Nia Kaul, “U.S. Navy’s CMSI Marks 20 Years Tracking Beijing’s Maritime Ambitions,” UPI, 21 October 2026.

The U.S. Navy’s China Maritime Studies Institute is marking 20 years of research that has helped shape understanding of Beijing’s maritime strategy.

• Reprinted in “Naval History,” CHINFO NEWS CLIPS: Navy and Marine Corps Daily Media Report, 22 October 2026, 15–16.

U.S. Navy’s CMSI marks 20 years tracking Beijing’s maritime ambitions

By Nia Kaul

The U.S. Navy’s China Maritime Studies Institute is marking 20 years of research that has helped shape understanding of Beijing’s maritime strategy. File Photo by EPA

As China’s expanding naval power and increasingly assertive maritime activities challenge U.S. interests across the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Instituteis marking 20 years of research that has helped shape American understanding of Beijing’s maritime strategy.

Established in 2006 as the Defense Department’s first service-specific China research center, the Institute has become an important source of analysis for U.S. military planners and policymakers confronting China’s growing maritime influence.

Its research extends beyond China’s naval modernization to examine the country’s broader maritime ambitions, including military strategy, maritime law enforcement and the expanding role of Chinese forces in contested regional waters.

Working closely with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Office of Naval Intelligence and operational Navy commands, the Institute provides research intended to inform U.S. naval strategy and decision-making.

The CMSI began with modest resources but quickly established itself as a center for research on China’s growing maritime power.

Recalling the Institute’s early days, co-founder Dr. Andrew Erickson described working through the night to sort photocopied Chinese-language articles into research categories.

By 2008, just two years after its founding at the U.S. Naval War College, CMSI had organized four major conferences, including one examining China’s future nuclear submarine force.

Its research has since gained wider recognition. A 2024 study, Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-Strait Invasion, was named the Samuel B. Griffith Foundation’s 2025 Publication of the Year and selected for the Marine Corps commandant’s professional reading lists in 2025 and 2026, underscoring the Institute’s growing influence on U.S. military thinking about China and Taiwan.

Through the utilization of an open-source research methodology, including Chinese-language official documents, journals and reports, to study the People’s Republic of China’s military maritime development, the CMSI highlights that it is able to provide a more in-depth understanding of China’s maritime activities.

The CMSI publishes a range of products that include the Quarterly Review, CMSI Studies in China Maritime, China Maritime Studies Red Books, CMSI China Maritime Reports, CMSI Notes and CMSI Translations. In addition, the Institute hosts regular conferences, with past topics covering China’s Near Seas Operations (2011), China’s Far Seas Operations (2012), China’s Naval Shipbuilding (2015) and China’s Undersea Warfare (2023).

During a panel discussion that took place to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the CMSI, Captain Christopher Sharman, director of the CMSI, noted that the Institute is able to deliver “cutting-edge” research that overcomes language and access barriers.

In an exclusive comment for the South China Sea NewsWire, Sharman and Erickson reflected on the key milestones the CMSI has accomplished, and looked ahead to the future implications of China’s maritime activities. Both researchers spoke in their personal capacities, not on behalf of the Institute.

Sharman and Erickson highlighted that what has changed most in the understanding of Chinese maritime activities is the “geographic scope of China’s maritime ambitions.” They emphasized “China’s maritime interests are global,” and that U.S. policymakers are looking too narrowly at isolated case studies — namely, at the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Their comments emphasized looking at the much wider naval strategy of China that has been in place since 2015: ‘Near Seas Defense, Far Seas Protection.’

Importantly, Sharman and Erickson’s observations also revealed that it won’t be all smooth sailing going forward, and that there are key factors that must not be overlooked by U.S. policymakers.

“We need to examine China’s military maritime activities holistically,” they said. “The challenge for U.S. policymakers is to look beyond the immediate crisis in the South China Sea or around Taiwan.”

A nearsighted approach risks policymaking that does not address China’s wider maritime activities. Sharman and Erickson also emphasized that China’s navy should not be analyzed in isolation. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), China Coast Guard, maritime militia, as well as the scientific and commercial maritime sector all work towards “different but complementary purposes,” they said.

Admiral Gary Roughead, former U.S. Navy officer and the 29th Chief of Naval Operations, offered his perspective of the evolution of the CMSI in a keynote speech during the CMSI’s 20th anniversary commemoration. He noted that the creation of the CMSI and his return to the Pacific Command “were almost concurrent.”

“The timing of CMSI’s founding could not have been better,” as the People’s Liberation Army was also demonstrating rapid transformation and development.

Roughead’s keynote mirrored the sentiment of Sharman and Erickson. He noted that the CMSI is a unique organization in terms of how it engages actors and conducts its research. The CMSI is able to offer “deeper insight” through fostering collaboration between China “linguists and practitioners.”

Roughead commented that the CMSI’s research beyond naval affairs “sets it apart” from other institutions. He noted that it is essential to monitor China’s “global merchant fleet,” “shipbuilding industry” and “global ports.”

Roughead echoed that challenges lie ahead for the U.S. Navy and administration, as today’s leaders are “leading a Navy engaged in the most intense naval conflict since World War II.”

