nations. We urge greater transparency in the Code of Conduct process to ensure a positive outcome that is fully consistent with the principles enshrined in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Third, on “joint development” deals: The PRC seeks to dominate the South China Sea’s oil and gas resources. To achieve this, Beijing is pursuing a campaign to deny Southeast Asian states access to desperately needed oil and gas resources except through “joint development” deals that disadvantage the smaller parties – that is, the non-Chinese parties.

The PRC gambit works like this. By aggressively deploying military forces, maritime militia, state-directed oil rigs and the like, Beijing tries to drive up risk for energy firms that want to operate in the South China Sea, in hopes of pushing out foreign competition. Once accomplished, Beijing pushes other states to accept “joint development” with its own state-owned firms, saying “if you want to develop those resources off your coast, your only option is to do so with us.” These are gangster tactics.

The United States supports nations in standing up for their sovereign rights and interests, and in resisting pressure to accept any deal whereby the PRC pushes its way into a share of offshore resources it has no right to claim.

Fourth, on the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea: Beijing is running an uncontested candidate for a judge’s position on this tribunal at an election currently slated for late August/early September.

Like the Arbitral Tribunal that ruled against Beijing in 2016, the International Tribunal is established under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Electing a PRC official to this body is like hiring an arsonist to help run the Fire Department.

We urge all countries involved in the upcoming International Tribunal election to carefully assess the credentials of the PRC candidate and consider whether a PRC judge on the Tribunal will help or hinder international maritime law. Given Beijing’s record, the answer should be clear.

THE GLOBAL SCOURGE OF PRC BULLYING

There are lessons here that apply well beyond the Western Pacific. When Beijing uses coercion, empty promises, disinformation, contempt for rules, bad-faith diplomacy, and other underhanded tactics in the South China Sea, it is drawing on a playbook that it uses worldwide.

We see it in the East China Sea and around Taiwan, where Beijing has expanded its maritime provocations and threatening sorties. We see it in the Himalayas, where Beijing recently took aggressive action on its frontiers with India. We see it along the Mekong River, where Beijing has used its massive cascade of dams to hold back water from downstream neighbors in Southeast Asia, contributing to the worst drought in the Mekong’s recorded history. I urge everyone to read the recent report from the Stimson Center, “New Evidence: How China Turned Off the Tap on the Mekong River.”

But Beijing’s aggressive mode of operation is visible not only in other disputes over territory and natural resources.

It is also visible in Hong Kong, where Beijing’s new national security law flouts its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 – an agreement now derided by PRC officials as nothing but a scrap of paper.  Just as they said about the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling on the South China Sea.

Aggressive behavior is Beijing’s general approach to international organizations. When the South China Sea came up at an ASEAN meeting in 2010, Beijing’s top diplomat thundered at his Southeast Asian counterparts: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.” This sort of contempt helps explain Beijing’s subversion of international institutions from the World Health Organization to Interpol, the World Trade Organization and beyond.

A few years ago, many believed that Beijing’s South China Sea abuses were mostly a local phenomenon, a kind of limited indulgence for a rising power finding its way in the world. Today we know that the Chinese Communist Party’s neo-imperial ways aren’t incidental to its character but are an essential feature of a nationalist and Marxist-Leninist mindset. Beijing wants to dominate its immediate neighborhood – and eventually impose its will and its rules on your neighborhood too, wherever you may be.

You could be a university student in Australia, a book publisher in Europe, or the general manager of an NBA franchise in Houston. You might work for an international hotel chain, a German car company, or a U.S. airline. You could be a 5G customer in Britain – or anywhere else in the world. Wherever you are, Beijing increasingly wants to stake claims, coerce, and control. By its nature, it cannot accept a pluralistic world with fundamental freedoms of choice and conscience.

The South China Sea, then, is less a faraway exception and more a sign and a threat of how the Chinese Communist Party will seek to act – unless it faces pushback. So it is good to see a wide range of countries increasingly stand against Beijing’s abuses, on a range of fronts including the South China Sea.

At the United Nations, a succession of formal declarations by Southeast Asian coastal states show clear resolve to uphold international law and reject pressure to accept Beijing’s unlawful claims. These include Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia in the past months alone.

Likewise, the United States and other countries have raised concerns for the first time in the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly over the dangers of PRC actions in the South China Sea.

Australia, Britain, France, Germany and India have all recently issued statements of unprecedented concern over South China Sea activities by Beijing that put regional stability and international law at risk. Meanwhile we see promising new defense and security arrangements among allies and partners from Australia to Southeast Asia, Japan and India.

As mentioned, all the Leaders of ASEAN last month insisted that South China Sea disputes must be resolved on the basis of international law, including UNCLOS.

I’ll close by citing the statement put out Sunday by the Philippines on the fourth anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal ruling. “The arbitration case initiated and overwhelmingly won by the Republic of the Philippines versus the People’s Republic of China is a contribution of great significance and consequence to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea and to the peace and stability of the region at large. . . . The arbitral tribunal’s award of 12 July 2016 represents a victory, not just for the Philippines, but for the entire community of consistently law-abiding nations.”

For our part, the United States is resolved to protect our vital interests and those of our allies and friends. We are building our military capabilities. We are vigilant. We are exercising and operating wherever international law allows. We are strengthening ties with our friends. We stand ready to help bolster the military capabilities of concerned nations. We support multilateral diplomatic efforts to resist PRC encroachments. And we are providing economic options to underscore that nations need not depend on initiatives from Beijing that are fundamentally predatory.

The community of law-abiding nations will indeed stand together. For a free and open South China Sea, a free and open Indo-Pacific, and a free and open world.

Many thanks for your time. I welcome your questions.

***

Derek Grossman and Logan Ma, “A Short History of China’s Fishing Militia and What it May Tell Us,” Maritime Issues, 6 April 2020.

If history is a good indication of what to expect in the future, then Beijing is likely to double down on the Maritime Militia in virtually any scenario imaginable. That means it should be a force to be reckoned in the years to come.

China’s armed fishing militia—officially called the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) by the U.S. Department of Defense—plays an instrumental role in Beijing’s strategy to enforce its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea. PAFMM is a government-supported armed fishing force of unknown strength that resides under the direct command and control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It has existed for decades and augments Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and PLA Navy (PLAN) operations in the region.

PAFMM plays a particularly important role in establishing a de facto Chinese operating presence in disputed areas—in effect, changing the facts on the ground, or at sea, as it were—to challenge counter-claimants’ ability to maintain control over disputed features. These classic “gray zone” operations are designed to “win without fighting” by overwhelming the adversary with swarms of fishing vessels usually bolstered from the rear together with CCG, and possibly PLAN ships, depending on the contingency, in escalatory concentric rings.

But the very existence of maritime militia in China is highly unique, given that the only other country that has one for sovereignty disputes is neighboring Vietnam. Indeed, Hanoi officially created its own maritime militia force in 2009 for the singular purpose of competing directly with PAFMM in an ongoing “people’s war at sea.”[1] It is therefore worth asking: why did Beijing create a maritime militia to begin with and how has PAFMM evolved over time? What does this history suggest about its future? … …

“Little Blue Men” At Work

What began as a coastal patrol and surveillance force eventually evolved into a maritime sovereignty support force by the 1970s. The PRC’s “little blue men” increasingly acquired the roles of maritime rescue, combat operations, anti-smuggling, and, ultimately, sovereignty enforcement.

Regarding Chinese sovereignty enforcement operations, early PAFMM forces demonstrated their significant contributions to island seizure campaigns starting in January 1974 with the Battle of the Paracel Islands against South Vietnam. In truth, Beijing did not have much of a PLAN to speak of in 1974, and perhaps the PAFMM was more capable of amphibious operations than the navy itself. Either way, the presence of Chinese fishing vessels around the Paracels slowed down South Vietnamese decision-making on the use of force against PAFMM as well as their response times to counter PLAN maneuvers. Additional time allowed Beijing to coordinate more effectively. When two fishing trawlers delivered 500 PLA troops to the Western Paracels, it resulted in the immediate surrender of the South Vietnamese soldiers defending the disputed features.

A key lesson learned for Beijing was that leveraging fishing militia forces was far less likely to trigger U.S. intervention in the matter even when the threatened neighbor was a U.S. ally. It is fair to say that this was the genesis of Beijing’s strategy to routinely employ irregular forces in gray zone operations in the East China Sea and South China Sea. PAFMM’s debut on the world stage was a resounding success, elevating the narrative that fishing militia forces were essential to the success of China’s maritime strategy in the South China Sea. Following the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974, the PAFMM has been observed in nearly every major PLAN and CCG operation to harass maritime counter-claimants at disputed features or to seize the features from them.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy have carefully catalogued PAFMM activities in support of the CCG and PLAN since 1974.[4] Among these incidents, the PAFMM in 1978 engaged in swarming operations at the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, disputed with Japan, and since 2016 the militia ramped up their presence there. Erickson and Kennedy note the proliferation of incidents in the South China Sea since the Battle of the Paracels, to include PRC seizure of Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 1995 and 2012 respectively. Beijing also attempted to blockade Manila’s resupply mission of Second Thomas Shoal in 2014, and since 2017, has harassed Filipino fishermen at Sandy Cay and nearby Thitu (Pagasa) Island. PAFMM has also routinely bothered Vietnamese vessels, and in May 2014 helped enforce Beijing’s emplacement of the Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig in disputed waters by ramming Vietnamese fishing and coast guard vessels. Separately, Beijing appears confident that PAFMM harassment of the U.S. naval ships is below the threshold of a forceful and escalatory response. It has consequently employed fishing militia against the USNS Impeccable in 2009 as well as the Howard O. Lorenzen in 2014.

What Might the Future Hold for PAFMM?

PAFMM has evolved from being a small and near seas force to a robust and critical element of China’s national maritime strategy. The fact that PAFMM has not only survived, but thrived, during the PRC’s naval modernization beginning in the 1980s, implies that further modernization prioritizing increasingly advanced systems will not necessarily reduce PAFMM’s value over time. Actually, the opposite seems to be the case—that is, PAFMM’s role will likely grow in parallel with the PLAN and CCG to better support their operations. PAFMM’s humble origins as a product of collectivization and the Soviet “Young School” also suggest that if China experiences slowing military modernization due to economic or other circumstances, Beijing could instead rely more heavily upon PAFMM as a cheaper and lower technology alternative to sovereignty disputes and coastal defense. If history is a good indication of what to expect in the future, then Beijing is likely to double down on the PAFMM in virtually any scenario imaginable. That means it should be a force to be reckoned in the years to come.

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “Office of Naval Intelligence Just Published Latest China & Russia Maritime Ship Recognition Guides,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 19 February 2020.

Check them out! Click here to access the China and Russia government naval/maritime ship recognition guide graphics that the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence just published!

***

アンドリュー・S・エリクソン (編集), ライアン・D・マーティンソン (編集), 五味 睦佳 (翻訳), 大野 慶二 (翻訳), 木村 初夫 (翻訳), 五島 浩司 (翻訳), 杉本 正彦 (翻訳), 武居 智久 (翻訳), 山本 勝也 (翻訳[Andrew S. Erickson (Editor), Ryan D. Martinson (Editor), Gumi Mutsuka (Translator), Ohno Keiji (Translator), Kimura Hatsuo (Translator), Goto Koji (Translator), Sugimoto Masahiko (Translator), Tomohisa Takei (translator), and Katsuya Yamamoto (translator)]; 中国の海洋強国戦略:グレーゾーン作戦と展開 (日本語) [China’s Maritime Power Strategy: Strategy and Deployment in Gray Zone (Japanese translation of China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations)] (Tokyo: 原書房 [Hara Shobo Press], 2020).

中国の海洋強国戦略:グレーゾーン作戦と展開 (日本語) 単行本 – 2020/3/19

アンドリュー・S・エリクソン (編集), ライアン・D・マーティンソン (編集), 五味 睦佳 (翻訳), 大野 慶二 (翻訳), 木村 初夫 (翻訳), 五島 浩司 (翻訳), 杉本 正彦 (翻訳), 武居 智久 (翻訳), 山本 勝也 (翻訳)

商品の説明

内容紹介

中国の沿岸警備隊に相当する海警局、そして海上民兵による軍事力や戦略・組織について、米海軍大学など世界の専門家がはじめて体系的に分析・紹介。日本にとっても注意が必要な中国の「グレーゾーン」戦略を知る最高の一書といえる。

内容(「BOOK」データベースより)

東シナ海・南シナ海に展開する準海軍「中国海警局」や「中国海上民兵」の実態と係争海域の実効支配を視野に入れた展開のすべて。米海軍大学の専門研究機関があらゆる角度から分析・詳述した決定版!

登録情報


中国の沿岸警備隊に相当する海警局、そして海上民兵による軍事力や戦略・組織について、米海軍大学など世界の専門家がはじめて体系的に分析・紹介。日本にとっても注意が必要な中国の「グレーゾーン」戦略を知る最高の一書。著者・編者紹介

【著者】
モーガン・クレメンス (Morgan Clemens)
SOS International LLCの研究アナリスト。
ピーター・A・ダットン(Peter A.Dutton)
退役米国海軍中佐および法務官、米国海軍大学中国海事研究所(CMSI)所長。
マシュー・P・フネオーレ(Matthew P.Funaiole)
戦略国際問題研究所(CSIS)チャイナ・パワー(中国実力)プレジェクト・フェロー。
ボニー・S・グレイサー(Bonnie S.Glaser)
戦略国際問題研究所アジア担当上級顧問およびチャイナ・パワープロジェクト・ディレクター。
ジョシュア・ヒッキー(Joshua Hickey)
米国海軍省上級分析官(15年以上の専門経験)。
ヘンリー・ホルスト(Henry Holst)
米国海軍省下級分析官。
コナー・M・ケネディ(Conor M.Kennedy)
米国海軍大学中国海事研究所研究員。
アダム・P・リフ(Adam P.Liff)
インディアナ大学グローバル国際問題研究校助教授兼ハーバード大学ライシャワー日本研究所研究員。
マイケル・マザール(Michael Mazarr)
ランド研究所アロヨセンター戦略・ドクトリンプログラムの上級政治学者およびアソシエイト・ディレクター。
バーナード・モアランド(Bernard Moreland)
退役米国沿岸警備隊大佐、米国沿岸警備隊の最初の元北京連絡官。米国太平洋艦隊司令部上級情報分析官。
ライル・J・モリス(Lyle J.Morris)
ランド研究所上級政策アナリスト。
ジョナサン・G・オドム(Jonathan G.Odom)
米国海軍中佐、ダニエル・K・イノウエ・アジア太平洋安全保障研究所法務官兼軍事教授。
マイケル・B・ピーターセン(Michael B.Petersen)
米国海軍大学ロシア海事研究所初代所長兼米国海軍大学海軍作戦研究センター准教授。
デール・C・リエーレ(Dale C.Rielage)
退役米国海軍大佐。米国太平洋艦隊インテリジェンス・情報作戦担当部長。
マーク・A・ストークス(Mark A.Stokes)
退役米国空軍中佐。Project 2049 Institute事務局長。
オースティン・M・ストランジ(Austin M.Strange)
ハーバード大学政治学部博士(PhD)課程。
スコット・H・スウィフト(Scott H.Swift)
退役米国海軍大将、元米国太平洋艦隊司令官(2015~2018年)。
武居智久
退役海上自衛隊海将、元第32代海上幕僚長(37年間の海上自衛隊経験)。現在、米国海軍大学教授兼米国海軍作戦部長特別インターナショナルフェロー。
マイケル・ウェーバー(Michael Weber)
米国議会調査部外交問題アナリストおよび大統領管理フェロー。
山本勝也
海上自衛隊1等海佐、元在北京日本国大使館防衛駐在官。米国海軍大学連絡官兼国際軍事教授(執筆時)。

【編者】
アンドリュー・S・エリクソン(Andrew S.Erickson)
米国海軍大学中国海事研究所戦略担当教授兼ハーバード大学ファエバンク中国研究所研究員。
ライアン・D・マーティンソン(Ryan D.Martinson)
米国海軍大学中国海事研究所助教授。

目次

序文
監訳者所感

序論 「砲煙なき戦争」

第I部 グレーゾーンの概念化
第1章 中国の海上グレーゾーン
第2章 中国の海上グレーゾーン作戦の概念化
第3章 海上民兵は海上における人民戦争(海上人民戦争)を実行しているのか
第4章 グレーゾーンが国際法の基本原則に抵触するとき

第II部 中国海警局とグレーゾーン
第5章 グレーゾーンのための組織改編
第6章 海上グレーゾーンにおける海警局作戦の軍事化
第7章 中国の海上法執行海上プラットフォーム

第III部 中国の海上民兵とグレーゾーン
第8章 権益擁護対戦闘
第9章 中国の海上民兵と偵察・攻撃作戦
第10章 ブルーテリトリー(外洋領域)におけるグレー軍

第IV部 近海グレーゾーンのシナリオ
第11章 南シナ海
第12章 東シナ海における中国の海上グレーゾーン作戦と日本の対応
第13章 東シナ海

第V部 グレーゾーン政策の課題と提言事項
第14章 グレーゾーンの作戦における時間的要素
第15章 中国のグレーゾーン作戦行動への対応における抑止の役割
第16章 中国との紛争管理における事例研究としてのベトナムおよびフィリピン
結論 グレーゾーンにおける米国のシーパワーの決定的使用のための選択肢

謝辞
略語集
著訳者紹介
原注

カスタマーレビュー

5つ星のうち5.0

星5つ中の5

5つ星のうち5.0 日本ではほとんど知られていない中国海上民兵の実態を明らかにしている貴重な本。

2020年3月27日に日本でレビュー済み

グレーゾーン作戦は、戦争状態と平時の状態の間をうまく利用して、本格的な軍事行動を敵国にとらせないために実施されるものということらしい。中国共産党は、米国海軍と正面から戦っても勝てないことを良く理解している。戦争に至らないグレーゾーンで正規海軍が手が出せないように行動し、少しづつ権益を確保して、最終的には領土をかすめ取ろうという中国共産党のやり口が理解できた。
日本の領土である尖閣列島も、常時中国海警局の艦船が領海を脅かす活動を実施している。中国海警局と言っても組織的には人民解放軍海軍と密接につながっており、ほとんど海軍といってもいい組織である。
中国共産党は、中国海警局を諸外国には沿岸警備隊と称しているが、装備的には戦闘艦と同じである。
また、その下部組織に中国海上民兵という組織があり、彼らは、通常普通の経済活動(漁業や海運)を実施していて上から指示があれば、中国海警局と連携して行動することにはあまり知られていないことだ。お笑いともいえるのは、ベトナムへの嫌がらせ行為を行う中で、漁船の場合には迷彩服を着て威圧する、しかし海軍が出てくると漁民の作業服を着て相手を騙す手法である。
敵をうまくだまして勝とうとする戦略は、まさに孫氏の兵法にのっとったものだろう。日本も学ぶべきだ。

2人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています

***

Chris Rahman, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources & Security; review of Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, eds., China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019); Marine Policy 110 (December 2019).

China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations is the seventh edited volume in the Studies in Chinese Maritime Development series published in collaboration with the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. In common with its predecessors this book has been produced to a consistently high standard. Collectively the series represents some of the leading available scholarship on China’s maritime power. This most recent volume is both focused and timely, addressing China’s strategy of coercively manipulating changes to the geopolitical status quo in East Asian waters via the employment of maritime operations in the ‘gray zone.’ The book comprises 16 concise chapters plus an introduction and conclusion, and is divided into five parts. The first part conceptualizes the gray zone itself. The next two focus on the primary instruments used in the strategy: the white hulls of the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the ‘blue hulls’ of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), respectively. Part four addresses possible scenarios for the next stage of gray zone operations based on analysis of China’s tactics in the two seas thus far. The final part comprises three short analyses: the temporal factor in gray zone operations, deterrence and the gray zone, and the different approaches taken by Vietnam and the Philippines in response to China’s strategy. Well-conceived maps and diagrams complete the whole.

The ‘gray zone’ is one of those trendy terms which periodically take hold within defence circles and associated strategic studies institutions. The intent is to describe situations of political and strategic competition which fall into the gray area separating peace and war; or, more accurately, between ‘normal’ peacetime conditions and outright armed conflict. Like much trendy terminology, the ‘gray zone’ describes a phenomenon which is hardly new, even in the maritime environment: the so-called ‘Cod Wars’ between Iceland and the United Kingdom are obvious examples. However, China’s strategy over the past decade to consolidate, and stretch, its claims to disputed territories, marine resources and maritime jurisdiction in both the East China Sea and South China Sea, has taken the practice of maritime gray zone operations to an unprecedented level of effort and scope of objective. China’s public rationales are couched in terms of safeguarding rights and interests at sea or ‘maritime rights protection.’ At face value, such rationales are neither unreasonable nor illegitimate objectives for any coastal state. The reality of Beijing’s expansive vision of its maritime rights, however, in practice exceeds any reasonable test of legitimacy; and indeed, following the Arbitral Tribunal’s July 2016 decision in the Philippines-China South China Sea case, lawfulness. Beijing’s objective in pursuing ‘maritime rights protection’ is nothing short of total political, strategic and economic control of the seas abutting mainland China’s coastline, to transform those seas into a veritable Chinese lake.

In the first chapter of Part I Michael B. Petersen thus defines the gray zone strategy employed by China to accomplish its objective as emphasizing ‘the nonlethal diplomatic, informational, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement, and irregular force means of compellence’ (p. 17). Michael Mazarr’s chapter on the role of deterrence in countering China’s strategy further elaborates on the concept, arguing that gray zone campaigns are attempts at strategic revisionism which avoid ‘crossing key thresholds that would prompt escalation’ (pp. 256–257). Mazarr identifies four key characteristics of gray zone campaigns: an aggressive pursuit of objectives, gradual in implementation, avoidance of escalation thresholds, and a preference for utilizing ‘nonmilitary tools’ (p. 257). Ambiguity and a difficulty in easily attributing responsibility for individual actions also are elements of gray zone operations. That is why China has demonstrated a preference for using the PAFMM as the vanguard of its maritime gray zone operations, supported, often from a distance, by coast guard vessels, which in turn are often supported, at a minimum implicitly, by naval forces usually positioned further away over the horizon from the operation in question.

In Part II Lyle J. Morris explains how four separate maritime law enforcement agencies were combined in 2013 into the CCG under the civilian State Oceanic Administration. He argues that integration has not been fully effective and many limitations remain, although, as the book as a whole demonstrates, this has not impeded the success of the gray zone strategy. Ryan D. Martinson further demonstrates how the CCG has become increasingly militarized, however, with one of the four agencies, China Maritime Police, part of the People’s Armed Police (PAP – an arm of China’s armed forces), taking a more prominent role. That process of militarization was completed in 2018 with the transfer of the CCG to PAP command.

The development of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia into the frontline force for China’s gray zone operations in East Asian seas is established in Part III. Whilst the PAFMM is not new, with militia playing an integral role in the national defence mobilization system throughout the Communist era, China has placed far more emphasis upon it in asserting its maritime claims over the past decade. Morgan Clemens and Michael Weber explain how the PAFMM operates under a dual military-civilian structure. On the civilian side this corresponds to the Communist Party administrative structures at different levels of government; and on the military side to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) counterpart territorial administrative arrangements. At each administrative level ‘the two halves are bound together’ by national defence mobilization committees (p. 136). With the maritime militia, especially, this structure sometimes encompasses individual enterprises, such as fishing companies or other maritime industry. The use of fishing boats sometimes tasked to the PAFMM for maritime rights protection thus exacerbates the ambiguity and attribution problem, and places the onus on other parties to escalate an incident, in which case China can respond with ever greater levels of coercion. The attribution issue has been particularly difficult in incidents involving Chinese fishing vessels in the East China Sea, as Katsuya Yamamoto’s later chapter explains: ‘ … if a vessel does not display any definitive symbol of militia activities, it can be difficult to determine instantly whether it is an ordinary fishing boat or a PAFMM unit’ (p. 237). Elsewhere, on the other hand, certain PAFMM units are increasingly recognizable, such as the unit from Sansha City in the disputed Paracel island group in the South China Sea, which operates 84 purpose-built vessels exclusively for rights protection duties; not for fishing or other economic activities.

Conor M. Kennedy establishes in more detail the types of operations performed by the PAFMM: presence, in large part to assert China’s claims; harassment and sabotage; escort of purely civilian vessels operating in disputed waters; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The PAFMM also exists to support the PLA in more intense warfighting missions. However, as Clemens and Weber argue, it is poorly equipped and trained for such tasks; and actions to remedy the situation would paradoxically ‘degrade those very … attributes … that make the maritime militia so useful and effective in prosecuting gray zone missions … ’ (p. 150). Jonathan G. Odom’s chapter assesses the status of the PAFMM under international law. Importantly he concludes that PAFMM actions are ‘legally attributable to the PRC’ and are often inconsistent with several aspects of international law (p. 67). The U.S. Navy seems to be listening, with its chief reportedly warning his Chinese counterpart in January 2019 that U.S. forces would treat PAFMM or CCG actions no differently to those of the PLA Navy itself.

While some chapters identify many weaknesses in both the PAFMM and CCG, as well as in the joint command and coordination effectiveness linking China’s three maritime forces, the book tells an overarching story of the success of China’s maritime gray zone operations in fulfilling its regional objectives thus far, especially in the South China Sea. This collection is without doubt the most comprehensive source available on the subject, providing a uniformly excellent quality of scholarship. As with any work that makes extensive use of foreign language materials, there is the occasional minor inconsistency in transliteration between chapters. And, as is common in dealing with mainland Chinese sources on sensitive issues, it is not clear just how authoritative much of the source material actually is. On the other hand, China’s well-documented actions in disputed waters provide ample evidence to support this volume’s arguments. Given the very recent changes outlined in the book, this is a story that will continue to unfold, but as a guide to understand the slow-burning crisis in East Asian seas so far, China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations is highly recommended.

Chris Rahman, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources & Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia E-mail address: crahman@uow.edu.au.

***

RECENT HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL STATEMENTS:

Vice President Pence deserves great credit for becoming the highest U.S. official ever to publicly call out China’s Maritime Militia! A most welcome capstone to five-plus years’ CMSI research on China’s Third Sea Force.

Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Frederic V. Malek Memorial Lecture,” sponsored by Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Conrad Hotel, Washington, DC, 24 October 2019.

Click here to watch the video on C-SPAN.

“…Beijing has stepped up its use of what they call ‘maritime militia’ vessels to regularly menace Filipino and Malaysian sailors and fishermen. And the Chinese Coast Guard has tried to strong-arm Vietnam from drilling for oil and natural gas off of Vietnam’s own shores.”

***

Statement of Assistant Secretary David R. Stilwell, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, Washington, DC, 16 October 2019.

“We remain skeptical of the PRC’s sincerity to negotiate a meaningful Code of Conduct that reinforces international law. While claiming that they are committed to peaceful diplomacy, the reality is that Chinese leaders – through the PLA navy, law enforcement agencies, and maritime militia – continue to intimidate and bully other countries. Their constant harassment of Vietnamese assets around Vanguard Bank is a case in point. If it is used by the PRC to legitimize its egregious behavior and unlawful maritime claims, and to evade the commitments Beijing signed up to under international law, a Code of Conduct would be harmful to the region, and to all who value freedom of the seas.”

***

David R. Stilwell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 18 September 2019.

… …

Beijing’s Malign Conduct

Finally, while the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy has made significant progress to reinforce and advance the free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region, we are increasingly concerned that some are actively seeking to challenge this order. We are committed to working with any country that plays by the rules, but we will also stand up to any country that uses predatory practices to undermine them.

As the President’s National Security Strategy makes clear, we are especially concerned by Beijing’s use of market-distorting economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and intimidation to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. Beijing’s pursuit of a repressive alternative vision for the Indo-Pacific seeks to reorder the region in its favor and has put China in a position of strategic competition with all who seek to preserve a free and open order of sovereign, diverse nations.

Since early July, Chinese vessels have conducted maritime surveys near Vanguard Bank with armed Coast Guard escorts and maritime militia in order to intimidate Vietnam and other ASEAN states away from developing oil and gas resources in the South China Sea. Through repeated illegal actions and militarization of disputed features, Beijing has and continues to take actions to prevent ASEAN members from accessing over $2.5 trillion in recoverable energy reserves. … …

***

Jessica Chen Weiss, “What China’s Assertiveness in the South China Sea Means—And What Comes Next,” The Monkey Cage, Washington Post, 30 May 2019.

China’s ‘maritime gray zone operations’ target U.S. naval vessels.

On Wednesday, General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., chairman of the Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked that despite assurances that there would be no moves to militarize the South China Sea, China had built “10,000-foot runways, ammunition storage facilities” — and routinely deployed aviation and missile defense capabilities. U.S. naval vessels operating in East Asia report being shadowed and harassed by China’s maritime forces. The Royal Australian Navy flagship Canberra also reported a recent encounter in the South China Sea while trailed by a Chinese warship: Its helicopter pilots were hit with lasers from what appeared to be fishing vessels.

To put these and other recent events in context, I reached out to two experts: Andrew S. Erickson, a professor at the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, and Ryan D. Martinson, a researcher at CMSI. They are the editors of the book “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations” (U.S. Naval Institute, 2019). What follows is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation:

Jessica Chen Weiss: The trade war has dominated headlines in U.S.-China relations, but what’s the state of play between the United States and China in the South China Sea? How has China’s artificial enlargement of islands and reefs affected U.S. operations and interests?

Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson: While tariff disputes dominate world news, territorial disputes in the South China Sea remain a key flash point in U.S.-China relations. Beijing maintains a claim to all of the space within a “dashed line” enclosing most of the South China Sea — including hundreds of tiny islands and reefs. China also believes it has the right to engage in military, scientific and economic activity anywhere within this zone, and to limit at least some these same activities by other countries. Over the last decade or so, Beijing has vigorously asserted these claims. Instead of using its navy, it has relied on coast guard and maritime militia forces, operating in the “gray zone” between war and peace. … … …

JCW: The U.S. Navy recently warned that it would treat Chinese coast guard and paramilitary vessels the same as the Chinese navy. What’s behind this development?

ASE/RDM: The U.S. Navy recognizes that China has not one but three sea forces, which act increasingly in coordination. Within that division of labor, China’s navy has sought prestigious engagement and substantive learning opportunities with the U.S. Navy as Beijing’s “good cop” at sea, while China’s coast guard and maritime militia “bad cops” bully its neighbors over disputed features and waters and harass the U.S. Navy’s own ships. But now the days of Washington letting Beijing have it both ways are over.

U.S. officials have been making similar statements for months now — then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis in November called for China’s maritime militia to “operate in a safe and professional manner in accordance with international law.” Assistant Defense Secretary Randall Schriver made a similar statement in a December interview. Their statements built on reports from the Pentagon and other agencies that exposed the maritime militia’s military nature and activities. These efforts to treat China’s three sea forces holistically and oppose their gray zone expansionism draw substantially on research conducted at CMSI over the past five years.

China has pursued a variety of coercive, competitive activities short of using force in the South China Sea. Which of these “gray zone activities” will the United States be more likely to succeed at deterring, and which will the United States probably have to live with?

ASE/RDM: That’s a great question, and one that Michael Mazarr addresses in our new book. … … …

***

Humphrey Hawksley, Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea and the Strategy of Chinese Expansion (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2018), 194-97.

Humphrey Hawksley, Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea and the Strategy of Chinese Expansion (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2018), 194.

Humphrey Hawksley, Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea and the Strategy of Chinese Expansion (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2018), 195.

Humphrey Hawksley, Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea and the Strategy of Chinese Expansion (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2018), 196.

Humphrey Hawksley, Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea and the Strategy of Chinese Expansion (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2018), 197.

***

Prashanth Parameswaran, “Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson on China and the Maritime Gray Zone,” The Diplomat, 14 May 2019.

How China thinks about and acts in the maritime gray zone, and what that means for the region’s future.

Over the past few years, as China has continued its expansion in the maritime domain, scholars and practitioners alike have honed in on the subject of how Beijing operates in the so-called “gray zone” between war and peace, staying below the threshold of armed conflict to secure gains while not provoking military responses by others, including the United States. Understanding the dynamics of this has important implications not only for particular maritime spaces, such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea, but also for broader issues such as the management of U.S.-China competition and wider regional peace and stability.

The Diplomat’s senior editor, Prashanth Parameswaran, recently spoke to Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson, both affiliated with the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, about how China thinks about and acts in the maritime gray zone and what that might mean for the region’s future. The discussion was framed around the release of a new edited volume by the authors in March entitled China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.

One of the core contributions of the book is providing a detailed and systematic understanding of how China itself thinks about the maritime gray zone – both on its own terms as well as how it related to broader Chinese foreign and defense policy – with a detailed use of Chinese sources. What are some of the key takeaways about how China thinks about the maritime gray zone in particular, in terms of how it is defined as well as the objectives and key components of China’s approach? And what would you flag as some of the areas of similarity and difference with respect to how others may think of these challenges and talk about them?

China is much more transparent in Chinese. And, particularly in native-language sources, Chinese policymakers are very clear about the fact that their long-term goal is to exercise “administrative control” over all of the 3 million square kilometers of Chinese-claimed maritime space. This includes all of the Bohai Gulf, large sections of the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, and all of the area within the nine-dash line in the South China Sea. Many Western analysts assume that China has more abstract aims, like discrediting the international legal order. This may happen anyway, as a byproduct of their actions, but the most compelling evidence suggests that Beijing sees strategic, economic, and symbolic value in controlling as much space as possible within the First Island Chain.

Chinese leaders don’t use the term “gray zone” to describe their approach to asserting control over this space. For at least a decade, they have conceived of their policy as a balancing act. On the one hand, they feel the need to defend and advance China’s claims. They call these actions “maritime rights protection.” On the other hand, they want to avoid severely harming their relations with other states. Regional stability, after all, is vital for sustaining China’s economic development — which remains the core of China’s grand strategy. Using paranaval forces like the coast guard and the militia allows them to find an optimal balance between “rights protection” and “stability maintenance.” Paranaval forces are much less provocative than gray-hulled warships. The Chinese coast guard operates on the pretext of routine law enforcement, and militia often pretend to be fishermen. Yet both forces can be used to pursue traditional military objectives of controlling space. … … …

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “The Pentagon Reports: China’s Military Power,” The National Interest, 8 May 2019.

The Department of Defense is out with its latest report detailing the rise of Beijing’s military. Here is what you need to know.

As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Randall G. Schriver emphasized in his rollout remarks on May 2, 2019, “our annual report to Congress, which we refer to as the China Military Power Report… is our authoritative statement on how we view developments in the Chinese military, as well as how that integrates with our overall strategy.”

Weighing in at a hefty 123 pages, this year’s document is nearly an inch thick. In terms of substance, it compares favorably among its seventeen predecessors. Among the report’s greatest strengths: as with previous iterations, it offers new data points and clarifications available nowhere else in authoritative form. This underscores the power of the U.S. government to disclose some of its collected information and accompanying analysis, a power this author and others believe should be used far more frequently. …

Gray Zone

The report pays proper attention to China’s emphasis on “gray zone” activities designed to fall below the threshold of armed conflict. Although the report also documents their use along China’s contested borders with India and Bhutan, such tactics are designed primarily to further disputed sovereignty claims regarding features and waters in the South and East China Seas (“Near Seas”). Here, China’s first sea force (the PLAN) often plays a backstop deterrence role over the horizon, while its second sea force (the China Coast Guard/CCG) and its third sea force (the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia/PAFMM) operate on the front lines. The CCG is “by far the largest coast guard force in the world.” It has “the ability to intimidate local, non-Chinese fishing boats, as occurred in an October 2016 incident near Scarborough Reef. The PAFMM is approximated only by Vietnam’s maritime militia, which is no match for it. On a related note, under the Joint Logistics Support Force, “The PLA is integrating civilian-controlled support equipment, including ships… into military operations and exercises.”

Since it first included coverage of the PAFMM in 2017, the Pentagon’s annual report has authoritatively showcased substantive details concerning this formerly under-considered force. This year, for the first time, the report includes both the CCG and PAFMM in an organizational chart depicting the leadership and chain of command of China’s armed forces. A dedicated section highlights increasing coordination and interoperability among China’s three sea forces, propelled by recent reforms including the CCG’s subordination to the People’s Armed Police (PAP), itself now under the sole command and control of the Central Military Commission. Notably, China’s three sea forces have shown greater interoperability amongst themselves than have the PAP and PLA between themselves.

Taken together, these developments could enhance the ability of China’s second and third sea forces “to provide support to PLA operations under the command of the joint theater commands.” In the South China Sea, the report stresses, “the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting….” It “has played significant roles in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years.” Of particular significance, “a large number of PAFMM vessels train with and assist the PLAN and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistic support, and search and rescue.” Moreover, “In conflict, China may… employ CCG and PAFMM ships to support military operations.” This all makes it crystal clear that Chinese navy interlocutors cannot plausibly profess ignorance of the PAFMM to their foreign counterparts—as they have done repeatedly in official meetings. Based on the report’s nature and content, doing so profoundly insults American intelligence in all senses of the word.

In the South China Sea, “China has built a state-owned fishing fleet for at least part of its maritime militia force….” Hainan’s provincial government “ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage, which the [Sansha City Maritime Militia] received by the end of 2016, along with extensive subsidies to encourage frequent operations in the Spratly Islands.” Comprising China’s most professional PAFMM units, Sansha’s “forces are paid salaries independent of any clear commercial fishing responsibilities and recruited from recently separated veterans.” Meanwhile, China’s development and fortification of outposts on the South China Sea features it occupies allows China to “maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the area.”

In his Q&A with journalists, Schriver explained how the U.S. government’s understanding of China’s three sea forces affects U.S. policy in practice: “We’re less interested in the color of the hull than the activity and the actions.  So what we’re most interested in is China behaving in a manner that’s respectful of international law and norms, and behaving in a manner that is not destabilizing and is more constructive. …if its coast guard and maritime militia or classic gray-hulled navy, if the design is to infringe upon the sovereignty of another country… with the objective of creating some sort of tension that results in a favorable outcome for them…. If they’re engaged in provocation or infringement on another country’s sovereignty, particularly our allies, then we would treat them differently than if they were doing what we would regard as more normal coast guard activities, or we don’t have necessarily the equivalent of a maritime militia, but peaceful activities.”

All these points emerged independently from extensive open-source research on the PAFMM that the author, Conor Kennedy, and colleagues conducted at the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) over the past five years. The Department of Defense has now validated our more specific findings and recommendations explicitly. … … …

***

Pentagon’s 2019 China Military Power Report Offers Strong Content on Maritime Militia

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019(Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2 May 2019).

p. 18

p. 52

INCREASING INTEROPERABILITY WITH PARAMILITARY AND MILITIA

Key Takeaways

  • As of 2018, the CMC assumed direct control of the PAP. As part of this reform, the PAP also assumed control of the China Coast Guard (CCG) from China’s State Oceanic Administration.
  • Paramilitary reforms could improve paramilitary forces’ ability to provide support to PLA operations under the command of the joint theater commands.
  • In 2018, examples of interoperability between the PLA and paramilitary forces included coordination between the PLAN, the CCG, and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).

p. 53

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and vary widely in composition and mission. In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational operations short of war as an effective means of accomplishing political objectives. The militia has played significant roles in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the 2009 harassment of the USNS Impeccable conducting normal operations, the 2012 Scarborough Reef

p. 54

standoff, the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig standoff, and a large incursion in waters near the Senkakus in 2016. A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and assist the PLAN and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistic support, and search and rescueThe government subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia vessels to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities. In the past, the PAFMM rented fishing vessels from companies or individual fishermen, but China has built a state-owned fishing fleet for at least part of its maritime militia force in the South China Sea. The Hainan provincial government, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage, which the militia received by the end of 2016along with extensive subsidies to encourage frequent operations in the Spratly Islands. This particular PAFMM unit is also China’s most professional. Its forces are paid salaries independent of any clear commercial fishing responsibilities and recruited from recently separated veterans.

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),” Editorial, The Maritime Executive, 30 April 2019.

Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM)

BY ANDREW S. ERICKSON 2019-04-30

To distill five years of research on China’s maritime militia into actionable policy recommendations, the author offers the following memorandum, which he proposes to be issued with official U.S. government authority.

As the National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017 emphasizes, China is engaged in continuous competition with America—neither fully “at peace” nor “at war.” Per this national guidance, we will raise our competitive game to meet that challenge, in part by addressing the potential risks to U.S. interests and values posed by all three Chinese sea forces: the Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia. In terms of ship numbers, each is the largest of its type in the world.

While virtually unique and publicly obscure, China’s Maritime Militia is known clearly to the U.S. government, which monitors it closely. A component of the People’s Armed Forces, it operates under a direct military chain of command to conduct state-sponsored activities. The PAFMM is locally supported, but answers to the very top of China’s military bureaucracy: Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping himself.

China employs the PAFMM in gray zone operations, or “low-intensity maritime rights protection struggles,” at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved. China has used it to advance its disputed sovereignty claims in international sea incidents throughout the South and East China Seas. This undermines vital American interests in maintaining the regional status quo, including the rules and norms on which peace and prosperity depend.

PAFMM units have participated in manifold maritime incidents in the South and East China Seas. Publicly-documented examples include China’s 1974 seizure of the Western Paracel Islands from Vietnam; 1978 swarming into the Senkaku Islands’ territorial sea; involvement in the occupation and development of Mischief Reef resulting in a 1995 incident with the Philippines; harassment of various Vietnamese government/survey vessels, including the Bin Minh and Viking; harassment of USNS Impeccable (2009) and Howard O. Lorenzen (2014); participation in the 2012 seizure of Scarborough Reef from the Philippines and 2014 blockade of Second Thomas Shoal; 2014 repulsion of Vietnamese vessels from disputed waters surrounding CNOOC’s HYSY-981 oil rig; large surge of ships near the Senkakus in 2016 and layered “cabbage-style” envelopment of the Philippines-claimed Sandy Cay shoal near Thitu Island, where China has sustained a presence of at least two PAFMM vessels since August 2017.

The elite units engaged in these incidents incorporate marine industry workers (e.g., fishermen) directly into China’s armed forces. While retaining day jobs, they are organized and trained in the PAFMM and often by China’s Navy, and activated on demand. Since 2015, starting in Sansha City in the Paracels, China has been developing more professionalized, militarized, well-paid full-time units including military recruits, crewing 84 purpose-built vessels with mast-mounted water cannons for spraying and reinforced steel hulls for ramming. Lacking fishing responsibilities, personnel train for peacetime and wartime contingencies, including with light arms, and deploy regularly to disputed South China Sea features even during fishing moratoriums.

There is no plausible deniability: the PAFMM is a state-organized, -developed, and -controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct Chinese state-sponsored activities. From now on, the United States expects all three Chinese sea forces—including the PAFMM—to abide at all times by the same internationally-recognized standards of law, seamanship, and communications to which U.S. maritime forces adhere; including the International Collision Regulations (COLREGS) and other international regulations governing allowable conduct by ships at sea.

Bottom line: Henceforth, the United States will not tolerate any attempt by the PAFMM to interfere with or compromise the safety, operations, or mission accomplishment of any U.S. government vessel.

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is a professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Since 2014, he and his colleague Conor M. Kennedy have been conducting and publishing in-depth research on the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) and briefing key U.S. and allied decision-makers on the subject. In 2017 Erickson received NWC’s inaugural  Civilian Faculty Research Excellence Award, in part for his pioneering contributions in this area. 

This editorial appears courtesy of Dr. Erickson and may be found in its original form here.

***

Ryan Pickrell, “China’s South China Sea Strategy Takes a Hit as the US Navy Threatens to Get Tough on Beijing’s Sea Forces,” Business Insider, 29 April 2019.

  • The US Navy’s top admiral has warned China that the US will treat China’s coast guard and maritime militia the same as the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the Financial Times
  • “The US Navy will not be coerced,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson told his Chinese counterpart, Vice Adm. Shen Jinlong, in January.
  • The move is a blow to Chinese gray-zone aggression, a tactic China uses to exercise its will in the South China Sea and East China Sea without escalating to armed conflict.

The US Navy has reportedly warned China that it could treat the Chinese coast guard and the paramilitary fishing fleet known as the maritime militia the same as the Chinese navy — as combatants.

Adm. John Richardson, the chief of naval operations, “made it very clear” to his Chinese counterpart in January that “that the US Navy will not be coerced,” the Financial Times reported, citing an interview with the Navy’s top admiral. …

For years, the maritime militia operated under the cloak of plausible deniability.

“Make no mistake,” Andrew Erickson, an expert on the Chinese maritime militia at the Naval War College, told lawmakers in 2016, “These are state-organized, -developed, and -controlled forces operating under a direct military chain of command.”

Erickson has repeatedly urged the US military to call the maritime militia what it is — a paramilitary force, one trained and directed by the Chinese military.

The Department of Defense for the first time dragged this paramilitary force out of the shadows in 2017 in its annual report on Chinese military power. The Pentagon said the maritime militia is used to “enforce maritime claims and advance [China’s] interests in ways that are calculated to fall below the threshold of provoking conflict.”

In the 2018 report, the department said that the maritime militia “plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting.”

Now it appears the US military is taking things a step further. The Department of Defense has not only recognized the existence of these forces, but it is also threatening to treat these forces as combatants should they engage in such behavior. …

***

Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “US Warns China on Aggressive Acts by Fishing Boats and Coast Guard,” Financial Times, 28 April 2019.

Navy chief says Washington will use military rules of engagement to curb provocative behaviour

The US has warned China that it will respond to provocative acts by its coast guard and fishing boats in the same way it reacts to the Chinese navy in an effort to curb Beijing’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. Admiral John Richardson, head of the US navy, said he told his Chinese counterpart, vice-admiral Shen Jinlong, in January that Washington would not treat the coast guard or maritime militia — fishing boats that work with the military — differently from the Chinese navy, because they were being used to advance Beijing’s military ambitions. “I made it very clear that the US navy will not be coerced and will continue to conduct routine and lawful operations around the world, in order to protect the rights, freedoms and lawful uses of sea and airspace guaranteed to all,” Adm Richardson told the Financial Times. …

James Stavridis, a retired US admiral who also served as commander of NATO forces, said Adm Richardson was right to have delivered the tough message to the Chinese. “It is a warning shot across the bow of China, in effect saying we will not tolerate ‘grey zone’ or ‘hybrid’ operations at sea,” said Mr Stavridis. “A combatant is a combatant is the message, and the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) is in the right place to warn China early and often.” …

US Analysts have long pushed for a more effective US response to counter China’s mix of military, paramilitary and economic coercive measures. Andrew Erickson, a maritime militia expert at the US Naval War College, recently called for the US to “deal with China’s sea forces holistically” and state clearly that it expected China’s navy, coast guard and maritime militia to follow international rules. He added that the US had to “accept some friction and force Beijing to choose between de-escalating — the preferred US outcome — or to move up against a US red line that China would prefer to avoid”. … … …

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “Maritime Numbers Game: Understanding and Responding to China’s Three Sea Forces,” Indo-Pacific Defense Forum Magazine 43.4 (December 2018): 30-35.

