10 June 2024

The China Maritime Militia Bookshelf: Latest Wikipedia Entries, U.S. Gov’t Docs, SECNAV Guidance, Official Video—& More!

Andrew S. Erickson, “Tracking China’s ‘Little Blue Men’—A Comprehensive Maritime Militia Compendium,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 10 June 2024.

American and Allied knowledge of the PRC’s Third Sea Force has come a long way since my outstanding Naval War College colleague Professor Conor Kennedy and I began our focused research following his arrival in Newport a decade ago in summer 2014. Now top U.S. officials, including the Secretary of the Navy and Vice President, have highlighted China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) in their official statements… You can read their words, other data and analysis, and findings from specialists here! A great research pioneer and public intellectual who is now an Assistant Professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), Conor is cited directly in the latest Wikipedia entry

This Bookshelf compilation is updated with the latest U.S. Government documents, guidance from SECNAV Carlos Del Toro, entry in Wikipedia and music video from the PAFMM’s very own Sansha Garrison! It includes everything from the very newest sources… to some of my earliest findings with colleagues at CMSI, dating back to 2009—when we uncovered PRC Militia forces’ role in mine warfare (MIW). For an overview, you can watch my best single PAFMM presentation, now available on YouTube.

As I told the Defense Forum Foundation in 2009, “China holds exercises that involve the Maritime Militia—with civilian fishing vessels—training in the laying of mines; GPS could leverage that considerably.” Here I drew on extensive research with other CMSI colleagues, published in China Maritime Study #3 (June 2009). Among CMSI’s early publications, this monograph pioneered the validation of open-source methodology, and remains a formative study in the field. We included multiple sections on PRC operational concepts and training to employ Maritime Militia forces and fishing vessels in MIW. Having long noticed references to China’s Maritime Militia dating back to at least the early 2000s in the PLA Navy (PLAN)’s official newspaper, People’s Navy (人民海军), I read and cited key articles therein.

Since Beijing remains far from being fully forthcoming and transparent, I hope that governments whose nations’ ships have been involved in incidents with Maritime Militia vessels—as well as any other knowledgeable parties—will release complete information on exactly what has happened. Meanwhile, however, ample information is already available concerning Chinas PAFMM and the important role it has played in these waters for decades. And its all here, in keyword-searchable format! Folks outside government looking for a way to enhance public understanding may wish of their own accord to update and enhance Wikipedias entries on “Maritime Militia” (now in English, Chinese, Japanese, and Czech)—all of which remain far from comprehensive or complete. Its easy to become a Wikipedia editor, by the platforms very design…

In sum, rarely is a topic so little recognized and so little understood (even now), yet so important and so amenable to research using Chinese-language open sources. To increase awareness and understanding of this important subject, I will keep updating this compendium of major publications and other documents available on the matter. If you know of others, please kindly bring them to my attention via <http://www.andrewerickson.com/contact/>.

China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a key component of its Armed Forces, each of which contains the world’s largest sea force of its type by number of ships. Graphic by Conor Kennedy, Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute.

CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIA: DATA & ANALYSIS

Maritime Militia,” Wikipedia, entry as of 10 June 2024.

Maritime Militia

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
China’s Maritime Militia
中国海上民兵

A purpose-built Chinese Maritime Militia ship (type WAG FT-16) harassing a Filipino vessel resupplying a Spratly outpost, 2023[1]
Country  People’s Republic of China
Allegiance Chinese Communist Party
Type Maritime militia
Role Naval patrols, reconnaissance, search and rescue; greyzone warfare
Fleet 370,000 non-powered FVs (2015)[2]
672,000 powered FVs (2015)[2]
Engagements

The Maritime Militia, also called the Fishing Militia (Chinese: 中国海上民兵), is one of the three forces, next to the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), used in maritime operations by the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[3]

As of 2022, the PRC and Vietnam were the only nations worldwide that had officially established a legal regime for their maritime militia.[4] Some U.S. states maintain naval militias, though they are primarily dedicated to supplementing disaster relief and port security.[5]

Name

The US Military refers to the Maritime Militia as the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).[6]

For reportedly operating in the South China Sea without clear identification, they are sometimes referred to as the “little blue men”, a term coined by Andrew S. Erickson of the Naval War College, in reference to Russia’s “little green men” during its 2014 annexation of Crimea.[7]

History

A crewmember on a Chinese trawler uses a grapple hook in an attempt to snag the towed acoustic array of USNS Impeccable in international waters, 8 March 2009

China’s maritime militia was established after the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) won the Chinese Civil War and forced the Kuomintang (KMT) to flee the mainland to Taiwan. The newly consolidated communist government needed to augment their maritime defenses against the nationalist forces, which had retreated offshore and remained entrenched on a number of coastal islands. Therefore, the concept of people’s war was applied to the sea with fishermen and other nautical laborers being drafted into a maritime militia. The nationalists had maintained a maritime militia during their time in power, but the communist government preferred to craft theirs anew given their suspicion of organizations created by the nationalists. The CCP also instituted a national-level maritime militia command to unite the local militias, something the KMT had never done. In the early 1950s, the Bureau of Aquatic Products played a key role in institutionalizing and strengthening the maritime militia as it collectivized local fisheries. Bureau of Aquatic Products leaders were also generally former high-ranking PLAN officers which lead to close relations between the organizations. The formation of the maritime militia was influenced by the Soviet “Young School” of military theory, which emphasized coastal defense over naval power projection for nascent communist powers.[6]

In the 1960s and 1970s, the PLAN established maritime militia schools near the three main fleet headquarters of Qingdao, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.[6] Through the first half of the 1970s, the maritime militia mostly stayed near shore and close to China. However, by the later 1970s, the maritime militia had evolved an important sovereignty support function which brought it into increasing conflict with China’s neighbors, especially in the South China Sea. The maritime militia contributed significantly to the Battle of the Paracel Islands, especially in providing amphibious lift capacity to Chinese forces.[6]

In the 2000s, the involvement of the maritime militia in more aggressive operations, namely, the physical interference with the navigation of Navy ships by the US, increased.[8]

China’s fishing fleet was being downsized until 2008, when maritime militia funding lead instead to an expansion. This expansion has led to an increase in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.[2]

In 2019, the United States issued a warning to China over aggressive and unsafe action by their Coast Guard and maritime militia.[9]

The maritime militia is believed to be behind a number of incidents in the South China Sea where high powered lasers were pointed at the cockpits of aircraft. This includes an attack against a Royal Australian Navy helicopter.[10]

In 2022, satellite images showed that more than a hundred militia vessels operated in the South China Sea on a daily basis. The number of vessels peaked in July 2022, when around 400 militia vessels were deployed in the South China Sea. The movement and the observed behavior of the militia vessels remained consistent over the years.[11]

Structure and characteristics

China’s fishing militia consists of a mixture of purpose-built maritime militia fishing vessels (MMFV) as well as normal fishing boats, called Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels (SBFVs), which get recruited by the central government via various subsidy programs.[8]Most of the boats are between 45 and 65 meters long.[11] A vast majority of the fleet is owned by natural persons, and not the government itself.[8] This means, a large part of the armed mass organization is made up of civilians, who still maintain regular jobs in the marine economy, while being part of the militia. Although the militia is independent from the PLAN and the CCG, it is trained by both.[12] The maritime militia operates from mainly ten ports within the Guangdong and Hainan Provinces of China.[8]

Capabilities

The Maritime Militia has utilized both rented fishing vessels and purpose-built ships in its operations.[13]

Although the maritime militia is part of the armed forces of the PRC, in 2018 it was usually unarmed.[3] The violence used by the militia is mostly limited to dangerous maneuvers and, on occasion, the ramming or shouldering of other vessels. Professional militia vessels can be equipped with large water cannons.[8] Most vessels are issued with navigation and communication equipment while some are also issued small arms.[14][15] Some Maritime Militia units are equipped with naval mines and anti-aircraft weapons.[16] [17]

The communications systems can be used both for communication and espionage. Often, fishermen supply their own vessels. However, there are also core contingents of the maritime militia who operate vessels fitted out for militia work instead of fishing; these vessels feature reinforced bows for ramming and high-powered water cannons.[18] The increasing sophistication of militia vessels’ communication equipment is a double-edged sword for Chinese authorities. New equipment, as well as training in its use, has substantially improved command, control, and coordination of militia units. However, the vessels’ resulting professionalism and sophisticated maneuvers make them more identifiable as government-sponsored actors, dampening their ability to function as a gray-zone force. Such improvements also potentially make militia vessels more threatening during at-sea confrontations, raising the risk of unintended escalations with foreign militaries.[19]

Tasks

The PRC considers its large fishing fleet an essential part of its sea power, helping with the pursuit of its maritime interests in disputed waters.[20] The maritime militia carries out three different tasks in China’s dispute strategy, also referred to as maritime rights protection:[21] It is active in disputes over the territorial features as well as disputes over the extent of zones of jurisdictions, and it regulates foreign activities – especially military activities – in waters claimed by the PRC. While the first two tasks target mostly neighboring countries, such as Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam and their conflicting interests in the South China and East China Sea, the third task is primarily a response to the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) by the US.[3]

According to a Congressional Research Service report, the Maritime Militia and coast guard are deployed more regularly than the PLAN in maritime sovereignty-assertion operations.[13]

Greyzone warfare

The Philippine Coast Guard approaches Maritime Militia vessels during the Whitsun Reef incident, April 13, 2021

Various academic journals and media articles claim that the maritime militia increasingly takes part in anti-access and area denial missions in a continuously growing area of the western Pacific. By using law enforcement and fishing vessels, instead of traditional naval assets, the PRC is able to stay with its actions in a greyzone area, avoiding a military conflict while still being able to successfully pursue its maritime claims.[12] The use of the maritime militia, which consists of civilians, allows the PRC to benefit from the legal ambiguity and the diplomatic arbitrariness coming from the involvement of civilians in such maritime operations.[22]

According to research from the Taiwanese Institute for National Defense and Security Research, China’s maritime militia is part of their “grey zone” tactics, which are used to wage conflict against China’s neighbors without crossing the threshold into conventional war.[23] The maritime militia is a particularly useful gray zone force because Chinese authorities can deny or claim affiliation with its members depending on context. China can send its militia to harass foreign vessels in contested areas, but publicly assert that the vessels are independent from government control, thus avoiding escalation with other states. At the same time, if militia members are hurt during confrontations with foreign vessels, the Chinese government can claim the need to “defend” its own fishermen, mobilizing domestic nationalism to improve its bargaining position in a crisis.[19]

Some of the incidents, which are generally defined as greyzone operations within the academic discourse, are the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009,[24] the Senkaku Island incident in 2010,[25] the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012, the Hai Yang Shi You 981 standoff in 2014,[20] the Natuna Islands incident in 2016 and the Whitsun Reef incident in 2021.[26]

Control

It is uncertain how much control the Chinese authorities have over the fishing vessels operating in the South China Sea. Funding problems are apparent, since fishermen earn more by fishing, than participating in militia operations. Command and coordination arrangements of the maritime militia are unclear as well and only a weak exertion of control on fishermen can be noticed.[12] Since most members of the maritime militia are simultaneously fishermen, they regularly pursue their own agendas, sometimes contradictory to what the government wants.[27] For instance, multiple fishermen went against the central government by using maritime militia policy to fish for protected and endangered species in disputed waters.[12]

Moreover, factors such as food security and economic advantages influence fishermen to operate outside of China’s exclusive economic zone,[20] since the PRCs jurisdictional waters are polluted, and a depletion of China’s fishery resources can be noticed.[26] Therefore, while the maritime militia is involved in greyzone operations, it is misleading to portray it as a professional coherent body, which can be systematically used by the central government.[12]

See also

References

  1. “‘Little blue men’: Is a militia Beijing says doesn’t exist causing trouble in the South China Sea?”. 12 August 2023.
  2. Kraska, James. “China’s Maritime Militia Vessels May Be Military Objectives During Armed Conflict”. thediplomat.com. The Diplomat. Retrieved 8 July 2020.
  3. Kennedy, Conor (2018). “The Struggle for Blue Territory. Chinese Maritime Militia Grey-Zone Operations”. RUSI Journal. 163 (5): 8. doi:10.1080/03071847.2018.1552450S2CID 158779705 – via Taylor & Francis Online.
  4. Cui, Haoran; Shi, Yubing (2022). “A Comparative Analysis of the Legislation on Maritime Militia Between China and Vietnam”. Ocean Development & International Law. 53 (2–3): 149. doi:10.1080/00908320.2022.2103478S2CID 251655218 – via Taylor & Francis Online.
  5. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011/october/nobody-asked-me-naval-militia-underutilized
  6. Grossman, Derek; Ma, Logan (6 April 2020). “A Short History of China’s Fishing Militia and What It May Tell Us”. rand.org. RAND Corporation. Archived from the original on 8 July 2020. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
  7. Jakhar, Pratik (15 April 2019). “Analysis: What’s so fishy about China’s ‘maritime militia’?”. monitoring.bbc.co.uk. BBC Monitoring. Archived from the original on 15 May 2021. Retrieved 25 July 2020.
  8. Poling, Gregory B.; Mallory, Tabitha Grace; Prétat, Harrison; The Center for Advanced Defense Studies (2021). “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia”.
  9. Sevastopulo, Demetri; Hille, Kathrin (28 April 2019). “US warns China on aggressive acts by fishing boats and coast guard”. Financial Times. Archived from the original on 8 July 2020. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
  10. Yeo, Mike (31 May 2019). “Testing the waters: China’s maritime militia challenges foreign forces at sea”. Defense News. Retrieved 9 July 2020.[dead link]
  11. Center for Strategic and International Studies (2022). “The Ebb and Flow of Beijing’s South China Sea Militia”.
  12. Luo, Shuxian; Panter, Jonathan G. (2021). “China’s Maritime Militia and Fishing Fleets. A Primer for Operational Staffs and Tactical Leaders”. Military Review: 11–15.
  13. “Ronald O’Rourke, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Implications for U.S. Interests—Background and Issues for Congress, R42784. Congressional Research Service. pp. 13, 76”Archivedfrom the original on 2021-01-26. Retrieved 2021-02-14.
  14. Owens, Tess (1 May 2016). “China Is Reportedly Training a ‘Maritime Militia’ to Patrol the Disputed South China Sea”. vice.com. Vice News. Archived from the original on 9 July 2020. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
  15. Song, Andrew (2023). “Civilian at Sea: Understanding Fisheries’ Entanglement with Maritime Border Security”. Geopolitics. 28 (3): 1161–1185. doi:10.1080/14650045.2021.1997995hdl:10453/151581 – via Taylor & Francis Online.
  16. Chan, Eric. “Escalating Clarity without Fighting: Countering Gray Zone Warfare against Taiwan (Part 2)”. globaltaiwan.org. The Global Taiwan Institute. Retrieved 21 June2021.
  17. Song, Andrew (2023). “Civilian at Sea: Understanding Fisheries’ Entanglement with Maritime Border Security”. Geopolitics. 28 (3): 1161–1185. doi:10.1080/14650045.2021.1997995hdl:10453/151581 – via Taylor & Francis Online.
  18. Manthorpe, Jonathan (28 April 2019). “Beijing’s maritime militia, the scourge of South China Sea”. Asia Times. Archived from the original on 15 May 2021. Retrieved 9 July2020.
  19. Luo, Shuxian; Panter, Jonathan (January–February 2021). “China’s Maritime Militia and Fishing Fleets: A Primer for Operational Staffs and Tactical Leaders”. Military Review. 101(1): 6–21. Archived from the original on 27 January 2021. Retrieved 19 January 2021.
  20. Zhang, Hongzhou (2016). “Chinese fishermen in disputed waters: Not quite a “people’s war””. Marine Policy. 68: 65–68. Bibcode:2016MarPo..68…65Zdoi:10.1016/j.marpol.2016.02.018 – via Elsevier Science Direct.
  21. Martinson, Ryan (2021). “Catching sovereignty fish: Chinese fishers in the southern Spratlys”. Marine Policy. 125: 8. Bibcode:2021MarPo.12504372Mdoi:10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104372S2CID 233844401 – via Elsevier Science Direct.
  22. Yoo, Su Jin; Koo, Min Gyo (2022). “Is China Responsible for Its Maritime Militia’s Internationally Wrongful Acts? The Attribution of the Conduct of a Parastatal Entity to the State”. Business and Politics. 24: 278 – via Cambridge University Press.
  23. “DIPLOMACY: Maritime militia warning issued”. Taipei Times. 16 June 2020. Archived from the original on 17 June 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2020.
  24. Pedrozo, Raul (2009). “Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident”. Naval War College Review. 62(3): 106. JSTOR 26397037 – via JSTOR.
  25. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2023). “Japanese Territory. Trends in China Coast Guard and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response”.
  26. Zhang, Hongzhou; Bateman, Sam (2017). “Fishing Militia, the Securitization of Fishery and the South China Sea Dispute”. Contemporary Southeast Asia. 39 (2): 292–294. JSTOR 44683771 – via JSTOR.
  27. Roszko, Edyta (2021). “Navigating Seas, Markets, and Sovereignties: Fishers and Occupational Slippage in the South China Sea”. Anthropological Quarterly. 94 (4): 663. doi:10.1353/anq.2021.0046hdl:11250/2838795S2CID 246264200 – via Project Muse.

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中国人民軍海上民兵

出典: フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)』
軍旗

中国人民軍海上民兵(ちゅうごくじんみんぐんかいじょうみんぺい)は、中国政府出資の海上民兵である[1]南シナ海で活動していると報じられていることから、2014年のクリミア併合時のロシアの「リトル・グリーン・メン」に言及した海軍兵学校のアンドリュー・S・エリクソンの造語である「リトル・ブルー・メン」と呼ばれることもある[2]

海上民兵は、中国共産党中央軍事委員会国防動員部の指揮下に入る。民兵法等の規定上は人民武装部が海上民兵を管轄し、装備などの提供も行っている。ただし、実態の訓練や指揮命令系統では、中国人民解放軍海軍の地方組織である軍区警備区が直接の指揮命令権を有すると考えられる[3]

運用上の役割・能力として、情報収集や建築資材の運搬、中国海軍艦艇への燃料や弾薬等の補給などの幅広い任務を果たしているほか、機雷対空ミサイルを使ったゲリラ戦の訓練も実施されている[4]。海上民兵は中国の海洋権益擁護のための尖兵的役割を果たすため、退役軍人から採用され、漁業活動とは別に給料が支払われているとの指摘がある。中国による領域侵害・不法占拠の特徴は、軍でもあり民でもあるという曖昧な位置づけの海上民兵を活用することで、相手国に負荷をかけ迅速な対応を遅らせることを目的とする[3]

海上民兵は、企業や個人の漁師から漁船を頻繁に借用する一方で、南シナ海において海上民兵のために国有の漁船団を設立しているとの指摘もある[3]。海上民兵の漁船は、通信システムレーダーなどを含む高度な電子機器を装備しているので、中国海軍を補完するとともに、中国海警等の他の機関との相互運用性を高めている。また、漁船の多くが航法衛星システムを備えているため、船舶の位置を追尾して中継することで海洋情報を収集・伝達する[5]

武装した漁船団は中国のパワープロジェクション[1]の一環であり、領土を掌握し、南シナ海全体の中国の主張に異議を唱える者を標的にするために配備されている。2016年には230隻の漁船が同じ島に群がった[1]。2020年8月には、日本尖閣諸島に100隻以上の漁船が嫌がらせを行った[1]

参考文献

  1. a b c d Thomas, Jason (2020年9月2日). “China’s ‘fishermen’ mercenaries”. The Weekend Australian
  2. ^ Jakhar, Pratik (2019年4月15日). “Analysis: What’s so fishy about China’s ‘maritime militia’?”. monitoring.bbc.co.uk. BBC Monitoring. 2020年7月25日閲覧。
  3. a b c “陸上における領域警備に関する考察 -準軍事組織の創設-”. 防衛省. 2023年2月2日閲覧。
  4. ^ “中国第3の海上兵力:海上民兵”. 防衛省. 2023年2月2日閲覧。
  5. ^ “中国の海上民兵と国際法”. 島嶼研究ジャーナル 第7巻1号 (2017年10月). 2023年2月2日閲覧。

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中国海上民兵

中华人民共和国军事

中国人民解放军军徽
最高军事领导机构
中央军事委员会
(中共中央军委:主席副主席
(国家中央军委:主席副主席
中华人民共和国武装力量
中国人民解放军
陆军
  海军  空军
火箭军
 
军兵种·预备役·文职人员


中国人民武装警察部队
内卫 · 机动 · 海警


中国民兵
军委机关职能部门
办公厅
联合参谋部 · 政治工作部
后勤保障部 ·
装备发展部
训练管理部 ·
国防动员部
纪委(监委) ·
政法委 · 科技委
战略规划办 ·
改革编制办 · 国际军合办
审计署 ·
机关事务管理总局
军委直属部队
军事航天部队
网络空间部队
信息支援部队
联勤保障部队
军委直属院校和科研机构
国防大学 · 国防科技大学 · 军事科学院
五大戰區
东部战区··
南部战区··
西部战区·
北部战区··
中部战区·
军事制度
兵役制度 · 编制等级 · 战备等级
军衔··) ·
武警警衔
军事将领·政治委員
国务院系统
国防部 · 退役军人事务部
国家国防科技工业局

国防动员委 · 边海防委 · 空中交通管理委


地方人民武装部

军事思想
军事战略方针 · 发展战略
听党指挥、能打胜仗、作风优良
人民战争 ·
战术三三制
游击战 ·
运动战 · 超限战
其他资料
中国战争史 · 解放军军事家
中国军事史 ·
中国水军史
中国空军史 ·
中国航天史
解放军军史 ·
解放军军服
院校 ·
纠察·保卫·检察·审判·优待


香港軍事史 · 澳門軍事史

中國海上民兵是对中华人民共和国政府资助海上民兵的指控[1],据称以武裝漁船方式為外界所認識。

观点

“武装渔船队是中国力量投射的一部分” 有争议[1],部署渔船是为了控制有争议海上领土、海岛(包括南海钓鱼台列屿等)。由于在南海活动时没有明确的身份标识,他们有时被[谁?]称为 「小蓝人」[註 1][2]

注释

  1. 这个词是海军战争学院的安德鲁·S·埃里克森创造的,指的是俄罗斯在2014年吞并克里米亚期间的「小绿人」。

参考文献

  1. Thomas, Jason. China’s ‘fishermen’ mercenaries. The Weekend Australian. 2020-09-02 [2020-09-05]. (原始内容存档于2021-05-15).
  2. Jakhar, Pratik. Analysis: What’s so fishy about China’s ‘maritime militia’?. monitoring.bbc.co.uk. BBC Monitoring. 15 April 2019 [25 July 2020]. (原始内容存档于2021-05-15).

参见

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Námořní milice ozbrojených sil lidu

Námořní milice ozbrojených sil lidu
Země Čína Čínská lidová republika
Vznik 1949
Typ milice

Námořní milice ozbrojených sil lidu je ozbrojeným sborem Čínské lidové republiky, který je součástí tamní Lidové milice.[1] Milice vznikla roku 1949.[2] Je to největší ozbrojená složka svého druhu na světě (podobnou funkci a velikost má pouze vietnamská námořní milice). Dle Číny milici tvoří prostí rybáři, ve skutečnosti jde o uniformovanou ozbrojenou složku podléhající armádnímu velení.[1] Milice je využívána jako politický nástroj v oblastech, jako jsou Jihočínské a Východočínské moře, o které ČLR vede územní spory. V těchto oblastech zajišťuje čínskou přítomnost, aniž by došlo k nasazení válečných lodí, nebo provádí rybolov ve sporných vodách. Poněkud nejasný statut milicionářů (jejich plavidla vystupují jako civilní rybářské lodě) druhé straně znesnadňuje reakci při jejich zapojení do námořních incidentů.[1] Jejich nasazením Čína snižuje riziko vypuknutí ozbrojeného konfliktu a vyhýbá se tomu, aby byla vnímána jako země, která své nároky prosazuje zbraněmi.[2]

Příklady nasazení

Milice na palubě rybářské lodě FS8399 se pokouší zachytit vlečný sonar americké výzkumné lodě USNS Impeccable

Dne 11. ledna 1974 se čínská námořní milice zapojila do bitvy o Paracelské ostrovy, ve které ČLR získala kontrolu nad ostrovy, které byly do té doby v držení Vietnamu.[3]

V roce 2009 byla v mezinárodních vodách jižně od ostrova Chaj-nan čínskými plavidly, včetně lodí milice, obklíčena a přinucena k nouzovému zastavení americká výzkumná loď USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23).[4]

V roce 2012 se cca 40 „rybářských člunů“ milice zapojilo do konfliktu s vietnamským námořnictvem, které se snažilo zastavit provoz čínské ropné plošiny na sporném území na Spratlyho ostrovech.[1]

Odkazy

Reference

  1. Lidové milice na moři: Čínské Tresčí války [online]. Sinopsis, rev. 2017-10-12 [cit. 2019-07-30]. Dostupné online.
  2. China’s Daring Vanguard: Introducing Sanya City’s Maritime Militia [online]. CIMSEC, rev. 2015-11-05 [cit. 2019-07-30]. Dostupné online. (anglicky)
  3. Battle for Paracel Islands [online]. Historynet.com, rev. 2017-06 [cit. 2019-07-30]. Dostupné online. (anglicky)
  4. Irregular Forces at Sea: Not “Merely Fishermen”—Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia [online]. CIMSEC, rev. 2015-11-02 [cit. 2019-07-30]. Dostupné online. (anglicky)

Související články

Externí odkazy

***

Check out the new paperback edition of our book, published in Naval War College Professor Geoffrey Till’s Routledge Cass Series on Naval Policy & History. Sponsored by the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy (KIMS), it offers:

1) An authoritative Preface by former Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral Scott Swift(USN, Ret.).

3) Uniquely revealing maps by Andrew Rhodes—including of the Northern Limit Line, Pyongyang’s counterproposals thereto, the five nearby Northwest Islands under South Korean control.

Proud to work with these leading stakeholders and superstars! Peter offers the best gray zone conceptual framework I’ve yet seen. Greg offers a tour de force of comparative context vis-a-vis the South China Sea and East China Sea. Devin offers unparalleled insights on the evolution of specialized PAFMM forces and the extent of their operations in the Yellow Sea. Terry delivers a powerful history and current survey of  North Korean strategy, policy, and actions in these strategically pivotal yet strangely understudied waters.

To see just how deep our new book dives in with original Chinese-language research, etc., see the graphics (& endnotes) in Conor’s chapter! He’s identified, geolocated, and analyzed Yellow Sea Maritime Militia units beyond anything else Open Source to the very best of my knowledge.

I’m honored to offer an Introduction and a chapter on the China’s Coast Guard. Hope this book helps increase attention to, and understanding of, all these vital issues…

The new paperback edition is Amazons #1 New Release in North Korean History:

Andrew S. Erickson, ed., Maritime Gray Zone Operations: Challenges and Countermeasures in the Indo-Pacific (New York, NY: Routledge Cass Series: Naval Policy & History, 2022/paperback 2024).

Author of:

  • Andrew S. Erickson, “Introduction: Understanding Chinese and North Korean Gray Zone Operations in the Yellow Sea,” 1–18.
  • Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Coast Guard: Organization, Forces, and Yellow Sea Applications,” 54–76.

Book Description

This book addresses the issues raised by Chinese and North Korean maritime ‘gray zone’ activities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

For years, China has been harassing its neighbors in South China Sea and East China Sea, employing both coast guard and maritime militia forces, in the name of safeguarding Chinese sovereignty. This behavior is frequently characterized as constituting ‘gray zone’ activity. As the term suggests, this refers to a state of conflict that falls between peace and war. Interestingly, the Yellow Sea, which is geographically much closer to China than South China Sea or East China Sea, has been comparatively quiet. However, there is a danger that the PRC has the capability to replicate its gray zone activities in this area. Worse, North Korea has also been engaging in carefully-calibrated provocations there. This book addresses pressing questions about these activities and offers: (1) a conceptual framework to understand maritime gray zone operations and Beijing and Pyongyang’s approach, with an unprecedented focus on the Yellow Sea; (2) a comprehensive, fully updated fleet force structure for the PRC’s Coast Guard, together with projections regarding how the Coast Guard is likely to develop in the future; (3) an extensive organizational analysis of the PRC’s Maritime Militia that surveys the many units relevant to Yellow Sea operations, some revealed publicly for the first time; and (4) a detailed assessment of North Korean maritime ‘gray zone’ activities.

This book will be of great interest to students of naval strategy, maritime security, Asian politics, and international security.

Table of Contents

Introduction: Understanding Chinese and North Korean Gray Zone Operations in the Yellow Sea

Andrew S. Erickson, U.S. Naval War College and Harvard University

1. Conceptualizing China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations

Peter A. Dutton, U.S. Naval War College and MIT

2. Gray Zone Incidents in the Yellow Sea

Gregory B. Poling, Center for Strategic and International Studies

3. China’s Coast Guard: Organization, Forces, and Yellow Sea Applications

Andrew S. Erickson, U.S. Naval War College and Harvard University

4. China’s Maritime Militia in the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea

Conor M. Kennedy, U.S. Naval War College

5. Casting a Wider Net: The Activities and Evolution of China’s Maritime Militia in the Yellow Sea

Devin Thorne, Threat Intelligence Analyst, Recorded Future

6. North Korea: Gray Zone Actions in the Yellow Sea

Terence Roehrig, U.S. Naval War College and Columbia University

Editor

Biography

Andrew S. Erickson is Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, RI, USA and a Visiting Scholar in the Department of Government at Harvard University.

Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia in the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea,” in Andrew S. Erickson, ed., Maritime Gray Zone Operations: Challenges and Countermeasures in the Indo-Pacific (New York, NY: Routledge Cass Series: Naval Policy & History, 2022), 77–99.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long relied on a deep reserve of militia forces to support government and military objectives in both war and peace time. At sea, from shortly after the founding of the PRC in 1949 until even after the Cold War’s end four decades later, Beijing relied on militia forces (typically drawing on fishing fleets or other civilian mariners) to compensate for its lack of maritime power, especially naval and constabulary forces. However, after decades of investment and rapid development, the PRC now has the world’s largest Navy and Coast Guard.1 It has also retained and continues to develop the world’s largest Maritime Militia force constructed out of its vast fishing and merchant fleets. The exact size of the Maritime Militia is still unknown to foreigners and will almost certainly remain that way to preserve a key advantage, deception.

Maritime Militia development in China assumed new significance after the national strategy to become a maritime power was declared after the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. This objective is comprehensive and includes development of all elements of Chinese maritime power.2 Recent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reforms also shifted the focus of reserve militia force construction toward the sea and high-tech sectors. General land-based militia forces and the overall number of personnel are undergoing significant reductions, whereas the construction of Maritime Militia and more sophisticated types of militia units better suited to supporting modern PLA operations are currently promoted.3 The result has been the growth of Maritime Militia forces nationwide.

Maritime Militia force development also included greater roles in the protection of PRC maritime rights and interests. Maritime rights protection is now a key focus in militia development to assert PRC presence and control in its maritime disputes. This focus was further invigorated by the highest levels of national leadership in 2013 with Xi Jinping’s visit to the little-known fishing village of Tanmen in Hainan Province shortly after coming to power.4 Xi’s visit on the first anniversary of China’s capture of Scarborough Reef from the Philippines in 2012, with the help of the village’s Maritime Militia, made it clear that the Maritime Militia will continue to be a key component in protecting maritime rights and interests. Xi is reported to have issued multiple directives on maritime rights protection and Maritime Militia construction since he assumed power.5 This demonstrates strong recognition of the success these forces had in protecting and advancing PRC claims without sparking a regional conflict.

The militia has a prominent role in protecting maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea due to sovereignty and territorial disputes between China and other regional claimants. Numerous operations and achievements by Maritime Militia forces in the South China Sea have been well-documented and acknowledged by international observers.6 Maritime Militia forces in the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea receive significantly less attention. However, Maritime Militia force development in this region appears to be equally as robust as in the rest of China’s coastal provinces. As a key responsibility of PLA provincial military districts, militia construction in northern coastal provinces has also shifted focus toward the sea.

This chapter provides a comprehensive review of Maritime Militia forces that could be mobilized in the Yellow Sea, how they are organized, and how the PLA envisions their use. The decentralized nature of militia development nationwide provides abundant authoritative open sources that elucidate this still insufficiently studied force. Surveying sources from various local governments, media news services, and PLA writings reveals the scale, organization, and development of Maritime Militia forces in Chinese provinces along the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea. Details on specific units, training, and other factors also demonstrate what capabilities may be available when mobilized, and can establish a baseline of Maritime Militia forces that commanders may draw upon in a gray zone scenario. This will be crucial to gauge potential responses by China in gray zone disputes in the region. … … …

***

Attention, Attention, Attention—This is not a drill! Don’t miss the China government naval/maritime ship recognition Order of Battle (OOB) guides that the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) just released! It’s the first time this unparalleled resource has been publicly updated in 15.5 months… And, for the first time ever, ONI has divided its exquisitely-detailed visual OOB into two separate subcomponents:

  1. China People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Recognition and Identification Guide
  2. China Coast Guard and Government Maritime Forces Recognition and Identification Guide

Graphics combined below for reference:

Bottom line: Unrivaled resource, worth waiting for, must examine now! PRC Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia forces, etc., all documented authoritatively as nowhere else.

Even a quick glance reveals the sheer scope and scale of Beijing’s three Sea Forces. The only downside to digesting this Open Source/OSINT cornucopia is that you may need to strengthen your eyeglass prescription to discern the dozens of hull forms and hundreds of pennant numbers…

Click here to download cached files:

China People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Recognition and Identification Guide(Suitland, MD: U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, 29 April 2024).

China Coast Guard and Government Maritime Forces Recognition and Identification Guide (Suitland, MD: U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, 29 April 2024).

***

As we steam through 2024, China under Xi is steaming full speed ahead, particularly at sea. Navigate todays troubled Indo-Pacific waters by consulting the latest version of Modern Chinese Maritime Forcesreleased today! This most recent iteration of the second edition includes sections for PLA Army (pp. 63–75) and PLA Air Force (pp. 76–78) watercraft; the latest data updates, including regarding nuclear-powered submarines (pp. 20–22); and a variety of new drawings. It is issued in both PDF and print versions.

This is the most comprehensive unclassified, open source PRC sea forces order of battle, data, and ship drawings available anywhere. It tracks the world’s most-numerous Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia vessels in unrivaled detail. Even just scrolling or flipping through this volume for a minute reveals the staggering scope and extent of Beijing’s sea power across the waterfront today. I simply could not be more honored to contribute a new, improved Foreword that captures China’s latest military maritime superlatives!

Manfred Meyer (edited by Larry Bond and Chris Carlson), Modern Chinese Maritime Forces, Second Edition (Admiralty Trilogy Group, 1 April 2024).

  • “A compilation of ships and boats of the Chinese Navy, Coast Guard, Maritime Militia and other state authorities”
  • In terms of ship numbers, each of China’s three sea forces is the world’s largest by a large margin. For the scenarios that most concern the U.S. and its regional allies, these numbers matter greatly.
    • This suggests an important conclusion: China’s numerical sea force supremacy and the corresponding need for power projection and presence to counter it effectively demonstrates the need for a substantially-sized U.S. Navy. This book can help inform related deliberations and development. All the more reason to consult this handy compendium today!
  • Click here to download sample content.
  • Conventionally-powered submarine coverage includes entry on the Type 039C Yuan-class SSP (p. 22) and test submarines (p. 24).
  • Unique PAFMM ship silhouettes and related information on pp. 129–30! Updated to include Guangdong Province vessels.
  • Check out the crane ship coverage on pp. 170–72!
  • Ro-Ro ferries are featured on p. 174.
  • You can order a copy here.
  • The .pdf version is a living document, updated quarterly (1 January, 1 April, 1 July, 1 October of each year) with new drawings, commissionings, decommissionings, and other ship data as it becomes available.
  • Single purchase includes access to future periodic updates of the volume.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

In addition to Modern Chinese Maritime Forces, the Admiralty Trilogy Group also offers a dedicated supplement for Harpoon V regarding PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, China Coast Guard ships and aircraft as well as missiles/weapons and sensors. It is designed as a sourcebook for the game, but can also be used as an unparalleled reference (offering unrivaled coverage from 1955 to the present).