Citing what he referred to as the “Mega-region,” he underscored that the CMSI must continue to monitor the “vast area from the Eastern Mediterranean to East Asia, particularly the great Indian Ocean.” Referring to technology, Roughead noted that U.S. policymakers must be cautious of the role of artificial intelligence enhancing China’s military maritime operations.

Former director of the CMSI Dr. Peter Dutton similarly stated that agility, and being able to efficiently adapt to new challenges, is paramount.

To address China’s growing maritime ambitions and challenges that lie ahead, the CMSI has concrete plans in store. Its upcoming conference in 2027 will discuss the theme Military-Civil Fusion at Sea: China’s Integrated Advantage?

Going forward, Sharman and Erickson emphasized the importance of maintaining a holistic and forward-looking approach to researching China’s maritime operations. They noted that China is likely to have more of a “persistent oceanic presence,” as well as “an expansion of activity in both polar regions.” “We need to understand not only what China’s maritime forces can do today, but also what its investments and activities are preparing them to do tomorrow,” Sharman said.

Nia Kaul is a Research Associate at the South China Sea NewsWire. She is based in London, and completed her Bachelor of Arts in International Relations at King’s College London. Her research expertise lies in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. This article is republished with permission from the South China Sea NewsWire. Read the original article. The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.

Topics

• Defense
• Gary Roughead
• Marine Corps

***

Hot off the NWC Press! In the new Autumn 2026 issue of Naval War College Review, I’m honored to publish my personal reflection on the founding and development of the China Maritime Studies Institute.

• Andrew S. Erickson, “Special Feature—Twenty Years of the China Maritime Studies Institute,” Naval War College Review 79.4 (Autumn 2026): 182–86.

From CMSI Director CAPT Christopher Sharman, USN (Ret.):

China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) Friends and Colleagues –

Dr. Andrew Erickson has been published in the Autumn 2026 edition of the Naval War College Review. His special feature article, “Twenty Years of the China Maritime Studies Institute” appears in this quarter’s issue.

Erickson’s article provides the definitive history of the origins and evolution of CMSI as a research institute within the Naval War College in his article.

Thank you for sharing the past 20 years with us. Much more to come from CMSI soon.

In the words of the War College Review Editor-in-Chief, Dr. Sam Tangredi:

“we present a retrospective essay from Professor Andrew Erickson on the twentieth anniversary of the official launch of the College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). Very quickly, CMSI established itself as an indispensable center of gravity for thought on China’s broader maritime ambitions and activities and their implications, as well as a vital repository of translations of Chinese sources to illuminate and enable research in the broader community of interest. CMSI’s conferences and publications, outreach, and expertise have helped steer national conversation and help ensure that Navy leadership and the broader government are equipped with the knowledge they need in this vital arena, a mission CMSI and the community of researchers it supports look forward to pursuing for many years to come.”

As CMSI winds down commemoration of our 20th Anniversary, please see other publications and web resources related to the CMSI’s 20th Anniversary events at the links below:

• CMSI 20th Anniversary Academic Panel: Splash Page
• Naval War College Public Affairs: News Release
• Keynote Address by Admiral Roughead: Published Remarks
• CMSI Publications: Webpage

**  Want to be added to the CMSI Distribution list? ** Sign up HERE.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Special Feature—Twenty Years of the China Maritime Studies Institute,” Naval War College Review 79.4 (Autumn 2026): 182–86.

Twenty Years of the China Maritime Studies Institute

Andrew S. Erickson

Naval War College Review  |  Volume 79, Number 4 (Autumn 2026), Article 16

This fall, the Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) marks twenty years since its official launch on 1 October 2006. Members of the self-organized faculty “China Maritime Studies Group” approached the College’s provost in the fall of 2004 with the idea of creating CMSI. The core founding members—Professors Lyle Goldstein, William Murray, Andrew “Dex” Wilson, and (this author) Andrew Erickson—proposed the institute to James Giblin, then provost of the College. Following approval from the President, Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, Giblin established CMSI within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies’ Strategic Research Department on 1 October 2004; the institute quickly proved its worth and two years later became an official Navy program and the first service-level China center in the Defense Department.¹

CMSI’s founding principles included a unique focus on People’s Republic of China (PRC) military maritime issues—a far broader remit than just naval affairs—encompassing activity across the waterfront. We insisted that scholarship can and should be relevant to the U.S. Navy and government. We saw our research as a collegial calling, with great emphasis on teamwork and scaling scholarship through intensive collaboration among professionals with diverse expertise, from linguistics and area studies to technology and military operations. We believed that rigorously analyzing pedigreed Chinese-language open sources could offer valuable insights, particularly by surveying PRC thinking and discerning inner layers indirectly, as well as through probing hard-to-measure emerging dynamics. These inductive methodologies would yield a better understanding for decision makers, who never have all the information they desire. The same methods would paint a picture of the context and underlying currents in ways otherwise unavailable to the U.S. government—even with its massive, sophisticated national and allied technical collection systems.

…………………………………………….