Powered by the world’s largest shipbuilding industry, as well as the world’s second-largest economy and defense budget under Xi Jinping’s ambitious leadership, China is becoming a major sea power in its own right and in its own way.

China’s armed forces comprise three major organizations, each with a maritime subcomponent that is already the world’s largest such sea force by number of ships. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) contains the PLA Navy (PLAN); the People’s Armed Police has formally been put in charge of most maritime law enforcement forces in the China coast guard (CCG); and the People’s Armed Forces Militia contains a growing proportion of seagoing units, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).

Not seeking war but determined to change the status quo coercively, Beijing employs its enormous second and third sea forces in so-called maritime gray zone operations to further its disputed sovereignty claims in the near seas (Yellow, East and South China seas). Typically, its first sea force provides coordination and deterrence from over the horizon.

THREE SEA FORCES

China’s first sea force, the PLAN, already has the most ships of any navy. “The PLAN is the largest navy in Asia, with more than 300 surface ships, submarines, amphibious ships and patrol craft,” according to the Pentagon’s 2017 China Military Power Report. By 2020, the PLAN will have 313-342 warships, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence forecasts. Meanwhile, as of April 13, 2018, the U.S. Navy had 285 “deployable battle force ships,” according to its official website.

China’s second sea force, the coast guard, is likewise the world’s largest, with more hulls than those of all its regional neighbors combined: 225 ships over 500 tons capable of operating offshore and another 1,050-plus confined to closer waters, for a total of 1,275. In 2020, the CCG is projected to have a total of 1,300-plus ships: 260 large vessels capable of operating offshore, many capable of operating worldwide, and another 1,050-plus smaller vessels confined to closer waters.

From 2005 to 2020, this represents a 15-year net increase of 400 total coast guard ships. That includes 202 additional ships capable of operating offshore, representing 350 percent growth in the latter category.

In terms of qualitative improvement, China has now replaced its older, less-capable large patrol ships. It is applying lessons learned from scrutinizing the “gold standard” U.S. and Japanese coast guards, as well as the CCG’s increasing experience operating farther offshore for longer periods. The resulting new ship features include helicopters, interceptor boats, deck guns, high-capacity water cannons and improved seakeeping. With a length of 165 meters, a beam of 20-plus meters, and at 10,000-plus tons full load, China’s two Zhaotou-class cutters are the world’s largest coast guard vessels and displace more than most modern naval destroyers. Most newly built CCG ships have helicopter decks, some with hangars. Many new CCG ships have quick-launch boat ramps on the fantail, allowing for rapid deployment of interceptor boats. These include approximately 10-meters-long fast interceptor boats with twin outboard engines enabling high speeds for visit, board, search and seizure law enforcement against fishing vessels or other ships. Many new ships have 30 mm guns mounted, with a few of the larger ships carrying 76 mm main guns. Most recently constructed CCG ships now have high-output water cannons mounted high on their superstructure.

China’s third sea force, the PAFMM, is a state-organized, developed and controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct Chinese national activities. It is locally supported, but it answers to the top of China’s centralized bureaucracy: Commander in Chief Xi himself. The part-time elite units engaged in many of these incidents incorporate marine industry workers (for example, fishermen) directly into China’s armed forces. While retaining day jobs, they are organized and trained in the PAFMM, often by China’s navy, and activated on demand.

Since 2015, starting in Sansha City in the Paracels, China has been developing a full-time militia force: more professional, militarized, well-paid units including military recruits, crewing 84 large vessels built with water cannons and external rails for spraying and ramming.

Lacking fishing responsibilities, personnel train for manifold peacetime and wartime contingencies, including with light arms, and deploy regularly to disputed South China Sea features even during fishing moratoriums.

FAR SEAS VERSUS NEARSEAS OPERATIONS

China’s second and third sea forces are helping to operationalize a naval strategy that has evolved from “near-coast defense” to a combination of “near-seas defense” and “far-seas protection.” Beijing’s maritime force posture is shifting from a coordinated three-sea-force focus on regional seas to supplementing that ongoing effort with a further division of labor in which PAFMM and CCG roles and missions have expanded to backfill behind the PLAN as it significantly increases its overseas missions and presence.

Adm. Harry B. Harris, Jr., then-Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, testified in February 2018 before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee: “Across the South China Sea, China’s air force, navy, coast guard and maritime militia all maintain a robust presence. Routine patrols and exercises ensure Chinese forces are in and around all the features, not just the ones they occupy. China routinely challenges the presence of non-Chinese forces, including other claimant nations and especially the U.S., often overstating its authority and insisting foreign forces either stay away or obtain Chinese permission to operate.”

China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, cruises into Hong Kong for a port call.
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

In the near seas, China employs the CCG and PAFMM in gray zone operations against vessels from its maritime neighbors, as well as the U.S., at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved.

China has used these forces to advance its disputed sovereignty claims in international sea incidents throughout the South China Sea, as well as in the East China Sea. This undermines vital U.S. interests in maintaining the regional status quo, including the rules and norms on which peace and prosperity depend.

Today, Chinese sea forces are enveloping the Philippines-claimed Sandy Cay shoal (near Thitu Island), around which China has sustained a presence of at least two PAFMM vessels since August 2017. The CCG regularly challenges Japanese administration of the Senkaku Islands. Chinese maritime law enforcement and PAFMM vessels and personnel cooperated in the 2014 controversial repulsion of Vietnamese vessels from disputed waters surrounding China National Offshore Oil Corp.’s Hai Yang Shi You 981 oil rig, 2012 seizure of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, and 2009 harassment of USNS Impeccable.

During the past two decades, PAFMM units have participated in China’s 2015 maneuvers around USS Lassen, 2014 harassment of USNS Howard O. Lorenzen, 2014 blockade of the Second Thomas Shoal, harassment of multiple Vietnamese government and survey vessels; and occupation and development of Mischief Reef, resulting in a 1995 incident with the Philippines.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As the U.S. National Security Strategy 2017 emphasizes, China is engaged in continuous competition with America — which it views as neither fully at peace nor at war. To continue to safeguard U.S. interests and maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific, the U.S. Navy must continue to grow numerically, maintain a robust presence, and — together with its domestic and foreign allies and partners — deter even the most determined aggression with sufficient numbers of long-range strike systems.

A Chinese coast guard vessel, right, passes near the Chinese oil rig, Hai Yang Shi You 981, in the South China Sea in June 2014. Vietnam challenged the location of the rig, saying it was in Vietnam’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Several weeks later, China moved the rig toward Hainan.
REUTERS

Numbers matter significantly when it comes to maintaining presence and influence in vital seas: Even the most advanced ship simply cannot be in more than one place simultaneously. Case in point: the growing U.S.-China strategic competition where Washington plays a distant away game. U.S. Coast Guard cutters are focused near American waters, far from any international disputes, while the U.S. Navy is dispersed globally, with many ships separated from maritime East Asia by responsibilities, geography and time. By contrast, all three major Chinese sea forces remain focused first and foremost on the contested near seas and their immediate approaches, close to China’s homeland, land-based air and missile coverage, and supply lines.

Meanwhile, the U.S. and its allies and partners must increase their efforts to counter China’s erosive gray zone activities, currently the focus of its efforts to impose its national laws and disputed sovereignty claims on features and maritime spaces to which its neighbors and the international community have legitimate rights.

To help complicate and counteract the Chinese maritime coercion that former Adm. Harris rightly emphasized, the U.S. should further demonstrate proactive leadership in the Indo-Pacific by sharing more information on all three PRC sea forces, emphasizing the cooperative nature of collective security, and encouraging allies and partners to invest in capabilities that complement those of the U.S. A particularly promising area for leveraging like-minded stakeholders is to further pursue collaborative approaches to maritime domain awareness that help them monitor proximate waters and airspace and share resulting information. Assisting less capable partners with hardware and training will help them not only to better help themselves and enhance status quo-supporting presence but also to populate the common operational picture.

Navy personnel from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy participate in a military display in April 2018 in the South China Sea, where China continues to increase its aggressive activities, including building military facilities on artificial “islands” recently constructed in contested territory. REUTERS

Additionally, the U.S. can leverage Chinese weaknesses and constraints more effectively to limit negative behavior. At the strategic level, the U.S. can curtail the ability of China’s gray zone forces to operate without scrutiny and with plausible deniability, however implausible, by publicly revealing their true nature and demonstrating resolve to impose consequences for unlawful actions.

  • First, the U.S. should demonstrate greater awareness of China’s actions to change its behavior.
  • Second, the U.S. should communicate consequences of unacceptable actions.
  • Third, the U.S. should utilize all relevant venues for strategic communications.
  • Fourth, the U.S. should deal with China’s sea forces holistically. Washington should state clearly that it expects all three — including the PAFMM — to abide by the same internationally recognized standards of law, seamanship and communications to which U.S. maritime forces adhere, including the International Collision Regulations and other international rules of the road at sea.

To regain the operational initiative, the U.S. must better deter and punish any Chinese use of the PAFMM in ways that are inimical to U.S. interests to break China’s asymmetric advantage through calibrated escalation as needed.

  • First, the U.S. needs to accept some friction and force Beijing to choose between de-escalating — the preferred U.S. outcome — or to move up against a U.S. red line that China would prefer to avoid.
  • Second, Washington must support its allies and partners on the front lines of keeping maritime East Asia peaceful and open to all to help them help themselves and the region alike.
  • Third, Washington should consider enhanced rules of engagement and signal to Beijing accordingly. The U.S. should not tolerate any attempt to interfere with or compromise the safety, operations or mission accomplishment of any U.S. government vessel.
  • Fourth, to support the above, Washington must develop a broad array of credible consequences including punishment options that rapidly and creatively impose costs just high enough to exceed any ill-gotten Chinese gains.

***

Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019).

As with the previous six volumes in our “Studies in Chinese Maritime Development” series, an Amazon Kindle edition will be available.

Eventually, there will also be an authorized Chinese-language translation through Ocean Press, China’s leading maritime publisher.

  • Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, “Introduction: ‘War Without Gun Smoke’—China’s Paranaval Challenge in the Maritime Gray Zone,” 1-11.
  • Joshua Hickey, Andrew S. Erickson, and Henry Holst, “China Maritime Law Enforcement Surface Platforms: Order of Battle, Capabilities, and Trends,” 108-132.
  • Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, “Conclusion: Options for the Definitive Use of U.S. Sea Power in the Gray Zone,” 291-301.

China’s maritime “gray zone” operations represent a new challenge for the U.S. Navy and the sea services of our allies, partners, and friends in maritime East Asia. There, Beijing is waging operations conducted to alter the status quo without resorting to war, an approach that some Chinese sources term “War without Gun Smoke” (一场没有硝烟的战争). Already winning in important areas, China could gain far more if left unchecked. One of China’s greatest advantages thus far has been foreign difficulty in understanding the situation, let alone determining an effective response. With contributions from some of the world’s leading subject matter experts, this volume aims to close that gap by explaining the forces and doctrines driving China’s paranaval expansion.

The book therefore covers in-depth China’s major maritime forces beyond core gray-hulled Navy units, with particular focus on China’s second and third sea forces: the “white-hulled” Coast Guard and “blue-hulled” Maritime Militia. Increasingly, these paranaval forces are on the frontlines of China’s seaward expansion, operating in the “gray zone” between war and peace: where the greatest action is. Beijing works constantly in peacetime (and possibly in crises short of major combat operations with the United States) to “win without fighting” and thereby to further its unresolved land feature and maritime claims in the Near Seas (Yellow, East, and South China Seas). There is an urgent need for greater understanding of this vital yet under-explored topic: this book points the way.

Volume 7 in Studies in Chinese Maritime Development series

March 2019 | 336 pp. | 6 x 9 | China and the Asia-Pacific

Maps | Hardcover

ASIN: 1591146933

ISBN-13: 978-1591146933

BOOK DESCRIPTION

As Washington’s new National Security Strategy emphasizes, China is engaged in continuous competition with the United States–neither fully “at peace” nor “at war.” Per this national guidance, the U.S. Navy must raise its competitive game to meet that challenge, in part by addressing the potential risks to American interests and values posed by all three Chinese sea forces: the Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia. In terms of ship numbers, each is the largest of its type in the world.

China’s maritime “gray zone” operations represent a new challenge for the U.S. Navy and the sea services of our allies, partners, and friends in maritime East Asia. There, Beijing is waging what some Chinese sources term a “war without gunsmoke.” One of China’s greatest advantages thus far is the difficulty for foreign powers to understand the situation, let alone determine an effective response. With contributions from some of the world’s leading subject matter experts, this volume aims to close that gap by explaining the forces and doctrines driving China’s paranaval expansion.

This book covers China’s major maritime forces beyond core gray-hulled Navy units, with particular focus on China’s second and third sea forces: the “white-hulled” Coast Guard and “blue-hulled” Maritime Militia. Increasingly, these paranaval forces are on the frontlines of China’s seaward expansion, operating in the “gray zone” between war and peace.

Chinese behavior at sea harms U.S. interests both directly and indirectly. As a seafaring state, America demands maximal access to the world’s oceans within the constraints of international law. Actions that impede that access violate America’s maritime freedom. China harms U.S. interests indirectly when it violates the legitimate maritime freedom and maritime rights of its allies and partners. Such acts devalue Washington’s commitments to its friends and shake the foundations of our alliance system–the true source of America’s global influence. Moreover, China’s efforts to curtail and infringe upon both the maritime freedom of all nations including the United States and the maritime rights of its neighbors undermines the rules-based international order. This volume concludes by examining America’s response to Beiing’s gray zone coercion and suggests what U.S. policymakers can do to counter it.

BLURBS

“How can the lightly armed white-hulled and blue-hulled ships of China’s coast guard and maritime militia defeat the heavily armed gray-hulled navies of the U.S. and its allies? Nowhere is this urgent question explored more exhaustively than in this incisive book. It should serve as a wake-up call for the American military.”

—J. William Middendorf, former Secretary of the Navy

“Many fret and opine about China’s gray zone behavior and strategy, yet few know and understand what is at play and in play in that space between peace and war. China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations is a timely and extraordinarily valuable resource for both new and experienced operators and policymakers who will navigate the gray zone challenge in the years ahead.”

—Admiral Gary Roughead, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Hoover Institution Fellow and former Chief of Naval Operations

“Who needs the CIA? Maritime competition represents the front lines in the struggle for influence between China and the United States. Gray hulls are not the only way Beijing tries to shift the balance. China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations provides as comprehensive an assessment of the challenge as one might expect from Langley.”

—James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., The Heritage Foundation

“Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson have established themselves as two of America’s most knowledgeable analysts of the PLA Navy and China’s naval strategy. Their new work on China’s maritime gray zone operations deepens our understanding of Chinese maritime operations that are neither peace nor war but that could have a profound impact on the western Pacific, Japan, and the role of the U.S. in Asia.”

—Stephen P. Rosen, Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs, Harvard University  

“An informative and striking book, which provides many eye-opening thoughts on China’s crafty and worrisome ‘gray zone’ strategy. A great focus is placed on practical countermeasures…. A good guideline for the planning and operations of frontline sailors.”

—Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) (Ret.) and former Commander-in-Chief, JMSDF Fleet

“This is an excellent account of how China is using its navy, coast guard, and maritime militia to expand its control and use of adjoining sea areas and exclude others from their use of sea areas legally recognized.”

—Andrew W. Marshall, retired, former Director of Net Assessment, Department of Defense

REVIEWS

“the book provides a cornerstone of what is happening now in addition to where things are likely headed. …certain to enlighten you.”

Virtual Mirage, 6 April 2019.

“… a first rate piece of work. …the discussions of the book could be seen as a historic look at a phase of Chinese maritime power and the evolving approach to strategic engagement in the region and beyond. … I would highly recommend reading this important book and thinking through what it teaches us, or challenges us to think about in terms of the much broader spectrum of crisis management we are facing.” 

—Robbin Laird, Defense Info, 26 March 2019.

 

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Andrew S. Erickson is professor of strategy in the Naval War College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and an associate in research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center. The recipient of NWC’s inaugural Research Excellence Award, he runs the China studies websitewww.andrewerickson.com.

Ryan D. Martinson is an assistant professor at CMSI. He holds a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a bachelor’s of science from Union College. Martinson has also studied at Fudan University, the Beijing Language and Culture University, and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Morgan Clemens is a Research Analyst at SOS International LLC.

Peter A. Dutton, a retired U.S. Navy Commander and judge advocate, is Professor and Director at CMSI.

Matthew Funaiole is a fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Bonnie S. Glaser is senior adviser for Asia and director of CSIS’s China Power Project.

Joshua Hickey is a senior analyst for the Department of the Navy with over fifteen years’ subject matter experience.

Henry Holst is a junior analyst for the Department of the Navy.

Conor M. Kennedy is a research associate at CMSI.

Adam P. Liff is an assistant professor at Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies and an associate in research at Harvard’s Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies.

Michael Mazarr is a senior political scientist and associate director of the strategy and doctrine program at the RAND Corporation’s Arroyo Center.

Barney Moreland, a retired Captain who served as the first U.S. Coast Guard Liaison Officer in Beijing, is the Senior Intelligence Analyst at U.S. Pacific Fleet Headquarters.

Lyle J. Morris is a senior policy analyst at RAND.

Cdr. Jonathan G. Odom, USN, is a judge advocate and military professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

Michael B. Petersen is the founding director Russia Maritime Studies Institute and an associate professor in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at NWC.

Capt. Dale C. Rielage, USN, is Director for Intelligence and Information Operations, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Mark A. Stokes, a retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, is Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute.

Austin M. Strange is a Ph.D. candidate in Harvard University’s Government Department.

Admiral Tomohisa Takei, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) (Ret.) concluded his thirty-seven-year naval career as the JMSDF’s 32nd Chief of Staff, and is now a professor and distinguished international fellow at NWC.

Michael Weber a foreign affairs analyst and Presidential Management Fellow at the Congressional Research Service.

Capt. Katsuya Yamamoto, JMSDF, who served as a Defense/Naval Attaché in Beijing, is a liaison officer and international military professor at NWC.

Previous Titles in the Series

China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force

China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies

China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective

China, the United States and 21st-Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership

Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles

Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain Course

RELATED READING

INTERVIEW

Dmitry Filipoff, “Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson Discuss China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 11 March 2019.

On March 15th, the Naval Institute Press will publish China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, a volume edited by professors Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson from the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. CIMSEC recently reached out to Erickson and Martinson about their latest work.

Q: What was the genesis of your book?

Erickson: In the last decade or so, China has dramatically expanded its control and influence over strategically important parts of maritime East Asia. It has done so despite opposition from regional states, including the United States, and without firing a shot. Others have examined this topic, but we found that much of the public analysis and discussion was not grounded in solid mastery of the available Chinese sources—even though China tends to be much more transparent in Chinese. We also recognized a general lack of understanding about the two organizations on the front lines of Beijing’s seaward expansion: the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). This volume grew out of a conference we held in Newport in May 2017 to address some of these issues. It contains contributions from world-leading subject matter experts, with a wide range of commercial, technical, government, and scholarly experience and expertise. We’re honored to receive endorsements from top leaders in sea power, strategy, and policy: former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead, former Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf, Harvard Professor Stephen Rosen, former Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Fleet Commander-in-Chief Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Dr. James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation, and former Pentagon Director of Net Assessment Andrew Marshall.

Q: The title of your book is China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations. How does the term “gray zone” apply here?

Martinson: We usually prefer to use Chinese concepts when talking about Chinese behavior, and Chinese strategist do not generally use the term “gray zone.” But we think that the concept nicely captures the essence of the Chinese approach. We were inspired by the important work done by RAND analyst Michael Mazarr, who contributed a chapter to the volume. In his view, gray zone strategies have three primary characteristics. They seek to alter the status quo. They do so gradually. And they employ “unconventional” elements of state power. Today, a large proportion of Chinese-claimed maritime space is controlled or contested by other countries. This is the status quo that Beijing seeks to alter. Its campaign to assert control over these areas has progressed over a number of years. Clearly, then, Chinese leaders are in no rush to achieve their objectives. And while China’s Navy plays a very important role in this strategy, it is not the chief protagonist.

Q: Who, then, are the chief actors?

Martinson: The CCG and the PAFMM perform the vast majority of Chinese maritime gray zone operations. Chinese strategists and spokespeople frame their actions as righteous efforts to protect China’s “maritime rights and interests.” The CCG uses law enforcement as a pretext for activities to assert Beijing’s prerogatives in disputed maritime space. PAFMM personnel are often disguised as civilian mariners, especially fishermen. Most do fish, at least some of the time. But they can be activated to conduct rights protection operations. And a new elite subcomponent is paid handsomely to engage in sovereignty promotion missions fulltime without fishing at all. Meanwhile, the PLA Navy also plays a role in disputed waters, serving what Chinese strategists call a “backstop” function. It discourages foreign countries from pushing back too forcefully and stands ready over the horizon to come to the aid of China’s gray zone forces should the situation escalate.

Q: Most readers will have heard about the China Coast Guard, but fewer may be familiar with the PAFMM. How is the PAFMM organized?

Erickson: The PAFMM is a state-organized, developed, and controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command.This component of China’s armed forces is locally supported, but answers to China’s centralized military bureaucracy, headed by Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping himself. While most retain day jobs, militiamen are organized into military units and receive military training, sometimes from China’s Navy. In recent years, there has been a push to professionalize the PAFMM. The Sansha City Maritime Militia, headquartered on Woody Island in the Paracels, is the model for a professional militia force. It is outfitted with seven dozen large new ships that resemble fishing trawlers but are actually purpose-built for gray zone operations. Lacking fishing responsibilities, personnel train for manifold peacetime and wartime contingencies, including with light arms, and deploy regularly to disputed South China Sea areas, even during fishing moratoriums.

Three types of maritime militia vessels depicted in the Office of Naval Intelligence’s China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Coast Guard, and Government Maritime Forces 2018 Recognition and Identification Guide. (Office of Naval Intelligence)

There are no solid numbers publicly available on the size of China’s maritime militia, but it is clearly the world’s largest. In fact, it is virtually the only one charged with involvement in sovereignty disputes: only Vietnam, one of the very last countries politically and bureaucratically similar to China, is known to have a similar force with a similar mission. China’s maritime militia draws on the world’s largest fishing fleet, incorporating through formal registration a portion of its thousands of fishing vessels, and the thousands of people who work aboard them as well as in other marine industries. The PAFMM thus recruits from the world’s largest fishing industry. According to China’s 2016 Fisheries Yearbook, China’s fishing industry employs 20,169,600 workers, mostly in traditional fishing practices, industry processing, and coastal aquaculture. Those who actually fish “on the water” number 1,753,618. They operate 187,200 “marine fishing vessels.” An unknown portion of these are militia boats. To give a sense of the size and distribution of PAFMM forces, our volume includes figures showing the location of leading militia units in two major maritime provinces: Hainan and Zhejiang.

Q: How is the CCG organized for gray zone operations?

Martinson: When we held the conference in 2017, the CCG was in the midst of a major organizational reform. It was only set up in 2013, the result of a decision to combine four different maritime law enforcement agencies. Before 2013, most rights protection operations were conducted by two civilian agencies: China Marine Surveillance and Fisheries Law Enforcement. They did not cooperate well with each other. Moreover, neither had any real policing powers. After the CCG was created, it became clear that Beijing intended to transform it into a military organization. In early 2018, Beijing announced a decision to transfer the CCG from the State Oceanic Administration to the People’s Armed Police. At about the same time, the People’s Armed Police was placed under the control of the Central Military Commission. So, like the PAFMM, it is now a component of China’s armed forces. Moreover, CCG officers now have the authority to detain and charge foreign mariners for criminal offenses simply for being present in disputed areas of the East China Sea and South China Sea (although they have yet to use this authority in practice).

Q: How is the CCG equipped to assert China’s maritime claims?

Martinson: When Beijing’s gray zone campaign began in earnest in 2006, China’s maritime law enforcement forces were fairly weak. They owned few oceangoing cutters, and many of those that they did own were elderly vessels handed down from the PLA Navy or the country’s oceanographic research fleet. They were not purpose-built for “rights protection” missions. In recent years, however, Beijing has invested heavily in new platforms for the CCG. Today, China has by far the world’s largest coast guard, operating more maritime law enforcement vessels than the coast guards of all its regional neighbors combined. As the chapter by Joshua Hickey, Andrew Erickson, and Henry Holst points out, the CCG owns more than 220 ships over 500 tons, far surpassing Japan (with around 80 coast guard hulls over 500 tons), the United States (with around 50), and South Korea (with around 45). At over 10,000 tons full load, the CCG’s two Zhaotou-class patrol ships are the world’s largest coast guard vessels. The authors project that in 2020 China’s coast guard could have 260 ships capable of operating offshore (i.e., larger than 500 tons). Drawing from lessons learned while operating in disputed areas in the East and South China Seas, recent classes of Chinese coast guard vessels have seen major qualitative improvements. They are larger, faster, more maneuverable, and have enhanced firepower. Many CCG vessels are now armed with 30 mm and 76 mm cannons.

Q: It appears that these gray zone forces and operations are heavily focused on sovereignty disputes such as in the East and South China Seas. Are they also pursuing other goals and lines of effort?

Erickson: That is correct. The vast majority of maritime gray zone activities involve efforts to assert Chinese control and influence over disputed maritime space in what Chinese strategists term the “Near Seas.” When conducting rights protection operations, these forces help Beijing enforce its policies regarding which kinds of activities can and cannot take place in Chinese-claimed areas. The CCG and PAFMM intimidate and harass foreign civilians attempting to use the ocean for economic purposes, such as fishing and oil/gas development. Since at least 2011, for instance, China’s coast guard and militia forces have been charged with preventing Vietnam from developing offshore hydrocarbon reserves in its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), part of which overlaps with China’s sweeping nine-dash line claim. China’s gray zone forces also protect Chinese civilians operating “legally” in Chinese-claimed maritime space. The 2014 defense of Chinese drilling rig HYSY-981, discussed in detail in our volume, is a classic case of this type of gray zone operation. By controlling maritime space, China’s gray zone forces can also determine who can and cannot access disputed features. Since 2012, for instance, Chinese coast guard and militia forces have upheld Chinese control over Scarborough Reef. Today, Filipino fishermen can only operate there with China’s permission.

Q: What are some of the tactics employed by China’s gray zone forces?

Erickson: Most CCG cutters are unarmed, and PAFMM vessels are minimally armed at most. They assert Chinese prerogatives through employment of a range of nonlethal tactics. In many cases, Chinese gray zone ships are themselves the weapon: they bump, ram, and physically obstruct the moments of other vessels. They also employ powerful water cannons to damage sensitive equipment aboard foreign ships and flood their power plants. Foreign states are often helpless to respond because China has the region’s most powerful navy, which gives it escalation dominance.

Q: How have regional states reacted to Chinese maritime gray zone operations? Have some had more effective responses than others?

Martinson: Regional states have not presented China with a united front. They have each handled Chinese encroachments differently. China’s strongest neighboring sea power, Japan has taken the most vigorous actions. As Adam Liff outlines in his chapter, it has bolstered its naval and coast guard forces along its southern islands. It has also taken bold steps to publicize China’s gray zone actions. Vietnam has been a model of pushback against Beijing’s maritime expansion, as Bernard Moreland recounts in his chapter. But even its resistance has limits. In July 2017, Beijing likely used gray zone forces to compel Hanoi to cancel plans to develop oil and gas in its own EEZ, in cooperation with a Spanish company. Other states have taken a much more conciliatory approach to China’s incursions in the South China Sea. The Philippines, for example, is apparently acquiescing to Beijing’s desire to jointly develop disputed parts of the South China Sea—areas that a 2016 arbitration ruling clearly place under Philippine jurisdiction. Meanwhile, China continues to push Manila in other ways. Philippine supply shipments to Second Thomas Shoal are still subject to harassment. China has recently concentrated a fleet of gray zone forces just off the coast of Philippine-occupied Thitu Island, in an apparent effort to pressure Manila to discontinue long-planned repairs and updates to its facilities there.

Chinese fishing vessels massed off Philippine-occupied Thitu Island in January 2019. (CSIS/AMTIDigitalGlobe)

At the same time, China itself continues to develop reclaimed land at Mischief Reef, a mostly submerged feature which because of its location clearly belongs to the Philippines. For its part, Malaysia has not publicly opposed Chinese incursions in its jurisdictional waters. But it is apparently proceeding with plans to develop seabed resources near the Chinese-claimed Luconia Shoals. Chinese coast guard vessels patrol the area, but have not forced a cessation of exploratory drilling operations—including those conducted by the Japanese-owned drilling rig Hakuryu 5 in February 2018. This story will be worth following, as Malaysia makes decisions about next steps. In 2016, Indonesia took robust actions to crack down on Chinese fishing activities near the southern part of the nine-dash line, northeast of its Natuna Islands. Things have been fairly quiet in the years since, perhaps because CCG vessels are escorting the fishing fleet to the area.

Q: It seems like China’s gray zone strategy is more often directed at other countries. Why is this topic important for U.S. national security?

Erickson: The U.S. Navy has also been targeted by China’s gray zone forces. U.S. Navy special mission ships such as the USNSBowditchUSNS Impeccable, USNS Effective, USNS Victorious, and USNS Howard O. Lorenzen have been shadowed and harassed, victims of China’s erratically-enforced opposition to foreign naval activities within its claimed EEZ. To be sure, China’s gray zone campaign is largely targeted at other territorial claimants, but two of these countries—Japan and the Philippines—are U.S. allies. Washington’s robust alliance with Tokyo, in particular, is critical to American presence and peace preservation in a vital but vulnerable region. Chinese bullying behavior threatens to undermine these alliances and could trigger direct American military intervention if China’s gray zone operations were to escalate into armed attack. Moreover, as Jonathan Odom points out in his chapter, China’s activities violate important international conventions and norms. This means they are weakening key pillars of the international maritime order, and with it the global system on which peace and prosperity depend. In many cases China’s gray zone forces are used to assert maritime claims that have no basis in international law.

Q: And how can the U.S. Navy, as a more high-end force, better handle these sorts of Chinese paramilitary forces without risking escalation?

Martinson: If the United States wants to be effectual, it must do more to expose China’s gray zone activities, and it must accept a degree of risk in opposing them more strongly. China’s gray zone activities cannot be easily deterred, because each individual act is calculated to fall below American red lines. If Washington wants to get serious about countering China’s gray zone expansion, it must do more than conduct “presence” and “freedom of navigation” operations—which appear to sit at the heart of the current approach. The former cannot deter Beijing from taking tactical actions in the gray zone. The latter does little to defend the interests of allies and partners. In our concluding chapter, we suggest ways that the U.S. Navy can do more to help them protect their legitimate interests and defend the legal norms and conventions that China’s behavior threatens to erode. In short, the United States should be out there with them, operating on the front lines of China’s seaward expansion. To that end, it must develop a range of nonlethal tactics that it can use to achieve local effects without resorting to use of force.

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is a Professor of Strategy in the China Maritime Studies Institute and the recipient of the inauguralCivilian Faculty Research Excellence Award at the Naval War College. He is an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2013, while deployed in the Pacific as a Regional Security Education Program scholar aboard USS Nimitz, he delivered twenty-five hours of presentations. Erickson is the author of Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development (Jamestown Foundation/Brookings Institution Press, 2013). He received his Ph.D. from Princeton University. Erickson blogs at www.andrewerickson.com.

Ryan D. Martinson is a researcher in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. He holds a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a bachelor’s of science from Union College. Martinson has also studied at Fudan University, the Beijing Language and Culture University, and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Featured Image: A China Coast Guard ship uses a water cannon to harass a Vietnamese law enforcement vessel near the disputed Paracel Islands on May 27, 2014. (Photo by The Asahi Shimbun)

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF VOLUME, AS WELL AS EDITORS’ FURTHER ANALYSIS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:

Ryan D. Martinson and Andrew S. Erickson, “Re-Orienting American Sea Power for the China Challenge,” War on the Rocks, 10 May 2018.

Summary: this article proposes a new set of tools for countering China’s maritime gray zone expansion.

As a seafaring state, America demands maximal access to the world’s oceans within the constraints of international law. Though seldom recognized, U.S. efforts to defend its interest in maritime freedom in the Western Pacific have been fairly successful. When the People’s Republic of China unlawfully draws “fences” around the sea, U.S. warships steam through the fences. Beijing recognizes the seriousness of America’s position, and thus far has generally yielded.

However, when it comes to helping its allies and partners protect themselves against Chinese encroachment, the United States has a mixed record. Since 2006, Beijing has dramatically expanded the frontiers of its control in the East and South China Seas. To pursue its irredentist agenda, Beijing has largely relied on unarmed or lightly armed paranaval forces — coast guard and militia — conducting operations in what has been described as the “gray zone” between war and peace. Despite the robust presence of American sea power in contested areas of maritime East Asia, the United States has largely failed to halt China’s bullying behavior. This failure devalues Washington’s commitments to its friends and shakes the foundations of the U.S. alliance system — the true source of American global influence.

To better aid its allies and partners, Washington should consider expanding its catalogue of peacetime maritime operations. Passive presence has proved inadequate. In some cases, American policymakers may need to place U.S. forces on the front lines, where they can play a more direct role helping other states counter China’s seaward expansion. … …

***

Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, “Ships of State: Chinese Civil-Military Fusion and the HYSY 981 Standoff,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 23 January 2019.

On a late June morning in 2014, Vietnamese fisheries inspection vessel KN 951 approached HYSY 981 (海洋石油981), a Chinese-owned mobile oil platform operating within Vietnam’s claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Three Chinese state-owned commercial vessels retaliated by spraying, ramming, and chasing KN 951 for approximately 11.5 nautical miles, ultimately doing substantial damage to the Vietnamese vessel’s hull. During the pursuit, these three Chinese tugboats displayed a considerable degree of tactical coordination: there is video footage showing that two boats worked in tandem to “T-bone” KN 951 while a third tug positioned itself in front of the Vietnamese vessel to prevent it from escaping. With the fifth anniversary of the HYSY 981 standoff on the horizon, reexamining it in the context of China’s civil-military fusion concept reveals Beijing’s strategic thinking on the role China’s merchant marine could play in future conflict.

Civil-military fusion (CMF) is a defining strategic concept in China’s quest to modernize its armed forces. A core component of the concept is improving national defense mobilization for both peaceful and wartime operations by integrating civilian personnel, equipment, and capabilities with military logistics systems. Burgeoning links between civilian actors and military bodies has led to, among other developments, agreements between the Joint Logistics Support Force and civilian-owned companies, as well as agreements between such firms and specific branches of China’s armed forces. In the maritime domain, agents of China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) have supplied People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) escort ships in the Gulf of Aden. Military exercises also use commercial semi-submersible transport ships as mobile docks, with the goal of moving materiel and repairing combat-damaged warships.

Civilian-military logistical cooperation in wartime is not uncommon. Yet the HYSY 981 standoff of 2014 is a striking display of how Chinese civilian infrastructure, nominally peaceful in purpose, might be summoned to assist in achieving national security objectives outside of war and how civilian equipment could be used in conflict. It also provides further evidence for an oft-heard but difficult-to-prove claim: Beijing sees state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their assets (as well as those of private companies) as dual-use and may consider using them aggressively to achieve China’s goals internationally.

Joint Operation

The HYSY 981 standoff began in May 2014, as a China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) mobile drilling platform moved into disputed waters south of the Paracel Islands on behalf of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). It was the opening of a bold play to enforce Beijing’s jurisdiction over the surrounding area. The U.S. Department of Defense described the standoff as “Using [a] Hydrocarbon Rig as a Sovereignty Marker.” This apt description was presaged two years earlier at HYSY 981’s unveiling when CNOOC’s Chairman and Party Secretary lauded the platform as “mobile national territory” in 2012 and, later, described HYSY 981 as a “strategic weapon.” Vietnam protested HYSY 981’s deployment through diplomatic representations and its coast guard, law enforcement, and fishing vessels harassed HYSY 981’s mission. The standoff lasted approximately two and a half months, with clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese non-military assets a common occurrence.

The HYSY 981 standoff has been judged to be the largest joint operation between China’s three main sea forces: the PLAN, the Coast Guard (CCG), and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Deployed to Vietnamese-claimed waters until July 15, 2014, the HYSY 981 platform was defended from Vietnamese challengers by three concentric security rings (i.e., cordons) primarily comprising CCG and PAFMM assets. PLAN vessels, as well as PLA aircraft, provided overwatch support. Yet a fourth fleet participated as well: China’s merchant marine. Over the summer, roughly 30 commercial transport ships and tugboats also defended the oil platform.

The June 23 incident was not an anomaly. Within just five days of the platform’s entrance into Vietnam’s claimed EEZ, Chinese and Vietnamese vessels clashed nearly 200 timesVideos of the standoff show how commercial vessels repeatedly worked in tandem with CCG assets to spray, ram, and otherwise harass Vietnamese vessels that approached HYSY 981. Thus, China’s merchant marine not only served as passive deterrents in the security rings around the rig, but became active combatants in the conflict. … …

Lessons Learned

The HYSY 981 incident demonstrates for foreign powers how China’s merchant marine may interface with military and paramilitary forces in maritime conflict, furthering state aspirations, and hints at how Beijing elicits and rewards participation. But questions remain: why did Beijing mobilize the merchant marine for this operation and in what circumstances might it consider doing so again?

To the former, it is possible that Beijing required SOEs to contribute to the rig’s defense in exchange for approving the project in the first place. This may explain why the majority of identified commercial vessels belonged to COSL and CNPC and their subsidiaries. Another possibility is that these ships were mobilized to augment the capacity of the maritime militia. The maritime militia is primarily comprised of civilian fishermen who are compensated to participate in paramilitary operations. There is some evidence that militia members may have initially resisted participation in the HYSY 981 mission due to limited incentives, and thus the merchant marine may have been called upon to offset a force deficit.

To the latter, it is possible that Beijing was testing the use of its merchant marine in conflict both as a test of efficiency and how foreign actors might respond. Just as the PAFMM is employed to assert China’s interests in its near-seas below the threshold of war, the merchant marine could be used to do the same farther abroad. Already, the Chinese merchant marine and civilian transport companies are expected to facilitate long-range naval missions globally. Even outside of the Gulf of Aden, Chinese companies operating in foreign countries resupply warships. In the years following the standoff, China has formalized aspects of the dynamics on display in 2014 by promulgating new legislation. In 2015 and 2016, new laws further required all “container, roll-on/roll-off, multipurpose, bulk carrier and break bulk” vessels be built to military standards and that “all SOEs conducting international transport services and their overseas institutions must provide re-supply and rest and re-organization assistance for all ships, planes, vehicles, and personnel involved in military operations for international rescue, maritime escort, and the defense of national interests overseas.”

Strategic Challenge

In building itself into a “great maritime power” capable of projecting power and influence far afield, China is employing both military and economic means. Chinese SOEs now dominate international shipping lanes and ports, enjoying control of or influence in over half of the world’s top 50 container ports—investments that have the potential to reshape operating environments in critical waterways. At the same time, China controls the world’s largest merchant marine (counting by vessels owned and registered in the country) of 2,008 ships (not including tugboats or fishing vessels), which the Chinese military thinks of as a “strategic delivery support force” to enhance Beijing’s maritime projection.

Many countries rely on their merchant marine fleets to provide logistical support to the military during war and peaceful long-range patrols, but the HYSY 981 standoff suggests that Beijing believes commercial assets are legitimate instruments of aggression in peacetime. Similar logic is seen frequently in the activities of China’s PAFMM fishing vessels, which is one of only two militias in the world that has a mandate to defend internationally disputed territorial claims, even in peacetime. China’s apparent willingness to leverage commercial assets—particularly SOE assets—as critical tools of foreign policy coercion has global security implications.

In 2015, the HYSY 981 platform was prominently featured at an Achievements of Civil-Military Fusion Development in the National Defense Technology Industry Exhibition alongside other dual-use systems and technologies, such as remote sensing and surveillance planes, satellites, and water-pressurized nuclear reactors. Yet the standoff shows that CMF is more than civil-military cooperation on science and technology or research and development (on which most CMF research in the West has focused). It is also more than the adaptation of civilian infrastructure for military logistics and defensive mobilization. CMF opens the door for direct civilian participation in conflict. The HYSY 981 standoff shows this to be the case in the maritime arena, and in other domains (specifically network warfare) Chinese strategists explicitly call for civilian participation in combat.

Conclusion

As CMF drives state-owned and private firms closer to the Chinese military, countries and corporations should appropriately evaluate the risks and rewards of certain Chinese investment. Chinese SOEs may pose the greatest risk, as they are directly controlled by the State. Moreover, they have deep capital reserves, enabling them to operate broadly across regions and industries, as well as potentially absorb substantial losses that market-driven businesses may not survive. Finally, many SOE subsidiaries are publicly traded on international markets, creating the impression that these companies are purely motivated by profits. Indeed, a CNOOC subsidiary is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Such impressions can be accurate, but the dual-use nature of SOEs and the inherent risks of civilian mobilization potentially stemming from CMF agreements demand heightened scrutiny of Chinese investments abroad.

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Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Shipbuilding and Seapower: Full Steam Ahead, Destination Uncharted,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 14 January 2019.

In recent years, China has been building ships rapidly across the waterfront. Chinese sources liken this to “dumping dumplings into soup broth.” Now, Beijing is really getting its ships together in both quantity and quality. The world’s largest commercial shipbuilder, it also constructs increasingly sophisticated models of all types of naval ships and weapons systems. What made this possible, and what does it mean? … … …

Near Seas Operational Scenarios

Closer to China’s shores, there is limited value for Chinese carrier operations, given their relative vulnerability and the potential for a highly-contested environment. But China’s shipbuilding industry has already produced a fleet of several hundred increasingly advanced warships capable of “flooding the zone” along the contested East Asian littoral, including increasingly large amphibious vessels well-suited to landing on disputed features, if they can be protected sufficiently. This is also where China’s large, conventionally-powered submarine fleet can be particularly deadly. When several hundred easy-and-cheap-to-build ships from China’s coast guard and its most advanced maritime militia units are factored in, Beijing’s numerical preponderance becomes formidable for the “home game” scenarios it cares about most. And that does not even include the land-based “anti-navy” of aircraft and missiles that backstops them. In this way, Beijing is already able to pose a formidable military-maritime challenge to the regional interests and security of the United States and its East Asian allies and partners. … … …

This article elaborates on a podcast in which CSIS scholar Bonnie Glaser interviewed Dr. Erickson as part of the ChinaPower Project that she directs there.

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Admiral John Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations: “It important for… the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia, to operate in a safe and professional manner, in accordance with international law”

CNO Visits China, Underscores Importance of Professional Interaction at Sea,” Navy.mil, 15 January 2019.

Story Number: NNS190115-13

Release Date: 1/15/2019 2:46:00 PM

From Chief of Naval Operations Public Affairs

NANJING, China (NNS) — Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson visited China and met with senior Chinese defense officials, Jan. 13 to 16, to discuss professional interactions at sea, specifically addressing risk reduction and operational safety measures.

Richardson visited the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) Command College for a roundtable discussion, where CNO underscored the importance of lawful and safe operations around the globe. He also reiterated that U.S. forces will continue to operate wherever international law allows–a point emphasized by U.S. officials during recent visits to Asia.

“The U.S. Navy will continue to conduct routine and lawful operations around the world, in order to protect the rights, freedoms and lawful uses of sea and airspace guaranteed to all,” said Richardson. “This will not change. Enhancing the prosperity of all is the direct result of a secure and orderly maritime domain.”

Richardson began the visit in Beijing where he met with PLA(N) Commander Vice Adm. Shen Jinlong; the two heads of navy had frank and substantive conversations on the importance of operating safely, in accordance with international law. They also discussed future opportunities for the two navies to engage.

“It important for all military, law enforcement, and civilian vessels and aircraft, includingthose in the PLA Navy, the Chinese Coast Guard, and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia, to operate in a safe and professional manner, in accordance with international law,” said Richardson. “Consistent operations and behavior are critical to preventing miscalculation.”

This is Richardson’s second visit to China as the chief of naval operations.

The two admirals met previously at the International Seapower Symposium, hosted by Richardson in Newport, R.I. and have held three discussions via video teleconference.

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Defense Intelligence Agency Report—“China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win”—Highlights People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia

China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019).

Click here to download a cached copy.

p. 65

China’s Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia are increasingly visible throughout the region, and Beijing has employed increasingly coercive tactics to advance its regional interests. As China’s naval capabilities have grown, Beijing has taken steps to consolidate its maritime forces and improve its ability to respond flexibly to contingencies, while avoiding escalation to military conflict and maintaining a veneer of advancing peaceful global interests. China’s land reclamation and outpost expansion in the Paracel and Spratly Islands include port facilities from which it can surge PLAN,

p. 66

China Coast Guard (CCG), and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) ships to better enforce maritime sovereignty claims, as well as airbases to support reconnaissance, fighter, and strike aircraft.

Under Chinese law, maritime sovereignty is a domestic law enforcement issue under the purview of the CCG. Beijing also prefers to use CCG ships for assertive actions in disputed waters to reduce the risk of escalation and to portray itself more benignly to an international audience. For situations that Beijing perceives carry a heightened risk of escalation, it often deploys PLAN combatants in close proximity for rapid intervention if necessary. China also relies on the PAFMM – a paramilitary force of fishing boats – for sovereignty enforcement actions.

p. 79

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia. The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization to perform basic support duties. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban subdistricts, and enterprises, and they vary widely from one location to another. The composition and mission of each unit reflects local conditions and personnel skills. In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part of broader Chinese military doctrine that states that confrontational operations short of war can be an effective means of accomplishing political objectives.225

A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and support the PLA and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, protecting fisheries, and providing logistic support, search and rescue (SAR), and surveillance and reconnaissance. The Chinese government subsidizes local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia ships to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside their regular commercial roles. The PAFMM has played a noteworthy role in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the harassment of Vietnamese survey ships in 2011, a standoff with the Philippines at Scarborough Reef in 2012, and a standoff involving a Chinese oil rig in 2014. In the past, the PAFMM rented fishing boats from companies or individual fisherman, but it appears that China is building a state-owned fishing fleet for its maritime militia force in the South China Sea. Hainan Province, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the construction of 84 large militia fishing boats with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage for Sansha City, and the militia took delivery by the end of 2016.226

225 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

226 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

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Andrew S. Erickson, “Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China’s Maritime Militia to Deter its Use,” The National Interest, 25 November 2018.

How China’s maritime militia threatens U.S. and allied interests—and how to counter it.