Admiralty Trilogy Group similarly offers dedicated sourcebooks for Harpoon V on Russia’s Navy and Military Aircraft, respectively, which likewise double as unique general references.

SUMMARY OF MODERN CHINESE MARITIME FORCES

The Admiralty Trilogy Group (ATG) is pleased to announce that in addition to publishing games supporting its tactical naval game system, the Admiralty Trilogy, it has released its first nonfiction book. Click here to read the announcement.

Modern Chinese Maritime Forces, by Manfred Meyer, a noted artist and illustrator, provides up-to-the minute information on Chinese sea power. It lists all Chinese state vessels – not just the People’s Liberation Army Navy, but the Coast Guard, China Maritime Surveillance, China Fisheries law Enforcement Command, and many other state-sponsored agencies that carry out China’s policies at sea.

Hundreds drawings show everything from aircraft carriers to buoy tenders, accompanied by detailed information on their characteristics. Additional supporting material includes theater navy assignments for individual ships as well as descriptions of the Chinese systems for hull numbers and equipment designations. This compact book has the most complete unclassified information on Chinese state-owned vessels available anywhere.

I am honored to contribute a revised Foreword, in which I write: “Today, China’s maritime forces have the most ships of any nation. This pathbreaking book documents their force structure in unprecedented detail.”

FOREWORD

Ships are the ultimate embodiment of maritime strategy. Today, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s military maritime forces have the most ships of any nation. This pathbreaking book documents their force structure in unprecedented detail, making it an invaluable reference for all who seek to understand Beijing’s seaward surge and its manifold impacts and implications.

While remaining shackled to geostrategic realities on land and hemmed in by “island chains” surrounding peripheral seas, China has gone to sea dramatically in both commercial and military dimensions. It is arguably the first continental power in two millennia to become a successful hybrid land-sea power and keep that sea change on course. Powered by the world’s second-largest economy and defense budget, the PRC has gone to sea with scale, sophistication, and superlatives that no continental power ever before achieved in the modern era. Living out the dreams of previous generations to truly develop China’s “blue economy,” paramount leader Xi Jinping is personally guiding China’s transformation into a “great maritime power.” Amid European decline and American fiscal and strategic challenges, this historic transformation has the potential to end six centuries of largely Western dominance of the world’s oceans.

Rather than operating on exterior lines like such geographically advantaged sea powers as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia, China must radiate sea power from interior lines in a way that prioritizes increasing control over its disputed sovereignty claims in the “Near Seas” (the Yellow, East, and South China Seas) while seeking growing influence across the Indo-Pacific region and nascent global presence. To pursue these radiating ripples of maritime interests and activities, Beijing draws on three sea forces, each the maritime component of one of its three armed forces: the (1) People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), (2) China Coast Guard (CCG), and (3) People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Each PRC sea force has the world’s most ships in its category. The PLAN also includes the world’s most numerous conventional submarine force. This volume tracks all three PRC sea forces in unrivaled detail.

The PRC military has the world’s largest fleet of space event support ships and oceanographic research vessels at its call, as well as global port infrastructure networks and logistics support and emerging overseas facilities. On the civilian side, PRC sea power is supplemented by the world’s largest fishing fleet, number of fishers, aquaculture and pisciculture industries, merchant marine, and marine sector overall, as well as a large nationally flagged tanker fleet. In 2023, China achieved the world’s largest commercial fleet in terms of gross tonnage in shipping capacity.

PRC ship numbers matter. First, China increasingly enjoys both quantity and quality at sea. In recent years China has transcended Cold War shipbuilding that produced crude Soviet-style, post-World War II ship designs. The PLAN, naturally China’s most advanced sea force technologically, has most dramatically replaced backward rust buckets with increasing numbers of sophisticated platforms. But the CCG and PAFMM are also modernizing significantly. Of China’s three sea forces, its coast guard has grown the most rapidly in numbers and enjoys the greatest global numerical superiority.

China’s shipbuilding juggernaut, powered by what until very recently was indisputably the world’s largest population and fastest-growing multi-trillion-dollar economy, has sustained rapid modernization of all three sea forces even as numbers of modern vessels grow substantially. Beijing’s sea forces are supported by the world’s largest shipyard infrastructure, which has achieved the largest, fastest production-capacity expansion since World War II. This is part of the largest postwar military buildup, for which Beijing leverages the world’s largest human-organizational technology acquisition and application infrastructure. China’s commercial shipbuilding juggernaut subsidizes overhead costs for construction of all three sea forces’ vessels, an impossibility for America’s military-focused shipbuilding industry. CCG construction is particularly economical and efficient: commercial off-the-shelf drivetrains and electronics, together with a lack of complex combat systems and weapons, facilitate rapid assembly with multiple units constructed simultaneously. PAFMM vessel building is even easier and cheaper.

Numbers matter for maintaining presence and influence in vital seas. Even the most advanced ship cannot be in more than one place at a time. This is particularly true regarding the growing Sino-American strategic competition where the United States is playing an away game. U.S. Coast Guard cutters are primarily focused near American waters, far from any international disputes, while the U.S. Navy is dispersed around the world. Meanwhile, all three major PRC sea forces remain focused first and foremost on the contested Near Seas and their immediate approaches, close to China’s homeland bases, and supported by “anti-navy” land-based air and missile coverage and short, interior supply lines. In those three proximate seas, Beijing has the world’s most numerous and extensive disputed island and feature claims, with the largest number of other parties; none looms larger than Taiwan. At approximately 4.7 million sq. km in area, the Near Seas are roughly half the size of mainland China and equivalent to the areas of the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, and North Sea combined. Within this maritime area China regularly deploys sea forces far greater numerically than the size of the entire U.S. Navy.

For all these reasons, a full accounting of China’s navy, coast guard, and maritime militia has long been needed. This pioneering volume has filled that vital void by offering the most comprehensive unclassified, open-source PRC sea forces order of battle, data, and ship drawings available anywhere. Even casually perusing its pages reveals the staggering scope and extent of Beijing’s sea power today. This second edition includes new sections for PLA Army and Air Force watercraft; the latest data updates, particularly concerning nuclear-powered submarines; and a variety of new illustrations. I commend it to everyone seeking to understand how China is making such great waves on the world’s oceans, and what course it may take in coming years.

Andrew S. Erickson

China Maritime Studies Institute

Newport, Rhode Island

Modern Chinese Maritime Forces, second edition is a naval reference book by Manfred Meyer, a noted artist and illustrator. It provides up-to-the minute information on Chinese sea power. It lists all vessels in service of the Chinese government. – not just the People’s Liberation Army Navy, but the Coast Guard, China Maritime Surveillance, China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, the Maritime Militia, and many other state-controlled agencies that carry out China’s policy at sea. This second edition add new sections covering the ships and boats used by the PLA Ground Forces and PLA Air Force. It has grown by almost 40 pages since the first edition was published in 2018.

Over 650 drawings show everything from aircraft carriers to buoy tenders, accompanied by detailed information on their characteristics. Supporting material covers fleet assignments and descriptions of the Chinese systems for hull numbers and equipment designations.

Modern Chinese Maritime Forces has the most complete unclassified information on Chinese state-owned vessels available anywhere. Noted China specialist Dr. Andrew Erickson, in the Foreword, writes “Today, China’s maritime forces have the most ships of any nation. This pathbreaking book documents their force structure in unprecedented detail.”

Modern Chinese Maritime Forces is available as either a searchable .pdf or a softcover 174-page book. Both can be bought as a bundle for a reduced price.

Because Mr. Meyer is continuing to support the book with new drawings and information, we update the .pdf quarterly. Anyone who purchases the latest edition .pdf version (now the Second Edition) automatically receives the updated version, at no charge, via the Wargame Vault. This feature of the Wargame Vault’s service ensures that your .pdf version of Modern Chinese Maritime Forces will never be more than three months out of date.

REVIEWS

“This is a phenomenally thorough project, and I suspect it is both more complete and up to date than anything available to our armed forces at a classified or unclassified level. Herr Meyer’s meticulous research and superb drawing skills have produced a reference resource of unparalleled usefulness for anyone needing a handy reference for China’s vast naval and paranaval forces.” 

– A.D. Baker III, former editor of Combat Fleets of the World

“I think it is for the first time that such a nearly complete overview of the Chinese maritime services has been made available to the public. The Chinese navy has risen in twenty years from a regional outdated navy to one of the global players which cannot be overlooked by the other world and regional powers.”

– Werner Globke, editor of Weyer’s Warships

“This is a badly-needed book: an accessible, compact guide to the ships of the Chinese navy and its related paramilitary services. All of the ships are shown in very clear scaled drawings, which give a good sense of size and configuration. No other guide of this type exists. That makes this quite possibly the only good reference to the Chinese fleets. No one concerned with current naval affairs can afford to miss it.”

– Dr. Norman Friedman, technical naval author

“I devoured this book. This is perhaps the most important and most comprehensive technical naval analysis book to appear in a generation. With the advent of Cold War II and the announced return to great power competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, this book should be on the bookshelf of every serious U.S. Navy officer and naval analyst. It will be the standard reference.”

– Captain Jerry Hendrix, USN (ret.), Center for a New American Security

***

This periodically-updated Library of Congress report is indispensable for policy-makers and analysts alike!

If you have trouble accessing the website above, please download a cached copy here.

You can also click here to access the report via the public CRS website.

KEY EXCERPTS:

p. 9

… …

p. 10

“Salami-Slicing” Strategy and Gray Zone Operations

Observers frequently characterize China’s approach to the SCS and ECS as a “salami-slicing” strategy that employs a series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a casus belli, to gradually change the status quo in China’s favor.32 Other observers have referred to China’s approach as a strategy of gray zone operations (i.e., operations that reside in a gray zone between peace and war),33 incrementalism,34 creeping annexation,35 working to gain ownership through adverse possession,36 or creeping invasion,37 or as a “talk and take” strategy, meaning a strategy in which China engages in (or draws out) negotiations while taking actions to gain control of contested areas.38 An April 10, 2021, press report, for example, states 

China is trying to wear down its neighbors with relentless pressure tactics designed to push its territorial claims, employing military aircraft, militia boats and sand dredgers to dominate access to disputed areas, U.S. government officials and regional experts say. 

The confrontations fall short of outright military action without shots being fired, but Beijing’s aggressive moves are gradually altering the status quo, laying the foundation for China to potentially exert control over contested territory across vast stretches of the Pacific Ocean, the officials and experts say…. 

The Chinese are “trying to grind them down,” said a senior U.S. Defense official…. 

***

31 Elisabeth Braw, “Why China Is Stepping Up Its Maritime Attacks on the Philippines,” Foreign Policy, December 13, 2023. 

32 See, for example, Julian Ryall, “As Regional Tensions Rise, China Probing Neighbors’ Defense,” Deutsche Welle (DW), October 13, 2022. Another press report refers to the process as “akin to peeling an onion, slowly and deliberately pulling back layers to reach a goal at the center.” (Brad Lendon, “China Is Relentlessly Trying to Peel away Japan’s Resolve on Disputed Islands,” CNN, July 8, 2022.)

33 See, for example, Masaaki Yatsuzuka, “How China’s Maritime Militia Takes Advantage of the Grey Zone,” Strategist, January 16, 2023.

34 See, for example, Patrick Mendis and Joey Wang, “China’s Art of Strategic Incrementalism in the South China Sea,” National Interest, August 8, 2020.

35 See, for example, Alan Dupont, “China’s Maritime Power Trip,” The Australian, May 24, 2014.

36 See Ian Ralby, “China’s Maritime Strategy: To Own the Oceans by Adverse Possession,” The Hill, March 28, 2023.

37 Jackson Diehl, “China’s ‘Creeping Invasion,” Washington Post, September 14, 2014.

38 The strategy has been called “talk and take” or “take and talk.” See, for example, Anders Corr, “China’s Take-And-Talk Strategy In The South China Sea,” Forbes, March 29, 2017. See also Namrata Goswami, “Can China Be Taken Seriously on its ‘Word’ to Negotiate Disputed Territory?” The Diplomat, August 18, 2017.

p. 11

“Beijing never really presents you with a clear deadline with a reason to use force. You just find yourselves worn down and slowly pushed back,” [Gregory Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies] said.39 

Island Building and Base Construction 

Perhaps more than any other set of actions, China’s island-building (aka land-reclamation) and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands in the SCS have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is rapidly gaining effective control of the SCS. China’s large-scale island-building and base-construction activities in the SCS appear to have begun around December 2013, and were publicly reported starting in May 2014. Awareness of, and concern about, the activities appears to have increased substantially following the posting of a February 2015 article showing a series of “before and after” satellite photographs of islands and reefs being changed by the work.40 

China occupies seven sites in the Spratly Islands. It has engaged in island-building and facilities-construction activities at most or all of these sites, and particularly at three of them—Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef, all of which now feature lengthy airfields as well as substantial numbers of buildings and other structures. 

Figure 1 and Figure 2 show reported military facilities at sites that China occupies in the SCS, and reported aircraft, missile, and radar “range rings” extending from those sites. Although other countries, such as Vietnam, have engaged in their own island-building and facilities-construction activities at sites that they occupy in the SCS, these efforts are dwarfed in size by China’s island-building and base-construction activities in the SCS.41 

New Maritime Law That Went Into Effect on September 1, 2021 

A new Chinese maritime law that China approved in April 2021 as an amendment to its 1983 maritime traffic safety law went into effect September 1, 2021. The law seeks to impose new notification and other requirements on foreign ships entering what China describes as “sea areas under the jurisdiction” of China.42 Some observers have stated that the new law could lead to increased tensions in the SCS, particularly if China takes actions to enforce its provisions.43 

[CONTINUED…]

***

39 Dan De Luce, “China Tries to Wear Down Its Neighbors with Pressure Tactics,” NBC News, April 10, 2021. See also Dan Altman, “The Future of Conquest, Fights Over Small Places Could Spark the Next Big War,” Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2021. 

40 Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Before and After: The South China Sea Transformed,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), February 18, 2015. 

41 See, for example, “Vietnam’s Island Building: Double-Standard or Drop in the Bucket?,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), May 11, 2016. For additional details on China’s island-building and base-construction activities in the SCS, see, in addition to Appendix E, CRS Report R44072, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options, by Ben Dolven et al. 

42 See, for example, Amber Wang, “South China Sea: China Demands Foreign Vessels Report before Entering ‘Its Territorial Waters,’” South China Morning Post, August 30, 2021. 

43 See, for example, Navmi Krishna, “Explained: Why China’s New Maritime Law May Spike Tensions in South China Sea,” Indian Express, September 7, 2021; Brad Lendon and Steve George, “The Long Arm of China’s New Maritime Law Risks Causing Conflict with US and Japan,” CNN, September 3, 2021; Richard Javad Heydarian, “China’s Foreign Ship Law Stokes South China Sea Tensions,” Asia Times, September 2, 2021. See also James Holmes, “Are China And Russia Trying To Attack The Law Of The Sea?” 19FortyFive, August 31, 2021.

p. 12

p. 13

… …

p. 15

USE OF COAST GUARD SHIPS AND MARITIME MILITIA ………………………………………………………………………………………. 15

Use of Coast Guard Ships and Maritime Militia 

China asserts and defends its maritime claims not only with its navy, but also with its coast guard and its maritime militia. Indeed, China employs its maritime militia and its coast guard more regularly and extensively than its navy in its maritime sovereignty-assertion operations. 

p. 90

Use of Coast Guard Ships and Maritime Militia Coast Guard Ships Overview

The China Coast Guard (CCG) is much larger than the coast guard of any other country in the region,228 and it has increased substantially in size through the addition of many newly built ships. China makes regular use of CCG ships to assert and defend its maritime claims, particularly in the ECS, with Chinese navy ships sometimes available over the horizon as backup forces. DOD states that 

The CCG is subordinate to the PAP [People’s Armed Police] and is responsible for a wide range of maritime security missions, including defending the PRC’s sovereignty claims; fisheries enforcement; combating smuggling, terrorism, and environmental crimes; as well as supporting international cooperation. In 2021, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the Coast Guard Law which took effect on 1 February 2021. The legislation regulates the duties of the CCG, to include the use of force, and applies those duties to seas under the jurisdiction of the PRC. The law was meet with concern by other regional countries that may perceive the law as an implicit threat to use force, especially as territorial disputes in the region continue. 

The CCG’s rapid expansion and modernization has made it the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world. Its newer vessels are larger and more capable than [its] older vessels, allowing them to operate further off shore and remain on station longer. A 2019 academic study published by the U.S. Naval War College estimates the CCG has over 140 regional and oceangoing patrol vessels (or more than 1,000 tons displacement). Some of the vessels are former PLAN [PLA Navy] vessels, such as corvettes, transferred to the CCG and modified CCG operations. The newer, larger vessels are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, interceptor boats, and guns ranging from 20 to 76 millimeters. In addition, the same academic study indicates the CCG operates more than 120 regional patrol combatants (500 to 999 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations, and an additional 450 coast patrol craft (100 to 499 tons).229 

In March 2018, China announced that control of the CCG would be transferred from the civilian State Oceanic Administration to the Central Military Commission.230 The transfer occurred on July 1, 2018.231 … … …

***

228 See, for example, Damien Cave, “China Creates a Coast Guard Like No Other, Seeking Supremacy in Asian Seas,” New York Times, June 12 (updated September 24), 2023. For a comparison of the CCG to other coast guards in the region in terms of cumulative fleet tonnage in 2010 and 2016, see the graphic entitled “Total Coast Guard Tonnage of Selected Countries” in China Power Team, “Are Maritime Law Enforcement Forces Destabilizing Asia?” China Power (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), updated August 26, 2020, accessed May 31, 2023, at https://chinapower.csis.org/maritime-forces-destabilizing-asia/. 

229 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, p. 78. 

230 See, for example, David Tweed, “China’s Military Handed Control of the Country’s Coast Guard,” Bloomberg, March 26, 2018. 

231 See, for example, Global Times, “China’s Military to Lead Coast Guard to Better Defend Sovereignty,” People’s Daily Online, June 25, 2018. See also Economist, “A New Law Would Unshackle China’s Coastguard, Far from Its Coast,” Economist, December 5, 2020; Katsuya Yamamoto, “The China Coast Guard as a Part of the China Communist Party’s Armed Forces,” Sasakawa Peace Foundation, December 10, 2020.

p. 93

Maritime Militia 

China also uses its maritime militia—also referred to as the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM)—to defend its maritime claims. The PAFMM essentially consists of fishing-type vessels with armed crew members. In the view of some observers, the PAFMM—even more than China’s navy or coast guard—is the leading component of China’s maritime forces for asserting its maritime claims, particularly in the SCS. U.S. analysts have paid increasing attention to the role of the PAFMM as a key tool for implementing China’s salami-slicing strategy, and have urged U.S. policymakers to focus on the capabilities and actions of the PAFMM.236 DOD states the following about the PAFMM:

***

236 For additional discussions of the PAFMM, see, for example, Agnes Chang and Hannah Beech, “Fleets of Force, How China Strong-Armed Its Way Into Dominating the South China Sea,” New York Times, November 16, 2023; Brad Lendon, “‘Little Blue Men’: Is a Militia Beijing Says Doesn’t Exist Causing Trouble in the South China Sea?” CNN, August 12, 2023; “The Ebb and Flow of Beijing’s South China Sea Militia,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), November 9, 2022; Samuel Cranny-Evans, “Analysis: How China’s Coastguard and Maritime Militia May Create Asymmetry at Sea,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 13, 2022; Zachary Haver, “Unmasking China’s Maritime Militia,” BenarNews, May 17, 2021; Ryan D. Martinson, “Xi Likes Big Boats (Coming Soon to a Reef Near You),” War on the Rocks, April 28, 2021; Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, “Records Expose China’s Maritime Militia at Whitsun Reef, Beijing Claims They Are Fishing Vessels. The Data Shows Otherwise,” Foreign Policy, March 29, 2021; Zachary Haver, “China’s Civilian Fishing Fleets Are Still Weapons of Territorial Control,” Center for Advanced China Research, March 26, 2021; Chung Li-hua and Jake Chung, “Chinese Coast Guard an Auxiliary Navy: Researcher,” Taipei Times, June 29, 2020; Gregory Poling, “China’s Hidden Navy,” Foreign Policy, June 25, 2019; Mike Yeo, “Testing the Waters: China’s Maritime Militia Challenges Foreign Forces at Sea,” Defense News, May 31, 2019; Laura Zhou, “Beijing’s Blurred Lines between Military and Non-Military Shipping in South China Sea Could Raise Risk of Flashpoint,” South China Morning Post, May 5, 2019; Andrew S. Erickson, “Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),” April 29, 2019, Andrewerickson.com; Jonathan Manthorpe, “Beijing’s Maritime Militia, the Scourge of South China Sea,” Asia Times, April 27, 2019; Ryan D. Martinson, “Manila’s Images Are Revealing the Secrets of China’s Maritime Militia, Details of the Ships Haunting Disputed Rocks Show China’s Plans,” Foreign Policy, April 19, 2021; Brad Lendon, “Beijing Has a Navy It Doesn’t Even Admit Exists, Experts Say. And It’s Swarming Parts of the South China Sea,” CNN, April 13, 2021; Samir Puri and Greg Austin, “What the Whitsun Reef Incident Tells Us About China’s Future Operations at Sea,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), April 9, 2021; Drake Long, “Chinese Maritime Militia on the Move in Disputed Spratly Islands,” Radio Free Asia, March 24, 2021; Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Secretive Maritime Militia May Be Gathering at Whitsun Reef, Boats Designed to Overwhelm Civilian Foes Can Be Turned into Shields in Real Conflict,” Foreign Policy, March 22, 2021; Dmitry Filipoff, “Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D.

(continued…)

p. 94

Background & Missions. The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization that is ultimately subordinate to the Central Military Commission through the National Defense Mobilization Department. Throughout China, militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission. 

PAFMM vessels train with and assist the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the China Coast Guard (CCG) in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistics support, and search and rescue. China employs the PAFMM in gray zone operations, or “low-intensity maritime rights protection struggles,” at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved. China employs PAFMM vessels to advance its disputed sovereignty claims, often amassing them in disputed areas throughout the South and East China Seas. In this manner, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, and these operations are part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational operations short of war as an effective means of accomplishing strategic objectives. 

Operations. PAFMM units have been active for decades in maritime incidents and combat operations throughout China’s near seas and in these incidents PAFMM vessels are often used to supplement CCG cutters at the forefront of the incident, giving the Chinese the capacity to outweigh and outlast rival claimants. In March of 2021, hundreds of Chinese militia vessels moored in Whitsun Reef, raising concerns the Chinese planned to seize another disputed feature in the Spratly Islands. Other notable incidents include standoffs with the Malaysian drill ship West Capella (2020), defense of China’s HYSY-981 oil rig in waters disputed with Vietnam (2014), occupation of Scarborough Shoal (2012), and harassment of USNS Impeccable and Howard O. Lorenzen (2009 and 2014). Historically the maritime militia also participated in China’s offshore island campaigns in the 1950s, the 1974 seizure of the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam, and the occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 1994. 

The PAFMM also protects and facilitates PRC fishing vessels operating in disputed waters. For example, from late December 2019 to mid-January 2020, a large fleet of over 50 PRC fishing vessels operated under the escort of multiple China Coast Guard patrol ships in Indonesian claimed waters northeast of the Natuna Islands. At least a portion of the PRC ships in this fishing fleet were affiliated with known traditional maritime militia units, including a maritime militia unit based out of Beihai City in Guangxi province. While most traditional maritime militia units operating in the South China Sea continue to originate from townships and ports on Hainan Island, Beihai is one of a number of increasingly prominent maritime militia units based out of provinces in the PRC. These mainland based maritime militia units routinely operate in the Spratly Islands and in the southern South China Sea, and their operations in these areas are enabled by increased funding from the PRC government to improve their maritime capabilities and grow their ranks of personnel. 

***

Martinson Discuss China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), March 11, 2019; Jamie Seidel, “China’s Latest Island Grab: Fishing ‘Militia’ Makes Move on Sandbars around Philippines’ Thitu Island,” News.com.au, March 5, 2019; Gregory Poling, “Illuminating the South China Sea’s Dark Fishing Fleets,” Stephenson Ocean Security Project (Center for Strategic and International Studies), January 9, 2019; Andrew S. Erickson, “Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China’s Maritime Militia to Deter its Use,” National Interest, November 25, 2018; Todd Crowell and Andrew Salmon, “Chinese Fisherman Wage Hybrid ‘People’s War’ on Asian Seas,” Asia Times, September 6, 2018; Andrew S. Erickson, “Exposed: Pentagon Report Spotlights China’s Maritime Militia,” National Interest, August 20, 2018; Jonathan Odom, “China’s Maritime Militia,” Straits Times, June 16, 2018; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report No. 1, Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, Newport, RI, March 2017, 22 pp.  (Continued…)

p. 95

Capabilities. Through the National Defense Mobilization Department, Beijing subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate PAFMM vessels to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities. PAFMM units employ marine industry workers, usually fishermen, as a supplement to the PLAN and the CCG. While retaining their day jobs, these mariners are organized and trained, often by the PLAN and the CCG, and can be activated on demand. Additionally, starting in 2015, the Sansha City Maritime Militia in the Paracel Islands has developed into a salaried full-time maritime militia force equipped with at least 84 purpose-built vessels armed with mast-mounted water cannons for spraying and reinforced steel hulls for ramming along with their own command center in the Paracel Islands. Lacking their normal fishing responsibilities, Sansha City Maritime Militia personnel, many of whom are former PLAN and CCG sailors, train for peacetime and wartime contingencies, often with light arms, and patrol regularly around disputed South China Sea features even during fishing moratoriums. Additionally, since 2014, China has built a new Spratly backbone fleet comprising at least 235 large fishing vessels, many longer than 50 meters and displacing more than 500 tons. These vessels were built under central direction from the Chinese government to operate in disputed areas south of twelve degrees latitude that China typically refers to as the “Spratly Waters,” including the Spratly Islands and southern SCS. Spratly backbone vessels were built for prominent PAFMM units in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan Provinces. For vessel owners not already affiliated with PAFMM units, joining the militia was a precondition for receiving government funding to build new Spratly backbone boats. As with the CCG and PLAN, new facilities in the Paracel and Spratly Islands enhance the PAFMM’s ability to sustain operations in the South China Sea.237 

***

237 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, pp. 79-80.

REPORT SUMMARY

Over the past 10 to 15 years, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition. China’s actions in the SCS—including extensive island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China’s claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China’s near-seas region—meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. 

Potential broader U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and resisting the emergence of an alternative “might-makes-right” approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia; and pursing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China. 

Potential specific U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: dissuading China from carrying out additional base-construction activities in the SCS, moving additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it occupies in the SCS, initiating island-building or base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, declaring straight baselines around land features it claims in the SCS, or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS; and encouraging China to reduce or end operations by its maritime forces at the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, halt actions intended to put pressure against Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands, provide greater access by Philippine fisherman to waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal or in the Spratly Islands, adopt the U.S./Western definition regarding freedom of the seas, and accept and abide by the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China. 

The issue for Congress is whether the Administration’s strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.

AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY—RONALD O’ROURKE

Mr. O’Rourke is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the Johns Hopkins University, from which he received his B.A. in international studies, and a valedictorian graduate of the University’s Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, where he received his M.A. in the same field.

Since 1984, Mr. O’Rourke has worked as a naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. He has written many reports for Congress on various issues relating to the Navy, the Coast Guard, defense acquisition, China’s naval forces and maritime territorial disputes, the Arctic, the international security environment, and the U.S. role in the world. He regularly briefs Members of Congress and Congressional staffers, and has testified before Congressional committees on many occasions.

In 1996, he received a Distinguished Service Award from the Library of Congress for his service to Congress on naval issues.

In 2010, he was honored under the Great Federal Employees Initiative for his work on naval, strategic, and budgetary issues.

In 2012, he received the CRS Director’s Award for his outstanding contributions in support of the Congress and the mission of CRS.

In 2017, he received the Superior Public Service Award from the Navy for service in a variety of roles at CRS while providing invaluable analysis of tremendous benefit to the Navy for a period spanning decades.

Mr. O’Rourke is the author of several journal articles on naval issues, and is a past winner of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Arleigh Burke essay contest. He has given presentations on naval, Coast Guard, and strategy issues to a variety of U.S. and international audiences in government, industry, and academia.

CLICK BELOW FOR THE FULL TEXT OF SOME OF THE PUBLICATIONS CITED IN O’ROURKE’S CRS REPORT:

Peter A. Dutton and Andrew S. Erickson, “When Eagle Meets Dragon: Managing Risk in Maritime East Asia,” RealClearDefense, 25 March 2015.

Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, “Records Expose China’s Maritime Militia at Whitsun Reef,” Foreign Policy, 29 March 2021.

Andrew S. Erickson,“Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 29 April 2019.

Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Secretive Maritime Militia May Be Gathering at Whitsun Reef,” Foreign Policy, 22 March 2021.

Dmitry Filipoff, “Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson Discuss China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 11 March 2019.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China’s Maritime Militia to Deter its Use,” The National Interest, 25 November 2018.

Andrew S. Erickson, “Exposed: Pentagon Report Spotlights China’s Maritime Militia,” The National Interest, 20 August 2018.

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, March 2017).

Andrew S. Erickson and Emily de La Bruyere, “Crashing Its Own Party: China’s Unusual Decision to Spy on Joint Naval Exercises,” China Real Time Report (中国实时报), Wall Street Journal, 19 July 2014.

Andrew S. Erickson and Emily de La Bruyere, “China’s RIMPAC Maritime-Surveillance Gambit,” The National Interest, 29 July 2014.

Andrew S. Erickson, “PRC National Defense Ministry Spokesman Sr. Col. Geng Yansheng Offers China’s Most-Detailed Position to Date on Dongdiao-class Ship’s Intelligence Collection in U.S. EEZ during RIMPAC Exercise,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 1 August 2014.

Andrew S. Erickson on the ‘Decade of Greatest Danger’,” interviewed by Eyck Freymann, The Wire China, 25 April 2021.

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “Xi’s Fast & Furious Nuclear Buildup & Beyond: Key Text from Pentagon’s 2023 China Military Power Report,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 16 January 2024.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 19, 2023).

  • Publication summarizing report’s China nuclear weapons-related content:

Gabriel B. Collins and Andrew S. EricksonReaping the Whirlwind: How China’s Coercive Annexation of Taiwan Could Trigger Nuclear Proliferation in Asia and Beyond (Houston, TX: Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 25 October 2023).

CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD FULL-TEXT PDF.

KEY CONTENT FROM 2023 CHINA MILITARY POWER REPORT (INCLUDES SOME MARITIME MILITIA-SPECIFIC ADDITIONS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ABOVE POSTING):

[Please note: bolding, underlining, italics, annotations in brackets, etc. are from me – Andrew Erickson – and not from the original report itself. Be sure to check the report’s exact text firsthand here.]

p. 18

The PRC continued to employ the PLA Navy (PLAN), China Coast Guard, and maritime militia to patrol the region throughout 2022.

p. 32

The National Defense Mobilization System. This MCF system binds the other systems as it seeks to mobilize the PRC’s military, economic, and social resources to defend or advance China’s sovereignty, security and development interests. The Party views China’s growing strength as only useful to the extent that the party-state can mobilize it. China characterizes mobilization as the ability to precisely use the instrument, capability, or resource needed, when needed, for the duration needed. Within the PLA, 2015-16 reforms elevated defense mobilization to a department called the National Defense Mobilization Department (NDMD), which reports directly to the CMC. The NDMD plays an important role in this system by organizing and overseeing the PLA’s reserve forces, militia, and provincial military districts and below.This system also seeks to integrate the state emergency management system into the national defense mobilization system in order to achieve a coordinated military-civilian response during a crisis. Consistent with the Party’s view of international competition, many MCF mobilization initiatives not only seek to reform how the PRC mobilizes for war and responds to emergencies, but how the economy and society can be leveraged to support the PRC’s strategic needs for international competition.

p. 75

PLA Reserves, Paramilitary, Militia: increasing operability, integration

PLAN, CCG, CMM

INCREASING OPERABILITY WITH PLA RESERVES, PARAMILITARY & MILITIA

Key Takeaways

Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC’s paramilitary forces continue to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the China Maritime Militia (CMM).

● The PRC primarily uses paramilitary maritime organizations in maritime disputes, selectively using the PLAN to provide overwatch in case of escalation.

p. 76

Internal security: MPS, MSS, PAP, PLA, Militia

Militia force/org details

p. 77

CMM often performs tasks in conjunction/coordination with PLAN & CCG

“Local maritime militia forces…perform tasks including safeguarding maritime claims, protecting fisheries, providing logistic support, search and rescue, and surveillance and reconnaissance, often in conjunction or coordination with the PLAN and the CCG.”

p. 80

CHINA MARITIME MILITIA

  • CMM train with/assist PLAN + CCG
    • “CMM vessels train with and assist the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the China Coast Guard (CCG) in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistics support, and search and rescue.”
  • Possible CMM near Natunas—ambition to expand ops
    • “These operations traditionally take place within the FIC along China’s coast and near disputed features in the SCS such as the Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reed, and Luconia Shoal. However, the presence of possible CMM vessels mixed in with Chinese fishing vessels near Indonesia’s Natuna Island outside of the “nine-dashed line” on Chinese maps indicated a possible ambition to expand CMM operations within the region.”
  • Often supplement CCG cutters at forefront of incident
    • 2021.09-2022.09: Iroquois Reef
    • 2020 West Capella
    • 1950s offshore island campaigns
    • Occupation of Mischief Reef 1994
      • CMM units have been active for decades in incidents and combat operations throughout China’s [!!] near seas and in these incidents CMM vessels are often used to supplement CCG cutters at the forefront of the incident, giving the Chinese the capacity to outweigh and outlast rival claimants. From September 2021 to September 2022, maritime militia vessels were a constant presence near Iroquois Reef in the Spratly Islands within the Philippines EEZ. Other notable examples include standoffs with the Malaysia drill ship West Capella (2020), defense of China’s HYSY-981 drill rig in waters disputed with Vietnam (2014), occupation of Scarborough Reef (2012), and harassment of USNS Impeccable and Howard O. Lorenzen (2009 and 2014). Historically, the maritime militia also participated in China’s offshore island campaigns in the 1950s, the 1974 seizure of the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam, the occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 1994.”

CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIA

China’s Maritime Militia (CMM) is a subset of the PRC’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization that is ultimately subordinate to the CMC through the National Defense Mobilization Department. Throughout China, militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and vary widely in composition and mission.