Founding CMSI director Lyle Goldstein and Professors William Murray, Andrew S. Erickson, and Andrew “Dex” Wilson (front row) with students from their Chinese Maritime Development class (Spring Elective 672) in the Naval War College’s Hewitt Hall, Newport, Rhode Island, 2008

At our best, we have been analytic Wayne Gretzkys, “skating to where the puck is going to be,” by offering answers to questions that the Navy or government as a whole did not yet know to ask. We have provided particularly transformative insights about China’s naval leadership, naval and maritime strategy, undersea warfare, amphibious capabilities, sovereignty disputes, maritime militia, and gray-zone operations, many of which have helped motivate and lead national conversations. Engaging the broader analytic community in and out of government enriches our effort, and we have always pursued productive symbiosis with the civilian China studies community, in part by utilizing Newport’s proximity to some of the world’s leading universities. But we are conscious, too, that we have a customer and seek inputs from key principals on relevant research topics to support their decision-making to prioritize our projects. We do so in particularly close consultation with leading stakeholders, including the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the interagency, geographic combatant commanders, and the fleet.

Admiral Scott Swift, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (center, speaking), with CMSI’s second director, Professor Peter Dutton (right), Professor Erickson (second from left), and PRC and Australian participants at CMSI’s Indian Ocean Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, 12 January 2016

The institute was written up as an issue for the College’s 2008 program objective memorandum submission (i.e., the College’s part of the future defense budget), which secured the Chief of Naval Operations’ personal approval to formally inaugurate CMSI as a part of the College and to provide funding to hire four additional faculty members during fiscal year 2008, meaning CMSI would have its own programmed research faculty and not simply borrow people and resources from other departments. In April 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates invoked CMSI as a model for the Minerva Research Initiative.² By December 2008, CMSI had held four influential conferences, with edited Studies in Chinese Maritime Development volumes following each iteration. These included CMSI’s inaugural event, “China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force” (26–27 October 2005). That event, in turn, yielded CMSI’s first edited volume, which helped validate the institute’s open-source methodology.³ Among CMSI’s early publications, Chinese Mine Warfare further underscored the potential of open-source analysis and remains a foundational study in the field.⁴

CMSI director Christopher Sharman (center) with CMSI faculty members Professors Ryan Martinson, Daniel Caldwell, Erickson, and Ian Easton (left to right) in the CMSI library, Newport, Rhode Island, 26 May 2026

Early on, we received substantial funding from the longtime director of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Marshall.⁵ His generous support paid for publication and database subscriptions and enabled my own shift from being a contractor supporting the College to being named a U.S. government research fellow before joining the faculty formally. Other key CMSI supporters included Naval Undersea Warfare Center engineer and program manager Kyrill Korolenko, who was instrumental in bringing our early undersea warfare research to Navy leadership’s attention—including at the National Defense Industry Association’s annual clambake in New London, Connecticut.⁶

As the U.S. military’s first service-specific China center, CMSI inspired the founding of other analytic organizations, which we have advised and supported since their creation. These include a panoply of Naval War College centers, such as the Russia Maritime Studies Institute, as well as centers elsewhere within the armed services, including the Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute, the Army’s China Landpower Studies Center, and the Marine Corps’s China Warfighting Initiative. All employ valued colleagues, and all our nation’s China centers collaborate and meet regularly to share best practices and advance the field together.

CMSI’s inaugural director, Lyle Goldstein, who served until 2011, and his successors provided key leadership and grew the institute into a recognized and in-demand center of gravity for China research in the U.S. government. Peter Dutton led major development and institutionalization as CMSI’s second director, serving from 2011 to 2018. From 2018 to 2021, Commander Daniel Caldwell, USN, sustained CMSI through major challenges, including the COVID pandemic, and strove to ensure that CMSI research served the needs of the fleet. From 2021 to 2023, under two acting directors, Andrew Erickson served as CMSI’s research director. Since 2023, our current director, Captain Christopher Sharman, USN (Ret.), has overseen unprecedented institutional connectivity and operational relevance. He and CMSI’s other faculty members—as well as CMSI affiliates and other contributors—produce extensive cutting-edge scholarship boresighted on China’s military maritime development as part of CMSI’s longstanding missions to research, write, advise, educate, and engage.⁷

CMSI’s six product lines now include edited conference volumes (Studies in Chinese Maritime Development), China Maritime Studies (“Red Books”), China Maritime Reports, CMSI Notes, CMSI Translations, and the CMSI Quarterly Review, which includes the publication of CMSI archived translations through special editions of the Quarterly Review.⁸ Among these, our flagship event and output is our conference, with papers and a resulting edited volume, now held biennially for best effect. Our award-winning 2024 volume, Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-Strait Invasion, has been named the Samuel B. Griffith Foundation’s 2025 Publication of the Year and selected for the Commandant of the Marine Corps Professional Reading Program’s 2025 and 2026 Reading Lists.⁹ In 2023, we revisited PRC undersea warfare, coming full circle since our first CMSI conference in 2005 on that very subject.¹⁰ The sobering comparison revealed Beijing’s two decades of progress in sharp relief. From 14 to 15 May 2025, CMSI held its fourteenth conference—to assess human factors in China’s military maritime forces.¹¹