At the U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue press conference on November 9, Defense Secretary James Mattis made a great contribution by using his top-level authority to shine a spotlight on China’s third sea force, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM): “We… discussed the importance of all military, law enforcement, and civilian vessels and aircraft—including those in the PLA Navy, the Chinese Coast Guard, and the PRC Maritime Militia—to operate in a safe and professional manner in accordance with international law as we seek peaceful resolution of all disputes in the South China Sea.”

An authoritative public statement by the Secretary of Defense—the very first by anyone at his level—is extremely positive and long overdue. The PAFMM is eroding U.S. and allied interests by operating surreptitiously in the “gray zone” between peace and war, an approach Chinese sources term “War without Gun Smoke.” U.S.-China maritime rivalry is intensifying and almost any conceivable crisis or contingency would involve PAFMM forces. They offer a tempting tool for Beijing to complicate Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) and related U.S. patrols. This People’s Liberation Army (PLA)-controlled force harasses foreign ships, including those of the U.S. government; and mans the front lines of other international sea incidents to further disputed sovereignty claims. Yet it has received far too little top-level scrutiny and official public pushback. Now it is time to build on Secretary Mattis’s statement with further understanding and countermeasures.

China’s Gray Zone Challenge:

China has three sea forces, each an Armed Forces subcomponent: the PLA Navy (PLAN)China Coast Guard (CCG), and PAFMM. Each has the world’s most ships in its category. They increasingly operate in concert under unified command and control. For decades, the PLA recruited marine industry workers (many fishermen), trained them regularly with their vessels as PAFMM units, and activated them for missions on demand. Recently, full-time PAFMM units have recruited ex-PLA personnel with generous salaries but no fishing responsibilities. They conduct operational deployments in disputed areas using larger vessels with mast-mounted water cannons for spraying, reinforced hulls for ramming, and reported weaponsstores. Despite attempting to operate below the radar, Beijing has no plausible deniability for the PAFMM’s activities: the PLA oversees its doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. It operates in disputed sea areas and serves Beijing’s interests through the PLA operational chain of command under Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping himself.

By choosing to employ soldiers disguised as civilian mariners, not conventional naval forces, Beijing has expanded the geographic scope of its influence and control without resorting to war, a classic case of “winning without fighting.” Use of the PAFMM tool is effective because it exploits foreign ignorance, inattention, and restraints. It is a key component of Chinese sea power, but most people do not know that. It operates actively in disputed areas and harasses ships of the U.S. and its allies and partners, but many encounters are not reported publicly.

The fundamental threat posed by the PAFMM is its ability to help China expand and strengthen its control over strategically important maritime space, with little cost or risk. For decades, part-time elite PAFMM units have helped to further Beijing’s disputed claims in international sea incidents throughout the South China Sea. Since 2006, relying heavily on the PAFMM, China has dramatically increased efforts to restrict foreign activities in strategically vital areas of the Western Pacific. It has aggressively challenged the legitimate maritime activities of U.S. allies and partners. It has also targeted and harassed U.S. Navy ships, yet faced no consequences.

In contingencies involving the PAFMM, U.S. and allied naval and coast guard officers will need to be able to make quick decisions regarding how to respond to this force but may be ill-equipped to do so. The U.S. has no way to match the PAFMM symmetrically, but the force itself has significant limitations and vulnerabilities. The U.S. government can and should do a much better job revealing the military nature of this perfidious force. With several low-cost policy initiatives, the U.S. could effectively curtail China’s use of the PAFMM in operations detrimental to U.S. interests and provide more options for escalation avoidance when encountering PAFMM forces at sea without harming U.S. interests. The following recommendations can help to take this under-recognized China-military-controlled force off the table as much as possible.

Recommendations:

While the U.S. has allowed it to operate surprisingly unchallenged in the shadows, the PAFMM has many weaknesses. Optimized for cost efficiency and covertness, it is inherently limited in training, sensors, situational awareness, autonomy, initiative, and morale. Open source research reveals no equivalent to commander’s intent, self-generation of courses of action, or operating in isolation from supporting forces—key sources of initiative that empower naval forces and make them harder to contend with. The PAFMM is therefore unlikely to improvise well or continue operations in unexpected situations. Attempting to rectify these weaknesses would change its appearance and erode its perceived benefits—making it more expensive and conspicuous while showcasing more unmistakably its true military nature. The more clearly U.S. and allied officials display understanding of the PAFMM and its vulnerabilities, the more Chinese decision-makers and militiamen alike will doubt its ability to intervene without self-risk, escalation, and/or mission failure. Chinese leaders deeply fear failure in front of foreigners, especially if their citizens could become aware of it. To deter harmful activities, U.S. officials should reveal the PAFMM publicly, hold China to international standards of seamanship, and treat its three sea forces holistically.

Develop and disseminate a public narrative to reveal, counter, and deter:

Sunlight is the best disinfectant against a force customized to thrive in the shadows. The most important thing that the U.S. can do to better counter PAFMM threats is to educate sailors, the American public, and allies/partners on the nature of the force and the challenge it poses. This requires regaining the strategic initiative by laying down a “Googleable” trail of online information rapidly accessible to all, particularly when the issue rises to the forefront. To preempt and counteract propaganda, the U.S. must get out in front of the problem with its own authoritative statements, including a fact sheet and encounter documentation website. Open-source researchers, including at the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), have already published extensive scholarship to support such an effort. The Office of Naval Intelligence could be asked to fill in the gaps. This involves revealing egregious Chinese behavior, on a day-to-day basis, to deter future activity by the PAFMM. Leadership could do so by helping Fleet Commanders more quickly declassify and approve for public release PAFMM-related photos, videos, and other data coming off U.S. ships. Public reports, public affairs releases, and top officials’ statements should all contain robust coverage of the PAFMM. To remove the camouflage of Chinese deception and spin, accurate terminology (not “civilian, irregular, innocent, [merely] fishermen,” etc.) is essential.

There should also be a crisis response plan—with complete communications strategy and media guidance ready to go—before an incident erupts. U.S. officials should be mindful that Beijing will likely have ready prepackaged propaganda, deployable via powerful state media mouthpieces that the U.S. lacks.

Reexamine rules of engagement (ROE) and signal to China accordingly:

The U.S. should state, both with Chinese interlocutors and publicly for external credibility and reassurance, that:

  1. It expects all three Chinese sea forces—including the PAFMM—to abide at all times by the same internationally recognized standards of law, seamanship (rules of the road regulations), and communications to which U.S. sea forces adhere.
  2. The PAFMM will not be given a pass if it interferes with U.S. government operations or participates in any coercive actions in international waters.
  3. Any elements that ignore repeated warnings by U.S. government vessels to desist from disruptive activities that compromise the safety, operations, or mission accomplishment of any U.S. government vessel will be treated as military-controlled and dealt with accordingly.

Treat China’s sea forces holistically: link behavior of all three to U.S. interaction with them:

Even if Chinese interlocutors profess ignorance or dismiss these matters initially, American resolve to impose linkage will make them report back and inform organizational interests. Professions of ignorance signify a lack of seriousness about, and lack of support for, the U.S. Navy-PLAN relationship. The PLAN should not be allowed to “bear hug” the U.S. Navy for prestige and best practices as the “good cop” of naval diplomacy while the CCG and PAFMM “bad cops” (which the PLAN helps train) do the dirty work of bullying neighbors and harassing U.S. Navy vessels. To ensure safety and accident avoidance, the CCG and PAFMM must adhere to the same Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to which the PLAN has publicly committed itself—together with other international standards of seamanship. The U.S. Navy should also continue to promote a binding regional code of conduct with robust rules of the road. Any Chinese failure to cooperate should trigger an explicit bottom-up review of activities that the PLAN itself values, such as naval diplomacy and other prestigious interactions.

To support these efforts, the author offers the following memorandum, which he recommends be issued with U.S. government authority.

Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia ( PAFMM)

As the National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017 emphasizes, China is engaged in continuous competition with America—neither fully “at peace” nor “at war.” Per this national guidance, we will raise our competitive game to meet that challenge, in part by addressing the potential risks to U.S. interests and values posed by all three Chinese sea forces: the Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia. In terms of ship numbers, each is the largest of its type in the world.

While virtually unique and publicly obscure, China’s Maritime Militia is known clearly to the U.S. government, which monitors it closely. A component of the People’s Armed Forces, it operates under a direct military chain of command to conduct state-sponsored activities. The PAFMM is locally supported, but answers to the very top of China’s military bureaucracy: Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping himself.

China employs the PAFMM in gray zone operations, or “low-intensity maritime rights protection struggles,” at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved. China has used it to advance its disputed sovereignty claims in international sea incidents throughout the South and East China Seas. This undermines vital American interests in maintaining the regional status quo, including the rules and norms on which peace and prosperity depend.

PAFMM units have participated in manifold maritime incidents in the South and East China Seas. Publicly-documented examples include China’s 1974 seizure of the Western Paracel Islands from Vietnam; 1978 swarming into the Senkaku Islands’ territorial sea; involvement in the occupation and development of Mischief Reef resulting in a 1995 incident with the Philippines; harassment of various Vietnamese government/survey vessels, including the Bin Minh and Viking; harassment of USNS Impeccable (2009) and Howard O. Lorenzen (2014); participation in the 2012 seizure of Scarborough Reef from the Philippines and 2014 blockade of Second Thomas Shoal2014 repulsion of Vietnamese vessels from disputed waters surrounding CNOOC’s HYSY-981 oil rig; large surge of ships near the Senkakus in 2016; and layered “cabbage-style” envelopment of the Philippines-claimed Sandy Cay shoal near Thitu Island, where China has sustained a presence of at least two PAFMM vessels since August 2017.

The elite units engaged in these incidents incorporate marine industry workers (e.g., fishermen) directly into China’s armed forces. While retaining day jobs, they are organized and trained in the PAFMM and often by China’s Navy, and activated on demand. Since 2015, starting in Sansha City in the Paracels, China has been developing more professionalized, militarized, well-paid full-time units including military recruits, crewing 84 purpose-built vessels with mast-mounted water cannons for spraying and reinforced steel hulls for ramming. Lacking fishing responsibilities, personnel train for peacetime and wartime contingencies, including with light arms, and deploy regularly to disputed South China Sea features even during fishing moratoriums.

There is no plausible deniability: the PAFMM is a state-organized, -developed, and -controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct Chinese state-sponsored activities. From now on, the United States expects all three Chinese sea forces—including the PAFMM—to abide at all times by the same internationally-recognized standards of law, seamanship, and communications to which U.S. maritime forces adhere; including the International Collision Regulations (COLREGS) and other international regulations governing allowable conduct by ships at sea.

Bottom line: Henceforth, the United States will not tolerate any attempt by the PAFMM to interfere with or compromise the safety, operations, or mission accomplishment of any U.S. government vessel.

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is a professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Since 2014, he and his colleague Conor M. Kennedy have been conducting and publishing in-depth research on the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) and briefing key U.S. and allied decision-makers on the subject. In 2017 Erickson received NWC’s inaugural  Civilian Faculty Research Excellence Award, in part for his pioneering contributions in this area. You can follow him on Twitter: @AndrewSErickson.​

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Yoshinari Kurose

(Click here to read the original article in Japanese.)

Randall Schriver, United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, recently spoke to Yoshinari Kurose, Washington Bureau chief of The Sankei Shimbun and JAPAN Forward.

The wide-ranging and substantive interview held on November 21 started off with the most contentious issue: China. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a key to China’s expansionism and its hegemonic strategy not just in the Indo-Pacific region but the whole world. 

Excerpts:

What is [your] main concern regarding the PLA’s advancement in strategy and also in weapons?

Well, they have been investing heavily in their military for quite a long period of time, over a decade of double-digit growth in official defense budgets. We think the spending exceeds what is published in official budgets. So, with that kind of investment over that period of time, they are obviously improving in a lot of areas. It is really a full-spectrum improvement: strategic systems, traditional platforms, conventional platforms, but also new areas, cyber, space. So, they are improving across the board.

That appears to be tied to a strategy that is more assertive, particularly in the Asia Pacific, Indo-Pacific region. But as you point out, they are more active globally, so I would say it is the combination of their qualitative improvement over time of their military [and] their more assertive foreign policy.

How about their nuclear arsenals? What is your assessment of them?

Well, they are not very transparent, so even what we would consider pretty fundamental information, like the number of warheads, they don’t publish. So, we make assessments based on what information is available. But, in delivery systems, they are improving, so their strategic forces are also part of that modernization effort.

And how about the assessment of the mid-range and short-range missiles posing a threat to U.S. bases in Guam or mainland Japan?

It has been an area of heavy investment, ballistic and cruise missiles, and it is an area where they have had, I think, technical success and progress. So, they are at a point where they can hold at risk our forward deployed forces, bases that we are allowed to use in Japan, and other forward operating locations. Some people refer to it as a strategy of A2AD — anti-access/area denial — and so that factors in how we think about future possible contingencies.

President Trump actually declared the U.S. pullout from the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty. Would that give any positive impact to the nuclear strategy in East Asia, in terms of countering the threat of those Chinese missiles?  

I think our State Department is still looking at precisely if — and how — a withdrawal would be made, and then at a later point I think we would have to look at implications.

How about the Chinese submarines, SLBMs?

Again, very similar. They have invested a lot in a strategic capability through submarine launched ICBMs, and we assess they have made progress there.

Especially in the South China Sea, you can see China is trying to make the particular area a bastion of submarines. I think it is a part of A2AD strategy. What is the U.S. strategy — beyond Freedom of Navigation operations — to prevent the South China Sea from becoming a Chinese naval stronghold?

Well, it is a “whole of government” approach. Some of it is declaratory policy making: declare our interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific and our firm belief that the South China Sea is international water, and that any sovereignty disputes should be handled peacefully.

Part of it is through freedom of navigation and presence operations (FONOPs).

Part of it is through operating with like-minded countries in presence operations. Perhaps not actual FONOPs because some countries don’t want to navigate within the 12 nautical mile areas, but presence operations alongside other countries. Cost imposition in some cases.

When we disinvited China from RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise), Secretary [James] Mattis specifically cited the behavior in the South China Sea as a reason. So, our goal is to ensure that everyone understands China can’t unilaterally change international law, international norms, and that their illegal expansive claims won’t be honored. And we demonstrate that through our behavior.

This is about China’s diplomatic field. They are establishing military outposts in places like Djibouti by acquiring ports through so-called “debt diplomacy.” Does this constitute a growing challenge to U.S. military strategy in the world?

Well, it is something that we are observing in real time. And I would say it is a fluid environment because, in some cases, the approach has backfired a bit and created a backlash in certain countries. I think we are seeing that in places like Malaysia, somewhat in Sri Lanka, although the politics there have gotten a little more complicated. But people don’t like the perception that their sovereignty is being eroded.

So, what can this Department do in countering this?

Well, again, I will speak more “whole of government.” I think shining a light on this approach by China and showing through the examples that countries are dealing with — that there is a downside to getting into these kinds of deals with China — so that other countries can learn from the experience of others. In some cases, offering alternatives.

We don’t invest and pursue development assistance the same way China does. We don’t use corruption, we won’t make sweetheart deals with authoritarian leaders. But we do promote investment that is clean, transparent, beneficial to the host nation. So, our own alternatives, or in cooperation with Japan, with India, are providing a better alternative than what the Chinese can offer.

I would like to change the topic to the East China Sea. It seems like the activities of the Chinese military, and so-called militia, are increasing. What is your assessment of the East China Sea at this moment?

Well, first of all, we don’t draw much of a distinction at this point between the Chinese Navy, Maritime Militia, and the Chinese Coast Guard. They are all involved in a similar activity, which is to challenge the sovereignty claims that are disputed with Japan, put pressure on our ally. So, I think we have seen a steady amount of activity and pressure on Japan. And we have seen Japan respond to that in, I think, an appropriate way.

Of course, several administrations in a row, including this one, have acknowledged that our treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands because it is a territory administered by the government of Japan, so we will continue to be a supportive ally in those matters. Although we haven’t taken a position on sovereignty itself, we do acknowledge the treaty applies.

You mentioned the Coast Guard and the Maritime Militia. As you know, now the Chinese Coast Guard is under the Central Military Commission of China and it is highly probable that those so-called fishermen are Chinese military. But, actually, is it a kind of gray zone? Would the U.S. draw a clear line that defines that those elements are actually part of the Chinese military, and change the approach?

We are more interested in what the activity is and what the mission is of a particular hull, not the color it is painted.

About the U.S.-Japan relationship, what do you expect the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) or the Japanese government to do to counter these assertive Chinese actions?  

We have been supportive of Japan’s response so far. I think Japan has had a steady tempo of challenges and intercepts when the activity is viewed as a threat to Japanese sovereignty and Japanese interests. I think, over a longer period of time, Japan is increasing resources for defense, but also realigning and paying more attention to the south and to those disputed areas, and we are supportive of that.

We are looking at Japan’s upcoming five-year defense program guidelines and we are in consultation with Japan, as we were when we were developing our National Defense Strategy. So, I think the challenges from China in the East China Sea are near the top of the list for our Japanese allies and so we will be supportive as they further develop the strategy.

Does that also apply to the South China Sea? Will Japan be playing a more proactive role in the South China Sea? 

That is a sovereign decision for Japan and I think where we know we are aligned is in the interests. We both want a free and open Indo-Pacific and a South China Sea that is under nobody’s sole control, that remains international waters, and so we will work out the particular activities that support that.

Turning our eyes to Taiwan: according to the Pentagon’s annual report, Chinese combat aircraft are actually increasing. Not only the numbers of aircraft, but the Cross-Strait balance of power is going in favor of China. So, what would be the U.S. action in order to balance the power, to make it more in favor of Taiwan?

Well, our law requires us to monitor the balance of military forces and the law also says, based solely on our assessment of the military balance, we will make decisions on weapons of a defensive nature for Taiwan’s self-defense. So that is part of an ongoing practice we do.

I think, beyond that, Taiwan is part of a sort of frontline activity for the whole Indo-Pacific first island chain that China may be presenting challenges to. So, we think of our own posture, our own readiness related not just to a Taiwan contingency but broader challenges, so we are looking at that now through the interpretation and implementation of our National Defense Strategy.

Talking about particular weapons, how about selling F-35s to Taiwan? That has been in the news and rumored for quite a while.

I am not in a position to talk about future sales, but we will act in accordance with our law which says, based on the military balance, based on the threat, we’ll make things available to Taiwan that are needed.

Has cooperation in building the Taiwanese indigenous submarine already been going on or started?

My understanding is that Taiwan has stood up a program and has appropriated funds. I think they are still in a research and development stage.

There is no plan for the United States to sell submarines itself to Taiwan?

Well, in April 2001, we committed to assist Taiwan in the acquisition of diesel electric submarines. We don’t make diesel electric submarines, so how we fulfill that commitment of assisting Taiwan in the acquisition of diesel electric submarines is still to be determined, but that is a commitment that was made.

I think you may have already mentioned on some occasions that the way of providing weapons to Taiwan – well, in the past it was like a package every year. But the United States decided to change the way of providing weapons to Taiwan in some way. Could you elaborate a little more on that?

Well, what we have said publicly is that we will treat Taiwan as a normal Foreign Military Sales (FMS) partner. So that means when they see a requirement, they can put in a letter of request and within a certain amount of time, they will get a response. That is how we treat Foreign Military Sales partners around the world, which is different than waiting and bundling and having years go by before things are announced. It is maybe a change back to the way things were done in the past.

Any response from the Chinese government on this?

They tend to protest anything we do with Taiwan.

About North Korea, of course now this is a State Department effort. But on the other hand, we notice North Korea’s non-movement in taking steps on dismantling their nuclear arsenals, or all in all denuclearization. So, what is the Defense Department’s (DoD) assessment on the status of North Korean denuclearization? 

We’re focused on supporting the State Department and the diplomacy. We have particular roles attached to that and very much in partnership with Japan, sanctions enforcement and particularly focusing on disruption of ship-to-ship transfers of illegal and illicit materials and goods. We’ll leave it to the diplomats to try to negotiate the denuclearization, so we will focus just on the DoD role here.

Has DoD detected any concrete moves or concrete steps that indicate North Korea is actually heading toward denuclearization? Like dismantling particular sites or something like that? 

I will just refer you to what the State Department has said on that.

On South Korea, in order to facilitate the diplomatic process, the U.S. and South Korea actually suspended some major joint exercises. How about next spring’s major exercises, like Ulchi Freedom Guardian and others? 

The only decisions that have been made are the ones that have been announced. And the future decisions, as Secretary Mattis has said, will be determined based on North Korea negotiating in good faith. So, so we will see how the State Department reads that, and then we will make future decisions.

There are concerns in Japan and South Korea that sometime in the future we will not know how the negotiation will unfold – we can just hope for the best solution. But, in that process there are concerns that the United States may pull out or actually decrease its number of troops on the Korean Peninsula. That kind of a change in numbers of troops is always a concern in the region.

I haven’t seen anybody in a position to speak authoritatively who has said we have a plan to reduce troops. And, I think that has been true of our ally in Seoul as well, all the way up to and including President Moon, who has said that our alliance has purpose beyond just the immediate North Korea threat and that he is not in a position now to say that we want a troop decrease. So, thus far the decisions we have made on the exercises have been in order to give the diplomats space. We may make future decisions, we will see how the negotiations go, but there is no discussion about troop levels and the numbers of troops.

Could you explain to ordinary readers why the United States’ staying in South Korea is very important? The significance of the U.S. troops in the R.O.K.?

The immediate priority is to help South Korea protect its country, protect its people, its sovereignty from a North Korea threat. Although we are in the process of talking about denuclearization, nothing has been done to reduce the conventional capabilities. There are some confidence building measures, but the North Koreans have not done anything to degrade any of their conventional capability. So, that is still a significant threat.

I think, beyond that, we have shared regional and global interests. The U.S. and the R.O.K. have fought alongside one another in every major war of the 20th century and into the 21st century. The R.O.K. was the third largest contributor to our forces in Iraq after the invasion in 2003. So, it is an alliance that has, in a way, become expeditionary, not just focused on the Korean Peninsula. So, for us to be there, to train and exercise with South Korean allies gives us the capability to be expeditionary.

And also, if you could talk about Okinawa. This is not a thing that you might comment on, but the Governor of Okinawa was elected, and he has his view on the bases on Okinawa. Could you address how important the bases are for the security of the region, not just the security of Japan and the United States?

Japan is our most important ally in the Asia Pacific region, not only because of the capabilities that Japan has, but because of the grand bargain that we reached in our treaty long ago, which was we could use our forward-deployed forces in Japan to affect security throughout Asia. That is a unique arrangement.

And we do have security challenges throughout Asia. We’ve mentioned the East China Sea, Taiwan, South China Sea, threats to sovereignty of maritime Asia. And so, having that ability to be forward deployed and to train and exercise in those environments, gives us an ability to affect security throughout the region in a way that our other allies and forward presence doesn’t afford us. So, it is absolutely critical.

Just one more thing, going back to the East China Sea, you say you don’t make a decision based on the paint on those [Chinese] vessels – you see them for their actions?

Right, we are most concerned with what their activity is, what their mission is, and their purpose, not what color the hull is painted.

How do you react when they are disguised as fishermen and the Coast Guard law enforcement is protecting ‘fishermen’ that are a disguised militia. But, in fact, what they are doing is totally different. Actually, the boats are taking advantage of their appearance as fishermen, so the United States or Japan cannot engage them the way they could a military. That is always posing a problem to the Japanese Self Defense Force. So, would there be any way to adequately deal with those forces?

Well, as I said, we don’t make a distinction based on the color of the hull. It is the activity. And this has, by the way, been communicated to the Chinese directly as well – that we are not interested in talking about three different forces if they are all involved in the same activity. So, our response in support of the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific, our response in terms of supporting our ally in Japan, will be appropriate for the activity, not what color the hull is painted.

(Click here to read the interview in Japanese.)

Interviewer: Yoshinari Kurose, Washington Bureau Chief

シュライバー国防次官補、民兵漁船「中国海軍と区別しない」

2018.11.22 13:21

シュライバー米国防次官補(東アジア太平洋担当)

【ワシントン=黒瀬悦成】米国防総省でアジア太平洋の安全保障を担当するシュライバー次官補は21日、産経新聞の単独会見に応じた。シュライバー氏は、尖閣諸島(沖縄県石垣市)周辺で活動を活発化させている中国海警局の公船や中国軍系民兵が乗り組んだ漁船に関し、「中国の領有権を主張して日本を圧迫する目的で活動しているのであれば、中国海軍の艦船と区別しない」と述べ、厳然と対処していく姿勢を強調した。

シュライバー氏は、「尖閣諸島は日本の施政権下にあり、日米安全保障条約(第5条に基づく米国の対日防衛義務)の適用対象であり、米国は同盟国として日本を支えていく」と言明した上で、「中国船の船体の色(が海軍の灰色か海警局の白色か)よりも、これらの船の任務や目的が何かに関して最大の懸念を抱いている」と指摘した。

また、中国船が「自由で開かれたインド太平洋」の原則や日本の施政権を脅かす行動をとった場合は「適切に対処する」と警告した。米国として一連の立場を「中国に直接伝えた」とも明らかにした。

同氏は、東シナ海をめぐる中国の行動は「日本にとり最重要に近い懸案だ」と指摘し、日本による尖閣防衛に向けた取り組み強化を支援していく姿勢を強調。日本が年末に策定する2019年度から5カ年の中期防衛力整備計画(中期防)の内容を「注視している」とも語った。

さらに「日本はアジア太平洋地域で最も重要な同盟国だ」と指摘。沖縄の米軍基地は「米国がアジア全域で懸案を抱える中、米軍の前進配備と現地での訓練・演習を可能にしている点で決定的に重要だ」と訴えた。

北朝鮮問題に関しては、「交渉は外交官に任せる」として国務省主導の非核化協議を支援する立場を打ち出す一方、「北朝鮮との間では幾つかの信頼醸成措置が取られたものの、北朝鮮は通常兵力を全く削減していない」と指摘し、「北朝鮮は引き続き重大な脅威だ」と訴え、米韓同盟に基づく米軍駐留の必要性を強調。在韓米軍の削減をめぐる議論は「現時点で一切行われていない」とした。

非核化協議を進展させる狙いから中止されている米韓の大規模合同演習を来年春以降に再開するかについては「北朝鮮の交渉態度が誠実かどうか次第だ」と指摘。これに関し国防総省は21日、今後の演習に関し、規模を縮小して実施するなどの選択肢を検討しているとする声明を発表した。

ランドールシュライバー米国防次官補 西部オレゴン州出身。海軍情報士官として湾岸戦争(1991年)などに参加後、ハーバード大で修士号(公共政策)取得。ブッシュ(子)政権下の2003~05年に国務次官補代理(東アジア・太平洋問題担当)を務めるなどした後、コンサルタント会社「アーミテージ・インターナショナル」をリチャード・アーミテージ元国務副長官らと共同設立した。アジア地域を専門とする政策研究機関「プロジェクト2049研究所」の代表も務めた。18年1月から現職。

***

SECDEF Mattis calls for “PRC Maritime Militia to operate in a safe and professional manner in accordance with international law…”

Important statement from Secretary Mattis at U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue (D&SD) press conference today, Friday 9 November 2018:

“We… discussed the importance of all military, law enforcement & civilian vessels & aircraft—including those in the PLA Navy, Chinese Coast Guard & PRC Maritime Militia—to operate in a safe & professional manner in accordance with international law as we seek peaceful resolution of all disputes in the South China Sea.”

Secretary Mattis made a great contribution by using his top-level authority to shine a spotlight on Chinas Maritime Militia. This PLA-controlled third Chinese sea force harasses foreign ships, including those of the U.S. government; and participates in other international sea incidents to further disputed sovereignty claims. Yet it has received far too little top-level scrutiny and official public pushback. An authoritative public statement by the Secretary of Defense—the very first by anyone in that position, to my knowledge—is extremely positive and long overdue, in my view.

Other D&SD principals were Secretary Mattis’s counterpart, State Councilor and Defense Minister General Wei Fenghe; and Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and his counterpart, Director of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the Central Commission of the Communist Party of China Yang Jiechi. The State Department, which hosted the event, lists further information here.

Click here to watch the press conference via the video the State Department posted on Facebook.

Click here for the official transcript, which includes the following full text of Secretary Mattis’s remarks:

SECRETARY MATTIS: Well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. And it’s been a pleasure to join Secretary Pompeo in welcoming Director Yang and Minister Wei to Washington for our U.S.-China Diplomatic & Security Dialogue. And we thank you both for making the long trip, along with your delegation, from Beijing.

Your visit reminds us that we build on a deep history between the United States and China, one that stretches back to the earliest days of our American experiment in democracy. Our meeting today is evidence of America’s efforts to work toward a brighter future for both our peoples. President Trump’s National Security Strategy makes it clear that competition does not mean hostility, nor must it lead to conflict. While our two Pacific nations may not always agree, we recognize it serves both our people’s interests to cooperate where we can.

High-level dialogues like this help diminish the space between us as we explore areas where we share common interest and common purpose. To that end, as Secretary Pompeo stated, today we discussed our shared desire to achieve the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea. We reaffirmed our nation’s commitments to enforcing the unanimous Security Council resolutions in pursuit of that goal for the good of all mankind.

As the Secretary of State touched on, we also discussed the importance for all military, law enforcement, and civilian vessels and aircraft, including those in the PLA Navy, the Chinese Coast Guard, and the PRC Maritime Militia, to operate in a safe and professional manner, in accordance with international law, as we seek peaceful resolution of all disputes in the South China Sea. Through candid discussions, we sought ways to lessen tension, maintain open lines of communication between our militaries, and reduce the risk of miscalculation. And we made clear that the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.

The U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, one that is underpinned by the rules-based international order and regional stability, is unwavering. Director Yang, Minister Wei, within our pursuit to realize this vision for the region, I echo Secretary of State Pompeo’s words that the United States seeks a constructive, reciprocal, and results-oriented U.S.-China relationship, one that benefits the Indo-Pacific and the world.

We continue our commitment to explore new areas of cooperation on strategic issues of mutual concern like space, cyber, and nuclear capabilities, as well as reinforce the importance of military-to-military exchanges for our bilateral relationship. For we recognize our military ties can serve as a source of stability for our two nations as long as we remain transparent and communicate sincerely with one another.

Along that line, the United States is committed to finalizing a military-to-military crisis deconfliction and communication framework with China while we seek ways to implement and enhance the existing confidence-building measures, including what we call the Joint Staff Dialogue Mechanism.

Director Yang, Minister Wei, thank you again for coming to Washington today. Minister Wei, I look forward to continuing this morning’s constructive conversation at our bilateral meeting this afternoon. And I now invite you to make your remarks.

***

SECRETARY MATTIS: Sure. In regards to our exercises and operations in the South China Sea, the United States adheres strictly to international law and the international maritime rules of the road, and we continue to operate anywhere in international waters, international air space, as all nations are entitled to. So the most important thing is that we all pay equal attention to international law.

***

Secretary Mattis’s points were buttressed by content from the State Department’s releasefrom the dialogue:

South China Sea: The two sides committed to support peace and stability in the South China Sea, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea in accordance with international law. Both sides committed to ensure air and maritime safety, and manage risks in a constructive manner. The United States discussed the importance of all military, law enforcement, and civilian vessels and aircraft operating in a safe and professional manner in accordance with international law. The United States called on China to withdraw its missile systems from disputed features in the Spratly Islands, and reaffirmed that all countries should avoid addressing disputes through coercion or intimidation. The United States remains committed to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.

***

2018 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, 14 November 2018.

Click here to read the full text.

Report PDFs:

2018 Annual Report to Congress.pdf

Executive Summary 2018 Annual Report to Congress.pdf

2018 Recommendations.pdf

Chapters: 

Chapter 1 Section 1- Year in Review, Economics and Trade.pdf

Chapter 1 Section 2- Tools to Address U.S.-China Economic Challenges.pdf

Chapter 1 Section 3- China’s Agricultural Policies-Trade, Investment, Safety, and Innovation.pdf

Chapter 2 Section 1- Year in Review, Security and Foreign Affairs.pdf

Chapter 2 Section 2- China’s Military Reorganization and Modernization, Implications for the United States.pdf

Chapter 3 Section 1- Belt and Road Initative.pdf

Chapter 3 Section 2- China’s Relations with U.S. Allies and Partners.pdf

Chapter 3 Section 3- China and Taiwan.pdf

Chapter 3 Section 4- China and Hong Kong.pdf

Chapter 3 Section 5- China’s Evolving North Korea Strategy.pdf

Chapter 4 Section 1- Next Generation Connectivity.pdf

Watch the livestream here.

Selected content:

p. 224

The China Coast Guard and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia have both expanded in number and quality in recent years, further increasing the challenges faced by the United States and China’s neighbors operating in the region. According to DOD, since 2010 the China Coast Guard’s fleet of large ships (over 1,000 tons) has doubled from around 60 to more than 130 ships, making it the largest in the world and allowing it to operate concurrently in multiple disputed areas. Its latest ships have more capabilities, including helicopter docks, larger guns and water cannons, and improved endurance. The maritime militia comprises civilian fishing boats and other ships trained, directed, and equipped by the PLA. It has also built larger, more capable ships equipped with water cannons and reinforced hulls. Together with the PLA Navy, the China Coast Guard and maritime militia greatly outnumber the maritime forces of China’s neighbors.97

  1. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, May 16, 2018, 71–72; Andrew Erickson, “Numbers Matter: China’s Three ‘Navies’ Each Have the World’s Most Ships,” National Interest, February 26, 2018.

p. 362

  • Ships: The PLA Navy has more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, and missile-armed patrol craft, in addition to China’s highly capable coast guard and maritime militia.184 4 Taiwan, on the other hand, has 92 naval combatants, comprising four submarines—two of which are only used for training—and 88 surface ships.† 185

†Taiwan’s coast guard is in the midst of a ten-year shipbuilding program that will bring its forces to 173 ships. Taiwan does not have a maritime militia. Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, “Taiwanese Coast Guard Launches OPV amid Ongoing Force Development Program,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 28, 2015.

***

Japan MoD Releases White Paper: Defense of Japan 2018—Mentions China Maritime Militia for 2nd Year in a Row

Defense of Japan 2018 (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, 28 August 2018).

Full Text (Japanese) (580 pages)

Click here to download a cached copy.

Digest (English) (20 pages)

Click here to download a cached copy.

MARITIME MILITIA COVERAGE IN DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

3節中国

Section 3: China

pp. 89-123

 p. 92

一方で、国防費については、内訳の詳細を明らかにしていない8。

8 国防白書「2008年中国の国防」及び「2010年中国の国防」では、それぞれ2007年度、2009年度の国防費の支出に限り、人員生活費、訓練維持費、装備費のそれぞれについて、現役部隊、予備役部隊、民兵別の内訳が明らかにされたが、最近はそのような説明も行われていない。

 p. 93

軍事態勢

5) Military Posture

中国の軍事力は、人民解放軍、人民武装警察部隊(武警)16 と民兵17 から構成されており、中央軍事委員会の指導及び指揮を受けるものとされている。人民解放軍は、陸・海・空軍とロケット軍などからなり、中国共産党が創建、指導する人民軍隊とされている。

17 平時においては経済建設などに従事するが、有事には戦時後方支援任務を負う。国防白書「2002年中国の国防」では、「軍事機関の指揮のもとで、戦時は常備軍との合同作戦、独自作戦、常備軍の作戦に対する後方勤務保障提供及び兵員補充などの任務を担い、平時は戦備勤務、災害救助、社会秩序維持などの任務を担当する」とされる。12(平成24)年10月9日付解放軍報によれば2010年時点の基幹民兵数は600万人とされている。

p. 99

また、中国の軍隊以外の武装力である民兵の中でも、いわゆる海上民兵が中国の海洋権益擁護のための尖兵的役割を果たしているとの指摘もある41。海上民兵については、南シナ海での活動などが指摘され42、漁民や離島住民などにより組織されているとされているが、その実態の詳細は明らかにされていない。しかし、海上において中国の「軍・警・民の全体的な力を十全に発揮」43 する必要性が強調されていることも踏まえ、こうした非対称的戦力にも注目する必要がある44

41 13(平成25)年4月、習近平国家主席が海南省の海上民兵を激励した際、海上民兵に対し、遠洋の情報を集め、島嶼建設支援作業を積極的に行うよう指示し、「君たちは海洋権益を守るために先陣の役割を果たしている」と語ったと言われている。

42 例えば、09(平成21)年3月、南シナ海の公海上で中国海軍艦艇などが米海軍調査船「インペッカブル」を妨害した際、同船のソナーを取り外そうとした漁船には海上民兵が乗船していたと指摘されている。また、14(平成26)年5月から7月にかけて大水深掘削リグ「海洋石油981」が西沙諸島南方で試掘活動を行った際、同リグの護衛船団として、海上民兵が乗船する鋼鉄製漁船も進出していたとの指摘がある。

43 16(平成28)年8月、常万全国防部長(当時)が浙江省の海上民兵装備などを視察した際、「『戦い勝利できる』という要求を保証するという観点から、軍・警・民の全体的な力を十全に発揮」する必要性について訓示した。

44 中国の海上民兵については国際法上の地位が不明確であるとの指摘がある。15(平成27)年11月、スウィフト米太平洋艦隊司令官(当時)は、呉勝利中国海軍司令員(当時)との会談に際し、中国の法執行機関と海上民兵を含めた海上兵力がプロフェッショナルに、かつ国際法規に従って行動することの重要性を強調した。

 

DETAILS FROM DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2017

Japan Defense White Paper mentions China Maritime Militia (p. 95):

  • Part of China’s Armed Forces
  • Xi visited
  • SCS ops.

FN 51-54:

  • Xi visited in 2013
  • Incidents include 2009 Impeccable & 2014 HYSY-981 oil rig
  • DefMin Chang visited in 2016
  • ADM Swift stressed w/ADM Wu

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “Exposed: Pentagon Report Spotlights China’s Maritime Militia,” The National Interest, 20 August 2018.

For countering China’s shadowy Third Sea Force—the Maritime Militia—sunlight is the best disinfectant and demonstrated awareness is an important element of deterrence. This year’s Department of Defense report to Congress offers both.

Finally, some good news from Washington! Last Thursday the Pentagon released its annual report to Congress on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The single most important revelation alone justifies the 145-page report’s $108,000 cost many times over. Even more than when last year’s report mentioned it for the first time, the U.S. government has officially deployed the formidable credibility of the world’s foremost intelligence collection and analytical capabilities to shine a spotlight and expose the shadowy People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Previously, in beltway bureaucracy, the PAFMM was mentioned by Ronald O’Rourke in his Congressional Research Service report and by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which rightly recommended that the Department of Defense address this vital subject. Indeed, there is no substitute for the Pentagon’s credibility in this regard. By releasing these important facts officially and authoritatively, the 2018 report has performed a signal service.

Beijing uses the PAFMM to advance its disputed sovereignty claims across the South and East China Seas. The Maritime Militia, China’s third sea force, often operates in concert with China’s first sea force (the Navy) and second sea force (the Coast Guard). In an unprecedented accompanying Fact Sheet, the Pentagon’s 2018 report offers a recent example: “China . . . is willing to employ coercive measures to advance its interests and mitigate other countries’ opposition. . . . In August 2017, China conducted a coordinated PLA Navy (PLAN), China Coast Guard (CCG), and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia patrol around Thitu Island and planted a flag on Sandy Cay, a sandbar within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef and Thitu Island, possibly in response to the Philippines’ reported plans to upgrade its runway on Thitu Island.”

Each PRC sea service is the maritime division of one of China’s three armed services, and each is the world’s largest by number of ships. “The PLAN, CCG, and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) form the largest maritime force in the Indo-Pacific,” the report emphasizes. First, “The PLAN is the region’s largest navy, with more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, patrol craft, and specialized types.” It is also the world’s largest navy numerically; as of August 17, 2018, the U.S. Navy has 282 deployable battle-force ships. Second, “Since 2010, the CCG’s fleet of large patrol ships (more than 1,000 tons) has more than doubled from approximately 60 to more than 130 ships,” the report adds, “making it by far the largest coast guard force in the world and increasing its capacity to conduct simultaneous, extended offshore operations in multiple disputed areas.” Third, Beijing has what is clearly the world’s largest and most capable maritime militia. One of the few maritime militia forces in existence today at all, it is virtually the only one charged with involvement in sovereignty disputes. Only Vietnam, one of the very last countries politically and bureaucratically similar to China, is known to have a roughly equivalent force with a roughly equivalent mission. Moreover, when it comes to forces at sea—militia or otherwise—Hanoi is simply not in the same league as Beijing and cannot compete either quantitatively or qualitatively.

Beijing’s use of the PAFMM undermines vital American and international interests in maintaining the regional status quo, including the rules and norms on which peace and prosperity depend. PAFMM forces engage in gray zone operations, at a level specifically designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved. One PRC source terms this PAFMM participation in “low-intensity maritime rights protection struggles”; the Pentagon’s report describes broader PAFMM and CCG “use of low-intensity coercion in maritime disputes.” “During periods of tension, official statements and state media seek to portray China as reactive,” the report explains. “China uses an opportunistically timed progression of incremental but intensifying steps to attempt to increase effective control over disputed areas and avoid escalation to military conflict.” In particular, “PAFMM units enable low-intensity coercion activities to advance territorial and maritime claims.” Because the PAFMM is virtually unique and tries to operate deceptively under the radar, it has remained publicly obscure for far too long even as it trolls with surprising success for advances in sovereignty disputes in seas along China’s contested periphery.

Fortunately, the U.S. government is well aware of the PAFMM’s predations and monitors it closely. In providing such detailed coverage of the PAFMM in its latest report, the Pentagon has strongly validated key findings from the Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute’s (CMSI) open source research project on that subject, which is now entering its fifth year. In what follows, I share CMSI’s conclusions and the related text in the report.

A component of the People’s Armed Forces, China’s PAFMM operates under a direct military chain of command to conduct state-sponsored activities. The PAFMM is locally supported, but answers to the very top of China’s military bureaucracy: Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping himself.

Part-time PAFMM units incorporate marine industry workers (e.g., fishermen) directly into China’s armed forces. As the Pentagon explains, “The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization. . . . Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission.” While retaining day jobs, personnel (together with their ships) that meet the standards for induction into the PAFMM are organized and trained within the militia—as well as, in many cases, by China’s Navy—and activated on demand. As part of such efforts, “A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and assist the PLAN and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fishery protection, logistics support, and search and rescue.” To further support and encourage PAFMM efforts, “The government subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia vessels to perform ‘official’ missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities.”

Since 2015, starting in Sansha City in the Paracel Islands, China has been developing a new full-time PAFMM contingent: more professionalized, militarized, well-paid units including military recruits, crewing purpose-built vessels with mast-mounted water cannons for spraying and reinforced hulls for ramming. “In the past, the PAFMM rented fishing vessels from companies or individual fishermen, but China has built a state-owned fishing fleet for at least part of its maritime militia force in the South China Sea,” the Pentagon expounds. “The Hainan provincial government, adjacent to the South China Sea”—whose important role in PAFMM development my colleague Conor M. Kennedy and I explain herehere, and here—“ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage, which the militia received by the end of 2016, along with extensive subsidies to encourage frequent operations in the Spratly Islands.” The report elaborates: “This particular PAFMM unit is also China’s most professional, paid salaries independent of any clear commercial fishing responsibilities, and recruited from recently separated veterans.” Lacking fishing responsibilities, personnel train for peacetime and wartime contingencies, including with light arms, and deploy regularly to disputed South China Sea features even during fishing moratoriums.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Coast Guard, and Government Maritime Forces 2018 Recognition and Identification Guide (Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, July 2018).
(EXCERPT SHOWING THREE TYPES OF SANSHA CITY MARITIME MILITIA VESSELS)

In July, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence issued the China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Coast Guard, and Government Maritime Forces 2018 Recognition and Identification Guide. The excerpt above shows three different types of purpose-built PAFMM vessels operated by the Sansha City Maritime Militia.

PAFMM units have participated in manifold international sea incidents. As the Pentagon attests, “The militia has played significant roles in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the 2009 harassment of the USNS IMPECCABLE conducting normal operations, the 2012 Scarborough Reef standoff, the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil-rig standoff, and a large surge of ships in waters near the Senkakus in 2016.”

The last of these is particularly significant, since it is now one of several publicly documented examples of PAFMM involvement in international incidents in the East China Sea, but had not been conclusively confirmed by previously known open sources. Other examples, as documented in CMSI research to date, include swarming into the Senkaku Islands’ territorial sea in 1978 and harassment of USNS Howard O. Lorenzen in 2014. So, while the vast majority of publicly revealed incidents involving PAFMM forces have occurred throughout the South China Sea, the PAFMM also clearly operates and has been empowered to engage in provocative activities in the East China Sea as well. Any PRC attempts to deny that the PAFMM operates in the East China Sea, including in disruptively close proximity to foreign forces, may therefore be easily disproven. The Pentagon is clear: “The PAFMM . . . is active in the South and East China Seas.”

This conclusive exposure of PAFMM activities in the East China Sea should be an important reminder to policy-makers in Tokyo and Washington alike that Beijing is certain to continue to wield its third sea force as a tool of choice to probe and apply pressure vis-à-vis the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands. These pinnacle-shaped features are the peak Sino-Japanese geographical flashpoint. As the current and previous U.S. administrations have affirmed explicitly, the Senkakus are covered under Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which states, in part: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”

American and Japanese analysts and decision-makers should therefore redouble their efforts to share information and develop and implement potential countermeasures concerning the PAFMM. Here, as elsewhere, sunlight is the best disinfectant and demonstrated awareness is an important element of deterrence. Just as the Pentagon’s 2017 report was the first iteration to mention the PAFMM and this latest 2018 edition builds strongly on that foundation, it is to be hoped that the Japan Ministry of Defense’s Defense of Japan 2017 report—which likewise mentioned the PAFMM for the first time, albeit without explicit in-text reference to the East China Sea—will be followed with a 2018 edition offering far more robust PAFMM coverage, including detailed consideration of extant and potential future activities in the East China Sea.

As mentioned above, the Pentagon’s latest report also stresses PAFMM involvement in the layered cabbage-style envelopment of the Philippines-claimed Sandy Cay shoal near Thitu Island in the South China Sea, although it does not mention the fact—confirmed by commercially available AIS data concerning ship movements—that China has sustained a presence of at least two PAFMM vessels around Sandy Cay since August 2017. As the Pentagon emphasizes, the “PLAN, CCG, and PAFMM sometimes conduct coordinated patrols.” Inter-service cooperation applies in peace and war: “In conflict, China may also employ China Coast Guard and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia ships to support military operations.”