CMM vessels train with and assist the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the China Coast Guard (CCG) in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistics support, and search and rescue. These operations traditionally take place within the FIC along China’s coast and near disputed features in the SCS such as the Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reed, and Luconia Shoal. However, the presence of possible CMM vessels mixed in with Chinese fishing vessels near Indonesia’s Natuna Island outside of the “nine-dashed line” on Chinese maps indicated a possible ambition to expand CMM operations within the region.The PRC employs the CMM in gray zone operations, or “low-intensity maritime rights protection struggles,” at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved. The PRC employs CMM vessels to advance its disputed sovereignty claims, often amassing them in disputed areas throughout the SCS and ECS. In this manner, the CMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve the PRC’s political goals without fighting and these operations are part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational operations short of war as an effective means of accomplishing strategic objectives.

CMM units have been active for decades in incidents and combat operations throughout [the] near seas and in these incidents CMM vessels are often used to supplement CCG cutters at the forefront of the incident, giving the Chinese the capacity to outweigh and outlast rival claimants. From September 2021 to September 2022, maritime militia vessels were a constant presence near Iroquois Reef in the Spratly Islands within the Philippines EEZ. Other notable examples include standoffs with the Malaysia drill ship West Capella (2020), defense of China’s HYSY-981 drill rig in waters disputed with Vietnam (2014), occupation of Scarborough Reef (2012), and harassment of USNS Impeccable and Howard O. Lorenzen (2009 and 2014). Historically, the maritime militia also participated in China’s offshore island campaigns in the 1950s, the 1974 seizure of the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam, the occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 1994.

The CMM also protects and facilitates Chinese fishing vessels operating in disputed waters. From late December 2019 to mid-January 2020, a large fleet of over 50 Chinese fishing vessels operated under the escort of multiple China Coast Guard patrol ships in Indonesian claimed waters northeast of the Natuna Islands. At least a portion of the Chinese ships in this fishing fleet were affiliated with known traditional maritime militia units, including a maritime militia unit based out of Beihai City in Guangxi province. While most traditional maritime militia units operating in the SCS

[continued on next page after text box below]

CMM AND LAND RECLAMATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Since at least 2014, CMM vessels have engaged in covert small scale reclamation activity and likely caused physical changes observed at multiple unoccupied features in the Spratly Islands, including Lankiam Cay, Eldad Reef, Sandy Cay, and Whitsun Reef. Beijing likely is attempting to covertly alter these features so that it can portray them as naturally formed high tide elevations capable of supporting PRC maritime claims out to the farthest extent of the nine-dash line. In contrast to the PRC large-scale reclamation program, which was overt and where the original status of occupied features is well documented, the less well-known historical record about many of the unoccupied features makes them more susceptible to PRC efforts to shape international opinion regarding the status of the features.

p. 81

  • Beihai MM: mainland based, to Spratlys/Southern SCS
  • From 2014: new Spratly backbone fleet from major CMM units in Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan.
    • With 235 or more large steel hulls; many >50 m, >500 tons.
    • Deploy to disputed Spratly waters below 12 degrees North.
  • Sansha MM—light arms
    • “Starting in 2015, the Sansha City Maritime Militia in the Paracel Islands has been developed into a salaried full-time maritime militia force with its own command center and equipped with at least 84 purpose-built vessels armed with mast-mounted water cannons for spraying and reinforced steel hulls for ramming. Freed from their normal fishing responsibilities, Sansha City Maritime Militia personnel – many of whom are former PLAN and CCG sailors – train for peacetime and wartime

continue to originate from townships and ports on Hainan Island, Beihai is one of a number of increasingly prominent maritime militia units based out of provinces in mainland China. These mainland based maritime militia units routinely operate in the Spratly Islands and in the southern SCS, and their operations in these areas are enabled by increased funding from the Chinese government to improve their maritime capabilities and grow their ranks of personnel.

Through the National Defense Mobilization Department, Beijing subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate CMM vessels to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities. CMM units employ marine industry workers, usually fishermen, as a supplement to the PLAN and the CCG. While retaining their day jobs, these mariners are organized and trained, often by the PLAN and the CCG, and can be activated on demand.

Since 2014, China has built a new Spratly backbone fleet comprising at least 235 large steel-hulled fishing vessels, many longer than 50 meters and displacing more than 500 tons. These vessels were built under central direction from the PRC government to operate in disputed areas south of 12 degrees latitude that China typically refers to as the “Spratly Waters,” including the Spratly Islands and southern SCS. Spratly backbone vessels were built for prominent CMM units in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan Provinces. For vessel owners not already affiliated with CMM units, joining the militia was a precondition for receiving government funding to build new Spratly backbone boats. As with the CCG and PLAN, new facilities in the Paracel and Spratly Islands enhance the CMM’s ability to sustain operations in the SCS.

Starting in 2015, the Sansha City Maritime Militia in the Paracel Islands has been developed into a salaried full-time maritime militia force with its own command center and equipped with at least 84 purpose-built vessels armed with mast-mounted water cannons for spraying and reinforced steel hulls for ramming. Freed from their normal fishing responsibilities, Sansha City Maritime Militia personnel – many of whom are former PLAN and CCG sailors – train for peacetime and wartime

p. 82

  • Sansha MM—light arms
  • contingencies, often with light arms, and patrol regularly around disputed South China Sea  features even during fishing moratoriums.
  • Tanmen MM—Xi: support SCS “island and reef development”
  • 1989-95 under SSF authority
  • Occupation/reclamation of PRC Spratly outposts: Subi, Fiery Cross, Mischief
  • “The Tanmen Maritime Militia is another prominent CMM unit. Homeported in Tanmen township on Hainan Island, the formation was described by Xi as a “model maritime militia unit” during a visit to Tanmen harbor in 2013. During the visit, Xi encouraged Tanmen to support “island and reef development” in the SCS. Between 1989 and 1995, the Tanmen Maritime Militia, under the authority of the PLAN Southern Theater Navy (then the South Sea Fleet), was involved in the occupation and reclamation of PRC outposts in the Spratly Islands, including Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef.

contingencies, often with light arms, and patrol regularly around disputed South China Sea features even during fishing moratoriums.

The Tanmen Maritime Militia is another prominent CMM unit. Homeported in Tanmen township on Hainan Island, the formation was described by Xi as a “model maritime militia unit” during a visit to Tanmen harbor in 2013. During the visit, Xi encouraged Tanmen to support “island and reef development” in the SCS. Between 1989 and 1995, the Tanmen Maritime Militia, under the authority of the PLAN Southern Theater Navy (then the South Sea Fleet), was involved in the occupation and reclamation of PRC outposts in the Spratly Islands, including Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef.

p. 119

ETC likely commands all CCG/MM ships conducting ops re Senkakus

“The Eastern Theater Command…likely commands all CCG and maritime militia ships while they are conducting operations related to the ongoing dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands.”

p. 121

ECS

Fishing/MM vessels, CCG escorts, PLAN overwatch

“The PRC attempts to legitimize its claims in the ECS through the continuous presence of PRC fishing and Maritime Militia vessels, escorted by CCG cutters and with PLA Navy warships nearby as overwatch.”

p. 122

STC

Track/react to U.S. ships operating within Nine-Dashed Line

“The Southern Theater Command is responsible for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS by regularly tracking and reacting to U.S. ships operating within the China-claimed “nine-dash line.””

Can assume command as needed over ALL CCG/CMM ships operating within 9DL

“can assume command as needed over all CCG and CMM ships conducting operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.””

p. 125

SCS

  • 2022 deployed PLAN/CCG/civilian ships:
    • Presence near Scarborough, Thitu
    • Respond to oil/gas exploration within 9DL
  • CCG/PAFMM used nets/ropes to block Philippine supply boats
  • the CCG and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) used nets and ropes to block Philippine supply boats on their way to an atoll in the SCS and issued radio challenges and threats to Philippine ships during routine resupply missions.”
    • “The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its sovereignty. Throughout 2022, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships to maintain a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.” Separately, the CCG and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) used nets and ropes to block Philippine supply boats on their way to an atoll in the SCS and issued radio challenges and threats to Philippine ships during routine resupply missions.”
  • 2022.11 CCG cut tow line of Philippine Navy vessel, seized PRC rocket debris
    • In November 2022, a CCG vessel forcibly seized apparent PRC rocket debris that had fallen near Philippine-occupied Thitu Island from the Philippines by cutting the tow line of a Philippine Navy vessel as it was towing debris back to shore. PRC insisted the debris was returned to them after a “friendly negotiation,” despite the Philippines producing video evidence of the incident and issues diplomatic notes of protest.”
***

Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, eds., China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019; paperback 15 January 2023).

CLICK HERE FOR COMPLETE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VOLUME INFORMATION.

Sample Chapters:

Reprinted in traditional Chinese 艾立信 [Andrew S. Erickson], 馬丁松 [Ryan D. Martinson], 編者 [Editors], 中共海上灰色地帶行動 [Communist China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations] (美國海軍學會出版社 [Naval Institute Press], 2019); (中華民國國防部 [Republic of China Ministry of National Defense], 譯印 出版機關 [Translator and Publishing Organization], April 2023).
SAMPLE CHAPTERS:

VOLUME INFORMATION

首頁

外交及國防

中共海上灰色地帶行動(精裝)

  • 編/著/譯者 / 艾立信(Andrew S. Erickson),馬丁松(Ryan D. Martinson…
  • 出版機關 / 國防部
  • 出版日期 / 2023-04
  • 主題分類 / 外交及國防
  • 施政分類 / 國防及退伍軍人
  • ISBN / 9786267080726
  • GPN / 1011200399
  • 頁數/張數/片數 / 367
  • 裝訂 / 精裝
  • 定價 / NT$ 400
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簡介

中共在世界第二大經濟體與國防預算支持下,正致力於進一步轉型為「海洋大國」,其海軍、海警與海上民兵三支海上武力正分進合擊大步邁向海洋,以第一線海軍部隊向海洋擴張,並以海警與海上民兵擔任第二與三線發起介於戰時與平時之間的灰色地帶行動,在這場「沒有硝煙的戰爭」中,透過「不戰而勝」的途徑,限縮並侵犯所有國家(包括美國)的海上自由,以及鄰國的海洋權利。

目次

卷首語 中共海事發展研究
前言
感謝詞
引言 「沒有硝煙的戰爭」:中共準海軍在海上灰色地帶的挑戰

第一篇 理解灰色地帶
1 中共海上灰色地帶:定義、危機與複雜的維權行動
2 中共海上灰色地帶行動之概念化
3 海上民兵是否在海上發起人民戰爭?
4 當灰色地帶遇上法律:中共準海軍戰略與國際法

第二篇 中共海警與灰色地帶
5 為灰色地帶而設:評估中共新成立之海警的維權能力
6 海警海上灰色地帶行動之軍事化
7 中共海上執法的水上平臺:戰鬥序列、能力與趨勢

第三篇 中共海上民兵與灰色地帶
8 維權與戰鬥:執行平戰任務的海上民兵組織
9 中共海上民兵與偵打一體行動
10 藍色領土中的灰色部隊:中共海上民兵灰色地帶行動藍本

第四篇 近海灰色地帶狀況想定
11 南海:評估中共在南海九段線內的準海軍行為
12 中共在東海的海上灰色地帶行動與日本因應作為
13 東海:未來趨勢、可能情況與因應作為

第五篇 灰色地帶政策之挑戰與建議
14 海上灰色地帶行動之時間因素
15 因應中共灰色地帶作為之嚇阻角色
16 對中共之爭議管理:越南與菲律賓之個案分析
17 結論:最穩當的選項

作者簡介
編者簡介

***

Lonnie D. Henley, Civilian Shipping and Maritime Militia: The Logistics Backbone of a Taiwan Invasion, China Maritime Report 21 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, May 2022).

About the Author

Lonnie Henley retired from federal service in 2019 after more than 40 years as an intelligence officer and East Asia expert. He served 22 years as a U.S. Army China foreign area officer and military intelligence officer in Korea, at Defense Intelligence Agency, on Army Staff, and in the History Department at West Point. He retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in 2000 and joined the senior civil service, first as Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia and later as Senior Intelligence Expert for Strategic Warning at DIA. He worked two years as a senior analyst with CENTRA Technology, Inc. before returning to government service as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia. He rejoined DIA in 2008, serving for six years as the agency’s senior China analyst, then National Intelligence Collection Officer for East Asia, and culminating with a second term as DIO for East Asia. Mr. Henley holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering and Chinese from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and master’s degrees in Chinese language from Oxford University, which he attended as a Rhodes Scholar; in Chinese history from Columbia University; and in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College (now National Intelligence University). His wife Sara Hanks is a corporate attorney and CEO specializing in early-stage capital formation. They live in Alexandria, Virginia.

This article was cleared for open publication by the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Prepublication and Security Review, DOPSR Case 21-S-1603. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of defense or the U.S. Government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the DoD of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.

Summary

Most analysts looking at the Chinese military threat to Taiwan conclude that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is incapable of invading the island because it lacks the landing ships to transport adequate quantities of troops and equipment across the Taiwan Strait. This report challenges that conventional wisdom, arguing that the PLA intends to meet these requirements by requisitioning civilian vessels operated by members of China’s maritime militia (海上民兵). Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government and military have taken steps to strengthen the national defense mobilization system to ensure the military has ample quantities of trained militia forces to support a cross-strait invasion. Despite ongoing challenges—including poor data management, inconsistent training quality, and gaps in the regulatory system—and uncertainties associated with foreign-flagged Chinese ships, this concept of operations could prove good enough to enable a large-scale amphibious assault.

Introduction

Discussion of a potential Chinese military invasion of Taiwan almost always hinges on whether the PLA has enough lift capacity to deliver the would-be invasion forces across the Taiwan Strait and, to a lesser extent, whether it could sustain them once they are ashore on Taiwan. The argument centers on People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) amphibious landing ships and other over-the-shore amphibious assault assets, with most observers concluding that the PLAN has not built enough of these ships and therefore that the PLA cannot (yet?) carry out a full-scale invasion.

This report argues that the PLA plans to rely heavily on mobilized maritime militia forces operating requisitioned civilian shipping as the logistical backbone of a cross-strait landing operation, including both the delivery of PLA forces onto Taiwan and logistical sustainment for the PLAN fleet at sea and ground forces ashore. Moreover, the PLA does not regard civilian shipping as a stopgap measure until more PLAN amphibious shipping can be built, but as a central feature of its preferred approach.

The report will examine China’s extensive system for preparing and generating this support force, the roles it will undertake in an invasion operation, and the challenges that must be overcome if the plan is to succeed.

The Scope of the Problem

Most authors looking at the Chinese military threat to Taiwan conclude that the PLA cannot land enough forces on Taiwan to make an invasion viable, that it wil not reach that capability until it builds many more amphibious landing ships, and that doing so will take at least several years even if they accelerate their efforts.2 There has been little detailed analysis to underpin that judgment, at least not in open sources, but most observers assess that the PLA would need to land 300,000 or more troops on Taiwan in total and that the PLAN amphibious fleet can only land around one division, roughly 20,000 troops, in a single lift.3 Since these constraints seem obvious, the logical conclusion is that the PLA must judge itself not yet capable of invading Taiwan.4

The PLA’s prospects appear even worse when one considers the rest of the logistical and operational requirements for a major landing operation, beyond the formidable challenge of getting enough troops ashore quickly in the face of determined resistance. The PLAN auxiliary fleet is inadequate to sustain large-scale combat operations, even if those operations were close to China’s shores as a Taiwan conflict would be. The PLAN has enlisted hundreds of civilian vessels to perform tasks ranging from over-the-shore logistics to at-sea replenishment, emergency repair and towing, medical support, casualty evacuation, and combat search and rescue, suggesting that its own inventory of support ships falls far short of what it deems necessary for a landing campaign.5 Skeptics will argue that this is more proof that the PLA itself does not take the invasion option seriously. The contrary view presented here is that the PLA does take these requirements seriously, but that it intends to rely on maritime militia support for large-scale combat operations, and specifically for a Taiwan invasion campaign.

The maritime militia (海上民兵) has attracted considerable attention in the past decade, led by the efforts of Andrew Erickson and Conor Kennedy at the U.S. Naval War College, focused mainly onits role in supporting China’s claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea.6  Kevin McCauley and Conor Kennedy have also looked at the role of civilian ships in military  power projection outside East Asia.7

What has received much less Western attention is the maritime militia’s role in large-scale combat operations, despite Chinese authors having written extensively on it since the PLA began serious consideration of a Taiwan invasion in the early 2000s. The Nanjing Military Region Mobilization Department director Guo Suqing observed in 2004 that a cross-strait island landing campaign would require large amounts of civilian shipping.8 He noted that there were many suitable ships available, some of which had already been retrofitted for wartime use, but warned that “the traditional form of last-minute non-rigorous civilian ship mobilization can no longer meet the needs of large-scale cross-sea landing operations.” Wang Hewen of the former General Logistics Department’s Institute of Military Transportation noted that efforts to strengthen the  retrofitting of civilian vessels for military use had accelerated in 2003,9 and a 2004 article from the Shanghai Transportation War Preparedness Office outlined the retrofitting work underway there.10 In 2004, Zhou Xiaoping of the Naval Command College called for overhaul of the mobilization system, arguing that “if the traditional administrative order-style mobilization and requisition methods were still followed, it would be difficult to ensure the implementation of civilian ship preparation and mobilization.”11 The government and PLA acted on these concerns, and over the past twenty years the maritime militia has evolved into a major force multiplier for the PLAN in large-scale combat operations.

Operational Roles for the Maritime Militia in a Taiwan Invasion

Kennedy and Erickson have written at length on the militia’s peacetime mission to assert China’s maritime claims, centered on fishing boats that may or may not do any actual fishing. The militia forces discussed here are very different, encompassing large-capacity commercial vessels including container ships, general cargo ships, bulk carriers, tankers, roll-on-roll-off (RO-RO) ferries, barges, semisubmersibles, ocean-going tugboats, passenger ships, “engineering ships,” and others, as well as smaller vessels.13 Authors from the Army Military Transportation University noted in 2015 that the force consisted of over 5,000 ships organized into 89 militia transportation units, 53 waterway engineering units, and 143 units with other specializations.14

Unlike the U.S. Merchant Marine model, where government officers and crews take control of leased ships, Chinese maritime militia units are composed mostly of the regular crews of the mobilized ships, what the Central Military Commission (CMC) Militia and Reserve Bureau director called the “model of selecting militiamen according to their ship” (依船定兵模式).15 The close correlation between requisitioned ships and militia units is essential for integration into military operations. There need to be clear command relationships with the supported PLA units,  and the crews need to be trained on their operational tasks, not to mention the increasingly important issue of legal rights and obligations in wartime. Local or provincial mobilization officials negotiate the requisitioning terms with the ship owners, either large shipping companies or individual owners, while the crews are inducted into militia units by a process that is not explained very clearly in the available writings. Several articles note that some militiamen are not enthusiastic about their role.16

PLA sources cite a wide range of wartime functions for the maritime militia. In a Taiwan invasion scenario, they include the following:

  • Delivery of forces. The most obvious operational role for militia units is to carry forces to the battlefield, referred to as “military unit transportation and delivery” (部队运输投送). PLA sources list this as a primary role for civilian shipping, to include participating in the assault landing phase of the operation.17 There are several delivery modes contemplated, the most straightforward being through existing ports. A 2019 article on amphibious heavy combined arms brigades in cross-strait island landing operations noted that as part of the first echelon ashore, one of their most important tasks was to create the conditions for second echelon units to land through operations such as the seizure of ports and piers.18 Articles published in 2014 and 2019 on amphibious landing bases made the same point and included rapid repair of piers among the main tasks to help the second echelon get ashore.19 Other landing modes include lightering from cargo ships to shallow-draft vessels; semisubmersible vessels delivering amphibious vehicles or air-cushion landing craft;20 and RO-RO ships delivering amphibious forces to their launching point or directly to shore.21
  • At-sea support. The PLAN has only a few replenishment ships, not enough to sustain the huge number of vessels that would be involved in a cross-strait invasion.22 Given the relatively short distances for a Taiwan landing, most PLAN ships would likely rely on shore-based support, but the service envisions using militia ships for at-sea replenishment as well, including fuel tankers and cargo ships fitted with equipment for alongside replenishment and helipads for vertical resupply.23 Militia ships would also provide emergency services including towing, rapid repair, firefighting, search and rescue, technical support, and even personnel augmentation to replace casualties aboard navy ships.24
  • Over-the-shore logistical support. A discussion of logistical support in island landing operations noted the importance of fuel tankers laying pipelines to support forces ashore.25 The author did not specify maritime militia in this role, but given the prominence of tankers in other discussions of militia support, it seems likely they would take part in this activity as well. Requisitioned cargo ships will also play a major role in logistical support through captured ports or via lighters and barges to expedient floating docks.
  • Medical support. The PLAN’s fleet of hospital ships could be overwhelmed by the casualties involved in a major landing operation. Militia would augment this force with containerized medical modules deployed on a variety of commercial ships, as well as smaller vessels providing casualty evacuation and first aid.26
  • Obstacle emplacement and clearing. Several sources list emplacing and clearing mines and other obstacles among maritime militia tasks in a landing operation, without providing much further detail.27
  • Engineering support. Maritime militia forces will not be passively waiting for first echelon units to open damaged ports. Tugboats, barges, salvage ships, crane ships, and dredgers will join the effort to clear obstacles, open channels, and repair docks and other facilities.28
  • Reconnaissance, surveillance, and early warning. While much of this discussion has focused on large ships, the huge fleet of militia fishing boats would have a large role in a Taiwan operation as well, providing eyes and ears across the entire maritime theater.29
  • Deception and concealment. One major advantage the PLAN derives from having hundreds of militia ships in the battlespace is the ability to hide its most valuable platforms among the radar clutter. Many sources list deception, camouflage, and feints among the militia’s tasks. One 2018 article explains that militia ships will “use corner reflectors, false radio signals, false heat sources, etc., to set up counterfeit ships, missiles, fighters and other targets on the sea … to cause the enemy to make wrong judgments and lure the enemy into attacking the false target.”30 Flooding the strait with false targets would severely complicate Blue efforts against the invasion fleet.
  • Helicopter relay platform. The Taiwan Strait is relatively narrow, but a two-hundred-mile round trip each sortie still creates a significant strain for helicopter operations. Some militia ships will serve as “helicopter relay support platforms” (直升机中继保障平台), fitted with helipads, ammunition storage compartments, aviation fuel bladders and refueling equipment, limited repair facilities, and flight control support systems to keep the helicopters in the fight.31 … … …

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Gray Zone Strategy in the South China Sea: Emerging Trends and Deterrence Strategies,” Kwentong Mandaragat Lecture, Foundation for the National Interest and University of the Philippines Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, via Zoom to Manila, 25 May 2021.

CLICK HERE TO WATCH THE PRESENTATION ON YOUTUBE.

On 25 May 2021, the Foundation for the National Interest, together with the UP Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, with the support of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, sat down with Dr. Andrew Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College. The 8th Kwentong Mandaragat Series webinar discussed China’s gray zone strategy in the South China Sea in light of recent developments in the region. The webinar explored the finer details that reinforces China’s continuing gray zone operations such as the Chinese Maritime Militia, the militarization of civilian industries, and the patterns and strategies employed by said maritime militias. For more information on Dr. Andrew Erickson’s latest compilation of information regarding China’s maritime militia “Tracking China’s ‘Little Blue Men’ – A Comprehensive Maritime Militia Compendium,” visit his website by clicking here.

DISCLAIMERS:

1) The views expressed here by Dr. Andrew S. Erickson are his alone, in solely an individual academic capacity, and do not represent the official policies or estimates of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. government.

2) The webinar is by-invitation only and the Open Forum is strictly off-the-record. The video has been modified to accommodate a public release of information contained herein.

***

Official Music Video: 三沙海上民兵之歌 “The Song of the Sansha Maritime Militia”

Open source intelligence pro tip #1: if you’re trying to lurk in the shadows of deniability—however implausible—don’t record and release an official music video!

Zoe Haver has published a blockbuster expose on the Sansha Maritime Militia. Among many revealing details, she mentioned that this vanguard unit of China’s Armed Forceshas its own music video.

Immediately below are the lyrics in Chinese, pinyin, and English. Key lines:

平时维权当先锋

Píngshí wéiquán dāng xiānfēng

In peacetime, be the vanguard of rights protection

急时参战打胜仗

Jí shí cānzhàn dǎ shèngzhàng

In times of emergency, join the battle and win the war

Be sure to watch all 2 minutes and 13 seconds for fascinating vignettes of personnel and operations. You may wish to pause and examine key frame-images such as that showing a militiaman reading the “永乐工作简报” (Yongle [Islands] Work Briefing). At the bottom of this post is a Chinese article with screenshots, associated images, and additional background.

My bottom line: the next time PRC officials appear to deny the existence of their own Maritime Militia, play them this music video! PAFMM karaoke, anyone?

Political Department of the PLA Hainan Province Sansha Garrison,

三沙海上民兵之歌 [The Song of the Sansha Maritime Militia], 12 April 2020.

三沙海上民兵之歌

Sān shā hǎishàng mínbīng zhī gē

The Song of the Sansha Maritime Militia

斗海浪 迎朝阳

Dòu hǎilàng yíng zhāoyáng

Fighting the waves, welcoming the rise of the morning sun

海上民兵英名传扬

Hǎishàng mínbīng yīngmíng chuán yáng

The Maritime Militia spreads its illustrious name

世代耕耘祖宗海

Shìdài gēngyún zǔzōng hǎi

Diligently cultivating the ancestral sea for generations

碧海丹心铸海疆

Bìhǎi dānxīn zhù hǎijiāng

Molding loyalty to the blue sea on the ocean frontier

战风云 为梦想

Zhàn fēngyún wèi mèngxiǎng

Fighting against the winds and clouds to achieve our dreams

海上民兵斗志昂扬

Hǎishàng mínbīng dòuzhì ángyáng

The Maritime Militia’s fighting spirit is soaring

不畏艰险担使命

Bù wèi jiānxiǎn dān shǐmìng

Not fearing hardship, carrying out the mission

建设三沙创辉煌

Jiànshè sān shā chuàng huīhuáng

Building Sansha to create glory

海上民兵海疆卫士

Hǎishàng mínbīng hǎijiāng wèishì

The Maritime Militia is the guardian of the ocean frontier

报效国家忠诚于党

Bàoxiào guójiā zhōngchéng yú dǎng

Serve the Country and be loyal to the Party

海上民兵海疆卫士

Hǎishàng mínbīng hǎijiāng wèishì

The Maritime Militia is the guardian of the ocean frontier

报效国家忠诚于党

Bàoxiào guójiā zhōngchéng yú dǎng

Serve the Country and be loyal to the Party

平时维权当先锋

Píngshí wéiquán dāng xiānfēng

In peacetime, be the vanguard of rights protection

急时参战打胜仗

Jí shí cānzhàn dǎ shèngzhàng

In times of emergency, join the battle and win the war

自豪吧 我们是三沙海上民兵

Zìháo ba wǒmen shì sān shā hǎishàng mínbīng

Be proud, we are the Sansha Maritime Militia

战风云 为梦想

Zhàn fēngyún wèi mèngxiǎng

Fighting against the winds and clouds to achieve our dreams

海上民兵斗志昂扬

Hǎishàng mínbīng dòuzhì ángyáng

The Maritime Militia’s fighting spirit is soaring

不畏艰险担使命

Bù wèi jiānxiǎn dān shǐmìng

Not fearing hardship, carrying out the mission

建设三沙创辉煌

Jiànshè sān shā chuàng huīhuáng

Building Sansha to create glory

海上民兵海疆卫士

Hǎishàng mínbīng hǎijiāng wèishì

The Maritime Militia is the guardian of the ocean frontier

报效国家忠诚于党

Bàoxiào guójiā zhōngchéng yú dǎng

Serve the Country and be loyal to the Party

海上民兵海疆卫士

Hǎishàng mínbīng hǎijiāng wèishì

The Maritime Militia is the guardian of the ocean frontier

报效国家忠诚于党

Bàoxiào guójiā zhōngchéng yú dǎng

Serve the Country and be loyal to the Party

平时维权当先锋

Píngshí wéiquán dāng xiānfēng

In peacetime, be the vanguard of rights protection

急时参战打胜仗

Jí shí cānzhàn dǎ shèngzhàng

In times of emergency, join the battle and win the war

自豪吧 我们是三沙海上民兵

Zìháo ba wǒmen shì sān shā hǎishàng mínbīng

Be proud, we are the Sansha Maritime Militia

前进吧 我们是三沙海上民兵

Qiánjìn ba wǒmen shì sān shā hǎishàng mínbīng

Advance forward, we are the Sansha Maritime Militia

【每周一曲】世代耕耘祖宗海的英雄们,也有豪迈的战歌!

 帧察 帧察点  2020-04-13
收录于话题
#每周一曲
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【上期内容:登船讲话惹众怒,恶人部长把官辞,航母中招破四百,病中舰长复原职?

三沙海上民兵之歌.mp3From 帧察点00:0002:12本期【每周一曲】分享的这首歌,正好与今天的头条切题。

2012年7月24日,人民解放军海南省三沙警备区随三沙市成立大会而正式挂牌成立,2013年7月21日,三沙警备区组建了三沙海上民兵连。为了进一步强化民兵的日常训练与管理使用,2014年12月,三沙市委决定在永兴、七连屿、永乐及南沙分别设立4个基层人民武装部;2015年1月6日,三沙市永兴人民武装部挂牌成立,七连屿人民武装部、永乐群岛人民武装部和南沙人民武装部等3个基层人民武装部同时成立,这首专为三沙海上民兵而写的战歌,就是诞生于这一年的5月。

斗海浪 迎朝阳

海上民兵英名传扬

世代耕耘祖宗海

碧海丹心铸海疆

战风云 为梦想

海上民兵斗志昂扬

不畏艰险担使命

建设三沙创辉煌

海上民兵海疆卫士

报效国家忠诚于党

海上民兵海疆卫士

报效国家忠诚于党

平时维权当先锋

急时参战打胜仗

自豪吧 我们是三沙海上民兵

战风云 为梦想

海上民兵斗志昂扬

不畏艰险担使命

建设三沙创辉煌

海上民兵海疆卫士

报效国家忠诚于党

海上民兵海疆卫士

报效国家忠诚于党

平时维权当先锋

急时参战打胜仗

自豪吧 我们是三沙海上民兵

前进吧 我们是三沙海上民兵

从MV中可见,在三沙民兵配发的枪械中,除了56式冲锋枪——全国很多地区民兵仍在使用这款老枪——之外,部分基干民兵配备的则是带有光学瞄准镜的95式自动步枪,与我军守礁部队相同。另外MV里还展示了一个近年来很少见的画面:民兵在渔船上架设85式12.7mm高射机枪打靶。

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▲除了07作训服之外,三沙民兵也混用其他款式的迷彩服,根据渔民们的描述,“以前遇到外国渔船我们也去赶,他知道你是渔民,赶不跑他们;现在只要看到穿迷彩服的民兵,外国渔船就会立刻掉头逃离

在曾经的国营渔业公司里,海上民兵们的渔船上架设重机枪、无后坐力炮等重火力是司空见惯的事情,三沙民兵的前辈们当年就是驾驶着这样的渔船,在1974年西沙海战中发挥了重要作用。而今共和国海上力量在南海的存在感,和当年早已不可同日而语;近年来当代海上民兵重火力传统的回归与公开亮相,展示的更多是我国在南海维权中越发自信的态度。

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▲从脚架部分来看,三沙民兵的这挺85高机成色不错

实际上,在近期海上民兵的几次实战经历中,枪械起到的主要是威慑作用;凭借着对祖国蓝色疆土的无限忠诚、丰富的海上经验锻炼出的体魄和部队的专业训练,在剽悍勇猛的三沙民兵中,不乏以“野路子VBSS”打法,赤手空拳降服对手的战例。

2015年7月21日,银屿东北方向3海里处发现一艘外籍渔船在进行非法捕捞作业。执法人员和民兵赶到后,这艘渔船仍然无视驱赶,继续作业。根据上级命令,李遴君跳上对方渔船,不顾右臂被鱼叉划伤,徒手擒住对方船长,和其他民兵一起制服了剩余船员。经过这次执法,李遴君“海上鲁智深”的名号不胫而走。“民兵也是兵,也要有兵的胆气和血性。”他说。

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▲已经年过六旬的李遴君,仍然战斗在保卫三沙的第一线

正如李老英雄所说,“民兵也是兵”。除了队列训练、轻武器射击、伤员包扎救护等等这类“军训科目”之外,为了强化民兵在南海作业和执行任务的能力,三沙警备区还组织民兵和渔民开设了船艇驾驶、轮机修理、雷达通信、海洋法律法规等多个海上相关技能培训班,每年培训数百人次。

目前,各民兵哨所普遍配备了指挥系统、AIS系统、雷达系统和光电监视系统,能够对岛礁和海面目标实施全天候监控,并且可以通过视频、电话、对讲机三种方式将情况上报到永兴岛作战值班室。如今从民兵发现渔船到我方强力部门出动执法,反应时间很快,大大提高了维权执法效率。

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▲这组截图反映了海上民兵从侦察上报到登船协助,与海军西沙水警区炮艇部队联合执法,迫使某国渔船用船身撞击我方船头的全过程

这首歌曲用词和结构上并不复杂,利于民兵学唱;而旋律中蕴含着的气势,则又与面朝大海、搏击风浪的渔民们的精神气质契合。如果有机会,我们一定要去三沙看一看,不仅是去欣赏碧海蓝天,更是去看看那些世代耕耘在祖宗海、把英名传扬到祖国大地上的人们,在那里唱响这首战歌!

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▲扎根三沙的一代代人们,用一生践行着“今朝立业南沙,千秋有功国家”

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “The Pentagon’s 2021 China Military Power Report: My Summary,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 5 November 2021.

Despite coming out late in the year, the Pentagon’s 2021 China Military Power Report (CMPR)was worth the wait. Policy-makers, planners, and concerned members of the public should absorb its concerning insights without delay. Demetri Sevastopulo, the Financial Times’s U.S.-China correspondent, was the first out of the gate with one of the very best media writeups. Thomas Shugart, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), belted out an incisive play-by-play on Twitter. Here, I offer a comprehensive distillation—I stayed up all night reading and weighing every word so that you don’t have to!

Since the first edition in 2000, the annual CMPR issued by the Department of Defense (DoD) has offered government-verified data on China’s meteoric military rise simply unfindable or unconfirmable anywhere else. While the 2020 edition was particularly impressive, the new report has a claim to being the best one yet. Today’s top takeaways arguably fall into the categories of triad, timing, and trends. … … …

Other Revelations

Dedicated CMPR sections illuminate authoritatively two new and important forces: the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) and Joint Logistic Support Force’s (JLSF). Periodic updates include the latest People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) patrols; operations in Natuna Sea waters claimed by Indonesia—a concrete confirmation of Ryan Martinson’s pioneering research concerning PAFMM units from Beihai City, Guangxi; and PAFMM harassment of South China Sea neighbors’ oil and gas exploration. … … …

***

The Honorable Carlos Del Toro, 78th Secretary of the Navy, One Navy-Marine Corps Team—Strategic Guidance from the Secretary of the Navy (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy Office of Information, 8 October 2021).

Click here to download a cached copy.

 KEY CHINA-RELATED EXCERPTS:

p. 1

Since my confirmation as the 78th Secretary of the Navy, I have characterized the most pressing challenges facing the Department of the Navy as the “Four Cs”: China, Culture, Climate Change, and COVID. The People’s Republic of China represents the pacing challenge against which we must plan our warfighting strategies and investments. …

Of the four, the long-term challenge posed by the People’s Republic of China is the most significant for the Department. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has radically expanded both its size and capabilities, growing to become the world’s largest fleet.