In the realm of advising, CMSI continues to inform USN and government stakeholders (current leaders) and Naval War College and Navy students (future leaders), as well as allies and partners. Through teaching and education more broadly, we provide curricular instruction, inputs, and guidance to the Naval War College, Navy commands across Naval Station Newport, and other professional military education institutions. We contribute directly to and support Naval War College education, with particular focus on instructing rising USN, Marine Corps, and joint flag and general officers through the College of Maritime Operational Warfare. We provide tailored flag-officer education, both on campus in Newport and around the world. We also furnish substantial support to the Joint Military Operations Department and all areas of the curriculum. Finally, we use our research and writing as a basis for highly substantive, targeted engagement with the U.S. Navy, the interagency, and allies and partners.

CMSI continues to illuminate Beijing’s meteoric oceanic advances; our next conference, to be held 11–12 May 2027, will probe military-civil fusion at sea. Two decades on, the Navy’s need to understand China’s sea forces and where they are going has never been more urgent.

Author Biography

Andrew S. Erickson is professor of strategy in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the Naval War College. A core founding member, he helped establish CMSI and stand it up officially in 2006 and played an integral role in its development; from 2021 to 2023 he served as research director. CMSI inspired the creation of other research centers, which Erickson has advised and supported; he is a China Aerospace Studies Institute associate. Erickson is also an adjunct professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Erickson is currently a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Asia Center, and he has been an associate in research at Harvard’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies since 2008. In 2024, Erickson was awarded the Navy Superior Civilian Service Medal. His research website is www.andrewerickson.com.

Notes

1. In 2015 the Strategic Research Department merged with the Warfare Analysis and Research Department to form the present-day Strategic and Operational Research Department. This essay draws in part on Andrew S. Erickson, “CMSI’s 20th Anniversary! China Maritime Studies Institute Established Two Decades Ago within Naval War College,” China Analysis from Original Sources, 2 October 2024, www.andrewerickson.com/; and John B. Hattendorf, 1984–2009, vol. 2 of Sailors and Scholars: The History of the U.S. Naval War College, 1884–2009, 2nd ed. (Naval War College Press, 2025), pp. 546–49, 553–54, 412–13, 418, 468, 530, 640, 649, 695–96, 729.
2. Robert M. Gates, speech to Association of American Universities (Washington, DC, 14 April 2008), transcript available at www.andrewerickson.com/.
3. Andrew S. Erickson et al., eds., China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Naval Institute Press, 2007); Raymond Pritchett (Galrahn), “Reading Bliss for Observers of Submarines and China,” Information Dissemination, 3 January 2008, available at www.andrewerickson.com/; Raymond Pritchett (Galrahn), “It’s Always Nice to Get the Chinese Perspective,” Information Dissemination, 8 January 2008, available at www.andrewerickson.com/.
4. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy “Assassin’s Mace” Capability, China Maritime Study 3 (Naval War College Press, June 2009), available at digital-commons.usnwc.edu/.
5. Andrew S. Erickson, “Honoring the Many Contributions of Andrew Marshall, an Early Supporter and Sponsor of CMSI,” China Analysis from Original Sources, 26 March 2019, www.andrewerickson.com/.
6. Andrew S. Erickson, “In Loving Memory: A Tribute to CMSI Founding Supporter Kyrill Korolenko,” China Analysis from Original Sources, 19 March 2019, www.andrewerickson.com/.
7. DVIDS HUB, “CLSC Dialogues—Ep 7—Christopher Sharman and Dr. Andrew S. Erickson—China Center Director Series—China Maritime Studies Institute,” 30 May 2024, YouTube video, 14:42, www.youtube.com/.
8. “China Maritime Studies Institute,” U.S. Naval War College, www.usnwc.edu/.
9. Eric M. Smith [Gen., USMC], “Update to the Commandant’s Professional Reading List for Fiscal Year 26,” ALMAR 024/25, 12 December 2025, available at www.marines.mil/; Andrew S. Erickson, “Two Years Running! ‘Chinese Amphibious Warfare’ Selected for Commandant of the Marine Corps Professional Reading Program’s 2025 & 2026 Reading Lists,” China Analysis from Original Sources, 14 December 2025, www.andrewerickson.com/.
10. China Maritime Studies Institute, “Chinese Undersea Warfare: Development, Capabilities, Trends,” Quick Look Report (U.S. Naval War College, 5 May 2023), available at www.andrewerickson.com/.
11. China Maritime Studies Institute, “The People of China’s Navy and Other Maritime Forces,” Quick Look Report (U.S. Naval War College, 22 May 2025), available at www.andrewerickson.com/.

Source: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol79/iss4/16

***

Admiral Gary Roughead, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “Charting the Course: 20 Years of CMSI and the Future of China in the Maritime Military Domain,” Keynote address delivered in the Mahan Reading Room, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 24 September 2026.

• Here is the official Naval War College writeup.
• My personal reflection on CMSI’s founding and development is available here.