“In the South China Sea,” the report emphasizes, “the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part of broader PRC military doctrine stating confrontational operations short of war can be an effective means of accomplishing political objectives.” Other CMSI-documented examples of international incidents involving the PAFMM there that the report does not mention explicitly include direct participation in China’s 1974 seizure of the Western Paracel Islands from Vietnam; involvement in the occupation and development of Mischief Reef resulting in a 1995 incident with the Philippines; harassment of various Vietnamese government/survey vessels, including the Bin Minh and Viking; participation in the 2014 blockade of Second Thomas Shoal; and engagement in the 2015 maneuvers around USS Lassen.

In conclusion, the Pentagon deserves great credit for employing the full force of its tremendous analytical capabilities and official authority to shine a bright, inescapable spotlight on the PAFMM’s true nature and activities. There is no plausible deniability: the PAFMM is a state-organized, -developed, and -controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct PRC state-sponsored activities. Publicly revealing the PAFMM’s true nature and activities is an important step in deterring its future use. But far more is needed to counter the pernicious challenge of Beijing’s shadowy but fully knowable third sea force. As the Pentagon’s valuable new report emphasizes, “China continues to exercise low-intensity coercion to advance its claims in the East and South China Seas.”

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is a professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Since 2014, he and his colleague Conor M. Kennedy have been conducting and publishing in-depth research on the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) and briefing key U.S. and allied decision-makers on the subject. In 2017 Erickson received NWC’s inaugural Civilian Faculty Research Excellence Award, in part for his pioneering contributions in this area.

Image: China’s People Liberation Army (Navy) sailors from the honour guard march during a welcoming ceremony for Fiji’s Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama outside the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, July 16, 2015. REUTERS/Jason Lee

***

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018 (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 16 August 2018).

Click here to read the full text of the 2018 report and accompanying Fact Sheet.

CONTENT FROM THE UNPRECEDENTED FACT SHEET ACCOMPANYING THIS YEAR’S (2018) REPORT:

China does not want to jeopardize regional stability, which remains critical to its economic development, but is willing to employ coercive measures to advance its interests and mitigate other countries’ opposition. …

In August 2017, China conducted a coordinated PLA Navy (PLAN), China Coast Guard (CCG), and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia patrol around Thitu Island and planted a flag on Sandy Cay, a sandbar within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef and Thitu Island, possibly in response to the Philippines’ reported plans to upgrade its runway on Thitu Island.

CONTENT FROM THE FULL TEXT OF THIS YEAR’S (2018) REPORT:

p. 16

CHINA’S USE OF LOW-INTENSITY COERCION IN MARITIME DISPUTES

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The PLAN, CCG, and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) form the largest maritime force in the Indo-Pacific.
  • PLAN, CCG, and PAFMM sometimes conduct coordinated patrols.

China continues to exercise low-intensity coercion to advance its claims in the East and South China Seas. During periods of tension, official statements and state media seek to portray China as reactive. China uses an opportunistically timed progression of incremental but intensifying steps to attempt to increase effective control over disputed areas and avoid escalation to military conflict. China also uses economic incentives and punitive trade policies to deter opposition to China’s actions in the region. In 2017, China extended economic cooperation to the Philippines in exchange for taking steps to shelve territorial and maritime disputes. Conversely, a Chinese survey ship lingered around Benham Rise in the spring after the Philippines refused several requests from China to survey the area. Later in the spring, CCG boats reportedly fired warning shots over Philippine fishing boats near Union Bank. In August 2017, China used PLAN, CCG, and PAFMM ships to patrol around Thitu Island and planted a flag on Sandy Cay, a sandbar within 12 nm of Subi Reef and Thitu Island, possibly in response to Manila’s reported plans to upgrade its runway on Thitu Island. China probably used coercion to pressure Vietnam to suspend joint Vietnam-Spain drilling operations in a disputed oil block in the South China Sea over the summer of 2017.

p. 71

CHINA’S GROWING CIVILIAN AND PARAMILITARY MARITIME CAPABILITY

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The CCG is the world’s largest; the PAFMM is the only government-sanctioned maritime militia in the world.
  • The PAFMM has organizational ties to, and is sometimes directed by, China’s armed forces, and is active in the South and East China Seas.
  • PAFMM units enable low-intensity coercion activities to advance territorial and maritime claims, including a patrol with the PLAN and CCG in August 2017.

 p. 72

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization. The PAFMM is the only government-sanctioned maritime militia in the world. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission. In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part of broader PRC military doctrine stating confrontational operations short of war can be an effective means of accomplishing political objectives. The militia has played significant roles in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the 2009 harassment of the USNS IMPECCABLE conducting normal operations, the 2012 Scarborough Reef standoff, the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig standoff, and a large surge of ships in waters near the Senkakus in 2016.

A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and assist the PLAN and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fishery protection, logistics support, and search and rescue. The government subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia vessels to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities. In August 2017, China used PLAN, CCG, and PAFMM ships to patrol around Thitu Island and planted a flag on Sandy Cay, a sandbar within 12 nm of Subi Reef and Thitu Island, possibly in response to the Philippines’ reported plans to upgrade the runway on Thitu Island.

In the past, the PAFMM rented fishing vessels from companies or individual fishermen, but China has built a state-owned fishing fleet for at least part of its maritime militia force in the South China Sea. The Hainan provincial government, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered  the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage, which the militia received by the end of 2016, along with extensive subsidies to encourage frequent operations in the Spratly Islands. This particular PAFMM unit is also China’s most professional, paid salaries independent of any clear commercial fishing responsibilities, and recruited from recently separated veterans.

p. 124

In conflict, China may also employ China Coast Guard and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia ships to support military operations.

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CONTENT FROM LAST YEAR’S (2017) CHINA MILITARY POWER REPORT:

In a long-overdue and welcome breakthrough, the Pentagon’s latest report on China’s Military and Security Developments contains substantial content on China’s Maritime Militia.

Previously, China’s Maritime Militia was mentioned by Ronald O’Rourke in his Congressional Research Service report and by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which recommended that the Department of Defense address this vital subject.

But the Pentagon’s new report is the first official top-level assessment by the U.S. government to cover China’s Maritime Militia. It is extremely encouraging that the U.S. government has finally brought to bear the full force of its authority and its tremendous analytical capabilities to address this vital issue.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017 (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 6 June 2017).

p. i

China has leveraged its growing power to assert its sovereignty claims over features in the East and South China Seas. China has used coercive tactics, such as the use of law enforcement vessels and its maritime militia, to enforce maritime claims and advance its interests in ways that are calculated to fall below the threshold of provoking conflict.

p. 12

CHINA’S USE OF LOW-INTENSITY COERCION IN MARITIME DISPUTES

China continues to exercise low-intensity coercion to advance its claims in the East and South China Seas. During periods of tension, official statements and state media seek to portray China as reactive. China uses an opportunistically timed progression of incremental but intensifying steps to attempt to increase effective control over disputed areas and avoid escalation to military conflict. China also uses economic incentives and punitive trade policies to deter opposition to China’s actions in the region. In 2016, China used CCG, maritime militia, and fishing ships to surge its maritime presence at various disputed South China Sea features following July’s arbitration ruling. At the same time, it extended economic cooperation in exchange for shelving disputes with the Philippines. Conversely, China restricted Philippine fruit imports during the height of Scarborough Reef tensions in 2012.

p. 56

China Maritime Militia (CMM). The CMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization to perform basic support duties. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely from one location to another. The composition and mission of each unit is based on local conditions and personnel skills. In the South China Sea, the CMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part of broader PRC military doctrine that states that confrontational operations short of war can be an effective means of accomplishing political objectives. A large number of CMM vessels train with and support the PLAN and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, protecting fisheries, logistics, search and rescue (SAR), and surveillance and reconnaissance. The government subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia vessels to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular commercial roles. The CMM has played significant roles in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the 2011 harassment of Vietnamese survey vessels, the 2012 Scarborough Reef standoff, and the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig standoff. In the past, the CMM rented fishing vessels from companies or individual fishermen, but it appears that China is building a state-owned fishing fleet for its maritime militia force in the South China Sea. Hainan Province, adjacent to the South China Sea, has ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels for Sansha City.

***

Ryan D. Martinson and Andrew S. Erickson, “Re-Orienting American Sea Power for the China Challenge,” War on the Rocks, 10 May 2018.

Summary: this article proposes a new set of tools for countering China’s maritime gray zone expansion.

As a seafaring state, America demands maximal access to the world’s oceans within the constraints of international law. Though seldom recognized, U.S. efforts to defend its interest in maritime freedom in the Western Pacific have been fairly successful. When the People’s Republic of China unlawfully draws “fences” around the sea, U.S. warships steam through the fences. Beijing recognizes the seriousness of America’s position, and thus far has generally yielded.

However, when it comes to helping its allies and partners protect themselves against Chinese encroachment, the United States has a mixed record. Since 2006, Beijing has dramatically expanded the frontiers of its control in the East and South China Seas. To pursue its irredentist agenda, Beijing has largely relied on unarmed or lightly armed paranaval forces — coast guard and militia — conducting operations in what has been described as the “gray zone” between war and peace. Despite the robust presence of American sea power in contested areas of maritime East Asia, the United States has largely failed to halt China’s bullying behavior. This failure devalues Washington’s commitments to its friends and shakes the foundations of the U.S. alliance system — the true source of American global influence.

To better aid its allies and partners, Washington should consider expanding its catalogue of peacetime maritime operations. Passive presence has proved inadequate. In some cases, American policymakers may need to place U.S. forces on the front lines, where they can play a more direct role helping other states counter China’s seaward expansion. … …

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Andrew S. Erickson, “The People’s Republic at Sea: Great Power with ‘Chinese Characteristics’,” Contemporary China Initiative Lecture, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 9 April 2018.

Click here to watch a video of the lecture.

Monday, April 9, 2018, 4:30pm to 6:00pm

Goldwin Smith Hall, G64, Kaufmann Auditorium

232 East Ave, Central Campus

The Cornell Contemporary China Initiative Lecture Series, featuring interdisciplinary talks by scholars on issues in China today, runs every Monday this semester.

Co-sponsored by the Cornell East Asia Program.

Andrew S. Erickson, Professor of Strategy in the NWC’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College

“The People’s Republic at Sea: Great Power with “Chinese Characteristics”

Powered by the world’s second largest economy and defense budget, China has become a great sea power in its own right, and in its own way. China’s Armed Forces comprise three major organizations, each with a maritime subcomponent that is already the world’s largest such sea force by number of ships. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) contains the PLA Navy (PLAN); the People’s Armed Police (PAP) has formally been put in charge of the consolidating China Coast Guard (CCG); and the People’s Armed Forces Militia contains a growing proportion seagoing units, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Not seeking war but seeking to change the status quo in its favor, Beijing employs its enormous second and third sea forces in maritime “gray zone” operations to further its disputed East and South China Sea sovereignty claims using coercion short of warfare; typically with its first sea force providing coordination and deterrence from over the horizon. This lecture considers why and how China has gone to sea to further its security interests, as well as suggest potential implications.

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Andrew S. Erickson, “Numbers Matter: China’s Three ‘Navies’ Each Have the World’s Most Ships,” The National Interest, 26 February 2018.

Numerical superiority allows China’s second and third sea forces to flood the maritime gray zone in ways that its neighbors, as well as the United States, may find very hard to counter.

As a friend’s five-year-old puts it, “China has three navies: the regular navy, the police navy and the sneaky navy.” Each of these three sea forces is the world’s largest of its type by number of ships—at least by some measures. China is truly a maritime power in its own right, and its sea forces’ numbers matter in important ways. In maritime “gray zone” operations, Beijing employs its enormous coast guard and maritime militia to further its disputed Yellow, East and South China Sea sovereignty claims using coercion short of warfare. This article, which is part one in a series, will focus on these quantitatively superior second and third sea forces.

More formally, China’s Armed Forces comprise three major organizations, each with a maritime subcomponent. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) contains the PLA Navy (PLAN); the People’s Armed Police (PAP) increasingly leads China’s Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) forces, including the China Coast Guard (CCG); and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) contains a growing proportion of seagoing units. The CCG and PAFMM, clearly the world’s most numerous by any logical measure, are the focus of this article.

In power and sophistication, the PAFMM is far less capable than the CCG—which, in turn, is far less capable than the PLAN. The PLAN has formidable firepower; most PLAN ships have longer-range antiship cruise missilesthan U.S. Navy ships possess. The CCG is an actual threat to both the U.S. Navy and the sea forces of all China’s maritime neighbors, and has an extremely substantial law-enforcement capability on a par with that of the U.S. and Japanese coast guards. Viewed through this unforgiving comparative lens, the PAFMM is at best a harassing force with questionable legal authority. Yet it has already killed Vietnamese citizens, helped to seize Vietnamese- and Philippine-claimed features, and harassed U.S. Navy vessels.

All three sea forces are useful tools for Beijing, when employed against different opponents and in different ways. This is no theoretical abstraction. China has already used its second and third sea forces in manifold gray-zone operations against vessels from its maritime neighbors, as well as the United States. Today, Chinese sea forces are enveloping the Philippines-claimed Sandy Cay shoal (near Thitu Island), around which China has sustained a presence of at least two PAFMM vessels since August 2017. Other publicly documented examples of PAFMM employment from research conducted by the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) over the past three-plus years include China’s 2015 maneuvers around USS Lassen, the 2014 repulsion of Vietnamese vessels from disputed waters surrounding China’s state-owned HYSY-981 oil rig, participation in the 2014 blockade of Second Thomas Shoal and 2012 seizure of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, the harassment of USNSHoward O. Lorenzen (2014) and Impeccable(2009), and the 1974 seizure of the Western Paracel Islands from Vietnam and subsequent harassment of various Vietnamese government/survey vessels.

As Adm. Harry Harris, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, recently testified before the House Armed Services Committee, “Across the South China Sea, China’s air force, navy, coast guard, and maritime militia all maintain a robust presence. Routine patrols and exercises ensure Chinese forces are in and around all the features, not just the ones they occupy. China routinely challenges the presence of non-Chinese forces, including other claimant nations and especially the U.S., often overstating its authority and insisting foreign forces either stay away or obtain Chinese permission to operate.” … …

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Tamara Gil, “La poco conocida Milicia Marítima de China, la unidad de Pekín que ‘actúa bajo los radares’ para controlar las aguas de Asia Pacífico” [The Little-Known Maritime Militia of China, The Beijing Unit that ‘Acts Under the Radar’ to Control the Waters of the Asia-Pacific], BBC News Mundo [BBC News World], 23 August 2018.

[Algunos miembros de la milicia son pescadores o trabajadores de astilleros.]

Juega un rol vital en la lucha de poderes que se vive en Asia Pacífico, pero poco se había hablado de ella a nivel oficial.

Hasta ahora.

Por primera vez, el Pentágono arrojó un poco de luz sobre la “Milicia Marítima” de China o, como la apoda Washington, “las Fuerzas Armadas Populares” chinas.

La única milicia marítimaen el mundo apoyada por un gobierno, según aseguró el organismo estadounidense en su “informe anual sobre desarrollo militar y de seguridad que involucra a la República Popular de China”.

Pese a que el documento, elaborado a petición del Congreso para constatar los avances chinos en ese campo durante el año anterior, se centra en el rápido desarrollo de las capacidades militares de China, “también analiza con cierta profundidad la poco conocida Milicia Marítima”, destaca Jonathan Marcus, corresponsal de la BBC especializado en Defensa.

Se trata de civiles -desde pescadores a trabajadores de astilleros- pero también exmiembros del Ejército, que son movilizados en apoyo a las Fuerzas Navales chinas y la Guardia Costera del país.

Y en el conflictivo mar de China Meridional, cuya soberanía Pekín reclama prácticamente en su totalidad en desafío a países vecinos y Estados Unidos, parecen estar muy solicitados.

Un paso crucial

Las tensiones por la soberanía del mar de China Meridional llevan años instaladas en la región y enfrentan a numerosos países de Asia y a Estados Unidos.

La disputa no solo se centra en el control de islas o zonas específicas, sino de aguas estratégicas: se cree que el mar de China Meridional contiene importantes recursos naturales y por él pasa casi un tercio del tráfico marítimo mundial.

Pekín asegura que estas aguas, que ahora son internacionales, le pertenecen casi por completo, pero su visión choca con la de sus países vecinos y Washington, que realiza patrullas en la zona en aras de defender la libre circulación de barcos en ese espacio.

En los últimos años, China ha construido islas artificiales e instalaciones en ellas que Estados Unidos y otros países consideran “militares”, mientras el régimen comunista defiende que su único fin es proteger a los barcos pesqueros.

Y se han producido diversos incidentes entre barcos chinos y de otros países y, en algunos de los sucesos más destacados, la Milicia Marítima estuvo involucrada, denuncia el Pentágono.

Entre ellos, menciona el caso de un buque estadounidense que en 2009 fue “acosado” por varios barcos chinos cuando se encontraba realizando “operaciones normales” o el conflicto de 2012 ocurrido en torno al disputado arrecife de Scarborough entre un buque filipino y navíos chinos.

La Milicia Marítima “juega un papel crucial en actividades coercitivas para lograr los objetivos políticos de China sin un enfrentamiento” en el área, especifica el informe.

“China no quiere poner en peligro la estabilidad regional, que sigue siendo crucial para su desarrollo económico, pero está dispuesta a emplear medidas coercitivas para lograr sus intereses y mitigar la oposición de otros países”, destaca el Departamento de Defensa estadounidense.

[China ha construido islas artificiales e instalaciones en ellas que Estados Unidos y otros países consideran militares.]

Esta estrategia forma parte de las llamadas “operaciones grises” del país asiático, diseñadas “para frustrar la respuesta de otros países involucrados (en el conflicto) y asegurar sus intereses” en la zona, apunta por su parte el especialista en Defensa de la BBC.

Como en años anteriores, Pekín rechazó firmemente el informe del Pentágono y presentó una protesta formal a Washington instándole a abandonar su mentalidad “de la guerra fría”.

“Una tercera fuerza marítima”

La creación de la Milicia Marítima de China se remonta a los primeros años tras la fundación de la República Popular de China, en 1949, cuando los comunistas liderados por Mao Zedong “querían defender la vulnerable costa de los ataques del Kuomintang” y al mismo tiempo controlar a la población de pescadores, explica en conversación con BBC Mundo Andrew Erickson, profesor de estrategia en el Instituto de Estudios Marítimos de China de la Escuela de Guerra Naval de EE.UU.

El profesor, uno de los más destacados investigadores en este campo junto a Conor Kennedy, aclara que la milicia actual es muy diferente a la de entonces y advierte que hoy en día forma parte de las Fuerzas Armadas de China.

Opera bajo órdenes militares directas, para llevar a cabo actividades patrocinadas por el Estado”.

[Según el profesor Erickson, miembros de la Guardia Costera china, como los que aparecen en esta foto, o de las Fuerzas Navales chinas suelen apoyar a la milicia en sus operaciones.]

Según sus investigaciones, esta “tercera fuerza marítima” del país asiático es entrenada y equipada por el Ejército Popular de Liberación chino y “está diseñada deliberadamente para pasar por debajo del radar lo más possible”.

Erickson enfatiza que esta fuerza marítima es “enorme”, con miles de barcos y de personas, cuya mayoría trabaja en operaciones rutinarias a lo largo de la costa, si bien también hay unidades que son enviadas a alta mar a defender los reclamos territoriales de la potencia asiática, como las que denuncia el Pentágono.

“China está determinada a resolver la disputa a su favor”

Andrew Erickson, profesor de la Escuela de Guerra Naval de EE.UU.

Pese a que las declaraciones oficiales sobre estos grupos han sido escasas, los medios oficiales chinos, considerados portavoces del gobierno, han mencionado el papel de esta milicia en diversas ocasiones.

“China debería mandar más misiones de la miliciaa salvaguardar la soberanía territorial y los derechos e intereses marítimos (de China) en el mar de China Meridional”, publicó el diario oficialista Global Times a principios de este año, citando a un miembro del Parlamento.

[China busca erigirse como una potencia marítima.]

La prensa oficial también informó de varias visitas del propio presidente Xi Jinping a las milicias ubicadas en la isla sureña de Hainan, adyacente al mar de China Meridional y donde, según el Pentágono, tiene base una de las unidades más profesionales de esta fuerza.

El informe de Washington especifica que para esta unidad el gobierno chino reclutó a veteranos del Ejército recientemente retirados -o puede que despedidos en la última campaña de recortes emprendida por el ejecutivo, apunta por su parte el profesor Erickson- y encargó la construcción de 84 grandes barcos de pesca con cascos reforzados y depósito para municiones.

Según explica Erickson, hay unidades “a tiempo parcial”, con personal que ostenta otros trabajos, y a “tiempo complete”, que están más militarizadas.

China ha trasladado una de estas unidades más profesionalizadas a la localidad de Sansha, en el disputado archipiélago de las Paracelso (también reclamado por Taiwán y Vietnam) y donde Pekín abrió una oficina del gobierno en 2012 para gestionar el mar de China Meridional.

El especialista advierte del riesgo de estas prácticas.

“China no desea que haya una guerra ahí. Tampoco Estados Unidos ni creo que otro país de la región (…). Pero, al mismo tiempo, está determinada a resolver la disputa a su favor”, asevera.

“Pese a que no busca una guerra, no está dispuesta a participar en medidas conciliatorias para garantizar que no se produzca una escalada de la tensión y crisis que lleve a un conflicto (…) así que sigue siendo un riesgo”.

Este no es un enfoque pacífico”.

***

Jonathan G. Odom, “China’s Maritime Militia Threat,” The Straits Times, 16 June 2018.

… China’s maritime militia raises specific concerns under the Law of the Sea, the international law governing the use of force, and international humanitarian law.

Past actions by the maritime militia have contributed to three recurring violations of China’s obligations under the Law of the Sea. First, militia vessels have interfered with the maritime freedoms of other nations, thereby breaching China’s obligation to maintain “due regard” under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Second, militia vessels have navigated unsafely in relation to other vessels, thereby violating the Collision Regulations Convention. Third, China has failed to police the fishing boats of its militia, breaching its UNCLOS duty as a flag state.

While these previous violations of the peacetime international law are problematic, the potential effects of China employing its maritime militia for belligerent purposes could be more troubling.

Aggressive use of the maritime militia could lead to war. Under international law, what constitutes a “use of force” is determined by the nature of actions, and not necessarily by the status of actors. Firing a missile, laying mines, enforcing a blockade, or conducting an amphibious landing of a disputed island could constitute a “use of force” — whether it was committed by the navy or a maritime militia. If China’s maritime militia engaged in any such actions, affected nations could justifiably use force in self-defence and escalation could spiral.

Consider this description in [the] PLA Daily newspaper about China’s maritime militia: “Putting on camouflage, they qualify as soldiers; taking off the camouflage, they become law- abiding fishermen.” Does this reflect a mindset to exploit international humanitarian law? The consequences of feigning civilian status would be tragic for legitimate fishermen who could inadvertently become targets if war broke out.

Third, China’s use of its maritime militia can impact the interests of many nations. They include China’s neighbours who have competing territorial and maritime claims, but they also include other Asia-Pacific nations whose navies pass through and operate in the waters of the Asia-Pacific. … …

***

Jonathan G. Odom, “Guerrillas in the Sea Mist: China’s Maritime Militia and International Law,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy 3.1 (2018): 31-94.

This article is intended to be a comprehensive legal analysis of China’s maritime militia. It applies four major bodies of international law to the known, open-source facts about China’s maritime militia, as derived from the series of articles by Andrew Erickson and Conor Kennedy at the USNWC China Maritime Studies Institute.

Abstract

Building upon recent scholarship about the maritime militia of the People’s Republic of China, this article analyzes a number of concerns about that militia’s status and its activities under existing regimes of international law. First, it lays the foundation of general principles of state responsibility and attribution as they pertain to the maritime militia. Thereafter, it identifies and applies three specialized bodies of international law to China’s use of its maritime militia, including the law of the sea, the use of force by states, and the law of naval warfare. Ultimately, the article concludes that there are serious potential consequences and ramifications under international law arising from China’s maritime militia. Looking ahead, the article then provides a series of recommended options that other nations should consider in addressing these legal problems.

***

If you have trouble accessing the website above, please download a cached copy here.

You can also click here to access the report via the new public CRS website.

KEY EXCERPTS:

p. 8

“Salami-Slicing” Strategy and Gray Zone Operations

Observers frequently characterize China’s approach to the SCS and ECS as a “salami-slicing” strategy that employs a series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a casus belli, to gradually change the status quo in China’s favor. Other observers have referred to China’s approach as a strategy of gray zone operations (i.e., operations that reside in a gray zone between peace and war), of creeping annexation28 or creeping invasion,29 or as a “talk and take” strategy,

***

28 See, for example, Alan Dupont, “China’s Maritime Power Trip,” The Australian, May 24, 2014.

29 Jackson Diehl, “China’s ‘Creeping Invasion,” Washington Post, September 14, 2014.

p. 9

meaning a strategy in which China engages in (or draws out) negotiations while taking actions to gain control of contested areas.30 A March 17, 2020, press report in China’s state-controlled media stated that “Chinese military experts on Tuesday [March 17] suggested the use of nonlethal electromagnetic weapons, including low-energy laser devices, in expelling US warships that have been repeatedly intruding into the South China Sea in the past week.”31

Table 1. China’s Apparent Goals and Supporting Actions for South China Sea

As assessed in January 2020 CNAS report

***

30 The strategy has been called “talk and take” or “take and talk.” See, for example, Anders Corr, “China’s Take-AndTalk Strategy In The South China Sea,” Forbes, March 29, 2017. See also Namrata Goswami, “Can China Be Taken Seriously on its ‘Word’ to Negotiate Disputed Territory?” The Diplomat, August 18, 2017.

31 Liu Xuanzun, “US Intrusions in S.China Sea Can Be Stopped by Electromagnetic Weapons: Experts,” Global Times, March 17, 2020.

USE OF CHINA COAST GUARD SHIPS AND MARITIME MILITIA ………………………………………………………………………………………. 11

p. 11

Use of Coast Guard Ships and Maritime Militia

China asserts and defends its maritime claims not only with its navy, but also with its coast guard and its maritime militia. Indeed, China employs its coast guard and maritime militia more regularly and extensively than its navy in its maritime sovereignty-assertion operations. DOD states that China’s navy, coast guard, and maritime militia together “form the largest maritime force in the Indo-Pacific.”38

***

38 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 16. See also Andrew S. Erickson, “Maritime Numbers Game, Understanding and Responding to China’s Three Sea Forces,” Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, January 28, 2019.

p. 14

In an April 22, 2020, statement, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated

Even as we fight the [COVID-19] outbreak, we must remember that the long-term threats to our shared security have not disappeared. In fact, they’ve become more prominent. Beijing has moved to take advantage of the distraction, from China’s new unilateral announcement of administrative districts over disputed islands and maritime areas in the South China Sea, its sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel earlier this month, and its “research stations” on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef. The PRC continues to deploy maritime militia around the Spratly Islands and most recently, the PRC has dispatched a flotilla that included an energy survey vessel for the sole purpose of intimidating other claimants from engaging in offshore hydrocarbon development. It is important to highlight how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is exploiting the world’s focus on the COVID19 crisis by continuing its provocative behavior. The CCP is exerting military pressure and coercing its neighbors in the SCS, even going so far as to sink a Vietnamese fishing vessel. The U.S. strongly opposes China’s bullying and we hope other nations will hold them to account too.46

***

46 Department of State, “The United States and ASEAN are Partnering to Defeat COVID-19, Build Long-Term Resilience, and Support Economic Recovery,” Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, April 22, 2020. See also A. Ananthalakshmi and Rozanna Latiff, “U.S. Says China Should Stop ‘Bullying Behaviour’ in South China Sea,” Reuters, April 18, 2020; Gordon Lubold and Dion Nissenbaum, “With Trump Facing Virus Crisis, U.S. Warns Rivals Not to Seek Advantage,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2020; Brad Lendon, “Coronavirus may be giving Beijing an opening in the South China Sea,” CNN, April 7, 2020; Agence France-Presse, “US Warns China Not to ‘Exploit’ Virus for Sea Disputes,” Channel News Asia, April 6, 2020.

p. 22

Recent Specific Actions

Recent Specific Actions Recent specific actions taken by the Trump Administration include but are not necessarily limited to the following:

As an apparent cost-imposing measure, DOD announced on May 23, 2018, that it was disinviting China from the 2018 RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise.66  [CONTINUED…]

***

66 RIMPAC is a U.S.-led, multilateral naval exercise in the Pacific involving naval forces from more than two dozen countries that is held every two years. At DOD’s invitation, China participated in the 2014 and 2016 RIMPAC exercises. DOD had invited China to participate in the 2018 RIMPAC exercise, and China had accepted that invitation. DOD’s statement regarding the withdrawal of the invitation was reprinted in Megan Eckstein, “China Disinvited from Participating in 2018 RIMPAC Exercise,” USNI News, May 23, 2018. See also Gordon Lubold and Jeremy Page, “U.S. Retracts Invitation to China to Participate in Military Exercise,” Wall Street Journal,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2018. See also Helene Cooper, “U.S. Disinvites China From Military Exercise Amid Rising Tensions,” New York Times, May 23, 2018; Missy Ryan, “Pentagon Disinvites China from Major Naval Exercise over South China Sea Buildup,” Washington Post, May 23, 2018; James Stavridis, “U.S. Was Right to Give China’s navy the Boot,” Bloomberg, August 2, 2018.

p. 23

  • In November 2018, national security adviser John Bolton said the U.S. would oppose any agreements between China and other claimants to the South China Sea that limit free passage to international shipping.67
  • In January 2019, the then-U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, reportedly warned his Chinese counterpart that the U.S. Navy would treat China’s coast guard cutters and maritime militia vessels as combatants and respond to provocations by them in the same way as it would respond to provocations by Chinese navy ships.68
  • On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated, “As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty [with the Philippines].” 69 (For more on this treaty, see Appendix B.)

***

67 Jake Maxwell Watts, “Bolton Warns China Against Limiting Free Passage in South China Sea,” Wall Street Journal, November 13, 2018.

68 See Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “US Warns China on Aggressive Acts by Fishing Boats and Coast Guard; Navy Chief Says Washington Will Use Military Rules of Engagement to Curb Provocative Behavior,” Financial Times, April 28, 2019. See also Shirley Tay, “US Reportedly Warns China Over Hostile Non-Naval Vessels in South China Sea,” CNBC, April 29, 2019; Ryan Pickrell, “China’s South China Sea Strategy Takes a Hit as the US Navy Threatens to Get Tough on Beijing’s Sea Forces,” Business Insider, April 29, 2019; Tyler Durden, “‘Warning Shot Across The Bow:’ US Warns China On Aggressive Acts By Maritime Militia,” Zero Hedge, April 29, 2019; Ankit Panda, “The US Navy’s Shifting View of China’s Coast Guard and ‘Maritime Militia,’” Diplomat, April 30, 2019; Ryan Pickrell, “It Looks Like the US Has Been Quietly Lowering the Threshold for Conflict in the South China Sea,” Business Insider, June 19, 2019.

69 State Department, Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin, Jr., Remarks [by] Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, March 1, 2019, accessed August 21, 2019 at https://www.state.gov/remarks-withphilippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/. See also Regine Cabato and Shibani Mahtani, “Pompeo Promises Intervention If Philippines Is Attacked in South China Sea Amid Rising Chinese Militarization,” Washington Post, February 28, 2019; Claire Jiao and Nick Wadhams, “We Have Your Back in South China Sea, U.S. Assures Philippines,” Bloomberg, February 28 (updated March 1), 2019; Jake Maxwell Watts and Michael R. Gordon, “Pompeo Pledges to Defend Philippine Forces in South China Sea, Philippines Shelves Planned Review of Military Alliance After U.S. Assurances,” Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2019; Jim Gomez, “Pompeo: US to Make Sure China Can’t Blockade South China Sea,” Associated Press, March 1, 2019; Karen Lema and Neil Jerome Morales, “Pompeo Assures Philippines of U.S. Protection in Event of Sea Conflict, Reuters, March 1, 2019; Raissa Robles, “US Promises to Defend the Philippines from ‘Armed Attack’ in South China Sea, as Manila Mulls Review of Defence Ttreaty,” South China Morning Post, March 1, 2019; Raul Dancel, “US Will Defend Philippines in South China Sea: Pompeo,” Straits Times, March 2, 2019; Ankit Panda, “In Philippines, Pompeo Offers Major Alliance Assurance on South China Sea,” Diplomat, March 4, 2019; Mark Nevitt, “The US-Philippines Defense Treaty and the Pompeo Doctrine on South China Sea,” Just Security, March 11, 2019; Zack Cooper, “The U.S. Quietly Made a Big Splash about the South China Sea; Mike Pompeo Just Reaffirmed Washington Has Manila’s back,” Washington Post, March 19, 2019.

p. 52

1972 Convention on Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs)

China and the United States, as well as more than 150 other countries (including all those bordering on the South East and South China Seas, but not Taiwan),121 are parties to an October 1972 multilateral convention on international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, commonly known as the collision regulations (COLREGs) or the “rules of the road.” 122 Although

***

121 Source: International Maritime Organization, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions, As at 28 February 2014, pp. 86-89. The Philippines acceded to the convention on June 10, 2013.

122 28 UST 3459; TIAS 8587. The treaty was done at London October 20, 1972, and entered into force July 15, 1977. The United States is an original signatory to the convention and acceded the convention entered into force for the United States on July 15, 1977. China acceded to the treaty on January 7, 1980. A summary of the agreement is [CONTINUED…]

p. 53

commonly referred to as a set of rules or regulations, this multilateral convention is a binding treaty. The convention applies “to all vessels upon the high seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.”123 It thus applies to military vessels, paramilitary and law enforcement (i.e., coast guard) vessels, maritime militia vessels, and fishing boats, among other vessels.

***

123 Rule 1(a) of the convention.

p. 69

Use of Coast Guard Ships and Maritime Militia

Coast Guard Ships

Use of Coast Guard Ships and Maritime Militia Coast Guard Ships DOD states that the China Coast Guard (CCG) is the world’s largest coast guard.166 It is much larger than the coast guard of any country in the region, and it has increased substantially in size in recent years through the addition of many newly built ships. China makes regular use of CCG ships to assert and defend its maritime claims, particularly in the ECS, with Chinese navy ships sometimes available over the horizon as backup forces.167 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) states the following:

Under Chinese law, maritime sovereignty is a domestic law enforcement issue under the purview of the CCG. Beijing also prefers to use CCG ships for assertive actions in disputed waters to reduce the risk of escalation and to portray itself more benignly to an international audience. For situations that Beijing perceives carry a heightened risk of escalation, it often deploys PLAN combatants in close proximity for rapid intervention if necessary. China also relies on the PAFMM—a paramilitary force of fishing boats—for sovereignty enforcement actions….

China primarily uses civilian maritime law enforcement agencies in maritime disputes, employing the PLAN [i.e., China’s navy] in a protective capacity in case of escalation.

The CCG has rapidly increased and modernized its forces, improving China’s ability to enforce its maritime claims. Since 2010, the CCG’s large patrol ship fleet (more than 1,000 tons) has more than doubled in size from about 60 to more than 130 ships, making it by far the largest coast guard force in the world and increasing its capacity to conduct extended offshore operations in a number of disputed areas simultaneously. Furthermore, the newer ships are substantially larger and more capable than the older ships, and the majority are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, and guns ranging from 30-mm to 76-mm. Among these ships, a number are capable of long-distance, longendurance out-of-area operations. In addition, the CCG operates more than 70 fast patrol combatants ([each displacing] more than 500 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations, and more than 400 coastal patrol craft (as well as about 1,000 inshore and riverine patrol boats). By the end of the decade, the CCG is expected to add up to 30 patrol ships and patrol combatants before the construction program levels off.168

In March 2018, China announced that control of the CCG would be transferred from the civilian State Oceanic Administration to the Central Military Commission.169 The transfer occurred on July 1, 2018.170 On May 22, 2018, it was reported that China’s navy and the CCG had conducted

***

166 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 71.

167 See Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, pp. 3, 7, and 44, and Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, undated but released August 2015, p. 14.

168 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, pp. 66, 78. A similar passage appears in Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, pp. 71-72.

169 See, for example, David Tweed, “China’s Military Handed Control of the Country’s Coast Guard,” Bloomberg, March 26, 2018.

170 See, for example, Global Times, “China’s Military to Lead Coast Guard to Better Defend Sovereignty,” People’s Daily Online, June 25, 2018.

p. 70

their first joint patrols in disputed waters off the Paracel Islands in the SCS, and had expelled at least 10 foreign fishing vessels from those waters.171

Maritime Militia

China also uses the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM)—a force that essentially consists of fishing ships with armed crew members—to defend its maritime claims. In the view of some observers, the PAFMM—even more than China’s navy or coast guard—is the leading component of China’s maritime forces for asserting its maritime claims, particularly in the SCS. U.S. analysts in recent years have paid increasing attention to the role of the PAFMM as a key tool for implementing China’s salami-slicing strategy, and have urged U.S. policymakers to focus on the capabilities and actions of the PAFMM.172

***

171 Catherine Wong, “China’s Navy and Coastguard Stage First Joint Patrols Near Disputed South China Sea Islands as ‘Warning to Vietnam,’” South China Morning Post, May 22, 2018. For additional discussion of China’s coast guard, see Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst, “Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime LawEnforcement Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2019; Teddy Ng and Laura Zhou, “China Coast Guard Heads to Front Line to Enforce Beijing’s South China Sea Claims,” South China Morning Post, February 9, 2019; Ying Yu Lin, “Changes in China’s Coast Guard,” Diplomat, January 30, 2019.

172 For additional discussion of the PAFMM, see, for example, Gregory Poling, “China’s Hidden Navy,” Foreign Policy, June 25, 2019; Mike Yeo, “Testing the Waters: China’s Maritime Militia Challenges Foreign Forces at Sea,” Defense News, May 31, 2019; Laura Zhou, “Beijing’s Blurred Lines between Military and Non-Military Shipping in South China Sea Could Raise Risk of Flashpoint,” South China Morning Post, May 5, 2019; Andrew S. Erickson, “Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),” April 29, 2019, Andrewerickson.com; Jonathan Manthorpe, “Beijing’s Maritime Militia, the Scourge of South China Sea,” Asia Times, April 27, 2019; Dmitry Filipoff, “Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson Discuss China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), March 11, 2019; Jamie Seidel, “China’s Latest Island Grab: Fishing ‘Militia’ Makes Move on Sandbars around Philippines’ Thitu Island,” News.com.au, March 5, 2019; Gregory Poling, “Illuminating the South China Sea’s Dark Fishing Fleets,” Stephenson Ocean Security Project (Center for Strategic and International Studies), January 9, 2019; Andrew S. Erickson, “Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China’s Maritime Militia to Deter its Use,” National Interest, November 25, 2018; Todd Crowell and Andrew Salmon, “Chinese Fisherman Wage Hybrid ‘People’s War’ on Asian Seas,” Asia Times, September 6, 2018; Andrew S. Erickson, “Exposed: Pentagon Report Spotlights China’s Maritime Militia,” National Interest, August 20, 2018; Jonathan Odom, “China’s Maritime Militia,” Straits Times, June 16, 2018; Andrew S. Erickson, “Understanding China’s Third Sea Force: The Maritime Militia,” Fairbank Center, September 8, 2017; Andrew Erickson, “New Pentagon China Report Highlights the Rise of Beijing’s Maritime Militia,” National Interest, June 7, 2017; Ryan Pickrell, “New Pentagon Report Finally Drags China’s Secret Sea Weapon Out Of The Shadows,” Daily Caller, June 7, 2017; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: All Hands on Deck for Sovereignty Pt. 3,” Center for International Maritime Security, April 26, 2017; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: Development Challenges and Opportunities, Pt. 2” Center for International Maritime Security, April 10, 2017; Andrew Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: China Builds A Standing Vanguard, Pt. 1,” Center for International Maritime Security, March 25, 2017; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report No. 1, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, March 2017, 22 pp.; Michael Peck, “‘Little Blue Sailors’: Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming (In the South China Sea and Beyond),” National Interest, December 18, 2016; Peter Brookes, “Take Note of China’s Non-Navy Maritime Force,” The Hill, December 13, 2016; Christopher P. Cavas, “China’s Maritime Militia a Growing Concern,” Defense News, November 21, 2016; Christopher P. Cavas, “China’s Maritime Militia—Time to Call Them Out?” Defense News, September 18, 2016; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Riding A New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security, September 1, 2016; John Grady, “Experts: China Continues Using Fishing Fleets for Naval Presence Operations,” USNI News, August 17, 2016; David Axe, “China Launches A Stealth Invasion in the South China Sea,” Daily Beast, August 9, 2016; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia Before They’re Used Again,” National Interest, July 6, 2016; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia, What It Is and How to Deal With It,” Foreign Affairs, June 23, 2016.

p. 71

DOD states that “the PAFMM is the only government-sanctioned maritime militia in the world,” and that it “has organizational ties to, and is sometimes directed by, China’s armed forces.”173 DIA states that

The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization to perform basic support duties. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban subdistricts, and enterprises, and they vary widely from one location to another. The composition and mission of each unit reflects local conditions and personnel skills. In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part of broader Chinese military doctrine that states that confrontational operations short of war can be an effective means of accomplishing political objectives.

A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and support the PLA and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, protecting fisheries, and providing logistic support, search and rescue (SAR), and surveillance and reconnaissance. The Chinese government subsidizes local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia ships to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside their regular commercial roles. The PAFMM has played a noteworthy role in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the harassment of Vietnamese survey ships in 2011, a standoff with the Philippines at Scarborough Reef in 2012, and a standoff involving a Chinese oil rig in 2014. In the past, the PAFMM rented fishing boats from companies or individual fisherman, but it appears that China is building a state-owned fishing fleet for its maritime militia force in the South China Sea. Hainan Province, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the construction of 84 large militia fishing boats with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage for Sansha City, and the militia took delivery by the end of 2016.174

***

173 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 71.

174 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, p. 79. A similar passage appears in Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 72.

p. 85

A January 18, 2020, press report states

Before assuming his post as commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip S. Davidson issued a stark warning about Washington’s loosening grip in the fiercely contested South China Sea. “In short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios, short of war with the United States,” Davidson said during a Senate confirmation hearing ahead of his appointment as the top US military official in the region in May 2018. For many analysts, the dire assessment was a long-overdue acknowledgement of their concerns. Today, there is a growing sense it did not go far enough. Washington’s strategic advantage in the waterway, which holds massive untapped oil and gas reserves and through which about a third of global shipping passes, has diminished so much, according to some experts, that it is powerless to prevent Beijing from restricting access during peacetime and could struggle to gain the upper hand even in the event of an outright conflict with Chinese forces. China, which claims almost the entire waterway, has tipped the balance of power not just through a massive build-up of its navy, they say, but also through the presence of a de facto militia made up of ostensibly non-military vessels and an island-building campaign, the profound strategic value of which has been lost on US policymakers.… “The US has lost advantage throughout the spectrum of operations, from low-level interaction against China’s maritime militia to higher-end conflict scenarios,” said James Kraska, a former US Navy commander who lectures at the Naval War College. … … …

REPORT SUMMARY

In an international security environment described as one of renewed great power competition, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition. U.S.- China strategic competition in the SCS forms an element of the Trump Administration’s more confrontational overall approach toward China, and of the Administration’s efforts for promoting its construct for the Indo-Pacific region, called the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

China’s actions in the SCS in recent years—including extensive island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China’s claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China’s near-seas region—meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.

Potential general U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and resisting the emergence of an alternative “might-makes-right” approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia; and pursing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China.

Potential specific U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: dissuading China from carrying out additional base-construction activities in the SCS, moving additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it occupies in the SCS, initiating island-building or base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, declaring straight baselines around land features it claims in the SCS, or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS; and encouraging China to reduce or end operations by its maritime forces at the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, halt actions intended to put pressure against Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands, provide greater access by Philippine fisherman to waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal or in the Spratly Islands, adopt the U.S./Western definition regarding freedom of the seas, and accept and abide by the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China.

The Trump Administration has taken various actions for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS. The issue for Congress is whether the Trump Administration’s strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both.

AUTHOR’s BIOGRAPHY—RONALD O’ROURKE

Mr. O’Rourke is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the Johns Hopkins University, from which he received his B.A. in international studies, and a valedictorian graduate of the University’s Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, where he received his M.A. in the same field.

Since 1984, Mr. O’Rourke has worked as a naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. He has written many reports for Congress on various issues relating to the Navy, the Coast Guard, defense acquisition, China’s naval forces and maritime territorial disputes, the Arctic, the international security environment, and the U.S. role in the world. He regularly briefs Members of Congress and Congressional staffers, and has testified before Congressional committees on many occasions.

In 1996, he received a Distinguished Service Award from the Library of Congress for his service to Congress on naval issues.

In 2010, he was honored under the Great Federal Employees Initiative for his work on naval, strategic, and budgetary issues.

In 2012, he received the CRS Director’s Award for his outstanding contributions in support of the Congress and the mission of CRS.

In 2017, he received the Superior Public Service Award from the Navy for service in a variety of roles at CRS while providing invaluable analysis of tremendous benefit to the Navy for a period spanning decades.

Mr. O’Rourke is the author of several journal articles on naval issues, and is a past winner of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Arleigh Burke essay contest. He has given presentations on naval, Coast Guard, and strategy issues to a variety of U.S. and international audiences in government, industry, and academia.

 

CLICK BELOW FOR THE FULL TEXT OF SOME OF THE PUBLICATIONS CITED IN O’ROURKE’S CRS REPORT:

Andrew S. Erickson, “Maritime Numbers Game: Understanding and Responding to China’s Three Sea Forces,” Indo-Pacific Defense Forum Magazine 43.4 (December 2018): 30-35.

Peter A. Dutton and Andrew S. Erickson, “When Eagle Meets Dragon: Managing Risk in Maritime East Asia,” RealClearDefense, 25 March 2015.

Andrew S. EricksonJoshua Hickey, and Henry Holst, “Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond,” Naval War College Review 72.2 (Spring 2019): 11-25.

Andrew S. Erickson,“Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 29 April 2019.

Dmitry Filipoff, “Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson Discuss China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 11 March 2019.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China’s Maritime Militia to Deter its Use,” The National Interest, 25 November 2018.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Exposed: Pentagon Report Spotlights China’s Maritime Militia,” The National Interest, 20 August 2018.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Understanding China’s Third Sea Force: The Maritime Militia,” Harvard Fairbank Center Blog Post, 8 September 2017.

Andrew S. Erickson, “New Pentagon China Report Highlights the Rise of Beijing’s Maritime Militia,” The National Interest, 7 June 2017.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: All Hands on Deck for Sovereignty, Pt. 3,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 26 April 2017.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: Development Challenges and Opportunities, Pt. 2,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 10 April 2017.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: China Builds a Standing Vanguard, Pt. 1,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 26 March 2017.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, March 2017).