Complementing its modern surface combatants are hundreds of coast guard and maritime militia vessels that Beijing employs to compete in the “gray zone,” the contested arena between routine statecraft and conflict. For the first time in at least a generation, we have a strategic competitor who possesses naval capabilities that rival our own, and who seeks to aggressively employ its forces to challenge U.S. principles, partnerships, and prosperity.

p. 2

The Department of the Navy will be expected to contribute our unique warfighting potential to compete in the gray zone, deter further aggression, and prepare to prevail in conflict as part of an integrated warfighting approach with our fellow Services. …

As our central governing concept, the top priority for the Department of the Navy will be to develop concepts of operations and capabilities that bolster deterrence and expand our warfighting advantages vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China.

p. 3

  1. Expand Forward Presence

We will prioritize strategic competitive advantage over China and Russia by expanding our global posture to ensure the presence of naval forces with the right mix of platforms, capability, and capacity to maintain freedom of the seas, support international law and norms, stand by our allies and continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. We will continue to promote sustained, persistent mobile operations forward. We will make tough decisions to maximize precious resources, ensuring our future naval supremacy against the full spectrum of potential threats, while seeking additional resources to support our increasing responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region. It will be essential for us to set our naval posture forward to be able to effectively transition from competition to crisis to conflict as needed.

  1. Enhance Warfighting Readiness

The Navy and Marine Corps Team must be ready to compete, fight, and win whenever and wherever needed. To reduce the time our platforms are offline for maintenance and repairs, we will invest in sustainment, critical readiness infrastructure, and the industrial workforce, while adopting the best practices of private industry to increase overall efficiency and reduce preventable mishaps. We will integrate and streamline our combined logistics apparatus and supply chains to ensure constant readiness throughout the Fleet and FMF. We will redirect savings towards transformative modernization wherever possible to enhance future and long term readiness. We will also enhance the readiness of our warriors through targeted investments in advanced training methods, ranges, and facilities on naval installations. Warfighting readiness is critical to deterring the People’s Republic of China.

 p. 5

  1. Leverage Naval Education as a Critical Warfighting Enabler

Our mission demands leaders who possess the highest intellectual and warfighting capabilities in order to confront the many dangers of a complex world. The institutions of our naval education enterprise will work together to develop leaders with the warfighting rigor, intellectual dynamism, and innovative creativity to maintain strategic advantage against competitors and global adversaries. We will create a continuum of learning that develops such leaders to serve at every level through ready, relevant education, attuned to the battle rhythm of active duty service. We will invest in the Naval War College, the Naval Post Graduate School, and the Naval Academy, and build on the creation of the U.S. Naval Community College to expand access for all personnel, ensuring all naval learning institutions provide world-class curricula, research opportunities, and partnerships, tailored and prioritized to meet our most pressing warfighting requirements. … … …

***

The Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) has released the Quick Look summary of its 4–6 May 2021 Conference on “Large-Scale Amphibious Warfare in Chinese Military Strategy.”

***Please kindly note that this Quick Look summary DOES NOT represent the views of any one individual participant, or assessments of the U.S. government.***

This conference seeks to increase our understanding of large-scale PLA amphibious warfare. We focus on the role of major amphibious operations in Chinese strategy to protect Beijing’s so-called “core interests,” namely a Taiwan Strait campaign. After putting the strategy in historical context, we assess PLA operational doctrine for major amphibious operations, recognizing that such operations are certain to be undertaken with close coordination among PLA air, sea, missile, and ground components. This conference evaluates how Chinese large-scale amphibious warfare would fit within a larger hypothetical campaign. The conference concludes with a discussion of the possible significance of major PLA amphibious operations for U.S. naval strategy.

China Maritime Studies Institute, “Large-Scale Amphibious Warfare in Chinese Military Strategy,” Quick Look Conference Summary (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 14 June 2021).

QUICK LOOK REPORT

“LARGE-SCALE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE IN CHINESE MILITARY STRATEGY”

BACKGROUND

From 4–6 May 2021 CMSI held a virtual academic conference on the topic of large-scale PLA amphibious warfare (i.e., a Taiwan invasion scenario). The event was unclassified. The roughly 160 attendees were all U.S. citizens. Participants included experts from government, academia, and U.S.-based think tanks. Panel topics included 1) Historical Cases Informing Chinese Amphibious Warfare, 2) The Joint Amphibious Force, 3) Enablers of Amphibious Warfare, 4) Pre-Assault Conditions, 5) Scenario Factors, and 6) Implications. This summary does notrepresent the views of any one individual participant, or assessments of the U.S. government.

KEY FINDINGS

  • China has a political strategy for unification with Taiwan, with an important but subordinate military component.
  • Xi and the CCP seek to resolve the “Taiwan problem” on terms they could call “reunification.”
    • Beijing continues to prefer long-term progress by non-war means, such as military, economic, and political coercion.
  • China keeps strengthening relevant capabilities.
    • Lacking the geographic and policy constraints facing Washington, Beijing has long emphasized missiles.
    • The PLA is developing both the sensors and shooters (surface-to-air missiles, advanced fighter aircraft, etc.) needed to vie for air superiority over the Taiwan Strait.
    • With probably the world’s most potent at-scale mine delivery capability, China appears to vastly exceed the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan. It has also invested heavily in MCM capabilities.
    • The PLA is developing new technologies (e.g., UAVs) to support a potential invasion force.
  • China retains many weaknesses.
    • Despite sweeping reforms, PLA jointness—essential to success in a Taiwan invasion—suffers persistent limitations, including apparent lack of joint training among special operations communities.
    • Despite dramatic expansion since 2017, the PLAN Marine Corps does not seem to be optimizing itself for a traditional amphibious landing against Taiwan.
      • Operations to protect China’s expanding overseas interests appear to be a major focus of its development.
    • PLA helicopter forces suffer enduring limitations, particularly in overall readiness; and in operational capacity under combat conditions, including air-ground integration.
  • Taiwan’s natural geographic defenses (Strait, weather, tides, currents, mudflats, coastal terrain) offer formidable protection, despite a mounting China-Taiwan military imbalance. 

AREAS OF CONSENSUS

  • Lacking in major modern-era successes of its own (beyond its seizure of Hainan and Yijiangshan Islands, etc.), the PLA has carefully studied foreign experiences with amphibious operations and incorporated relevant lessons.
    • A cross-Strait invasion remains tremendously difficult and risky for the PLA, despite a growing military imbalance across the Strait.
    • China has clearly attempted to emulate and incorporate major “gold standards” of U.S. doctrine, terminology, and forces.
    • China recognizes sea and air control as prerequisites for a successful invasion.
  • China is pursuing comprehensive capabilities through incorporation of all possible forces, including a major emphasis on Maritime Militia and civilian logistics.
  • The PLA is attempting to boost the realism of its amphibious training/exercises.
  • The PLA currently lacks the required amphibious lift, logistics, and materiel for a robust cross-Strait invasion and shows no urgency to achieve it.
    • China is building large amphibious vessels, but these appear to be designed to support overseas operations, not a cross-Strait invasion per se.
    • China has not yet built the large numbers of LSTs and LSMs that would support a conventional invasion of Taiwan.
      • Indeed, its inventory of those more essential, “expendable” vessels is arguably smaller than it was a decade ago.
    • Thus, a major invasion today would require heavy reliance on civilian assets.
  • The PRC is unlikely to achieve a major element of surprise.

AREAS OF DEBATE

  • Whether the PLA might preemptively threaten strikes against—or seizure of—offshore islands (Kinmen, Matsu, Pratas, Penghu Islands) as a means of coercion short of attempting to invade Taiwan’s main island?
  • Extent to which the PRC would have to exploit a limited number of predictable landing points on Taiwan’s main island, where Taiwan could prepare for defense prior to conflict?
  • Whether the PLA seeks to prioritize large-scale beach landings or seizure of Taiwanese ports to facilitate invasion?
    • Citing PLA textbooks, one presenter argued that major ports are the key/priority.
    • Several presenters contended strongly that the PLA will likely be unable to successfully conduct a large-scale cross-Strait invasion until it masters what the U.S. military terms Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).
  • Whether Beijing could effectively use civilian assets to support a cross-Strait invasion?
    • Most participants concluded that current ability is inadequate.
    • One presenter argued strongly that Maritime Militia forces might operate mobilized civilian shipping as a “just-good-enough” logistical backbone.

IMPLICATIONS

  • The PLA has achieved tremendous progress in developing many of the capabilities needed for a cross-Strait invasion. The threat posed to Taiwan is grave.
  • Nevertheless, the inherent challenges and risks remain sufficiently high for Xi and the CCP that Taipei, Washington, and Tokyo can continue to deter—or, in a worst case, frustrate—an invasion.
  • Key PRC sensors are far less numerous than key PRC shooters, and hence a better single-point-failure target for limited U.S. and allied fires.
  • Taiwan must redouble its efforts to build A2/AD “porcupine” capabilities grounded in its natural defenses.
  • U.S. planners must consider the possibility of the PRC improvising in just-good-enough-for-long-enough fashion to attempt to pursue basic political objectives, particularly if events or trendlines “force” Xi’s hand.

***

Andrew Chubb, Chinese Nationalism and the “Gray Zone”: Case Analyses of Public Opinion and PRC Maritime Policy, Naval War College China Maritime Study 16 (May 2021).

This volume examines the role of popular nationalism in China’s maritime conduct. Analysis of nine case studies of assertive but ostensibly nonmilitary actions by which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has advanced its position in the South and East China Seas in recent years reveals little compelling evidence of popular sentiment driving decision-making. While some regard for public opinion demonstrably shapes Beijing’s propaganda strategies on maritime issues, and sometimes its diplomatic practices as well, the imperative for Chinese leaders to satisfy popular nationalism is at most a contributing factor to policy choices they undertake largely on the basis of other considerations of power and interest. Where surges of popular nationalism have been evident, they have tended to follow after the PRC maritime actions in question, suggesting instead that Chinese authorities channeled public opinion to support existing policy.

***

Zachary Haver, “Unmasking China’s Maritime Militia,” Benar News, 17 May 2021.

China has long denied that it uses maritime militia forces to assert its maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea, often describing the Chinese vessels clustered around disputed reefs and islets as just fishing boats.

But the paper trail left by the Chinese bureaucracy tells a different story.

Radio Free Asia analyzed bidding documents, corporate records, and other official data in an effort to shed new light on the maritime militia belonging to Sansha City, a municipality under Hainan province that administers China’s claims in the South China Sea from its headquarters on Woody Island in the Paracels.

RFA found that the state-owned fishing company in charge of Sansha City’s maritime militia fleet has managed projects involving classified national security information, a strong indicator that the company’s ships are engaged in more than just fishing.

In addition to tracking the fleet owned by this company, RFA also uncovered evidence that one of its ships was used to test an experimental command and communications system built with foreign technology, which likely transformed the vessel into a mobile communications and surveillance platform capable of transmitting intelligence back to the authorities on land.

And referencing the corporate records of fishermen legally registered in Sansha City against Chinese state media reporting on the city’s militia, RFA further verified that numerous “fishermen” living in Sansha are actually militiamen responsible for guarding China’s outposts.

China’s maritime militia has been in the news. The presence of numerous maritime militia ships at Whitsun Reef in the Spratly Islands in late March set off a diplomatic tussle between Beijing and Manila and prompted widespread international criticism of China, despite its assertion that these were just fishing vessels sheltering from poor weather.

“Recently, some Chinese fishing vessels take shelter near Niu’e Jiao [Whitsun Reef] due to rough sea conditions,” said a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines. “It has been a normal practice for Chinese fishing vessels to take shelter under such circumstances. There is no Chinese Maritime Militia as alleged,” the spokesperson stated.

But multiple open-source investigations have confirmed the presence of militia vessels near the reef.

Now, RFA is taking a step further to shed light on the true nature of China’s maritime militia, pulling back the curtain on the procurements, fleet, and personnel of this shadowy paramilitary force. … … …

The experimental system on the Qiongsanshayu 00209 even uses foreign satellite technology originating with companies from the United States, South Korea, and Japan, the 2018 environmental impact assessment shows.

The technology includes a KNS-Z12 satellite antenna from KNS Inc., a South Korean company; a POB-KUS100 upconverter from Wavestream, a U.S. company; a NJR2836U low-noise block downconverter from Japan Radio Company, a Japanese company; and a CDD 562AL satellite modem, a CDM 570A/L satellite modem, a CDM 625A satellite modem, and a CRS 170A switch from Comtech EF Data, a U.S. company.

Contracting records show that both Wavestream and Comtech EF Data are U.S. defense contractors, and the website of Comtech EF Data claims that the company has worked on numerous programs for clients like the U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Marines.

That means satellite communications technology from U.S. defense contractors might be supporting the operations of Sansha City’s maritime militia in the South China Sea.

This is not the first time China has obtained foreign technology for use in South China Sea. A recent report by RFA revealed that Sansha City has acquired over $930,000 of foreign hardware, equipment, software, and materials. And in a separate investigation, this reporter found that Sansha’s local maritime law enforcement force is also using satellite communications technology from a U.S. defense contractor.

***

Ryan D. Martinson, “No Ordinary Boats: Cracking the Code on China’s Spratly Maritime Militias,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 17 May 2021.

A Chinese fishing vessel appears in a sensitive location—near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, a South China Sea reef, or just offshore from a U.S. military base. Is it an “ordinary” fishing boat, or is it maritime militia?

This straightforward question seldom yields straightforward answers. China does not publish a roster of maritime militia boats. That would undermine the militia’s key advantages—secrecy and deniability. Nor is it common for Chinese sources to recognize the militia affiliations of individual boats. Analysts can gather clues and make a case that a vessel is likely maritime militia, or not. That process requires painstaking effort, and the results are rarely definitive.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) may have made that process much easier, at least in the most contested parts of the South China Sea—the Spratly Islands. Since 2014, the PRC has built hundreds of large Spratly fishing vessels, collectively called the “Spratly backbone fleet” (南沙骨干船队). As I recently suggested at War on the Rocks, most if not all of these vessels are maritime militia affiliated. This insight can help overcome the perennial challenge of differentiating wayward Chinese fishermen from covert elements of China’s armed forces. … … …

Implications

In this article, I have argued that most if not all Spratly backbone boats are militia boats. They may actually catch fish, but their militia affiliation makes them available for state and military tasking. If this conclusion is correct, it offers useful new ways to identify Chinese maritime militia forces operating in the Spratly waters. While the PRC does not publish lists of active maritime militia boats, it does share information about which boats belong to the Spratly backbone fishing fleet. This can serve as an indicator of militia status.

How might this work in practice? At the time of this writing, a team of four Chinese fishing boats is operating illegally within 200 nautical miles of Vietnam’s coast, i.e., within the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The four vessels are named Qionglinyu60017, 60018, 60019, and 60020, respectively, indicating they are registered to Hainan’s Lingao county (临高县). Vietnamese maritime law enforcement authorities could evict them, but before doing so they might ask, are they maritime militia?

My answer: “very likely.” A quick sifting of open-source materials reveals they are all backbone boats. This information appears in a March 2020 open letter posted on the website “Message Board for Leaders” (领导留言板). In it, the boat owners entreat PRC officials to restore fuel subsidies and other rewards for operating in “specially-designated waters” in 2018. Likely amounting to hundreds of thousands of RMB, the subsidies were withheld as punishment for operating in the Spratlys without the required licenses. To elicit special consideration, they emphasized that their four vessels were Spratly backbone boats. (Their ploy ultimately failed, as the Lingao County Bureau of Agriculture responded to their letter with a firm but polite refusal to change their decision.)

Southeast Asian countries can and should compile lists of known Spratly backbone boats. They can start with local newspapers, which are a great source for such information. In December 2016, for example, Zhanjiang Daily published an article about the launching of the city’s first Spratly backbone trawlers: the 48-meter (577 ton) Yuemayu 60222 and 60333. Registered to the city’s Mazhang District, the craft are owned by Zhanjiang Xixiang Fisheries (湛江喜翔渔业有限公司). With these clues in hand, one can then try to learn the identities of the company’s two other Spratly backbone boats, then still under construction.

The websites of Chinese shipbuilding companies are another useful source of information. Those with contracts to build backbone boats often issue news releases when these vessels are launched or delivered. In October 2017, for instance, the Fujian-based Lixin Ship Engineering Company launched five very large Spratly backbone trawlers built for a Guangdong fishing company, Maoming City Desheng Fisheries Limited. The five boats were delivered two months later. They included Yuedianyu 42881, 42882, 42883, 42885, and 42886. The boats were 63.6 meters in length and had the large (1244kW) engines typical of the backbone fleet. Of note, Desheng Fisheries is the same company that owns Yuemaobinyu 42881, 42882, 42883, 42885, and 42886, all spotted moored at Whitsun Reef in March. Indeed, they may be the very same boats (their names having been slightly altered in the years since they were built).

Provincial and municipal governments may be the most valuable sources of all. In November 2020, the Guangdong Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Affairs released information about the province’s Spratly (“NS,” for nansha) fishing license quota for 2021. The document indicated that 255 Guangdong boats would receive Spratly fishing licenses this year, among which 185 would go to backbone boats and 70 would go to “ordinary boats” (普通渔船). The Bureau attached an Excel spreadsheet listing the chosen vessels. The document omitted Table 1, containing the list of backbone boats. But it did include Table 2, listing the 70 “ordinary” fishing boats. Since only two types of Guangdong boats operate in the Spratlys—i.e., ordinary and backbone—any Guangdong boat there and not found in Table 2 must be a backbone bone, and therefore presumed militia.

These data help shed light on recent events. In March and April 2021, the Philippine Coast Guard released photos of Chinese fishing boats loitering at Whitsun Reef. Thanks to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), we know the identities of 23 of them.

Both AMTI and the Philippines Coast Guard classified them as “militia.” They are right. All are from Guangdong. All are absent from Table 2. And that makes them no “ordinary” boats.

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “PRC Gray Zone Operations in the South China Sea,” Maritime Power Seminar for Changing Character of War Centre (CCW), University of Oxford, based at Pembroke College and the Department of Politics and International Relations, 12 May 2021.

PRC GRAY ZONE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA BY ANDREW ERICKSON

PRC Gray Zone Operations in the South China Sea

Professor Andrew Erickson, US Naval War College

A component of the People’s Armed Forces (PAF), China’s Maritime Militia is a state-organized, -developed, and -controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct state-sponsored activities. Third among China’s sea forces after the Navy and Coast Guard, the PAF Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is locally supported, but answers to the very top of China’s military bureaucracy: Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping himself. China employs the PAFMM in gray zone operations, or “low-intensity maritime rights protection struggles,” at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved. China has used it to advance its disputed sovereignty claims in international sea incidents, particularly in the South China Sea. Publicly-documented examples include China’s 1974 seizure of the Western Paracel Islands from Vietnam;  involvement in the occupation and development of Mischief Reef resulting in a 1995 incident with the Philippines; harassment of various Vietnamese government/survey vessels, including the Bin Minh and Viking; harassment of USNS Impeccable (2009); participation in the 2012 seizure of Scarborough Reef from the Philippines and 2014 blockade of Second Thomas Shoal2014 repulsion of Vietnamese vessels from disputed waters surrounding CNOOC’s HYSY-981 oil rig; layered “cabbage-style” envelopment of the Philippines-claimed Sandy Cay shoal near Thitu Island; and most recently in ongoing operations in Union Banks, including Whitsun Reef. This Maritime Power Seminar will explain the nature and significance of China’s third sea force before suggesting broader implications and offering policy recommendations.

Recommended Reading, Downloadable PDFs:

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is a Professor of Strategy in the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). A core founding member, he helped establish CMSI and stand it up officially in 2006, and has played an integral role in its development. CMSI inspired the creation of other research centers, which he has advised and supported; he is a China Aerospace Studies Institute Associate. Erickson is currently a Visiting Scholar in full-time residence at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, where he has been an Associate in Research since 2008. He runs the research website <www.andrewerickson.com>.

Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/defenceimages/

***

Lieutenant General Berrier, DIA Director: Written Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, “Hearing: Worldwide Threats,” 29 April 2021.

CHINA

p. 10

Territorial Issues and Coercive Actions … …

In the South China Sea, China employed coercive approaches—such as using law enforcement vessels and maritime militias to enforce claims and advance interests—to deal with disputes in ways calculated to remain below the threshold of provoking armed conflict. In April, Beijing named 80 geographic features and announced two new administrative subdistricts covering disputed territory and maritime areas in the South China Sea. China also conducted a coercive survey operation, using a government

p. 11

research vessel and multiple Chinese Coast Guard vessels, to follow a Malaysian hydrocarbon exploration vessel within Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone. In August 2020, China test-fired multiple ballistic missiles that landed near Hainan and the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Further, China’s Spratly Islands outposts are equipped with advanced antiship and antiaircraft missile systems and jamming equipment, comprising the most capable land-based weapons systems deployed by any claimant in the South China Sea.

In the East China Sea, China named 50 geographic features and continued using maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Senkaku Islands and challenge Japan’s territorial claim to and administration of the islands.

Relations between China and Australia deteriorated in late 2020 with China restricting trade and engaging in high-profile diplomatic rows with Australia—including arbitrary detentions of Australian citizens—for supporting what China viewed as U.S.-led anti-Chinese measures. Effective 1 February 2021, China passed a law authorizing its coast guard ships to detain or forcibly evict foreign vessels in China’s claimed jurisdictional waters, impacting both the East China Sea and the South China Sea.

***

Ryan D. Martinson, “Xi Likes Big Boats (Coming Soon to a Reef Near You),” War on the Rocks, 28 April 2021.

When General Secretary Xi Jinping visited Tanmen village in April 2013, he famously urged China’s South China Sea fishers to “build big boats, charge forth on the deep sea, and catch big fish.” As recent scenes from Whitsun Reef reveal, however, very little “charging” is taking place, which means very few “big fish.” But, in one respect, Chinese fishers have clearly obeyed Xi’s command: They have built some very large boats.

Photos the Philippine government released in March show nests of Chinese fishing vessels moored in the lagoon of the disputed reef. Aside from the sheer number of craft present, one is struck by the size of individual vessels. Satellite images reveal many boats 60 meters (almost 200 feet) in length — dwarfing the Philippine Coast Guard vessel (BRP Cabra) sent to monitor their activities.

Chinese fishers did not buy these boats out of mere love for Xi. Even if that were their motive, they could not afford these expensive craft without some help. Rather, the more than 200 fishing vessels seen congregating at Whitsun Reef are largely a product of policies that China has designed to prioritize Spratly fishing vessels in a national program to modernize the country’s fishing industry. This program has provided China’s maritime militia with potent new tools with which to exert influence and control in disputed maritime space — posing significant new challenges for Southeast Asian states. … … …

Connections to the Maritime Militia

Despite being a component of China’s armed forces, the maritime militia lacks a national organization with its own leadership and budget. Most members have “day jobs” in marine industries, especially fishing. Thus, they are directly affected by policies regulating their respective industries. For instance, militiamen operating in the Spratlys receive Spratly fuel subsidies. They have also directly benefited from the Spratly fleet upgrade program discussed above.

Existing militia units have received new Spratly boats. From 2014 to 2015, for example, residents of Tanmen Village (Hainan) took advantage of the subsidy program to build over 50 steel-hulled vessels, each displacing 300 to 500 tons. Wang Shumao, second in command of Tanmen’s maritime militia company, was among the lucky recipients. The ordinarily serious Wang declared to a Chinese reporter, “Piloting my new steel-hulled fishing vessel feels awesome!” In a July 2016 essay, the Central Military Commission chief responsible for militia affairs, Wang Wenqing, highlighted the importance of additional policies to “bring maritime militia fishing vessels into local fishing vessel upgrade plans.”

In some locales, joining the militia is apparently a precondition for receiving the subsidies. For example, the fishing vessel upgrade plan for Hainan’s Yangpu Economic Development Zone clearly states that vessels receiving subsidies will enter the militia. This means that, when conducting sovereignty operations and other “national defense tasks” in the South China Sea, they “must submit to the [military’s] unified command and control.” Similar policies in Guangdong may also explain the militia affiliation of the nine large trawlers owned by Taishan’s Fancheng Fisheries Development, seven of which were recently observed operating at Union Banks.

Other sources treat the subsidized vessels as constituting an organizational whole subject to state control. A 2017 report reveals that, in the case of Guangdong, the development, training, and operations of the Spratly backbone fleet represent a joint effort by the provincial Fisheries Bureau and the Guangdong provincial military district. At the very least, this suggests a heavy militia element within the fleet, but it could also mean that every boat in the fleet is subject to military tasking.

Implications

Members of China’s maritime militia have operated in the Spratlys for over three decades. Today, they go there embedded in a brand new fleet comprising hundreds of large steel-hulled vessels — the product of a national program to modernize China’s marine fishing industry. The successful rollout of this program has enhanced the militia’s ability to perform all facets of its mission set.

In the Spratlys, the militia’s most important mission is to maintain presence in disputed space. Presence is the currency of control in the maritime domain, as the ocean cannot be occupied like land territory. Presence also allows maritime militia vessels to collect intelligence, thereby boosting the People Liberation Army’s awareness of foreign activities in these waters. The new vessels offer important advantages in this respect, as their size enables them to carry more fuel and provisions — giving them much greater endurance.

China’s maritime militia also sometimes perform more coercive operations. For instance, they provide security for Chinese civilian vessels as they operate in disputed space. The classic example of these “escort” operations involved the 2014 defense of the HYSY-981 drilling rig in waters south of the Paracel Islands. But more recently, in July 2019, members of the Sansha maritime militia — operating elements of their new fleet of 60-meter fishing vessels — flanked the Haiyangdizhi 8 as it conducted seismic surveys in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone. Larger vessels are better able to physically block other states’ forces from approaching the vulnerable craft under their protection. The militia is also known to harass foreign vessels operating in Chinese claimed space. They do this by threatening to ram or bump their victims, forcing them to cease operations or risk collision. Clearly, the coercive capacity of a 600-ton steel vessel is much greater than that of a 80-ton wooden one.

How might Southeast Asian states respond? Because of their comparative weakness, they cannot simply build more and bigger coast guard vessels and send them out to meet steel with steel. In fact, Beijing would probably relish another major confrontation near a disputed land feature. It would give it a pretext to escalate and potentially seize a new piece of territory.

These large modern fishing vessels in the hands of China’s maritime militia pose special challenges for Southeast Asian states. They make it much more difficult for countries like the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam to protect their exclusive rights to living and non-living resources out to 200 nautical miles from their coasts. Indeed, many boats in the new Spratly fishing fleet are larger than the regional coast guard cutters that would seek to board them. As a result, they should either accept the illegal presence of Chinese fishers within their exclusive economic zones, or use armed force to evict them — which could encourage Beijing to respond in kind. On the flip side, a better equipped maritime militia is also more capable of coercively imposing Chinas own prerogatives in disputed areas, by threatening the physical safety of foreign mariners with collision or worse. In sum, the new fleet enriches the “tool kit” used by China to assert control over vast areas of the South China Sea on the basis of its notorious — and utterly discredited — “nine-dash line.”

Instead, the best option for other Southeast Asian states may be to do as the Philippines government has done — to publicly document the activities of China’s new Spratly fishing fleet. This puts China on the defensive — forcing them to issue weak, unconvincing denials — and limits its ability to portray itself as the victim if and when an incident occurs. Ultimately, this approach could undermine Beijing’s favorite defense for new assertive behavior in the South China Sea (i.e., “they started it”). If Xi likes big boats, other Southeast Asian nations can at least create conditions in which he cannot lie.

***

Caught on Camera: Two Dozen Militia Boats at Whitsun Reef Identified,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 21 April 2021.

Last month, the National Task Force on the West Philippine Sea, an interagency body housed within the Presidential Office in Manila, reported that more than 200 Chinese militia vessels were anchored at Whitsun Reef. The task force released photos of some of those vessels, collected during a patrol by the Philippine Coast Guard on March 7. Additional images and video were released after two subsequent patrols by the Philippine Coast Guard ship Cabra. As with other known militia deployments, the behavior of these vessels defies commercial explanation. Most have remained in the area for weeks or even months, riding at anchor in clusters without engaging in any fishing activity. Many are trawlers which, by definition, must move to fish. And blue skies have debunked the initial excuse from the Chinese Embassy in Manila that they were riding out a storm.

AMTI has identified 14 of the ships in these photos and videos. To these can be added the vessels of the Yuetaiyu fleet, numbered 18000-18999. Those nine ships have broadcast AIS from Whitsun several times, as previously reported by Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson. Their involvement in the militia has been well-documented and AMTI first tracked them patrolling Union Banks, which includes Whitsun Reef, in early 2019.

A photo taken during the initial Philippine patrol on March 7 shows six Chinese vessels tied together at Whitsun Reef. Only the bow numbers and the first two characters, Yue (粤) and Mao (茂), of five of the ships can be clearly seen. By cross referencing this information with vessel profiles in the commercial AIS database Marine Traffic, AMTI can identify them as the Yuemaobinyu (粤茂滨渔) 42881, 42882, 42883, 42885, and 42886.

These names will sound familiar in the Philippines. In early 2019, the Yuemaobinyu 42212—so named because it operates from the same port as these five—rammed and sank the Philippine fishing vessel F/B Gem-Ver 1 at Reed Bank. AMTI afterward discovered that the vessel had a history of government contracts and suspicious AIS activity, but could not conclusively prove that it was part of the militia.

Video shot during the Cabra’s first patrol on March 26-27 provides a clear shot of another vessel, the Yueyangxiyu (粤阳西渔) 96523:

Also visible is a vessel with the bow number 08041—almost certainly the Yuezhanyu (粤湛渔) 08041. That conclusion is supported by both AIS data from Marine Traffic and the later identification of its sister ships, the Yuezhanyu 08039, 08042, and 08043 in a video shot during the Cabra’s recent return visit on April 12-13.

This second video also captured the Yuexinhuiyu (粤新会渔) 60138 and 60139, which Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson recently profiled in Foreign Policy. … … …

***

Ryan D. Martinson and Andrew S. Erickson,Manila’s Images Are Revealing the Secrets of China’s Maritime Militia,” Foreign Policy, 19 April 2021.

Details of the ships haunting disputed rocks show China’s plans.

Six Chinese fishing vessels believed to be part of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia, including the Yuexinhuiyu 60138 and 60139, are moored together at Whitsun Reef on March 27. PHOTO PROVIDED BY PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

The Philippines is regaining the initiative in the South China Sea. In an apparent policy shift, it has begun sharing unprecedented amounts of information about Chinese actions in the Spratly Islands, the archipelago of disputed rocks and reefs off the western coast of the Philippines. While Manila’s precise motives are unclear, its newfound transparency is creating fascinating new opportunities for understanding Beijing’s maritime strategy. This is especially true when it comes to China’s fleet of Spratly fishing vessels, some portion of which operates under the command of the Chinese military—units of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Conceivably numbering thousands of vessels and with tens of thousands of personnel, this subcomponent of China’s armed forces is trained and equipped to support the People’s Liberation Army in advancing sovereignty claims to disputed features and sea areas.

Last week, the Philippine Coast Guard released images of Chinese fishing vessels moored at the Spratlys’ Whitsun Reef, taken by the crew of the BRP Cabra, a Coast Guard ship that approached close to the Chinese vessels. Gone are the hundreds of boats seen in March. What remains is a small number of Chinese fishing vessels, six of which are tied together in the lagoon.

One key point: The new photos and an accompanying video show that the vessels seen last week were the same six boats observed by the Cabra on its last patrol over two weeks ago. Real fishing vessels cannot afford to linger for weeks in a single spot like this, especially when the weather is perfect for fishing elsewhere. As the captains of these boats are plainly indifferent to the economic costs of inactivity, their protracted presence at Whitsun can only mean one thing: They are tasked with being there. Yes, China does sometimes pay ordinary fishers to linger in disputed space, but given the intense spotlight on Whitsun Reef it seems far more likely it has turned to the professionals. They are undoubtedly members of the PAFMM. … … …

***

Brad Lendon, “Beijing Has a Navy it Doesn’t Even Admit Exists, Experts Say. And it’s Swarming Parts of the South China Sea,” CNN, 12 April 2021.

… … … Despite Chinese government denials, there is little ambiguity in Western circles about what the Pentagon calls the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). …

Some experts have taken to referring to the militia as “Little Blue Men,” a reference to the color of their boats’ hulls and to Russia’s “Little Green Men,” soldiers in unmarked green uniforms who infiltrated Crimea before Moscow annexed it from Ukraine in 2014. …

“The Militia is a key component of China’s Armed Forces and a part of what it calls the ‘People’s Armed Forces System,’” Conor Kennedy and Andrew Erickson, two leading American experts on the subject, wrote for the US Naval War College in 2017.

It is “a state-organized, -developed, and -controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct Chinese state-sponsored activities,” they added.

The alleged militia is integrated with China’s fishing fleet, the world’s largest with more than 187,000 boats, Erickson told CNN, but the actual number of armed boats remains unclear to Western experts.

Whatever their ranks, experts say they can lead large flotillas of actual fishing boats in actions to further Chinese government policies and territorial claims — including those in the South China Sea.

“China is typically secretive about its Third Sea Force (behind the PLA Navy and coast guard), which might conceivably number in the thousands of vessels and in the tens of thousands of personnel. Possibly more,” Erickson told CNN.

2020 US Defense Department report on the Chinese military mentions only 84 actual maritime militia boats, all assigned to a unit operating out of Sansha City on Hainan island, in the northern reaches of the South China Sea. The unit, established in 2016, gets frequent subsidies to operate in the Spratly Islands, the report said.

“This particular PAFMM unit is also China’s most professional. Its forces are paid salaries independent of any clear commercial fishing responsibilities and recruited from recently separated veterans,” it said.

But Erickson told CNN the boats seen around Whitsun Reef in recent weeks looked different from those in the Hainan unit, suggesting full-time militia boats are greater in number than previously thought.

Erickson and colleague Ryan Martinson, writing in the journal Foreign Policy late last month, said tracking of some of the Chinese boats at Whitsun using open-source intelligence shows they came from Taishan in China’s southern Guangdong province.

At least seven “enormous” trawlers that were in the Whitsun lagoon could be part of “the most advanced PAFMM unit yet developed and deployed,” Erickson and Martinson wrote.

Using automatic identification system data, they said the boats at Whitsun had patrolled the Union Banks, where Whitsun Reef is, as well as other Spratly Islands features like the Subi and Mischief reefs, both of which have been built up and militarized by the Chinese armed forces.

“There is no evidence of fishing whatsoever during these laser-focused operations, but every indication of trolling for territorial claims,” the pair wrote.

Data that Erickson and Martinson compiled from MarineTraffic.com shows just how frequently the unit has been in the Spratly Islands chain over the past year. …

What is the purpose of a maritime militia?

The concept of a maritime militia, or an irregular naval force, allows China to make territorial claims in huge numbers without ever involving the People’s Liberation Army proper, Western experts say.

Even if lead boats like those mentioned by Erickson and Martinson are relatively small in number, they can spearhead flotillas in the hundreds — as seen in Whitsun Reef.

“These classic ‘gray zone’ operations are designed to ‘win without fighting’ by overwhelming the adversary with swarms of fishing vessels,” Derek Grossman, a RAND Corp defense analyst, wrote last year.

Jay Batongbacal, director of the Institute for Maritime Affairs at the University of the Philippines, summed up what Beijing has done in recent weeks at Whitsun Reef and recent years across the South China Sea — 1.3 million square miles of water, almost all of which Beijing claims as Chinese territory.

“They are now essentially occupying Whitsun Reef by the mere presence of their vessels,” Batongbacal said in an interview with National Public Radio.

“That’s actually the objective of the Chinese strategy, to establish de facto control and dominance over the entire South China Sea through these incremental moves.” … … …

***

Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World (Office of the Director of National Intelligence: National Intelligence Council, March 2021).

p. 104 [Situating Maritime Militia in Spectrum of Conflict]

***

Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, “Records Expose China’s Maritime Militia at Whitsun Reef,” Foreign Policy, 29 March 2021.