From CMSI Director Chris H Sharman, US Navy (Ret.):

China Military Maritime Watchers: What does it really mean to be a maritime power?

“Charting the Course: 20 Years of CMSI and the Future of China in the Maritime Military Domain” — Here are the Keynote remarks by Admiral (Ret.) Gary Roughead, the 29th Chief of Naval Operations, delivered at CMSI’s 20th anniversary commemoration.

Admiral Roughead has had a front-row seat to China’s maritime transformation. From his engagement with Admiral Liu Huaqing, a key architect of China’s naval modernization, to his tenure as Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, he has witnessed that transformation over decades. His tenure as Pacific Fleet commander coincided with CMSI’s founding, making him uniquely positioned to reflect on the Institute’s contributions and the challenges ahead.

His keynote underscores a central insight that has guided CMSI’s work for two decades:

“We often compare our navy to theirs, counting the number and types of ships in each. But a maritime power is more than a navy.”

Admiral Roughead challenges us to look beyond ship counts to China’s global merchant fleet, shipbuilding capacity, port access, and broader maritime enterprise.

He also offers a sobering assessment of what lies ahead:

“China’s broad, deep maritime approach and ambition are unlikely to stop when Chairman Xi passes from the scene.”

What does this mean for U.S. maritime power—and what should CMSI be studying over the next 20 years?

*** 

“Charting the Course:

20 Years of CMSI and the Future of China in the Maritime Military Domain”

Keynote address by former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Gary Roughead, U.S. Navy (Ret.) at the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI)’s official public launch.[1]

Delivered in the Mahan Reading Room, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island,

24 September 2026.

Figure 1:  Admiral Gary Roughead delivers remarks

Photograph by Mr. Kristopher Burris

Thank you for the introduction and thank you to CMSI and the Naval War College for the invitation to offer remarks on CMSI’s 20^th anniversary.

Admiral Walker, fellow former Chiefs of Navy, faculty and staff, and especially the young leaders assembled here… It’s always a pleasure to return to Newport and to the Naval War College. Time has flown by since my last visit, and much in our world has changed.

The Navy has three extraordinary educational institutions: the Naval Academy, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Naval War College. All comprise an important continuum, and as CNO, in a paternalistic sense, I loved them all equally, guarded them from detractors, and advocated for them equally. But truth be told, as a Pacific Fleet commander and as CNO, the Naval War College was top of mind for me. I visited it more often than the others, was more attuned to what was going on here, and it was where I came to explore, be stimulated, and be invigorated as I worked through the issues most pressing to me.

The international dimension—the brilliant young leaders from around the world who immerse themselves in thinking here and the assembly of current global naval leaders is the gold standard of international cooperation.

The Naval War College has been, is, and must remain the intellectual center of gravity of our Navy and the global touchstone for naval and maritime thought.

With my Pacific and Asian focus, CMSI was particularly of interest and a point of pride. Its founding and my assuming command of the Pacific Fleet were almost concurrent. Although the country and all the armed services, at the time, were intensely and justifiably focused on the wars in the Middle East, those who envisioned, advocated for, and—in Chief Engineer parlance—lit CMSI’s first fires, were prescient, thoughtful, and focused.

My return to the Pacific Command in 2003, after less than a decade away, jolted me with how much China and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had changed. My two snapshots were impactful points of comparison, but I like to watch movies, and what struck me was the trajectory, structure, and China’s unquestionable focus, investment, and energy underpinning the changes.

The few shops, primarily in Washington, DC, that focused on China and hadn’t jumped exclusively to the Middle East weren’t digging deep enough and tended to be echo chambers. The timing of CMSI’s founding could not have been better. Having observed institutes and academies in China study our open sources intently and their familiarity with the intricacies of our strategies, approaches, priorities, and investments—indeed, sometimes with greater familiarity than our leaders in Washington—we needed to do the same. CMSI was not and is not an echo chamber and has been delivering ever since.

This small band of scholars here at Newport punches far above its weight. Leaders, including me, had some unique PRC exposure at the time. We thought we knew China, the PLA, and the PLA Navy (PLAN). CMSI gave us deeper insight into the drivers of Beijing’s maritime ambition through rigorous analysis, not superficial musings. The secret sauce was and remains the team’s focus, intellect, instincts regarding what is consequential, and the ensuing collaboration among China hands, linguists, and practitioners.

As CNO, the opportunity to drive budgets that have impact can be frustrating at times, but the 2008 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) that included CMSI was a no-brainer.[2] It is a testament to the power of the POM pen and the value that CMSI has generated over the years.

CMSI stands apart, as its name suggests. Housed at the Naval War College, and as most others are inclined to do, it could have been the China Naval Studies Institute. But maritime is far more consequential than naval alone. Most are fixated on navies as the measure of maritime power, which is a huge blind spot. CMSI’s broader maritime appreciation and aperture set it apart.

Although I obviously remain intensely interested in naval affairs, my post-retirement affiliations—which include commercial shipping, investing, technology, and education—have reinforced the value, relevance, and uniqueness of CMSI’s broader remit.