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Riding a New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 1 September 2016.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” The National Interest, 6 July 2016.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia: What It Is and How to Deal With It,” Foreign Affairs, 23 June 2016.

Andrew S. Erickson and Emily de La Bruyere, “Crashing Its Own Party: China’s Unusual Decision to Spy on Joint Naval Exercises,” China Real Time Report (中国实时报), Wall Street Journal, 19 July 2014.

Andrew S. Erickson and Emily de La Bruyere, “China’s RIMPAC Maritime-Surveillance Gambit,” The National Interest, 29 July 2014.

Andrew S. Erickson, “PRC National Defense Ministry Spokesman Sr. Col. Geng Yansheng Offers China’s Most-Detailed Position to Date on Dongdiao-class Ship’s Intelligence Collection in U.S. EEZ during RIMPAC Exercise,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 1 August 2014.

Prashanth Parameswaran, “Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson on China and the Maritime Gray Zone,” The Diplomat, 14 May 2019.

Ryan D. Martinson and Andrew S. Erickson, “Re-Orienting American Sea Power For The China Challenge,” War on the Rocks, 10 May 2018.

***

China Security Report 2018: The China-U.S. Relationship at a Crossroads (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2018).

On p. 57, the 2018 report from Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), entitled “The China-US Relationship at a Crossroads,” does what the U.S. government should have done at the time, and has suffered unfortunate consequences for failing to do. In “Table 3-2: Major Actions Taken by China in the South China Sea,” under the category of “Interference in other countries’ activities,” the report correctly describes the 2009 USNS Impeccable Incident as an instance of “Harassment of the US vessel by maritime militia.”

BACKGROUND ON THE 2018 NIDS REPORT AND ITS PREDECESSORS:

The international community keeps a close watch on China’s security policy and its military trends. The Japanese public has been increasingly aware of the large impact of China’s rising military (and economic) power that may have a huge impact on Japanese security. China, now the second largest economy in the world, has become an essentially important economic partner for Japan and other East Asian countries. At the same time, its rapid economic growth allows China to multiply its military spending and move forward with the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Produced by Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies, the NIDS China Security Report analyzes the strategic and military trends of China. The report is originally published in Japanese, then translated into English and Chinese.

China Security Report 2018

***

Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, Washington, DC, 14 February 2018.

“Across the South China Sea, China’s air force, navy, coast guard, and maritime militia allmaintain a robust presence. Routine patrols and exercises ensure Chinese forces are in and around all the features, not just the ones they occupy. China routinely challenges the presence of non-Chinese forces, including other claimant nations and especially the U.S., often overstating its authority and insisting foreign forces either stay away or obtain Chinese permission to operate.”

***

China’s Maritime Militia: A Conversation with Andrew Erickson,” podcast interview with Bonnie Glaser, ChinaPower Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 26 October 2017.

Click here to listen to the half-hour-long podcast.

In this episode, Professor Andrew Erickson joins us to discuss the origin and role of China’s maritime militia. Our conversation traces the history of the maritime militia fleet and the training the militia receives. We talk about the various ways that the maritime militia is employed to strengthen China’s sovereignty claims in the South China. Professor Erickson provides recommendations on how the United States should respond to this unique challenge.

Andrew Erickson is a Professor of Strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, where his research focuses on the Chinese military and maritime studies, and an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. He is considered a leading figure in the research of China’s maritime militia.

The views expressed here are those of Dr. Andrew Erickson alone. They in no way represent the policies or estimates of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. government.

***

Chapter 6: Asia,” The Military Balance 118:1 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), 259.

p. 259

“Maritime Militia

Made up of full- and part-time personnel. Reports to PLA command and trains to assist PLAN and CCG in a variety of military roles. These include ISR, maritime law enforcement, island supply, troop transport and supporting sovereignty claims. The Maritime Militia operates a variety of civilian vessels including fishing boats and oil tankers.”

 

National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017 (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017).

p. 27

In addition, after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned. China and Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and globally. Today, they are fielding military capabilities designed to deny America access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to operate freely in critical commercial zones during peacetime. In short, they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor.

p. 28

The United States must prepare for this type of competition. China, Russia, and other state and nonstate actors recognize that the United States often views the world in binary terms, with states being either “at peace” or “at war,” when it is actually an arena of continuous competition. Our adversaries will not fight us on our terms. We will raise our competitive game to meet that challenge, to protect American interests, and to advance our values.

***

2017 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, 15 November 2017.

Click here to read the full text.

Report PDFs: 

2017 Annual Report

2017 Executive Summary and Recommendations.pdf

Comprehensive List of the Commission’s Recommendations.pdf

Selected content:

p. 11

“Disputes over islands and other land features in the South China Sea could easily escalate into crises, and in fact already have (notably with China’s seizure and effective blockade of Philippines-claimed Scarborough Reef in 2012 and the destructive skirmish between Chinese and Vietnamese non-naval forces over a Chinese oil rig in 2014). Should China perceive an intolerable challenge to its claimed sovereignty over one of these disputed areas, it could employ a range of options—including island landing operations, blockades, or missile strikes—to seize control of disputed features. Such operations likely would involve (perhaps even exclusively) its non-naval maritime forces, such as the China Coast Guard and maritime militia, creating operational uncertainty and “grey zone” challenges for adversaries.

 p. 153

CHAPTER 2 U.S.-CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS

SECTION 1: YEAR IN REVIEW: SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Key Findings

  • China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea and in South Asia flared in 2017. China continued to rely primarily on nonmilitary and semiofficial actors (such as the China Coast Guard and maritime militia) to advance its interests in the disputed South China Sea, straining already-unsettled relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. The 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which overwhelmingly sided against China’s position, has not deterred Beijing. China’s territorial assertiveness was also on display when Chinese armed forces attempted to consolidate control over territory disputed by Bhutan and India. Ultimately, India was more successful than the Philippines and Vietnam in countering Chinese coercion.”

p. 237

“Disputed Claims in the South China Sea

Protecting territory claimed by China in the South China Sea has become an increasingly important mission for the PLA.14 Chinese military scholars at China’s National Defense University and the Academy of Military Science argue that while China does not seek a conflict with the United States, “the South China Sea and the East China Sea are … issues that must be settled in the course of China’s rise.”15 Although China has used force to resolve disputes in the” …

p. 238

… “South China Sea in the past,* it has managed its South China Sea claims in recent years with a mix of naval presence, harassment, and hostilities from maritime law enforcement agencies and maritime militia,† and a massive reclamation and fortification campaign of the features it occupies within its claimed “nine-dash line.”16 Furthermore, in 2012, China Coast Guard ships wrested control of the disputed Scarborough Reef from the Philippines.17”

† China’s maritime militia, a quasi-military force of fishermen that are tasked by and report to the PLA, has a key role in China’s South China Sea strategy. They are trained to participate in a variety of missions, including search and rescue, reconnaissance, deception operations, law enforcement, and “rights protection,” which often entails activities like harassing foreign vessels in China’s claimed waters. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, May 15, 2017, 56; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016 Annual Report to Congress, November 2016, 197; Andrew Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Fishing Militia Is a Military Force in All but Name,” War Is Boring, July 9, 2016.

 p. 252

South China Sea Contingency Operation

China’s military, law enforcement, and maritime militia activity in the South China Sea—particularly the ongoing construction of civil-military facilities on reclaimed features in the Spratly Islands—is intended to enhance China’s control over disputed areas in the region.100 Should Beijing judge that China’s sovereignty claims over occupied features within the South China Sea are challenged by states with overlapping claims, the PLA has a range of campaigns that can be executed to maintain control of these features within the nine-dash line. These campaigns include the aforementioned joint firepower strike, joint blockade, sea force group, and coral reef offensive campaigns. China would certainly incorporate maritime law enforcement operations in conjunction with these campaigns, as well as in the run-up to one or more of these campaigns. This will have significant implications for a contingency in the South China Sea or East China Sea. As numerous analysts have noted, China’s unconventional practice of using its maritime law enforcement agencies and maritime militia to advance its territorial claims and harass neighboring countries’ vessels enables China to effectively assert military might in the “gray zone,” just below the threshold of conflict, putting the onus of escalation on the adversary.101 This approach was on display in the case of the oil rig deployed to Vietnam-claimed waters, discussed earlier in this section: Chinese maritime law enforcement forces effectively waged a small maritime” …

  1. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, April 26, 2016, 7.
  2. Lyle J. Morris, “The New ‘Normal’ in the East China Sea,” Diplomat, February 24, 2017; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” National Interest, July 6, 2016; Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The PLA and Near Seas Maritime Sovereignty Disputes,” in Andrew Scobell et al., eds., The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China, National Defense University Press, 2015, 290–291.

 p. 253

… “battle against Vietnam, to the point that at least one Vietnamese vessel sank and several vessels on both sides incurred damage. But because only nonmilitary vessels were involved in the actual fighting, this conflict was characterized in international media as a “standoff,”102 rather than a kinetic conflict initiated by China. This narrative, and the general downplaying of the role maritime law enforcement forces can play in a conflict, greatly benefits China.”

p. 262

  • “After seizing control of Scarborough Reef from the Philippines in 2012, China has intermittently permitted Filipino fishermen to fish at the reef and has harassed some Filipino fishermen;186 this dispute remains a flashpoint between the two countries.187
  • In March 2017, China declared its intent to build an environmental monitoring station near Scarborough Reef.188 The Philippines government has declared that any Chinese building at Scarborough would be a “red line.”189 Should China seek to alter the reef through land reclamation or the deployment of PLA equipment such as surface search radars, this would certainly increase tension between the two countries.*
  • Second Thomas Shoal—where Filipino Marines man a makeshift outpost on the Sierra Madre, a grounded Philippine Navy amphibious ship—is another potential flashpoint.190 China has often challenged the resupply of the grounded ship and threatened to destroy the outpost.† 191
  • In April 2017, President Duterte declared the AFP would “occupy” all Philippines-claimed features in the Spratly Islands.192 Although he later walked back the statement,193 it illustrates the high level of tension that still pervades the China-Philippines relationship with regard to the South China Sea.”

*In addition to the likelihood that land reclamation activity at Scarborough Reef would in- crease tensions between China and the Philippines, Andrew S. Erickson, a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, in his testimony to the Commission stated, “It’s important to ensure that Scarborough [Reef] is not dredged and developed into a key targeting node for China in the South China Sea, where it would, in effect, be the last big piece in the coverage puzzle.” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, oral testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.

p. 351

Commercial and semiofficial Chinese actors, such as fishing boats and vessels that are part of China’s maritime militia,* have accounted for the majority of China’s maritime activity near the Senkakus.219 In August 2016, China deployed roughly 230 fishing boats and 15 CCG vessels within 24 nm of the Senkakus—the largest number of vessels China has deployed to the area since tensions spiked in September 2012.220 More than 100 maritime militiamen reportedly were identified on these fishing boats, many of them apparently commanding fishing boats while dressed in Chinese military fatigues.221 With this operation, China demonstrated it can control these vessels and integrate them into operations with law enforcement. This capability has been enabled by multiple joint drills involving Chinese military, law enforcement, and civilian agencies in recent years.222 The huge number of nongovernment vessels at China’s disposal—including roughly 200,000 fishing boats—and the CCG’s growing capabilities increase the possibility that China could swarm and overwhelm the Japan Coast Guard near the Senkakus.223”

*China has the world’s largest maritime militia, a quasi-military force of fishermen that are tasked by and report to the PLA. They are trained to participate in a variety of missions, in- cluding search and rescue, reconnaissance, deception operations, law enforcement, and “rights protection,” which often entails activities like harassing foreign vessels in China’s claimed waters. Andrew Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Fishing Militia Is a Military Force in All but Name,” War Is Boring, July 9, 2016.

 p. 358

With Japan, China has gradually but decisively moved to consolidate its claims in the East China Sea, with its coast guard and maritime militia forces leading the chargeChina’s use of nonmilitary actors to advance its claims handicaps Japan’s ability to mount an effective countervailing force; the Japan Coast Guard is highly capable, but will meet significant difficulties engaging China’s maritime forces. China’s growing competence in conducting “gray zone” operations below the threshold of kinetic military conflict could also complicate the United States’ ability to fulfil its treaty obligation to defend Japan from an armed attack.”

p. 390

The PLA Navy has more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, and missile-armed patrol craft, in addition to China’s highly capable coast guard and maritime militia.162 Taiwan, on the other hand, has 92 naval combatants, comprising four submarines—two of which are only used for training—and 88 surface ships.† 163”

†Taiwan’s coast guard is in the midst of a ten-year shipbuilding program that will bring its forces to 173 ships. Taiwan does not have a maritime militia. Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, “Taiwanese Coast Guard Launches OPV amid Ongoing Force Development Programme,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 28, 2015.

p. 572 

“The PLA Navy is exploring options for unmanned surface vehicles (USVs),159 and some Chinese research institutes have made progress on these systems. However, DGI’s 2016 report assessed that Chinese military strategists appear to be minimally interested in USVs, potentially because China’s maritime militia can already be mobilized for a variety of missions to support the PLA Navy.160”

  1. Jonathan Ray et al., “China’s Industrial and Military Robotics Development,” Defense Group, Inc. Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis (prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission), October 2016, 68.

p. 579

“China has often relied on foreign technology to boost its advanced weapons programs. China may have incorporated technologies from the U.S. Pershing II MRBM into its ASBMs,233 and its HGV may be an enhanced version of a MaRV developed for an existing ballistic missile, for example.234”

  1. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, written testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.

LINKS TO FULL TEXT OF SELECTED SOURCES CITED:

Andrew S. Erickson, ed., Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain Course (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016).

Andrew S. Erickson and Adam P. Liff, “China’s Military Spending Swells Again Despite Domestic Headwinds,” China Real Time Report (中国实时报), Wall Street Journal, 5 March 2015.

Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,” The China Quarterly 216 (December 2013): 805-30.

Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting,” Asian Security, 8.2 (Summer 2012): 115-37.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Fishing Militia Is a Military Force in All but Name,” War Is Boring (Blog), 9 July 2016.

Reprint of Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” The National Interest, 6 July 2016.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development and Counter-intervention Efforts,” testimony at Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons held by U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, 23 February 2017.

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China’s Strategic Rocket Force: Sharpening the Sword (Part 1 of 2),” Jamestown China Brief 14.13 (3 July 2014).

Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, [Xu Qi], “21世纪初海上地缘战略与中国海军的发展” [Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early 21st Century], 中国军事科学 [China Military Science] 17.4 (2004): 75-81, Naval War College Review  59.4 (Autumn 2006): 46-67.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” The National Interest, 6 July 2016.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Showtime: China Reveals Two ‘Carrier-Killer’ Missiles,” The National Interest, 3 September 2015.

Timothy Heath and Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Turn Toward Regional Restructuring, Counter-Intervention: A Review of Authoritative Sources,” Jamestown China Brief 15.22(16 November 2015): 3-8.

Andrew S. Erickson and Michael Monti, “Trouble Ahead? Chinese-Korean Disputes May Intensify,” The National Interest, 20 February 2015.

Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, May 2013).

Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “Guam and American Security in the Pacific,” in Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson, eds., Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 14-35.

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “Understanding China’s Third Sea Force: The Maritime Militia,” Harvard Fairbank Center Blog Post, 8 September 2017.

Andrew S. Erickson, professor at the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and Fairbank Center Associate in Research, outlines China’s evolving maritime security forces.

China’s Armed Forces are composed of three major organizations, each of which has a maritime subcomponent. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) contains the PLA Navy (PLAN); the People’s Armed Police, which increasingly leads China’s Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) forces, including the China Coast Guard; and the Militia, which contains a growing proportion of sea-based units, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Each of China’s three sea forces is the world’s largest of its type.

First, China has the world’s largest navy. The U.S. Naval War College’s CMSI analyzed China’s fleet force development in its previous conference volume, Chinese Naval Shipbuilding. The PLAN currently has slightly over 300 vessels; by 2020, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence forecasts that it will have 313–342 warships. According to its official website, as of September 2017 the U.S. Navy has 277 “deployable battle force ships.” While Chinese warships lag behind their American counterparts in individual capabilities — a “mandarin oranges to apples” comparison — numbers matter significantly when it comes to maintaining presence and influence in vital seas.

Second, China has the world’s largest coast guard by a sizable margin. Today, China’s Coast Guard has 225 ships over 500 tons capable of operating offshore, and another 1,050+ confined to closer waters, for a total of over 1,275 ships: more hulls than the coast guards of all its regional neighbors combined. China has two of the world’s largest coast guard ships (10,000+ tons full load). In 2020, China’s Coast Guard is projected to have a total of 1,300+ ships: 260 large vessels capable of operating offshore, many capable of operating worldwide; and another 1,050+ smaller vessels confined to closer waters.

Third, China has the world’s largest maritime militia, and virtually the only one charged with involvement in sovereignty disputes. Only Vietnam is known to have a similar force with a similar mission. China’s PAFMM is a set of mariners and their vessels which are trained, equipped, and organized directly by the PLA’s local military commands. While at sea, these units typically answer to the PLA chain of command, and are certain to do so when activated for missions. While most militiamen have civilian jobs, new units are emerging that appear to employ elite forces full-time as militarized professionals. … …

***

China Maritime Studies Institute Faculty Brings China’s Maritime Militia Out of the Shadows,” The Beacon: U.S. Naval War College Newsletter 1.3 (August 2017): 14.

As part of an intensive multi-year project, Professor Andrew Erickson and Research Associate Conor Kennedy of the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) have illuminated China’s use of a Maritime Militia to overpower its neighbors and advance Beijing’s control over the South China Sea. Since July 2015, they have authored more than twenty articles and papers and delivered numerous briefings to fleet planners, senior decision-makers, and other stakeholders. Professor Erickson has also testified on this topic before the House Armed Services Committee and briefed repeatedly at OPNAV and the National Security Council. (See Erickson and Kennedy’s China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA and Professor Ryan Martinson’s The Arming of China’s Maritime Frontier.)

Using CMSI’s interdisciplinary open source methodology to evaluate hundreds of original Chinese-language sources, this project has revealed Chinese Maritime Militia involvement in international sea incidents of significant concern to the United States and its regional allies and partners.

Building on this research, Professor Erickson and Professor Ryan Martinson organized May’s CMSI conference on “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.” They are editing the resulting Naval Institute Press volume, which scrutinizes China’s Maritime Militia and Coast Guard, and the central role they play in maritime operations designed to overwhelm or coerce an opponent through activities not easily countered without escalating to war.

Below: Professor Erickson gives Congressional testimony concerning China’s Maritime Militia

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “New Pentagon China Report Highlights the Rise of Beijing’s Maritime Militia,” The National Interest, 7 June 2017.

Pentagon experts have finally keyed in on one of the most important aspects of China’s strategy to dominate the waterways of the Asia-Pacific.

Issued yesterday, the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on China’s military and security developments contains a typically vast array of data, some publicly specified or confirmed for the first time. Among its 106 pages—arguably the most significant development is its unprecedented coverage of China’s maritime militia—the first official U.S. government assessment to call it out in public. This is a long overdue and welcome breakthrough: the shadowy but knowable force’s vanguard units are literally on the front lines of Beijing’s efforts to overpower its neighbors and advance its control over the South China Sea.

Together with the world’s largest Coast Guard, and with China’s Navy backstopping in an “overwatch” capacity, China’s maritime militia plays a central role in maritime activities designed to overwhelm or coerce an opponent through activities cannot be easily countered without escalating to war. The report terms this approach “low-intensity coercion in maritime disputes.” Leading elements of China’s maritime militia have already played frontline roles in manifold Chinese incidents and skirmishes with foreign mariners throughout the South China Sea. Such international-sea incidents of significant concern to the United States and its regional allies and partners include multiple contributions to furthering China’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.

China maritime-militia forces played a central role in the 1974 battle in which China seized the western Paracel Islands from Vietnam. More recently, as the report documents, they “played significant roles in . . . the 2011 harassment of Vietnamese survey vessels.” They harassed USNS Impeccable in international waters in 2009. They helped trigger the 2012 incident in which they ultimately supported other Chinese forces in seizing Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines. They engaged in reconnaissance and sovereignty patrols during China’s February 2014 blockade of Philippine resupply of Second Thomas Shoal. They played the frontline role in the 2014 repulsion of Vietnamese vessels from disputed waters surrounding China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s HYSY-981 oil rig.

The militia is a key component of China’s armed forces and its maritime subcomponent is the Third Sea Force of China. China’s maritime militia is a set of marine industry workers (typically fishermen) and their vessels trained, equipped, organized and commanded directly by the local military commands of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These units typically answer to the PLA chain of command, and are certain to do so when activated for international-sea incidents pre-planned by Beijing. While most militiamen have civilian jobs, new units are emerging that appear to employ elite forces full-time as militarized professionals. Directed participation by China maritime-militia forces in international-sea incidents or provocations occurs under the PLA chain of command, and sometimes also under the temporary command of the Chinese maritime law-enforcement agencies.

Here’s why the Pentagon’s publicizing of China’s maritime-militia matters: it is strongest—and most effective—when it can lurk in the shadows. But the Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute’s two-and-a-half-year study—and more than twenty articles, papers and briefings—reveals that there is more than enough open-source information available to expose China’s maritime militia for what it is: a state-organized, state-developed and state-controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct Chinese state-sponsored activities.

By revealing the maritime militia’s true nature and “calling it out” in public, the U.S. government can remove the force’s plausible deniability, reduce its room for maneuver, and reduce the chances that China’s leaders will employ it dangerously in future encounters with American and allied vessels at sea. The very few previous U.S. government-related statements were not top-level official assessments, and hence did not have the full force and influence of the U.S. government behind them. China’s maritime militia was mentioned by Adm. Scott Swift, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet; by Ronald O’Rourke in his Congressional Research Service report on Chinese maritime disputes; and by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which rightly recommended that the Department of Defense address this vital subject. But the Pentagon’s new report is the first official top-level assessment by the U.S. government to cover China’s maritime militia. It is extremely encouraging that the U.S. government has finally brought to bear the full force of its authority and its tremendous analytical capabilities to address this vital issue.

Unique Insights

Beyond its maritime-militia coverage, the report offers a treasure trove of other insights. Some areas, particularly broader strategic points and basic force-structure elements, are well known to PLA analysts outside the U.S. government but are conveniently compiled in a go-to source for many in Washington not normally focused on the subject. A number of specific points, however, are difficult—if not impossible—to corroborate or even learn through open sources. The report contains too many insights to enumerate them all here, and is best read in full—or at least skimmed directly. The following surveys some of the most important and interesting highlights from both categories. … … …

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION & ANALYSIS:

In a long-overdue and welcome breakthrough, the Pentagon’s latest report on China’s Military and Security Developments contains substantial content on China’s Maritime Militia.

Previously, China’s Maritime Militia was mentioned by Ronald O’Rourke in his Congressional Research Service report and by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which recommended that the Department of Defense address this vital subject.

But the Pentagon’s new report is the first official top-level assessment by the U.S. government to cover China’s Maritime Militia. It is extremely encouraging that the U.S. government has finally brought to bear the full force of its authority and its tremendous analytical capabilities to address this vital issue.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017 (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 6 June 2017).

p. i

China has leveraged its growing power to assert its sovereignty claims over features in the East and South China Seas. China has used coercive tactics, such as the use of law enforcement vessels and its maritime militia, to enforce maritime claims and advance its interests in ways that are calculated to fall below the threshold of provoking conflict.

p. 12

CHINA’S USE OF LOW-INTENSITY COERCION IN MARITIME DISPUTES

China continues to exercise low-intensity coercion to advance its claims in the East and South China Seas. During periods of tension, official statements and state media seek to portray China as reactive. China uses an opportunistically timed progression of incremental but intensifying steps to attempt to increase effective control over disputed areas and avoid escalation to military conflict. China also uses economic incentives and punitive trade policies to deter opposition to China’s actions in the region. In 2016, China used CCG, maritime militia, and fishing ships to surge its maritime presence at various disputed South China Sea features following July’s arbitration ruling. At the same time, it extended economic cooperation in exchange for shelving disputes with the Philippines. Conversely, China restricted Philippine fruit imports during the height of Scarborough Reef tensions in 2012.

p. 56

China Maritime Militia (CMM). The CMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization to perform basic support duties. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely from one location to another. The composition and mission of each unit is based on local conditions and personnel skills. In the South China Sea, the CMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part of broader PRC military doctrine that states that confrontational operations short of war can be an effective means of accomplishing political objectives. A large number of CMM vessels train with and support the PLAN and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, protecting fisheries, logistics, search and rescue (SAR), and surveillance and reconnaissance. The government subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia vessels to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular commercial roles. The CMM has played significant roles in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the 2011 harassment of Vietnamese survey vessels, the 2012 Scarborough Reef standoff, and the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig standoff. In the past, the CMM rented fishing vessels from companies or individual fishermen, but it appears that China is building a state-owned fishing fleet for its maritime militia force in the South China Sea. Hainan Province, adjacent to the South China Sea, has ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels for Sansha City.

***

HERE’S A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIA:

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, March 2017).

China’s Third Sea Force,

The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia:

Tethered to the PLA

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson[1]

China Maritime Report No. 1

March 2017

China Maritime Studies Institute

U.S. Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island 

Summary

Amid growing awareness that China’s Maritime Militia acts as a Third Sea Force which has been involved in international sea incidents, it is necessary for decision-makers who may face such contingencies to understand the Maritime Militia’s role in China’s armed forces. Chinese-language open sources reveal a tremendous amount about Maritime Militia activities, both in coordination with and independent of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Using well-documented evidence from the authors’ extensive open source research, this report seeks to clarify the Maritime Militia’s exact identity, organization, and connection to the PLA as a reserve force that plays a parallel and supporting role to the PLA. Despite being a separate component of China’s People’s Armed Forces (PAF), the militia are organized and commanded directly by the PLA’s local military commands. The militia’s status as a separate non-PLA force whose units act as “helpers of the PLA” (解放军的助手)[2] is further reflected in China’s practice of carrying out “joint military, law enforcement, and civilian [Navy-Maritime Law Enforcement-Maritime Militia] defense” (军警民联防). To more accurately capture the identity of the Maritime Militia, the authors propose referring to these irregular forces as the “People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia” (PAFMM).

Like a tetherball, the PAFMM may be sent in many different directions when contacted by different players in the Chinese security space, but is often directed by the PLA and always remains tied to the PLA.

Key points:

  • Leading elements of China’s Maritime Militia have already played frontline roles in manifold Chinese incidents and skirmishes with foreign mariners throughout the South China Sea.
  • The Militia is a key component of China’s Armed Forces and a part of what it calls the “People’s Armed Forces System” (人武系统).[3]
  • China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is therefore the most accurate name for this Third Sea Force of China.
  • Directed participation by PAFMM forces in international sea incidents or provocations occurs under the PLA chain of command, and sometimes also under the temporary command of the Chinese Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE).
  • The PAFMM is thus a state-organized, -developed, and -controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct Chinese state-sponsored activities.

Command and Control

China boasts the world’s largest fishing fleet. A portion of its thousands of fishing vessels, and the thousands of people who work on them and in related industries, are registered in the Maritime Militia.[4] China’s PAFMM is an armed mass organization primarily comprising mariners working in the civilian economy who are trained and can be mobilized to defend and advance China’s maritime territorial claims, protect “maritime rights and interests,” and support the PLA Navy (PLAN) in wartime.

China’s People’s Armed Forces include the PLA, People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the militia, of which the PAF Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a subset. As militia, members of the PAFMM typically retain their regular civilian employment while fulfilling their scheduled training and providing their service on demand for multifarious state-sponsored activities. To fully understand the PAFMM, it is critical to assess the institutional relationship between the PLA and the militia broadly.

Militia building typically involves a separate system in the armed forces, termed the “militia system” (民兵制度). The most recent official public description, in China’s 2013 Defense White Paper, states that they serve “as an assistant and backup force of the PLA.” While the militia is classified as a reserve force (后备力量), it should not be confused with the actual reserves of the PLA services (预备役部队). China builds the militia and the PLA reserves simultaneously as two separate components of its reserve force system.[5] Authoritative Chinese writings typically refer to the militia as “China militia” (中国民兵), essentially a reserve force that plays a parallel and supporting role to the PLA. This confers three responsibilities: first, to support the PLA in defending China from external threats, and second, to assist China’s domestic security forces to ensure social stability and to engage in disaster relief.

The militia has a military organizational structure and, despite being a separate component of China’s armed forces, is organized and commanded directly by the PLA’s local military commands.[6] Its forces are subject to the “dual-responsibility system” (双重领导) at the core of civil-military leadership over local forces. This system is implemented through multiple institutionalized mechanisms whereby local military and civilian leaders serve in posts on each other’s Party Committees that oversee militia work. Civilian leadership involvement in local military commands’ work helps ensure ‘Party control of the gun’ and creates useful synergies by leveraging local civilian resources.[7]

Fundamentally, militia units are local forces levied by provincial governments to support national defense efforts. This is reflected in the interactions between local civilian and military leaders. National militia work policies are prescribed for the provinces by the Central Military Commission’s National Defense Mobilization Department, currently headed by PLA Generals. The PLA Provincial Military Districts (MD) send their militia force requirements to the provincial government/Party apparatuses, which then plan and fund construction of the militia in their social and economic plans.[8] The local PLA commands (MDs, Military Subdistricts, and People’s Armed Forces Departments/PAFDs) then organize, train, and command the militia units. When required, other maritime-related government departments also help local military and government authorities to construct the PAFMM. For example, local branches of MLE agencies such as the Maritime Safety Administration and the China Coast Guard (CCG) provide safety or technical training pertinent to their departmental specialties.[9] Both central and provincial governments provide funding for the militia.[10] Local governments cover lost wages or damages incurred by militia personnel in training or missions. Since they help foot the bill for militia construction, local governments may call on the units if needed. The militia thus also provide a ready source of manpower for local governments in times of emergencies, such as natural disasters, law enforcement, and search and rescue efforts. This division of responsibilities requires civilian and military leaders to cooperate in militia building.

At the bottom tiers of the PLA local commands are the PAFDs, which link the PAFMM directly to the PLA chain of command. They are divided into county-level and grassroots-level PAFDs.[11]The county-level PAFDs, through which PAFMM communications and directives—such as mobilization and mission orders—must typically pass, are manned by active duty PLA personnel. Below them, the grassroots PAFDs are manned by civilian cadres whose salaries are paid by local governments and sometimes work on a part-time basis. These grassroots PAFDs are the closest interface through which militia interact with the PLA command on a regular basis, as their direct managers for recruitment, planning, organization, training, and policy execution.

The militia’s status as a separate non-PLA armed force is further reflected in China’s practice of conducting “joint military, law enforcement, and civilian defense” (军警民联防). At sea, this takes the form of “joint PLAN, MLE, and Maritime Militia [PAFMM] defense.”[12] Managing this joint defense system is a key responsibility of PLA commands located in border and coastal regions, such as the Sansha Garrison on Woody Island in the Paracels. These efforts are meant to integrate and coordinate local forces, such as the PAFMM and the PAP, vis-à-vis the PLA services’ joint warfighting operations. These dedicated efforts to incorporate local forces into broader joint operations seek to enable the PAFMM to operate effectively in such close coordination with the PLA services. Official Chinese sources indicate that leading PAFMM units are receiving military training directly from uniformed PLAN personnel while wearing their own militia uniforms.[13] Their vessels conduct exercises with PLAN and CCG vessels. To incentivize such risky state service, localities provide PAFMM personnel with a range of periodically-adjusted compensation and remuneration, including substantial pensions, social benefits, and subsidies.

Militia units established to specifically support PLA services, called “Service Support Detachments” (军兵种民兵分队), have also received greater emphasis over the past decade.[14]“Specialized Naval Militia Detachments” (海军民兵专业分队), created jointly by Military Subdistricts and the PLAN, train to provide specified support for naval combat operations. While the types of units vary significantly, the specialized naval militia detachments appear to draw upon technical professionals and former PLAN sailors for unit personnel, and to requisition fishing vessels for missions.[15] Unlike other PAFMM units that also carry out peacetime missions in support of China’s maritime claims, this subset of PAFMM enjoys a particularly close relationship with the PLAN and likely focuses heavily on combat scenarios.

Chinese leaders clearly see value in the PAFMM’s blurred status.[16] Among the chief motivations for building the militia is that it is not technically a direct subcomponent of the PLA. This rationale was also present during the establishment of the PAP in 1982 as an internal security force to relieve the PLA of the controversial task of suppressing domestic unrest. Such ambiguity affords the PAFMM great leeway in supporting China’s national interests and maritime claims.[17] It offers freedom to act in ways that would otherwise tarnish the PLA’s professional image and heighten escalation risks.[18] For example, an article run on the PLAN’s website described the advantages civilian identities afford PAFMM forces in terms of the “Three Warfares.” According to the author, PAFMM forces can “utilize their identities as civilians to create concern for maritime rights protection, spread maritime rights protection thought, display the determination and confidence of the nation’s people in protecting maritime rights and interests, makes gains in public opinion space, and occupy our rightful moral high ground.” The author also states that PAFMM personnel enjoy civilian liberties denied to active duty troops in the expression of policy, allowing them to guide public opinion in maritime affairs.[19] Having a third sea force that can keep a low profile and engage in deception while remaining subject to PLA command and control thus appears to be an essential motivation for China’s retention of a body that might appear crude and unprofessional in some respects.

The PAFMM contributes to China’s overall national defense mobilization work and is subject to the dual-leadership of local civilian and military organs. Thus, it is a unique component of China’s armed forces that is both separate from, and bound to, the PLA.

See Figure 1 (below) for a graphic depiction of PAFMM organization.

China's People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia Organization

Notes for Figure 1 (above):

1) Command of the PAFMM depends on the conditions prompting its mobilization in the first place, both in peace and in war. Generally, the MD chain of command exercises command over the PAFMM until operational command is delegated temporarily to the PLAN or CCG.[20] The PAFMM serves the Navy in both peacetime and wartime. MLE forces can also call on PAFMM forces for their own missions, but would likely have to provide compensation for the resources, i.e., fuel and labor, expended in such operations.[21] In their non-activated regular capacity as civilians conducting economic activities such as fishing, PAFMM members also maintain subordinate relationships with administrative entities such as the CCG and the PAP Border Defense Force. In all cases, the MD military and civilian leadership would be involved, either directly or at very least in a supervisory role.

2) National Defense Mobilization Committees (国防动员委员会) are consulting and coordinating bodies that assemble each level of civilian and military leadership under a single decision-making organ. Each level of NDMC works to ensure that national resources can be swiftly incorporated into national emergency or war efforts. Following recent PLA organizational reforms, it remains unclear whether there is still a NDMC-level entity between MDs and the State/CMC level, heretofore known as the “Military Region NDMC.” Transforming the former Military Regions into Theater Commands was meant to focus theater level commands’ efforts on joint warfighting rather than on the administrative functions of preparation for mobilization. The lack of Chinese reporting makes verification of this issue particularly difficult. Not reflected in the above organization chart, but also relevant to PAFMM building, are the Border and Coastal Defense Committees (边海防委员会) established in coastal provinces. As with the NDMCs, there is a State Border and Coastal Defense Committee under the unified leadership of the CMC and State Council, as well as Border and Coastal Defense Committees established at each corresponding level of governments and military commands in the provinces. These committees are also consulting and coordinating bodies for implementing defense of China’s land borders and claimed territorial waters, coordinating military and civilian forces under a single decision-making body. It also remains unknown if there will be a Border and Coastal Defense Committee at the former Military Region level, i.e., in the new Theater Commands.

3) Following the latest reforms, former Military Regions have been relieved of their responsibility for the construction of reserve forces in the provinces. MDs are now under the management of the CMC National Defense Mobilization Department. In times of emergency or war, Theater Commands would likely assume a commanding role for militia forces operating within their areas of geographic responsibility.

4) The depiction of three PAFMM units does not represent any specific order of battle or organizational structure, but rather illustrates that multiple Maritime Militia units may exist under an individual PAFD.

Nature of PLA Control in Specific Incidents

While not all PAFMM activities at sea are directly controlled by the PLA in real time, the ones of greatest concern to the United States and its allies and security partners are PLA-affiliated. A PLA-mandated approval process for mobilizing the PAFMM is always involved in events that include its use. Due to the dual-responsibility system, local governments are often involved in providing leadership over PAFMM forces when they are mobilized. Depending on the type of missions assigned, local governments and government agencies will both assume relevant roles to facilitate the missions of the PAFMM, thereby ensuring “unified leadership” (统一领导) between the local military and government organs.

Critically, deliberate participation by PAFMM forces in international sea incidents occurs directly under the PLA chain of command, at least in a supervisory capacity. Moreover, some leading elements of the PAFMM appear to be increasingly professionalized and militarized; the most advanced among them may draw a generous salary with no fishing or other civil economic employment whatsoever.[xxii] This trend would certainly make management and training of the PAFMM easier for PLA authorities. Increasingly capable PAFMM forces may also be bolstered by the continued downsizing of the PLA Army as veterans comprise priority recruitment by MDs. Although the following examples are from the South China Sea, abundant evidence indicates that similar control structures are present in the MDs in coastal provinces bordering the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.

Activities are also initiated by non-PLA organs, albeit with PLA approval, in a general supervisory role attentive to the condition of units and their vessels. These include basic recurrent peacetime tasks such as fishing, typhoon response and other disaster relief organized by local governments, search and rescue missions to assist the CCG, presence missions in disputed waters, and the expulsion of foreign fishermen from Chinese-claimed waters. Examples of non-recurrent assignments not known to involve PLA initiation include the following. In March 2009 Sanya’s Maritime Militia participated in the harassment of the USNS Impeccable. In March 2014, it participated in the search for missing Malaysian Airlines Flight 370, likely within the confines of the South China Sea. In April 2013 Sanya’s Maritime Militia protected China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)’s surveying operations south of Triton Island.

The harassment of the USNS Impeccable is a fitting example. Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLE) under the direction of FLE South China Sea Bureau Director Wu Zhuang commanded the fishing vessels that impeded the U.S. survey vessel’s operations.[xxiii] Having established a PAFMM unit in 2009,[xxiv] the Sanya Fugang Fisheries Company grassroots PAFD would thus have requested mission approval from its superiors in the district or municipal PAFDs in Sanya City, notifying their PLA superiors at a minimum. The degree to which the PLA was involved in harassment of the USNS Impeccable is still unclear; at least one PLAN vessel was on the scene. However, the fact that the Sanya fishing vessels involved were in the PAFMM would necessitate PLA awareness of FLE intentions regarding the incident.

PAFMM activities documented to have been initiated and guided by PLA organs include direct participation in the following international sea incidents pre-planned by China: the 1974 seizure of the Western Paracels from Vietnam, reconnaissance and sovereignty patrols during the February 2014 blockade of Second Thomas Shoal, and the 2014 repulsion of Vietnamese vessels from disputed waters surrounding the CNOOC HYSY-981 oil rig.

The 2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff shows how the PLA can mobilize militia forces already at sea. Available sources do not reveal a direct PLA connection to the initial PAFMM-related encounters that sparked the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff. However, reports on members of the PAFMM unit present and their actions at Scarborough Shoal suggest PLA involvement in subsequent command and control of PAFMM operations to help seize the feature from the Philippines.

When Philippine naval forces arrived at Scarborough Shoal on 10 April 2012, Chinese militiamen from the Port of Tanmen in Hainan Province provided their first reports to a Border Defense Force Control Station located in their home port, which in turn alerted a civilian law enforcement agency (China Marine Surveillance, now part of the CCG) to come to their aid. PAFMM-produced reporting on events at sea is shared among the local military commands, PLAN, and CCG; the Tanmen Maritime Militia alone is credited with providing 510 pieces of “valuable intelligence” in recent years.[xxv] Among the six Tanmen fishing vessels initially inside Scarborough Shoal’s lagoon, two were commanded by known Tanmen Maritime Militia squad leaders Chen Zebo and Xu Detan. The owner of fishing vessel Qionghai 02096 and likely a militia member, Yu Ning, transmitted several messages that alerted the PAP Border Defense Control Station of the unfolding situation and the identity of the approaching Philippine naval vessel BRP Gregorio del Pilar. The station’s attendant then rapidly issued a quick brief that was probably shared with PLAN and MLE forces.[xxvi] While the Tanmen Militia contingent was escorted away after the initial standoff by MLE vessels, their subsequent mobilization and return to the vicinity of the shoal under the company’s deputy commander, who then led the unit from outside the shoal, suggests PLA approval of such mobilization.

The PLA communicates with PAFMM vessels at sea by using a communications suite required by the MD Command to be present aboard all militia vessels. Moreover, to join the PAFMM, a Chinese fishing vessel or enterprise must meet certain capability and reliability requirements before gaining membership; many are thus ineligible. Vessels are inspected to ensure they have the onboard equipment[xxvii] to stay connected to the PAFD and can respond wherever they are located. This is central to the ISR reporting of the PAFMM, a persistent function that occurs regularly and independently outside of missions and training.[xxviii] While exact reporting protocol varies, it appears that PAFMM reporting follows the same channels that their mobilization orders originate from, the MD Command system and their PAFDs, which subsequently is shared with other agencies. During PAFMM personnel training, PAFDs provide specialized training to “information personnel” in target identification and reporting protocol. MLE forces are also involved in these information-sharing channels, but direct PAFMM to MLE vessel reporting requirements remain unclear or perhaps temporary or conditional.[xxix] Nonetheless, PAFMM forces make regular contributions to China’s maritime domain awareness, regardless of mobilization status.

Key Actors: The Leading Units

The PAFMM organizational structure resembles an enormous pyramid with a broad base. The vast majority of the thousands of Maritime Militia personnel and vessels handle relatively mundane tasks, such as supporting basic port security, in undisputed shoreline areas of no direct concern to foreign nations or navies.[xxx] An elite subset is entrusted with operating far from Mainland China’s coastline and monitoring, approaching, and engaging with other foreign sea actors as necessary, including in international sea incidents. This is evident in both articles authored by PLA leaders and actual unit construction.[xxxi]

These advanced units can be defined specifically because they are distinctive and few. They are the frontline irregular forces that the United States and its allies and partners will most likely encounter in the Near Seas (Yellow, East China, and South China Seas). With respect to the South China Sea, most known leading units are based in Hainan Province, which according to Chinese policy statements administers the vast majority of the South China Sea. Four major PAFMM units dominate Hainan’s Maritime Militia operations in the South China Sea. The Danzhou Militia, still active and developing today, is the successor to the militia company that played an important role in the 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands wherein China wrested the Western Paracels from Vietnam. The Tanmen Militia, established in 1985, supported early first-generation-structure construction on such Chinese-occupied Spratly features as Mischief Reef in the 1990s and more recently played a key role in China’s 2012 takeover of Scarborough Shoal. President Xi Jinping visited the Tanmen Militia in April 2013. Sanya City’s Maritime Militia had a frontline role in disrupting USNS Impeccable’s operations in March 2009. Maritime Militia units from across Hainan Province, including key units from Sanya and Tanmen, participated in the two-month-long incident over an oil rig placed inside Vietnam’s claimed EEZ in 2014.[xxxii] The latest leading unit is the Sansha City Maritime Militia headquartered on the Paracels’ Woody Island, a prefectural-level city responsible for administering China’s South China Sea claims, including in the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal, and the Spratlys.

In Sansha, China is generating a new model for PAFMM development. The militia in the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company was established to be a professional paramilitary force first and foremost, with fishing a secondary mission at best. Sansha Maritime Militia members have been photographed loading crates labeled “light weapons” onto one of their several dozen newly delivered large vessels, all of which boast mast-mounted water cannons, collision-absorbing rails, and reinforced hulls—highly useful features for aggressive spraying and ramming. The largest Sansha Maritime Militia vessels are 59 meters long with 9 meters beam, and likely displace approximately 750 tons. Their smaller counterparts are likely closer to 600 tons.[xxxiii] All have considerable displacement and are longer than the Parola-class patrol vessels Japan is constructing for the Philippines.[xxxiv] Some of these new ships reportedly have a “weapons and equipment room” and an “ammunition store.”[xxxv]

Sansha is taking the blue hull role in China’s three-tier Navy-MLE-Maritime Militia “joint defense” to a new level of frontline capability, centered on a $6 million command center. This force also operates “informatized” outposts on at least two Paracel Islands that monitor proximal seas. PLA leaders have indicated that these initial outposts will be replicated in the Spratlys, and have begun construction on three other features in the Paracels. Already, the Sansha Garrison has established a PAFD on Fiery Cross Reef and a PAFMM element on Mischief Reef, foreshadowing a future permanent PAFMM presence in the Spratlys.

 

APPENDIX 1: PHOTOS

PAFMM_Identity, Organization & PLA Connection_PHOTO_1

Ta Kung Pao, 14 July 2016: One of Sansha City’s newly-built PAFMM fishing vessels, “Qiongsanshayu 00111” (琼三沙渔), participates in the “2016 Sansha Maritime Emergency Response Exercise” hosted by the Hainan Maritime Safety Administration. Shown in this photo conducting firefighting and rescue operations, this is one example of the new elite PAFMM forces’ vessels under construction for Sansha City.

 

PAFMM_Identity, Organization & PLA Connection_PHOTO_2

China Military Online, 24 September 2016: (Guangdong Province) Zhanjiang Maritime Militia come alongside a PLAN vessel for training. The appearance of these fishing vessels is typical of regular PRC fishing vessels.

 

PAFMM_Identity, Organization & PLA Connection_PHOTO_3

China Military Online, 24 September 2016: (Guangdong Province) Zhanjiang Maritime Militia shown conducting Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) resupply training with the PLAN wearing clearly marked green uniforms. Collar insignia reads “GDMB” (“Guangdong Minbing”). Most militia uniforms only feature the letters “MB” on collar insignia without additional geographic designator abbreviations.

 

PAFMM_Identity, Organization & PLA Connection_PHOTO_4

Hainan Daily, 5 January 2015: (Hainan Province) Tanmen Maritime Militia are assembled wearing a different style of uniform. The Tanmen Maritime Militia have also appeared wearing the army-style green camouflage uniforms shown in the previous photo of the Zhanjiang Maritime Militia.

 

PAFMM_Identity, Organization & PLA Connection_PHOTO_5

China Military Online, 23 July 2016: A PLAN South Sea Fleet base, most likely the Yulin Navy Base given its mobilization of Sanya City’s Maritime Militia in this instance, held a joint defense exercise including PLAN ships, submarines, aircraft, shore-based guided missiles, special forces, and public security forces; as well as both land-based militia and the Maritime Militia. This photo shows a Maritime Militia unit from Sanya City’s Tianya district participating in the exercise, wearing blue uniforms clearly indicating their identity as “Tianya Militia” (天涯民兵) on the shoulder patch.