Beijing Claims They Are Fishing Vessels. The Data Shows Otherwise.

Accompanying slide deck: Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, “Exposed! Here are China’s Maritime Militia Ships at Whitsun Reef,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 29 March 2021.

Even as dozens of Chinese “fishing vessels” strongly resembling the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) have been anchoring at the disputed Whitsun Reef—without doing any fishing—within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea, Chinese officials have responded to formal Philippine and U.S. concerns about maritime militia activities with denial and obfuscation. When pressed on March 22, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying deflected: “Chinese fishing boats have been fishing in the waters near the reef all along. Recently, due to maritime situation, some fishing boats have been taking shelter from the wind near [Whitsun Reef], which is quite normal.” Her Chinese Embassy Manila counterpart issued a direct denial: “There is no Chinese maritime militia as alleged.”

These statements are provably untrue. At the very least, seven PAFMM vessels have been operating at the Spratly Islands’ Union Banks, including Whitsun Reef—both during the past month and multiple times over the past year.

Both in February and March this year, identified PAFMM vessels transmitting automatic identification system (AIS) signals were present in Whitsun’s lagoon. Openly available sources confirm our exposé from multiple angles. The only “paywalls” they lie behind are Chinese characters and vessel-tracking websites. [Click here to view an accompanying PDF with images and links.]

Among the massed “fishing vessels” at Union Banks are at least seven enormous trawlers owned by an obscure fishing company: Taishan Fancheng Fisheries Development. Established in October 2016, it is based in Taishan (population around 1 million), itself administered by Jiangmen, a city of 1.7 million in Guangdong Province. PAFMM units typically reflect their locality’s socioeconomic characteristics. It follows that this organization, based on populous, prosperous coastline, would support a leading unit—perhaps, in some respects, the most advanced PAFMM unit yet developed and deployed.

The seven trawlers currently at Union Banks were built by Guangxin Shipbuilding and Heavy Industry. On March 15, 2017, Fancheng Fisheries and Guangxin Shipbuilding signed a contract for nine 62.8-meter-long “backbone Spratly fishing vessels,” Guangdong’s thirteenth batch of such vessels approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. Guangxin had no experience building fishing vessels but completed the task in just nine months, with sea trials in October 2017 and delivery by December.

Nominally in charge of Fancheng Fisheries, General Manager Huang Jiang is far from the only key player. At the nine trawlers’ delivery ceremony on Dec. 5, 2017, the guests of honor included two Chinese military officers: Wan Liang’an, deputy commander of the Jiangmen military subdistrict, and Zhang Yuanfa, director of the War Readiness Construction Bureau, Jiangmen military subdistrict. The presence of Wan and Zhang indicates the Fancheng Nine were no ordinary fishing vessels but rather the newest additions to the Taishan PAFMM—subject to a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) chain of command.

Distinctively-numbered Yuetaiyu 18000, 18111, 18222, 18333, 18555, 18666, 18777, 18888, and 18999, the Fancheng Nine operate out of Shadi Bay on Shangchuan Island’s southern end. With this base of operations, 105 miles southwest of Hong Kong, they apparently constitute the core of a “Far Seas Militia Squadron.” Plans to establish a Far Seas Militia Squadron were discussed at a Taishan “Armed Forces Work Meeting” in March 2016—the same year Fancheng Fisheries was set up. In PAFMM terminology, “Far Seas” often designates remote waters within the first island chain, including the southern reaches of the South China Sea. … … …

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Secretive Maritime Militia May Be Gathering at Whitsun Reef,” Foreign Policy, 22 March 2021.

Boats designed to overwhelm civilian foes can be turned into shields in real conflict.

An obscure boomerang-shaped feature in the South China Sea may host the next phase of PRC maritime coercion. Since at least March 7, 2021, many dozens of large, blue-hulled PRC ships have been lashed together in Whitsun Reef’s lagoon. They have not been seen to do any fishing, but run powerful lights at night. Citing the presence of 220 China Maritime Militia (CMM) vessels, on March 21 Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana publicly demanded their departure from his nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Manila supplemented his statement with a diplomatic protest from Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr.

But Beijing remains defiant. Spokespeople from the PRC’s foreign ministry (Hua Chunying) and embassy in Manila have denied that the vessels belong to China’s militia, defended their presence as sheltering from (unobservable) inclement weather, and deflected by making the usual PRC claim that others should not inflame the situation with irresponsible accusations. But on the morning of March 22, Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief Lt. Gen. Sobejana reports, the Philippine Air Force observed “183 CMM vessels” still present.

When it comes to South China Sea features, few things are simple. While Whitsun Reef remains undeveloped and uninhabited for now, it is claimed by the Philippines as Julian Felipe Reef, by Vietnam as Da Ba Dau, and by China as 牛轭礁 Niu’e Jiao (“Oxbow Reef”). As the easternmost feature in the Spratlys’ multi-nationally occupied Union Banks, it is strategically situated astride busy sea lanes—an ideal base for monitoring and operational dispatch. Previously a low-tide elevation, Whitsun apparently now has “a 100-meter long sand dune that has reportedly grown in area and height.” Since at least the 1990s, China and Vietnam have been playing a cat-and-mouse game of sovereignty maneuvers around Whitsun, with China attempting to stake a claim with markers such as buoys, and Vietnamese forces operating from nearby features such as nearby Sin Cowe Island and removing them.

In recent years, whenever Beijing has chosen to focus on a feature or factor, it has increased efforts to a scale and intensity that its rivals cannot directly match. Case in point: All South China Sea states occupying features enhanced them to some extent, but starting around 2014 Beijing began industrial-scale “island building” and fortification that left its rivals in the coral dust. Thus whatever exactly is happening at Whitsun Reef at the moment, it’s a good time to look at China’s well-tested approach to eroding neighbors’ sovereignty and international rules and norms in the South China Sea—and what can be done to counter it. … … …

***

Aie Balagtas See and Zoe Haver, “Manila Protests Presence of Hundreds of Chinese Ships in Contested Waters,” Radio Free Asia, 22 March 2021.

… … … According to Philippine National Security Adviser Hermogenes Esperon Jr., the 220 Chinese ships were seen moored at the “large boomerang shaped shallow coral reef” [Whitsun Reef] on March 7 – and they were not fishing.

“Despite clear weather at the time, the Chinese vessels massed at the reef showed no actual fishing activities and had their full white lights turned on during night time,” Esperon said on Saturday.

Photographs of the 220 ships indicated they were [most likely] maritime militia vessels, which were not involved in fishing activities, said Andrew Erickson, a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute.

“The photos from the Philippine Coast Guard and statement from Defense Secretary Lorenzana match verified information on China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),” he told BenarNews, an RFA-affiliated online news service.

“The ships photographed look and act very much like the 84 large steel-hulled vessels purpose-built at multiple shipyards by 2016 for the leading Sansha City Maritime Militia, as documented by both the U.S. Department of Defense and Office of Naval Intelligence.”

Automatic identification system-data for the past few years had shown Sansha ships engaged in rotational forward deployments to China-claimed features and outposts throughout the South China Sea, he said.

“Crewed by well-salaried full-time personnel recruited in part from former PLA ranks, they appear not to bother fishing – the better to focus on trolling for territory,” Erickson said, referring to China’s People’s Liberation Army.

“Such vessels reportedly have weapons lockers, and official PRC [People’s Republic of China] photos depict exercises in which they are loaded with ‘light arms.’”

The presence of these vessels conforms to Beijing’s established South China Sea modus operandi, Erickson added.

“Two implications arise immediately: First, if not properly countered at Whitsun Reef, or elsewhere, PAFMM vessels could support further territorial seizure akin to what China achieved at Scarborough Shoal in 2012,” he said.

In 2012, the Chinese seized Scarborough Shoal, a traditional fishing ground within the 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines, after a two-month standoff with the Philippine Navy.

“Second, if these [approximately] 220 vessels indeed belong to leading professionalized, militarized PAFMM units, they alone should significantly increase the U.S. government’s sole public estimate of total PAFMM ship numbers – which may be excessively conservative at [approximately] 84 vessels total, a number projected to remain fixed through 2030.” … … …

***

Professor Williams is a senior research scholar, lecturer, and executive director of the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. He is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

… …

Maritime Crisis Management and China’s “White Hulls” and “Blue Hulls” 

Amid an increase in the frequency and intensity of Chinese and American military operationsin maritime East Asia, an array of commentators have argued that there is an urgent need for the United States and China to work together to improve bilateral crisis avoidance and communication mechanisms. Nowhere is this need more evident than in the contested waters of the South China Sea and East China Sea. The recent history of U.S.-China military dialoguesoffers little cause for optimism about the potential for a near-term breakthrough.

Nonetheless, the Biden administration has an early opportunity to test the sincerity of China’s professed desire to prevent and manage the risks of conflict. As an initial good-faith step, Washington and Beijing should work to supplement existing maritime safety protocols to include non-naval vessels such as coast guards and maritime militias.

Recent legal developments related to the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) have brought this issue to a head. On Jan. 21, Beijing passed a law that authorizes the Chinese Coast Guard to use “all necessary measures” to prevent foreign organizations and individuals from violating, or posing an “imminent danger” of violating, China’s “sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdictional rights.” This is the first time China has spelled out in law the conditions under which its coast guard can fire weapons on foreign vessels. The new law permits the coast guard to use force under prescribed circumstances to defend China’s “jurisdictional waters” (管辖海域)—a deliberatelyambiguous term that likely encompasses China’s ill-defined claimsover nearly 80 percent of the waters in the South China Sea. …

The Coast Guard Law also implicitly concedes what American officials have long argued: Maritime accidents and encounters involving the threat or use of force are at least as likely to arise from the operation of China’s coast guard as from its naval vessels. And it’s not just the Coast Guard and the Navy. China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) raises similar concerns given its function as an armed reserve force that assists the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the CCG in enforcing China’s sovereignty claims. As China doubles down on these enforcement activities, all signs point to a growing role for so-called “white hull” coast guards and “blue hull” maritime militias in addition to “gray hull” naval vessels. … …

CUES and the maritime safety MOU do not expressly apply to coast guard vessels or to China’s armed fishing militia. As Andrew Erickson has explained, China uses these non-naval vessels for “gray zone operations against vessels from its maritime neighbors, as well as the U.S., at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved.” These types of vessels are deployed to assert and defend China’s expansive maritime claims “more regularly and extensively than its navy.” Erickson and Connor Kennedy have shown that the PAFMM, which includes both fishing vessels and purpose-built vessels designed to look like fishing vessels, is organized and commanded by the PLA’s local military commands. Given the high percentage of incidents involving these forces, the absence of a CUES-like arrangement for non-naval vessels is a glaring weakness in the regional maritime safety regime. … …

This is not to suggest that CUES has been a silver bullet for safe interactions between U.S. and Chinese naval vessels. Nor could a supplemental protocol that applies to “white hulls” and “blue hulls” resolve the deeper maritime security tensions between China and the United States or other countries. But a CUES-type document for non-naval vessels could serve as a useful building block, especially if accompanied by a commitment that representatives of coast guards and maritime militia forces will actively participate in bilateral risk reduction and crisis communication talks going forward. The United States could demonstrate reciprocal good faith by subjecting its own coast guard to these safety rules and encouraging U.S. allies and partners in the region to do the same. … …

Managing Competition, Not Solving It

To be clear, this simple update to existing rules should not be viewed as a Chinese concession to be anxiously bargained over. Numerous Chinese experts have argued that strengthening risk reduction mechanisms and communication channels is critically important for China’s own interests. For dialogues on these mechanisms to be effective, they should focus on operational safety and avoid getting bogged down in grievances over differing legal and policy positions.

In an echo of the Chinese government’s erstwhile bid for a “new type of great power relationship” between China and the United States, Chinese defense officials have sought to cast the dawn of the Biden administration as a “new historical starting point” for Sino-U.S. military relations. Washington will be rightly skeptical of such rhetoric, which rings hollow to U.S. officials familiar with Beijing’s past efforts to “change the soup but not the medicine.” Moving forward, the focus in talks between the two countries must shift to achieving concrete outcomes that diminish the potential for miscalculation. A Sino-U.S. commitment to applying clear mutual safety procedures to all sea forces would be a small step toward building the confidence needed to address larger challenges such as the deployment of new capabilities in military robotics and artificial-intelligence-enabled vessels and weapons systems.

The goals of bilateral maritime risk reduction should not be held hostage to broader U.S.-China disagreements. Like their naval counterparts, coast guards and maritime militias should be subject to clear procedures for safe encounters at sea. Reaching this understanding would be a small but meaningful step toward proving that Beijing and Washington can achieve a manageable equilibrium of “competition without catastrophe.”

***

Ryan Martinson, “Catching Sovereignty Fish: Chinese Fishers in the Southern Spratlys,” Marine PolicyVolume 125 (March 2021): 1–11.

Highlights

  • Each year, close to 200 Chinese fishing vessels operate in disputed space in the southern Spratlys.
  • Chinese government policies play a decisive role in enabling them to operate there safely and profitably.
  • Chinese policymakers see fishing vessels as instruments with which to uphold China’s maritime claims.
  • China provides generous financial incentives (including fuel and other subsidies) to Chinese fishers and invests heavily in maritime law enforcement forces to ensure their security.
  • Guangxi-based maritime militiamen likely operate in the southern Spratlys, but there is little documentary evidence directly connecting them with particular incidents in these waters.

In recent years, Chinese fishers have been involved in a number of incidents in disputed areas of the East and South China Seas. Their presence in contested space is due to a combination of factors, including the individual initiative of private fishing boat owners and state policies that seek to leverage Chinese fishers to achieve political aims. These factors differ depending on the area in question. This article examines the case of Chinese fishing in the southernmost sections of China’s claims in the South China Sea, in waters that fall within the exclusive economic zones of Indonesia and Malaysia. It argues that while most Chinese fishing in these waters is driven by private fishing boat owners pursuing economic gain, the Chinese government has played a decisive role in enabling and supporting their activities. This article also offers evidence that some PRC fishers operate there at the direction of the Chinese military, in their capacity as members of China’s “maritime militia.”

Keywords: South China Sea, Fisheries disputes, Spratly Islands, Chinese marine policy

Introduction

Chinese fishing in disputed waters in the East and South China Seas is a product of individual initiative and state policy. China’s coastal waters are overfished, so Chinese fishers have economic incentives to operate in areas with greater chance for profit. This includes disputed space. For its part, the central government sees value in their presence there. Aside from contributing to the marine economy, Chinese fishing in disputed space upholds China’s claims to sovereignty and jurisdiction in these areas. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) therefore crafts policies to support—and in some cases, direct—the activities of Chinese fishers operating in contested space [1].

Which of these factors—individual initiative or government policy—is the more important driver? It depends on the area in question. This article examines the circumstances of Chinese fishing activities in one particular area, the “southern Spratlys,” defined as Chinese-claimed waters in the South China Sea south of 6 degrees latitude [2].1 It argues that the Chinese government has played a decisive role in enabling and supporting Chinese fishing in these waters. Moreover, this article also offers evidence that some PRC fishers operate there at the direction of the Chinese military, serving as members of China’s maritime militia.

The southern Spratlys merit close examination for two key reasons. First, in recent years these waters have seen a number of fishing incidents involving China and Southeast Asian states, especially Indonesia. There exists an urgent, practical need to better understand the circumstances—policy and otherwise—behind Chinese actions in this area. Second, better understanding of Chinese policies in the southern Spratlys can shed light on Beijing’s South China Sea claims. While the PRC has been very clear that it claims sovereignty over all of the land features within the “nine-dash line,” it has been notoriously vague about the nature and extent of its claimed maritime rights in the vast spaces between these tiny rocks and reefs [3].2 The southern Spratlys are an interesting case because they are largely devoid of land and contain none that could plausibly generate an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). A close examination of Beijing’s policies therefore sheds light on the PRC’s treatment of the nine-dash line as a maritime boundary [4].3

This article comprises six parts. Part one outlines the known facts of Chinese fishing activities in the southern Spratlys. Part two discusses the economic incentives luring Chinese fishers to the southern Spratlys, and the costs and risks associates with pursuing commercial gain in these waters. Part three examines the factors informing Beijing’s policies for Chinese fishing in the southern Spratlys. Parts four, five, and six analyze the three main prongs of its approach. The paper concludes with a summary of key findings. … … …

8. Conclusion

Chinese fishers have operated in the southern Spratlys since the early 1990s. The first expeditions were conducted by vessels from Guangxi’s Beihai city. Beihai fishers continue to dominate Chinese fishing in this area. In 2018, at least 175 Guangxi trawlers operated in these waters, the vast majority from Beihai.

Economic motives are clearly a key driver behind the activities of Guangxi fishers in the southern Spratlys. That is, they go there to catch fish that is unavailable in the same abundance in the Gulf of Tonkin. However, this article shows that government policies have played a decisive role ensuring that these activities are safe and profitable. By implementing robust policy measures, the PRC enables and encourages Guangxi fishers to operate in this highly disputed maritime space.

PRC fisheries policy in the southern Spratlys is largely focused on the political importance of Chinese fishing in these waters. It proceeds from two key beliefs. First, that Chinese fishers have the right to operate in the northern part of the Sunda Shelf because it falls within the nine-dash line. Second, Chinese fishers should operate in the southern Spratlys because their activities serve the political function of upholding China’s claims to maritime rights in these waters. Just by being present there, they demonstrate Chinese sovereignty.

These beliefs drive Beijing’s efforts to support Chinese fishing in these waters. Chinese policymakers heavily subsidize fishing operations in the Spratlys. These subsidies include defraying fixed costs, offsetting fuel costs, and providing other monetary awards to influence the cost-benefit analysis of individual fishing boat owners. Chinese analysts have shown that these incentives are probably the biggest inducements for fishing in the southern Spratlys. Moreover, Chinese policymakers invest huge sums of money to ensure the security of Chinese fishers operating there. They have built dozens of very large law enforcement cutters and charged them with maintaining adequate presence in these waters to deter coastal state EEZ enforcement. Beijing’s efforts have been largely successful: since 2016, Chinese fishing vessels have been able to operate with impunity in the southern Spratlys.

There is some evidence that China’s maritime militia also operates in conjunction with Guangxi’s Spratly fishing fleet. In recent years, Guangxi has invested heavily in the development of maritime militia forces. Boosting the service’s ability to conduct sovereignty operations is a key driver behind these investments. All of the Guangxi ports that host Spratly vessels possess maritime militia units. Moreover, authoritative sources suggest that Guangxi militia vessels perform missions in the Spratlys. Nevertheless, there is no definitive documentary evidence connecting Guangxi militia vessels with individual incidents in these waters. This is not surprising, as China can achieve its current maritime objective without the militia, and if the militia are present they are serving presence and intelligence collection functions, which are generally not newsworthy.

***

Zoe Haver, Sansha City in China’s South China Sea Strategy: Building a System of Administrative ControlChina Maritime Report 12 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, January 2021).

China established Sansha City in 2012 to administer the bulk of its territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea. Sansha is headquartered on Woody Island. The city’s jurisdiction includes the Paracel Islands, Zhongsha Islands, and Spratly Islands and most of the waters within China’s “nine-dash line.” Sansha is responsible for exercising administrative control, implementing military-civil fusion, and carrying out the day-to-day work of rights defense, stability maintenance, environmental protection, and resource development. Since 2012, each level of the Chinese party-state system has worked to develop Sansha, improving the city’s physical infrastructure and transportation, communications, corporate ecosystem, party-state institutions, and rights defense system. In effect, the city’s development has produced a system of normalized administrative control. This system ultimately allows China to govern contested areas of the South China Sea as if they were Chinese territory.

Key Findings

  • Sansha is responsible for administering China’s maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea on a day-to-day basis from the front lines of the disputes.
  • Sansha’s physical infrastructure, transportation, communications, economy, party-state institutions, and defense capabilities form a unified system that continuously strengthens the city’s capacity to exercise administrative control over contested areas of the South China Sea.
  • The city uses civilian-administrative means, including maritime law enforcement and maritime militia operations, rather than military force to advance China’s position in the South China Sea disputes.
  • The development of Sansha is gradually civilianizing and institutionalizing China’s efforts to control the South China Sea, providing a mechanism to govern contested areas as if they were Chinese territory.
  • The city’s development aligns closely with China’s broader strategy in the South China Sea, which aims to consolidate China’s claims while deterring other states from strengthening their own claims. This strategy relies on China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia operations backed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy.
  • Military-civil fusion is the guiding principle of the city’s development, which ensures that all aspects of Sansha’s development ultimately serve China’s sovereignty and security interests.
  • Improvements to Sansha’s physical infrastructure and transportation, including the construction of a smart microgrid on Woody Island, allow Woody Island and other occupied features to accommodate a growing number of military, civilian, and law enforcement personnel and guarantee the continuous operation of important facilities.
  • The development of the city’s communications infrastructure enables local leaders to monitor and govern vast swathes of contested maritime space with ease.
  • Sansha’s leaders have systematically mobilized private and state-owned enterprises in support of nearly every aspect of the city’s daily operations and long-term development.
  • The expansion of the city’s party-state institutions allows municipal authorities to directly govern contested areas of the South China Sea and ensures the primacy of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interests in local decision-making.
  • To defend China’s maritime rights and interests, the city created Sansha Comprehensive Law Enforcement (SCLE), a maritime law enforcement force, and established a new maritime militia force. Sansha has integrated both forces into its military, law enforcement, and civilian joint defense system. Using these capabilities, local leaders physically assert Sansha’s jurisdiction at the expense of China’s neighbors and coordinate joint operations with the CCG.
  • Sansha’s system of normalized administrative control is currently strongest in the Paracel Islands. Despite the continuing influence of the central bureaucracies, CCG, and PLA, elements of this system also exist in the Spratly Islands and show signs of expanding.

About the Author

Zoe Haver is a Party Watch Initiative Fellow at the Center for Advanced China Research. Her research focuses on the South China Sea disputes and Chinese economic statecraft. She has worked on Chinese security and economic issues at SOS International LLC, the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), the U.S. Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, and the Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program. Zoe received her BA in International Affairs from George Washington University. She lived in China for three years, studied Chinese in both Taiwan and China, and is proficient in Mandarin Chinese.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Isaac Kardon and the rest of the China Maritime Studies Institute team for their encouragement and helpful feedback. Moreover, this project would not have possible without generous support from the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS). Finally, the author thanks Devin Thorne for his valuable contributions.

Zoe Haver, Sansha City in China’s South China Sea Strategy: Building a System of Administrative Control, China Maritime Report 12 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, January 2021). COVER

***

Andrew S. Erickson, interviewed by Harry J. Kazianis, “Advantage At Sea: U.S. Maritime Strategy Focuses On China,” 19FortyFive, 22 December 2020.

Editor’s Note: We recently spoke with Dr. Andrew Erickson, a professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), to get his take on the newly released U.S. maritime strategy, Advantage at Sea.

First, give us a sense of your overall assessment of the new maritime strategy, Advantage at Sea. What does it do, why does it matter, and how could it shape future naval strategy for the United States?

The tri-service strategy offers a clear vision of the greatest challenges facing the United States and its vital interests, how the U.S. NavyMarine Corps, and Coast Guard can best address them, and the prioritization that will be required to do so. This well-written document is exceptional in its provision of information, substantive analysis, and guidance. It explains how China poses the greatest challenges to American interests of any nation: “the most comprehensive threat to the United States, our allies, and all nations supporting a free and open system.” It explains how America’s Sea Services, front-line witnesses to this sea change, are best placed to address many of those challenges, and why this should be the top priority moving forward.

I could not help but notice the amount of attention is given to China’s maritime militia in the document. Does the new strategy, in your view, pay enough attention to this threat? Do we have the resources needed in the Asia-Pacific considering the size and scope of the threat presented by Beijing in this area?

The strategy concisely explains China’s own tri-service strategy at sea with a laser focus that no previous U.S. government document provided so directly. Through a simple but powerful graph, this latest maritime strategy document offers new data concerning the ultimate expression of Beijing’s own maritime strategy: numbers of ships in service, by service, starting in 2000 and projected out to 2030. This includes a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy that has already trebled in size to as many as ~360 battle force ships today and is forecast to exceed 450 ships a decade hence. It already exceeds U.S. Navy battle force ship numbers, which have not quite reached 300.

The graph shows a China Coast Guard of ~250 ships, for which little further quantitative growth is forecast, but for which substantial qualitative development can be expected. A key area to watch is Coast Guard aviation, which will be greatly enhanced from its current limited state.

Most interestingly, the graph offers the first public U.S. government estimate of ship numbers for China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). With an increase from virtually zero in 2015 to ~100 today and little further growth projected, this would seem to be the lowest, most strict-constructionist tabulation possible. The relatively low number appears to reflect only the very-most-advanced purpose-built hulls from a small subset of vanguard units: As the Pentagon’s 2020 China Military Power Report documents, the Sansha City Maritime Militia alone by 2016 received “84 large militia vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage.” When one includes the many basic fishing vessels registered in the PAFMM, the total order of battle is in the high hundreds at least. Here, China draws from the world’s largest fishing fleet, which contained approximately 187,211 marine fishing vessels at the end of 2015.

Already, each of China’s three sea services is itself the world’s largest by number of ships. By the Strategy’s graphic calculus, their combined total currently stands at 700 and is projected to exceed 800 by 2030. Both numbers and quality matter, and China is growing considerably in both dimensions at sea.

We can be confident that the battle force numbers calculated for China’s Navy correspond numerically with those for the U.S. Navy battle force. The U.S. Navy is required to count PLA Navy (PLAN) ship numbers strictly according to the criteria listed in SECNAVINST 5030.8C (“General Guidance for the Classification of Naval Vessels and Battle Force Ship Counting Procedures”). It’s the closest to an “apples-to-apples” comparison that one can expect.

While U.S. forces continue to retain formidable qualitative advantages undersea, particularly in blue water and with submarines; in strike warfare; and in anti-air warfare, China has increasing advantages across the board in anti-surface warfare. Worryingly, on a ship-to-ship basis, new advanced PLAN platforms are increasingly closing the “apples-to-apples” gap with their USN counterparts in apparent hardware capabilities: equipment, weapons, and sensors. The U.S. Navy is increasingly banking on the intangibles of personnel, doctrine, tactics, and experience: being able to employ its ships better and to fight better overall. In a surface-to-surface fight, the U.S. Navy would be overmatched in surface-to-surface firepower (i.e., short-range, subsonic Harpoon missiles) against PLAN anti-ship cruise missiles that already have a range advantage, and with the new YJ-12 and YJ-18 also being supersonic. When it comes to Sino-American competition at sea, the strategy document warns starkly, the U.S. Navy is already quantitatively behind China and is rapidly losing qualitative advantages.

Overall, China has deployed far more missiles on land and at sea than has the United States. For some of these systems, reliable long-range targeting far from China’s land-based radars and other C4ISR architecture remains a work in progress. However, for the Near Seas scenarios that matter most to China, it enjoys increasingly robust overlapping sensor coverage. Beijing is rapidly expanding and enhancing its land-, sea-, and air-, and space-based C4ISR platforms. Its South China Sea outposts are making a major contribution. And reconnaissance has been a core PAFMM mission for decades, with many times the ~100 vessels documented in the strategy being potentially available to provide a rudimentary warning function—an extensive capability that would be hard to counter.

At the same time, China’s overall naval capacity is growing by leaps and bounds—especially in new aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, conventional submarines, and new warships. Does the U.S. Navy have the resources it needs to counter this threat as well, particularly considering that our global footprint is stretched rather thin?

The strategy rightly underscores a key asymmetry: Overall, China’s Sea Forces remain largely regionally focused. Its Maritime Militia is not known to operate outside the “Near Seas”—Yellow, East, and South China Seas—home to all Beijing’s unresolved island/feature and maritime sovereignty claims. Its Coast Guard has vessels capable of global operations, but the majority of its force is regionally deployed. Its Navy increasingly operates around the world, but retains a strong home-region presence, and would certainly be recalled to a dedicated focus on any conflict scenario. In contrast, the U.S. Navy is dispersed across the world’s oceans. In the event of a Near Seas scenario, it could not be fully vectored there at the abandonment of other concerns, let alone the incentives of other rivals to exploit any emergent power vacuum.

As the strategy rightly contends, the U.S. Navy needs additional resources to address rising challenges. Resources need to be provided predictably to support consistent shipbuilding, operations, and maintenance. Recent years of shutdowns, sequestration, continuing resolutions, and other stopgap measures have wreaked havoc on America’s defense industrial base, in which private contractors cannot maximize investment and progress when facing excessive uncertainty. Resource provision, in turn, must be informed by a cohesive strategy. This document offers welcome strategic direction, but its impact remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the two-decade tidal wave of Chinese military shipbuilding that it enumerates has been powered by a consistency of strategy and resources that is in many respects superior to its formidable but floundering American counterpart.

 Looking at some of the pressure points in the Indo-Pacific region like the South and East China Seas as well as the Taiwan Strait, it seems China is attempting to mass enough forces to make any sort of kinetic contest over those bodies of water a tough challenge. Does this new strategy do enough to ensure the United States can support allies and partners in the region if a crisis did erupt with China?

Even if it proves as influential over time as I hope it will be, this strategy will be only one element of what the U.S. and its allies and partners need to “hold the line” in the Near Seas. There, China is amassing a formidable overlapping constellation of capabilities not only at sea, in the form of the tri-service expansion the strategy describes; but also on land, in the form of a potent missile-centric “anti-Navy.”

Beijing has developed quite a range of land-based anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons platforms like the DF-21D and DF-26B anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). Does this strategy take into account these emerging threats where forces from the land like ballistic, cruise, and now hypersonic weapons could limit U.S. maritime forces’ ability to project power?

The strategy most certainly factors in China’s ASBMs and other A2/AD weapons. There are many ways in which U.S. maritime forces can continue to project power, but they require sufficient resources and sufficient numbers. The strategy makes plain a critical tipping point: given sufficient support, America’s sea services can continue to fully execute all missions with which they are entrusted; but absent such support, they will soon no longer be able to do so effectively where it matters most.

In terms of ship numbers, each of China’s three sea forces is the world’s largest by a large margin. For the scenarios that most concern the U.S. and its regional allies, these numbers matter greatly. This suggests an important conclusion: China’s numerical sea force supremacy and the corresponding need for power projection and presence to counter it effectively demonstrates the need for a substantially increased U.S. Navy. The cost of maintaining sufficient sea power is great, but the cost of not doing so would be devastating—not only to American ideals, but also to interests we have taken for granted since American sea power started helping to continuously secure a peaceful and prosperous postwar order nearly eight decades ago.

In addition to the new tri-service strategy, where can readers find the latest information on China’s sea forces?

This cogent new strategy needs all the support it can get. It comes amid a growing wave of serious booksmonographs, and reports on PRC military maritime issues by specialists at the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and elsewhere in the field. Beyond that, for near-real-time information, here are my reading recommendations:

The best coverage of China’s three sea services overall is in the Pentagon’s 2020 report, which has authoritative coverage of the PLAN and a special section on its coordination with the CCG and PAFMM (pp. 69-72). Another encompassing report is the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2019 China Military Power. For those with an eye for detail, and the ability to zoom in or use a magnifying glass, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) maintains an exquisite ship Identification Guide, complete with silhouettes and pennant numbers. Even a quick glance is enough to grasp the enormity and variety of China’s oceanic juggernaut. I hope that ONI soon updates its Equipment GuidePLAN Report, and accompanying videos—all excellent but dated 2015.

A formidable book-length counterpart to ONI’s “eye chart” is offered by Modern Chinese Maritime Forces, authored by Manfred Meyer and edited by Larry Bond and Chris Carlson. This unique compendium combines beautiful line diagrams that would impress Edward Tufte with a comprehensive order of battle and technical specifications that would amaze Mahan himself. (Full disclosure: I was so impressed with this quarterly-updated resource that I accepted the editors’ invitation to write the Foreword.)

For China’s Navy, see Library of Congress analyst Ron O’Rourke’s frequently-updated Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on “China’s Naval Modernization.” He offers detailed coverage of PLAN force structure, as well as thoughtful discussion and insights of its relative size and strength. O’Rourke’s report remains the sole public source of U.S. government projections out to 2040. The tri-service strategy only projects numbers out to 2030, possibly because meaningful projections for China’s Coast Guard and Maritime Militia out two decades were not readily available.

For China’s Coast Guard, see O’Rourke’s periodically-updated CRS report on “U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas.” This invaluable reference also compiles content and sources concerning China’s Maritime Militia. The work of my CMSI colleague Ryan Martinson, which I compile here, offers some of the best qualitative insights concerning the world’s largest civil maritime force and its role in China’s maritime strategy.

For China’s Maritime Militia, I maintain an extensive compendium of curated open sources. More than six years into my efforts in this area with Conor Kennedy and other CMSI colleagues such as former Director Peter Dutton, it is sobering that awareness and understanding of this virtually unique force remains so elusive for so many. Fortunately, a new Wikipedia entry on the “People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia” offers an invaluable distillation. I hope that dedicated Wikipedians will build on this foundation by incorporating some of the authoritative PRC and U.S. government sources that I highlight in keyword-searchable format.

Andrew S. Erickson is a professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). A core founding member, he helped establish CMSI and stand it up officially in 2006, and has played an integral role in its development. CMSI inspired the creation of other research centers, which he has advised and supported; he is a China Aerospace Studies Institute Associate. Erickson is currently a Visiting Scholar in full-time residence at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, where he has been an Associate in Research since 2008. He blogs at www.andrewerickson.com.

***

Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, 17 December 2020).

Includes a great graphic showing the very first public estimates of China Maritime Militia ship numbers that I’ve seen (courtesy of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence)! [The relatively small numbers and their mostly-post-2015 genesis would seem to include only the most advanced hulls; i.e., including the 84 latest ships in the Sansha City Maritime Militia.]

Click here to download a cached copy.

 p. 3

A GLOBAL COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE

Today, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) employ all instruments of their national power to undermine and remake the international system to serve their own interests. Each conduct a variety of malign activities incrementally, attempting to achieve their objectives without triggering a military response. Both nations back their revisionist activities with regionally powerful militaries and obscure their aggressive behavior by mixing military and paramilitary forces with proxies. China’s and Russia’s attempts to exert control over natural marine resources and restrict access to the oceans have negative repercussions for all nations.

China has implemented a strategy and revisionist approach that aims at the heart of the United States’ maritime power. It seeks to corrode international maritime governance, deny access to traditional logistical hubs, inhibit freedom of the seas, control use of key chokepoints, deter our engagement in regional disputes, and displace the United States as the preferred partner in countries around the world.

To enable its strategy, China deploys a multilayered fleet that includes the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the China Coast Guard, and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia—naval auxiliaries disguised as civilian vessels—to subvert other nations’ sovereignty and enforce unlawful claims. It continues to militarize disputed features in the South China Sea and assert maritime claims inconsistent with international law. Its state-subsidized distant- water fishing fleet steals vital resources from nations unable to defend their own exclusive economic zones. To support its multilayered fleet, China is also developing the world’s largest missile force, with nuclear capabilities, which is designed to strike U.S. and allied forces in Guam and in the Far East with everything from ballistic missiles to maneuverable cruise and hypersonic missiles. Further, China has centralized its robust strategic, space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities.

With naval forces as the cornerstone of its efforts, China is aggressively growing and modernizing its military. Already commanding the world’s largest naval force, the PRC is building modern surface combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, fighter jets, amphibious assault ships, ballistic nuclear missile submarines, large coast guard cutters, and polar

p. 4

icebreakers at alarming speed. China’s navy battle force has more than tripled in size in only two decades (Figure 1).