As a nation, stimulated by recent executive orders, we may be on the cusp of greater awareness of naval and maritime matters. The wars in Ukraine, and to a greater extent, Iran and the maritime Middle East, have reinforced the impact of disrupted maritime commerce and the value of naval power and its differentiated characteristics and unique considerations from the longstanding land bias of the nation and the Joint Force. A greater understanding and commitment, particularly in terms of budgets, must emerge that naval and maritime power must already exist in being when a crisis arises. Naval and maritime power cannot be wished into existence when needed and then ridden hard. Navies are maintained, not raised.

It’s unfortunate the public has not been able to see the extraordinary competence and hard work of our Sailors because of the current aversion to embedded press. All the more reason for this being the moment for the Naval War College and CMSI to seize.

CMSI has articulated the essence of the maritime challenge of our time. Most recently, in its excellent China Maritime Report, Chairman Xi’s Navy.[3] For the first time in decades, we face a prime competitor, an adversary that is led by a navalist. The last of that breed were FDR and Churchill, and they were on our side. Just running through the list of CMSI China Maritime Reports, Notes, Red Books, Studies, and Translations makes Xi’s and China’s maritime and naval bent readily apparent.

It really is quite extraordinary that, in my career—indeed, the latter part of my career and my second chapter—China, a former Eurasian empire and land power, transformed itself into the dominant maritime power, challenging the United States as the dominant naval power. That unique strategic shift is lost on most.

We often compare our navy to theirs, counting the number and types of ships in each. But a maritime power is more than a navy. A maritime power has a global merchant fleet, a robust and productive shipbuilding industry, and assured access to global ports it may own, operate, and otherwise control.

By all those measures, China has surged ahead in a very short period.

China’s commercial shipbuilding infrastructure and capacity are unmatched. Unlike in the United States, its shipyards build both commercial and naval ships. It has created a more fungible shipbuilding workforce. In commercial ship construction, it has displaced Japan and Korea to seize the top spot. To the Trump administration’s credit, it strongly emphasizes revitalizing American shipbuilding, but catching China will be a heavy lift, and our workforce shortfalls are real.

CMSI has been telling China’s maritime and growth story, not superficially, but through unique scholarship and perspectives. Highlighting the role and characteristics of its Coast Guard, Maritime Militia, and research fleet. The last of these, out of the American public’s eye, has expanded greatly and has been ranging ever wider over the years, gathering critical oceanographic data and, importantly for the future, locating and mapping critical seabed mining opportunities, as well as the transmission lines of global commerce: undersea cables. Most believe wealth rides on the PowerPoint lightning bolts from Earth to satellites and back. Making others aware of China’s enterprise approach on the seafloor highways of commerce and wealth cannot begin soon enough.

China’s broad, deep maritime approach and ambition are unlikely to stop when Chairman Xi passes from the scene. Meanwhile, Beijing will undoubtedly face internal headwinds. Some, like its self-inflicted demographic problem, will intensify.

For us, will we realize the recent call to revitalize our maritime and naval power? It will come at great cost, but not doing so will cost far more. We are seeing that cost in the Middle East today. Whether naval or commercial, the strains are showing. Missed by many who track fuel prices is the boost the Iran war has afforded China’s shipbuilding enterprise. In the past few months ship orders to China are nearly three times the year-earlier level as shippers contemplate longer, more energy-consuming voyages and new mixes of ships.

My hat is off to today’s naval and maritime leaders. As always, today’s leaders must address the day’s most pressing issues and build what the nation needs for the future. In their case, they are leading a Navy engaged in the most intense naval conflict since World War II.

I no longer have the POM pen nor authority to move things along, but I’ll offer some thoughts on how I see CMSI and the Naval War College adding value in the coming years. Who knows, when we gather for CMSI’s 40^th we can see how things played out….

It’s unfortunate that U.S. military leaders, and our Navy in particular, do not enjoy the same degree and frequency of senior leader engagement that I experienced. As all of you know, it was opaque, hard, mostly unsatisfying. Many saw it as not worth it, but it did provide context, a sense of personalities and tone shifts, and a messaging opportunity. Even the highly orchestrated and controlled visits and show-and-tell, over time, told a story. CMSI’s products as preparation helped clear our opaque lens. Now CMSI is the lens.

The immediate needs of operational commanders will remain at the top of the list. How we get into China’s view and calculus regarding contingencies involving Taiwan and the South China Sea, among others, is essential, but I believe we must also expand our view geographically and temporally. Some have heard me recount a conversation I was privy to with Admiral Liu Huaqing in 1994, when he characterized the short term as 50 years. We need a longer view. Where will the PLAN’s growing carrier fleet roam in the years ahead and to what end? How will China and the PLAN play in shifting relationships in what I call the “Mega-region,” the vast area from the Eastern Mediterranean to East Asia, particularly the great Indian Ocean.[4] CMSI should be on the speed dial for that.