 

PAFMM_Identity, Organization & PLA Connection_PHOTO_6

The November 2016 issue of China’s Militia covering the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region’s border and coastal defense work featured this image of non-uniformed PAFMM personnel during inspection. The article also described one of the militia’s requisite characteristics as: “putting on military uniforms [they] qualify as soldiers, taking off the uniforms they qualify as citizens” (穿上军装做合格战士, 脱下军装做合格公民).[xxxvi]

APPENDIX 2: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AUTHORS’ PUBLISHED RESEARCH

Andrew S. Erickson, “Passing a Chinese Maritime ‘Trump Test’,” The National Interest, 15 December 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/passing-chinese-maritime-trump-test-18754.

Andrew S. Erickson, “The South China Sea’s Third Force: Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Militia,” Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, Hearing on Seapower and Projection Forces in the South China Sea, Washington, DC, 21 September 2016, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20160921/105309/HHRG-114-AS28-Wstate-EricksonPhDA-20160921.pdf.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Riding a New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 1 September 2016, http://cimsec.org/riding-new-wave-professionalization-militarization-sansha-citys-maritime-militia/27689.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” The National Interest, 6 July 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/countering-chinas-third-sea-force-unmask-maritime-militia-16860.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Chapter 5: China’s Maritime Militia,” in Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (ret.), ed., Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream (Arlington, VA: CNA Corporation, June 2016), 62-83, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2016-U-013646.pdf.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia: What It Is and How to Deal with It,” Foreign Affairs, 23 June 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-06-23/chinasmaritime-militia.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “From Frontier to Frontline: Tanmen Maritime Militia’s Leading Role—Part 2,” CIMSEC, 17 May 2016, http://cimsec.org/frontier-frontline-tanmen-maritime-militias-leading-role-pt-2/25260.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Model Maritime Militia: Tanmen’s Leading Role in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident,” CIMSEC, 26 April 2016, http://cimsec.org/model-maritime-militia-tanmens-leading-role-april-2012-scarborough-shoal-incident/24573.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia,” CNA Corporation, 7 March 2016, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/Chinas-Maritime-Militia.pdf.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Trailblazers in Warfighting: The Maritime Militia of Danzhou,” CIMSEC, 1 February 2016, http://cimsec.org/trailblazers-warfighting-maritime-militia-danzhou/21475.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Daring Vanguard: Introducing Sanya City’s Maritime Militia,” CIMSEC, 5 November 2015, http://cimsec.org/chinas-daring-vanguard-introducing-sanya-citys-maritime-militia/19753.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Irregular Forces at Sea: Not ‘Merely Fishermen’—Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia,” CIMSEC, 2 November 2015, http://cimsec.org/new-cimsec-series-on-irregular-forces-at-sea-not-merely-fishermen-shedding-light-on-chinas-maritime-militia/19624.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Making Waves in the South China Sea,” A ChinaFile Conversation, The Asia Society, 30 October 2015, http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/making-waves-south-china-sea.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Directing China’s ‘Little Blue Men’: Uncovering the Maritime Militia Command Structure,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11 September 2015, https://amti.csis.org/directing-chinas-little-blue-men-uncovering-the-maritime-militia-command-structure/.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Tanmen Militia: China’s ‘Maritime Rights Protection’ Vanguard,” The National Interest, 6 May 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/tanmen-militia-china%E2%80%99s-maritime-rights-protection-vanguard-12816.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Island Builders: The People’s War at Sea,” Foreign Affairs, 9 April 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2015-04-09/china-s-island-builders.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Meet the Chinese Maritime Militia Waging a ‘People’s War at Sea’,” China Real Time Report (中国实时报), Wall Street Journal, 31 March 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/03/31/meet-the-chinese-maritime-militia-waging-a-peoples-war-at-sea/.

Notes:

[1] The views expressed here are the authors’ alone. They do not represent the estimates or policies of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. government. A complete compilation of the authors’ analysis, together with related sources and data, is available at: http://www.andrewerickson.com/2017/03/china-open-source-example-shipyard-details-sansha-maritime-militia-vessel-with-weapons-and-equipment-room-and-ammunition-store/.

[2] “中国武装力量的多样化运用” [The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces], Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, 2013, http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2013-04/16/content_4442839.htm.

[3] China’s “People’s Armed Forces System” is comprised of three bodies of personnel: the civilian People’s Armed Forces Cadres that man the grassroots PAFDs, the staff of grassroots PAFDs—usually veterans, and the militia.

[4] While exact numbers are difficult to calculate from open sources, a rough estimate within an order of magnitude can be established by sifting through reports on PAFMM units in the provinces. The scale and effective strength of a province’s PAFMM force are directly determined by its local conditions, such as the dynamism of its marine economy. The authors’ research on Hainan Province has identified 31 PAFMM units, all of which would be considered fendui (分队) or tactical-level-unit organizations (battalion, company, platoon, squad). While most counties establish at least one company-sized PAFMM unit, their size and capabilities vary tremendously. For example, some units can conduct missions in the Spratlys with their large-tonnage seagoing vessels while others stay in close to shore with their smaller, less capable vessels. Some specialized support units may not even possess vessels organic to their unit and must requisition them when training or conducting missions. In addition to the 31 units the authors have identified, there are also many other smaller militia elements on Hainan Island and stationed at outposts and PRC-occupied features in the South China Sea. One can notionally estimate the total number of personnel and vessels in Hainan’s PAFMM force by assuming that the 31 units are each the rough median size of a PAFMM company (approximately 120 personnel and 10 fishing vessels). This would yield a hypothetical total of 3,720 personnel and 310 vessels.

[5] “国防后备力量” [National Defense Reserve Force], Jinhu County People’s Government Double-Support Office, 20 October 2016, http://www.jinhu.gov.cn/art/2016/10/20/art_96_19469.html.

[6] Local military commands here refer to the levels of organization set up by the PLA in province-level administrative areas, forming what China terms “local military and government” (地方军地). Each military region (军区), recently reformed from 7 Military Regions into 5 Theater Commands (战区), contains several provinces and hence several Provincial Military Districts (省军区). The geographic area of responsibility by each Provincial Military District coincides with the borders of the provincial administrative area. As each province is divided into municipalities, each Provincial Military District is divided into multiple Military Subdistricts (军分区); within each Military Subdistrict are numerous county-level and grassroots People’s Armed Forces Departments. The county level PAFDs are staffed by active-duty personnel while the grassroots PAFDs are non-active duty organizations staffed by “full-time People’s Armed Forces cadres” (专职人民武装干部). The Provincial Military Districts oversee local PLA units and the reserves (both PLA reserves and PAF militia), including the militia work conducted by their subordinate Military Subdistricts and PAFDs within its area of responsibility. Each corresponding level of government in the provinces also shares responsibility for coordinating with their military counterparts, the equivalent level of local military command, to build and support the militia. This civilian-military division of responsibilities mitigates the costs and burdens of militia building on any single department.

[7] Like the PLA, militia units have Party organizations to implement the PLA’s political work. For example, militia companies have a Party branch with a political instructor. Platoons and squads also form Party Small Groups. Party members often become leading cadres in militia units. Party representation ensures Party control of the gun at the micro-levels of militia organization.

[8] Local governments can also make use of their administrative authorities to ensure smooth execution of PAFMM missions and training, as well as coordination among different bureaucracies (Maritime Safety Administration, CCG, etc.) when drafting emergency response plans that may entail mobilization of the militia. Local military commands also work with civilian governments to legislate rules and regulations for the use of PAFMM forces. This dual-responsibility system between local military and government authorities enables deeper civil-military integration and resource sharing in militia construction.

[9] 张践 [Zhang Jian], “围绕 ‘六化’ 抓建 推动海上民兵转型” [Advance the Transformation of Maritime Militia Centered on ‘Six Changes’], National Defense 10 (2015), http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=GUOF201510009&DbName=CJFD2015&DbCode=CJFD; “钦州军分区着力提升实战能力 – 联训联演建强海上民兵” [The Qinzhou Military Subdistrict Strives to Enhance Combat Capability – Joint Exercises Strengthen the Maritime Militia], China Defense News, 15 July 2015, http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2015-07/15/content_4601890.htm.

[10] To build the militia, the PLA receives direct allocations from central and provincial governments, and is required to submit budgets and reports for approval by government authorities. The PLA manages those funds internally through its chain of logistics departments. In addition, local governments compensate militia personnel directly for wages lost while participating in training. PAFMM costs introduce greater complexity in funding and compensation since elements of the force assist and receive support from multiple bureaucracies, such as MLE forces. Some sources suggest that whoever uses PAFMM units must provide a degree of support for those operations (谁用兵谁保障), implying that CCG may have to provide funding and material support to PAFMM units that it uses. As reflected in the dual-responsibility system of military and civilian leaders over the militia, military and civilian cooperation is required to fund the militia.

[11] Most county PAFDs are regimental grade organizations within the PLA grade structure, while PAFDs established in sub-provincial cities and their districts are deputy divisional grade organizations.

[12] “三沙市推动军警民联防机制 构建三线海上维权格局” [Sansha City Advances its Joint Military, MLE, Militia Defense System—Constructs a Three-line Maritime Rights Protection Layout], China News Online, 22 November 2014, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/11-21/6803776.shtml; Interview with PLA Major General Liu Lianhua: “军队代表: 应从战略层面构建军警民海防体系” [Military Representative: [We] Should Strategically Construct a Military, Police, Militia Maritime Defense System], China News Online, 15 March 2013, http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2013/03/id/922031.shtml.

[13] While a variety of militia uniforms can be observed in photos of militia training and assembly, there is no standard uniform for China’s militia forces. Militia uniforms often feature an insignia on the collar with two parallel lines interspersed with the letters “MB,” an abbreviation of the Chinese word for militia, “minbing.” Identification of PAFMM personnel is particularly difficult as they typically wear no uniforms while conducting operations at sea, thereby exploiting perceived advantages in their role as both military personnel and citizen marine workers.

[14] 刘卫华 [Liu Weihua], “军种主建, 民兵专业分队如何对接?” [Services Focus on Building, How Do Militia Specialized Detachments Correspond?], China Defense News, 27 January 2016, http://www.81.cn/mb/2016-01/27/content_7071697.htm; 吴维满 [Wu Weiman], “中国新型军兵种民兵分队上演兵场, 适应作战需要” [China’s New-type Service Militia Detachments Fielded as Soldiers, Adapting to Operational Requirements], PLA Daily, 27 December 2010, http://mil.sohu.com/20101227/n278525284.shtml.

[15] 郑一冰、钱晓虎 [Zheng Yibing and Qian Xiaohu], “后备新军: 万里海疆试锋刃- 我国海军民兵专业分队扫描” [New Reserve Forces: Testing the Vanguard of the Vast Maritime Frontier—A Review of China’s Naval Militia Specialized Detachments], China’s Militia 4 (2007), http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=MMZG200704042&DbName=cjfd2007&DbCode=CJFD.

[16] Chinese sources express this in variations of a similar phrase, such as “putting on camouflage they qualify as soldiers, taking off camouflage they are law abiding fishermen” (穿上迷彩是合格战士, 脱下迷彩是守法渔民). “广西北海军分区加强海上民兵建设 提升装备效能” [Beihai Military Subdistrict of Guangxi Strengthens Maritime Militia Construction, Increases Equipment Performance], PLA Daily, 6 January 2014, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2014/01-06/5700496.shtml.

[17] “科学构建海上民兵管控体系” [Scientifically Construct a Management System for the Maritime Militia], National Defense 12 (2014), http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=GUOF201412038&DbName=CJFD2014&DbCode=CJFD.

[18] 郑陵晨 [Zheng Lingchen], “发挥好海上民兵优势 打好军民融合攻坚战” [Make Full Use of the Advantages of the Maritime Militia and Fight a Tough Battle in Civil-Military Fusion], China Navy News, 31 October 2016, http://navy.81.cn/content/2016-10/31/content_7334774.htm.

[19] The “Three Warfares” refers to the use of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare to assert influence in support China’s national objectives. For more information, see Elsa Kania, “The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares,” Jamestown: China Brief 16.13 (22 August 2016), https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-latest-strategic-thinking-on-the-three-warfares/; 郑凌晨 [Zheng Lingchen], “发挥好海上民兵优势 – 打好军民融合攻坚战” [Give Full Play to the Advantages of the Maritime Militia – Fighting a Civilian-Military Integrated Battle], China Navy Online, 31 October 2016, http://navy.81.cn/content/2016-10/31/content_7334774.htm.

[20] 徐海峰 [Xu Haifeng], “适应新形势 全面规范海上民兵建设 ” [Adapting to New Circumstances— Comprehensively Standardize Maritime Militia Construction], National Defense, No. 2 (2014), http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=GUOF201402048&DbName=CJFD2014&DbCode=CJFD.

[21] Ibid.

[xxii] This report draws heavily on the authors’ research on PAFMM from Hainan Province operating in the South China Sea, which has identified and evaluated a variety of PAFMM units province-wide. They have identified an elite subset of units greater in capability and readiness than the bulk of other units; as well as recruiting preferences for more experienced mariners and PLA veterans, particularly in the Sansha City Maritime Militia.

[xxiii] Ryan D. Martinson, “From Words to Action: The Creation of the China Coast Guard,” CNA Corporation, 29 July 2015, 20, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/creation-china-coast-guard.pdf; “中国渔政 蓝色国土的守护者” [China’s Fisheries Law Enforcement—Protectors of the Nation’s Blue Territory], Lianjiang City Oceanic and Fisheries Administration Information Network, 22 February 2011, http://www.ljhyj.gov.cn/Shownews.asp?Sid=79.

[xxiv] “林同兴与林心瑞与魏立凤与三亚福港实业有限公司单位行贿罪刑事二审裁定书” [Appeal Ruling on the Lin Tongxing, Lin Xinrui, Wei Lifeng, and Sanya Fugang Fisheries Co. Ltd. Bribery Case], Hainan Province Haikou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, 28 December 2015, http://openlaw.cn/judgement/4386f3505aaf46988c35dca2097d1b60.

[xxv] 王春棠 [Wang Chuntang], “渔民保护神: 海南潭门海上民兵连守护南海29年” [Protectors of the Fishermen: The Hainan Tanmen Maritime Militia Company Guards the South China Sea for 29 Years], Business Daily of International Tourism Island, 6 January 2014, http://sansha.hinews.cn/system/2014/01/06/016357550.shtml.

[xxvi] This dynamic was expressed in 2007 by authors from the PLAN HQ Military Affairs Department and resulted in PAFMM unit construction in Zhejiang Province. “依托海上民船民兵建立侦察信息体系” [Establish a Reconnaissance System Based on Civilian Vessels and Militia], National Defense 6, 2007, http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=GUOF200706034&DbName=cjfd2007&DbCode=CJFD; “浙江省宁波市国动委加强海上动员力量建设记事” [Chronicle of Zhejiang Province, Ningbo City’s National Defense Mobilization Committee Strengthening Construction of Maritime Mobilization Forces], National Defense News, 25 May 2015, http://www.mod.gov.cn/mobilize/2015-05/25/content_4586486.htm; 徐海峰 [Xu Haifeng], “适应新形势 全面规范海上民兵建设” [Adapting to New Circumstances— Comprehensively Standardize Maritime Militia Construction], National Defense, No. 2 (2014), http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=GUOF201402048&DbName=CJFD2014&DbCode=CJFD.

[xxvii] Communications equipment central to fisheries management as well as command of the PAFMM includes China’s indigenous Beidou satellite navigation system, which features transmission capability of 120 Chinese characters per message, conveying significant content thanks to Chinese characters’ unique logographic nature.

[xxviii] 廖刚斌, 王牌, 熊睿 [Liao Gangbin, Wang Pai, and Xiong Rui], “海上民兵分队建设存在的问题与对策” [Issues and Measures in Maritime Militia Unit Construction], National Defense 8 (2014), http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=GUOF201408006&DbName=CJFD2014&DbCode=CJFD; “Scientifically Construct a Management System for the Maritime Militia], National Defense 12 (2014); 徐海峰 [Xu Haifeng], “适应新形势 全面规范海上民兵建设” [Adapting to New Circumstances— Comprehensively Standardize Maritime Militia Construction], National Defense, No. 2 (2014), http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=GUOF201402048&DbName=CJFD2014&DbCode=CJFD.

[xxix] 徐海峰 [Xu Haifeng], “适应新形势 全面规范海上民兵建设” [Adapting to New Circumstances— Comprehensively Standardize Maritime Militia Construction], National Defense, No. 2 (2014), http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=GUOF201402048&DbName=CJFD2014&DbCode=CJFD; “浙江省加强海上民兵建设” [Zhejiang Province Strengthens Maritime Militia Construction], Xinhua Wang, 4 December 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2013-12/04/c_125806747.htm; 徐海峰 [Xu Haifeng], “适应新形势 全面规范海上民兵建设” [Adapting to New Circumstances— Comprehensively Standardize Maritime Militia Construction], National Defense, No. 2 (2014), http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=GUOF201402048&DbName=CJFD2014&DbCode=CJFD; “福安市人武部组织海上民兵信息员集训” [Fu’an City PAFD Organizes Maritime Militia Information Personnel Collective Training], Fujian National Defense Education Network, 19 September 2014, http://mil.fjsen.com/2014-09/19/content_14905500.htm.

[xxx] Among the issues beyond this report’s scope is the great diversity of unit types and functions in militia forces, even within the PAFMM alone. Due to limited capabilities and training resources, many PAFMM units are given a narrow set of mission tasks on which to focus, often in line with their civilian professional specialties, such as transport, medical rescue, supply, and reconnaissance. This division of labor and functional specialization increases the utility of individual units. As mentioned earlier, militia unit sizes are largely restricted to tactical-levels of organization usually employing army-style terms, thereby forming “squads,” “platoons,” “companies,” and “battalions.” Most PAFMM units are typically company-sized and similarly use army terms. Some reports, by contrast, refer to PAFMM units using naval-style terminology such as “squadron” (中队).

[xxxi] After becoming head of the CMC National Defense Mobilization Department’s Militia Reserves Bureau in 2016, Major General Wang Wenqing wrote in National Defense News about solutions to solving PAFMM problems, including the construction of an elite effective maritime militia forces for “year-round missions guarding the ocean frontier.” See “破解海上民兵建设难题” [Resolving Issues in Maritime Militia Construction], National Defense News, 28 July 2016, www.81.cn/gfbmap/content/2016-07/28/content_151895.htm. This is also reflected in articles written by Hainan Provincial Military District Commander Zhang Jian and Political Commissar Liu Xin: 张践 [Zhang Jian], “围绕‘六化’抓建 推动海上民兵转型” [Advance Transformation of the Maritime Militia Centered on Six Changes], National Defense 10 (2015), http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=GUOF201510009&DbName=CJFD2015&DbCode=CJFD; 刘新[Liu Xin], “面向复杂多变海洋安全环境, 着力抓好海上民兵维权准备” [Geared Towards a Complex and Volatile Maritime Security Environment—Focus on Preparing Maritime Militia Rights Protection], National Defense 12 (2015), http://kns55.en.eastview.com/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?recid=&FileName=GUOF201512011&DbName=CJFD2015&DbCode=CJFD.

[xxxii] A knowledgeable source has described to one of the authors his experience aboard a Sanya Maritime Militia vessel. He observed substantial “T-bar” type reinforcements inside the hull. Unlike a normal fishing vessel, there was no sight or smell of anything fish-related. Personnel aboard appeared extremely professional and specialized, with a military-style bearing quite different from that of normal fishermen.

[xxxiii] Tonnage estimates were made by: (1) searching for names of known Sansha Maritime Militia at marinetraffic.com, which lists their respective displacement, length, and beam; (2) using these data and estimating draft at no more than 3 meters for vessels in this size category, and (3) employing a block coefficient to calculate displacement.

[xxxiv] Pia Lee-Brago, “Philippines to Get Nine More Patrol Vessels from Japan,” The Philippine Star, 14 October 2016, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/10/14/1633448/philippines-get-9-more-patrol-vessels-japan.

[xxxv] Guangzhou Taicheng Shipbuilding Industry Co. Ltd. (广州市泰诚船舶工业有限公司) provides services for the vessels produced at Xijiang Shipyard in Liuzhou and Huangpu Wenchong Shipyard in Guangzhou, both subsidiaries of China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC). These shipyards have produced a number of the new vessels built specifically for the Sansha Maritime Militia, and have subcontracted additional companies to install subsystems and finish other interior elements of the fleet’s vessels in preparation for delivery. In December 2015, among its advertised services, Taicheng Shipbuilding’s website featured one of the Sansha Maritime Militia vessels that it furnished for the vessel’s producer, Xijiang Shipyard. It is a light trapping vessel capable of employing a falling net to trap squid, a fairly-common commercial design. However, photos contained on the webpage show it to be the vessel Qiongsanshayu 000212; which other open sources reveal to be a ship in the new fleet of Sansha Maritime Militia vessels delivered to the state-run Sansha City Fisheries Development Company that operate under the guise of fishing. Among the numerous details and specifications concerning Qiongsanshayu 000212’s interior furnishing is a listing of two rooms, respectively titled “weapons and equipment room” (武备库) and “ammunition store” (弹药库). Details available in other open sources, some of which show the Sansha Maritime Militia training to load light weapons onto the deck of these new vessels, help confirm the intended roles and identities of this new militia fleet. “2015年12月西江船厂58.5米灯光罩网渔船交船” [Xijiang Shipyard’s 58.5 Meter Light Trap Falling-net Fishing Vessel Delivered in December 2015], Taicheng Shipyard, 12 December 2015. Original URL: http://www.tcship.com/news-show.php?lm=1&id=20. Complete document and accompanying photos now available at: http://www.andrewerickson.com/2017/03/china-open-source-example-shipyard-details-sansha-maritime-militia-vessel-with-weapons-and-equipment-room-and-ammunition-store/.

[xxxvi] “‘边海’二字重千钧” [“Borders and the Sea” Two Very Serious Words], China’s Militia 11 (2016), 30-32.

***

HERE’S MY RECENT CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY ON CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIA AND WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD DO ABOUT IT:

Andrew S. Erickson, “The South China Sea’s Third Force: Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Militia,” Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, Hearing on Seapower and Projection Forces in the South China Sea, Washington, DC, 21 September 2016.

Click here to watch the hearing on YouTube

I deliver my main testimony (statement) from 1:24:07–1:32:54.

I answer questions from Congressman Randy Forbes on how to address China’s Maritime Militia from 1:40:40–1:43:02, and on why the South China Sea matters to America and Americans from 1:47:02–1:48:22.

I reminisce with Congressman Rick Larsen about our April 2011 trip with four other Members of Congress to military, defense industrial, and government-related facilities in Beijing, Qingdao, Chengdu, and Shanghai and answer a question from him about the utility of a U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy from 2:03:42–2:07:15.

Finally, at the invitation of Chairman Forbes, I offer closing remarks from 2:24:44–2:27:28.

READ THE ARTICLES IN CIMSEC’S NINE-PART SERIES ON CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIA HERE:

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Irregular Forces at Sea: ‘Not Merely Fishermen—Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia’,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 2 November 2015.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Daring Vanguard: Introducing Sanya City’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 5 November 2015.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Trailblazers in Warfighting: The Maritime Militia of Danzhou,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 1 February 2016.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Model Maritime Militia: Tanmen’s Leading Role in the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 21 April 2016.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “From Frontier to Frontline: Tanmen Maritime Militia’s Leading Role—Part 2,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 17 May 2016.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Riding a New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 1 September 2016.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: China Builds a Standing Vanguard, Pt. 1,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 26 March 2017.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: Development Challenges and Opportunities, Pt. 2,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 10 April 2017.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: All Hands on Deck for Sovereignty, Pt. 3,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 26 April 2017.

HERE’S EXTENSIVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CHINA’S ***VERY-KNOWABLE*** MARITIME MILITIA:

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: All Hands on Deck for Sovereignty, Pt. 3,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 26 April 2017.

Part I and II of this conclusion to our series on Hainan’s maritime militia discussed the Hainan Provincial Military District (MD) leadership’s approach to constructing maritime militia forces in response to national militia guidelines and how they address challenges during construction efforts. This final installment in our series offers a glimpse into what the Hainan MD’s efforts have yielded in force scale. It also examines the incentives motivating the builders of this force, such as political drivers and pressures confronting local officials. The conclusion also outlines issues meriting further observation and analysis, such as the significance of the Sansha Maritime Militia force for China’s third sea force more broadly, and the degree to which Chinese officials frame related efforts as part of a “People’s War.”

Although this series has discussed in depth four key locations for maritime militia development, they are part of a far broader effort by the entire Hainan MD. The maritime militia units of Sanya, Danzhou, Tanmen, and Sansha should not be seen in isolation, but rather as elements of the Hainan MD militia force system. Directed by national militia construction guidelines and a highly publicized visit by paramount leader Xi Jinping to the Tanmen Maritime Militia, every other county in Hainan Province has established singular or multiple maritime militia units. These include districts of the provincial capital Haikou and many other directly administered and autonomous counties. Additional noteworthy maritime militia units are located in Lingshui CountyChengmai CountyChangjiang Li Autonomous CountyWanning City, and Dongfang City. While our research to date has not revealed them to be on the same level of the four leading units in the totality of their documented capabilities or achievements, they nonetheless merit further examination. Dongfang and Wanning Cities’ maritime militia, for example, participated in defense of China’s HYSY-981 oil rig alongside the better-known Sanya and Tanmen maritime militia units.

Below is a map depicting all of the 31 maritime militia units under the Hainan MD jurisdiction identified as we conducted research for this series. …

***

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: Development Challenges and Opportunities, Pt. 2,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 10 April 2017.

As it works to improve its maritime militia, Hainan Province is engaged in multiple lines of effort. It confronts many of the same multifarious challenges that other provinces face in constructing their own maritime militia forces. These include strengthening legal frameworks, bolstering incentive structures, constructing infrastructure, and the perennial task of organizing and improving militia training. Hainan thus offers a leading-edge microcosm of the trials and triumphs of Chinese Maritime Militia development, and a bellwether of progress in managing the sprawling effort. Part 1 of this three-part coverage of maritime militia building in Hainan Province surveyed the role of provincial officials and programs, especially at the Provincial Military District (MD) level, as well as their achievements to date; Part 2 now examines in depth the remaining hurdles and bottlenecks that they are grappling with in the process. It will explain specific measures that the Hainan MD is taking to address the abovementioned issues. These include newly promulgated regulations, specific construction projects, breakthroughs in training, increased funding, and examples of the range of direct and indirect benefits maritime militia enjoy through their service.

Challenges in Policy Execution

As explained in Part 1, the Central Military Commission National Defense Mobilization Department (CMC-NDMD) promulgates guidance for nationwide maritime militia work. Provinces, for their part, must flesh out the details in law, plans, and implementation. Numerous reports on the maritime militia by various levels of PLA commands exhort provincial governments to enact more robust laws to help govern the maritime militia. While it is difficult for outsiders to access local laws on the maritime militia, PRC news reports reveal the progress provinces are making in bolstering legal mechanisms for maritime militia mobilization. They often lament the lack of legal basis for fully implementing mobilization work, specifically the lack of legal authority in enforcing and supporting the missions of the maritime militia. One recent report from Zhejiang Province’s Wenzhou City Military Subdistrict (MSD) illuminates these efforts, representing an East China Sea-based case of this broader trend permeating China’s coastal provinces. The Wenzhou MSD struggled to levy fines on maritime militia units that refused to fulfill their duty in training exercises. The abdication of duties by some maritime militiamen triggered an effort by this MSD to evaluate the Wenzhou Court system and the Fisheries Law Enforcement Department, both of which had no legal authority to enact the punishments sought by the Wenzhou MSD.

The MSD therefore established a Maritime Mobilization Office of Legislative Affairs (海上动员法治办公室) to head efforts at drafting local rules and regulations in coordination with the city government. Ensuing maritime militia regulations drawn and passed included “Measures on Maritime Militia Intelligence and Information Incentives” (海上民兵情报信息奖励办法), “Specifications for Maritime Militia Party Organization Construction” (海上民兵党组织建设规范), “Regulations on the Education and Management of Fishing Vessels and Crews on Missions” (任务渔船船员教育管理规定), and other regulations pertaining to the mobilization of reserve forces and requisition of vessels. Troops were reportedly “stunned” when one ship repair yard that refused to cooperate in registering for national defense mobilization was fined and compelled to fulfill its duties. Whereas previous attempts by local military organs to enforce penalties against militiamen abandoning their duties were often described as “loud thunder but little rain,” Wenzhou’s courts now have the teeth to enforce national defense mobilization requisition rules. Additionally, this ordeal shows that military organs have limited legal authority over the militia; and according to Militia Work Regulations (Chapter 8), must rely on local governments or the affiliated enterprise or institution of the perpetrating militia for enforcement. Improved legal measures such as Wenzhou’s allows government and military organs to impose costs for discipline violations in the maritime militia, which directly enhances the maritime militia’s responsiveness and assures their participation in training and missions. The Hainan MD’s leadership has also expressed urgency in strengthening institutional and legal support for its maritime militia development. Specific legal measures appear to be drafted by governments below the provincial level. Like Wenzhou, Sansha City promulgated similar regulations, such as “Measures for the Regular Management of Maritime Militia” and “Rules on the Use of Militia Participating in Maritime Rights Protection and Law Enforcement Actions.”

Significant variation among the economies of each province requires their respective military and civilian authorities to calibrate the incentive structure to motivate their maritime militia units effectively. No single rubric applies, as the Wenzhou MSD discovered when it realized the national standard of fines contained in “Regulations on National Defense Mobilization of Civil Transport Resources” (民用运力国防动员条例) was insufficient to prevent abdication of mobilization duty in economically vibrant Wenzhou. The head of Wenzhou MSD’s Maritime Mobilization Office of Legislative Affairs told reporters in April that compensation for fishing vessel requisition was an example of one area that “requires a great deal of research.” The current standard stipulates that authorities should normally compensate each vessel 10,000 RMB a day, rising to 20,000 RMB a day during the busy fishing season. In Wenzhou’s thriving marine economy, this standard has proven insufficient. The same problem plagued the People’s Armed Forces Department (PAFD) of Yazhou, one of Sanya City’s districts that now host the newly constructed Yazhou Central Fishing Port known to harbor Hainan’s maritime militia forces, as described in the articles on Sanya and Sansha in this series. In addition to hosting Hainan’s maritime militia forces, the Yazhou PAFD has also established its own unit, but experienced difficulties in motivating its unit during the peak period of the fishing season. As Hainan continues to modernize its fishing fleet through vessel upgrades and the replacement of old smaller vessels with larger tonnage fishing vessels, fishing enterprises will attain greater economies of scale. Mitigating lost income due to involvement in maritime militia activities will require increasing compensation.

Parallel efforts to incentivize service help motivate militiamen with financial incentives, including compensation for lost wages, injury, and equipment damage; as well as even reduced insurance costs. A survey conducted by the director of the Sansha Garrison Political Department in 2015 found that 42 percent of Sansha’s maritime militia attached greater importance to “material benefits” than “glory” in their service.

Chinese legislation for the compensation of the military, called the Regulations on Pensions and Preferential Treatments for Servicemen, also applies to the PAP and militia. To further encourage China’s militia to execute their missions, the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ codified the treatment of militia injured, missing, or killed in action in its Measures on the Support and Preferential Treatment of Militia Reserve Personnel Carrying out Diversified Military Missions, effective on 26 September 2014. These measures categorically list the various types of missions and conditions by which the member’s regimental-grade or above PLA commanding unit (county-level PAFDs are regimental-grade units) and the county-level government would determine the status of that member. Missions include supporting the PLA in combat and “participating in maritime rights protection missions.” Militia personnel can be granted the status of “martyr” (烈士), thereby entitling their families to receive money from local governments according to the militia member’s status. For example, survivors of a martyred militia member receive what are known as “Martyr Praise Funds” (褒扬金), equivalent to “30 times the national per capita disposable income.” In addition to “Martyr Praise Funds,” survivors also receive a one-time payment for the member’s “sacrifice in public service” (因公牺牲), equal to 40 months of pay. Under certain circumstances families can also receive annual payments for the militia member’s “sacrifice in public service,” which amounts to a maximum of 21,030 RMB (approximately U.S. $3,235) per the most recent adjustments by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The military is also allowed to offer other “special payments.”

Militia members are also taken care of and provided for if injured and disabled in the course of their duties. Depending on militia members’ status and the classification of disability they fall under, they (or their families) are granted amounts in accordance with PLA disability compensation under the “Disabled Veterans Special Care Regulations” (伤残军人优抚条例). The standards of compensation are adjusted each year as the national average income changes. According to the most recent national adjustments to the standards of compensation, disabled militia members injured in combat can receive a maximum annual payout of 66,230 RMB (approximately U.S. $10,189) — an extremely generous sum in a fishing village. Major General Wang Wenqing wrote in July 2016 that “we must provide suitable treatment and pensions according to the law for those maritime militia that are injured or sacrificed in the course of their service.” In sum, while a number of regulations already exist to assure militia members their families are taken care of no matter what might happen, authorities continue to optimize incentives for their relatively riskier missions. …

***

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Hainan’s Maritime Militia: China Builds a Standing Vanguard, Pt. 1,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 26 March 2017.

Reprinted as Hainan’s Maritime Militia: A Standing Vanguard,” with Conor M. Kennedy, The Maritime Executive, 29 March 2017.

Through the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, the authors have just published China Maritime Report No. 1, entitled “China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA.” In it, they propose a more formal term for China’s maritime militia: the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). The present article, the first in a three-part conclusion to their nine-part series on the PAFMM of Hainan Province, will instead use the term “maritime militia” to maintain consistency with all preceding installments and to facilitate discussion of China’s broader militia construction.

Hainan Province’s unique geography makes its buildup of maritime militia units the spear tip of China’s prosecution of gray zone operations in the South China Sea: as a standing, front-line force whose leading units are lauded as models for other localities to emulate. This series has therefore examined Hainan’s leading maritime militia units, located in SanyaDanzhou, Tanmen (in parts one and two), and Sansha. To understand these grassroots units and their development, it has delved deeply into their respective local environments. Having examined these leading entities in depth, it is time to take a province-wide look at larger policy processes and trends in implementation. This installment will also examine the intentions of China’s leaders to construct new elite militia units tailored to meet heightened requirements in China’s armed forces. This new type of front-line militia will serve as a standing force for more regular employment in support of China’s objectives at sea. Part 1 of this final series will therefore explore maritime militia building in a more systemic organizational context, chiefly at the Provincial Military District level; while Part 2 will address specific challenges and how they are managed. Part 3 will conclude this series by appraising the results of Hainan’s maritime militia construction effort and discussing some additional dynamics at play in the provinces. This first part will thus start by probing how a frontier province like Hainan responds to national level militia building initiatives and the measures taken by provincial leaders to see its implementation. …

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “China Open Source Example: Shipyard Details Sansha Maritime Militia Vessel with ‘Weapons and Equipment Room’ (武备库) and ‘Ammunition Store’ (弹药库),” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 24 March 2017.

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENT:

“2015年12月西江船厂58.5米灯光罩网渔船交船” [Xijiang Shipyard’s 58.5 Meter Light Trap Falling-net Fishing Vessel Delivered in December 2015], Taicheng Shipyard, 12 December 2015. Original URL: http://www.tcship.com/news-show.php?lm=1&id=20.

Guangzhou Taicheng Shipbuilding Industry Co. Ltd. (广州市泰诚船舶工业有限公司) provides services for the vessels produced at Xijiang Shipyard in Liuzhou and Huangpu Wenchong Shipyard in Guangzhou, both subsidiaries of China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC). These shipyards have produced a number of the new vessels built specifically for the Sansha Maritime Militia, and have subcontracted additional companies to install subsystems and finish other interior elements of the fleet’s vessels in preparation for delivery. In December 2015, among its advertised services, Taicheng Shipbuilding’s website featured one of the Sansha Maritime Militia vessels that it furnished for the vessel’s producer, Xijiang Shipyard. It is a light trapping vessel capable of employing a falling net to trap squid, a fairly-common commercial design. However, photos contained on the webpage show it to be the vessel Qiongsanshayu 000212; which other open sources reveal to be a ship in the new fleet of Sansha Maritime Militia vessels delivered to the state-run Sansha City Fisheries Development Company that operate under the guise of fishing. Among the numerous details and specifications concerning Qiongsanshayu 000212’s interior furnishing is a listing of two rooms, respectively titled “weapons and equipment room” (武备库) and “ammunition store” (弹药库). Details available in other open sources, some of which show the Sansha Maritime Militia training to load light weapons onto the deck of these new vessels, help confirm the intended roles and identities of this new militia fleet.

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT TEXT AND PHOTOS:

2015年12月 西江船厂58.5米灯罩渔船交船

2015年12月12日

2015年4月份承接中船西江造船有限公司四条58.5米灯光罩网渔船,在2015年12月陆续交船

 

西江船厂-渔船58.5米

案例简介

1 说明 1.1 灯光罩网渔船内装工程是由我司与中船西江造船有限公司双方协商后签订的。 2适用法规 2.1本船内装工程的设计、选材和施工应符合中华人民共和国农业部渔船检验局《渔业船舶法定检验规则》(2000)、中华人民共和国农业部渔船检验局《钢质海洋渔船建造规范》(1998)对船舶内装的要求。

 

详细内容

 

内装工程内容

1内装区域

内装工程区域为:

驾驶甲板区域:驾驶室,船长室,轮机长室,1号通道,1号盥洗室,报务室,备用室,二人住室。

主甲板区域:1~4号四人室,弹药库,武备库,CO2室,2号通道,储藏室,充放电室,艉镇流器室,2号盥洗室,厨房,餐厅。

主船体区域:监控室。

2我司内装工程范围为船厂提供内装设计图纸的内容,我司提供材料设备供货和安装施工,直至提交验收。

3内装工程范围

3.1内装工程范围是装修区域内除船体结构油漆、绝缘、梯子等以外的内装部分,包括:(1)舱室内装围壁板、天花板的提供与安装。(2)通道扶手、装修舱内梯口栏杆的提供与安装;(3)地板敷料的提供与敷设。(4)舱室家俱的提供与安装;(5)装修区域内的舱室门(蜂窝板门及防火门)的提供与安装。(6)浴室、卫生间的洁具、小五金的供货与安装。(7)窗套、窗帘的提供与安装。

3.2厨房的炉具及设备由船厂订货及安装;风雨密门及窗由船厂订货并安装。

3.3电气设备、空调系统以及管路、电缆、灯具、插座、开关等均由船厂供货与安装。内装区域内的壁板或天花上的设备由我司协助开孔,船厂安装。

3.4外露的电缆、管子、阀件、接头由我司进行装饰性包覆。

  4 技术要求

4.1天花板

4.1.1厨房、1号盥洗室、2号盥洗室等区域的天花板采用25mm厚A型不锈钢复合岩棉板。岩棉板的外表面为0.6mm厚304亚光不锈钢板,内表面为0.6mm厚镀锌钢板。

4.1.2驾驶室,船长室,轮机长室,1号通道,报务室,备用室,二人住室,1~4号四人室,2号通道,餐厅,监控室等区域的天花板采用25mm厚A型复合岩棉板。岩棉板的双表面为0.6mm厚镀锌钢板,可见面贴PVC膜,颜色白色。

4.1.3弹药库,武备库,CO2室,储藏室,充放电室,艉镇流器室等区域的区域不安装天花板。

4.2 壁板

4.2.1 厨房、1号盥洗室、2号盥洗室等区域的围壁采用25mm厚C型不锈钢复合岩棉板。岩棉板的外表面为0.6mm厚304亚光不锈钢板,内表面为0.6mm厚镀锌钢板。

4.2.2驾驶室,船长室,轮机长室,1号通道,报务室,备用室,二人住室,1~4号四人室,2号通道,餐厅,监控室等区域的围壁采用25mm厚C型钢复合岩棉板。岩棉板的双表面为0.6mm厚镀锌钢板,可见面贴PVC膜,颜色白色。

4.2.3 盥洗室内部的隔断板,采用30mm厚不锈钢铝蜂窝板,铝蜂窝板双面0.6mm厚304亚光面不锈钢板。

4.2.4 弹药库,武备库,CO2室,储藏室,充放电室,艉镇流器室等区域不安装围壁板。

5甲板敷料、PVC地板、地砖、防静电地板

5.1厨房、1号盥洗室、2号盥洗室等区域的地面,敷设40mm厚A-15级耐火甲板基层敷料,表面贴8mm厚防滑地砖,颜色米黄。

5.2厨房、1号盥洗室、2号盥洗室等区域的挡水围栏与围壁板间,敷设200mm厚A-15级耐火甲板基层敷料。

5.3驾驶室、轮机长室、1号通道、报务室、备用室、二人住室、1~3号四人室等区域的地面,敷设10mm厚轻质甲板敷料,2mm流平敷料,用专业地板胶粘贴2mm厚PVC地板(浅灰蓝色)。

5.4船长室、2号通道、4号四人室、餐厅等区域的地面,敷设40mm厚A-15级耐火甲板基层敷料,2mm流平敷料,用专业地板胶粘贴2mm厚PVC地板(浅灰蓝色)。

5.5弹药库、武备库等区域的地面,敷设40mm厚A-15级耐火甲板基层敷料,2mm流平敷料,用专业地板胶粘贴5mm厚条纹防滑防静电橡胶地板。

5.6 CO2室,储藏室,充放电室,艉镇流器室等区域的地面,敷设40mm厚A-15级耐火甲板基层敷料,2mm流平敷料。

5.7监控室的地面,在地铺板上用专业地板胶粘贴2mm厚PVC地板(浅灰蓝色)。

5.8 潮湿区域用地砖做地脚线。铺PVC地板的区域安装深棕色PVC地脚线。

6舱室设备

6.1内装舱室的床铺、衣柜、书桌、搁物架、海图桌、文件柜等家具用木芯板制作,木芯板内、外表面均贴木纹防火板(枫木)。

6.2餐厅的餐桌表面为304亚光面不锈钢板。

6.3驾驶室配不锈钢高脚扶手椅。

船长室、轮机长室的沙发用木芯板制作框架,座垫和背靠为黑色真皮软垫。

餐厅配带扶手的靠背椅,椅子框架为不锈钢材料,座垫和背靠为黑色超纤皮。

办公桌前的工作椅为带扶手的靠背椅,椅子框架为不锈钢材料,座垫和背靠为黑色超纤皮。

6.4所有家俱均与壁板、地板连接固定式安装。

衣柜安装平式锁,办公桌安装按拉锁,抽屉配有导轨拉手、匙锁,柜门装烟头铰或不锈钢铰等五金件。床下设有抽屉。配阻燃海棉床垫。

6.5 卫生间内的蹲便器、洗手盆用陶瓷制品,选用尺寸偏小的型号。

6.6淋浴花洒、水龙头、毛巾架、洗浴用品架、手纸盒、衣帽钩等五金件选用304不锈钢制品。

7栏杆、扶手、斜梯

7.1 内通道防浪扶手用¢38X1.5mm不锈钢制作,材料为304不锈钢。

7.2 梯道栏杆用¢32/25X1.5mm不锈钢制作,扶手用¢38X1.5mm不锈钢钢管制作,材料均为304不锈钢。

7.3 由主甲板上驾驶甲板的斜梯踏步敷设PVC地板。

8 门、窗、帘

8.1 非潮湿区域舱室的窗套采用1.0mm厚铝板制作,表面喷白色。

厨房、1号盥洗室、2号盥洗室等舱室的窗套用1.0mm厚304#不锈钢板制作窗套。

8.2非潮湿区域的窗配备窗帘轨,安装阻燃窗帘,颜色由船厂商定。(根据舱室情况现场确定安装窗帘盒)

8.3 双人住室、四人住室的每铺床配备床帘。

8.4 由船厂提供安装的门,由我司制作门套。

8.5我司根据后续页的舱室明细表,提供舱室门(防火门或空腹门)的供货与安装,门板的颜色与内装板的颜色协调。其余风雨密门、水密门为船厂提供及安装。

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “China Open Source Example: Proposal to Hainan Government Reveals Maritime Militia Activities,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 7 February 2017.

SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSAL DOCUMENT:

“关于建设南海渔业后勤补给基地, 发展南海渔业生产的建议” [Proposal on Establishing Fisheries Logistics Supply Bases and Developing Fisheries Production in the South China Sea], submitted to the Hainan Provincial Government, 2 February 2015.

In February 2015, a proposal was submitted to the Hainan Provincial Government calling for financing the construction of fisheries logistics bases in the Spratlys (Mischief and Fiery Cross Reefs) and increasing subsidies to the fishing industry, including subsidies for activities concerning the protection of China’s claimed maritime rights and interests. According to the proposal, these bases would facilitate the management of fisheries production, streamline the processing of aquatic products and transactions, supply materials and provisions, repair fishing vessels, serve as a base for rights protection with a dedicated command center, and support disaster relief efforts.

In making this case, the proposal documents and cites the achievements of the Sanya Fugang Fisheries Maritime Militia between July 2012 and May 2014. These include rights protection presence missions in the Spratlys; and participation in the blockade of Second Thomas Shoal in February 2014, led by the Sanya City People’s Armed Forces Department (PAFD) and assisted by command-and-supply vessel F8168. This advanced People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) unit also received orders to conduct escort missions for China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) on two occasions. The first, in April 2013, was commanded by the Hainan Province People’s Armed Police Border Defense Force. The second occurred when the Guangzhou Military Region Command mobilized Hainan Province’s forces to assist in defending the Haiyang Shiyou (HYSY)-981 Oil Rig.

This document describes in detail the performance of Sanya Fugang Fisheries Maritime Militia during the defense of the oil rig. It states that Fugang’s 29 maritime militia vessels participated in the mission for over two months. This was part of a larger effort in which China’s maritime militia drove away or rammed over 80 Vietnamese armed fishing vessels and crippled three, fighting off over 20 waves of incoming armed Vietnamese fishing vessels. The proposal also states that the general consensus regarding the best way for China to protect its sovereignty in the South China Sea is by first developing and improving its fishing industry there.

ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE PROPOSAL DOCUMENT:

关于建设南海渔业后勤补给基地,发展南海渔业生产的建议编号: 532008    时间: 2015-02-11  Source: The People’s Government of Hainan

发表人: bgtjyta

http://www.hainan.gov.cn/tiandata-rdjy–5636.html

     发展渔业已成为开发南海渔业资源和常态维护南海海洋权益的重要力量,如何提高南海捕捞作业的经济效益与保障海上维权力量的可操作性和持续性至关重要。

提高渔业产业化建设,维护固有南海主权,“渔业必须先行”,这是迄今为止社会各界达成的基本共识!南沙诸岛屿距离我省沿岸路途遥远,浩荡数百乃至上千海里,在南沙生产的渔船执行维权行动时,如果需要补给或者渔船机器发生故障时,难以在第一时间得到后勤保障,反而在渔况好时延误时机、增加海上安全风险。

目前,适宜在南沙作业的设施较先进的渔船已有数十艘,包括1艘排水量3000吨的大型南沙综合补给船,三亚已经初步建立起一支有规模的南海渔业生产船队。

2012年7月,三亚29艘渔船在1艘大型综合补给运输船的带领下,分2个编队,6个小组,一共316名渔民及4名渔政执法人员与10多名新华社等主流媒体记者,历时18日,辗转永暑礁、渚碧礁和美济礁,总航程1756海里,为海南历年首次大规模民间力量赴南沙维权的渔船船队。如果岛礁渔业基础设施建设良好,此次航程会历时更长,收获将会更大。并且在此次航程中,众渔船共同抗击了“韦森特”台风。

2013年4月中旬,中建南油井踩点护航,三亚福港水产实业有限公司配合海南省武警边防总队为我国中建南油井的勘探工作保驾护航,此次维权护航历时近30天。

2014年2月27日至3月28日,三亚福港水产实业有限公司派出琼三亚F8168综合补给船和7 艘大型捕捞渔船,配合三亚人民武装部与仁爱礁内菲律宾坐滩军舰对峙,密切监视期间,民兵与武装部官兵还进行了宣示主权仪式。

2014年5月4日,中建南油井项目安保维权行动,三亚福港公司派遣29艘民兵船队配合广州军区、海南省军分区,维护我国“981”钻井平台正常工作,共同对抗并多批次进行驱赶、撞击和阻挠越南武装渔船80余艘,我方民兵渔船撞损越南3艘渔船,并驱离越南武装渔船20余波次。此次维权行动历时两个多月。

这些壮举极大鼓舞了大量企业和渔民。因此,建设西、中、南沙渔业长效后勤补给基地是刻不容缓的,也是势在必行的!渔业生产领域流行一句话:“打政治鱼,撒主权网”。我们要让五星红旗飘扬在南沙海域,彰显我主权,以大规模的渔业生产将觊觎我南海资源的国家反蚕食出我国的海域。

为此,提出以下建议:

一、扩大南沙捕捞和养殖规模

在实施渔业产业化结构调整政策中,省政府有计划的鼓励和扶持一批渔船和渔户到南海进行捕捞和海水养殖,提高捕捞和养殖规模。南沙海域远离大陆,陆源污染极少,水质达到健康养殖标准,利用渔船捕捞的副渔获物作为饵料,可大大提升养殖产品的质量和水平,从而构建新的经济增长点。

二、建设长效后勤补给基地

目前,南海渔业的基础设施极其简陋,渔船的安全生产和渔民的生命财产得不到保障,是当前发展南海渔业的最大障碍。在美济礁、永暑礁等岛礁建设有一定规模的后勤补给基地,是发展渔业生产的重要基础,迫切需要省级财力给予解决。省政府要建设南海渔业后勤补给基地,形成长效码头、岛礁救援中心、仓储和燃料等后勤保障体系,克服后勤短板,其功能主要有:一是生产指挥功能。有利于生产调度和管理,通过北斗监控、报告、遇险报警、信息数据交换等多功能指挥,避免和减少渔业生产安全、涉外事件发生。二是简易加工与交易功能。新鲜的海产品经过海上的简易加工包装,及时入库,及时在海上岛礁进行交易,避免运输至陆地过程中产生的消耗。三是渔需品保障与后勤补给功能。提供机油、网具等生产资料,加强生活必需品的及时、有效存储与供给。四是渔船维修功能。建设配套功能的船舶维修厂。五是维权基地功能。南沙距离陆地绵延数千海里,若能建立岛礁维权指挥中心,必能克服远距离维权(山高皇帝远)这一短板。六是防灾减灾功能。提供最基本的气象、灾害预防讯息。

三、加大财政补贴

省政府对企业和渔民造大船、购买大船和改造大船要给予适当财政补贴,特别要提高柴油补贴的幅度以及在维权活动中提高补贴额度等。通过采取切实有效的财政扶持政策,鼓励企业和渔民去开发和守护本来就属于我们的南海资源。

*** 

Thomas J. Culora, “Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming,” Comment & Discussion, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 143.1 (January 2017): 8, 76.

(See J. Stavridis, pp. 30–33, December 2016 Proceedings)

Thomas J. Culora, Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College—Admiral Stavridis unpacks the strategic and operational implications and identifies the challenges presented by this asymmetric form of warfare. I commend Admiral Stavridis and the Naval Institute for highlighting this important issue.

Admiral Stavridis admonishes the Naval War College to “take the lead on analyzing this phenomenon, working with the various community tactical centers.” I am pleased to report that during the past two years, the Naval War College has been engaged in a range of efforts across all military and constabulary operations, international law, freedom-of-navigation operations, cyber, and other areas attendant to many of the challenges called out in the article.

This past summer, when the Center for Naval Warfare Studies developed its research agenda for 2017 through 2018, “Gray Zone Conflict” was singled out as a priority for a comprehensive, interdisciplinary research effort in the next 18 months and beyond. This effort will build on the groundbreaking published work by our China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) faculty on China’s maritime militia as well as the research of many other faculty members. The leadership and the faculty understood that, while we had addressed many of the hard and soft power elements, the only way to uncover innovative methods to counter this form of hybrid warfare is through a multidisciplinary, structured approach.

Admiral Stavridis provides a consolidated accounting of the key tenets of hybrid warfare ashore that he rightly suggests provides a framework for analyzing and developing “hybrid warfare from the sea.” Any research and analysis in this area intended to build a comprehensive strategy, outline a concept of operations, and develop the tools and tactics to counter this form of warfare would do well to use these tenets as the foundation for creative thought.

Building on this foundation, it is essential to remember that the current gains garnered by both the Russians, on land in Georgia and the Ukraine, and the Chinese, in the South China Sea, were achieved through well-calculated risk that triangulated an incremental series of steps to gauge potential opponents’ tolerance and reaction. This was coupled with the use of non-traditional, hazy, hybrid forces and underpinned by classic deception and disinformation campaigns leveraged by the millennial tools of the internet, social media, and offensive cyber activities highlighted in the article. Most things worth achieving involve some level of risk; Moscow and Beijing have not shied away from taking risks and are reaping the rewards of their shrewd calculations.

Thus, approaches to counter gray zone exploits by would-be aggressors, be they nation-state or transnational actors, must address the range of risks and the attendant opportunities. To date, countering gray zone operations is seemingly intractable, as evidenced by the either anemic or non-existent responses to current and past activities. Any analysis conducted by the Naval War College, or others elsewhere, must candidly identify to U.S. military and civilian leadership the risks and rewards among a range of whole-of-government, cross-domain activities and provide a menu of options and actions. Without a full appreciation of the risks and rewards, and the grit and fortitude to take those risks, countering maritime hybrid warfare will remain intractable. As does Admiral Stavridis, we at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies take this challenge very seriously.

*** 

Andrew S. Erickson, “Passing a Chinese Maritime ‘Trump Test’,” The National Interest, 15 December 2016.

If the past is any guide, China may test the new administration early on. Beijing’s “maritime militia” could play an important part.

China’s Leninist leadership has rightly been termed the “high church of realpolitik.” Beijing’s leaders believe that even small changes in foreign leaders, correlation of forces, or the relative balance of power have important significance. If they appear in flux, China probes for opportunities. If meeting minimal or manageable resistance, it then pushes further to gain ground. Given the particular uncertainty concerning President-elect Donald Trump’s outlook and policies, and Beijing’s indignation at his statements already regarding both mainland China and Taiwan, he may even face probing without the typical “grace period” arguably accorded his predecessors. How Trump handles such pressure will reverberate across the Asia-Pacific and around the world.

In recent years, China has tested each new American president. The past two faced an early challenge: George W. Bush with increasingly aggressive aircraft intercepts that triggered the April 2001 EP-3 crisis, Barack Obama with the March 2009 Impeccable incident. China appears to engineer tensions or activities to assess a president’s position in an area of its interest and to attempt to alter his decision-making to Beijing’s preferences. While motivations are hard to prove, Trump and his team must certainly prepare for the possibility that at some point Beijing—having never “forgotten” whatever statements and actions may accumulate despite its objections—will push back in a manner that effectively poses a test.

If the past is any guide, Chinese leaders may test the new administration early on. While a trial could take many forms, the last two presidential tests revolved around U.S. surveillance operations in international airspace and waters, to which Beijing continually objects. Given current Sino-American friction points, one possible scenario involves the South China Sea, U.S. Navy vessels, and China’s Maritime Militia. Such a “Trump Test” could involve China’s maritime militia harassing the operations of U.S. warships or surveillance ships in hope that he could be pressured to reduce such activities, thereby accommodating Chinese sovereignty promotion efforts. It might include not only direct tests of U.S. resolve, but also that of America’s regional allies and partners and its commitment toward them; particularly given uncertainty over how the Trump Administration intends to handle longstanding alliances and partnerships. China may see this as an opportunity to weaken the alliance system, which it opposes vehemently. Here the East and South China Seas are equally likely arenas, with Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia among the leading potential targets. Either way, the Obama Administration’s failure to publicly acknowledge the asymmetric challenge of China’s Maritime Militia on its watch contributes to a looming disconnect in which Beijing and Washington or one of its allies or partners may (eventually) be headed for a tense encounter or incident at sea, without sufficient preparations for its effective management.

Beijing’s broader South China Sea strategy includes advancing disputed claims where it can, delaying resolution of issues it cannot yet settle in its favor, and coercing potential opponents while limiting escalation. Beijing’s longstanding opposition to key principles of international air-and-sea-related law and its growing assertiveness in the South China Sea make it view ‘unapproved’ American activities there as contravening vital interests. To implement that strategy with as little American resistance as possible, and thereby further its unresolved land feature and maritime sovereignty claims without escalating to major power war, it is employing not one but three major sea forces.

China’s Maritime Militia is its Third Sea Force of “blue hulls,” after its Navy of “gray hulls” and Coast Guard of “white hulls.” Increasingly, these forces operate together, with blue hulls operating forward and white and gray hulls backstopping them. Collectively, these are “gray zone” operations: conducted to alter the status quo, and employing coercion as necessary, but without resorting to war.

China’s irregular sea force is one of the most important—yet most under-considered—factors affecting U.S. security interests in the South China Sea. These Chinese “Little Blue Men” are roughly equivalent at sea to Putin’s “Little Green Men” on land. … … …

***

Ryan Pickrell, “Is Trump Ready for China’s Inevitable Test of American Power?” Daily Caller, 27 November 2016.

China’s worldview prompts it to probe the strength and resolve of the dominant power, and President-elect Donald Trump will inevitably be tested.

In recent years, China has carefully tested and evaluated each new American president.

“The Leninist core of Chinese leadership thinking makes Beijing probe assiduously for international opportunities stemming from changes in counterparts’ personalities, policies, and power,” Dr. Andrew Erickson, a leading expert on China, explained to The Daily Caller News Foundation. China sees power in relative terms; one country’s loss is another’s gain. Weaknesses, even in a dominant power, are vulnerabilities that can be exploited.

For former President George W. Bush, his test was the 2001 Hainan Island Incident. …

Following the incident, China scaled back interceptions of U.S. surveillance aircraft, while the U.S. did not make any substantive concessions to the Chinese.

A few weeks after President Barack Obama took office, the Chinese tested him by harassing ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable. …

On March 8, 2009, five Chinese vessels — specifically a Navy intelligence ship, a government fisheries-patrol vessel, a state oceanographic patrol vessel, and two fishing trawlers — surrounded the Impeccable in international waters about 75 miles off the coast of Hainan Island.

The fishing ships came within 25 feet of the U.S. ship and even stopped in front of it, forcing the Impeccable to take emergency action to avoid a collision.

The Impeccable returned the next day accompanied by a guided-missile destroyer, a reasonable yet temporary solution overlooking a far more complicated and troublesome problem that has continuously resurfaced during Obama’s time in office.

The Chinese fishing vessels dispatched to harass the Impeccable were part of China’s Third Sea Force, its Maritime Militia. The threat has gone unacknowledged and unaddressed by the Obama administration.

As Trump prepares to take office, he can expect to be tested as well, possibly by issues left unresolved by the previous administration.

“Beijing’s longstanding opposition to key principles of international air-sea law and its growing assertiveness in the South China Sea make it view ‘unapproved’ American activities there as contravening vital interests,” Erickson told TheDCNF. “Recent evolution of bilateral frictions suggests that China might test Trump by using Maritime Militia personnel and vessels to pose some sort of ambiguity, complication, and possible harassment to a U.S. freedom-of-navigation operation.”

China uses its Third Sea Force as a paramilitary force while portraying units as noncombatants. The ambiguous appearance allows China’s Maritime Militia to engage in “gray zone aggression.”

“Make no mistake, these are state-organized, -developed, and -controlled forces operating under a direct military chain of command,” Erickson revealed at a House Committee on Armed Services hearing in September.

“Trump and his team must prepare for manifold contingencies from the start. Among them, a Maritime Militia challenge would stand out for the Obama administration’s failure to pave the way with basic public preparations,” Erickson asserted. “The Administration’s apparent dismissal thus far of repeated recommendations that it at least mention China’s Maritime Militia by name to begin raising awareness can only have emboldened Beijing.”

“This is a force that thrives within the shadows of plausible deniability,” Erickson argued in September. “China’s Maritime Militia can only be as deceptive and plausibly deniable as we allow it to be through our own silence and our own inaction.”

Throughout the Obama administration, the Third Sea Force has repeatedly made its presence known. Outside of the incident with the Impeccable, the Maritime Militia was also involved in the 2011 sabotage of two Vietnamese hydrographic vessels, 2012 seizure of Scarborough Shoal, 2014 repulsion of Vietnamese vessels near a Chinese oil rig in disputed waters, and 2015 shadowing of the USS Lassen during a freedom-of-navigation operation.

Although it has yet to do so, the Obama administration still has time to address this challenge.

“To avert a potential setback or crisis, the Obama Administration must immediately ‘call out’ China’s Maritime Militia officially in public, share information with countries at risk, and communicate clearly to Beijing that any ships ignoring repeated warnings by U.S. vessels to desist from disrupting or harassing them will be treated as military-controlled and handled accordingly,” Erickson told TheDCNF. “Regardless of what leadership and stewardship President Obama ultimately demonstrates in this regard, Trump and his team must prepare to pass their China test. The world is watching.”

While Trump promised to get tough on China on the campaign trail, there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding Trump and his policies, making him a likely target for persistent probing early on in his first term. “How he responds will reverberate across the region and around the world,” Erickson emphasized.

By firmly upholding the rules of the road, Trump has the ability to pave the way for sustainable U.S.-China cooperation within a rules-based international order. Failure to do so will result in a continuation and possibly an exacerbation of existing challenges.

*** 

Christopher P. Cavas, “China’s Maritime Militia a Growing Concern,” Defense News, 21 November 2016.

WASHINGTON Near the top of US Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Scott Swift’s concerns is China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and close behind is the country’s burgeoning Coast Guard. But a third government-controlled seagoing force, the little-known and somewhat mysterious maritime militia, is drawing increased attention.

“Let’s be careful to not characterize them as, you know, a rag-tag group of fishermen. They’re well organized,” Swift told a small group of reporters in Washington Nov. 18.

The militia, Swift said, “are structured. [Chinese president] Xi Jinping has gone to visit them, recognized them publicly for their great efforts.”

The militia “are operating largely independently out there or in groups,” Swift said. And while not strictly a military force, the militia, to Swift, are not acting randomly.

“I think they have a clear command and control. It’s transparent to me,” he said.

Chinese officials routinely deny any government connection, and have described the militia as fishermen wearing camouflage uniforms for sun protection. On at least one occasion they were referred to as a film crew. Their ships have had a strong hand in numerous encounters at sea and on one occasion obstructed a US Navy surveillance ship and tried to snatch its towed listening gear.

“There needs to be precision in how we talk about the maritime militia,” Swift said. “I’ve made it clear in my conversations with my counterparts that they’re being commanded and controlled. And if they’re being command-and-controlled I have an obligation to treat them exactly like I do any other unit that’s being command-and-controlled.”

Swift noted that relationships with the Chinese Navy remain professional, and lauded the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), a 2014 agreement establishing procedures and protocols to keep incidents from escalating in scale or becoming violent. At least 21 countries have signed the agreement, including China, but not every Chinese maritime agency is taking part.

“CUES has been incredibly important in reducing the uncertainty,” Swift said. “We have a mechanism now that has diminished the impact of the language barrier, we have a mechanism to communicate that transcends the differences between Chinese and English with the PLAN. That was a very positive step.”

The US has been urging the Chinese Coast Guard to join the agreement, but so far to no avail.

“We’re going to continue to push at it,” Swift said. “We’re making some progress, the conversation is deepening, but it’s been difficult to have the conversation, even to start the conversation.” …

Swift said he enjoys personal relationships with most Chinese Navy fleet commanders.

“As I talk to my counterparts in China – the South Sea Fleet commander, the East Sea Fleet commander, the North Sea Fleet commander – I know these gentlemen personally. [People’s Liberation Army Navy commander] Admiral Wu Shengli, I know him personally as well.

“The discussions we’ve had is that we have more than an obligation to ensure that a tactical event doesn’t occur that takes away maneuver space from our two presidents. We have a responsibility as maritime leaders to ensure that tactical forces don’t get so wrapped up in the rhetoric that’s occurring at the national level or the international level that they don’t think they’re defending the sovereignty of whatever their national position is.

“On the US side as well, I caution my commanders on a regular basis about their obligations and responsibilities to the ultimate authority, which is our commander in chief.

“We have complete unanimity and agreement when I talk to my Chinese counterparts,” Swift added. “That’s absolutely the case.”

But opening up communications with the maritime militia remains a vexation.

“I haven’t even pushed at the problem of bringing CUES to them because I can’t get anyone to acknowledge the veracity of who they are. I can’t get that conversation started,” Swift said.

“I don’t know how to make sure we can communicate with them other than for me to continue to say that the Pacific Fleet will continue to hold anyone responsible that is being directed to execute operations that are counter to freedom of navigation.” …

“I haven’t started the process of trying to understand the mechanisms that China has walked through to come to the conclusion that they need a Maritime Militia,” Swift admitted. “The fact is that it is there. Let’s acknowledge that it’s there. Let’s acknowledge how it’s being command-and-controlled.

“I’m concerned about it. I want dialogue, and the dialogue’s not happening,” Swift said. “I’d love to have a discussion with my Chinese counterparts – whoever’s running them. What is the intent?” …

*** 

2016 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, 16 November 2016.

pp. 29-30:

THE COMMISSION’S KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission considers 10 of its 20 recommendations to Congress to be of particular significance. The complete list of recommendations appears at the Report’s conclusion on page 507.

The Commission recommends:

  • Congress direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to prepare a report examining the extent to which large-scale outsourcing of manufacturing activities to China is leading to the hollowing out of the U.S. defense industrial base. This report should also detail the national security implications of a diminished domestic industrial base (including assessing any impact on U.S. military readiness), compromised U.S. military supply chains, and reduced capability to manufacture state-of-the-art military systems and equipment.
  • Congress amend the statute authorizing the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to bar Chinese state-owned enterprises from acquiring or otherwise gaining effective control of U.S. companies.
  • Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to include a permanent section in its Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China on the role and activities of China’s maritime militia and the implications for U.S. naval operations.
  • Congress enact legislation requiring its approval before China—either the country as a whole or individual sectors or entities—is granted status as a market economy by the United States.
  • Congress require that under anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws, Chinese state-owned and state-controlled enterprises are presumed to be operating on behalf of the state and, as a result, do not have standing under U.S. laws against unfair trade to block a case from proceeding.
  • Congress direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide a classified report to Congress on what risks and concerns have been identified as associated with information systems acquired by the U.S. government, and how those risks are being mitigated. This report should identify information systems or components that were produced, manufactured, or assembled by Chinese-owned or -controlled entities.
  • Congressional committees of jurisdiction hold hearings to:
    • Analyze the impact of China’s state-directed plans such as “Made in China 2025” and “Internet Plus” on U.S. economic competitiveness and national security, and examine the steps Congress can take to strengthen U.S. high-tech and high-value-added industries such as artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles and systems, and semiconductors.
    • Ensure that U.S. government agencies such as the U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Department of Commerce, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative have sufficient personnel, funding, and Chinese-language capabilities 30 to examine China’s economic and trade policies and China’s compliance with its bilateral and multilateral commitments, including to the World Trade Organization.
    • Examine U.S. access to China’s domestic market, particularly for the service and high-tech sectors. This hearing should assess how U.S. government agencies such as the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative are seeking to increase market access for U.S. firms and explore what additional policy options could be pursued.
  • Congress require the U.S. Department of Defense to conduct a study identifying the risks and gains associated with the United States pursuing a burden sharing strategy that utilizes emerging People’s Liberation Army expeditionary capabilities to help stabilize the Asia Pacific region during a crisis or to counter a shared threat such as the spread of terrorism in Southeast Asia.
  • Congress express support for more frequent U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea in conjunction with U.S. allies and partners.
  • Congress direct the U.S. Department of State to develop educational materials to alert U.S. citizens living and traveling abroad about recruitment efforts by Chinese intelligence agents, and to make these materials available to U.S. universities and other institutions sending U.S. students to China. Congress should also direct the U.S. Department of Defense to develop and implement a program to prepare U.S. students studying in China through Department of Defense National Security Education Programs to recognize and protect themselves against recruitment efforts by Chinese intelligence agents.

*** 

James E. Fanell and Ryan D. Martinson, “Countering Chinese Expansion through Mass Enlightenment,” Center for International Maritime Security, 18 October 2016.

From Newport to New Delhi, a tremendous effort is currently underway to document and analyze China’s pursuit of maritime power. Led by experts in think tanks and academia, this enterprise has produced a rich body of scholarship in a very short period of time. However, even at its very best, this research is incomplete—for it rests on a gross ignorance of Chinese activities at sea.  

This ignorance cannot be faulted. The movements of Chinese naval, coast guard, and militia forces are generally kept secret, and the vast emptiness of the ocean means that much of what takes place there goes unseen. Observers can only be expected to seek answers from the data that is available.

The U.S. Navy exists to know the answers to these secrets, to track human behavior on, above, and below the sea. While military and civilian leaders will always remain its first patron, there is much that USN intelligence can and should do to provide the raw materials needed for open source researchers to more fully grasp the nature of China’s nautical ambitions. Doing so would not only improve the quality of scholarship and elevate the public debate, it would also go a long way to help frustrate China’s current—and, to date, unanswered—strategy of quiet expansion. Most importantly, sharing information about the movements and activities of Chinese forces could be done without compromising the secrecy of the sources and methods used to collect it. …

The available information provides important clues about the nature and extent of Chinese activities at sea. This is true for all three of the sea services: the coast guard, the maritime militia, and the PLA Navy. …

Chinese sources also provide raw materials for understanding the activities of the second major instrument of Chinese sea power—the maritime militia. This force is comprised of civilians trained to serve military and other state functions. In peacetime, a segment of the militia, mostly fishermen, constitutes an important tool in Chinese maritime strategy. It sails to disputed waters to demonstrate Chinese sovereignty and justify the presence of the Chinese coast guard and navy. The militia also harasses foreign vessels, and helps protect China’s own.

China’s maritime militia is particularly active in the South China Sea. The Chinese press eagerly covers their activities in disputed waters, often revealing ship pennant numbers and the names of key militiamen. Websites owned by provincial, municipal, and county governments also highlight their local contributions to the “people’s war” at sea. Using such sources, Conor Kennedy and Andrew Erickson have tracked the militia’s activities at places such as Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal, and deciphered its role in pivotal events such as the 2009 assault on the USNS Impeccable. … 

*** 

Daniel L. Kuester, “Naval War College Professors Testify on State of South China Sea,” Navy News Service, Navy.mil, 30 September 2016.

WASHINGTON (NNS) — The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) invited two U.S. Naval War College (NWC) faculty members to testify in Washington, D.C. on understanding and countering China’s growing maritime concerns.

Andrew Erickson, professor of strategy in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), and James Kraska, professor in the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, explained to the subcommittee the current situational framework and offered courses of action at the committee’s hearing titled “Seapower and Projection Forces in the South China Sea.”

Erickson’s testimony centered on China’s growing involvement of their Maritime Militia, which he describes as the third maritime force in addition to the nation’s navy and coast guard.

The Maritime Militia is a civilian force posing as fishing boats and other noncombatants but is clearly under the operational control of the government, according to Erickson.

“China’s irregular sea force is one of the most important-yet most under-considered-factors affecting U.S. security interests in the South China Sea,” said Erickson in his testimony. “Many in Washington understand that China has the world’s second-largest blue water navy, some that China has the world’s largest blue water Coast Guard. But almost no one knows that China-drawing on the world’s largest fishing fleet-has deployed the world’s largest Maritime Militia; and virtually the only one charged with advancing disputed maritime claims.”

Kraska’s testimony focused on the legal issues of the region and enforcement of the rule of law in the oceans. The events unfolding in the area have regional and global consequences, he said.

“The South China Sea is the maritime fulcrum in East Asia, where the United States has treaty commitments to Japan, Korea, Thailand, Australia, and the Philippines, and legislative obligations to Taiwan,” testified Kraska. “The rule of law in the oceans provides an important force multiplier for U.S. military operations and diplomacy. Consequently, the navigation and overflight rules accepted in the region have great strategic consequence.”

Kraska also gave the committee direction on how the United States’ responses to China’s actions in the region could improve the situation in the long term.

“The right to transit through some Asian littoral areas is being effectively abandoned out of concern that China will react and create an incident,” he said. “But forgoing the right to be present in these areas makes it more likely that it will be impossible to reenter them later. Indeed, the cost of doing so now is higher than it would have been had the United States continuously exercised its rights; the cost tomorrow will be even greater unless action is taken now. China’s expectation and sense of entitlement to ‘own’ parts of the global commons increases each year they remain unchallenged.”

Erickson also gave advice on how to effectively respond to China.

First, Erickson asked for the U.S. to call out China’s Maritime Militia officially in public.

Second, Erickson proposed having the U.S. share information with countries at risk, and provide strategic reassurance to them.

Last, he called for the U.S. to communicate clearly with Chinese interlocutors and make it plain that any elements that ignore repeated warnings by U.S. vessels to desist from disruptive activities will be treated as military-controlled and dealt with accordingly, to ensure self-defense and unobstructed mission accomplishment.

To view the complete hearing, visit https://armedservices.house.gov/legislation/hearings/seapower-and-projection-forces-south-china-sea.

For more information, visit www.navy.milwww.facebook.com/usnavy, orwww.twitter.com/usnavy.

For more news from Naval War College, visit www.navy.mil/local/nwc/.

*** 

Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 8 June 2016), R42784.

USE OF CHINA COAST GUARD SHIPS, FISHING BOATS/MARITIME MILITIA, AND OIL EXPLORATION PLATFORMS ………………………………………………………………………………………. 25

p. 25

Use of China Coast Guard Ships, Fishing Boats/Maritime Militia, and Oil Exploration Platforms

China makes regular use of China Coast Guard (CCG) ships to assert and defend its maritime territorial claims, with Chinese Navy ships sometimes available over the horizon as backup forces.74 China has, by far, the largest coast guard of any country in the region, and is currently building many new ships for its Coast Guard.75 CCG ships are generally unarmed or lightly armed, but can be effective in asserting and defending maritime territorial claims, particularly in terms of confronting or harassing foreign vessels that are similarly lightly armed or unarmed.76 In addition to being available as backups for CCG ships, Chinese navy ships conduct exercises that in some cases appear intended, at least in part, at reinforcing China’s maritime claims.77 China also uses civilian fishing ships as a form of maritime militia, as well as mobile oil exploration platforms, to assert and defend its maritime claims.78

78 See Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, pp. 3, 7; Ryan D. Martinson, “Shephards of the South Seas,” Survival, June-July 2016: 187-212; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “From Frontier to Frontline: Tanmen Maritime Militia’s Leading Role Pt. 2,”Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), May 17, 2016; Matthew Carney, “China’s Secret Maritime Militia: Fishermen the Forward guard in South China Sea Dispute,”ABC News (Australia), May 8, 2016; Reuters, “Beijing Training ‘Fishing Militia’ for South China Sea,” Straits Times, May 2, 2016; Megha Rajagopalan, “China Trains ‘Fishing Militia’ to Sail into Disputed Waters,” Reuters, April 30, 2016; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Model Maritime Militia: Tanmen’s Leading Role in the April 2012 Scarborough (continued…)

p. 26

(…continued) Shoal Incident,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), April 21, 2016; Simon Denyer, “How China’s Fishermen Are Fighting A Covert War in the South China Sea,” Washington Post, April 12, 2016; Tom Hanson, “China’s Super Strategy to Dominate South China Sea: Little Green Fisherman,” National Interest, April 7, 2016; Teo Cheng Wee, “China’s Front-Line Fisherman,” Straits Times, April 5, 2016; Brendan Nicholson, “China’s Huge Fleet ‘Is Fishing for Information for Its Navy,’” The Australian, March 15, 2016; Minnie Chan and Liu Zhen, “Beijing Enlists Trawlers to Help Protect Maritime Rights in Disputed Waters,” South China Sea Morning Post, March 7, 2016; Yao Jianing, “Maritime Militia Increases Drills, Expands in Scope,”China Daily, February 2, 2016; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Trailblazers in Warfighting: The Maritime Militia of Danzhou,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), February 1, 2016; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Daring Vanguard: Introducing Sanya City’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), November 5, 2015; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Irregular Forces at Sea: ‘Not Merely Fisherman— Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), November 2, 2015; Christopher P. Cavas, “China’s ‘Little Blue Men’ Take Navy’s Place in Disputes,” Defense News, November 2, 2015; Justin Chock, “China’s Non-Military Maritime Assets as a Force Multiplier for Security,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, September 22, 2015; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor Kennedy, “Directing China’s ‘Little Blue Men’: Uncovering the Maritime Militia Command Structure,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (Center for Strategic & International Studies), September 11, 2015; “Beijing Expands Its Maritime Militia in South China Sea,” Want China Times, August 3, 2015; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Tanmen Militia: China’s ‘Maritime Rights Protection’ Vanguard,” The National Interest, May 6, 2015; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Meet the Chinese Maritime Militia Waging a ‘People’s War at Sea,” Wall Street Journal (China Real Time), March 31, 2015; James R. Holmes. A Competitive Turn: How Increased Chinese Maritime Actions Complicate U.S. Partnerships, Washington, Center for a New American Security, December 2012, East and South China Sea Bulletin 7, p. 1, accessed March 25, 2012, at http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/flashpoints/CNAS_bulletin_Holmes_ACompetitiveTurn.pdf; James R. Holmes, “China’s Small Stick Diplomacy,” The Diplomat, May 21, 2012, accessed October 3, 2012, at http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/21/chinas-small-stick-diplomacy/; Jens Kastner, “China’s Fishermen Charge Enemy Lines,” Asia Times Online, May 16, 2012; Carlyle A. Thayer, “Paracel Island: Chinese Boats Attack Vietnamese Fishing Craft,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, May 28, 2013, p. 1; Kurt Campbell, “Trouble at Sea Reveals The New Shape of China’s Foreign Policy,” Financial Times, July 22, 2014; John Ruwitch, “Satellites and Seafood: China Keeps Fishing Fleet Connected in Disputed Waters,” Reuters, July 27, 2014; Wendell Minnick, “Fishing Vessels in China Serve as Proxy Enforcers,” Defense News, August 17, 2014.

Report Summary

China’s actions for asserting and defending its maritime territorial and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims in the East China (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS), particularly since late 2013, have heightened concerns among observers that China may be seeking to dominate or gain control of its near-seas region, meaning the ECS, the SCS, and the Yellow Sea. Chinese domination over or control of this region could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere.

China is a party to multiple territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, including, in particular, disputes over the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, and the Senkaku Islands in the ECS. China depicts its territorial claims in the SCS using the so-called map of the nine-dash line that appears to enclose an area covering roughly 90% of the SCS. Some observers characterize China’s approach for asserting and defending its territorial claims in the ECS and SCS as a “salami-slicing” strategy that employs a series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a casus belli, to gradually change the status quo in China’s favor.

In addition to territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, particularly with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China’s EEZ. The dispute appears to be at the heart of incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace in 2001, 2002, 2009, 2013, and 2014.

The U.S. position on territorial and EEZ disputes in the Western Pacific (including those involving China) includes the following elements, among others:

  • The United States supports the principle that disputes between countries should be resolved peacefully, without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force, and in a manner consistent with international law.
  • The United States supports the principle of freedom of seas, meaning the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations in international law. The United States opposes claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea that belong to all nations.
  • The United States takes no position on competing claims to sovereignty over disputed land features in the ECS and SCS.
  • Although the United States takes no position on competing claims to sovereignty over disputed land features in the ECS and SCS, the United States does have a position on how competing claims should be resolved: Territorial disputes should be resolved peacefully, without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force, and in a manner consistent with international law.
  • Claims of territorial waters and EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea and must therefore, among other things, derive from land features. Claims in the SCS that are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed.
  • Parties should avoid taking provocative or unilateral actions that disrupt the status quo or jeopardize peace and security. The United States does not believe that large-scale land reclamation with the intent to militarize outposts on disputed land features is consistent with the region’s desire for peace and stability.
  • The United States, like most other countries, believes that coastal states under UNCLOS have the right to regulate economic activities in their EEZs, but do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs.
  • U.S. military surveillance flights in international airspace above another country’s EEZ are lawful under international law, and the United States plans to continue conducting these flights as it has in the past.
  • The Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan and unilateral attempts to change the status quo raise tensions and do nothing under international law to strengthen territorial claims.

China’s actions for asserting and defending its maritime territorial and EEZ claims in the ECS and SCS raise several potential policy and oversight issues for Congress, including whether the United States has an adequate strategy for countering China’s “salami-slicing” strategy, whether the United States has taken adequate actions to reduce the risk that the United States might be drawn into a crisis or conflict over a territorial dispute involving China, and whether the United States should become a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). …

*** 

Ryan Pickrell, “How the US Should Respond to China’s ‘Secret’ Weapon,” The Daily Caller, 24 September 2016.

China’s naval and coast guard ships in the South China Sea tend to draw the most attention, but a more troublesome force has been hiding in plain sight for years.

China deploys three types of ships to enact its will in the South China Sea. These include navy “grey hulls,” coast guard “white hulls,” and maritime militia “blue hulls,” Naval War College Professor Dr. Andrew Erickson explained during a [House] Armed Services Committee hearing Thursday. 

Naval vessels — labeled People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships — are noticeably threatening and escalatory, so China often limits their deployment.

Coast guard and maritime law enforcement ships are seen as China’s go-to units in the South China Sea. Between 2010 and 2016, Chinese coast guard units were involved in 71 percent of the 45 [reported] incidents. China’s coast guard vessels are growing in size and are, in some cases, navy “grey hulls” which have been painted white, according to Center for Strategic and International Studies scholar Bonnie Glaser, who also spoke at the hearing.

The third sea force, China’s maritime militia, is a paramilitary force that operates on the front lines but hides behind the façade of civilian operations. They are often presented as fishing trawlers, but they rarely behave as such. These maritime militia “blue hulls” are waging a campaign of “grey zone aggression.”

“Make no mistake, these are state-organized, developed, and controlled forces operating under a direct military chain of command,” Erickson stated emphatically during the recent hearing.

China’s maritime militia has been involved in numerous incidents. Maritime militia units made appearances during the 2009 harassment of a U.S. surveillance ship, 2011 sabotage of two Vietnamese hydrographic vessels, 2012 seizure of Scarborough Shoal, 2014 repulsion of Vietnamese vessels near a Chinese oil rig in disputed waters, and 2015 harassment of the U.S.S. Lassen during a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP).

“China is generating a worrying new wave … in leading maritime militia development,” Erickson mentioned. “The Sansha maritime militia was established to be a professional paramilitary force first and foremost, with fishing a secondary mission at best,” he added.

Several new, large maritime militia vessels with reinforced hulls, external rails for the mitigation of collision damage, and water cannons have been deployed in the South China Sea. Such features are not necessary for standard fishing trawlers, but they work well for ramming other vessels and spraying other ships with water to force them out of certain areas.

A 1978 report estimated that China’s maritime militia consisted of 750,000 personnel and 140,000 vessels, but the current size of this force is unknown. A 2010 defense white paper reported that China had 8 million militia units; the maritime militia would be a smaller subset of that group.

China’s maritime militia is typically positioned on the front line, with naval and coast guard vessels stationed nearby for protection. China uses these vessels to skirt claims that it is militarizing the South China Sea. “This is a force that thrives within the shadows of plausible deniability,” argued Erickson.

Despite the present administration’s emphasis on pivoting to Asia and deterring Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, the U.S. government has not addressed this lethal third sea force. Erickson explained, “American officials must reveal the third sea force’s true nature and deeds. China’s maritime militia can only be as deceptive and plausibly deniable as we allow it to be through our own silence and our own inaction.”

China’s maritime militia is not really a “secret” weapon. It is a force that has been operating in the open for quite some time.

An English-language China Daily article openly referred to the “less noticed force, China’s maritime militia” earlier this year. An image in the article showed men in military drab training with firearms equipped with bayonets, but the article claimed that “most of the maritime militia is made up of local fishermen.”

Maritime militia units have taken part in many air and naval exercises since 2014, according to Senior Colonel Xu Qingduan.

“The maritime militia is … a component of China’s ocean defense armed forces [that enjoys] low sensitivity and great leeway in maritime rights protection actions,” explained Zhoushan Garrison Commander Zeng Pengxiang.

Erickson asserts that the U.S. should acknowledge China’s maritime militia as a paramilitary force, revoking civilian protections for these vessels in the event of a conflict.

The U.S. should also call out China’s maritime militia publicly and share information with countries affected by the third sea force, Erickson said in his testimony. Furthermore, the U.S. should make it clear that units which ignore repeated warnings from U.S. vessels will be treated as military units and dealt with accordingly.

Plausible deniability is a strength, yet unmasking it will expose the maritime militia force to vulnerabilities. “We have to make it clear that we are wise to Beijing’s game,” said Erickson.

The South China Sea is a national interest for the U.S., as well as American allies and partners. “The issue is really about having a rules-based order, that if there are no international rules everybody agrees to and abides by, then you have chaos and anarchy in a region where we have enormous interests,” Glaser explained. China appears to be undermining that order to create its own regional norms.

*** 

Megan Eckstein, “Experts Advocate Harder Stance Against Illegal Claims in South China Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute News, 22 September 2016.

… The experts from the U.S. Naval War College and the Center for Strategic and International Studies agreed at a House Armed Services seapower and projection forces subcommittee hearing yesterday that adherence to maritime law in the South China Sea is important not only for regional security but also for maintaining law of the sea elsewhere on the globe.

In addition to unanimously supporting the U.S. ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the experts testified that U.S. Navy freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) needed to be bolstered. …

Beyond agreeing that the U.S. needs to be more direct in countering illegal Chinese territorial claims, the panelists also discussed how China was attempting to enforce those claims – not primarily through the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s fleet of gray-hull navy warships, but through the white-hull coast guard ships and the rarely discussed blue-hull maritime militia ships.

“Make no mistake, these are state-organized, -developed and -controlled forces operating under a direct military chain of command,” Andrew Erickson, a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, said of the maritime militia ships, which are essentially fishing trawlers outfitted with strengthened hulls, guardrails to protect the hulls when ramming other ships, and water cannons to harass nearby vessels.

“This is a force that thrives in the shadows of plausible deniability, and I tried to make the case today that it is well within our power to shine enough light to dispel a lot of those shadows,” he said at the hearing. During last year’s Lassen FONOPS patrol, “small commercial craft with the hallmarks of maritime militia vessels approached [Lassen] provocatively, having apparently anticipated its presence. Who knows what contingencies they might have been practicing for or what footage they might have been capturing for later misuse. So before China is able to put the United States or one of our regional allies or partners in a misleading but precarious position of appearing to confront ‘innocent civilian fisherman,’ American officials must finally publicly reveal the third sea force’s true nature and deeds.”

Erickson said he worried that the maritime militia may turn on a U.S. warship, leading to a Gulliver’s Travels-type scenario with …Gulliver taken captive by the tiny Lilliputians. To avoid being stymied by this fleet – which he called little blue men, much like Russia’s ambiguous little green men – Erickson said the next administration needs to publish a comprehensive policy statement on freedom of navigation and consider how China employs all its assets to block that freedom at sea.

“We cannot tolerate a situation in which their navy bear hugs our Navy in search of best practices and diplomatic cameo (opportunities) as a kind of a good cop, while their other two sea forces, the coast guard and the maritime militia, play the role of bad cops doing the dirty work in the South China Sea,” Erickson said.

“So I think by looking at this issue comprehensively, by raising attention to it in Congress and asking the administration to do the same, by communicating all of this with resolve to our Chinese interlocutors, I think we can create a much better baseline and understanding in the South China Sea. It won’t solve all the problems, but it will reduce risk.” …

*** 

HEARING: 

SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Date: 

Wednesday, September 21, 2016 – 2:00pm

Location: 

2212 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515

House Armed Services Committee

Subcommittees: 

WITNESSES

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson, Ph.D. 

Professor of Strategy, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College

Andrew S. Erickson, “The South China Sea’s Third Force: Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Militia,” Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, Hearing on Seapower and Projection Forces in the South China Sea, Washington, DC, 21 September 2016.

Click here to watch on YouTube.

I deliver my main testimony (statement) from 1:24:07–1:32:54.

I answer questions from Congressman Randy Forbes on how to address China’s Maritime Militia from 1:40:40–1:43:02, and on why the South China Sea matters to America and Americans from 1:47:02–1:48:22.

I reminisce with Congressman Rick Larsen about our April 2011 trip with four other Members of Congress to military, defense industrial, and government-related facilities in Beijing, Qingdao, Chengdu, and Shanghai and answer a question from him about the utility of a U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy from 2:03:42–2:07:15.

Finally, at the invitation of Chairman Forbes, I offer closing remarks from 2:24:44–2:27:28.

Ms. Bonnie S. Glaser 

Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Dr. James Kraska, S.J.D. 

Professor of International Law, Oceans Law and Policy, Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, U.S. Naval War College

*** 

Christopher P. Cavas, “China’s Maritime Militia—Time to Call them Out?” Defense News, 18 September 2016.

… “China’s maritime militia is only as deniable for China as we allow it to be, and we don’t have to allow it to be deniable,” said Andrew Erickson, a professor of strategy at the US Naval War College, where he is a founding member of the China Maritime Studies Institute.

The militia, Erickson said, are controlled directly by the Chinese military, adding another degree of complexity to at-sea confrontations below that of the navy and coast guard. The craft, he said, are “working in close coordination with the other two more powerful sea forces or at least with their backing and coordination added as necessary.”

Erickson often refers to the militia as “little blue men” – a play on references to little green men” employed by Russia in Crimea and the Ukraine to insinuate military forces into a region without clear identification.

“There is plenty of evidence of the front-line elite Chinese maritime militia units answering specifically to a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) chain of command, being entrusted with the fulfilling of specific state-sponsored missions with respect to participation in international sea encounters and incidents,” Erickson declared.

While the Chinese don’t widely advertise the militia in English-language publications or web sites, the Chinese Internet is rife with information confirming that craft involved in confrontations are militia-controlled, Erickson said. The evidence in some cases goes back years – he cited the example of a March 2009 confrontation in the northern South China Sea where several trawlers harassed the US intelligence ship Impeccable. One of those vessels, Erickson pointed out, bore a clear fishing registration number.

“You can run that number through the Chinese Internet and you’ve got clear documentation of its registration in a maritime militia organization,” Erickson said. “You can see very clearly that it was owned by someone named Lin Wei and reportedly piloted by him during the incident. Lin Wei is a cadre in the maritime militia of Sanya City, Hainan, from where the boats were dispatched.

“We have lots of nitty-gritty,” Erickson said, “specifying and backing this up with the authoritative Chinese sources, including Chinese provincial government sources, that you can piece together to document all of this — how the vessels are registered, who owns them, the status of that person as a member of the maritime militia, having a specific role in the maritime militia.”

While the total number of militia is not clear, the potential is large.

“China has the world’s largest fishing fleet, has thousands of fishing boats and a portion of these fishing vessels and a portion of the people who work on those fishing vessels and in related industries are specifically registered in the maritime militia,” Erickson said. “They receive some form of training and compensation, and in return, they have some sort of responsibility to be available to be called up for various types of state-sponsored activities.”

Erickson has frequently written about the Tanmen Militia, another organization also based on Hainan Island that has even been cited by Chinese President Xi Jinping as a model for maritime militia building.

“The current deputy commander of the Tanmen Militia is Wang Shumao,” Erickson said. “He is the operational commander when the militia goes out to participate as a fleet in international sea incidents. The two big international incidents we know it’s participated in are the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident, and a 2014 oil-rig incident. Wang was in charge of that. He’s been in the Tanmen Militia since the late 1990s and his risen up through the ranks.

“This is not a faceless organization. We can document it, provide many details on who’s leading it, what the organizational structure is, how they report, how it all works,” Erickson added. “I believe we already have enough data to make very conclusive durable connections using sources that, within China’s own system, are authoritative and legitimate. The only thing missing is for some US government official and report to state this officially.”

Erickson noted that except for one public reference he’s found uttered by the US Pacific Fleet commander, there seem to be no authoritative US government statements directly referring to the maritime militia. In the constant tit-for-tat arena of public relations and diplomatic maneuvering, the issue could become important.

“We could have a very difficult situation with China sending out a media information or disinformation campaign and the public at home and in the region buying China’s version of events or getting confused,” he said, adding that “this could also all come to a head in a particularly worrisome way at the start of the next presidential administration.”

The outgoing Obama administration, Erickson noted, has not taken the opportunity to call out the maritime militia.

“China may already lay the groundwork to create a distorting ‘CNN effect’ or ‘CCTV effect’ that lays a difficult trap for us,” Erickson said. “For all we know China is selectively collecting video and photographic images to be used as part of an information-operations campaign, so that at some future point they’ll be ready to selectively portray or mis-portray what they’re doing and what we’re doing. I see this potentially coming to a head in some sort of Chinese effort to make a freedom-of-navigation type of operation more difficult for us.”

The administration, Erickson said, should “go on the record and document publicly the reality, the nature and the approach of China’s maritime militia.” Such an effort could “create a measure of deterrence, showing the US is wise to China’s game.

“If we do our homework and act well in advance,” he added, “we can portray the facts accurately and thereby have a powerful narrative in our favor and deter Chinese adventurism and the causing of problems for us.”

*** 

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Riding a New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 1 September 2016.