This rapid growth is enabled by a robust shipbuilding infrastructure, including multiple shipyards that exceed those in the United States in both size and throughput. In conflict, excess PRC industrial capacity, including additional commercial shipyards, could quickly be turned toward military production and repair, further increasing China’s ability to generate new military forces.

Whereas U.S. naval forces are globally dispersed, supporting U.S. interests and deterring aggression from multiple threats, China’s numerically larger forces are primarily concentrated in the Western Pacific. However, as China seeks to establish regional hegemony, it is also expanding its global reach. China’s One Belt One Road initiative is extending its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure that will enable its forces to operate farther from its shores than ever before, including the polar regions, Indian Ocean, and Atlantic Ocean. These projects often leverage predatory lending terms that China exploits to control access to key strategic maritime locations. … …

p. 5

In the event of conflict, China and Russia will likely attempt to seize territory before the United States and its allies can mount an effective response—leading to a fait accompli. Each supports this approach through investments in counter-intervention networks. Each seeks to shift the burden of escalation by reinforcing annexed territory with long-range precision-strike weapons and make a military response to an invasion seem disproportionately costly. … …

***

Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook (Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, December 2020).

p. 14

Distant Water Fishing Fleets

Distant Water Fishing (DWF) fleets, which conduct fishing activities on an industrial scale in waters far from their home countries, have been closely associated with IUU fishing. These vessels, owned both by individuals and corporate entities, are often subject to weak, negligent, or intentionally complicit management by their flag States. Many DWF fleets are heavily subsidized by their home governments, which can diminish true fishing costs and incentivize unsustainable fishing practices. Predator states can also use DWF fleets to exploit gaps between governance structures and operate in areas where there is little or no effective enforcement presence, deliberately undermining maritime rules-based order.

Some governments have demonstrated a lack of political will to fully acknowledge and address IUU fishing problems in their DWF fleets, selfishly placing their own steady supply of fish above preserving the marine ecosystems, food supplies, and economic stability of other nations. A 2019 Stimson Center research study found that in the past several decades, the practice of DWF has expanded in size and reach across the ocean and around the world. DWF is heavily dominated by just five fleets, which make up 90% of global effort. China and Taiwan represented nearly 60% of all global distant water fishing effort in other countries’ waters from 2015 to 2017. Japan, South Korea, and Spain’s DWF fleets each represented 10%. (The U.S. DWF fleet was the sixth largest and amounted to 1.4% of the global effort.6) The international community, DWF states, coastal nations, and the fishing industry must collectively improve transparency and accountability for DWF fleets while taking necessary steps to safeguard global fisheries for future generations.7

CONCERNS WITH CHINA’S FISHING PRACTICES

The People’s Republic of China has the largest distant water fishing fleet in the world. NOAA’s 2019 biennial IUU Fishing Report to Congress8 identified a troubling expanse of alleged violations by Chinese-flagged fishing vessels, describing multiple instances where they have been found illegally fishing in the EEZs of coastal states around the globe, from the Western and Central Pacific to the coasts of Africa and South America. The 2019 Report also raised concerns over the number of stateless fishing vessels in the Northern Pacific displaying characteristics of Chinese registration. Additionally, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia, estimated to include more than 3,000 vessels, actively carries out aggressive behavior on the high seas and in sovereign waters of other nations to coerce and intimidate legitimate fishers in support of the Chinese Communist Party’s long term maritime strategic goals.

China must exercise more responsible flag state control over its vessels, including its DWF, and demonstrate that it is taking the necessary steps to ensure compliance with international norms and governance structures. Sovereign nations must be allowed to benefit from their own economic resources. Disregard for this sovereignty and territorial integrity by Chinese and other IUU fishing perpetrators not only threatens the stability of nations who rely on marine resources for food security and economic development, it is a direct violation of international rules-based order.

***

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Appendix II—China’s Maritime Militia: An Important Force Multiplier,” in Michael McDevitt, China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power: Theory, Practice, and Implications (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2020), 207–29.

APPENDIX II

China’s Maritime Militia

An Important Force Multiplier

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a state-organized, -developed, and -controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct Chinese state–sponsored activities.1 The PAFMM is locally organized and resourced but answers to the very top of China’s military bureaucracy: the commander in chief, Xi Jinping. While the PAFMM has been part of China’s militia system for decades, it is receiving greater emphasis today, because of its value in furthering China’s near-seas “rights and interests.”

Traditionally, the PAFMM has been a military force raised from civilian marine industry workers (e.g., fishermen). Personnel keep their “day jobs” but are organized and trained in exchange for benefits and can be called up as needed. Recently, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA— in this context, the military generally) has been adding a more professionalized, militarized vanguard to the PAFMM, recruiting former servicemen (by offering them high salaries) and launching formidable purpose-built vessels. This vanguard has no apparent interest in fishing.

This chapter focuses on the current organization and employment of Chinese maritime-militia organizations. It first puts this force into historical context by surveying the PAFMM’s background and its changing role in China’s armed forces. Next, it examines the PAFMM’s current contributions toward China’s goal of becoming a great maritime power, in both old and new mission areas. The remaining sections will address specific maritime-militia modes of command and control, intelligence gathering, organization and training and will suggest possible scenarios and implications.

Decades-Long History

China’s militia system originated before the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power, but the system of recruiting numerous state- supported maritime militias from coastal populations was not fully implemented until the communists began to exercise greater control of the coastline in the 1950s. This segment of China’s population had been relatively isolated from the turmoil of the Civil War; these regions had been under either Japanese or Republic of China (ROC) control in the decades before CCP rule was established. The CCP targeted the fishing communities by creating fishing collectives and work units, enacting strict organizational and social controls, and conducting political education. Factors motivating and shaping this transformation included:

  • The PLA’s early use of civilian vessels after Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party decamped to Taiwan.
  • The fact that fishermen constituted the bulk of China’s experienced mariners.
  • The requirement during the 1950s and 1960s to defend against Nationalist incursions along the coast.
  • Increasingly frequent confrontations with other states’ fishing and naval vessels as China’s fishermen gradually began to fish farther offshore.
  • The transformation of many shore-based coastal-defense militias to the at-sea maritime militia.

The PAFMM has played significant roles in manifold military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years:

  • In the 1950s, support of the PLA’s island seizure campaigns off the mainland coast
  • In the 1960s, securing of China’s coast against Nationalist infiltrations
  • In 1974, seizure of the western portion of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea from South Vietnam
  • In 1976, harassment of “foreign” naval ships east of the Zhoushan Archipelago (south of Shanghai)
  • In 1978, presence mission in the territorial sea of the Senkaku Islands
  • In 1995, Mischief Reef encounter with the Philippines stemming from the occupation and development of that reef
  • In 2009, harassment of USNS Impeccable
  • In 2012, Scarborough Shoal stand-off with the Philippines
  • In 2014, blockade of Philippine-occupied Second Thomas Shoal
  • In 2014, repulse of Vietnamese vessels from disputed waters surrounding the China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC’s) oil rig HYSY 981
  • In 2014, harassment of USNS Howard O. Lorenzen
  • In 2016, large surge of fishing craft near the Senkaku Islands
  • In 2017, envelopment of Philippine-claimed Sandy Cay in the northern Spratly Islands.2 … … …

VOLUME INFORMATION:

About the Author

During his 34-year Navy career, Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.) had four at sea commands including an aircraft carrier battle group. He was a Pacific Ocean sailor with experience in all the waters he has written about. He began a 30-year involvement with U.S. security policy and strategy in Asia when he was assigned to the Office of Secretary of Defense in 1990 as Director and then as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. This professional interest continues to this day.

Summary

Xi Jinping has made his ambitions for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) perfectly clear, there is no mystery what he wants, first, that China should become a “great maritime power” and secondly, that the PLA “become a world-class armed force by 2050.” He wants this latter objective to be largely completed by 2035. China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power focuses on China’s navy and how it is being transformed to satisfy the “world class” goal.

Beginning with an exploration of why China is seeking to become such a major maritime power, author Michael McDevitt first explores the strategic rationale behind Xi’s two objectives: China’s reliance on foreign trade and overseas interests such as China’s Belt and Road strategy. In turn this has created concerns within the senior levels of China’s military about the vulnerability of its overseas interests and maritime life-lines: a major theme. McDevitt dubs this China’s “sea lane anxiety” and traces how this has required the PLA Navy to evolve from a “near seas”-focused navy to one that has global reach; a “blue water navy.” He details how quickly this transformation has taken place, thanks to a patient step-by-step approach and abundant funding. The more than 10 years of anti-piracy patrols in the far reaches of the Indian Ocean has acted as a learning curve accelerator to “blue water” status.

McDevitt then explores the PLA Navy’s role in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. He provides a detailed assessment of what the PLAN will be expected to do if Beijing chooses to attack Taiwan, potentially triggering combat with America’s “first responders” in East Asia, especially the U.S. Seventh Fleet and U.S. Fifth Air Force.

He conducts a close exploration of how the PLA Navy fits into China’s campaign plan aimed at keeping reinforcing U.S. forces at arm’s length (what the Pentagon calls anti-access and area denial [A2/AD]) if war has broken out over Taiwan, or because of attacks on U.S. allies and friends that live in the shadow of China. McDevitt does not know how Xi defines “world class” but the evidence from the past 15 years of building a blue water force has already made the PLA Navy the second largest globally capable navy in the world. This book concludes with a forecast of what Xi’s vision of a “world-class navy” might look like in the next fifteen years when the 2035 deadline is reached.

Reviews

“Rear Admiral Mike McDevitt delivers the definitive study on China’s ambitious quest for greatness at sea. Armed with decades of operational experience, he renders persuasive judgments about China’s nautical ascent. For those looking for an authoritative yet accessible appraisal of the Chinese navy, this is it.”

— Toshi Yoshihara, senior fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, co-author of Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, 2nd ed.

“In order to counter China’s willful and persistent challenges against the stabilizing PAX-AMERICANA global framework, an accurate and comprehensive understanding of China’s security and naval strategies is required. In this context, RADM Mike McDevitt’s superb book is a ‘must-read’ for naval/security specialists, as well as national leaders and thinkers.”

— Yoji Koda, Former Commander in Chief, JMSDF Fleet

“Admiral Michael McDevitt has written an important book about China as a world power. Few Americans possess his knowledge of maritime strategy and China. He has combined this knowledge with his background as a historian and a sea-going officer with more thirty years’ experience. China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power is a must read for military officers, China specialists, and historians.”

— Captain Bernard D. Cole, USN (Ret.), Professor Emeritus, National War College, author of China’s Quest for Great Power: Ships, Oil, and Foreign Policy

“Admiral McDevitt has written the definitive book on China’s maritime ambitions and its ability to fulfill them. His years of careful research following a career of high-level Navy and Defense Department positions are blended into a carefully detailed and documented, yet practical and sensible examination of China’s security shift from land defense to control of the seas. The discussions of Taiwan and the South China Sea are especially informative and sobering. The implications are judicious and very clear – the United States must urgently and intelligently increase its own maritime and air capability.”

— Dennis C. Blair, former Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command and former Director of National Intelligence

“Rear Admiral McDevitt has studied the Chinese navy from the decks of destroyers in the South China Sea to the corridors of leading think tanks around the world. His expertise is legendary, and this new book is a commanding analysis of the course China will steer over the coming decades in their voyage to become the leading global maritime power.”

— Adm. James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), 16th Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and author of Sailing True North: Ten Admirals and the Voyage of Character

“As he explores the rationale for China’s unprecedented accretion of maritime power and quest for a ‘world-class’ navy, McDevitt provides perceptive insights into Beijing’s obsessive pursuit of sea-lane security, regional-hegemony and, eventually, global-dominance. The vivid future-scenarios, painted by this former practitioner of seapower, could prove prophetic, and deserve our closest attention.”

— Adm. Arun Prakash (Ret.), former Indian Navy Chief and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

Product details

Publisher : Naval Institute Press (October 15, 2020)

Subject: Fall 2020 Catalog | China and the Asia Pacific

Item Weight : 2.5 pounds/40 oz

Product Dimensions: 9 × 6 × 1 in

Hardcover : 320 pages

Illustrations: 5 maps, 7 tables, 5 b/w illustrations

ISBN-10 : 1682475352

ISBN-13 : 978-1682475355

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “Breaking Down the Pentagon’s 2020 China Military Power Report: A Quest for PLA Parity?” The National Interest, 2 September 2020.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020 (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 1 September 2020).

p. 29

Militia. The militia is an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization. It is distinct from the PLA’s reserve forces. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and vary widely in composition and mission. The PRC’s 1997 National Defense Law authorizes the militia to assist in maintaining public order. The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a component of the militia and its tasks include safeguarding maritime claims, which it often performs in conjunction with the PLAN and the CCG.

p. 34

p. 69

INCREASING INTEROPERABILITY WITH PARAMILITARY AND MILITIA

Key Takeaway

  • Interoperability and integration between the PLA and the PRC’s paramilitary forces continues to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination between the PLAN, the CCG, and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).

People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a paramilitary police component of the PRC’s armed forces and an armed wing of the CCP. Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and assisting the PLA in times of war. In early 2018, the CMC assumed direct control of the PAP after the CCP ended the previous CMC-State Council dual-command system. As part of this reform, the PAP also assumed control of the China Coast Guard (CCG) in July 2018 from the PRC’s State Oceanic Administration. In addition to these changes, the PAP has undergone a comprehensive reorganization and shed missions and some specialized forces for border defense, firefighting, natural resource protection (forests, gold mines, and hydropower), allowing the PAP to focus more on internal security. The PAP is comprised principally of the Mobile Corps, the Internal Security Corps, and the CCG. …

p. 70

China’s Coercive Approach

China’s leaders use tactics short of armed conflict to pursue China’s objectives. China calibrates its coercive activities to fall below the threshold of provoking armed conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region. These tactics are particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas as well as along its border with India and Bhutan.1 In recent years, the PLA has also increased patrols around and near Taiwan using bomber, fighter, and surveillance aircraft to signal Taiwan. China also employs nonmilitary tools coercively, including economic tools during periods of political tensions with countries that China accuses of harming its national interests.

China Coast Guard (CCG). The CCG is subordinate to the PAP and is responsible for a wide range of missions under the umbrella of maritime rights protection, including enforcement of the PRC’s sovereignty claims, surveillance, protection of fisheries’ resources, anti-smuggling, and general law enforcement. In July 2018, the CCG completed its merger into the CMC command structure through its subordination to the PAP, which itself is under the CMC like the PLA. This could facilitate closer coordination between the CCG and the PLAN. The PRC primarily uses paramilitary maritime law

p. 71

enforcement agencies in maritime disputes, selectively using the PLAN to provide overwatch in case of escalation.

The CCG’s rapid expansion and modernization has improved China’s ability to enforce its maritime claims. Since 2010, the CCG’s fleet of large patrol ships (more than 1,000 tons) has more than doubled from approximately 60 to more than 130 ships, making it by far the largest coast guard force in the world and increasing its capacity to conduct simultaneous, extended offshore operations in multiple disputed areas. Furthermore, the newer ships are substantially larger and more capable than the older ships, and the majority are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, and guns ranging from 30 mm to 76 mm. A number of these ships are capable of long-endurance and out-of-area operations. These characteristics give CCG vessels the ability to intimidate local, non-PRC fishing boats, as occurred in an October 2016 incident near Scarborough Reef.

In addition, the CCG operates more than 70 fast patrol combatants (more than 500 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations, more than 400 coastal patrol craft, and approximately 1,000 inshore and riverine patrol boats. The CCG is likely to add another 25-30 patrol ships and patrol combatants by the end of the decade before the construction program levels off.

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).

The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission. In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve the PRC’s political goals without fighting, part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational operations short of war as an effective means of accomplishing political objectives. The militia has played significant roles in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the 2009 harassment of USNS Impeccable conducting normal operations, the 2012 Scarborough Reef standoff, the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou-981 oilrig standoff, and a large incursion in waters near the Senkakus in 2016.

A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and assist the PLAN and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistic support, and search and rescue. The government subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia vessels to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities.

The PAFMM often rents fishing vessels from companies or individual fishermen. However, China has also built a state-owned fishing fleet for at least part of its “maritime militia” in the South China

p. 72

Sea. The Hainan provincial government, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage, which the militia received by the end of 2016, along with extensive subsidies to encourage frequent operations in the Spratly Islands. This particular PAFMM unit is also China’s most professional. Its forces are paid salaries independent of any clear commercial fishing responsibilities and recruited from recently separated veterans.

p. 95

EASTERN THEATER COMMAND

Key Takeaway

  • The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea.

The Eastern Theater Command likely executes operational control over national defense matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. In 2019, the Eastern Theater Command focused on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of longdistance training and mobilization, aerial combat, and live-fire training. PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, and one missile base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while conducting Senkakus-related operations.

p. 99

SOUTHERN THEATER COMMAND

Key Takeaway

  • The Southern Theater Command is oriented toward the South China Sea, Southeast Asia border security, and territorial and maritime disputes.

The area of responsibility of the Southern Theater Command covers mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea. This geographic area implies that the Southern Theater Command is responsible for securing the South China Sea, supporting the Eastern Theater Command in any invasion of Taiwan, responding to territorial disputes, and assuring the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) seen as vital to China’s global ambitions. PLA units located within the Southern Theater Command are two group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, and two Rocket Force bases. The Southern Theater Command is responsible for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, and likely commands all CCG and maritime militia ships conducting operations within China’s claimed “nine-dash line.”

p. 165

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces

Note: In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the PLA’s Eastern and Southern Theater Navies would participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The Northern Theater Navy (not shown) would be responsible primarily for protecting the sea approaches to China, but could provide mission-critical assets to support the other fleets. In conflict, China may also employ China Coast Guard (CCG) and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) ships to support military operations.

***

 

 

 

Alice DU Liangliang, “The Sino-British Maritime Frontier, 1950–1957,” in Mary Ann O’Donnell, Jonathan Bach, and Denise Y. Ho, eds., “Forum: Transformation of Shen Kong Borderlands,” Made in China 3 (September–December 2020): 102–07.

The area that is today known as the Pearl River Delta in fact comprises two deltas, which were historically referred to as the Pearl River and the Lingding Sea. The Pearl River is formed by the confluence of three rivers, the West, North, and East. It runs through the city of Guangzhou and discharges at Humen, the Bocca Tigris. The Lingding Sea extends from the mouth of the Pearl River through the corridor between Macau and Hong Kong and ends (more or less) near Outer Lingding Island in the Wanshan Archipelago (Zong et al. 2009). Westerners may have heard of the Lingding Sea indirectly through ‘Lintin Island’, the common name for Inner Lingding Island (内伶仃岛), which historically marked the gateway to Guangzhou from the South China Sea. In Chinese, the Lingding Sea was made famous in the poem ‘Crossing Lingding Sea’ by the Song loyalist Wen Tianxiang. The poem imaginatively recounts the flight of the boy emperor Zhao Bing (r.1278–79) from Lin’an (present-day Hangzhou) to Yamen. The poem’s pathos is figured by the Song’s defeat at Yamen, where, despite being outnumbered 10 to one, the Yuan navy won a decisive maritime battle, ending the Song dynasty. However, the two landmarks in the poem, Huangkong Shoals and the Lingding Sea, are what suggest how northern armies experienced southern landscapes at the end of the thirteenth century. Huangkong Shoals translates as ‘Terror Shoals’—a reference to a famously difficult passage on the Gan River in Jiangxi Province. Lingding Sea means ‘Lonely Sea’, referring to the vast and underpopulated edges of the empire.

Five hundred years later, the Lonely Sea was no longer an underpopulated frontier. Instead, pirates, privateers, and foreign navies were competing to seize control of the gateway to Guangzhou. Coastal villages and towns occupied both coasts of the Lingding Sea, while islands and bays had been claimed by smaller groups of fishermen and boat-dwellers, who were pejoratively known as Tanka (疍家). Living at the edge of agrarian society, these water-dwellers nevertheless controlled local waters and earned their living working for the highest bidder (Antony 2016). The 1898 Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory made maritime borders explicit; the United Kingdom did not simply lease territory from the Qing, but also (and more importantly) secured maritime access to Guangzhou. The convention did not, however, change the status of coastal, island, and water-dwellers, who were granted traditional water rights. During the war against Japan (1937–45) and the Civil War (1945–49) in southern China, the allied forces of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the United States relied on local water-dwellers to obtain intelligence and supply arms via ports in Hong Kong and Macau (Hou 2019).

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rose to power on the strength of its ground forces, only forming the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in May 1950, a month before the Korean War broke out. Unsurprisingly, the joint navies of the United States and KMT easily embargoed coastal China. Knowing that ground forces could not hold the coastline, Mao Zedong instructed People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leaders:

The army must leave the coastline, stay in appropriate places to conveniently annihilate the enemy … They should train rather than guard the coastline. It is the responsibility of security teams and local armed forces to monitor spies and kill bandits. Many Communists, after fighting for more than 20 years, have suddenly forgotten their experience, building fortifications everywhere [because] they fear the enemy like tigers. (Hou 2019: 248)

Instead, another strategy—one based on CCP experience in guerilla warfare and local organising—was necessary if the CCP was to wrest control of Chinese coastal waters from the United States and the KMT. Over the next few years, the CCP would rely on its experience of land reform (in 1950–52) and the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries (December 1950– October 1951) to integrate water-dwellers into its maritime defence strategy, just as peasants had been integrated into its ground war strategy. This entailed resettling water-dwellers, while blockading Hong Kong via the islands of the Wanshan Archipelago. In turn, the consolidation of the coastal frontier occurred via the transplanted fishermen and islanders. Their bodies, settlements, and labour made the Sino-British border visible, asserting Chinese claims to the coastline.

The story of Fishing One Village (渔一村) highlights how these larger processes not only transformed the cultural geography of the Lingding Sea, but also laid the foundation for the establishment of the China Merchants Shekou Industrial Zone in 1979. On the one hand, through the stories of Fishing One, we see how the so-called democratic fishing reform (alternatively known as 渔民民主改革 or 渔业 民主改革) reshaped the cultural geography of the Lingding Sea. Previously, mobile ‘fishing despots’ (渔霸) had patrolled the water, but, after the fishing reform, boat-dwellers could no longer freely sail the seas. Instead, they worked out of fixed ‘fishermen villages’ (渔村), which the state could mobilise as necessary, effectively landlocking water-dwellers without giving them full status onshore. On the other hand, these stories also highlight how the region’s fluid borders were first consolidated through revolutionary methods. Once the borders were secured, later development of the coast became feasible precisely because the coastline was de facto located within Chinese—and not British—territory. When Yuan Geng decided to establish the China Merchants Shekou Industrial Zone, for example, the port, industrial park, and its factories not only incorporated the coastline from the high-tide mark, but also extended the coastline through land reclamation into what (at the time) were acknowledged to be British waters.

Reorganising the Lingding Sea

In 1949, the Central Committee of the CCP entrusted the task of securing China’s southern coast to Ye Jianying, head of the South China Branch Bureau. The situation was daunting. More than one million people, including boat-dwellers, inhabited the coastal waters of Guangdong Province. Historically, these people had formed groups based on language and labour, enjoying relative autonomy from state oversight. Fishing reform in coastal waters (1951–54) and policy consolidation during the following three years (1955–57) allowed the CCP to occupy the southern coastline, pushing back against the historical frontier. The organisation of fishermen and territory was contemporaneous with the Socialist Transformation Movement (December 1951 to the end of 1956). Drawing on the ideas of the Agricultural Cooperative Movement, the Bao’an County Government encouraged fishermen to come ashore, aiming to enclose them within prescribed boundaries that simultaneously secured the coastline and improved the lives of the poorest fishermen. Once the fishermen were onshore, the government set up mutual aid groups, which were the embryonic form of fishermen’s villages (渔民村).

In 1950, the leading organisation in Bao’an County was the Shashenbao branch of the Guangdong Military Administrative Commission (广东军事管理委员会沙深宝分 会), with Qi Feng as director. There was debate over whether islands should be administered by the Bao’an Government or by the Military Commission. Ma Lun, the Bao’an County Secretary, for example, maintained that the Bao’an County Government should only administer the territory within its land borders, while the management of waters and islands fell under the purview of the Shashenbao Committee. As a result, local fishermen’s groups were not placed within the Bao’an County Government (as Qi Feng had hoped), but within the Island Administration Bureau. The two fishermen’s groups in Bao’an County became the East Island and West Island offices, corresponding to the county’s eastern and western coasts. That year, there were about 600 people living on Inner Neilingding Island, including more than 120 fishermen. Due to military necessity, the PLA was stationed on the island and the islanders were relocated to Shekou and Xixiang.

In January 1951, Guangdong Province set up the Pearl River District Commission Office, Island Administration Bureau, and Post Reform Management Office (珠江区专员公署海岛管理局后改管理处). Responsibility for organising fishermen’s work was transferred from the Shashenbao Border Committee to the Island Administration Bureau. Jurisdiction over Inner Lingding Island, the islands of the Wanshan Archipelago and coastal islands from Zhongshan, Dongguan, and Bao’an counties was transferred to the new bureau. The Island Administration Bureau’s office was set up in Tangjiawan, Zhuhai (珠海唐家湾), a coastal subdistrict (乡) in Zhongshan County. In practice, this meant that, although Inner Lingding Island fishermen had been resettled in Bao’an and their cadres were considered part of the Bao’an Government, they were nevertheless to make annual trips to Zhuhai to report on their work.

The reorganisation of previously scattered islands under one administrative entity was an important step to organise fishermen. Zhou Enlai, first premier of the People’s Republic of China, and Liao Chengzhi, the Hong Kong–based official in charge of the United Front and overseas Chinese, asked the relevant departments to help fishermen establish their homes on land. Once ashore, fishermen could be assigned a political identity, land resources, and finally be organised into villages, which was the most basic unit of rural administration. To this end, the Fishermen’s Association Committee (渔民协会委员会) was established in 1951. Status in the Fishermen’s Association was based on physical residence. Fishing families with a fixed residence on land were defined as ‘fishermen’ (渔民) and would ultimately receive hukou (户口; ‘household registration’) based on that settlement. Fishing families who had no fixed residence on land and travelled between harbours in Bao’an, Hong Kong, and Macau were defined as ‘itinerant fishermen’ (流动渔民), ultimately receiving identity cards in Hong Kong. The organisation of fishermen was also a mobilisation of resources. The local Party committee established a democratic reform committee, which worked with local cadres to organise a work team to develop and train activists among fishermen, teaching them to distinguish between the ‘enemy and ourselves’ (敌我问题). In the first stage of the fishermen’s democratic reform (1951–52), local political groups dealt with the smuggling of intelligence and weapons to the United States, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

In July 1952, during the second phase of the fishermen’s democratic reform, the Island Administration Committee transferred the governance of islands to Zhongshan County—an administrative shift from party to government. This shift emphasised location (rather than a specific mission) as the principle for governance. On this basis, on 19 November 1952, the CCP Central Committee issued a set of ‘Instructions on Fishermen’s Work’, stating: ‘Coastal fishermen should also divide fishermen’s counties and districts according to their fishing areas, with a port as the centre’ (Chen 2019: 100). According to the relevant materials, the boundaries of the fishermen’s county referred to the southern Lingding Sea and included most of the islands therein. The new county would be called Zhuhai, with its county seat at Tangjiawan. In July 1953, Bao’an County designated West Sea, East Sea, Nantou, and Yantian as pilot areas to carry out the local fishermen’s democratic reform. Significantly, fishing areas crossed the maritime border. The West Sea, for example, included waters near Shekou and islands in the Wanshan Archipelago, as well as near Tsing Shan, Tuen Mun, on the northeastern coast of the Hong Kong New Territories. Similarly, East Sea waters included those near Yantian and Yazhou Bay as well as near Sai Kung on the northeastern coast of the New Territories. At this time, Bao’an County became responsible for the fishermen who had been relocated from Inner Lingding and Dachan islands to Shekou and Xixiang. This was the first appearance of ‘Shekou’ among Chinese administrative placenames.

From 1953 through to 1954, local Party representatives organised fishermen through campaigns in democratic struggle, democratic unity, and democratic construction. Fishermen were also encouraged to join the fishing trade union, the Fishing Association, the Communist Youth League, militia, and other organisations. Organisers united fishermen according to the logic under which peasants had been united, encouraging better-off fishermen to employ poor fishermen. Although fishermen could not be classified as ‘poor’ or ‘middle-income’ based on how many tools they owned (as was the criteria for classifying peasants), some fishermen owned boats and others did not. Fishermen with boats could work alone or were encouraged to employ one or two people. During the 1954 fishery cooperative movement (渔业合作化运动), whether or not one maintained ‘fisherman’ or ‘floating fisherman’ status was based on joining the cooperative and the sharing of boats. Most residents in the Shekou area, for example, joined friends and family in the fishing cooperative, while those who chose not to join became itinerant fishermen, taking up residence in bays along the coasts of Hong Kong and Macau. In contrast to the West Sea area, there were more floating fishermen in Mirs Bay in the East Sea area.

The differences between fishermen and itinerant fishermen were not immediately consolidated but were settled over the course of the decade. Shekou, for example, is home to two fishing villages, the aforementioned Fishing One and Fishing Two (渔二村). The root of Fishing One was the Inner Lingding Island mutual aid group. Fishermen Wu Jindi, Zhou Dezai, and several others who had lived on Inner Lingding Island and owned houseboats (罟仔艇 or Kwu Tzu boats) became core members of the Inner Lingding Island mutual aid group after their relocation to Shekou. Their status allowed them to receive interest-free or low-interest loans from the Bao’an County Government to update their fishing equipment. Funds were also used to set up marketing cooperatives to help these fishermen sell their products. By 1954, cooperation and a guaranteed market meant that organised fishermen could expand their enterprises. In contrast, activist Zhang Meitou set up Bao’an County’s first fishery production cooperative in Shekou with resettled boat-dwellers. With government help, the cooperative purchased new fishing equipment and began deep-sea fishing. However, unlike Fishing One, which comprised members from the same linguistic group and a shared home island, fishing cooperative members came from Haifeng and Panyu. Due to the differences in customs and languages, the cooperative dissolved in less than two years. Some of the Teochew-speaking fishermen opted to return to Haifeng and become farmers, while some of the Cantonese-speaking fishermen moved to Hong Kong, becoming itinerant fishermen. In fact, it was not until 1957 that the cooperative was successfully reorganised as Fishing Two Village (Shekou Museum of Reform and Opening Up 2019).

Onshore but Not of the Land

Although islanders, fishermen, and boat-dwellers were assigned ‘villager’ status, they did not enjoy the same treatment and historical rights as farmers. Specifically, while farmers continued to have rights to cultivated land and housing plots via collectives that were based on historical settlements, fishermen lost their historical rights once they were relocated. In Shekou, for example, islanders were given berths only at local typhoon shelter wharfs and were not permitted to build housing on land. The question of where Inner Lingding Islanders were entitled to land arose because their jurisdiction had not been settled. In 1952, when Zhuhai was split from Zhongshan and redistricted as the fishermen’s county, it was given jurisdiction over Inner Lingding Island. However, islanders were already residents of the Shekou and Xixiang areas of Bao’an County since their resettlement in 1950. Neither Zhuhai nor Bao’an was willing to take responsibility for giving the islanders onshore plots. In Shekou, the islanders’ housing situation was only resolved in 1970, when Shekou Commune allocated a section of coastal land belonging to Wanxia Village (湾厦村) to the islanders. In Xixiang, those who came on land did not remain ‘fishermen’. Instead, housing plots were created through reclamation of coastal fishponds and polders, which were known as jiwei (基围). Islanders, fishermen, and boat-dwellers on the western Bao’an coast (from Xixiang to Shajing) who received these plots became ‘jiwei people’, living in shacks at the edges of landed villages. The main livelihood of jiwei villagers was raising fish, shrimp, and crab in coastal polders. As land reform deepened, jiwei people were divided into village units; however, because they did not have a traditional land residence, these new villages were given revolutionary names, including Turn Over (翻身村), Labour (劳动村), Freedom (自由村), Settled Happily (安乐村), Peace (和平村), Happy Together (共 乐村), and Democracy (民主村) villages.

In 1979, China Merchants established the Shekou Industrial Zone, which was set up for logistics and basic manufacturing. The new entity inherited not only the reorganised coastline, but also the rights to plan and develop it. Fishing One Village took advantage of Reform and Opening Up to pursue private enterprise, including selling seafood in Hong Kong and Shekou. That same year, Inner Lingding Island was reassigned to Shenzhen City. In 1989, based on its historical relationship with Inner Lingding Island, Fishing One raised 13 million yuan and borrowed 9 million yuan to invest in the construction of a resort on the island (Shekou Museum of Reform and Opening Up 2019). However, due to the unclear jurisdiction, there were frequent conflicts among Zhuhai, Shenzhen, and Fishing One over what residual rights villagers had. During a provincial survey meeting in 1993, Fishing One’s head, Zhou Dezai, angrily exclaimed: ‘We were born and raised in Bao’an for generations, and all of a sudden we have become Zhuhai people. What is the basis of this claim? I’ll die with eternal regrets’ (Shekou Museum of Reform and Opening Up 2019). His words proved prophetic and he died soon after. Unfortunately, it was not until his death that the Guangdong Provincial Government made greater efforts to clarify administrative oversight over Inner Lingding Island. It did not, however, return the islanders’ native holdings and the resort project was ultimately abandoned. 

***

Christian Vicedo, “China’s PAFMM Grey Zone Maritime Challenge to the Philippines,” East Asia Forum, 13 August 2020.

China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is key to understanding Beijing’s grey-zone operations in the South China Sea (SCS). The PAFMM is organised and linked to the People’s Liberation Army chain of command through the People’s Armed Forces Districts. PAFMM members are trained in maritime claims enforcementlogistics supportintelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and sabotage. Operating about 84 large vessels with reinforced hulls and water cannons, the PAFMM serves as China’s third force in the SCS.

The Philippines currently occupies nine features in the SCS. But through its PAFMM, China can prevent the Philippines from exercising sovereignty within and surrounding these features. Given precedents such as the seizure of the Paracels in 1974 and the occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995, the PAFMM may be employed to seize any of the Philippine-occupied features and to construct artificial islands and facilities on them. … … …

***

David R. Stilwell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “The South China Sea, Southeast Asia’s Patrimony, And Everybody’s Own Backyard,” Remarks at Center for Strategic and International Studies (Virtual), 14 July 2020.

Remarks as prepared

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Greg. I’m honored to join you. I commend CSIS for regularly convening leading thinkers on the Indo-Pacific and on the South China Sea in particular. Your work is an invaluable resource to us all.

This is a timely and important discussion. In recent months, while the world has focused on the fight against COVID-19, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has doubled-down on its campaign to impose an order of “might makes right” in the South China Sea. Beijing is working to undermine the sovereign rights of other coastal states and deny them access to offshore resources – resources that belong to those states, not to China. Beijing wants dominion for itself. It wants to replace international law with rule by threats and coercion.

In recent months, Beijing has sunk Vietnamese fishing vessels, sent an armed flotilla to harass Malaysian offshore energy exploration, and wielded maritime militia to surround Philippine outpostsBeijing has further militarized its artificial islands in the Spratlys with new aircraft deployments. It has announced unilateral fishing bans. It has conducted destabilizing military exercises in contested waters around disputed features. And it increasingly uses its artificial islands as bases for harassment operations – to curtail access of Southeast Asian coastal states to offshore oil, gas and fisheries.