Warfare has changed dramatically, even in the short time since I hung up the uniform. Significant geopolitical changes are afoot, and technology, as it always has, will change warfare—but perhaps more in the next few years than ever before. Precision is no longer solely a privilege of the great powers, and we are getting the preview in Ukraine and the Middle East that cheap mass challenges defense and survivability. What will China and the PLA learn from that, and how will they act on it? What will be the take-away in countering cheap mass? Again, CMSI has a long history of ferreting out thought trends far before others.

Perhaps as China grows increasingly confident, there will be more open-source boasting and reveals, fact and misinformation, which will be fertile ground for CMSI to plow. As the PLAN ranges farther, there will be regional dynamics to explore. Commercial seabed activities will offer insights into dual-use technologies. I cannot see undersea warfare not being a priority for China. Will China’s silent service be able to avoid touting its prowess? What might be gleaned from boastful publications?

How will we understand how knitting the growing maritime enterprise together, from shipping and shipbuilding and ports to systems like LOGINK [the PRC state-supported national logistics information and data-exchange platform], might advantage China and disadvantage others? LOGINK is used both domestically and internationally and covers 90% of global container shipping. It and other systems facilitate deep data sharing that reveals commercial data with security and operational implications. How will technology that can ply, map, and understand the seafloor be used by China?

Regarding technology, the app is king in China. We work to refine the technology and want to perfect it. China, by contrast, moves quickly from application to civilian and military use. Get the app out, use it, refine it, redeploy it—repeatedly. If things fail, learn and do it quickly. On the commercial side, a willingness to push the apps onto its Belt and Road foundation and other willing users only accelerates application improvements and, by the way, embeds their technology more broadly.

How does China’s maritime enterprise benefit from the non-maritime apps and investments that have proliferated in the past decades? These include telecoms, power grids, logistic systems, and factories.

Highlighting the maritime industrial base—capacity, quality, innovation—those insights are more challenging and perhaps more important than counting output. I’m of the mind that every discussion of force comparisons must begin by understanding and comparing respective industrial bases, including supply chains. Those comparisons are not your purview, but your knowledge of China’s maritime enterprise is the place to start.

At the risk of appearing to jump on the issue of the day, what is the artificial intelligence (AI) play in all of this? As with apps, China will move quickly to proliferate and have others adopt its models over others.

I had the good fortune to witness the PLAN’s human dimension change over three decades; now those interactions are rare, if they exist at all. My first PLA unit visit was in 1994, to a regiment with a storied operational history. But it was nothing more than a walkabout showing how much money the unit was making by manufacturing a range of products, from shoe polish to tools, and by selling its agricultural produce. An ‘A’ in entrepreneurship, not so good on combat readiness. That is a far cry from the PLA/PLAN of today.

CMSI has provided great insight on the changing structure, culture, and professionalism of the PLAN. Your focus on the training, quality, and thinking of leaders and among the ranks of the PLAN is especially valuable. The dots you connect in this evolving human dimension will perhaps be the most important work you will do.

Again, it’s easy to offer more work from the sidelines, or to be a clown when you are not the ringmaster responsible for the big show. But the Naval War College, with CMSI’s unique insight, approach, and competence, should consider a wider window on regional and global reactions to China’s maritime ambition. No one else will do it in the same impressive way, nor can they.

I don’t urge CMSI to become something it is not, and particularly not an adjunct intel analyst. But no one sees, understands, and can articulate China’s maritime-related currents as well as CMSI. You are unique.

CMSI, the Naval War College, and the Navy should press as hard as you can on greatly expanding readership and awareness of CMSI’s great work. Be proactive and available beyond the pure security bubble with offerings such as Andrew Erickson’s excellent testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.[5]

You are the best in the business, and twenty years of your extraordinary work give you a unique perspective and pride of place. It’s important to show the complex movie in the way you do and not let others’ snapshots tell a superficial story.

Thank you, congratulations, and all the best in the next twenty years.

Figure 2:  Rear Admiral Darryl Walker delivers opening remarks       Figure 3:  (From right to left) CMSI Director Christopher Sharman, Admiral Roughead, and Dr. Peter Dutton

                                                                      Photographed by Mr. Kristopher Burris

[1] The views expressed in these remarks do not necessarily represent the perspectives of the Department of War or the Naval War College.

[2] The POM describes how the Services and Defense agencies want to allot future funding for a program so that it meets Service Program Guidance (SPG) and Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The POM includes an analysis of missions, objectives, alternative courses of action, and allocation of resources covering the 5-year Future Year Defense Program (FYDP).

[3] Ryan D. Martinson, Chairman Xi’s Navy, China Maritime Report 54 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 2 June 2026), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/54/.

[4] Admiral Gary Roughead, “Eurasia’s Southern Rim: A Blue Economy Mega-region,” The Caravan (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 9 June 2026), https://www.hoover.org/research/eurasias-southern-rim-blue-economy-mega-region.

[5] Andrew S. Erickson, Statement for the Record for Hearing on “Part of Your World: U.S.-China Competition Under the Sea,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, 2 March 2026, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2026-03/Andrew_Erickson_Statement_for_the_Record.pdf.