On 21 July 2013, several dozen Sansha City “residents” stood before the city government building and swore oaths during an inspection by Mayor Xiao Jie (肖杰) and his military counterpart Garrison Commander Cai Xihong (蔡喜宏). Clad in militia uniforms and toting Type-56 assault rifles, the Sansha Maritime Militia was officially established to uphold Chinese interests throughout the Paracels and beyond. According to the Garrison Commander, Sansha City’s Maritime Militia are given five major missions in China’s struggle for maritime rights protection: regular declarations of sovereignty, conducting reconnaissance and patrols, cooperating with maritime law enforcement, participating in marine rescue, and supporting combat operations. They also repel foreign fishing vessels, safeguard islands and reefs, and provide disaster relief for civilians living there. Such missions represent important, evolving roles for the militia as China seeks to reinforce its claims to the South China Sea. Sansha’s Maritime Militia is on the frontlines of this effort given the municipality’s responsibility for administering all Chinese-claimed features in the South China Sea.

We previously examined in depth the maritime militia forces of SanyaDanzhou, and Tanmen (Parts One and Two). No examination of the maritime militia of Hainan Province would be complete, however, without scrutinizing the Sansha Maritime Militia. As China’s newest, southernmost municipality, Sansha City is a critical node in China’s South China Sea strategy. Given its responsibility to administer all of China’s claimed features within the nine-dashed line by Beijing, Sansha lies at the apex of Chinese civilian presence in the South China Sea and efforts to exercise administrative control over China’s claimed waters. To better grasp the range of tools China uses to achieve such control, deeper understanding of Sansha’s Maritime Militia is necessary.

Most importantly, recent organizational developments concerning the Sansha Maritime Militia demonstrate a new professionalization and militarization of China’s elite maritime militia forces. Indicators of increased professionalization include hiring recently separated veterans, standardization and enhancement of training, and in some cases lack of clear fishing responsibilities in return for payment of salaries. Key indicators of increased militarization include preparations to make small arms rapidly available to deploying units according to mission requirements, construction of new bases, deployment for noncommercial purposes, and introduction of new classes of vessels with dedicated weapons and ammunition storage rooms, reinforced hulls, and water cannons.

Significantly, the Sansha Maritime Militia is being created from scratch using personnel that receive extremely generous guaranteed salaries—seemingly independent of any fishing or marine industrial activity on their part, a dedicated arrangement that we have not seen elsewhere. This represents a significant departure from what we have described previously regarding the maritime militias at Sanya, Danzhou, and Tanmen. These militias were formed and evolved over years if not decades, drawing upon the community’s resident skills and resources. The majority of such militia members engaged in fundamentally civilian economic activities with occasional additional purposes assigned through a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) chain of command, including military law enforcement-style activities. While these three elite militias remain important to Chinese “rights protection” activities, Sansha City’s new, purpose-built militia may in the future be even more so. …

*** 

Andrew S. Erickson, “China Open Source Example: Big Plans for Maritime Militia Base Buildup, as Seen from a Government Proposal Document,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 30 August 2016.

“关于在文昌木兰头规划建设三沙战略腹地和民兵渔船停泊港的建议” [Proposal for the Planning and Construction of Wenchang Mulantou Rear Area for Sansha and Harbor for MooringMaritime Militia Fishing Vessels], submitted to the Hainan Provincial Government, 12 February 2015.

This proposal, as a result of a special assessment made by the Development Research Center of the State Council and submitted to the Hainan Provincial Government in early 2015, details plans to bolster what is apparently emerging as its leading state-owned militia fishing fleet: the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company. The proposal involves development of a new port to act as a “strategic rear area” for Sansha City, providing a logistics base for the 84 large steel-hulled militia fishing vessels allocated to Sansha City by Hainan provincial authorities. According to the proposal, ten of these vessels were delivered in 2015, with 70 more scheduled for delivery in 2016. Citing concerns regarding Woody Island’s fragile environment and the inability of Hainan’s other fishing ports to support this large militia fleet, the proposal argues for the appropriation of 20 square kilometers of coastal land in Wenchang City’s Puqian Township. Located on Hainan Island’s northern coast, this land is envisioned to be designated as a strategic rear area for Sansha City.

(Since this proposal’s promulgation, there have been multiple official indications that it has been formally approved; and that this project is therefore proceeding, with planning already well underway.)

ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE PROPOSAL DOCUMENT:

关于在文昌木兰头规划建设三沙战略腹地和民兵渔船停泊港的建议编号: 532238    时间: 2015-02-12    发表人: bgtjyta

    省政府2013年政府工作报告明确提出研究建设三沙市战略腹地,为开发建设提供依托。为此,三沙市积极委托国务院发展研究中心进行专题比选研究。

一、建设三沙战略腹地和民兵渔船停泊港的必要性

(一)三沙战略腹地和民兵渔船停泊港建设是中央经略南海战略的重要举措。为推进三沙“维权、维稳、保护、开发”工作,省委省政府深入贯彻落实中央领导关于海南海上民兵钢质渔船建造的一系列指示精神,将84艘民兵钢质渔船交给三沙市运营管理,但由于三沙远离海南本岛、台风多,生态环境脆弱,岛礁人口承载力有限,无法在本市范围内建立渔船的停靠泊地。目前,三沙在文昌清澜港有1个专用码头(仅能停靠“琼沙3号”和“三沙1号”),今年即将投入使用的10艘渔船以及明年陆续投入使用的70多艘渔船面临的停靠及综合保障问题急需解决。为解决民兵渔船的停靠、维修、保养、海上训练、船员后勤保障等事宜,急需建设海南本岛停靠泊地及综合保障基地,才能更好地在维护国家主权和海洋权益中发挥重要作用,实现国防战略安全和区域经济发展的双赢目标。

(二)三沙战略腹地和民兵渔船停泊港建设是加快三沙建设发展的必然要求。加强三沙建设发展是党和国家提出的明确要求,是实现我国南海战略目标的必要前提和保障。2013年4月,习总书记在海南考察时强调“加快三沙建设,是海南省委、省政府的重要职责,是必须承担好的重大担当”。三沙设市以来,在省委省政府的领导和支持下,在政权建设、基础设施建设、民生工作、环境保护、军民融合等方面取得了显著成效,但目前存在的问题也比较突出。三沙市陆地面积狭小,陆地面积仅13平方公里,土地资源稀缺,建设用地紧张,难以承载大规模、高强度的开发利用,不能满足三沙市日益发展的新常态。在海南本岛建设三沙战略腹地和民兵渔船停泊港,作为三沙市后方生活保障基地和产业基地,承接三沙市政权和经济社会建设在海南本岛的落地,有利于保护三沙生态环境,有利于通过促进三沙产业建设带动海南经济发展。

二、建设三沙战略腹地和民兵渔船停泊港的可行性

(一)机遇百年不遇。三沙面临着巨大的发展机遇。从国家总体战略布局看,三沙设市,是中央经略南海的重大战略部署。随着海洋强国发展战略和21世纪“海上丝绸之路”的推进,党中央、国务院高度重视三沙的发展,三沙在国家总体发展布局中的战略支点地位日益突显。从三沙发展总体规划看,由国家发改委牵头编制的《三沙市总体发展规划》颁布在即,明确了三沙重点项目支持政策。与此同时,随着南海维权力度不断加强,以及海南国际旅游岛建设成效初显等一系列发展环境的改善,南海海上形势总体稳定,三沙发展在向常态化转变,为在海南本岛规划建设三沙战略腹地和民兵渔船停泊港奠定了良好的基础。

(二)木兰头条件成熟。经过对海南本岛规划体系中42个三级以上渔港进行比选,条件比较成熟,能够批量停靠民兵渔船的渔港仅有3个,分别是文昌市清澜渔港、三亚市崖州渔港、儋州市白马井渔港。清澜渔港承载力有限,清澜港航道泥沙沉积量大,需每年疏浚,且不能停泊5000吨以上大型补给船,对民兵渔船的补给和停泊都有很大的限制;三亚市崖州渔港2014年底实现功能性开港,儋州白马井渔港综合补给能力还未形成。为保障民兵渔船正常管理运营及今后长远发展的需要,有必要在海南本岛建设停靠泊地,为民兵渔船提供有力的综合保障服务。

木兰头位于文昌市铺前镇境内,木兰湾是海南三大最具有开发价值的深水良港,海岸线长25公里。铺前湾大桥建成后距离海口仅40公里,未来交通便利;港址位置水深条件良好,开挖量少,建设方波提后便可满足民兵渔船使用要求。因此,在文昌市铺前镇木兰头划出适当区域,规划建设三沙后方战略腹地和民兵渔船停泊港,具有天时地利的良好条件。

三、建设三沙战略腹地和民兵渔船停泊港的建议

建议省政府在文昌市铺前镇木兰头划出20平方公里土地及沿岸海域给三沙市,用于建设三沙后方战略腹地和民兵渔船停泊港,统一规划建设,形成以海洋产业园区、生活保障、渔船维修保养、物资补给等为主的综合性保障基地。将此项目建设经费列入国家、海南省十三五规划,列入国家发改委的三沙建设专项。并给予特殊的金融、税收、海关优惠政策,支持三沙发展海洋特色产业,为海南建设海洋强省发挥重要作用。

Original source URL: http://www.hainan.gov.cn/tianprint-rdjy–5740.html

*** 

David Axe, “Little Blue Men: China Launches a Stealth Invasion in the South China Sea,”The Daily Beast, 9 August 2016.

Beijing isn’t fighting for control of disputed waters with missiles and drones—it’s using Chinese coast guard and fisherman instead.

On Aug. 6, the Chinese government sent a stealth invasion force sailing into the disputed waters surrounding traditionally Japanese-occupied islands in the East China Sea.

But there wasn’t a single Chinese naval warship among the nearly 250 vessels that swarmed the Senkaku Islands, around 250 miles southwest of Japan. Instead, Beijing deployed 13 coast guard ships, some of them armed, along with an estimated 230 fishing vessels operated by government-sponsored maritime militiamen. …

Beijing’s heavy reliance on [the maritime] militia is equally noteworthy—and, for China’s rivals, potentially very worrying. These “little blue men,” as U.S. Naval War College professor Andrew Erickson has dubbed them, have become the main combatants in China’s undeclared—and so far mostly bloodless—pseudomilitary campaign of expansion into the East and South China Seas.

Erickson’s nickname for China’s maritime militia references the so-called “little green men,” or incognito soldiers, that Moscow sent into Ukraine to back pro-Russian separatists.

There are clear advantages to mobilizing… [militias and] paramilitaries for what amounts to a military mission, Erickson said. In deploying government-controlled fishermen, Beijing gets “the bonus without the onus” as it tries to forcefully cement its claim to huge, fish- and mineral-rich swathes of the western Pacific. …

… in sending fishermen, China both maintains credible deniability regarding its true intentions and has the opportunity to portray the other side as overly forceful—or indeed to turn the tables, and cast the defender as the attacker.

The little blue men have popped up across the China Seas…. “Anyone seeing a pattern here?” Erickson quipped on Twitter. …

In a foreboding message to the Chinese people in the aftermath of the tribunal’s ruling on China’s South China Seas claims, Chinese defense minister Chang Wanquan called for a “people’s war at sea” in order to preserve Chinese sovereignty. …

…when Beijing wants to take over an island without starting a war, it doesn’t need a fleet of warships. The little blue men can do the job.

*** 

下平 拓哉 [Capt. Takuya Shimodaira, JMSDF], “中国第3の海上兵力: 海上民兵” [China’s Third Sea Force: The Maritime Militia], 海上自衛隊幹部学校 [Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Maritime Staff College], 8 August 2016.

これからの中国の海洋におけるパワーを判断するためには、中国海軍、第2の海軍と言われる中国海警局(China Coast Guard)、そして海上民兵(Maritime Militia)の3つの研究が欠かせません。  米海大中国海事研究所(CMSI)における海上民兵研究のスペシャリストは、アンドリュー・エリクソン(Andrew S. Erickson)教授とコナー・ケネディ(Conor M. Kennedy)研究助手でしょう。特にケネディ氏は、この新しい研究分野におけるパイオニア的存在であり、CMSIでは親しみを込めて「ミスター海上民兵」と呼ばれているほど、緻密な分析研究を続けています。

中国の海上民兵は、近年急速に活動を活発化しています。特に、東シナ海や南シナ海において中国の権利を主張するための情報収集や建築資材の運搬等、幅広い任務を果たすようになってきています。また、中国海軍艦艇への燃料や弾薬等の補給や、機雷や対空ミサイルを使ったゲリラ戦の訓練も実施されています。

エリクソン教授によれば、海上民兵に係る最近の特徴は、次のとおりです。  第1に、中国の主張を強硬に推し進めるために、単一ではなく、中国海軍、中国海警局、海上民兵の3つが協同する。

第2に、中国は、世界第2の中国海軍、世界第1の中国海警局、そして世界第1の海上民兵を有しており、海上民兵は非正規戦の最前線に立つ。

第3に、海上民兵は、平時に相手に圧力をかける上で非常に有効である。

今後、中国の海上民兵は、米国等による「航行の自由作戦」に挑戦するために、より高圧的な行動に出ることが予想され、また米国や同盟国の交戦規定(ROE)の隙をつく活動を活発化する等、ますます厄介なアクターとなってくるでしょう。多数の船団からなる海上民兵の船舶は、中国の衛星測位システム北斗で位置情報を入手していると言われていますが、部隊としての通信ネットワークについてはまだまだ問題があるようです。

(2016年7月23日記)

【エリクソン教授推薦の海上民兵に関する論文】

1) Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia: What It Is and How to Deal With It,” Foreign Affairs, June 23, 2016.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/countering-chinas-third-sea-force-unmask-maritime-militia-16860

2)                    , “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” The National Interest, July 6, 2016.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/countering-chinas-third-sea-force-unmask-maritime-militia-16860

3)                    , “China’s Maritime Militia,” CNA, June 2016.

https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2016-U-013646.pdf

海上民兵の歴史、任務、指揮統制、情報化、組織、訓練、最近の活動等について詳細に分析されています。

【エリクソン教授のHP】

http://www.andrewerickson.com/

最新の中国研究に欠かせない必読論文がぎっしり詰まっています。

*** 

J. Michael Cole, “China Opens Large Fishing Port to ‘Safeguard’ South China Sea Claims,” The News Lens International, 2 August 2016.

A new port facility in Hainan could serve as a base for China’s ‘maritime militias’ in the disputed South China Sea.

China on Monday officially opened a new fishing port at Yazhou, Hainan Province, to host fishing vessels operating in the disputed South China Sea.

Located approximately 50 km West of Sanya, the Yazhou Bay Central Fishing Port — the largest in Hainan and the closest to the Nansha Islands (Spratlys) — commenced limited operations in April 2015. The port spans a length of 1,063 meters and counts 11 functional berths that can currently accommodate a fleet of 800 fishing boats. Local officials say they hope to expand capacity to as many as 2,000. Construction was completed in June this year.

Starting on May 15, fishing boats stationed at Sanya Port were ordered to relocate to Yazhou. As per official plans, 468 Sanya-registered fishing boats and approximately 1,000 non-Sanya-registered fishing boats and 66 ice-making workshops and traders are to be transferred to Yazhou.

Yazhou Port is located about 260 km from the Xisha Islands (Paracels)… which “administers” an area of about 2 million square kilometers in the South China Sea. …

According to U.S.-based defense expert Andrew S. Erickson, the world has not paid enough attention to what he calls China’s “maritime militia,” or “irregular forces [that] have been an important element of Chinese maritime force structure and operations.”

An expanding maritime militia, Erickson says, is one of the many instruments at China’s disposal to defend its territorial claims in the South China Sea, allowing it to “vigorously pursue objectives without risking military conflict or creating an image of gunboat diplomacy.”

Erickson adds that Hainan’s maritime militia — and there is absolutely no doubt that Yazhou will serve as a base for those — is “poised to become even more significant,” adding that “they remain widely under-appreciated and misunderstood by foreign observers.” Particularly worrying, he observes, is the high possibility that such maritime militias could be used to undermine and harass freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) by the U.S. Navy operating in the South China Sea.

*** 

International Tribunal to Rule on South China Sea Case,” interviewed by Anthony Kuhn, Morning Edition, National Public Radio, 11 July 2016.

Click here to listen to the program.

A decision in the case is expected on Tuesday. The Philippines challenged China’s claims to most of the South China Sea, through which about a 5th of the world’s commerce passes through.

Anthony Kuhn, “In a Chinese Port Town, South China Sea Dispute Is Personal,” Parallels, National Public Radio, 11 July 2016.

… At this time of year in Tanmen, many fishing boats are in the docks for repairs. A fishing ban from May to August gives the fish populations some time to recover.

Only a few decades ago, the town’s docks were mostly lined with wooden sailboats. Now many of them are 100-ton steel trawlers with electronic navigation systems. The government subsidizes the building of these boats. It has also recruited many of the fishermen into maritime militia units.

Near the docks, a billboard shows a picture of President Xi Jinping talking to local fishermen and praising their vanguard role in protecting China’s maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea.

Critics charge that China has used these militia forces to build up artificial islands and reefs, to harass the ships of its Southeast Asian neighbors and the U.S.

Chinese fishing trawlers — possibly belonging to militia units — reportedly crossed the bow of a U.S. destroyer, the USS Lassen, as it conducted freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea last October.

Chinese militia boats also rammed and destroyed Vietnamese trawlers in a fight over a Chinese oil rig operating in waters claimed by both China and Vietnam near the Paracels in 2014.

China and Vietnam both have maritime militias, notes Andrew Erickson, a professor of strategy and expert on China’s navy at the U.S. Naval War College. He accuses China of trying to create confusion about whether the militia forces are military or civilian.

“By obfuscating and having these forces lurk in the shadows,” he argues, “China’s trying to have it both ways in a way that doesn’t accord with international law.”

Erickson says there should be no confusion: The militia takes orders from China’s military.

“It’s high time that the U.S. made statements in advance so that it’s clear to everybody that the U.S. is wise to China’s game,” he says, and that American naval vessels will not be deterred by the militia as they carry out their operations in the South China Sea.

When asked to clarify the status of the maritime militias, Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesman Yang Yujun did not respond directly, saying only that the militia forces engage in fishing and “maritime rights protection” activities in accordance with Chinese law. …

*** 

Episode 340: China’s Maritime Militia with Andrew Erickson,” Live Interview on Midrats Radio Program, Blog Talk Radio, 10 July 2016.

Click here to listen to the complete podcast.

Navy Milbloggers Sal from “CDR Salamander” and EagleOne from “EagleSpeak” discuss leading issues and developments for the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and related national security issues.

As China continues to slowly use a variety of tools to claim portions of her maritime near-abroad in the South China Sea and elsewhere, part of their effort includes what can almost be considered naval irregular forces – a Maritime Militia.

What is China doing with these assets, why are they being used, and what could we expect going forward as she taps in to a variety of assets to attempt to establish her authority?

Our guest for the full hour to discuss this and more will be Dr. Andrew S. Erickson.

Dr. Erickson is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). Since 2008 he has been an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, and is an expert contributor to theWall Street Journal’s China Real Time Report, for which he has authored or coauthored thirty-seven articles.

He received his Ph.D. and M.A. in international relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and graduated magna cum laude from Amherst College with a B.A. in history and political science. He has studied Mandarin in the Princeton in Beijing program at Beijing Normal University’s College of Chinese Language and Culture; and Japanese language, politics, and economics in the year-long Associated Kyoto Program at Doshisha University. Erickson previously worked for Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) as a Chinese translator and technical analyst. He gained early experience working briefly at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong, the U.S. Senate, and the White House. Proficient in Mandarin Chinese and conversant in Japanese, he has traveled extensively in Asia and has lived in China, Japan, and Korea.

***Please note: unless otherwise specified, the views posted, reposted, or otherwise expressed on Dr. Andrew S. Erickson’s research websites, social media accounts, and other electronic and print sources are his alone and should not be construed to represent the official policies or estimates of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. government. Additionally, retweets via Twitter do not imply endorsement in any way. Neither tweets nor retweets should be construed as political statements.***

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China’s Third Sea Force—the Maritime Militia,” interviewed on “‘Farce’ Says China, in the South China Sea” program, The John Batchelor Show, 77 WABC Radio New York, 7:30 p.m. EST, 6 July 2016.

Click here for webcast, and listen to minutes 30:40-39:33.

*** 

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” The National Interest, 6 July 2016.

As the South China Sea heats up, one of Beijing’s most important tools—its Maritime Militia or “Little Blue Men,” roughly equivalent at sea to Putin’s “Little Green Men” on land—offers it major rewards while threatening the U.S. and other potential opponents with major risks. When the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague announces its rulings on the Philippines-initiated maritime legal case with China on July 12—likely rejecting some key bases for excessive Chinese claims in the South China Sea—the Maritime Militia will offer a tempting tool for Beijing to try to teach Manila (and other neighbors) a lesson while frustrating American ability to calm troubled waters. This major problem with significant strategic implications is crying out for greater attention, and effective response. Accordingly, this article puts China’s Maritime Militia under the spotlight to explain what it is, why it matters and what to do about it.

To promote its disputed claims to features and maritime zones with increasing assertiveness, China is employing not one but three major sea forces—a potent three-pronged trident. In addition to what will soon be the world’s second-largest blue-water navy, and what is already the world’s largest blue-water coast guard, Beijing wields the world’s largest maritime militia, whose leading units are military-controlled forces trolling for territory. Most usefully in the peacetime coercion Beijing hopes to exclusively employ to advance its claims, China’s Maritime Militia remains the least recognized and understood of its sea forces. That needs to change—immediately.

Last October, when destroyer USS Lassen passed near Subi Reef, built up by Beijing in the Spratlys, merchant ships including fishing vessels maneuvered around it, having apparently anticipated its approach. China opposes such freedom of navigation operations categorically. In the future, to turn up the heat, while attempting to preserve plausible deniability and exploit perceived limitations in U.S. rules of engagement, China may employ Maritime Militia vessels more assertively to harass—and even attempt to thwart—such operations. Chinese propagandists might preemptively flood the airwaves with a misleading narrative of selectively edited footage of “civilian fishermen” being “unjustly attacked.” Leading People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) scholar and former deputy naval attaché to the United States Sr. Capt. Zhang Junshe seemed to be laying possible groundwork for just such a (mis)portrayal when he told Global Times that:

“waters adjacent to the Spratly Archipelago are the traditional fishing grounds of Chinese fishermen. For an American warship to barge into the adjacent waters constituted a threat to the normal operations of Chinese fishermen. The displacement of Chinese fishing vessels is small, and they have a shallow draft. They cannot withstand a collision. Americans show no remorse for their own actions or talk about the threat that a 10,000-ton warship represents for Chinese fishermen. Instead they hype up the ‘harassment’ of Chinese Maritime Militia. They are totally off base. There is absolutely no connection to the Maritime Militia.”

Yet, as of today, the U.S. government has demonstrated neither public awareness of the problem nor offered authoritative information to dispel such propaganda. Absent further preparations, this inaction could leave U.S. decisionmakers in a difficult position indeed. …

*** 

Andrew S. Erickson, Interviewed by Eleanor Hall, “Tensions between China and U.S. Intensify over South China Sea,” The World Today Program, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), 29 June 2016.

Click here to listen to both key interview highlights (MP3 Download) and the full-length interview (Extra Audio).

The World Today is Australia’s leading midday current affairs radio program, broadcast across the country and throughout the region by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). An hour of current affairs background and debate from Australia and the world every Monday to Friday, 12:05 pm, ABC Local Radio and Radio National, The World Today is a comprehensive current affairs program which backgrounds, analyses, interprets and encourages debate on events and issues of interest and importance to all Australians.

Transcript of key interview highlights:

“Tensions between China and U.S. Intensify over South China Sea”

ELEANOR HALL: Well let’s go now to one of the world’s most critical and contested trade routes, the South China Sea.

The standoff there between China, its neighbours and the US has been intensifying in recent months, with the Chinese taking an increasingly acquisitive stance in the area.

And a specialist on China’s strategy is adamant that one of the keys to China’s success is a secretive militia based on China’s fishing fleet.

Dr Andrew Erickson is a professor of strategy and a founding member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College.

He joined me earlier from Rhode Island to discuss his latest research.

ANDREW ERICKSON: The maritime militia appears to be an important part of China’s maritime security approach, nothing less than a third sea force for China.

China’s maritime militia is mostly effective for China and most corrosive to regional security and international norms when it’s able to lurk in the shadows below the level of awareness for the vast majority of outside observers and policy makers.

ELEANOR HALL: And how effective are these apparent fishermen against the huge United States naval vessels that are conducting their freedom of navigation trips through this area.

ANDREW ERICKSON: The capabilities of China’s maritime militia are not just theoretical. This is a force that has played a significant role in a variety of Chinese international sea battles, skirmishes, and incidents. … most importantly in recent years the 2012 direct participation of maritime militia forces in China’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, and finally in 2014, maritime militia participation in repelling Vietnamese forces that were trying to challenge the stationing of the Chinese HYSY-981 oil rig in waters disputed with Vietnam.

And according to an article in Defence News, late last October when the USS Lassen was involved in a freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea, it’s reported that a number of civilian-like vessels anticipated its transit and approached it and that has all the hallmarks of maritime militia activity that in the future I worry could be dialled up.

ELEANOR HALL: And is there a particular power in this militia because it is not wearing a naval uniform?

ANDREW ERICKSON: At this point China’s trying to have it both ways. The maritime militia are in fact organised forces subordinate to a PLA, People’s Liberation Army, Chinese military, chain of command.

It appears Chinese officials are going to deny some of these things in a very implausible way. We are getting some very implausible stories here and I think it’s really high time that we got to the bottom of this and got down to the facts, so that’s what we’re trying to do now with our research.

ELEANOR HALL: You’ve been urging the US government to at least acknowledge the existence of this militia, why is the US reluctant to do this?

ANDREW ERICKSON: I don’t know why it hasn’t come up in a significant number of US official public statements. I’m optimistic that that will change in the near future. I think the fact that some of these Chinese official denials are as implausible as they are is testimony to the cost of the US not making a more conclusive official statement.

ELEANOR HALL: What do you think would happen were the US government to acknowledge the existence of this fishing militia? Do you think it would make it harder for the Chinese to then use them to build the islands and block the US vessels?

ANDREW ERICKSON: The more that this irregular force is called out and documented for what it is, I think the more power and the more effectiveness it will lose. It will lose plausible deniability, it will lose an element of surprise, and… Chinese officials may be extremely reluctant acknowledge or admit how it’s been developed in some ways.

I think… that as other countries take it seriously and their officials make statements about it, those very facts will make Chinese officials much more careful about how they think about developing and employing this third sea force of theirs.

ELEANOR HALL: Do you think that the US Navy should change its rules of engagement so that it can take action against what appear to be civilian vessels?

ANDREW ERICKSON: I am not a lawyer so I am not qualified to comment on the specific details of rules of engagement. My personal strong recommendation, and I think this should be communicated to China, is that any Chinese maritime militia-type elements that ignore repeated warnings by US Navy or other US government vessels to desist from disruptive activities, should be treated as militarily controlled and should be dealt with accordingly to ensure self defence and unobstructed mission accomplishment.

It seems clear to me that there should be ways to make it clear that US government vessels will act in a positive way and they’re not looking for some sort of unsafe encounter, but nor will they allow themselves to be stymied or thwarted or diverted by any kind of Chinese military-sponsored harassment even if it comes from ostensibly humble appearing maritime militia forces.

ELEANOR HALL: Could doing what you suggest, though, actually spark a military conflict in the area?

ANDREW ERICKSON: I think that both the US and China have very strong incentives and strong shared interests to not let tensions get out of hand. I think we’re in a period right now, at least in some security aspects, that I term ‘competitive coexistence’.

So, on the one hand our two countries have deep, shared economic interests, we have strong interests in counter-terrorism. These are strong bulwarks that I think can keep things from spinning out of control. The fact is China has equally strong interests not to allow any sort of unexpected encounter or incident to escalate out of control.

ELEANOR HALL: That’s Dr Andrew Erickson, a professor of strategy and a founding member of the US Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute.

*** 

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Chapter 5: China’s Maritime Militia,” in Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (ret.), ed., Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream (Arlington, VA: CNA Corporation, June 2016), 62-83.

Introduction

An important component of China’s local armed forces is the militia. It supports China’s armed forces in a variety of functions, and is seeing expanded mission roles as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to modernize. While the maritime militia is not a new addition to China’s militia system, it is receiving greater emphasis since China now aspires to become a great maritime power and because maritime disputes in China’s near seas are a growing concern.

No official definition of the maritime militia exists in the many sources the authors examined. However, in late 2012 the Zhoushan garrison commander, Zeng Pengxiang, and the garrison’s Mobilization Office described it concisely: “The Maritime Militia is an irreplaceable mass armed organization not released from production and a component of China’s ocean defense armed forces [that enjoys] low sensitivity and great leeway in maritime rights protection actions.”

The only estimate of the size of the maritime militia obtained during the course of this research was from a source published in 1978, which put the number of personnel at 750,000 on approximately 140,000 craft. In its 2010 defense white paper, China stated that it had 8 million primary militia members nationwide. The maritime militia is a smaller unique subset since it performs many of its missions at sea. However, an accurate number is not available. It is important to note that the maritime militia is distinct from both China’s coastal militia (shore based) and its naval reserve, although some coastal militia units have been transformed into maritime militia units.

History of China’s maritime militia

China’s militia system originated before the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power, but the system of making numerous state-supported maritime militias out of the coastal populations was not fully implemented until the Communists began to exercise greater control of the coastline in the 1950s. This segment of China’s population had been relatively isolated from events on land and was subject to Japanese and Nationalist control in the decades before CCP rule was established. The CCP targeted the fishing communities, creating fishing collectives and work units, enacting strict organizational control, and conducting political education.146 Factors motivating and shaping this transformation included:

  • The PLA’s early use of civilian vessels
  • The need to prevent Nationalist Chinese (ROC) incursions along the coast
  • The need to man the maritime militia with fishermen, as there were too few other experienced mariners
  • Confrontations with other states’ fishing and naval vessels, due to the depletion of fishery resources.
  • The need to fish farther from shore, in contested waters.
  • The transformation from coastal defense militias to the at-sea maritime militia
  • Overall trends in militia development, including specialization, emergency response, technological units, and increased orientation towards supporting each of the PLA branches.

The maritime militia has played significant roles in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including:

  • The 1950s support of the PLA’s island seizure campaigns
  • The 1974 seizure of the western portion of the Paracels
  • The 2009 Impeccable incident
  • The 2011 harassment of Vietnam’s survey vessels (Viking II and Binh Minh)
  • The 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff (Tanmen Militia present)
  • The 2014 Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig standoff. …

*** 

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia: What It Is and How to Deal With It,” Foreign Affairs, 23 June 2016.

Last October, when the American destroyer USS Lassen sailed by Subi Reef, an artificial island built by China in the South China Sea, a number of Chinese merchant ships and fishing boats maneuvered around it, apparently having anticipated its approach. The Lassen was on a freedom of navigation operation, meant to demonstrate the United States’ commitment to maintaining open access to the area, much of which China claims as its own. China was using an unusual resource to broadcast its opposition to the trip: ships that appeared to be crewed by civilians, but in all likelihood were actually controlled by state-sponsored forces taking orders from China’s military.

To promote its disputed claims in the South China Sea, China is increasingly relying on irregular forces such as these, which together form what China calls its maritime militia. In recent years, maritime militia units have played important roles in a number of encounters and skirmishes in international waters: in 2012, for example, they participated in China’s seizure of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, and in 2014, they helped China repel Vietnamese ships from an oil rig that China had stationed near the contested Paracel Islands.

The militia represents a useful tool in China’s plan to bloodlessly press its maritime claims, since its frequently civilian appearance allows Beijing to deny its involvement in encounters such as last October’s and exploit the U.S. Navy’s rules of engagement…. …

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萧雨 [Xiao Yu], “南海仲裁在即 潭门渔民集体封口” [South China Sea Arbitration Imminent—Tanmen Fishermen Collective Seals Mouth],  美国之音 [Voice of America], 23 June 2016.

 

John Sudworth, “South China Sea: The Mystery of Missing Books and Maritime Claims,”BBC News, 19 June 2016.

If you want to understand the way China really feels about its controversial claim to huge swathes of the sea off its southern shore, then the island of Hainan is a good place to start.

This is a place where everything is bent towards justifying and upholding that assertion of sovereignty, from government and military policy, to fishing and tourism, and even history itself.

We came to the fishing port of Tanmen, on Hainan’s east coast, because of recent state media reports about the existence of an extraordinary document – a 600-year-old book containing evidence of vital, national importance. …

China’s insistence that these features are Chinese territory rests largely on a “we were there first” argument. So 81-year-old Mr Su’s book, “cherished” and “wrapped in layers of paper” is apparently a kind of maritime Holy Grail. …

… when I ask to see the document – the existence of which was, just a few weeks ago, being so widely reported in China and beyond – there’s a surprising development.

Mr Su tells me it doesn’t exist.

“Although the book was important, I threw it away because it was broken,” he says. …

Whatever it was, Mr Su’s book is not, it seems, any longer ironclad proof of anything. Except perhaps China’s Communist Party-controlled media’s willingness not to let a few facts get in the way of the official narrative. …

Everywhere we go, we’re followed by a number of blacked-out government cars; from the port where we try to interview fishermen, to the fish market where we speak to traders, and all the way back to our hotel. …

All of this comes, of course, amid the much-anticipated international court ruling on the South China Sea, expected some time in the next few weeks. …

This may help to explain why a foreign journalist’s presence in Hainan at this particular moment in time is likely to attract such close attention from the authorities.

Although in our case there may have been another reason: we were, perhaps, asking too many questions about Hainan’s notorious “maritime militia”.

China has been known to be giving its fishermen military training for decades.

But in recent years, the number of militiamen on fishing boats is reported to be increasing and their actions appear to be becoming more assertive in helping to underwrite and enforce China’s sovereignty claims.

Their strategic advantage is that they can be, and often are, used for irregular military engagements – occupying territory at sea, carrying out surveillance or harassing other vessels – while operating under the guise of civilian fishing boats.

The activities of the militia units in the port of Tanmen have been well documented.

They even have their own headquarters inside the town’s government compound, honoured with a visit in 2013 by the Chinese President Xi Jinping. 

Despite our efforts though no-one would talk about the role this shadowy force plays within China’s fishing fleet, and the more we ask, the more intense the tailing and government surveillance seems to become.

Prof Andrew S Erickson from the Chinese Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College believes the presence of the militia in already troubled waters raises risks.

“I see a tremendous risk of miscalculation and escalation,” he told me.

“The current approach that China is taking to the use of its maritime militia not only puts them in danger, [it] puts any other individuals and vessels around them in danger and it indeed imposes a risk of force being used against them by the US and other forces in legitimate self defence or to ensure the legitimate passage of vessels.”

And that risk may rise even further, he suggests, after the Permanent Court of Arbitration Ruling.

“When the arbitral tribunal finally hands down some sort of a ruling I think China is going to try to find a way to concretely register its opposition, its resolve and its displeasure.

“And I think using maritime militia forces to further approach in close proximity and potentially harass US, Philippine and other vessels is something that policy makers from those countries must be prepared for.” …

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Andrew S. Erickson, “Reported Chinese Efforts to Conceal Maritime Militia Reach Intelligence-Insulting Level,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 16 June 2016.

Chinese officials are insulting foreign intelligence, likely in all senses of the word.

Xi Jinping’s visit in 2013 to Tanmen Township, and the designation of its Maritime Militia as a national model, has made this the leading unit for other seaports to emulate. Yet earlier this month, as the Al Jazeera article below documents, a local propaganda official told foreign reporters that a contingent of 40-50 fatigue-clad militiamen drilling was “part of a film crew.” Moreover, Wang Shumao, the Tanmen Militia’s deputy commander and a veteran of its involvement in the Scarborough Shoal Standoff with the Philippines in 2012, “denied knowing anything about the militia.” Amazingly, Wang further claimed that his deeply-tanned comrades were simply fishermen who “chose to wear camouflage to protect themselves from the sun”!

Unfortunately, we’ve seen this movie before—one of confirmed Maritime Militia involvement in a series of international maritime incidents and skirmishes, including the 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands, the 2011 sabotage of Binh Minh 02 and harassment ofViking II, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff, and the 2014 HYSY-981 Oil Rig Standoff.

Whatever its future plans for its irregular sea forces, China clearly has something to hide. Fortunately for open source analysts, China can be surprisingly transparent—at least in Chinese. In the tradition of supporting free scholarly inquiry and discussion, as pioneered and practiced by the China Maritime Studies Institute, China Analysis from Original Sources now offers an updated China Maritime Militia Compendium:

Florence Looi, “Looking for China’s Maritime Militia,” Al Jazeera, 4 June 2016.

Reporting on groups involved in confrontations with foreign patrol vessels in the South China Sea is proving difficult.

Tanmen, China – We had come to this fishing village on Hainan Island, China’s southern-most province, because it’s home to one of the country’s best-known maritime militias – the Tanmen Maritime Militia Company.

Its recruits are mostly men from the fishing community. They are given basic military training, and their activities, according to the Hainan Daily, include “collecting maritime information … and contributing to sovereignty defence in the South China Sea.”

Chinese President Xi Jinping cited the Tanmen Maritime Militia as the model for maritime militia building, and honoured them with a visit in 2013.

But while they may be celebrated in local media, we soon found out filming the Tanmen Maritime Militia was not so straightforward.

It was by chance that we spotted them one sunny morning, as we drove past Tanmen Port – around 40 or 50 men, dressed in military fatigues, going through a drill.

What was to prove even more difficult though was getting people to talk about the group.

We asked a local official from the propaganda office whether the men we saw were members of the Tanmen Militia. He told us they were part of a film crew. That would have been a bit more believable, had we not driven past the film crew just minutes earlier.

A fisherman we interviewed, Wang Shumao, denied knowing anything about the militia. He said the men we saw were just fishermen who “… chose to wear camouflage to protect themselves from the sun.”

But it turned out Wang was not telling the truth about how much he knew about the group.

We found out later that he was not just an ordinary fisherman. He is a deputy commander of the Tanmen Maritime Militia.

He was also on one of the 12 Chinese vessels involved in a standoff with the Philippine Navy at Scarborough Shoal in 2012. He had led an unsuccessful attempt to block Philippine vessels from approaching the shoal.

The Qionghai City Government website published a profile of Wang last year.

Wang did not reveal any of that when we spoke to him, and denied knowing anything about the group.

But why were the Chinese so reluctant to talk to foreign media about the Tanmen Maritime Militia?

Perhaps because of the unflattering reports about China’s maritime militias. These groups have been involved in confrontations with foreign patrol vessels in the South China Sea.

In 2014, boats belonging to maritime militias, together with Chinese coastguard and naval ships helped form a cordon around an oil rig, that the Chinese had installed in disputed waters, to prevent Vietnamese maritime authorities from approaching.

A year later, fishing vessels, believed to be part of several Chinese maritime militias, were reportedly involved in harassing a US navy ship when it sailed near the Spratly Islands in October 2015.

Experts say the use of quasi-civilian forces is a tactic to avoid direct military confrontations, and allows the Chinese government some degree of deniability.

Andrew Erickson, professor at the US Naval War College, told Defense News: “China is trying to use these government-controlled fisherman below the radar to get the bonus without the onus to support its South China Sea claims.”

China however denied this. Its foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said: “This kind of situation does not exist.” …

***

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “From Frontier to Frontline: Tanmen Maritime Militia’s Leading Role—Part 2,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 17 May 2016.

Tanmen Militia’s Leading Role in the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou (HYSY)-981 Oil Rig Standoff, Spratly Features Construction, and Beyond

Our series on the leading maritime militias of Hainan Province continues with this second installment in a two-part in-depth examination of the maritime militia of Tanmen Township. Since its founding in 1985, this force has transformed from an entrepreneurial fishing collective on China’s marine frontier to a reliable frontline unit in increasingly vigorous sovereignty promotion. In part one we discussed the role Tanmen’s maritime militia played in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident that resulted in a Chinese takeover of the feature from the Philippines. After the Communist Party of China (CPC) officially declared the new national goal of becoming a maritime power at the 18th National Congress, newly appointed Chinese President Xi Jinping marked the Tanmen Militia unit as the model for emulation in maritime militia building. A subsequent deluge of delegation visits further reinforced the significance of this unit. Part two will focus on other major events involving the Tanmen Maritime Militia, particularly its participation in the 1995 Mischief Reef Incident and China’s sea-based defense of the HYSY-981 oil rig off the southern Paracel islands in 2014 (which also involved the Sanya militia, as the first article in this series discussed) and China’s multi-decade augmentation of its Spratlys outposts. This article will also probe the Tanmen militia’s organization and leadership, the challenges and opportunities associated with its management and motivation, and will raise the possibility that the Tanmen militiamen’s mission at Scarborough Shoal may not yet be finished.

After Xi Jinping’s visit in 2013, Tanmen Township quickly became ground zero in China’s discussion about the future direction of militia work. The township was host to the 2014 National Border and Coastal Defense Work Conference. Additionally, Tanmen People’s Armed Forces Department (PAFD) Head and Maritime Militia Company Commander Zhang Jiantang attended the Fifth National Conference on Border and Coastal Defense Construction Work in Beijing in June 2014. There he received awards on behalf of his company for its bravery in defending China’s maritime sovereignty. One month prior, he and his men were involved in one of the most volatile showdowns between Vietnam and China since their border war in 1979, the Haiyang Shiyou (HYSY)-981 Oil Rig Standoff of 2 May-15 July 2014.

On 6 June 2014, Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense newspaper The People’s Army stated that China was maintaining between 110 and 115 vessels around China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) HYSY-981 oil rig. This included 35-40 coast guard vessels, 30 transport ships and tugboats, 35-40 “fishing vessels,” and four naval ships. These forces assembled to form what the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to in English as a “cordon” around the oil rig, effectively preventing Vietnamese vessels from approaching the platform. For China’s maritime forces it was an escort mission to protect HYSY-981 during its operations. In early May, the Chinese government issued Maritime Notice 14034 warning foreign vessels not to enter within three nautical miles of the location of the rig at these coordinates (15°29’58.0”N 111°12’06.0”E). However, Vietnamese reports state China expanded its cordon radius and would confront approaching vessels 9.5-10 nautical miles out from the rig. It appears that Vietnam’s fishing vessels could not fish near the platform because of heavy Chinese interference, so they opted to fish outside of the Chinese cordoned area to display presence in their “traditional fishing grounds.” They were not safe, however, as vessels from China’s maritime militia sallied forth to repel the Vietnamese vessels, using non-military forces against non-military forces as a deliberate means of preventing escalation. One report describes Chinese fishing vesselQiongdongfang 11209 (琼东方11209) ramming and sinking Vietnamese fishing vessel No. 90152 during an encounter 17 nautical miles from the rig, where Vietnamese fishing vessels were surrounded by 40 Chinese fishing vessels. Video footage of Qiongdongfang 11209 running down the smaller Vietnamese vessel can be seen below. Moreover, Vietnam’s smaller wooden-hulled fishing vessels were outclassed by China’s larger tonnage steel-hulled fishing vessels. …

PART ONE OF THE TWO-PART ARTICLE:

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Model Maritime Militia: Tanmen’s Leading Role in the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 21 April 2016.

This series on the leading maritime militias of Hainan Province began by examining the “rights protection” efforts of Sanya City’s maritime militia, whose exploits have given them a prominent position among the province’s irregular sea forces. Discussionsabout the Sanya City maritime militia are still ongoing as we watch their development. Next came our evaluation of the historical legacy of Danzhou’s maritime militia, which directly demonstrated the value of irregular forces in naval warfare during the 1974 Paracels Sea Battle. This third installment in the series is part one of a two-part in-depth look at the maritime militia of Tanmen.

Tanmen Fishing Harbor is a small fishing port on the eastern shore of Hainan Island. It is home to one of China’s best-known maritime militia units, the Tanmen Maritime Militia Company (潭门海上民兵连). This irregular force receives disproportionate media coverage stemming largely from its involvement in numerous incidents with foreign actors at sea, most notably the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal Incident between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Philippines. Since its founding in 1985, Tanmen has received numerous accolades as an “advanced militia unit” from the government and military on all levels. Tanmen’s fame spread further after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s high-profile visit on the first anniversary of the incident. Xi encouraged Tanmen’s maritime militia to build larger vessels, collect information in distant waters, master modern equipment, and support “island and reef” development. The extent of Chinese attention to this fishing village merits a deep-dive analysis to determine what is happening on the ground there, and what kind of maritime militia capabilities are resulting.

Some of Tanmen’s importance to the PRC stems from the wealth of historical artifacts and other evidence China possesses that allegedly support claims that Tanmen fishermen were the earliest community to discover and sustain continuous exploitation of the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Numerous reports of Tanmen fishermen having been detained or attacked by foreign states also support a growing Chinese narrative of the victimization of Chinese fishermen in the South China Sea. This narrative justifies enhanced ‘defensive’ activities by Chinese maritime forces operating there. Contributions from fishing communities such as Tanmen’s to China’s overall posture in the South China Sea bolsters domestic Chinese rationale for regaining lost “blue territory” (蓝色国土) and “maritime rights and interests” (海洋权益). Tanmen Village is likewise the future site of China’s South China Sea Museum and the South China Sea Base for the State Administration of Cultural Heritage’s Undersea Cultural Heritage Protection Center. Both institutions will likely be dedicated to bolstering China’s historical evidence to support its claims of sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea and resource rights in those waters. The latter also has a stated purpose of “promoting maritime industries, shoreline protection and development, utilization and conservation of marine resources, marine service systems, and the implementation of the overall national marine economic development strategy.”

Central to furthering these interests are irregular units including the Tanmen Maritime Militia Company. Its history exhibit, located in its headquarters, houses artifacts documenting historical presence in the South China Sea by the forefathers of present-day militia members. These include navigation logs, compasses, and diving gear. Tanmen’s maritime militia activities began well before the present company’s official establishment in 1985. Previously a more loosely-organized fishermen militia, it became an official militia company when the PRC promulgated new guidelines for developing fisheries in distant waters and opened up the oceanic fishing industry to privatization. A contingent from this new organization was led initially by its first commander, Huang Xunmian, to the Spratlys, thereby becoming the first organized Tanmen fleet for Spratly development. Huang became a major part of the militia movement to mobilize Tanmen fishermen to build bigger vessels and venture to the Spratlys. By the early 1990s, the company included 150 militiamen and 21 vessels. Today it continues to expand under the current political agenda of transforming China into a “maritime power.”

Chinese media coverage of Tanmen fishermen often states that a large portion of incidents in the South China Sea between Chinese fishermen and foreign states is attributable to the Tanmen fishermen and maritime militia, whose members resolutely oppose “foreign encroachment.” The deputy station chief of the Qionghai City Fisheries Management Station told reporters in 2012 that 90% of the Chinese fishing vessels visiting the Paracels and Spratlys are from Tanmen Harbor, the remainder from Sanya City (also in Hainan Province) or Guangdong Province. While that particular claim is difficult to verify, the number of tense encounters between Tanmen fishermen and militia and the maritime forces of o