We all know why this matters. By claiming “indisputable sovereignty” over an area larger than the Mediterranean and trampling the rights of others, Beijing threatens the existing order that has given Asia decades of prosperity. That order has been based on freedom and openness, ideas that Beijing opposes.

Nearly $4 trillion in trade transits the South China Sea each year. More than $1 trillion of that is linked to the U.S. market. The sea is home to an estimated $2.6 trillion in recoverable offshore oil and gas. It also has some of the world’s richest fishing grounds that employ an estimated 3.7 million people in coastal Southeast Asian states.

These resources are the birthright of Southeast Asian nations, the lifeblood of their coastal communities, and the livelihood of millions of their citizens. They are the inheritance of each nation’s children and grandchildren. Beijing’s behavior is an assault on the people of Southeast Asia today, and from generation to generation.

ANNIVERSARY OF TRIBUNAL RULING

This week marks the anniversary of a historic statement on international law in the South China Sea: the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling.

This case of peaceful arbitration was brought – with real courage – by the Philippines. And the verdict was unanimous: Beijing’s Nine-Dash line maritime claim has no basis in international law. The tribunal sided squarely with the Philippines on the bulk of its legal claims.

Beijing has since tried to delegitimize and ignore the verdict, despite its obligations to abide by it as a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Beijing likes to present itself as a champion of multilateralism and international institutions, but it has dismissed the verdict as “nothing more than a piece of paper.”

Only the gullible or the co-opted can still credit Beijing’s pretense of good global citizenship. Today we are hearing more and more voices raised against Beijing’s aggressiveness and unilateralism.

We welcome the clear insistence last month by Leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that South China Sea disputes should be resolved on the basis of international law, including UNCLOS.

The wider world is also speaking up and taking action, in recognition that Beijing’s actions pose the greatest threat to freedom of the seas anywhere on the planet. South China Sea issues have direct bearing on the future of the Arctic, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, and other vital waterways. What is at stake in the South China Sea has a direct impact on every nation and person who relies on freedom of the seas and the free movement of maritime commerce to ensure their nation’s prosperity.

U.S. POLICY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The United States has strengthened our own approach to the South China Sea.

Our policy is to champion a free and open Indo-Pacific in which all the region’s diverse nations can live and prosper in peace. Our policy appreciates the diversity of those nations. It defends sovereignty, independence, and pluralism. A free and open Indo-Pacific means a region where countries are secure in their sovereignty and equal in their shared use of the global commons. No hegemonic power dominates others or turns international waters into a zone of exclusion.

Our approach builds on America’s long record in the Pacific of preserving the peace, upholding freedom of the seas in line with international law, maintaining the unimpeded flow of commerce, and supporting peaceful settlement of disputes. These are important and abiding interests we share with our many allies and partners.

In recent years we have deepened our collaboration across the region. We have increased our maritime capacity-building support for Southeast Asian partners, reaffirmed alliances, and maintained a robust tempo of military activities to keep the peace. These include freedom-of-navigation operations, including five in the South China Sea so far this year; presence operations, including dual-carrier operations earlier this month; strategic bomber patrols; and combined operations and exercises with our allies and partners.

The United States continues to be the largest source of commercial investment in the region, by far. Our nearly $300 billion in annual trade in goods and services with the 650 million people of ASEAN help ensure the growing prosperity of that dynamic region. ASEAN nations now produce almost $3 trillion of annual GDP. Living standards have improved tremendously, thanks to ASEAN’s incredible energy, and a global system that has long sustained stability, security, and prosperity.

Yesterday, Secretary Pompeo announced an important step to strengthen our policy, and to stand firmly with our Southeast Asian partners in defense of their sovereign rights. The Secretary issued a statement of policy on maritime claims in the South China Sea, on the occasion of the anniversary of the 2016 tribunal ruling. Since that ruling, we have said that it is “final and legally binding” on both parties, China and the Philippines. This announcement goes further, to make clear: The PRC has no right to bully Southeast Asian states for their offshore resources.

Specifically, Secretary Pompeo said three main things:

First, the PRC has no lawful maritime claim vis-a-vis the Philippines over waters determined by the Tribunal to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf. Within those areas, Beijing’s harassment of Philippine fisheries and offshore energy development is unlawful, as are any unilateral PRC actions to exploit those resources. Nor does the PRC have a legal claim to Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal, both of which are under Philippines jurisdiction.

Second, because Beijing has failed to put forth a lawful, coherent maritime claim in the South China Sea, the United States rejects any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands. This means that the United States rejects any PRC maritime claim in the waters surrounding Vanguard Bank (off Vietnam), Luconia Shoals (off Malaysia), Natuna Besar (off Indonesia), or in the waters of Brunei’s EEZ. Any PRC action to harass other states’ fishing or hydrocarbon development — or to unilaterally carry out such activities on its own – is unlawful. Period.

Third, the PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to James Shoal, off Malaysia. This one deserves a moment of study. James Shoal is a submerged feature on the sea floor some 20 meters beneath the surface. It is also only 50 nautical miles from Malaysia – and over 1,000 nautical miles from the Chinese mainland. Yet Beijing claims it as the “southernmost point of China”! The claim is absurd – appearing to derive from an erroneous old British atlas and a subsequent translation error, suggesting the underwater shoal was actually a sandbank above the waves. But it isn’t. And yet Beijing’s propaganda touts James Shoal as PRC territory and PLA Navy ships deploy there to stage ostentatious oath-swearing ceremonies. International law is clear: An underwater feature gives no rights. James Shoal is not and never was Chinese territory, nor can Beijing assert any lawful maritime rights from such spurious claims.

In all these cases, the United States stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in upholding their sovereign rights, and with all the rest of the law-abiding world in defending the freedom of the seas. As the Secretary has said, the world cannot – and will not – allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire.

BEIJING’S PLAYBOOK

Let me briefly raise four other important aspects of the South China Sea issue: (1) the role of Beijing’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs); (2) the negotiations between China and ASEAN over a Code of Conduct; (3) Beijing’s push for “joint development” of Southeast Asian resources; and (4) Beijing’s campaign for a seat on the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).

First, on state-owned enterprises: In the South China Sea, as elsewhere, Beijing has used state-owned enterprises as tools of economic coercion and international abuse.

They have been used to dredge, construct, and militarize the PRC’s artificial island fortresses in the Spratlys, from which Beijing now violates the exclusive economic zones of Southeast Asian states. One of Beijing’s leading infrastructure contractors that works all around the world – China Construction & Communications Corporation, or CCCC – led the dredging for Beijing’s South China Sea military bases, with terribly destructive effects on the marine environment and regional stability.

State-owned enterprises have been used as battering rams to attempt to enforce Beijing’s unlawful “Nine Dashed Line.” China National Offshore Oil Corporation, or CNOOC, used its mammoth survey rig HD-981 to try intimidating Vietnam off the Paracel islands in 2014. It is telling that CNOOC’s chief executive touted that oil rig as “mobile national territory.” The implications of such a statement should give pause to every nation that relies on the freedom of the seas for prosperity and security.

Other PRC commercial survey ships and rigs have been sent repeatedly into Southeast Asian waters in which China has no rights. Numerous PRC state-owned tourism, telecom, fisheries and banking firms invest in ways to enable Beijing’s unlawful claims and bullying. PRC fishing fleets in the South China Sea often operate as maritime militia under the direction of  China’s military, harassing and intimidating others as a tool of violent state coercion.

These state-owned enterprises are PRC instruments of abuse, and we should highlight their improper behavior. We should also shine light on how these companies operate around the world, including across Southeast Asia and in the United States. In all our societies, citizens deserve to know the differences between commercial enterprises and instruments of foreign state power. These state enterprises are modern-day equivalents of the East India Company.

Second, on Code of Conduct talks: There are clear red flags about Beijing’s intentions. For years Beijing has insisted that ASEAN states keep silent on the proceedings. Press reports have shown why: Behind closed doors, the PRC has pushed ASEAN states to accept limits on core matters of national interest.

These include limits on who ASEAN states can partner with for military exercises and offshore oil and gas work. Beijing is also pressuring ASEAN nations to cut ties with “outside” states and to dilute references to international law. These are demands of a bully, not a friendly neighbor. Beijing may have backed off its arbitrary 2021 deadline for concluding the talks, but its hegemonic goals remain.

U.S. interests are clearly at stake in the Code of Conduct process, as are those of all states who value freedom of the seas. A Code of Conduct that in any way legitimates Beijing’s reclamation, militarization, or unlawful maritime claims would be severely damaging, and unacceptable for many nations. We urge greater transparency in the Code of Conduct process to ensure a positive outcome that is fully consistent with the principles enshrined in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Third, on “joint development” deals: The PRC seeks to dominate the South China Sea’s oil and gas resources. To achieve this, Beijing is pursuing a campaign to deny Southeast Asian states access to desperately needed oil and gas resources except through “joint development” deals that disadvantage the smaller parties – that is, the non-Chinese parties.

The PRC gambit works like this. By aggressively deploying military forces, maritime militia, state-directed oil rigs and the like, Beijing tries to drive up risk for energy firms that want to operate in the South China Sea, in hopes of pushing out foreign competition. Once accomplished, Beijing pushes other states to accept “joint development” with its own state-owned firms, saying “if you want to develop those resources off your coast, your only option is to do so with us.” These are gangster tactics.

The United States supports nations in standing up for their sovereign rights and interests, and in resisting pressure to accept any deal whereby the PRC pushes its way into a share of offshore resources it has no right to claim.

Fourth, on the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea: Beijing is running an uncontested candidate for a judge’s position on this tribunal at an election currently slated for late August/early September.

Like the Arbitral Tribunal that ruled against Beijing in 2016, the International Tribunal is established under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Electing a PRC official to this body is like hiring an arsonist to help run the Fire Department.

We urge all countries involved in the upcoming International Tribunal election to carefully assess the credentials of the PRC candidate and consider whether a PRC judge on the Tribunal will help or hinder international maritime law. Given Beijing’s record, the answer should be clear.

THE GLOBAL SCOURGE OF PRC BULLYING

There are lessons here that apply well beyond the Western Pacific. When Beijing uses coercion, empty promises, disinformation, contempt for rules, bad-faith diplomacy, and other underhanded tactics in the South China Sea, it is drawing on a playbook that it uses worldwide.

We see it in the East China Sea and around Taiwan, where Beijing has expanded its maritime provocations and threatening sorties. We see it in the Himalayas, where Beijing recently took aggressive action on its frontiers with India. We see it along the Mekong River, where Beijing has used its massive cascade of dams to hold back water from downstream neighbors in Southeast Asia, contributing to the worst drought in the Mekong’s recorded history. I urge everyone to read the recent report from the Stimson Center, “New Evidence: How China Turned Off the Tap on the Mekong River.”

But Beijing’s aggressive mode of operation is visible not only in other disputes over territory and natural resources.

It is also visible in Hong Kong, where Beijing’s new national security law flouts its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 – an agreement now derided by PRC officials as nothing but a scrap of paper.  Just as they said about the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling on the South China Sea.

Aggressive behavior is Beijing’s general approach to international organizations. When the South China Sea came up at an ASEAN meeting in 2010, Beijing’s top diplomat thundered at his Southeast Asian counterparts: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.” This sort of contempt helps explain Beijing’s subversion of international institutions from the World Health Organization to Interpol, the World Trade Organization and beyond.

A few years ago, many believed that Beijing’s South China Sea abuses were mostly a local phenomenon, a kind of limited indulgence for a rising power finding its way in the world. Today we know that the Chinese Communist Party’s neo-imperial ways aren’t incidental to its character but are an essential feature of a nationalist and Marxist-Leninist mindset. Beijing wants to dominate its immediate neighborhood – and eventually impose its will and its rules on your neighborhood too, wherever you may be.

You could be a university student in Australia, a book publisher in Europe, or the general manager of an NBA franchise in Houston. You might work for an international hotel chain, a German car company, or a U.S. airline. You could be a 5G customer in Britain – or anywhere else in the world. Wherever you are, Beijing increasingly wants to stake claims, coerce, and control. By its nature, it cannot accept a pluralistic world with fundamental freedoms of choice and conscience.

The South China Sea, then, is less a faraway exception and more a sign and a threat of how the Chinese Communist Party will seek to act – unless it faces pushback. So it is good to see a wide range of countries increasingly stand against Beijing’s abuses, on a range of fronts including the South China Sea.

At the United Nations, a succession of formal declarations by Southeast Asian coastal states show clear resolve to uphold international law and reject pressure to accept Beijing’s unlawful claims. These include Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia in the past months alone.

Likewise, the United States and other countries have raised concerns for the first time in the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly over the dangers of PRC actions in the South China Sea.

Australia, Britain, France, Germany and India have all recently issued statements of unprecedented concern over South China Sea activities by Beijing that put regional stability and international law at risk. Meanwhile we see promising new defense and security arrangements among allies and partners from Australia to Southeast Asia, Japan and India.

As mentioned, all the Leaders of ASEAN last month insisted that South China Sea disputes must be resolved on the basis of international law, including UNCLOS.

I’ll close by citing the statement put out Sunday by the Philippines on the fourth anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal ruling. “The arbitration case initiated and overwhelmingly won by the Republic of the Philippines versus the People’s Republic of China is a contribution of great significance and consequence to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea and to the peace and stability of the region at large. . . . The arbitral tribunal’s award of 12 July 2016 represents a victory, not just for the Philippines, but for the entire community of consistently law-abiding nations.”

For our part, the United States is resolved to protect our vital interests and those of our allies and friends. We are building our military capabilities. We are vigilant. We are exercising and operating wherever international law allows. We are strengthening ties with our friends. We stand ready to help bolster the military capabilities of concerned nations. We support multilateral diplomatic efforts to resist PRC encroachments. And we are providing economic options to underscore that nations need not depend on initiatives from Beijing that are fundamentally predatory.

The community of law-abiding nations will indeed stand together. For a free and open South China Sea, a free and open Indo-Pacific, and a free and open world.

Many thanks for your time. I welcome your questions.

***

Derek Grossman and Logan Ma, “A Short History of China’s Fishing Militia and What it May Tell Us,” Maritime Issues, 6 April 2020.

If history is a good indication of what to expect in the future, then Beijing is likely to double down on the Maritime Militia in virtually any scenario imaginable. That means it should be a force to be reckoned in the years to come.

China’s armed fishing militia—officially called the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) by the U.S. Department of Defense—plays an instrumental role in Beijing’s strategy to enforce its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea. PAFMM is a government-supported armed fishing force of unknown strength that resides under the direct command and control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It has existed for decades and augments Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and PLA Navy (PLAN) operations in the region.

PAFMM plays a particularly important role in establishing a de facto Chinese operating presence in disputed areas—in effect, changing the facts on the ground, or at sea, as it were—to challenge counter-claimants’ ability to maintain control over disputed features. These classic “gray zone” operations are designed to “win without fighting” by overwhelming the adversary with swarms of fishing vessels usually bolstered from the rear together with CCG, and possibly PLAN ships, depending on the contingency, in escalatory concentric rings.

But the very existence of maritime militia in China is highly unique, given that the only other country that has one for sovereignty disputes is neighboring Vietnam. Indeed, Hanoi officially created its own maritime militia force in 2009 for the singular purpose of competing directly with PAFMM in an ongoing “people’s war at sea.”[1] It is therefore worth asking: why did Beijing create a maritime militia to begin with and how has PAFMM evolved over time? What does this history suggest about its future? … …

“Little Blue Men” At Work

What began as a coastal patrol and surveillance force eventually evolved into a maritime sovereignty support force by the 1970s. The PRC’s “little blue men” increasingly acquired the roles of maritime rescue, combat operations, anti-smuggling, and, ultimately, sovereignty enforcement.

Regarding Chinese sovereignty enforcement operations, early PAFMM forces demonstrated their significant contributions to island seizure campaigns starting in January 1974 with the Battle of the Paracel Islands against South Vietnam. In truth, Beijing did not have much of a PLAN to speak of in 1974, and perhaps the PAFMM was more capable of amphibious operations than the navy itself. Either way, the presence of Chinese fishing vessels around the Paracels slowed down South Vietnamese decision-making on the use of force against PAFMM as well as their response times to counter PLAN maneuvers. Additional time allowed Beijing to coordinate more effectively. When two fishing trawlers delivered 500 PLA troops to the Western Paracels, it resulted in the immediate surrender of the South Vietnamese soldiers defending the disputed features.

A key lesson learned for Beijing was that leveraging fishing militia forces was far less likely to trigger U.S. intervention in the matter even when the threatened neighbor was a U.S. ally. It is fair to say that this was the genesis of Beijing’s strategy to routinely employ irregular forces in gray zone operations in the East China Sea and South China Sea. PAFMM’s debut on the world stage was a resounding success, elevating the narrative that fishing militia forces were essential to the success of China’s maritime strategy in the South China Sea. Following the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974, the PAFMM has been observed in nearly every major PLAN and CCG operation to harass maritime counter-claimants at disputed features or to seize the features from them.

Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy have carefully catalogued PAFMM activities in support of the CCG and PLAN since 1974.[4] Among these incidents, the PAFMM in 1978 engaged in swarming operations at the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, disputed with Japan, and since 2016 the militia ramped up their presence there. Erickson and Kennedy note the proliferation of incidents in the South China Sea since the Battle of the Paracels, to include PRC seizure of Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 1995 and 2012 respectively. Beijing also attempted to blockade Manila’s resupply mission of Second Thomas Shoal in 2014, and since 2017, has harassed Filipino fishermen at Sandy Cay and nearby Thitu (Pagasa) Island. PAFMM has also routinely bothered Vietnamese vessels, and in May 2014 helped enforce Beijing’s emplacement of the Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig in disputed waters by ramming Vietnamese fishing and coast guard vessels. Separately, Beijing appears confident that PAFMM harassment of the U.S. naval ships is below the threshold of a forceful and escalatory response. It has consequently employed fishing militia against the USNS Impeccable in 2009 as well as the Howard O. Lorenzen in 2014.

What Might the Future Hold for PAFMM?

PAFMM has evolved from being a small and near seas force to a robust and critical element of China’s national maritime strategy. The fact that PAFMM has not only survived, but thrived, during the PRC’s naval modernization beginning in the 1980s, implies that further modernization prioritizing increasingly advanced systems will not necessarily reduce PAFMM’s value over time. Actually, the opposite seems to be the case—that is, PAFMM’s role will likely grow in parallel with the PLAN and CCG to better support their operations. PAFMM’s humble origins as a product of collectivization and the Soviet “Young School” also suggest that if China experiences slowing military modernization due to economic or other circumstances, Beijing could instead rely more heavily upon PAFMM as a cheaper and lower technology alternative to sovereignty disputes and coastal defense. If history is a good indication of what to expect in the future, then Beijing is likely to double down on the PAFMM in virtually any scenario imaginable. That means it should be a force to be reckoned in the years to come.

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “Office of Naval Intelligence Just Published Latest China & Russia Maritime Ship Recognition Guides,” China Analysis from Original Sources 以第一手资料研究中国, 19 February 2020.

Check them out! Click here to access the China and Russia government naval/maritime ship recognition guide graphics that the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence just published!

***

アンドリュー・S・エリクソン (編集), ライアン・D・マーティンソン (編集), 五味 睦佳 (翻訳), 大野 慶二 (翻訳), 木村 初夫 (翻訳), 五島 浩司 (翻訳), 杉本 正彦 (翻訳), 武居 智久 (翻訳), 山本 勝也 (翻訳[Andrew S. Erickson (Editor), Ryan D. Martinson (Editor), Gumi Mutsuka (Translator), Ohno Keiji (Translator), Kimura Hatsuo (Translator), Goto Koji (Translator), Sugimoto Masahiko (Translator), Tomohisa Takei (translator), and Katsuya Yamamoto (translator)]; 中国の海洋強国戦略:グレーゾーン作戦と展開 (日本語) [China’s Maritime Power Strategy: Strategy and Deployment in Gray Zone (Japanese translation of China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations)] (Tokyo: 原書房 [Hara Shobo Press], 2020).

中国の海洋強国戦略:グレーゾーン作戦と展開 (日本語) 単行本 – 2020/3/19

アンドリュー・S・エリクソン (編集), ライアン・D・マーティンソン (編集), 五味 睦佳 (翻訳), 大野 慶二 (翻訳), 木村 初夫 (翻訳), 五島 浩司 (翻訳), 杉本 正彦 (翻訳), 武居 智久 (翻訳), 山本 勝也 (翻訳)

商品の説明

内容紹介

中国の沿岸警備隊に相当する海警局、そして海上民兵による軍事力や戦略・組織について、米海軍大学など世界の専門家がはじめて体系的に分析・紹介。日本にとっても注意が必要な中国の「グレーゾーン」戦略を知る最高の一書といえる。

内容(「BOOK」データベースより)

東シナ海・南シナ海に展開する準海軍「中国海警局」や「中国海上民兵」の実態と係争海域の実効支配を視野に入れた展開のすべて。米海軍大学の専門研究機関があらゆる角度から分析・詳述した決定版!

登録情報


中国の沿岸警備隊に相当する海警局、そして海上民兵による軍事力や戦略・組織について、米海軍大学など世界の専門家がはじめて体系的に分析・紹介。日本にとっても注意が必要な中国の「グレーゾーン」戦略を知る最高の一書。著者・編者紹介

【著者】
モーガン・クレメンス (Morgan Clemens)
SOS International LLCの研究アナリスト。
ピーター・A・ダットン(Peter A.Dutton)
退役米国海軍中佐および法務官、米国海軍大学中国海事研究所(CMSI)所長。
マシュー・P・フネオーレ(Matthew P.Funaiole)
戦略国際問題研究所(CSIS)チャイナ・パワー(中国実力)プレジェクト・フェロー。
ボニー・S・グレイサー(Bonnie S.Glaser)
戦略国際問題研究所アジア担当上級顧問およびチャイナ・パワープロジェクト・ディレクター。
ジョシュア・ヒッキー(Joshua Hickey)
米国海軍省上級分析官(15年以上の専門経験)。
ヘンリー・ホルスト(Henry Holst)
米国海軍省下級分析官。
コナー・M・ケネディ(Conor M.Kennedy)
米国海軍大学中国海事研究所研究員。
アダム・P・リフ(Adam P.Liff)
インディアナ大学グローバル国際問題研究校助教授兼ハーバード大学ライシャワー日本研究所研究員。
マイケル・マザール(Michael Mazarr)
ランド研究所アロヨセンター戦略・ドクトリンプログラムの上級政治学者およびアソシエイト・ディレクター。
バーナード・モアランド(Bernard Moreland)
退役米国沿岸警備隊大佐、米国沿岸警備隊の最初の元北京連絡官。米国太平洋艦隊司令部上級情報分析官。
ライル・J・モリス(Lyle J.Morris)
ランド研究所上級政策アナリスト。
ジョナサン・G・オドム(Jonathan G.Odom)
米国海軍中佐、ダニエル・K・イノウエ・アジア太平洋安全保障研究所法務官兼軍事教授。
マイケル・B・ピーターセン(Michael B.Petersen)
米国海軍大学ロシア海事研究所初代所長兼米国海軍大学海軍作戦研究センター准教授。
デール・C・リエーレ(Dale C.Rielage)
退役米国海軍大佐。米国太平洋艦隊インテリジェンス・情報作戦担当部長。
マーク・A・ストークス(Mark A.Stokes)
退役米国空軍中佐。Project 2049 Institute事務局長。
オースティン・M・ストランジ(Austin M.Strange)
ハーバード大学政治学部博士(PhD)課程。
スコット・H・スウィフト(Scott H.Swift)
退役米国海軍大将、元米国太平洋艦隊司令官(2015~2018年)。
武居智久
退役海上自衛隊海将、元第32代海上幕僚長(37年間の海上自衛隊経験)。現在、米国海軍大学教授兼米国海軍作戦部長特別インターナショナルフェロー。
マイケル・ウェーバー(Michael Weber)
米国議会調査部外交問題アナリストおよび大統領管理フェロー。
山本勝也
海上自衛隊1等海佐、元在北京日本国大使館防衛駐在官。米国海軍大学連絡官兼国際軍事教授(執筆時)。

【編者】
アンドリュー・S・エリクソン(Andrew S.Erickson)
米国海軍大学中国海事研究所戦略担当教授兼ハーバード大学ファエバンク中国研究所研究員。
ライアン・D・マーティンソン(Ryan D.Martinson)
米国海軍大学中国海事研究所助教授。

目次

序文
監訳者所感

序論 「砲煙なき戦争」

第I部 グレーゾーンの概念化
第1章 中国の海上グレーゾーン
第2章 中国の海上グレーゾーン作戦の概念化
第3章 海上民兵は海上における人民戦争(海上人民戦争)を実行しているのか
第4章 グレーゾーンが国際法の基本原則に抵触するとき

第II部 中国海警局とグレーゾーン
第5章 グレーゾーンのための組織改編
第6章 海上グレーゾーンにおける海警局作戦の軍事化
第7章 中国の海上法執行海上プラットフォーム

第III部 中国の海上民兵とグレーゾーン
第8章 権益擁護対戦闘
第9章 中国の海上民兵と偵察・攻撃作戦
第10章 ブルーテリトリー(外洋領域)におけるグレー軍

第IV部 近海グレーゾーンのシナリオ
第11章 南シナ海
第12章 東シナ海における中国の海上グレーゾーン作戦と日本の対応
第13章 東シナ海

第V部 グレーゾーン政策の課題と提言事項
第14章 グレーゾーンの作戦における時間的要素
第15章 中国のグレーゾーン作戦行動への対応における抑止の役割
第16章 中国との紛争管理における事例研究としてのベトナムおよびフィリピン
結論 グレーゾーンにおける米国のシーパワーの決定的使用のための選択肢

謝辞
略語集
著訳者紹介
原注

カスタマーレビュー

5つ星のうち5.0

星5つ中の5

5つ星のうち5.0 日本ではほとんど知られていない中国海上民兵の実態を明らかにしている貴重な本。

2020年3月27日に日本でレビュー済み

グレーゾーン作戦は、戦争状態と平時の状態の間をうまく利用して、本格的な軍事行動を敵国にとらせないために実施されるものということらしい。中国共産党は、米国海軍と正面から戦っても勝てないことを良く理解している。戦争に至らないグレーゾーンで正規海軍が手が出せないように行動し、少しづつ権益を確保して、最終的には領土をかすめ取ろうという中国共産党のやり口が理解できた。
日本の領土である尖閣列島も、常時中国海警局の艦船が領海を脅かす活動を実施している。中国海警局と言っても組織的には人民解放軍海軍と密接につながっており、ほとんど海軍といってもいい組織である。
中国共産党は、中国海警局を諸外国には沿岸警備隊と称しているが、装備的には戦闘艦と同じである。
また、その下部組織に中国海上民兵という組織があり、彼らは、通常普通の経済活動(漁業や海運)を実施していて上から指示があれば、中国海警局と連携して行動することにはあまり知られていないことだ。お笑いともいえるのは、ベトナムへの嫌がらせ行為を行う中で、漁船の場合には迷彩服を着て威圧する、しかし海軍が出てくると漁民の作業服を着て相手を騙す手法である。
敵をうまくだまして勝とうとする戦略は、まさに孫氏の兵法にのっとったものだろう。日本も学ぶべきだ。

2人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています

***

Chris Rahman, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources & Security; review of Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, eds., China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019); Marine Policy 110 (December 2019).

China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations is the seventh edited volume in the Studies in Chinese Maritime Development series published in collaboration with the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. In common with its predecessors this book has been produced to a consistently high standard. Collectively the series represents some of the leading available scholarship on China’s maritime power. This most recent volume is both focused and timely, addressing China’s strategy of coercively manipulating changes to the geopolitical status quo in East Asian waters via the employment of maritime operations in the ‘gray zone.’ The book comprises 16 concise chapters plus an introduction and conclusion, and is divided into five parts. The first part conceptualizes the gray zone itself. The next two focus on the primary instruments used in the strategy: the white hulls of the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the ‘blue hulls’ of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), respectively. Part four addresses possible scenarios for the next stage of gray zone operations based on analysis of China’s tactics in the two seas thus far. The final part comprises three short analyses: the temporal factor in gray zone operations, deterrence and the gray zone, and the different approaches taken by Vietnam and the Philippines in response to China’s strategy. Well-conceived maps and diagrams complete the whole.

The ‘gray zone’ is one of those trendy terms which periodically take hold within defence circles and associated strategic studies institutions. The intent is to describe situations of political and strategic competition which fall into the gray area separating peace and war; or, more accurately, between ‘normal’ peacetime conditions and outright armed conflict. Like much trendy terminology, the ‘gray zone’ describes a phenomenon which is hardly new, even in the maritime environment: the so-called ‘Cod Wars’ between Iceland and the United Kingdom are obvious examples. However, China’s strategy over the past decade to consolidate, and stretch, its claims to disputed territories, marine resources and maritime jurisdiction in both the East China Sea and South China Sea, has taken the practice of maritime gray zone operations to an unprecedented level of effort and scope of objective. China’s public rationales are couched in terms of safeguarding rights and interests at sea or ‘maritime rights protection.’ At face value, such rationales are neither unreasonable nor illegitimate objectives for any coastal state. The reality of Beijing’s expansive vision of its maritime rights, however, in practice exceeds any reasonable test of legitimacy; and indeed, following the Arbitral Tribunal’s July 2016 decision in the Philippines-China South China Sea case, lawfulness. Beijing’s objective in pursuing ‘maritime rights protection’ is nothing short of total political, strategic and economic control of the seas abutting mainland China’s coastline, to transform those seas into a veritable Chinese lake.

In the first chapter of Part I Michael B. Petersen thus defines the gray zone strategy employed by China to accomplish its objective as emphasizing ‘the nonlethal diplomatic, informational, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement, and irregular force means of compellence’ (p. 17). Michael Mazarr’s chapter on the role of deterrence in countering China’s strategy further elaborates on the concept, arguing that gray zone campaigns are attempts at strategic revisionism which avoid ‘crossing key thresholds that would prompt escalation’ (pp. 256–257). Mazarr identifies four key characteristics of gray zone campaigns: an aggressive pursuit of objectives, gradual in implementation, avoidance of escalation thresholds, and a preference for utilizing ‘nonmilitary tools’ (p. 257). Ambiguity and a difficulty in easily attributing responsibility for individual actions also are elements of gray zone operations. That is why China has demonstrated a preference for using the PAFMM as the vanguard of its maritime gray zone operations, supported, often from a distance, by coast guard vessels, which in turn are often supported, at a minimum implicitly, by naval forces usually positioned further away over the horizon from the operation in question.

In Part II Lyle J. Morris explains how four separate maritime law enforcement agencies were combined in 2013 into the CCG under the civilian State Oceanic Administration. He argues that integration has not been fully effective and many limitations remain, although, as the book as a whole demonstrates, this has not impeded the success of the gray zone strategy. Ryan D. Martinson further demonstrates how the CCG has become increasingly militarized, however, with one of the four agencies, China Maritime Police, part of the People’s Armed Police (PAP – an arm of China’s armed forces), taking a more prominent role. That process of militarization was completed in 2018 with the transfer of the CCG to PAP command.

The development of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia into the frontline force for China’s gray zone operations in East Asian seas is established in Part III. Whilst the PAFMM is not new, with militia playing an integral role in the national defence mobilization system throughout the Communist era, China has placed far more emphasis upon it in asserting its maritime claims over the past decade. Morgan Clemens and Michael Weber explain how the PAFMM operates under a dual military-civilian structure. On the civilian side this corresponds to the Communist Party administrative structures at different levels of government; and on the military side to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) counterpart territorial administrative arrangements. At each administrative level ‘the two halves are bound together’ by national defence mobilization committees (p. 136). With the maritime militia, especially, this structure sometimes encompasses individual enterprises, such as fishing companies or other maritime industry. The use of fishing boats sometimes tasked to the PAFMM for maritime rights protection thus exacerbates the ambiguity and attribution problem, and places the onus on other parties to escalate an incident, in which case China can respond with ever greater levels of coercion. The attribution issue has been particularly difficult in incidents involving Chinese fishing vessels in the East China Sea, as Katsuya Yamamoto’s later chapter explains: ‘ … if a vessel does not display any definitive symbol of militia activities, it can be difficult to determine instantly whether it is an ordinary fishing boat or a PAFMM unit’ (p. 237). Elsewhere, on the other hand, certain PAFMM units are increasingly recognizable, such as the unit from Sansha City in the disputed Paracel island group in the South China Sea, which operates 84 purpose-built vessels exclusively for rights protection duties; not for fishing or other economic activities.

Conor M. Kennedy establishes in more detail the types of operations performed by the PAFMM: presence, in large part to assert China’s claims; harassment and sabotage; escort of purely civilian vessels operating in disputed waters; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The PAFMM also exists to support the PLA in more intense warfighting missions. However, as Clemens and Weber argue, it is poorly equipped and trained for such tasks; and actions to remedy the situation would paradoxically ‘degrade those very … attributes … that make the maritime militia so useful and effective in prosecuting gray zone missions … ’ (p. 150). Jonathan G. Odom’s chapter assesses the status of the PAFMM under international law. Importantly he concludes that PAFMM actions are ‘legally attributable to the PRC’ and are often inconsistent with several aspects of international law (p. 67). The U.S. Navy seems to be listening, with its chief reportedly warning his Chinese counterpart in January 2019 that U.S. forces would treat PAFMM or CCG actions no differently to those of the PLA Navy itself.

While some chapters identify many weaknesses in both the PAFMM and CCG, as well as in the joint command and coordination effectiveness linking China’s three maritime forces, the book tells an overarching story of the success of China’s maritime gray zone operations in fulfilling its regional objectives thus far, especially in the South China Sea. This collection is without doubt the most comprehensive source available on the subject, providing a uniformly excellent quality of scholarship. As with any work that makes extensive use of foreign language materials, there is the occasional minor inconsistency in transliteration between chapters. And, as is common in dealing with mainland Chinese sources on sensitive issues, it is not clear just how authoritative much of the source material actually is. On the other hand, China’s well-documented actions in disputed waters provide ample evidence to support this volume’s arguments. Given the very recent changes outlined in the book, this is a story that will continue to unfold, but as a guide to understand the slow-burning crisis in East Asian seas so far, China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations is highly recommended.

Chris Rahman, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources & Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia E-mail address: crahman@uow.edu.au.

***

RECENT HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL STATEMENTS:

Vice President Pence deserves great credit for becoming the highest U.S. official ever to publicly call out China’s Maritime Militia! A most welcome capstone to five-plus years’ CMSI research on China’s Third Sea Force.

Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Frederic V. Malek Memorial Lecture,” sponsored by Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Conrad Hotel, Washington, DC, 24 October 2019.

Click here to watch the video on C-SPAN.

“…Beijing has stepped up its use of what they call ‘maritime militia’ vessels to regularly menace Filipino and Malaysian sailors and fishermen. And the Chinese Coast Guard has tried to strong-arm Vietnam from drilling for oil and natural gas off of Vietnam’s own shores.”

***

Statement of Assistant Secretary David R. Stilwell, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, Washington, DC, 16 October 2019.

“We remain skeptical of the PRC’s sincerity to negotiate a meaningful Code of Conduct that reinforces international law. While claiming that they are committed to peaceful diplomacy, the reality is that Chinese leaders – through the PLA navy, law enforcement agencies, and maritime militia – continue to intimidate and bully other countries. Their constant harassment of Vietnamese assets around Vanguard Bank is a case in point. If it is used by the PRC to legitimize its egregious behavior and unlawful maritime claims, and to evade the commitments Beijing signed up to under international law, a Code of Conduct would be harmful to the region, and to all who value freedom of the seas.”

***

David R. Stilwell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 18 September 2019.