FURTHER READING:

• “China Maritime Studies Institute Celebrates 20 Years with Lecture by Former Chief of Naval Operations, Panel Discussion,” U.S. Naval War College Public Affairs, 25 September 2026.
• Andrew S. Erickson, “CMSI’s 20th Anniversary! China Maritime Studies Institute Established Two Decades Ago within Naval War College,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 2 October 2024.

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“China Maritime Studies Institute Celebrates 20 Years with Lecture by Former Chief of Naval Operations, Panel Discussion,” U.S. Naval War College Public Affairs, 25 September 2026.

China Maritime Studies Institute Celebrates 20 Years with Lecture by Former Chief of Naval Operations, Panel Discussion

The U.S. Naval War College (NWC) celebrated the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies’ (CNWS) China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) on Thursday, Sept. 24, with a lecture by retired U.S. Navy Adm. Gary Roughead and subsequent panel discussion.

“The world-class experts at our China Maritime Studies Institute have been leading international discourse for two decades,” said NWC President Rear Adm. Darryl Walker. “The research and analysis conducted by the CMSI team over the years has been foundational not only to the greater public understanding of geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region, but more importantly to the planning and decision-making of our senior-most military, civilian and allied leaders.”

“Over its 20 years of work, CMSI has become an indispensable resource that places the U.S. Naval War College at the center of some of the most important conversations in the world,” he continued.

Roughead served as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from 2007 to 2011, and had previously served as commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S. Pacific Fleet. Joining Roughead as speakers and panelists at the Thursday event were former CMSI Director Dr. Peter Dutton and current Director and retired U.S. Navy Capt. Christopher Sharman.

“We’re showing the legacy of CMSI, and how we’ve addressed policy needs and national security priorities over the years,” Sharman said. “We’re letting both the student body and the faculty know what we’re doing, the importance our research has had and how we’re a resource not only to commanders across the Pacific, but also to the teaching and learning communities here at the war college.”

Initially a self-organized group of four faculty members with expertise on China, then-Provost Dr. James Giblin – with support from then-President Rear Adm. Jacob Shuford – established CMSI within CNWS’ Strategic Research Department on Oct. 1, 2004. Founding member Dr. Andrew Erickson wrote in a history of the institute that the U.S. Navy followed suit and designated CMSI an official Navy program, the first service-level China center under the Department of Defense, exactly two years later.

In addition to Sharman and Erickson, CMSI currently consists of associate professors Ryan Martinson and Ian Easton, as well as senior researcher and retired U.S. Navy Cmdr. Daniel Caldwell.

“As the Pacific Fleet commander, as CNO, the Naval War College was top of mind for me,” Roughead told a full Mahan Hall reading room Thursday, adding: “As I walk through the halls of the Naval War College, it has been, it is, and it must remain the intellectual center of gravity for our Navy, and a global touchstone for naval and maritime thought.

“The small band of scholars here in Newport punches far above its weight,” he later continued. “CMSI gave us deeper insight into the drivers of China’s maritime ambitions through their rigorous analysis and not-superficial means. Their secret sauce was, and remains, the team’s focus, intellect and instincts on what is consequential, and the collaboration they employ among China analysts, linguists and practitioners.”

The institute’s personnel use Chinese-language sources – official documents, journals and reports – to generate scholarly research, translations, books, monographs and other products to inform and advise senior U.S. military leaders and national security decision makers.

Among those oft-cited publications, in 2024, was the eighth edition in the CMSI Studies in Chinese Maritime Development series titled Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-Strait Invasion. The volume was named the Samuel B. Griffith Foundation’s 2025 Publication of the Year and selected for the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps Professional Reading Program’s 2025 and 2026 Reading Lists.

“The China Maritime Studies Institute is at its best and strongest when it’s engaging across the Navy,” Dutton said. “Especially with Navy leadership, as I mentioned to Adm. Roughead, to answer the questions that you and your staff don’t have time to answer, to begin to pull the thread at those things that are at the back of your mind, that you’re trying to sort out. … Here in Newport, the time, the skill and the structure exists.”

Sharman said the CMSI faculty’s ability to cut through language and access barriers to analyze the Chinese forces’ writings allows them to uniquely contextualize data from other sources on military capabilities, technology and tactics.

“Having a deep understanding – built up over decades of research – of strategy and where China is trying to take things gives us a cutting-edge angle,” Sharman said.

The institute also maintains a robust event schedule, anchored by a biennial conference, last held in May of 2025 with a focus on assessing human factors in China’s military maritime forces. CMSI’s May 11-12, 2027 conference is scheduled to be titled “Military-Civil Fusion at Sea: China’s Integrated Advantage?”

Dutton said CMSI has adapted over the years to ensure its products and events reflect the country’s needs and priorities at any given time.

“Your successes are based on your agility – the agility of this organization to meet the strategic ends of the time,” he said. “Agility is important to meet the strategic imperative of the day.”

Established in 1884, NWC informs today’s decision-makers and educates tomorrow’s leaders by providing educational experiences and learning opportunities that develop their ability to hedge aggressively, innovate continuously, fight distributively, delegate confidently, and command with clarity within complex battlespaces.

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U.S. Naval War College Public Affairs

September 25, 2026

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