… …

Beijing’s Malign Conduct

Finally, while the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy has made significant progress to reinforce and advance the free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region, we are increasingly concerned that some are actively seeking to challenge this order. We are committed to working with any country that plays by the rules, but we will also stand up to any country that uses predatory practices to undermine them.

As the President’s National Security Strategy makes clear, we are especially concerned by Beijing’s use of market-distorting economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and intimidation to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. Beijing’s pursuit of a repressive alternative vision for the Indo-Pacific seeks to reorder the region in its favor and has put China in a position of strategic competition with all who seek to preserve a free and open order of sovereign, diverse nations.

Since early July, Chinese vessels have conducted maritime surveys near Vanguard Bank with armed Coast Guard escorts and maritime militia in order to intimidate Vietnam and other ASEAN states away from developing oil and gas resources in the South China Sea. Through repeated illegal actions and militarization of disputed features, Beijing has and continues to take actions to prevent ASEAN members from accessing over $2.5 trillion in recoverable energy reserves. … …

***

Jessica Chen Weiss, “What China’s Assertiveness in the South China Sea Means—And What Comes Next,” The Monkey Cage, Washington Post, 30 May 2019.

China’s ‘maritime gray zone operations’ target U.S. naval vessels.

On Wednesday, General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., chairman of the Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked that despite assurances that there would be no moves to militarize the South China Sea, China had built “10,000-foot runways, ammunition storage facilities” — and routinely deployed aviation and missile defense capabilities. U.S. naval vessels operating in East Asia report being shadowed and harassed by China’s maritime forces. The Royal Australian Navy flagship Canberra also reported a recent encounter in the South China Sea while trailed by a Chinese warship: Its helicopter pilots were hit with lasers from what appeared to be fishing vessels.

To put these and other recent events in context, I reached out to two experts: Andrew S. Erickson, a professor at the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, and Ryan D. Martinson, a researcher at CMSI. They are the editors of the book “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations” (U.S. Naval Institute, 2019). What follows is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation:

Jessica Chen Weiss: The trade war has dominated headlines in U.S.-China relations, but what’s the state of play between the United States and China in the South China Sea? How has China’s artificial enlargement of islands and reefs affected U.S. operations and interests?

Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson: While tariff disputes dominate world news, territorial disputes in the South China Sea remain a key flash point in U.S.-China relations. Beijing maintains a claim to all of the space within a “dashed line” enclosing most of the South China Sea — including hundreds of tiny islands and reefs. China also believes it has the right to engage in military, scientific and economic activity anywhere within this zone, and to limit at least some these same activities by other countries. Over the last decade or so, Beijing has vigorously asserted these claims. Instead of using its navy, it has relied on coast guard and maritime militia forces, operating in the “gray zone” between war and peace. … … …

JCW: The U.S. Navy recently warned that it would treat Chinese coast guard and paramilitary vessels the same as the Chinese navy. What’s behind this development?

ASE/RDM: The U.S. Navy recognizes that China has not one but three sea forces, which act increasingly in coordination. Within that division of labor, China’s navy has sought prestigious engagement and substantive learning opportunities with the U.S. Navy as Beijing’s “good cop” at sea, while China’s coast guard and maritime militia “bad cops” bully its neighbors over disputed features and waters and harass the U.S. Navy’s own ships. But now the days of Washington letting Beijing have it both ways are over.

U.S. officials have been making similar statements for months now — then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis in November called for China’s maritime militia to “operate in a safe and professional manner in accordance with international law.” Assistant Defense Secretary Randall Schriver made a similar statement in a December interview. Their statements built on reports from the Pentagon and other agencies that exposed the maritime militia’s military nature and activities. These efforts to treat China’s three sea forces holistically and oppose their gray zone expansionism draw substantially on research conducted at CMSI over the past five years.

China has pursued a variety of coercive, competitive activities short of using force in the South China Sea. Which of these “gray zone activities” will the United States be more likely to succeed at deterring, and which will the United States probably have to live with?

ASE/RDM: That’s a great question, and one that Michael Mazarr addresses in our new book. … … …

***

Humphrey Hawksley, Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea and the Strategy of Chinese Expansion (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2018), 194-97.

Humphrey Hawksley, Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea and the Strategy of Chinese Expansion (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2018), 194.

Humphrey Hawksley, Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea and the Strategy of Chinese Expansion (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2018), 195.

Humphrey Hawksley, Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea and the Strategy of Chinese Expansion (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2018), 196.

Humphrey Hawksley, Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea and the Strategy of Chinese Expansion (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2018), 197.

***

Prashanth Parameswaran, “Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson on China and the Maritime Gray Zone,” The Diplomat, 14 May 2019.

How China thinks about and acts in the maritime gray zone, and what that means for the region’s future.

Over the past few years, as China has continued its expansion in the maritime domain, scholars and practitioners alike have honed in on the subject of how Beijing operates in the so-called “gray zone” between war and peace, staying below the threshold of armed conflict to secure gains while not provoking military responses by others, including the United States. Understanding the dynamics of this has important implications not only for particular maritime spaces, such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea, but also for broader issues such as the management of U.S.-China competition and wider regional peace and stability.

The Diplomat’s senior editor, Prashanth Parameswaran, recently spoke to Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson, both affiliated with the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, about how China thinks about and acts in the maritime gray zone and what that might mean for the region’s future. The discussion was framed around the release of a new edited volume by the authors in March entitled China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.

One of the core contributions of the book is providing a detailed and systematic understanding of how China itself thinks about the maritime gray zone – both on its own terms as well as how it related to broader Chinese foreign and defense policy – with a detailed use of Chinese sources. What are some of the key takeaways about how China thinks about the maritime gray zone in particular, in terms of how it is defined as well as the objectives and key components of China’s approach? And what would you flag as some of the areas of similarity and difference with respect to how others may think of these challenges and talk about them?

China is much more transparent in Chinese. And, particularly in native-language sources, Chinese policymakers are very clear about the fact that their long-term goal is to exercise “administrative control” over all of the 3 million square kilometers of Chinese-claimed maritime space. This includes all of the Bohai Gulf, large sections of the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, and all of the area within the nine-dash line in the South China Sea. Many Western analysts assume that China has more abstract aims, like discrediting the international legal order. This may happen anyway, as a byproduct of their actions, but the most compelling evidence suggests that Beijing sees strategic, economic, and symbolic value in controlling as much space as possible within the First Island Chain.

Chinese leaders don’t use the term “gray zone” to describe their approach to asserting control over this space. For at least a decade, they have conceived of their policy as a balancing act. On the one hand, they feel the need to defend and advance China’s claims. They call these actions “maritime rights protection.” On the other hand, they want to avoid severely harming their relations with other states. Regional stability, after all, is vital for sustaining China’s economic development — which remains the core of China’s grand strategy. Using paranaval forces like the coast guard and the militia allows them to find an optimal balance between “rights protection” and “stability maintenance.” Paranaval forces are much less provocative than gray-hulled warships. The Chinese coast guard operates on the pretext of routine law enforcement, and militia often pretend to be fishermen. Yet both forces can be used to pursue traditional military objectives of controlling space. … … …

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “The Pentagon Reports: China’s Military Power,” The National Interest, 8 May 2019.

The Department of Defense is out with its latest report detailing the rise of Beijing’s military. Here is what you need to know.

As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Randall G. Schriver emphasized in his rollout remarks on May 2, 2019, “our annual report to Congress, which we refer to as the China Military Power Report… is our authoritative statement on how we view developments in the Chinese military, as well as how that integrates with our overall strategy.”

Weighing in at a hefty 123 pages, this year’s document is nearly an inch thick. In terms of substance, it compares favorably among its seventeen predecessors. Among the report’s greatest strengths: as with previous iterations, it offers new data points and clarifications available nowhere else in authoritative form. This underscores the power of the U.S. government to disclose some of its collected information and accompanying analysis, a power this author and others believe should be used far more frequently. …

Gray Zone

The report pays proper attention to China’s emphasis on “gray zone” activities designed to fall below the threshold of armed conflict. Although the report also documents their use along China’s contested borders with India and Bhutan, such tactics are designed primarily to further disputed sovereignty claims regarding features and waters in the South and East China Seas (“Near Seas”). Here, China’s first sea force (the PLAN) often plays a backstop deterrence role over the horizon, while its second sea force (the China Coast Guard/CCG) and its third sea force (the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia/PAFMM) operate on the front lines. The CCG is “by far the largest coast guard force in the world.” It has “the ability to intimidate local, non-Chinese fishing boats, as occurred in an October 2016 incident near Scarborough Reef. The PAFMM is approximated only by Vietnam’s maritime militia, which is no match for it. On a related note, under the Joint Logistics Support Force, “The PLA is integrating civilian-controlled support equipment, including ships… into military operations and exercises.”

Since it first included coverage of the PAFMM in 2017, the Pentagon’s annual report has authoritatively showcased substantive details concerning this formerly under-considered force. This year, for the first time, the report includes both the CCG and PAFMM in an organizational chart depicting the leadership and chain of command of China’s armed forces. A dedicated section highlights increasing coordination and interoperability among China’s three sea forces, propelled by recent reforms including the CCG’s subordination to the People’s Armed Police (PAP), itself now under the sole command and control of the Central Military Commission. Notably, China’s three sea forces have shown greater interoperability amongst themselves than have the PAP and PLA between themselves.

Taken together, these developments could enhance the ability of China’s second and third sea forces “to provide support to PLA operations under the command of the joint theater commands.” In the South China Sea, the report stresses, “the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting….” It “has played significant roles in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years.” Of particular significance, “a large number of PAFMM vessels train with and assist the PLAN and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistic support, and search and rescue.” Moreover, “In conflict, China may… employ CCG and PAFMM ships to support military operations.” This all makes it crystal clear that Chinese navy interlocutors cannot plausibly profess ignorance of the PAFMM to their foreign counterparts—as they have done repeatedly in official meetings. Based on the report’s nature and content, doing so profoundly insults American intelligence in all senses of the word.

In the South China Sea, “China has built a state-owned fishing fleet for at least part of its maritime militia force….” Hainan’s provincial government “ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage, which the [Sansha City Maritime Militia] received by the end of 2016, along with extensive subsidies to encourage frequent operations in the Spratly Islands.” Comprising China’s most professional PAFMM units, Sansha’s “forces are paid salaries independent of any clear commercial fishing responsibilities and recruited from recently separated veterans.” Meanwhile, China’s development and fortification of outposts on the South China Sea features it occupies allows China to “maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the area.”

In his Q&A with journalists, Schriver explained how the U.S. government’s understanding of China’s three sea forces affects U.S. policy in practice: “We’re less interested in the color of the hull than the activity and the actions.  So what we’re most interested in is China behaving in a manner that’s respectful of international law and norms, and behaving in a manner that is not destabilizing and is more constructive. …if its coast guard and maritime militia or classic gray-hulled navy, if the design is to infringe upon the sovereignty of another country… with the objective of creating some sort of tension that results in a favorable outcome for them…. If they’re engaged in provocation or infringement on another country’s sovereignty, particularly our allies, then we would treat them differently than if they were doing what we would regard as more normal coast guard activities, or we don’t have necessarily the equivalent of a maritime militia, but peaceful activities.”

All these points emerged independently from extensive open-source research on the PAFMM that the author, Conor Kennedy, and colleagues conducted at the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) over the past five years. The Department of Defense has now validated our more specific findings and recommendations explicitly. … … …

***

Pentagon’s 2019 China Military Power Report Offers Strong Content on Maritime Militia

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019(Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2 May 2019).

p. 18

p. 52

INCREASING INTEROPERABILITY WITH PARAMILITARY AND MILITIA

Key Takeaways

  • As of 2018, the CMC assumed direct control of the PAP. As part of this reform, the PAP also assumed control of the China Coast Guard (CCG) from China’s State Oceanic Administration.
  • Paramilitary reforms could improve paramilitary forces’ ability to provide support to PLA operations under the command of the joint theater commands.
  • In 2018, examples of interoperability between the PLA and paramilitary forces included coordination between the PLAN, the CCG, and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).

p. 53

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and vary widely in composition and mission. In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational operations short of war as an effective means of accomplishing political objectives. The militia has played significant roles in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the 2009 harassment of the USNS Impeccable conducting normal operations, the 2012 Scarborough Reef

p. 54

standoff, the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig standoff, and a large incursion in waters near the Senkakus in 2016. A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and assist the PLAN and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistic support, and search and rescueThe government subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia vessels to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities. In the past, the PAFMM rented fishing vessels from companies or individual fishermen, but China has built a state-owned fishing fleet for at least part of its maritime militia force in the South China Sea. The Hainan provincial government, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage, which the militia received by the end of 2016along with extensive subsidies to encourage frequent operations in the Spratly Islands. This particular PAFMM unit is also China’s most professional. Its forces are paid salaries independent of any clear commercial fishing responsibilities and recruited from recently separated veterans.

***

Andrew S. Erickson, “Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM),” Editorial, The Maritime Executive, 30 April 2019.

Fact Sheet: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM)

BY ANDREW S. ERICKSON 2019-04-30

To distill five years of research on China’s maritime militia into actionable policy recommendations, the author offers the following memorandum, which he proposes to be issued with official U.S. government authority.

As the National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017 emphasizes, China is engaged in continuous competition with America—neither fully “at peace” nor “at war.” Per this national guidance, we will raise our competitive game to meet that challenge, in part by addressing the potential risks to U.S. interests and values posed by all three Chinese sea forces: the Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia. In terms of ship numbers, each is the largest of its type in the world.

While virtually unique and publicly obscure, China’s Maritime Militia is known clearly to the U.S. government, which monitors it closely. A component of the People’s Armed Forces, it operates under a direct military chain of command to conduct state-sponsored activities. The PAFMM is locally supported, but answers to the very top of China’s military bureaucracy: Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping himself.

China employs the PAFMM in gray zone operations, or “low-intensity maritime rights protection struggles,” at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved. China has used it to advance its disputed sovereignty claims in international sea incidents throughout the South and East China Seas. This undermines vital American interests in maintaining the regional status quo, including the rules and norms on which peace and prosperity depend.

PAFMM units have participated in manifold maritime incidents in the South and East China Seas. Publicly-documented examples include China’s 1974 seizure of the Western Paracel Islands from Vietnam; 1978 swarming into the Senkaku Islands’ territorial sea; involvement in the occupation and development of Mischief Reef resulting in a 1995 incident with the Philippines; harassment of various Vietnamese government/survey vessels, including the Bin Minh and Viking; harassment of USNS Impeccable (2009) and Howard O. Lorenzen (2014); participation in the 2012 seizure of Scarborough Reef from the Philippines and 2014 blockade of Second Thomas Shoal; 2014 repulsion of Vietnamese vessels from disputed waters surrounding CNOOC’s HYSY-981 oil rig; large surge of ships near the Senkakus in 2016 and layered “cabbage-style” envelopment of the Philippines-claimed Sandy Cay shoal near Thitu Island, where China has sustained a presence of at least two PAFMM vessels since August 2017.

The elite units engaged in these incidents incorporate marine industry workers (e.g., fishermen) directly into China’s armed forces. While retaining day jobs, they are organized and trained in the PAFMM and often by China’s Navy, and activated on demand. Since 2015, starting in Sansha City in the Paracels, China has been developing more professionalized, militarized, well-paid full-time units including military recruits, crewing 84 purpose-built vessels with mast-mounted water cannons for spraying and reinforced steel hulls for ramming. Lacking fishing responsibilities, personnel train for peacetime and wartime contingencies, including with light arms, and deploy regularly to disputed South China Sea features even during fishing moratoriums.

There is no plausible deniability: the PAFMM is a state-organized, -developed, and -controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct Chinese state-sponsored activities. From now on, the United States expects all three Chinese sea forces—including the PAFMM—to abide at all times by the same internationally-recognized standards of law, seamanship, and communications to which U.S. maritime forces adhere; including the International Collision Regulations (COLREGS) and other international regulations governing allowable conduct by ships at sea.

Bottom line: Henceforth, the United States will not tolerate any attempt by the PAFMM to interfere with or compromise the safety, operations, or mission accomplishment of any U.S. government vessel.

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is a professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Since 2014, he and his colleague Conor M. Kennedy have been conducting and publishing in-depth research on the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) and briefing key U.S. and allied decision-makers on the subject. In 2017 Erickson received NWC’s inaugural  Civilian Faculty Research Excellence Award, in part for his pioneering contributions in this area. 

This editorial appears courtesy of Dr. Erickson and may be found in its original form here.

***

Ryan Pickrell, “China’s South China Sea Strategy Takes a Hit as the US Navy Threatens to Get Tough on Beijing’s Sea Forces,” Business Insider, 29 April 2019.

  • The US Navy’s top admiral has warned China that the US will treat China’s coast guard and maritime militia the same as the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the Financial Times
  • “The US Navy will not be coerced,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson told his Chinese counterpart, Vice Adm. Shen Jinlong, in January.
  • The move is a blow to Chinese gray-zone aggression, a tactic China uses to exercise its will in the South China Sea and East China Sea without escalating to armed conflict.

The US Navy has reportedly warned China that it could treat the Chinese coast guard and the paramilitary fishing fleet known as the maritime militia the same as the Chinese navy — as combatants.

Adm. John Richardson, the chief of naval operations, “made it very clear” to his Chinese counterpart in January that “that the US Navy will not be coerced,” the Financial Times reported, citing an interview with the Navy’s top admiral. …

For years, the maritime militia operated under the cloak of plausible deniability.

“Make no mistake,” Andrew Erickson, an expert on the Chinese maritime militia at the Naval War College, told lawmakers in 2016, “These are state-organized, -developed, and -controlled forces operating under a direct military chain of command.”

Erickson has repeatedly urged the US military to call the maritime militia what it is — a paramilitary force, one trained and directed by the Chinese military.

The Department of Defense for the first time dragged this paramilitary force out of the shadows in 2017 in its annual report on Chinese military power. The Pentagon said the maritime militia is used to “enforce maritime claims and advance [China’s] interests in ways that are calculated to fall below the threshold of provoking conflict.”

In the 2018 report, the department said that the maritime militia “plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting.”

Now it appears the US military is taking things a step further. The Department of Defense has not only recognized the existence of these forces, but it is also threatening to treat these forces as combatants should they engage in such behavior. …

***

Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “US Warns China on Aggressive Acts by Fishing Boats and Coast Guard,” Financial Times, 28 April 2019.

Navy chief says Washington will use military rules of engagement to curb provocative behaviour

The US has warned China that it will respond to provocative acts by its coast guard and fishing boats in the same way it reacts to the Chinese navy in an effort to curb Beijing’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. Admiral John Richardson, head of the US navy, said he told his Chinese counterpart, vice-admiral Shen Jinlong, in January that Washington would not treat the coast guard or maritime militia — fishing boats that work with the military — differently from the Chinese navy, because they were being used to advance Beijing’s military ambitions. “I made it very clear that the US navy will not be coerced and will continue to conduct routine and lawful operations around the world, in order to protect the rights, freedoms and lawful uses of sea and airspace guaranteed to all,” Adm Richardson told the Financial Times. …

James Stavridis, a retired US admiral who also served as commander of NATO forces, said Adm Richardson was right to have delivered the tough message to the Chinese. “It is a warning shot across the bow of China, in effect saying we will not tolerate ‘grey zone’ or ‘hybrid’ operations at sea,” said Mr Stavridis. “A combatant is a combatant is the message, and the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) is in the right place to warn China early and often.” …

US Analysts have long pushed for a more effective US response to counter China’s mix of military, paramilitary and economic coercive measures. Andrew Erickson, a maritime militia expert at the US Naval War College, recently called for the US to “deal with China’s sea forces holistically” and state clearly that it expected China’s navy, coast guard and maritime militia to follow international rules. He added that the US had to “accept some friction and force Beijing to choose between de-escalating — the preferred US outcome — or to move up against a US red line that China would prefer to avoid”. … … …

***

Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, eds., China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019; paperback 15 January 2023).

Author of:

Reprinted in traditional Chinese 艾立信 [Andrew S. Erickson], 馬丁松 [Ryan D. Martinson], 編者 [Editors], 中共海上灰色地帶行動 [Communist China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations] (美國海軍學會出版社 [Naval Institute Press], 2019); (中華民國國防部 [Republic of China Ministry of National Defense], 譯印 出版機關 [Translator and Publishing Organization], April 2023).

Reprinted in Japanese as: アンドリュー・S・エリクソン (編集), ライアン・D・マーティンソン (編集), 五味 睦佳 (翻訳), 大野 慶二 (翻訳), 木村 初夫 (翻訳), 五島 浩司 (翻訳), 杉本 正彦 (翻訳), 武居 智久 (翻訳), 山本 勝也 (翻訳[Andrew S. Erickson (Editor), Ryan D. Martinson (Editor), Gumi Mutsuka (Translator), Ohno Keiji (Translator), Kimura Hatsuo (Translator), Goto Koji (Translator), Sugimoto Masahiko (Translator), Tomohisa Takei (translator), and Katsuya Yamamoto (translator)]; 中国の海洋強国戦略:グレーゾーン作戦と展開 (日本語) [China’s Maritime Power Strategy: Strategy and Deployment in Gray Zone (Japanese translation of China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations)] (Tokyo: 原書房 [Hara Shobo Press], 2020).

COVER, CONTENTS & FOREWORD

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ABOUT THE AUTHORS, EDITORS & TRANSLATORS

BILINGUAL GLOSSARY

China’s maritime “gray zone” operations represent a new challenge for the U.S. Navy and the sea services of our allies, partners, and friends in maritime East Asia. There, Beijing is waging operations conducted to alter the status quo without resorting to war, an approach that some Chinese sources term “War without Gun Smoke” (一场没有硝烟的战争). Already winning in important areas, China could gain far more if left unchecked. One of China’s greatest advantages thus far has been foreign difficulty in understanding the situation, let alone determining an effective response. With contributions from some of the world’s leading subject matter experts, this volume aims to close that gap by explaining the forces and doctrines driving China’s paranaval expansion.

The book therefore covers in-depth China’s major maritime forces beyond core gray-hulled Navy units, with particular focus on China’s second and third sea forces: the “white-hulled” Coast Guard and “blue-hulled” Maritime Militia. Increasingly, these paranaval forces are on the frontlines of China’s seaward expansion, operating in the “gray zone” between war and peace: where the greatest action is. Beijing works constantly in peacetime (and possibly in crises short of major combat operations with the United States) to “win without fighting” and thereby to further its unresolved land feature and maritime claims in the Near Seas (Yellow, East, and South China Seas). There is an urgent need for greater understanding of this vital yet under-explored topic: this book points the way.

Volume 7 in Studies in Chinese Maritime Development series

March 2019 | 336 pp. | 6 x 9 | China and the Asia-Pacific

Maps | Hardcover

ASIN: 1591146933

ISBN-13: 978-1591146933

BOOK DESCRIPTION

As Washington’s new National Security Strategy emphasizes, China is engaged in continuous competition with the United States–neither fully “at peace” nor “at war.” Per this national guidance, the U.S. Navy must raise its competitive game to meet that challenge, in part by addressing the potential risks to American interests and values posed by all three Chinese sea forces: the Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia. In terms of ship numbers, each is the largest of its type in the world.

China’s maritime “gray zone” operations represent a new challenge for the U.S. Navy and the sea services of our allies, partners, and friends in maritime East Asia. There, Beijing is waging what some Chinese sources term a “war without gunsmoke.” One of China’s greatest advantages thus far is the difficulty for foreign powers to understand the situation, let alone determine an effective response. With contributions from some of the world’s leading subject matter experts, this volume aims to close that gap by explaining the forces and doctrines driving China’s paranaval expansion.

This book covers China’s major maritime forces beyond core gray-hulled Navy units, with particular focus on China’s second and third sea forces: the “white-hulled” Coast Guard and “blue-hulled” Maritime Militia. Increasingly, these paranaval forces are on the frontlines of China’s seaward expansion, operating in the “gray zone” between war and peace.

Chinese behavior at sea harms U.S. interests both directly and indirectly. As a seafaring state, America demands maximal access to the world’s oceans within the constraints of international law. Actions that impede that access violate America’s maritime freedom. China harms U.S. interests indirectly when it violates the legitimate maritime freedom and maritime rights of its allies and partners. Such acts devalue Washington’s commitments to its friends and shake the foundations of our alliance system–the true source of America’s global influence. Moreover, China’s efforts to curtail and infringe upon both the maritime freedom of all nations including the United States and the maritime rights of its neighbors undermines the rules-based international order. This volume concludes by examining America’s response to Beiing’s gray zone coercion and suggests what U.S. policymakers can do to counter it.

BLURBS

“How can the lightly armed white-hulled and blue-hulled ships of China’s coast guard and maritime militia defeat the heavily armed gray-hulled navies of the U.S. and its allies? Nowhere is this urgent question explored more exhaustively than in this incisive book. It should serve as a wake-up call for the American military.”

—J. William Middendorf, former Secretary of the Navy

“Many fret and opine about China’s gray zone behavior and strategy, yet few know and understand what is at play and in play in that space between peace and war. China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations is a timely and extraordinarily valuable resource for both new and experienced operators and policymakers who will navigate the gray zone challenge in the years ahead.”

—Admiral Gary Roughead, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Hoover Institution Fellow and former Chief of Naval Operations

“Who needs the CIA? Maritime competition represents the front lines in the struggle for influence between China and the United States. Gray hulls are not the only way Beijing tries to shift the balance. China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations provides as comprehensive an assessment of the challenge as one might expect from Langley.”

—James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., The Heritage Foundation

“Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson have established themselves as two of America’s most knowledgeable analysts of the PLA Navy and China’s naval strategy. Their new work on China’s maritime gray zone operations deepens our understanding of Chinese maritime operations that are neither peace nor war but that could have a profound impact on the western Pacific, Japan, and the role of the U.S. in Asia.”

—Stephen P. Rosen, Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs, Harvard University  

“An informative and striking book, which provides many eye-opening thoughts on China’s crafty and worrisome ‘gray zone’ strategy. A great focus is placed on practical countermeasures…. A good guideline for the planning and operations of frontline sailors.”

—Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) (Ret.) and former Commander-in-Chief, JMSDF Fleet

“This is an excellent account of how China is using its navy, coast guard, and maritime militia to expand its control and use of adjoining sea areas and exclude others from their use of sea areas legally recognized.”

—Andrew W. Marshall, retired, former Director of Net Assessment, Department of Defense

REVIEWS

“the book provides a cornerstone of what is happening now in addition to where things are likely headed. …certain to enlighten you.”

Virtual Mirage, 6 April 2019.

“… a first rate piece of work. …the discussions of the book could be seen as a historic look at a phase of Chinese maritime power and the evolving approach to strategic engagement in the region and beyond. … I would highly recommend reading this important book and thinking through what it teaches us, or challenges us to think about in terms of the much broader spectrum of crisis management we are facing.” 

—Robbin Laird, Defense Info, 26 March 2019.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Andrew S. Erickson is professor of strategy in the Naval War College (NWC)’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) and an associate in research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center. The recipient of NWC’s inaugural Research Excellence Award, he runs the China studies websitewww.andrewerickson.com.

Ryan D. Martinson is an assistant professor at CMSI. He holds a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a bachelor’s of science from Union College. Martinson has also studied at Fudan University, the Beijing Language and Culture University, and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Morgan Clemens is a Research Analyst at SOS International LLC.

Peter A. Dutton, a retired U.S. Navy Commander and judge advocate, is Professor and Director at CMSI.

Matthew Funaiole is a fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Bonnie S. Glaser is senior adviser for Asia and director of CSIS’s China Power Project.

Joshua Hickey is a senior analyst for the Department of the Navy with over fifteen years’ subject matter experience.

Henry Holst is a junior analyst for the Department of the Navy.

Conor M. Kennedy is a research associate at CMSI.

Adam P. Liff is an assistant professor at Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies and an associate in research at Harvard’s Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies.

Michael Mazarr is a senior political scientist and associate director of the strategy and doctrine program at the RAND Corporation’s Arroyo Center.

Barney Moreland, a retired Captain who served as the first U.S. Coast Guard Liaison Officer in Beijing, is the Senior Intelligence Analyst at U.S. Pacific Fleet Headquarters.

Lyle J. Morris is a senior policy analyst at RAND.

Cdr. Jonathan G. Odom, USN, is a judge advocate and military professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

Michael B. Petersen is the founding director Russia Maritime Studies Institute and an associate professor in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at NWC.

Capt. Dale C. Rielage, USN, is Director for Intelligence and Information Operations, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Mark A. Stokes, a retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, is Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute.

Austin M. Strange is a Ph.D. candidate in Harvard University’s Government Department.

Admiral Tomohisa Takei, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) (Ret.) concluded his thirty-seven-year naval career as the JMSDF’s 32nd Chief of Staff, and is now a professor and distinguished international fellow at NWC.

Michael Weber a foreign affairs analyst and Presidential Management Fellow at the Congressional Research Service.

Capt. Katsuya Yamamoto, JMSDF, who served as a Defense/Naval Attaché in Beijing, is a liaison officer and international military professor at NWC.

Previous Titles in the Series

China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force

China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies

China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective

China, the United States and 21st-Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership

Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles

Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain Course

SAMPLE CHAPTER

Conor M. Kennedy, “Gray Forces in Blue Territory: The Grammar of Chinese Maritime Militia Gray Zone Operations,” in Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, eds., China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019), 168–85.

As China’s third sea force, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a key instrument Chinese leaders use to defend and advance the country’s maritime claims. Evolving from a tool of necessity when the Chinese navy was weak to a tool of choice for China’s more recent assertive posture, the maritime militia has been involved in multiple incidents at sea. However, to date there has been no systematic effort to define the range of dispute-related operations it performs.

This chapter attempts to fill that gap. Part one of the chapter outlines the considerations guiding Beijing’s use of militia in its dispute strategy. China could simply rely on its powerful navy and coast guard to pursue its claims. For political and operational reasons, however, the militia has important roles to play. Part two examines the specific types of gray zone operations the militia conducts. These include presence; harassment and sabotage; escort; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. It discusses the functions and tactics that characterize each type of operation and highlights known cases in which these operations have been performed.

Gray Zone Advantages

In peacetime, the maritime militia serves Chinese dispute strategy. China is a party to three broad categories of disputes: over territorial features, over the shape and extent of zones of jurisdiction, and over coastal state authorities to regulate foreign activities—above all, military activities—in its jurisdictional waters. The first two categories involve China’s neighbors: Japan and Taiwan in the East China Sea, and the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Indonesia in the South China Sea. The third category primarily involves the United States. The PAFMM plays important roles in defending and advancing China’s position in all three types of disputes. Their actions are often framed as efforts to “safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests.”

The vast majority of China’s maritime militiamen are part-time personnel: commercial mariners, often fishermen, who can be mobilized as paramilitary personnel to serve the state functions for which they train and are compensated. Despite serving under the command authority of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and sometimes also the China Coast Guard (CCG), the PAFMM is generally unarmed when conducting peacetime rights protection operations, and its members frequently operate in civilian guise. This dual identity—as civilians in day jobs and as soldiers when activated for national tasking—makes them uniquely suited to serve key functions in China’s dispute strategy. Beginning in Sansha City in 2015, an even more professional, militarized full-time maritime militia contingent has emerged with easily identified vessels optimized for nonlethal coercion.

Use of militia forces is guided both by political and operational considerations. Politically, militia forces can vigorously pursue China’s claims without opening the country to criticism for gunboat diplomacy or justifying foreign escalation (or intervention). When not in uniform, their activities can be framed as private actions. This perceived deniability, however implausible, makes them ideal instruments for pursuing national aims in the gray zone between war and peace. Senior Colonel Chen Qingsong, the head of the Zhanjiang City Xiashan District’s People’s Armed Forces Department (PAFD), describes the role of the PAFMM as a means of preventing war: “In peace [the maritime militia] not only play a role in declaring sovereignty, fighting harassment by foreign enemies, and rights protection security; they also serve as a buffer for war (战争缓冲器) to create a peaceful, ordered, and stable maritime security environment. [They are] an effective means for ensuring implementation of the national strategy of strategically managing the ocean.”

While in many ways inferior to China’s other two sea services (the navy and coast guard), the maritime militia also offers unique operational capabilities. Militia forces tend to operate smaller and more maneuverable vessels, which are better equipped for plying shallow waters and engaging small foreign vessels. Moreover, with their blue hulls far more numerous than China’s gray- and white-hulled assets, militia forces can cover much broader swaths of ocean, enhancing presence and bolstering maritime domain awareness. … … …

Reprinted in traditional Chinese as 康納爾 · 甘迺迪 [Conor Kennedy], “藍色領土中的灰色部隊: 中共海上民兵灰色地帶行動藍本 [Gray Forces in Blue Territory: The Grammar of Chinese Maritime Militia Gray Zone Operations,], in 艾立信 [Andrew S. Erickson], 馬丁松 [Ryan D. Martinson], 編者 [Editors], 中共海上灰色地帶行動 [Communist China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations] (美國海軍學會出版社 [Naval Institute Press], 2019); (中華民國國防部 [Republic of China Ministry of National Defense], 譯印 出版機關 [Translator and Publishing Organization], April 2023), 207–25.

RELATED READING

INTERVIEW

Dmitry Filipoff, “Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson Discuss China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 11 March 2019.

On March 15th, the Naval Institute Press will publish China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, a volume edited by professors Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson from the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. CIMSEC recently reached out to Erickson and Martinson about their latest work.

Q: What was the genesis of your book?

Erickson: In the last decade or so, China has dramatically expanded its control and influence over strategically important parts of maritime East Asia. It has done so despite opposition from regional states, including the United States, and without firing a shot. Others have examined this topic, but we found that much of the public analysis and discussion was not grounded in solid mastery of the available Chinese sources—even though China tends to be much more transparent in Chinese. We also recognized a general lack of understanding about the two organizations on the front lines of Beijing’s seaward expansion: the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). This volume grew out of a conference we held in Newport in May 2017 to address some of these issues. It contains contributions from world-leading subject matter experts, with a wide range of commercial, technical, government, and scholarly experience and expertise. We’re honored to receive endorsements from top leaders in sea power, strategy, and policy: former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead, former Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf, Harvard Professor Stephen Rosen, former Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Fleet Commander-in-Chief Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Dr. James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation, and former Pentagon Director of Net Assessment Andrew Marshall.

Q: The title of your book is China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations. How does the term “gray zone” apply here?

Martinson: We usually prefer to use Chinese concepts when talking about Chinese behavior, and Chinese strategist do not generally use the term “gray zone.” But we think that the concept nicely captures the essence of the Chinese approach. We were inspired by the important work done by RAND analyst Michael Mazarr, who contributed a chapter to the volume. In his view, gray zone strategies have three primary characteristics. They seek to alter the status quo. They do so gradually. And they employ “unconventional” elements of state power. Today, a large proportion of Chinese-claimed maritime space is controlled or contested by other countries. This is the status quo that Beijing seeks to alter. Its campaign to assert control over these areas has progressed over a number of years. Clearly, then, Chinese leaders are in no rush to achieve their objectives. And while China’s Navy plays a very important role in this strategy, it is not the chief protagonist.

Q: Who, then, are the chief actors?

Martinson: The CCG and the PAFMM perform the vast majority of Chinese maritime gray zone operations. Chinese strategists and spokespeople frame their actions as righteous efforts to protect China’s “maritime rights and interests.” The CCG uses law enforcement as a pretext for activities to assert Beijing’s prerogatives in disputed maritime space. PAFMM personnel are often disguised as civilian mariners, especially fishermen. Most do fish, at least some of the time. But they can be activated to conduct rights protection operations. And a new elite subcomponent is paid handsomely to